Contents

• Overview and Outlook
• U.S.-Israel Military Cooperation and Congressional Debate
• Confronting Iran and Its Allies After October 2023
• Regional Security Implications: Iran and Its Allies, Abraham Accords, and Turkey
• International Views on Israel and Palestinian Statehood
• Israeli 2026 Elections and Domestic Politics
• Key Strategic Areas for U.S.-Israel Relations
• Iran
• Lebanon
• Gaza
• West Bank
• Syria
• Yemen
• Issues for Congress
• Recent U.S. Aid and Arms Sales to Israel
• Role of Congress and Key Questions

Summary

The United States and Israel have cooperated closely for decades, reflecting assessments across several Administrations and Congresses that the countries share a number of strategic interests, including in countering mutual threats from other regional states and militant groups. Large-scale U.S. assistance, as approved by Congress (generally more than $3.8 billion annually), has helped Israel develop conventional military capabilities and industrial capacities that have bolstered its advantages against Middle Eastern adversaries such as Iran and groups that Iran supports.

The October 7, 2023 attacks against Israel, led by the Iran-backed Palestinian militant group Hamas, triggered massive Israeli counter assaults into Gaza and a two-year war. With Israel's leaders identifying threats from various Iran-supported adversaries to Israel's territory and population, they have subsequently sought to (1) degrade threats near Israel's borders; (2) create buffer zones beyond those borders in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and Syria; and (3) conduct direct, assertive military operations against Iran in close coordination with the United States. Israel has scored major operational successes against Iran and its "axis of resistance," while suffering some casualties and damage from counterattacks, and facing some strain on its fighting capacity, material resources, and popular morale.

Amid ongoing debate in the United States over the impact of Israel's approach on U.S. interests, some Members of Congress have increased scrutiny of U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel. In 2025, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress of possible arms sales for Israel worth more than $12 billion, and to date in 2026 has reportedly notified Congress of additional potential sales of more than $7 billion. Senator Bernie Sanders has introduced joint resolutions of disapproval against multiple sales, with none succeeding to date, but one in 2026 garnering support from 40 Senators. U.S. and Israeli officials may be discussing potential shifts after FY2028 away from direct U.S. military aid to Israel and more toward joint programs.

Since February 2026, U.S./Israel-Iran conflict has significantly affected regional security and global commerce, and may reshape future relationships between Israel and other U.S. partners in the Middle East. Prior to the October 2023 attacks, the Abraham Accords and subsequent diplomacy had brought Israel and various Arab countries (including Saudi Arabia) closer together on aspects of security, political, and economic relations. Since then, several of these countries and other key regional actors (including Turkey) have denounced Israeli actions in Gaza and elsewhere, asserting that these actions have caused suffering among civilian populations and violated other countries' sovereignty, and criticizing Israeli policy opposing Palestinian statehood. Israel has reportedly deepened some cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, and it is unclear to what extent Arab Gulf states have practical alternatives to some form of ongoing security coordination involving Israel.

Iran. Early in the 2026 conflict with Iran, President Donald Trump appeared to favor objectives beyond countering Iran's nuclear program—including destroying its missile arsenal and its ability to support regional militants, and helping bring about regime change—that Israel strongly supports and has pursued. In mid-June 2026, the United States and Iran agreed to end "military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon," "respect each other's sovereignty," and negotiate for 60 days on Iran's nuclear program and other issues. Neither Iran's missiles nor its backing for regional allies was mentioned in the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU). Ongoing talks, which do not directly include Israel, may expose some divergences between U.S. and Israeli objectives.

Lebanon. Shortly after the Iran conflict began, Iran-backed Lebanese Hezbollah started firing projectiles into northern Israel, prompting large-scale Israeli military operations in Lebanon that displaced around 20% of Lebanon's population. Israel has apparently sought to maintain a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to reduce Hezbollah threats to Israel, and to pressure Lebanon's government and military to marginalize Hezbollah. The U.S.-Iran MOU calls for an end to conflict in Lebanon, and a late June U.S.-Israel-Lebanon agreement calls for phased Israeli withdrawals from where Hezbollah has been disarmed.

Gaza. In October 2025, an Israel-Hamas ceasefire brokered with U.S. help took effect in Gaza, connected to a broader U.S. 20-point plan proposing a security and governance transition. The current de facto division between areas where Israeli troops are deployed and those generally subject to Hamas control could last indefinitely if the parties cannot agree on or compel Gaza-wide solutions, such as Hamas's disarmament. Gazans still face mass displacement and humanitarian problems.

West Bank. Various Israeli actions (including settlement expansion and a rising tide of settler violence) and Palestinian militancy (partly backed by Iran) continue to fuel tensions and violence in the West Bank. The current Israeli government has accelerated settlement planning and construction, as well as steps to further legitimize Israeli civilian control at the expense of the Palestinian Authority. In September 2025, President Trump declared that he would not allow Israel to unilaterally annex the West Bank, later threatening to withhold U.S. support to Israel if it were to do so.

Israeli elections. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his domestic challengers are preparing for elections scheduled to take place by October 2026, the outcome of which could affect Israeli policies on various issues (including those mentioned above), and on relations with the United States.

Overview and Outlook

U.S.-Israel Military Cooperation and Congressional Debate

The United States and Israel (see Appendix A for a map of and basic facts about Israel) have cooperated closely for decades, reflecting assessments across several presidential Administrations and Congresses that the countries share a number of strategic interests, including countering threats from other regional states and militant groups.¹ Large-scale U.S. military assistance and other legislative action since the 1970s have helped Israel develop conventional military capabilities—including with advanced fighter aircraft, munitions, and missile defense systems—and industrial capacities that have bolstered its advantages against Middle Eastern adversaries such as Iran and groups that Iran supports.²

Bilateral agreements and legislation have formalized various aspects of U.S. defense cooperation with Israel. A 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in 2016 commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental missile defense funding in exceptional situations such as conflict.³

Since the mid-2010s, debate within Congress has intensified regarding various aspects of U.S.-Israel military cooperation. Some Members have cited provisions of U.S. and international law in efforts to halt or delay certain arms sales to Israel, or have supported conditioning or reducing U.S. aid to Israel⁴—largely in connection with their criticism of Israeli policies regarding Palestinians in the West Bank⁵ and Gaza Strip. Other lawmakers have defended Israel's actions and advocated for continued or expanded U.S. military support.⁶

Confronting Iran and Its Allies After October 2023

The October 7, 2023, attacks against Israel, led by the Iran-backed Palestinian militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO) apparently caught Israeli leaders by surprise. Israel's counterattack in Gaza and subsequent actions in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran marked a series of military operations and statements reflecting Israeli leaders' apparent determination to eliminate threats or potential threats from various Iran-supported adversaries to their territory and population by

• degrading threats near Israel's borders, including by targeting Israel's adversaries' leaders and infrastructure in those areas;
• deploying the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at forward positions to maintain buffer zones beyond those borders in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria; and
• conducting direct, assertive military operations against Iran in close coordination with the United States.

During the two decades prior to 2023, Israel had generally sought to deter and contain external threats without sustained commitments of the Israel Defense Forces outside Israel. This period was marked by IDF withdrawals from Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and numerous limited or covert military actions against Iran and its allies.⁷

Since October 2023, polls indicate that Israeli decisions to initiate military action against Iran and its key allies Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah (another FTO) have received majority support among Israel's population.⁸ Before the resolution of Gaza's hostage situation in late 2025, Israeli public opinion had been divided over whether the two-year war in Gaza was increasing or decreasing prospects for a safe return of Israeli hostages.⁹ Since then, some Israeli domestic public debate regarding the costs of expanded, multi-front military action has focused on the toll it takes on Israel's fighting capacity, economy, and popular morale,¹⁰ while also exacerbating a preexisting political dispute over the extent to which religious exemptions to Israel's military draft should continue.¹¹ An April 2026 poll reportedly indicated that 57% of Israelis polled thought Israel had not achieved victory on any front since October 2023.¹² Nevertheless, another survey signals that majority opinion in Israel apparently supports the continued maintenance of buffer zones beyond Israel's borders.¹³

In March 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel's "security concept" now features IDF control over "zones deep within enemy territory" in eastern Gaza, southern Lebanon, and southern Syria.¹⁴ After Hamas and other Palestinian militants killed more than 1,200 people and took 251 hostages on October 7, 2023, Israeli forces have reportedly killed over 73,000 Palestinians (comprising both militants and civilians) in Gaza.¹⁵ Most of Gaza's 2.1 million people have been displaced multiple times, with many facing acute problems relating to hunger, disease, and overcrowding.¹⁶ Additionally, more than one million residents in Lebanon have been internally displaced by conflict in 2026, and some towns in southern Lebanon have reportedly been largely destroyed.¹⁷ Since 2025, the IDF has also increased its presence in the West Bank amid ongoing controversies over the entrenchment and expansion of Israeli settlements, the viability of limited self-rule by the Palestinian Authority (PA), and violence involving Israeli settlers, Palestinian militants (including some backed by Iran), and Israeli and PA security forces.

Regional Security Implications: Iran and Its Allies, Abraham Accords, and Turkey

Since October 2023, Israel has scored major operational successes against the arsenals, leadership cadres, and battle readiness of Iran and its "axis of resistance." The December 2024 fall of former Syrian president Bashar al Asad (alt. Assad), an Iran ally, also greatly reduced Iran's ability to use Syria as a transport hub and host country for weapons and forces.¹⁸ Shortly after Asad's ouster, Israel launched ground and air operations in Syria to capture some territory in southern Syria and destroy Syrian military assets.¹⁹ One objective of Israeli attacks on Iran in early 2026—carried out jointly with U.S. forces—was apparently to so weaken Iran's Islamic Republic that it would no longer be able to marshal a credible threat to Israel, or provide continuing material support to its regional allies.²⁰ Other Israeli aims, including regime change in Iran, have not been achieved.²¹ An Israeli journalist has written, "In relative terms, Israel has beaten its enemies on every front. Unfortunately, the Jewish state has failed to secure long-term diplomatic results that would allow it to switch from constant fighting to only partial fighting."²²

Since 2023, Israeli military achievements appear to have altered the regional balance of power.²³ Analysts inside and outside Israel have debated whether and how these tactical advances might affect longer term security scenarios.²⁴ Factors may include whether Israel will (1) continue to act militarily against Iran-linked actors with the assertiveness it has demonstrated since October 2023, and/or (2) resume some aspects of the deterrence-based approach it employed before then, perhaps partly owing to apparent limits on Israeli military reserve capacity and material resources.

Abraham Accords and Arab states. Israel's relations with other U.S. regional partners could be one factor that affects Israel's future defense posture. Before the October 2023 attacks, the Abraham Accords and subsequent diplomacy had brought Israel and various Arab countries (including Saudi Arabia) closer together on various aspects of security, political, and economic relations.²⁸ Since then, multiple Muslim-majority countries have denounced Israeli military actions in Gaza, Lebanon, and elsewhere, asserting that these actions have caused suffering among civilian populations and violated other countries' sovereignty, as well as criticizing Israeli actions and statements that oppose Palestinian statehood.²⁹ At least some Arab Gulf states may harbor latent concerns that greater Israeli power projection could undermine rather than buttress regional stability.³⁰ A September 2025 Israeli strike in Qatar targeting Hamas leaders apparently was a factor that influenced the United States to work with Israel, Qatar, other key Arab states, Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan on diplomacy aimed at halting Israel-Hamas fighting in Gaza.³¹

The 2026 conflict in Iran, with its many implications for regional security and global commerce, could reshape relations between Israel and other U.S. partners in the Middle East—perhaps partly depending on Israel's willingness to integrate these U.S. partners' security concerns into its decision-making. Some analysts observed during the conflict that Israeli actions appeared less constrained than those of the United States and its Arab Gulf partners by the potential for retaliatory attacks on Gulf infrastructure, Iranian internal instability, and disruptions to the energy trade.³² Arab Gulf states may also have few near-term alternatives to coordinating defensive action with the United States and Israel, possibly providing Israel with some leverage to seek closer political and economic ties.

After President Trump called on several Muslim-majority countries to join the Abraham Accords in connection with May 2026 U.S.-Iran diplomacy, none indicated an immediate willingness to do so.³³ Future Israeli discussions with these states on normalization or deeper relations may face uncertain prospects amid greater regional uncertainty. Statements from officials in Saudi Arabia have linked potential Saudi normalization with Israel to progress toward Palestinian statehood, which the current Israeli government has strongly opposed.³⁴ One Israeli analyst has said that Muslim-majority states are unlikely to consider moves toward the Abraham Accords "before the elections in Israel and before seeing what the deal with Iran yields."³⁵ The United Arab Emirates (UAE), which helped initiate the Abraham Accords by normalizing its relations with Israel in 2020, has signaled an intention to deepen cooperation with Israel as part of an apparent strategy to act independently from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.³⁶ Reports indicate that during the Iran conflict, Israel sent various air defense weapons to the UAE, including an Iron Dome air defense battery and an Iron Beam laser system.³⁷

Turkey (Türkiye). Longtime disputes between Israel and Turkey (a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) over Palestinian issues appear to have the potential to grow into a larger regional rivalry. The war in Gaza exacerbated these bilateral differences over the impact of Israel's actions on Gaza's population and Turkey's continued support for Hamas.³⁸ Since Sunni Islamist figures came to power in Syria in 2024, Israel has sought to counter Turkey's growing influence with Syria's government and a continued Turkish military presence in northern Syria, with some Israeli military operations reportedly undertaken to prevent Turkey's transfer of major weapons systems to Syrian bases.³⁹ Israeli concerns about Turkey's influence in Syria may also partly account for Israeli actions to take control of southern Syrian border areas and directly or indirectly support Syrian Druze and Kurdish minorities.

Israel-Turkey tensions, while generating heated rhetoric, may remain controllable in the near term because of some presumed shared interests. Both countries could stand to gain from a weakened Iran, and Turkey has reportedly continued to allow oil from Azerbaijan—estimated to comprise nearly half of Israel's oil imports—to be shipped from a Turkish seaport, despite a formal Turkish suspension on goods trade with Israel due to the Gaza war.⁴⁰ One analyst has written that a decisive question for U.S. interests in the region will be whether Israel and Turkey—as two key military powers in the region potentially benefitting from an Iranian decline—might be able to "overcome their mutual suspicion" and "work out ways to coexist in the new Middle East that will emerge when the smoke has cleared."⁴¹

The Trump Administration's November 2025 National Security Strategy includes the following passage:

The key to successful relations with the Middle East is accepting the region, its leaders, and its nations as they are while working together on areas of common interest.

America will always have core interests in ensuring that Gulf energy supplies do not fall into the hands of an outright enemy, that the Strait of Hormuz remain open, that the Red Sea remain navigable, that the region not be an incubator or exporter of terror against American interests or the American homeland, and that Israel remain secure. We can and must address this threat ideologically and militarily without decades of fruitless "nation-building" wars. We also have a clear interest in expanding the Abraham Accords to more nations in the region and to other countries in the Muslim world.⁴²

International Views on Israel and Palestinian Statehood

Israel's military approach in the region since October 2023, particularly in Gaza, has further polarized international views on Israeli regional policy. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found in January 2024 that it has jurisdiction over allegations by South Africa (later joined by some other countries) that Israel may have committed acts of genocide against Palestinians in Gaza; and at this time and during continuing deliberations the ICJ has ordered Israel to take or refrain from certain actions to prevent conditions that could harm Gaza's population.⁴³ A number of countries have expressed varying perspectives on the ICJ case via formal filings with the ICJ. Declarations to the ICJ that may be favorable to Israel tend to focus on context and legal standards that could frame Israeli actions contributing to civilian casualties and suffering as responsive to threats or potential threats, while appearing to acknowledge difficulties in avoiding non-combatant hardship in complex, crowded environments.⁴⁴ Declarations to the ICJ that may be critical of Israel generally allude to context and legal standards that could frame Israeli action as possibly disproportionate or intentionally punitive.⁴⁵

Also in 2024, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for alleged crimes against humanity and alleged war crimes for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant,⁴⁶ triggering strong denunciations from U.S. and Israeli leaders who insisted that the ICC has no jurisdiction in the matter (Israel and the United States are not members of the ICC).⁴⁷ Simultaneously, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for alleged crimes against humanity and alleged war crimes against Hamas leader Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri (aka Mohammed Deif).⁴⁸ The Trump Administration imposed sanctions on various ICC officials in 2025,⁴⁹ in one statement saying its sanctions effort "aims to impose tangible and significant consequences on those directly engaged in the ICC's transgressions against the United States and Israel.⁵⁰

Israeli 2026 Elections and Domestic Politics

Prime Minister Netanyahu (b. 1949) and his Likud party have led Israel almost continually since 2009, other than a brief period from 2021 to 2022 when Netanyahu was displaced by an opposition coalition led by Naftali Bennett (a right-of-center political figure and erstwhile Netanyahu ally) and Yair Lapid (a centrist figure and the current opposition leader).⁶³ Bennett, Lapid, and other leaders—including popular retired general Gadi Eisenkot—are set to challenge Netanyahu in elections to Israel's Knesset (parliament) that are scheduled to take place no later than October 2026 (see profiles of main Israeli political parties and their leaders in Appendix B). Netanyahu or the Knesset could call for elections to take place as early as September. In April 2026, Bennett and Lapid announced that they would contest this year's elections together in a new party known as Beyachad (Together). As of June, polls signal that Eisenkot's Yashar (Upright) party could eclipse Beyachad as the top challenger to Netanyahu and Likud.⁶⁴ Opposition to Netanyahu from figures who share some of Netanyahu's right-of-center political views increased after various corruption allegations emerged against Netanyahu in the late 2010s—he was indicted in 2019 for fraud, breach of trust, and accepting a bribe, and his criminal trial remains ongoing.⁶⁵

Netanyahu's current government (see Table 1), which took office in late 2022, features two ultra-nationalist figures who openly support Israeli annexation of at least some West Bank areas: Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir. Some observers have argued that Smotrich's and Ben Gvir's views are influential on Palestinian issues because Netanyahu may depend on their support to preserve his coalition.⁶⁶ Smotrich has a second position within the defense ministry that has allowed him to quicken the pace of Israeli settlement planning and construction in the West Bank, and he has taken corresponding actions aimed at further legitimizing Israeli civilian control in the West Bank at the expense of the Palestinian Authority.⁶⁷ Ben Gvir has used his control over Israel's police and other internal security to make appointments to key positions that seemingly diminish checks on extremist settlers in the West Bank, and increasingly permit Jewish prayer at Jerusalem's Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif—despite Israel's formal commitment to a "status quo" dating to at least the 19^th century intended to prevent non-Muslim worship there.⁶⁸

Based on polling to date, it is unclear whether parties supporting Netanyahu or those opposing him may be likely to garner the necessary Knesset majority to form a government.⁶⁹ The Bennett-Lapid coalition of 2021-2022 relied on support from the United Arab List (alt. Ra'am). Bennett and Lapid have signaled that they may not be willing to reprise such a partnership after the next election,⁷⁰ though any such inclination may be less relevant if Eisenkot outperforms them.

If neither Netanyahu nor parties currently opposing him can form a new government after an election, the following are two possibilities for government formation:

Broader coalition featuring Netanyahu's Likud and one or more of the opposition parties, some of which (as mentioned above) share right-of-center positions with Likud but have opposed Netanyahu probably at least partly due to the criminal charges against him; or

Caretaker government led by Netanyahu while the country would likely prepare for another round of elections in early 2027. Netanyahu previously led successive caretaker governments for over a year (during 2019-2020), in connection with stalemates on forming a coalition after elections in April and September 2019.

In November 2025, Prime Minister Netanyahu applied to Israeli President Isaac Herzog for a pardon from his criminal case. During Israel's history, presidential pardons have generally occurred after trial convictions, though Israel's supreme court permitted a case of pre-trial pardons in the 1980s as an exceptional situation.⁷¹ President Donald Trump has repeatedly advocated for Netanyahu's pardon, arguing that the trial—which could continue into 2027 or beyond (before any possible appeals)—distracts Netanyahu and Israel from focusing on critical matters for Israel's national security and cooperation with the United States.⁷² According to some reports, Israeli President Herzog may seek first to help mediate a plea deal before considering a pardon.⁷³

Polls indicate high levels of Jewish Israeli public support for decisions to pursue military action—most recently in Iran and Lebanon.⁷⁴ A subsequent survey in May 2026 showed a decline in "satisfaction with the military achievements in Iran," and 49% of Israelis polled agreed that Israel "will not win or has already lost" the campaign against Iran, while 41% "believe that Israel has [won] or will win in Iran."⁷⁵ One poll taken after the mid-June U.S.-Iran MOU found that more than 80% of Israelis polled believe the conflict weakened Israel's long-term security, and more than 56% rate Prime Minister Netanyahu's management of the conflict as "failed" or "poor."⁷⁶ Candidates opposing Netanyahu have criticized aspects of his post-October 2023 military approach to the region and argued that Netanyahu and other government leaders have fallen short in achieving promised objectives.⁷⁷ Additionally, the following issues continue to generate domestic debate in Israel as scheduled elections draw near.

Ultra-orthodox (Haredi) conscription. For several years, Israeli lawmakers have vigorously disputed whether to conscript young Haredi men. Under a longtime informal government arrangement, these men had generally been exempted from the military service required of most other young Jewish Israelis, on the basis of their involvement in religious studies. Pursuant to a 2024 Israeli supreme court ruling that invalidated the general exemption, the government has issued draft notices to thousands of young Haredi men—who are growing fast as a percentage of the country's population.⁷⁸ Reports suggest that around 5% of Haredim have complied with the draft, and the current government has generally refrained from enforcing it.⁷⁹ In April 2026, the supreme court ordered the state to take concrete steps to revoke financial benefits from those evading conscription.⁸⁰ The government, which has relied on support from the Knesset's two Haredi parties, sought during the current Knesset session to advance a bill with an exemption that appeared to be calibrated to satisfy these parties. Some opponents of the bill, including a number of Knesset members from Prime Minister Netanyahu's Likud party, argued that the exemption would be too broad, given the burdens of military service borne by other sectors of the country's population over the past three years.⁸¹ A February 2026 poll indicated that 32% of Israelis supported the bill and 54% opposed it.⁸²

With prospects for that bill uncertain, the government is seeking to enact another bill as a Basic Law that would designate Jewish religious study (specifically, Torah study) as a "significant service" to the state, and possibly have legal and financial implications for Haredi conscription requirements or exemptions.⁸³ Key figures opposing Prime Minister Netanyahu have denounced the bill, and Israeli Knesset legal advisers and the attorney general's office have argued it raises "fundamental constitutional questions."⁸⁴

Domestic inquiry into October 7 attacks. To date, Netanyahu's government has resisted the establishment of a state commission of inquiry into the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks. Past commissions, each appointed by the supreme court president, looked into aspects of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the 1982 Lebanon war. To review elements of the 2006 Lebanon war, the then-serving government appointed a committee that was approved by Israel's attorney general.⁸⁵ Netanyahu announced in November 2025 that his government would appoint the members of an October 7 inquiry panel. Israel's attorney general has filed a petition opposing this action with the supreme court, arguing that a state commission of inquiry is "the only investigative framework capable of examining the full scope of political, military, and intelligence failures" that may have occurred.⁸⁶ A January 2026 poll indicated that 55% of Israelis supported a state commission of inquiry headed by a judge, and 22% supported a government-appointed committee.⁸⁷

Proposed judicial system changes. The government proposed a number of major changes to the judicial system in 2023, including making judicial appointments more directly subject to the government's control, and giving the Knesset power to override decisions from Israel's supreme court. These proposals triggered considerable domestic controversy—including public protests and counterprotests—over the extent to which an elected government and simple Knesset majority should be able to institute such changes without broader institutional support.⁸⁸ In 2024, the supreme court invalidated a law that the Knesset had enacted to limit judges' ability to overturn government actions.⁸⁹ In 2025, the Knesset amended the law on judicial appointments (with the change to take effect in the next Knesset) to replace bar association members on the committee that selects judges with political appointees; this amendment is under supreme court review.⁹⁰ Some government leaders have subsequently sought to pursue additional changes. In 2025, the supreme court—in response to petitions by the main opposition party and a civil society group—overturned an effort by the government to fire Israel's attorney general without consulting a nonpartisan professional committee.⁹¹ While the attorney general controversy is not part of the government's legislative agenda, it may have related implications for the future in Israel of apolitical expertise and checks on government action.

Key Strategic Areas for U.S.-Israel Relations

Iran

Since Prime Minister Netanyahu returned to power in 2009, he and other Israeli officials have sought to influence U.S. and international policy on Iran, while also trying to increase Israel's military capabilities to counter or deter Iran and its regional allies. For much of that time, U.S. leaders largely employed coercive diplomacy—backed by economic sanctions and threats of force—in efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Israeli officials have generally sought to convince U.S. counterparts to adopt broader objectives, to encompass ending Iran's uranium enrichment program and degrading its missile arsenal and production capacity, as well as reducing Iran's support for armed groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen.⁹²

After the October 2023 attacks on Israel, the scope of regional conflict expanded to include direct exchanges of fire between Israel and Iran for the first time. The United States and other partners assisted Israel with air defense. In two relatively brief conflicts in 2024, Israel reportedly caused considerable damage to Iranian air defenses. Then, during what has been termed a "12-day war" in June 2025, Israel and the United States apparently dealt a major setback to Iran's nuclear program with coordinated strikes against key sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Israel also targeted several Iranian military, government, and nuclear program-related facilities and officials.⁹³

2026 conflict. At the start of the 2026 U.S.-Israel conflict with Iran on February 28, President Trump pledged to ensure that Iran could not obtain nuclear weapons, while also expressing an intention to destroy Iran's missiles, missile industry, and navy, and to prevent Iranian "proxies" from destabilizing the region or attacking U.S. forces.⁹⁴ In a March 10 letter to the UN Security Council, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Michael Waltz said that the United States was taking "necessary and proportionate actions" against Iran "in exercise of the inherent right of self-defense as reflected in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations," and "in close cooperation with, and in the collective self-defense of, Israel."⁹⁵ During the conflict, in coordination with U.S. counterparts, Israel's military struck a range of targets in Iran aimed at dismantling the regime's security infrastructure and impairing its industrial capacity.⁹⁶

Israeli leaders have expressed support for regime change in Iran. Early in the conflict, Prime Minister Netanyahu repeatedly called on the Iranian people to rise up and topple the Islamic Republic.⁹⁷ Israel reportedly carried out strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several other high-level Iranian leaders, including key regime figure and national security advisor Ali Larijani. As the conflict continued, Israel appeared to adjust its messaging on regime change, perhaps reflecting reported Israeli intelligence assessments that an Iranian domestic uprising—if one occurs—could take place over a longer timeframe or at some point after U.S.-Israel military operations cease.⁹⁸ A former Israeli intelligence official has assessed that Israel would welcome any type of domestic instability within Iran—be it a coup, renewed protests, or a civil war—and that Israel may be less concerned than the United States about broader implications of such instability for Iran's future and the security balance for various regional partners.⁹⁹ In a May interview, Netanyahu said that, before jointly launching military operations against Iran, he and President Trump agreed that toppling Iran's regime faced uncertain prospects. Netanyahu also stated that "nobody had perfect foresight" regarding potential disruptions to commerce transiting the Strait of Hormuz.¹⁰⁰

Various sources have speculated on how Israel's apparent support for changing or weakening Iran's regime may have influenced Trump Administration positions.¹⁰¹ In President Trump's February 28 speech, he said to the Iranian people, "When we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations."¹⁰² One media report citing unnamed sources (including two U.S. officials) stated that President Trump rejected a March suggestion by Prime Minister Netanyahu for the two of them to publicly call on the Iranian people to take to the streets, with Trump pointing to risks that regime forces could violently suppress any domestic protests, as had happened in January.¹⁰³ President Trump has argued that the killing of Khamenei and other key Iranian leaders during the conflict has effectively amounted to regime change.¹⁰⁴

Iranian retaliatory strikes against Israel represent the fourth time since 2024 that Iran has directly fired missiles and drones at Israeli targets, though in the 2026 conflict Iran's regime—facing a potentially existential threat—has also fired at other countries, including Arab Gulf states and Turkey. As in the previous conflicts, U.S. and Israeli air defenses reportedly intercepted most of the Iranian projectiles deemed to endanger civilians or important infrastructure in Israel.¹⁰⁵ Some missiles and drones, however, evaded these defenses and caused casualties or damage, including an instance near Israel's main nuclear research facility and reactor in Dimona.¹⁰⁶ Iran's use of cluster munitions in the 2026 conflict has complicated the defense effort, as has the firing of additional projectiles at Israel from Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Some open sources have reported concerns about potential scarcity of U.S.-funded interceptors for some U.S. or Israeli missile defense systems.¹⁰⁷ One media article, reportedly citing Department of Defense¹⁰⁸ assessments, stated that the U.S. military expended "far more high-end munitions defending Israel amid hostilities with Iran than Israeli forces used themselves."¹⁰⁹ Public discussion has continued regarding options to boost interceptor production and find more efficient and/or lower-cost means of countering missile and drone threats.¹¹⁰

Conflict diplomacy and some U.S.-Israel divergence. On April 7, 2026, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire and to negotiating a more durable end of conflict—with Israel reportedly not a direct participant in the U.S.-Iran talks. The ceasefire was then extended indefinitely, though it was punctuated by some outbreaks of fighting. On June 7, Iran carried out ballistic missile strikes on Israel following an escalation of fire between Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel.¹¹¹ After the Iranian strikes, President Trump reportedly urged Prime Minister Netanyahu to use restraint in responding, but Israel went forward with airstrikes in Iran, triggering some tit-for-tat exchanges on June 8.¹¹² President Trump said that after receiving messages from Iran indicating a willingness to resume the ceasefire, Israel called off further military action after he told Netanyahu "you better be careful, or you will be on your own very soon."¹¹³ In an interview later that day, Vice President J.D. Vance said:

The Israelis and the United States, we have a lot of shared interests, but we also have some situations where our interests diverge…. the United States' main objective in Iran is to ensure that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon…. the president believes – and I think that he's right – that we can get the long-term settlement to Iran's nuclear deal. Now, Israel may like that, they may not like that. But fundamentally, we think this is in the best interest of the United States of America.¹¹⁴

One former U.S. official, surveying the situation, stated, "Trump's priority is to re-open the Strait of Hormuz to stabilize global energy markets and bring down the price of fuel, and Netanyahu wants to continue degrading Iran's ballistic missile arsenal and nuclear program."¹¹⁵ On June 11, Prime Minister Netanyahu's office released the following statement: "Even though Israel is not a party to the memorandum of understanding, the Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for President Trump's commitment that the final agreement at the conclusion of negotiations will include the removal of enriched material, the dismantling of enrichment infrastructure, limits on missile production, and the cessation of Iran's support for its terrorist proxies in the region."¹¹⁶

In mid-June 2026, the United States and Iran signed an MOU to end "military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon," act to facilitate commerce via the Strait of Hormuz, take steps that could provide Iran with some financial relief, and begin a 60-day negotiating period on related issues that include Iran's nuclear program. The MOU also states that Iran and the United States "undertake to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs."¹¹⁷ Prior to the signing, Netanyahu emphasized that Israel was not a party to the U.S.-Iran deal, and that he was "not limiting" himself in acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon or countering Hezbollah in Lebanon.¹¹⁸ Despite the Israeli demands to include Iran's missile program and support for proxy militias in any deal, neither issue was mentioned in the MOU, and resolution on the nuclear issue remains uncertain.¹¹⁹ An unnamed former senior Israeli official labeled the diplomatic outcome to date a "strategic disaster," saying that the situation is worse than before the conflict, especially since "we're not in lockstep with the US as before."¹²⁰

Lebanon

In early March 2026, shortly after the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict began, Lebanese Hezbollah started firing projectiles into northern Israel, prompting large-scale Israeli military operations in Lebanon. In previous fighting between October 2023 and November 2024, Israel exacted major losses on Hezbollah, after which Israel maintained some positions across the Lebanese border and conducted airstrikes in Lebanon in parallel with a debate over ceasefire compliance involving Israel, Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, and international stakeholders including the United States, France, and the United Nations. In March 2026, the Lebanese government took the unprecedented step of banning Hezbollah's military activities, though the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) chief's reported inability and/or unwillingness to enforce the decree has sparked political contention within Lebanon.¹²¹ The disarmament of Hezbollah, an Israeli demand and the stated goal of the Lebanese government, represents a potential key element to resolution of conflict, but Hezbollah remains entrenched in parts of Lebanon and may be more capable in some respects than the LAF.¹²²

Early 2026 Israeli operations in Lebanon (which reportedly displaced around a million people, or about 20 percent of the country's population) have sought to reduce the ability of Iran and its allies to threaten Israel from Lebanese territory. Israeli objectives have apparently included the creation of a larger buffer zone in southern Lebanon to reduce Hezbollah threats to Israel (see Figure 1), and the exertion of pressure on Lebanon's government and military to marginalize Hezbollah—both politically and militarily—and disrupt the group's sources of weapons and funding. The history of Israeli involvement in Lebanon over several decades suggests that any short-term gains for Israeli security could engender popular domestic resistance over the longer term to a prolonged Israeli presence in Lebanon and/or any Lebanese political decisions deemed to be driven by Israeli demands. In March, Prime Minister Netanyahu identified preventing cross-border anti-tank fire from Hezbollah as a specific aim.¹²³ Israel also has targeted Iranian officials in Lebanon.¹²⁴ Reports indicate that Hezbollah drones, including some featuring fiber optic cables resistant to electronic countermeasures, present security challenges for Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, and have also targeted areas of Israel within a few miles over the border.¹²⁵

The long-term effect of the 2026 conflict on civilian populations in Israel and Lebanon is unclear. Unlike in October 2023, to date Israel has not ordered the evacuation of potentially at-risk residents living near its border with Lebanon, though some displacement has reportedly occurred.¹²⁶ Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said in March that the IDF was planning to establish a security zone in southern Lebanon, including by destroying villages near the Israeli border "in accordance with the Rafah and Beit Hanoun model in Gaza."¹²⁷

After the U.S.-Iran ceasefire was announced on April 7, Israel differed publicly with Iran on whether the ceasefire included Lebanon. After reported U.S. efforts to halt the fighting in Lebanon, President Trump announced on April 16 that the Israeli and Lebanese governments had agreed to pause hostilities for 10 days, a period that was later nominally extended until late June. Despite the ceasefire, which did not require Israel to withdraw from its forward positions in Lebanese territory, Israel and Hezbollah later resumed some fighting, including Israeli strikes on targets around Beirut.¹²⁸

In April, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, "But ultimately, the answer, both sides agree, is a Lebanese Armed Forces with the capability to go after and disarm and dismantle Hizballah inside of their country. And that's what we're working towards establishing, is a system that actually works where vetted units within the Lebanese Armed Forces have the training, the equipment, and the capability to go after elements of Hizballah and dismantle them so Israel doesn't have to do it."¹²⁹ In early June, the United States, Israel, and Lebanon jointly announced a ceasefire "contingent on a complete cessation of Hizbollah fire and the evacuation of all Hizbollah operatives from the South Litani Sector." The announcement also anticipated the creation of "pilot zones," where the LAF would presumably seek to establish exclusive control over certain southern Lebanon areas.¹³⁰ Reportedly, Hezbollah and Iran indicated that they rejected the terms of any such deal unless Israel were to fully withdraw from Lebanon.¹³¹

Figure 1. Lebanon: Pilot Zones and Israeli Military Positions

The June 2026 U.S.-Iran MOU calls for "the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon" and "ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon."¹³² The United States and Iran reportedly agreed in their first post-MOU talks to create a "de-confliction cell … to ensure the adherence of the termination of military operations in Lebanon as per the MoU."¹³³ Some Israel-Hezbollah fighting has taken place after the MOU was signed. On June 22, Prime Minister Netanyahu stated, "Our fighters in southern Lebanon have full freedom of action to thwart any direct or developing threat to them or to the residents of the North…. My stance is firm on our remaining in the security zone in southern Lebanon for as long as is required in order to protect the residents of the North and all citizens of the state."¹³⁴ An unnamed senior Israeli political source was cited as saying that if the United States pressures Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Netanyahu "won't be able to defend such a move to his Likud base and right-wing voters on the eve of elections."¹³⁵

On June 26, the United States, Israel, and Lebanon agreed to a "trilateral framework" by which Israel and Lebanon pledged to work toward peace with each other through a gradual effort to have the LAF gain control in areas upon confirmation that Hezbollah has been disarmed and had its infrastructure dismantled. Israel and Lebanon designated two initial pilot zones (see Figure 1) and agreed to designate future zones by mutual consent. The framework agreement stated that Lebanon "welcomes the readiness of the United States to support such efforts, recognizing that any new U.S. assistance [for the LAF] will be strictly conditioned on verifiable milestones, full transparency, demonstrated results, and ongoing oversight."¹³⁶

Gaza

In October 2025, a ceasefire brokered by the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey took effect between Israel and Hamas.¹³⁷ The deal appeared intended to facilitate the eventual implementation of a broader 20-point plan regarding Gaza's future put forth by President Trump in September,¹³⁸ and endorsed by Israel and some other regional countries (but not Hamas to date). In November 2025, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, which endorsed the 20-point plan in its entirety and called for its implementation. The resolution also authorized a transitional authority for Gaza and international civil and security presences until the end of 2027 (see Figure 2).

In January 2026, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced the "launch of Phase Two of the President's 20-Point Plan to End the Gaza Conflict…. Phase Two establishes a transitional technocratic Palestinian administration in Gaza … and begins the full demilitarization and reconstruction of Gaza, primarily the disarmament of all unauthorized personnel."¹³⁹

Figure 2. Gaza Transition: Key Entities

Sources and Notes: Depiction is approximate, based on CRS analysis of various open sources, mainly: White House, "Statement on President Trump's Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict," January 16, 2026; X, The White House (@WhiteHouse), January 22, 2026 – 9:07 AM, https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/2014339243221434783; and UN Security Council Resolution 2803, November 17, 2025 (including Annex 1: President Trump's Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict [also known as the "20-Point Plan"]). Actual operations may differ from depiction and sources.

Israel and Hamas have engaged in some bouts of fighting since the ceasefire. Gazans still face major challenges related to mass displacement and overcrowding, food insecurity, and scarcity of shelter and other life-sustaining or -saving supplies and services.¹⁴⁰ The de facto division of Gaza between (1) areas comprising more than half of Gaza's territory where Israeli troops are deployed, and (2) the rest of the territory, where roughly 85% of Gaza's population was living as of late 2025¹⁴¹ (generally subject to Hamas security control), could last indefinitely if the parties and stakeholders cannot agree on or compel solutions that apply to the entire territory (see Figure 3 for the October 2025 ceasefire lines).¹⁴²

Figure 3. Gaza Ceasefire Lines: October 2025

Source: Guardian (UK), November 2025, citing the IDF as its source. Notes: As depicted in the map, red areas appear to be generally subject to Hamas security control; green areas appear to be generally subject to Israeli military control.

One April 2026 media report asserted that Israel has pushed forward the "yellow line" dividing these two zones in some places, increasing the amount of territory under its control.¹⁴³ Prime Minister Netanyahu appeared to confirm this in May when saying, "In Gaza now, we are no longer holding 50% [of its territory], but already 60%" (see Figure 4 for reported June 2026 lines of control).¹⁴⁴ He later stated that this amount could increase toward 70%.¹⁴⁵ In June 2026 testimony before a House Appropriations subcommittee, Secretary of State Rubio indicated that the U.S. 20-point plan does not call for expanded Israeli territorial control, but for non-Hamas, technocratic Palestinian governance.¹⁴⁶

Figure 4. Reported Gaza Lines of Control: June 2026

Sources: From a series of Associated Press maps citing the following sources: the Israeli military, Peace Now, the United Nations, the Institute for National Security Studies, Yaakov Garb, and Harvard Dataverse; and stating that basemap data is from Mapcreator. Notes: As depicted in the map, red areas appear to be generally subject to Israeli military control; other areas of Gaza appear to be generally subject to Hamas security control.

Questions persist about how Israel's expanded control over Gaza's territory and Hamas's unwillingness to date to disarm might impact the U.S. 20-point-plan and efforts to transition toward non-Hamas and non-Israel governance and security arrangements in Gaza.¹⁴⁷ It is also unclear how the early 2026 U.S./Israel-Iran conflict may impact Hamas's ties with Iran and capacity to project force within and outside of Gaza. According to Israeli officials, Hamas in Gaza retains some arsenals of rockets, anti-tank missiles, and drones (perhaps including fiber-optic drones like those used by Hezbollah), as well as an estimated 60,000 assault rifles and 20,000 fighters.¹⁴⁸

The President Trump-chaired Board of Peace (see Figure 2) reportedly demanded in April that Hamas agree to demilitarize within days. Some media articles purported to describe the Board of Peace proposal as a multi-stage disarmament framework over eight months that might facilitate a security and governance transition and initial reconstruction efforts in Gaza.¹⁴⁹ Hamas leaders apparently rejected the proposal while asking for modifications, also asserting that Israel has violated the ceasefire by continuing attacks in Gaza and limiting the number of humanitarian aid trucks that access the territory.¹⁵⁰ Reportedly, Hamas insisted in May that any handover of its weapons occur as part of a framework leading to a Palestinian state.¹⁵¹ In April, the World Bank estimated Gaza's recovery and reconstruction needs to be $71.4 billion.¹⁵² In May, Gaza High Representative Nickolay Mladenov attempted to facilitate Hamas disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, and other Phase Two transition efforts by posting a 15-point "Roadmap to Complete the Implementation of President Trump's Gaza Comprehensive Peace Plan."¹⁵³

West Bank

Israel, the PA, and security. While Israel maintains overarching military control over the West Bank and the close to 3.5 million Palestinians reportedly living there,¹⁵⁵ the PA has some authority to govern and provide security in specified Palestinian-populated areas, under Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreements dating back to the 1990s (see Figure 5).¹⁵⁶ The long-term viability of PA limited self-rule in the West Bank is unclear, in light of (1) supervening Israeli control and more than half-a-million Israeli citizens living in West Bank settlements, and (2) elements of PA rule that some analysts contend are largely undemocratic, repressive, and corrupt.¹⁵⁷

Figure 5. Selected Events Affecting West Bank Control

Sources: Graphic created by CRS using maps from various open sources, including the BBC and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Text taken from various open sources. Notes: For additional historical detail, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.

Factors reportedly contributing to escalations in West Bank violence and tension over the past three years have included various Israeli actions (including settlement expansion, a rising tide of settler violence, and military operations), Palestinian militancy (reportedly fueled partly by Iranian assistance), and PA weakness.¹⁵⁸ According to the United Nations, since 2025 at least 295 Palestinians and 18 Israelis have been killed in the West Bank, and more than 40,000 Palestinians have been displaced.¹⁵⁹

PA President Mahmoud Abbas heads the secular Arab nationalist faction Fatah, which has been the leading group within the PLO for decades. Abbas's age (b. 1935) has contributed to speculation about leadership succession. The United States and other Western countries have historically sought to bolster the Abbas-led PA vis-à-vis Hamas—which violently seized Gaza from Fatah-led PA forces in 2007, and also has a presence in the West Bank—and to support PA-Israel cooperation. To date during his presidency, Abbas has publicly opposed using PA security forces against Israel,¹⁶⁰ though some observers argue that the PA under Abbas has continued to incite Palestinians to violence against Israelis.¹⁶¹ Within the context of divided control since 2007—the Fatah-led PA has administered parts of the West Bank and Hamas has controlled Gaza—PA elections throughout the West Bank and Gaza have not taken place since 2005 (a presidential election that Abbas won) and 2006 (legislative elections that Hamas won). President Abbas has exercised authority by decree since 2007 in PA-administered areas of the West Bank.

Israel and the PA cooperate on some functional aspects of administration while engaging in adversarial politics on a number of issues. They reportedly coordinate on security measures to counter Hamas and other West Bank-based militants amid a dynamic in which Israeli officials sometimes state that the PA does not sufficiently curtail threats, and PA leaders express concern that Israeli actions undermine PA security forces.¹⁶² The already fragile PA West Bank economy has been further weakened after October 2023 by various Israeli measures, including the withholding or delay of certain tax transfer (aka "clearance revenue") payments to the PA, and the suspension of access permits for around 150,000 West Bank Palestinians to work in Israel.¹⁶³ On a number of occasions, Finance Minister Smotrich has with apparent reluctance—and under reported U.S. pressure in at least some instances—assented to temporary Israeli renewals of the letter of indemnity that allows Palestinian banks to access the international financial system via Israeli banks; the current renewal is reportedly set to expire on July 12, 2026.¹⁶⁴ PA President Abbas decreed an end in 2025 to a tiered public welfare payment structure that appeared to favor Palestinians deemed terrorists by Israel (or their families).¹⁶⁵ Some reports indicate that certain tiered payments to these recipients reportedly continued at least through August 2025, and it is unclear whether subsequent measures have implemented the changes Abbas decreed.¹⁶⁶

Settlements and settler violence. Some observers have characterized the means used or proposed for integrating Israeli settlements in the West Bank with Israel proper, along with restrictions on Palestinian building and land use in surrounding areas, as "creeping annexation" or "de facto annexation."¹⁶⁷ As Israel has expanded settlements in the West Bank since 1967, it has integrated many of those settlements and their residents into the political, legal, and economic life of Israel proper. For example, while Israel deals with Palestinians in the West Bank according to military law, some norms of Israeli civilian law already apply to West Bank settlements, "either through application of personal jurisdiction over the settlers, or through military decrees that incorporated Israeli law into the law applicable to all or parts of the West Bank."¹⁶⁸

The current government also has accelerated settlement planning and construction. In August 2025, the planning committee within Israel's defense ministry approved settlement plans in a place known as E1, located in an area where construction potentially could impede the viability of a Palestinian state.¹⁶⁹ Some media reports in April 2026 indicated that Israel's cabinet approved dozens of new settlements in March, many of which are reportedly outposts previously deemed illegal under Israeli law.¹⁷⁰

Amid a fall 2025 uptick in settler violence in the West Bank, 101 U.S. Representatives sent a letter to House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast in November requesting a markup for the West Bank Violence Prevention Act (H.R. 3045).¹⁷⁵ The bill and its companion in the Senate (S. 2667) would codify the key provisions of a 2024 executive order (EO 14115) from President Joe Biden. The order directed executive branch agencies to impose sanctions against individuals and groups deemed to have responsibility for disruptive action in the West Bank; President Trump rescinded the order in January 2025.¹⁷⁶

Following instances of additional settler violence in early 2026, U.S. and IDF officials have publicly expressed concern.¹⁷⁷ In May, the IDF reportedly told Prime Minister Netanyahu that up to 80% of West Bank incidents logged by Israeli troops are Jewish attacks on Palestinians.¹⁷⁸ A May media article, citing a United Nations office, said that since the beginning of the 2026 U.S./Israel-Iran conflict, at least 13 West Bank Palestinians have been killed in settler attacks, compared with 15 in all of 2025.¹⁷⁹ A number of reports about intensified settler attacks suggest that Israeli authorities impose few constraints on the settlers and—in some cases—may seek to enable their actions.¹⁸⁰ In March 2026, the Knesset enacted a bill—which will likely face an Israeli supreme court appeal—prescribing the death penalty for West Bank Palestinians (but not for Israelis) convicted of murder in terrorist attacks.¹⁸¹ In May, the European Union simultaneously approved new sanctions against violent Israeli settlers and Hamas leaders, and later imposed specific sanctions on some Israeli individuals and organizations.¹⁸²

In June 2026 testimony before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, Secretary of State Rubio said, "We have advocated repeatedly and made very clear that we want the status quo, meaning that there not be additional actions taken in the West Bank that can destabilize the broader situation." He also stated that Israel has "stood up special units of some of their forces" to take on settlers or gangs that "carry out some of these acts of violence."¹⁸³

Potential annexation and Trump Administration. After obtaining support from key Muslim-majority countries for the 20-point plan for Gaza in September 2025, President Trump declared that he would not allow Israel to unilaterally annex the West Bank, later threatening to withhold U.S. support if it were to do so.¹⁸⁴ The Israeli Knesset had voted 71-13 earlier in 2025 to approve a non-binding resolution for annexing areas of Jewish settlement within the West Bank,¹⁸⁵ and the Israeli government had reportedly been debating whether to move forward with annexation.¹⁸⁶

Syria

Since the fall of Asad in 2024, Israel (alongside Turkey, with which Israel appears to be developing some form of regional rivalry, as discussed above) has emerged as one of the most impactful outside actors in Syria. Israel has undertaken hundreds of airstrikes to degrade Syrian military positions and stockpiles and insisted that areas in Syria south of Damascus remain permanently demilitarized. Syria's interim leaders reject Israel's demilitarization demands and have called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions they occupied before their troop movements in December 2024 following Asad's ouster.¹⁸⁸

Israel also has targeted Syrian government forces, state facilities, and non-state actors while stating that it seeks to protect Syrian minorities. For example, Israel has acted militarily on behalf of Druze communities in southern Syria, though some Syrian Druze have rejected any association with Israel.¹⁸⁹ The Druze are a religious minority group with members concentrated in southern Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. One December 2025 media article suggested that Israel has airdropped equipment, provided funding, and facilitated training for Druze fighters in Syria—with airdrops since August focused on nonlethal equipment like body armor and medical supplies.¹⁹⁰

U.S. and Israeli priorities in Syria may differ to some extent. U.S. officials have cultivated ties with Syria's interim leaders and have suggested they be given opportunities to deliver on their stated objectives of reforging national unity and coexisting peacefully with regional countries, including Israel. In the wake of the October 7, 2023 attacks and subsequent conflicts involving Gaza and Lebanon, Israeli leaders appear skeptical of territorial withdrawals or compromises that could increase Israel's vulnerability, particularly given Syrian interim President Ahmed al Sharaa's previous association with Al Qaeda, and Turkey's presence and influence in Syria.¹⁹¹ The Trump Administration has eliminated or waived most sanctions on Syria, despite reportedly receiving earlier entreaties from Prime Minister Netanyahu to keep sanctions in place.¹⁹²

U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (who also serves as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) has mediated Israel-Syria talks aimed at stabilizing security arrangements between the two countries. A deal could include elements of demilitarization in southern Syria and Syrian government agreements to prevent attacks against Israel or Syrian Druze communities, in exchange for Israeli withdrawals from areas its military has controlled since December 2024.¹⁹³ U.S. officials have also reportedly proposed a demilitarized economic zone on both sides of the border.¹⁹⁴ In January 2026, Israel and Syria agreed to establish "a joint fusion mechanism—a dedicated communication cell—to facilitate immediate and ongoing coordination on their intelligence sharing, military de-escalation, diplomatic engagement, and commercial opportunities under the supervision of the United States."¹⁹⁵

Yemen

The Iran-backed Houthi movement in Yemen (also known as Ansar Allah, another FTO) regularly refers to Israel as the core security threat to the region. Following the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel, the Houthis launched numerous long-range missile and drone strikes against targets in Israel, while also conducting attacks on international shipping in and around the Red Sea. From March to May 2025, U.S. forces expanded strikes against the Houthis, seeking to compel a lasting end to Houthi maritime attacks. The U.S. campaign ended under an agreement brokered by neighboring Oman in which the Houthis reportedly agreed to cease targeting U.S. vessels and the United States reportedly agreed to halt strikes on the Houthis.

The Houthis resumed attacks on some non-U.S. ships in summer 2025 and continued to launch hundreds of long-range strikes against targets in Israel.¹⁹⁶ Israel in turn expanded its own strikes against Houthi targets, destroying port, airport, military, and electricity infrastructure, and killing the prime minister and several civilian and military officials of the Houthi government.¹⁹⁷ The Houthis suspended their attacks after Israel and Hamas reached their ceasefire in October 2025, reportedly telling Hamas that if Israel "resumes its aggression against Gaza, we will return to our military operations" and "reinstate the ban on Israeli navigation in the Red and Arabian Seas."¹⁹⁸ The Houthis fired a number of projectiles at Israel during the 2026 U.S./Israel-Iran conflict (reportedly in March, April, and June).

Issues for Congress

Recent U.S. Aid and Arms Sales to Israel

Expedited and ongoing U.S. arms exports to Israel since October 2023 have received increased congressional scrutiny.¹⁹⁹ In 2025, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress of possible arms sales for Israel worth more than $12 billion,²⁰⁰ and Senator Bernie Sanders introduced joint resolutions of disapproval against multiple sales (S.J.Res. 22-23, 26-27, 32-35, and 40-42), none of which have succeeded to date.²⁰¹ The Administration reportedly formally notified the 119^th Congress of some $8 billion worth of these potential sales in February 2025 without first receiving pre-approval from both the Chair and Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), which the executive branch customarily has sought in other cases.²⁰² Later in February 2025, the Administration invoked emergency authorities under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) to preempt the regular AECA-mandated congressional review period for sales to Israel of nearly $4 billion in arms and equipment (including guided and unguided munitions and bulldozers).²⁰³

As of July 2026, the Administration has reportedly formally notified Congress of possible additional sales of more than $7 billion. January 2026 notifications, totaling more than $6.5 billion, included attack helicopters and infantry assault vehicles,²⁰⁴ with HFAC Ranking Member Gregory Meeks asserting that the Administration had again proceeded without receiving his customary pre-approval.²⁰⁵ In the first week of the conflict with Iran in March 2026, the Administration reportedly invoked emergency authorities to notify Congress of munitions sales to Israel of an estimated $650 million.²⁰⁶ (Also during March, the Administration notified Congress of similar emergency sales to multiple Arab states.) Senator Sanders introduced three additional joint resolutions of disapproval (S.J. Res. 136-138) in response to the emergency sales to Israel. none of which have succeeded to date.²⁰⁷

U.S. and Israeli officials have reportedly begun discussions regarding an MOU on security-related funding to cover the 10 years after the current MOU expires in FY2028.²⁰⁸ Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli officials, with the support of some Members of Congress, have proposed phasing out direct U.S. Foreign Military Financing to Israel (currently $3.3 billion annually) and shifting the bilateral cooperation focus to joint programs, research and development, and co-production.²⁰⁹

For more on U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel and the role of Congress, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023, by Jeremy M. Sharp; and CRS Insight IN12695, Possible Changes in U.S. Military Aid to Israel: Considerations for Congress, by Jeremy M. Sharp.

Role of Congress and Key Questions

Congress may assess U.S. national security priorities and deploy various legislative and oversight tools to support, reject, or seek to modify the Administration's approach to Israel and the larger Middle East region. Examples of proposed legislation on Israel beyond aid, arms sales, and bilateral defense and intelligence cooperation include some efforts to strengthen Israel's partnerships with surrounding countries (Optimizing Acquisition Strategies for Integrated Security (OASIS) in the Middle East Act, S. 4681; Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act, S. 4443 and H.R. 3307), and some efforts to discourage activities that could contribute to instability (such as the West Bank Violence Protection Act discussed above, S. 2667 and H.R. 3045).

Questions that could affect congressional deliberations on U.S.-Israel security cooperation and other legislation regarding bilateral relations may include:

• Israel's impact on U.S. interests. How do Israeli actions, including those to prevent, deter, or respond to perceived threats in the Middle East, advance or hinder U.S. national interests, regional and global economic stability, and U.S. military readiness in the region and other areas important to U.S. and international security? What contributions does Israel make to U.S. interests with regard to technology cooperation, defense production, and intelligence sharing? Since October 2023, what effects have surges of U.S. military assets to the region to assist Israel's defense had on fueling, mitigating, or preventing conflict? How should these effects impact future U.S. deployments and cooperation with Israel?
• Action on U.S. aid/arms sales and U.S.-Israel joint programs. What action (if any) should be taken to increase, reduce, continue, or condition the scope and level of U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel? Should Israeli behavior related to regional security, trade and investment, humanitarian concerns, and other factors influence U.S. decisions on these points? U.S. and Israeli officials have referred to possibly phasing out direct U.S. military aid to Israel and focusing more on joint programs. What are the national security, economic, and other implications of proposed legislative provisions for FY2027 that could affect the level and scope of U.S.-Israel defense industrial integration and intelligence sharing? How might any such provisions affect future congressional oversight of U.S.-Israel security cooperation? If U.S. and Israeli officials negotiate another bilateral MOU to cover U.S. military assistance for Israel after FY2028, what key terms or principles should it include?
• Possible effect of Israel-related military operations on U.S. defense articles and stockpiles. What effect might intensified and/or prolonged U.S. military operations and deployments in the region in coordination with Israel have on the availability to the United States and its partners of important defense articles—including air defense interceptors and radars, fighter and tanker aircraft, and technologically advanced munitions? What is the status of U.S.-Israel joint programs to implement more cost-effective air, naval, and ground-based defense solutions?
• Sustainability of Israeli buffer zones and their regional impact. What resources, domestic political consensus, and foreign support would Israel need to maintain an indefinite Israeli military presence in large buffer zones in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria? What effects might such operations have on Israel's military capacity, economy, and political life, and on efforts to forge greater and more durable political and economic stability in those places and other regional hotspots like Yemen and Iraq? What effects might such operations have on U.S. interests?
• Israel's effect on other regional U.S. partners. How are Israeli military actions and deployments in Iran, Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria affecting the security, political, and economic decisions and calculations of other key U.S. partners in the region, including Arab Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan? How are Israeli policies and operations affecting the willingness of these partners to work with the United States and Israel—via the Abraham Accords or other initiatives—on establishing durable networks for air and naval defense, corridors for trade and investment, and other critical functions with implications for global strategic competition?
• Relationship between Israeli policies and political and humanitarian outcomes. How are developments in Israeli domestic and foreign policy affecting the possibilities of security for Israel, humanitarian welfare and economic opportunity for Gazans and Lebanese, and some form of national self-determination for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza? What is the likelihood that Jewish Israeli ultra-nationalist figures such as Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir will remain in government after the 2026 elections in Israel? What are prospects for the U.S. 20-point-plan in Gaza, deepening Israeli control or annexation in the West Bank, and ongoing disputes over holy sites in Jerusalem?

Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from Economist Intelligence Unit, World Bank, Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, Bank of Israel, and Peace Now. All numbers are estimates or projections for 2026 unless otherwise specified. Notes: Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. The United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty. The United States recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, UN Security Council Resolution 497, adopted on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights controlled by Israel's military is occupied territory belonging to Syria.

Appendix B. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders

RIGHT
	Likud (Consolidation) – Coalition Israel's historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. Four of its Knesset seats are held by people who were elected as members of the New Hope party, which initially was in the opposition, but later merged with Likud. Leader: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel's prime minister in December 2022. Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians—which has solidified during the 2020s into outright opposition to Palestinian statehood—and his desire to counter Iran's nuclear program and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. In 2019, he was indicted for various corruption-related offenses; his trial is ongoing.
	Beyachad (Together) New consensus party formed to contest 2026 elections against Prime Minister Netanyahu. A component party, the centrist Yesh Atid (There Is a Future, led by Yair Lapid), leads the current Knesset opposition. Leader: Naftali Bennett Born in 1972, Bennett served as Israel's prime minister from June 2021 to June 2022 in a power-sharing arrangement with Yair Lapid. Bennett served in various cabinet positions in previous governments. After serving in Israeli special forces units, Bennett was a successful software entrepreneur and lived for a time in the United States. He served as Netanyahu's chief of staff from 2006 to 2008 while Netanyahu was opposition leader. Bennett led the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization for Israeli West Bank settlers) from 2010 to 2012, and then joined Israeli electoral politics in 2013.
	Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam. Leader: Bezalel Smotrich Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel's finance minister, as well as a minister within the defense ministry with some responsibilities over West Bank administration. He has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and religiously conservative causes.
	Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam. Leader: Itamar Ben Gvir Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel's national security minister. He once belonged to Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir Kahane (1932-1990) that was banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a lawyer and has represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.
	Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – Opposition Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian speakers from the former Soviet Union. Leader: Avigdor Lieberman Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel's defense minister, foreign minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disillusioned by Netanyahu's willingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in a 2013 case.
LEFT
	Labor (Avoda) – Opposition Israel's historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel's responsibility for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Leader: Yair Golan Born in 1962, Golan became Labor's leader in 2024. After a military career in which he served as IDF deputy chief of staff from 2014 to 2017, Golan served in the Knesset in 2019-2020 as part of the Democratic Union alliance and 2020-2022 representing the Meretz party. In June 2024, Golan announced a merger between Labor and Meretz into a party calling itself "The Democrats."
CENTER
	Yashar (Upright) New party formed to contest 2026 elections against Prime Minister Netanyahu. Leader: Gadi Eisenkot Born in 1960, Eisenkot served as IDF chief of general staff from 2015 to 2019. He then became a Knesset member for the National Unity party in 2022. After the October 7, 2023 attacks, Eisenkot joined the government and became an observer in Israel's war cabinet as a minister without portfolio until leaving the government in June 2024. He resigned from the Knesset and left the National Unity party in July 2025.
	Blue and White (Kahol Lavan) – Opposition Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Known as the National Unity party from 2022 to 2025. Leader: Benny Gantz Born in 1959, Gantz served as IDF chief of general staff from 2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022. After the October 7, 2023 attacks, Gantz joined the government and Israel's war cabinet as a minister without portfolio until leaving the government in June 2024.
	Reservists (HaMiluimnikim) New party formed to contest 2026 elections, prioritizing full conscription into military or national service for all Israeli citizens. Leader: Yoaz Hendel Born in 1975, Hendel commanded a naval special forces unit and became a history professor and writer. He served briefly as director of communications for Prime Minister Netanyahu and resigned over some differences. He entered the Knesset in 2019 with the Blue and White party, and switched to the New Hope party in 2020, serving twice as minister of communications before switching to the (now defunct) Yamina party.

ULTRA-ORTHODOX
	Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition Mizrahi Haredi ("ultra-Orthodox") party; favors welfare and education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over Jerusalem. The party left the government in 2025 over the Haredi conscription issue, but stayed in the Knesset coalition. Leader: Aryeh Deri Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. He returned as the party's leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November 2022 election. In January 2023, Israel's High Court of Justice ruled that he could not serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had indicated in the 2022 plea deal that he would permanently leave politics.
	United Torah Judaism – Generally supports coalition Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its interpretation of traditional Jewish law. The party left the government in 2025 over the Haredi conscription issue while continuing to generally support the coalition in Knesset voting. Leader: Yitzhak Goldknopf Born in 1951, Goldknopf served as Israel's construction and housing minister prior to the party leaving the current government in 2025. He has been prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance.
ARAB
	Hadash-Ta'al – Opposition Electoral slate in the current Knesset featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist political strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta'al (Arab Movement for Renewal). For the scheduled 2026 elections, Hadash announced in June that it and Ta'al would run on a joint list with the secular, Arab nationalist Balad party. Leader: Yousef Jabarin Born in 1972, Jabarin is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with the overall Hadash-Ta'al slate. Jabarin is a legal scholar and served in the Knesset from 2015 to 2021, and was chosen as Hadash's leader in 2026 after his predecessor Ayman Odeh stepped down.
	United Arab List (UAL or Ra'am) – Opposition Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state support to improve Arabs' socioeconomic position within Israel. Leader: Mansour Abbas Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a dentist by profession. He led the UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for Arab Israelis.

Sources: Various open sources.

Footnotes