Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

October 23, 2015 – September 27, 2023 R44245

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations
September 27, 2023
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel
Jim Zanotti
$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile
Specialist in Middle
defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some
Eastern Affairs
Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance,

contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters:

Netanyahu government and controversy over judicial system changes. In December 2022,
Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new coalition government, despite facing an ongoing
criminal trial for corruption. Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the
new Israeli government has triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions
with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States. The government has proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s
judicial system. Despite major domestic controversy over whether changes—or responses to them—might impact checks and
balances, cohesion, and military readiness, and efforts by President Biden to encourage compromise, the coalition passed a
law in July 2023 to prevent Israeli courts from using a “reasonableness” standard to invalidate government actions. Israel’s
High Court of Justice has heard arguments challenging the legislation in September, raising the possibility of a constitutional
crisis. The government may consider additional legislation that could modify how judges are selected, though Netanyahu has
stated openness to dialogue with the opposition into November.
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken
out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of
Jerusalem’s holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered
heightened West Bank counterterrorism measures. As the Gaza Strip remains under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant
group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and other international actors face significant
challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and possible Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia. The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ongoing efforts to deepen security and
economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on
various types of defense. After China helped broker diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the
Administration has declared that Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia is a U.S. priority. Any negotiations toward that end
would likely consider Saudi security and civilian nuclear demands, as well as a pathway toward a two-state solution.
Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging expanded and deepened regional cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran and other regional dynamics. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015
international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran
amid questions about the tenor of U.S.-Israel cooperation on Iran-related issues. Israel also has reportedly conducted a
number of covert or military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq for various purposes, including
to prevent Lebanese Hezbollah from bolstering its weapons arsenal and capabilities. Some reports suggest the future
possibility of an informal, unwritten U.S.-Iran understanding by which Iran might limit some uranium enrichment and
receive some financial relief for humanitarian purposes, raising questions about how Israel might respond to such a deal.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. Israel has shown reluctance to provide
lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However, Israel is
reportedly providing or planning to provide Ukraine with basic intelligence, assistance with early warning systems, and anti-
drone jamming systems to counter Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 32 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers
seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
In July 2023, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 57,2 expressing the sense of Congress that
1. the State of Israel is not a racist or apartheid state;
2. Congress rejects all forms of antisemitism and xenophobia; and
3. the United States will always be a staunch partner and supporter of Israel.
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include the following:
• Domestic Israeli issues, including action by the government of Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu to reduce the power of Israel’s judiciary that has triggered a
highly charged national debate.
• Israeli-Palestinian violence and ongoing disputes.
• Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords,
including speculation about potential Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization.
• Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria.
• Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S.
assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise
permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
2 The House passed the resolution on July 18 by a vote of 412-9, with one voting present. The Senate passed it by
unanimous consent on July 25.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 5 link to page 33 link to page 6

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Domestic Issues
Netanyahu’s Return to Power and New Coalition Partners
On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) voted to reinstall Likud party leader
Benjamin Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and
2009-2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox
parties (see Figure 1 and Appendix B).
Figure 1. November 2022 Knesset Election Results

Source: Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious
Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1).
The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption
allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could
last for months or years.3 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a
government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021
government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him.
Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may
have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.4
Key Government Figures and Decisionmaking
Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new
Israeli government (see Table 1) has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s
democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its
relations with the United States and other countries.5 Coalition agreements state that the Jewish
people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,6
appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to
expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious
law in Israeli society.7 Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at

3 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand—and where they are going—analysis,” Jerusalem
Post, August 16, 2022.
4 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, December 30, 2022.
5 Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” Associated Press, December 29, 2022.
6 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022.
7 “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” Ynetnews/i24News, December 30, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

2

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.8 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007
for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.9
Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work
with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the
two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests
and values.”10 Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge
the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”11 In July 2023,
President Biden said in a CNN interview that some of the members of Israel’s cabinet are among
the most extreme he has seen.12
Table 1. Israeli Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu
Likud
Defense Minister
Yoav Gallant
Likud
Foreign Minister
Eli Cohen
Likud
Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry
Bezalel Smotrich
Religious Zionism
Justice Minister
Yariv Levin
Likud
National Security Minister
Itamar Ben Gvir
Jewish Power
Transportation Minister
Miri Regev
Likud
Strategic Affairs Minister
Ron Dermer
No formal affiliation
Energy Minister
Israel Katz
Likud
Agriculture and Rural Development Minister
Avi Dichter
Likud
Smotrich and Ben Gvir have each assumed some security responsibilities. Under the coalition
agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over civil affairs
units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning commission that
oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.13 Ben Gvir heads a national
security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including personnel that patrol
Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.14 He also expects to oversee the border police, including
units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) authority.15 Ben Gvir
supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their legal immunity.16

8 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” France24,
May 15, 2021.
9 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007.
10 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29,
2022.
11 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022.
12 Transcript: Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden, CNN, July 9, 2023.
13 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” Times of
Israel, December 5, 2022.
14 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” Times of
Israel, December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations.
15 “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” Times of Israel, December 29,
2022.
16 Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’”
Congressional Research Service

3

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and top IDF leaders have apparently sought to prevent changes to
the defense ministry and border police from disrupting the chain of command.17 In February
2023, Smotrich received general responsibilities to direct settlement planning and enforcement
over illegal construction in the West Bank, while Gallant maintained formal powers to intervene
in Smotrich’s decisions with cause.18 In June, the Israeli government eased and expedited the
process for settlement construction approval. While the process reportedly remains subject to
final authorization by the prime minister, this move makes it harder for the defense minister or
prime minister to slow the efforts of Smotrich or any successor in his position.19 U.S. and
Palestinian Authority (PA) officials have criticized the Israeli action.20
In anticipation of the government’s formation in late 2022, Netanyahu asserted that he would
personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.21 One Israeli journalist argued that
Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition partners and Western countries
concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing the support of one or the
other.22 Two former U.S. officials wrote that if a government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir
featured open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to change Israel’s democracy, opponents of
strong U.S.-Israel relations would exploit the situation “to try to undo aspects of the relationship,
and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”23
The coalition agreements are not legally binding.24 The degree of their implementation could have
significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the
rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to
Israel.25 The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank
areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.26
Controversy over Judicial System Changes and Proposals
Shortly after Netanyahu’s government took office, it advanced proposals in January 2023 aimed
at reducing the power of the judiciary—particularly Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ, also
known as the Supreme Court)—to check actions approved by Israel’s government.27 The

17 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within—analysis,” Jerusalem Post, January
2, 2023; Ash Obel, “Smotrich refuses to attend meeting with IDF chief on transfer of West Bank powers,” Times of
Israel, January 25, 2023.
18 Jeremy Sharon, “Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning,” Times of
Israel, February 23, 2023.
19 Isabel Kershner, “Israel Eases Rules for Settlements in West Bank,” New York Times, June 19, 2023.
20 Ibid.; Department of State, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18,
2023.
21 Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,”
NPR, December 15, 2022.
22 Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” Al-Monitor, December 9,
2022.
23 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,”
Times of Israel, November 2, 2022.
24 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022.
25 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” Jerusalem Post,
December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” Al-Monitor,
December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Jerusalem
Post, December 22, 2022.
26 Associated Press, “Netanyahu government: West Bank settlements top priority,” December 28, 2022.
27 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” Times of Israel,
January 4, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

4

link to page 33 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

proposals have triggered several months of highly charged national debate. In March, Netanyahu
dropped or delayed plans on various proposals to give the government control over Israel’s
Judicial Selection Committee (JSC) and allow the Knesset to override most HCJ decisions, in the
face of pressure from various sectors of society and President Biden. In June, a dialogue aimed at
achieving national consensus between government and opposition leaders broke down. Despite
appeals from President Biden for Netanyahu to pursue compromise, the coalition proceeded in
July to advance legislation that would prevent Israeli courts from using a “reasonableness”
standard to invalidate government actions.28 Netanyahu defended his action by saying that after
trying to compromise for three months without success, he “decided to proceed with this minor
correction.”29
“Reasonableness” Law, Next Political Steps, and Popular Sentiment
The new law, which the Knesset passed on July 24, amends Israel’s Basic Law on the judiciary.
The amendment prohibits courts from evaluating the reasonableness of administrative decisions
made by the cabinet or its ministers (see text box below).30 The opposition, which vehemently
contested the bill, boycotted the vote.
The Role of Israel’s Reasonableness Clause
One of the government’s January 2023 proposals for changing the judiciary’s role was to prevent courts from
invalidating government actions on the grounds that they are “unreasonable in the extreme.” The reasonableness
test does not apply to laws, but only to administrative decisions such as executive orders, cabinet actions, matters
that require ministerial sign-off, and municipal planning and zoning rulings.31
As the courts have developed the reasonableness framework over time, they have applied it in various cases
where they determine that an action might be arbitrary, reckless, or unethical, even if it does not contradict a
specific provision of law.32 Among other things, the HCJ has used this clause as a basis for some decisions to
vacate cabinet appointments, including the current Netanyahu government’s December 2022 designation of Shas
party leader Aryeh Deri (see Appendix B) as interior and health minister.33 The HCJ found Deri’s appointment
to be unreasonable because of his past criminal convictions for corruption and his promise in a plea bargain not to
return to public life.34
Debate was vigorous over the July 2023 bil to end courts’ use of the reasonableness standard. The coalition and
its supporters argued that because the clause is not clearly defined in law, its potentially broad application infringes
on the government’s popular mandate and chil s executive action.35 Despite the new limitation on using the
reasonableness clause, some supporters of the limitation have said that courts can stil resort to other common
law standards that could protect against certain government decisions. These grounds include proportionality,
anti-discrimination, conflict of interest, and lack of good faith.36 Some opponents of the bil maintained that the

28 Barak Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats,” Axios, July
23, 2023.
29 Morgan Winsor, “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks out on divisive judicial overhaul: ‘It’s a minor
correction,’” ABC News, July 27, 2023.
30 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset begins final votes on reasonableness law, curbing court review of decisions,” Times of
Israel, July 23, 2023. Under the bill, courts can still use reasonableness to examine the actions of lower-level civil
servants or municipal officials.
31 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “What the ‘reasonableness’ law does—and doesn’t—mean for judicial overhaul,” Times of
Israel, July 27, 2023.
32 Amichai Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness,” Israel Democracy Institute, June
22, 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “The reason for reasonableness: A doctrine at the heart of the overhaul explained,” Times of
Israel, July 8, 2023.
33 Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness.”
34 Jeremy Sharon, “Deri v. High Court: What did he actually pledge in his 2022 plea bargain?” Times of Israel, January
24, 2023.
35 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Is Torn by Debate over How Much Power to Allow Supreme Court,” July 22, 2023.
36 Sharon, “The reason for reasonableness: A doctrine at the heart of the overhaul explained.”
Congressional Research Service

5

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

HCJ has shown restraint in rejecting most petitions challenging reasonableness, and that courts should have
flexibility to employ the reasonableness standard to protect uncodified rights and prevent public corruption and
malfeasance.37 Israeli President Isaac Herzog and the opposition had sought a compromise with Netanyahu that
would have preserved some use of reasonableness to review government action, suspended additional legislation
on judicial changes for a period of time, and stipulated that the government could not fire the attorney general,38
but these efforts fell short.
When the Knesset reconvenes in October, it may consider additional legislation affecting the JSC
and perhaps other issues related to the judiciary. Netanyahu has said that the coalition is willing to
return to dialogue with the opposition until sometime in November in an effort to “reach a
comprehensive agreement,”39 but opposition leader Yair Lapid has said that he will not join talks
that are an “empty show.”40 Lapid has demanded an 18-month moratorium on further judiciary-
related legislation (unless it has support from a two-thirds majority in the Knesset) before
resuming talks.41
Polls have suggested that a majority of Israelis may support some form of judicial reform, but
generally favors efforts toward compromise. The specific measures introduced by the government
seem to attract only minority support.42 One July 2023 poll had 43% of Israelis opposing the
Knesset’s reasonableness legislation, 31% supporting it, and the rest undecided. Moreover, polls
also indicate a downturn in general support for Netanyahu and other coalition members.43 A poll
taken after the passage of the reasonableness law said that a majority of Israelis worry that civil
conflict is possible, while 22% support the government advancing legislation unilaterally.44
The reaction within Israeli society—including from protests and potential military service and
workforce disruptions—appears likely to affect how the legislative process continues. The
proposed judicial changes have galvanized and polarized substantial portions of the Jewish Israeli
populace, with some broad divisions manifest between
• Opponents, many of whom are members of the largely secular and Ashkenazi
(Jews of European origin) communities that have traditionally occupied leading
roles in government, the military, and the burgeoning high-tech sector; and
• Supporters, including many from certain groups with growing populations like
West Bank settlers, Jewish nationalists, and the ultra-Orthodox (some of whom
hail from a Mizrahi, or Middle Eastern Jewish, background).45

37 Ibid.; Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness.”
38 Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats.”
39 “Netanyahu vows to continue dialogue to reach judicial reform compromise,” i24News, July 24, 2023.
40 Dov Lieber, “Israelis Vow to Intensify Protests Against New Judicial Legislation,” Wall Street Journal, July 28,
2023.
41 Knesset News, “Opposition Leader MK Lapid to Knesset Plenum: The only possible solution, and the only thing that
will enable a return to dialogue, is a moratorium on legislation,” July 30, 2023.
42 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Only a Minority of Israelis Support the Proposed Judicial Overhaul,” Israel
Democracy Institute, February 21, 2023, and “Overhauling the Judicial System—What Do Israelis Think?” Israel
Democracy Institute, February 3, 2023; “Direct Polls: 3/4 of Israelis support judicial reform,” Israel National News,
March 7, 2023.
43 “43% of Israelis opposed to judicial reform Reasonableness Clause—poll,” Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2023.
44 Moshe Cohen, “58% of Israelis fear a civil war amid judicial reform crisis,” Jerusalem Post/Maariv, July 28, 2023.
45 Patrick Kingsley and Moises Saman, “Israelis Feeling Pain of Discord in Daily Lives,” New York Times, September
13, 2023; Dov Lieber and Shandi Raice, “Protests Break Out in Israel After Judicial Revamp Passes,” Wall Street
Journal, July 25, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

6

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Since January, hundreds of thousands of opponents have joined in regular non-violent protests
against the proposed changes in conjunction with opposition politicians,46 and several former HCJ
justices and attorneys general have strongly criticized the proposals.47 At some times, the protests
have disrupted traffic and operations at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport. Widespread opposition also
has come from Israel’s financial and economic sector.48 Thousands of supporters of the proposed
changes have engaged in several non-violent counter-protests. A July poll suggested that majority
approval in Israel of popular protests does not extend to disruptions of traffic or airport access, or
to refusals to report for military reserve duty.49
Potential Court Review
In September, the HCJ has held hearings on petitions challenging the reasonableness law.
Disagreement between the HCJ and Knesset majority on the law’s implementation could spark a
national crisis.50 Some media reports suggest that Netanyahu might be seeking some form of
compromise with opposition figures in hopes of avoiding such a crisis, perhaps partly in response
to polling that suggests his coalition may have lost support from the political center.51
The HCJ could strike down the reasonableness law, uphold it, or narrowly interpret it to curb its
impact. To date, the HCJ has not invalidated any provision of Israel’s Basic Laws, which in the
absence of a written constitution lay down the rules of government and enumerate fundamental
rights. Nevertheless, the HCJ has indicated that it could reverse a Basic Law if it fundamentally
changes the nature of democracy in Israel or abuses the constitutional process.52 One Israeli legal
expert has speculated that the HCJ could refrain from deciding on the July law’s validity in the
abstract, but opt to engage on the issue when presented with a concrete case if the government
tries to replace the attorney general or change the composition of the JSC—both of which could
represent red lines for the court on the issue of judicial independence.53
General Assessment
The following implications of the judicial system changes and proposals may have relevance for
U.S. policy.
Israel’s security and economy. Reportedly, thousands within Israel’s military reserves have
threatened to suspend their service, and some in the workforce (including doctors) have gone on
strike or warned that they might. Consequently, observers have raised questions about effects on

46 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2023; “Anti-overhaul
protesters call to turn up heat as over 300,000 estimated at rallies,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2023.
47 Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Jerusalem Post,
January 12, 2023.
48 Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2023.
49 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Flash Survey: Most Israelis Assess that the Protest Movement Has Delayed
Progression of the Judicial Overhaul,” Israel Democracy Institute, July 17, 2023.
50 Neri Zilber, “Will Israel’s Supreme Court Fight Back?” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2023. David Horovitz,
“Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,” Times of Israel, January 12,
2023.
51 See, for example, Haviv Rettig Gur, “Neither coalition nor High Court respects Basic Laws. Urgently needed: A
constitution,” Times of Israel, September 12, 2023.
52 Lieber and Raice; Emily Bazelon, “How Israel’s Supreme Court Might React to the Challenge to Its Power,” New
York Times, July 25, 2023.
53 Bazelon.
Congressional Research Service

7

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

the country’s defense readiness and economic strength.54 According to a media report citing an
unnamed U.S. official, the Pentagon “is concerned that the crisis facing the Israeli military could
have negative implications for Israel’s deterrence strategy and encourage Iran or Hezbollah to
conduct military provocations that could escalate the situation in the region.”55 In late July,
Israel’s air force commander said, “It is possible that at a time like this they (Israel’s enemies)
will try to test the frontiers, our cohesion and our alertness.”56
Additionally, disputes continue about whether reservists and other military personnel—many of
whom fulfill key roles—are justified in linking their service to legislative outcomes.57 In August,
protest leaders claimed that thousands of reservists had stopped reporting for duty, and the
military acknowledged a “limited” impact from no-shows.58
One news source has reported that the main problem for the military would be decreased
cohesion and readiness over the long term rather than an immediate breakdown in performance.
This source cites analysis arguing that highly skilled reservists (fighter pilots, special operations
troops, and intelligence analysts) who stop volunteering would probably return in the event of a
crisis, and the IDF would retain the capacity to handle most short-term threats.59 Another source
postulates that the IDF’s recruitment of mandatory conscripts to combat duty might face
challenges.60
Democracy, governance, and Israel’s international standing. Much of the national debate
focuses on the potential long-term implications for Israeli democracy and governance that might
stem from changes to the judiciary’s power. The discourse highlights the challenge Israel faces in
respecting the actions of an elected government while protecting minority rights at a time when
the prime minister’s personal stake in judicial outcomes—owing to his criminal trial—may
complicate efforts to build trust with the opposition.
Weakening judicial review could allow the government to take actions that the HCJ might have
previously resisted. Such actions could include expanding Israel’s West Bank control at
Palestinians’ expense, increasing economic preferences and military service exemptions for ultra-
Orthodox Jews, or changing minority rights and the religious-secular balance in Israel.61 Some
debate whether Israel might face heightened condemnation and legal prosecution in international
fora if the independence of its judiciary arguably erodes.62

54 David S. Cloud and Dov Lieber, “Israel Faces New Security Threats if Protesting Military Reservists Refuse to
Serve,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2023; Associated Press, “Israeli doctors walk off the job and more strikes are
threatened after law weakening courts passes,” July 25, 2023; Dov Lieber, “Economic, Political Tumult Roil Israel,”
Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2023.
55 Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats.”
56 Reuters, “Israeli air chief warns of security threat from judicial reform crisis,” July 28, 2023.
57 Associated Press, “Here’s how reservists are playing a crucial role in opposing Israel’s judicial reforms,” July 25,
2023.
58 Reuters, “Israel’s Netanyahu cools censure of protesting reservists as judicial crisis simmers,” August 14, 2023.
59 Cloud and Lieber.
60 Lilach Shoval, “Israel’s army readiness, Air Force cohesion at risk over judicial overhaul rift,” Al-Monitor, July 30,
2023.
61 Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions”; Associated Press, “Israel unveils controversial plans to overhaul
judicial system,” January 4, 2023.
62 Michael Starr, “Judicial reform reasonableness bill advances to final Knesset votes,” Jerusalem Post, July 20, 2023;
Eugene Kontorovich and Avraham Russel Shalev, “Arguments about judicial reform, ICC are legally baseless—
opinion,” Jerusalem Post, July 21, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

8

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Many of those supporting the proposed changes assert that the HCJ needs corrective balance
because Israel lacks a constitution providing explicit boundaries to judicial review. 63 Some also
allege that elites from Israeli society who oppose the coalition’s proposals are at least partly
focused on maintaining their power and position.64
Netanyahu’s legal future. Changes to the judicial system also might affect the status of
Netanyahu’s ongoing criminal trial. Some have speculated that legislative changes could lead to
Netanyahu replacing the current attorney general with one amenable to dismissing the legal case
against Netanyahu.65 One source quoted Netanyahu as saying he would not make such a move,
while citing an Israeli legal expert who questioned Netanyahu’s credibility. Netanyahu and
Israel’s attorney general have publicly disagreed on her insistence that a conflict-of-interest
agreement bars him from participating in debates surrounding proposed judicial system
changes.66 In late September, the HCJ is scheduled to hear a petition (supported by the attorney
general) seeking the reversal of an earlier Basic Law provision (passed in March) that prevents
the judiciary from ordering a prime minister to step down.67
U.S. role. President Biden’s repeated efforts to steer Netanyahu toward compromise may have
helped delay some measures, but did not stop the enactment of the July reasonableness law.
Biden’s attempts also have generated debate about U.S. input into Israel’s domestic politics.68
Members of Congress have articulated varying opinions about U.S. engagement in the discourse
over Israel’s judicial system.69
Israeli-Palestinian Issues70
Overview (Including Jerusalem, Gaza, and Visa Waiver Program)
Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for

63 “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” Times of Israel,
January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, CNN, January 31, 2023.
For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s
Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s
Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Real Clear Politics, February 5, 2023. For some historical context, see Patrick
Kingsley, “Social Rifts, Spread over Decades, at the Root of Israel’s Judicial Crisis,” New York Times, March 11, 2023.
64 Moshe Koppel, “This reform will end limitless power for unelected elites,” Times of Israel (blog), February 5, 2023.
65 Tia Goldenberg, “What is the latest on Netanyahu’s corruption trial?” Associated Press, April 27, 2023.
66 Reuters, “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” February 2, 2023; Chen
Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Haaretz, January 26, 2023.
67 Pending its decision on the matter, the HCJ has issued a temporary injunction against the law. Michael Starr,
“Israel’s High Court issues injunction against Netanyahu’s protection law,” Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2023.
68 See, for example, Robert Satloff, “President Biden can show his support for Israel by staying silent,” The Hill, July
29, 2023.
69 Peter Baker and Lisa Lerer, “U.S. Navigates Turbulent Ties to a Close Ally,” New York Times, July 24, 2023; Marc
Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform,” Jewish Insider,
February 16, 2023. Full text of three letters available at https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/
files/evo-media-document/final-3.8.23-delauro-schakowsky-mcgovern-letter-to-biden-administration-on-two-state-
solution-compressed.pdf, https://nadler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.9.23_letter_to_israeli_government_final.pdf, and
https://eshoo.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/eshoo.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/open-letter-to-israeli-pro-
democracy-protesters-5.24.23.pdf. See also H.Con.Res. 61, introduced in July 2023.
70 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
Congressional Research Service

9

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.71 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster
Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump
Administration.72 These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians
that they argue could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.73 In January
2023 remarks made alongside PA President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West Bank,
Secretary of State Antony Blinken said
Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution]
more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like
settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions
to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to
violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless
of the victim or the perpetrator.74
U.S. Policy on Jerusalem
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as
Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018.
These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem
as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of
Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.75
Israel’s previous government initiated some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living
circumstances, including through loans and work permits,76 and some of these measures have
continued under its current government. Some critics have charged that the measures mirror past
Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its causes through
negotiation with Palestinians.77 During President Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel and the West
Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had committed to expanding the
number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the Allenby border crossing between
the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank and Gaza to 4G communications
infrastructure.78 As of April 2023, Israeli personnel began 24-hour operations at the Allenby
crossing five days a week.79
In September 2023, Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas and Secretary of State
Blinken announced that Israel would join the U.S. Visa Waiver Program on November 30, 2023.
As part of Israel’s efforts to qualify for entry into the program under its reciprocity requirement,
Israel began allowing Palestinian-Americans to travel to Israel, the West Bank, and (for residents
or those closely related to residents) Gaza from Israeli airports in summer 2023, per a U.S.-Israel

71 Department of State Press Briefing, February 23, 2023; White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President
Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.
72 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations.
73 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022.
74 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting,” January 31, 2023.
75 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021.
76 Thomas Grove and Fatima Abdulkarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of
Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to
20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022.
77 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021.
78 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing
started operating on a nearly continuous basis in April 2023.
79 Rina Bassist, “Israel expands border crossing hours for Palestinians going to Jordan,” Al-Monitor, April 3, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

10

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

MOU.80 Earlier in September, fifteen Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken expressing
skepticism that the Israeli steps met the reciprocity requirement.81 In the statement announcing
Israel’s entry into the Visa Waiver Program, the Department of Homeland Security said, “As is
the process with all VWP countries, the U.S. Government will continue to engage with the
Government of Israel while monitoring its continued implementation of all program
requirements, including the reciprocity commitments it made to the United States on July 19,
2023.”82
In January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/Haram
al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of condemnation
or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and globally.83
Netanyahu pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims to worship at
the holy site, and downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous ministerial visits to the
site.84 Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of Ben Gvir’s visit, the
State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his commitment on the status quo.85
During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of Jordan, which has a custodial role
over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel should respect the “historic
and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate it.”86 Ben Gvir made additional
visits to the Mount/Haram in May and July.

80 An unofficial version of the draft U.S.-Israel MOU on the issue is available at https://ammannet.net/english/text-us-
israel-visa-waiver-mou. See also Department of State, “Israel’s Commitments to Extend Reciprocal Privileges to All
U.S. Citizens,” August 24, 2023; U.S. Embassy in Israel, “Updated FAQs Regarding New Israeli Travel Procedures for
U.S. Citizens,” September 22, 2023; Jacob Magid, “Israel eases entry for Gazan-Americans, meeting US Visa Waiver
Program benchmark,” Times of Israel, September 11, 2023. For more information on the Visa Waiver Program, see
CRS Report R46300, Adding Countries to the Visa Waiver Program: Effects on National Security and Tourism, by
Abigail F. Kolker and Michaela D. Platzer.
81 Text of letter available at https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
van_hollen_vwp_letter_to_blinken_090823.pdf.
82 Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Mayorkas and Secretary Blinken Announce Designation of Israel into
the Visa Waiver Program,” September 27, 2023.
83 Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Axios, January 3,
2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain
Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023.
84 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report
RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations.
85 Department of State Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
86 Reuters, “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” January 24, 2023.
For background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
Congressional Research Service

11

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.87
Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.88
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.89 Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.90 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.91 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.92
Israel-West Bank Violence and Settlement Tensions
Overview of violence, Palestinian militant groups, and some countermeasures. After an
upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30 Israelis or
foreigners in Israel and at least 170 Palestinians in the West Bank,93 violence has spiked in 2023.
For this year, at least 30 Israelis and 180 West Bank Palestinians have died from attacks by
militants and/or extremists on both sides against civilians and/or their property, or clashes
involving Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants.94
Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on northern West Bank cities like Nablus and
Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and
production, and establish order.95 Newer groups like the Jenin Brigades and Nablus-based Lion’s
Den—which polls suggest enjoy high levels of Palestinian domestic popularity—feature young
fighters from across and even outside of the spectrum of Palestinian militant factions that includes
the secular, Fatah-linked Tanzim, and Islamist groups like PIJ and Hamas.96 According to some

87 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations.
88 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
89 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
90 Ibid.
91 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021.
92 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” Haaretz, November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
93 Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” New York Times,
January 29, 2023.
94 Shayndi Raice and Fatima Abdulkarim, “Palestinian Authority Fights Its Own,” Wall Street Journal, September 6,
2023; Patrick Kingsley, “Israeli Guard Is Shot Dead After Settler Kills Palestinian,” New York Times, August 6, 2023.
95 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” New York Times, November 16, 2022.
96 Ayman Oghanna, “Inside the Lions’ Den: the West Bank’s Gen Z fighters,” Economist (1843 Magazine), July 7,
2023; Udi Dekel, “The Lion’s Den: A Wake-Up Call for Imminent Challenges,” Institute for National Security Studies,
October 19, 2022; Hani al-Masri, “The Jenin Brigades and The Lions’ Den: Palestine’s new resistance,” Middle East
Eye, October 21, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

12

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

open sources, various factors may fuel increased Palestinian militancy, including Israeli actions in
the West Bank, PA weakness, socioeconomic challenges, and the easy availability of weapons.97
One article suggests that much of the funding comes from Iran, supposedly allowing some
fighters to earn $300 to $700 per month in an area of chronic unemployment, but that Iran defers
to the local groups on operational planning and implementation. This same article says, “Much of
the weaponry used by the Jenin fighters comes from Israel itself, stolen and sold on through
criminal gangs, Israeli officials say. Some is smuggled across the Jordanian border, and some is
improvised in local workshops.”98
As the increase in Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,99 Israeli
and PA forces have approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions
and the possibility of future escalation.100 The PA reportedly has sought time and flexibility to
address militancy independent of Israel’s preferred methods, as part of an effort to reach
compromises that minimize major armed confrontations or arrests. In 2022, some PA personnel
reportedly acted outside their authority by directly targeting Israeli forces or settlers, raising
questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.101
Israel’s government approved measures in January that Prime Minister Netanyahu said were
aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps accelerating home
demolitions and West Bank settlement building, reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and
expediting gun licenses for Israelis.102 In defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the
terrorists and their immediate circle,” Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000
Palestinians to work in Israel, has reduced security checkpoints, and encourages investment by
Israelis and “our new peace partners in the Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.103
After a deadly January Israeli raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security
coordination with Israel,104 but its practical meaning is unclear.105 Previously, the PA publicly
suspended security coordination with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was
contemplating annexation of West Bank areas.106 In February, Central Intelligence Agency
Director Bill Burns remarked that the tensions resembled “some of the realities” of the 2000-2005
period of Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising).107 An

97 Dekel, “The Lion’s Den”; al-Masri, “The Jenin Brigades and The Lions’ Den.”
98 Reuters, “Palestinian gunmen say they’re fighting for Jenin, not foreign backers,” August 14, 2023.
99 Department of State Press Briefings, October 25, 2022 and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda
Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S.
Relations.
100 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” New York Times, October 26, 2022; Yaniv
Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian
Authority,” Haaretz, October 12, 2022.
101 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Al-Monitor,
October 12, 2022.
102 Dov Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2023; Raja Abdulrahim,
“Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement in West Bank as Violence Rages,” New York Times, January 30,
2023.
103 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
104 WAFA News Agency, “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security
coordination with Israel,” January 26, 2023.
105 Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in
the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023.
106 Reuters, “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” November 17, 2020.
107 Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Times of Israel,
February 7, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

13

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

unnamed “senior Israeli security source” was cited in September as saying that terrorist threats
from the West Bank are “rising tremendously” because restraining factors are weakening and
accelerating factors are growing, but that “it is not close to what happened” with a deep terror
infrastructure during the second intifada.108
Challenges related to de-escalation efforts and settlements. During Secretary Blinken’s
January visit to the West Bank, he said that “it’s important to take steps to de-escalate, to stop the
violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the foundation for more positive actions
going forward.”109 He also said that he discussed with President Abbas “the importance of the
Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its governance and accountability,
strengthening the institutions of the PA.”110
In February, the Israeli government decided to advance West Bank plans to construct nearly
10,000 additional settlement units and begin a process to retroactively legalize nine outposts that
had previously been illegal under Israeli law—triggering a statement of strong opposition from
Secretary Blinken.111 A few days later, the United States, Israel, the PA, Jordan, and Egypt issued
a communique from Aqaba, Jordan aimed at de-escalating tensions and violence by committing
Israel and the PA to suspend unilateral measures for a few months.112 In March, the five parties
reconvened as scheduled in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, and restated the commitments from
Aqaba.113
Also in March, the Knesset passed legislation to overturn parts of a 2005 law that had made
Jewish settlements in certain areas of the northern West Bank illegal. In that year, then-Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had affirmed in writing to then-President George W. Bush that Israel
committed to evacuate settlements and outposts in that region. A State Department spokesperson
said that the United States is extremely troubled about the legislation, and that it clearly
contradicts Israel’s longtime undertaking to the United States, as well commitments it made
earlier in March to de-escalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions.114 Despite the legal change,
Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying that Israel’s government has “no intention of
establishing new communities” in the West Bank areas in question.115 The relocation of a yeshiva
(Jewish religious school) within one of these areas in May triggered additional criticism from the
State Department,116 as did additional settlement-related announcements from Israel in June.117
Reportedly, when President Biden raised concerns about settlement expansion in a July call with
Netanyahu, Netanyahu said that no additional settlement plans would be approved in 2023.118

108 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s security brass advocates Saudi deal as way to calm tensions with Palestinians,” Al-Monitor,
September 8, 2023.
109 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting.”
110 Ibid.
111 Department of State, “Israeli Settlement and Outpost Legalization Announcement,” February 13, 2023. Israel
announced the legalization of three of the nine outposts in September in the face of U.S. criticism. Jacob Magid, “US
slams legalization of 3 West Bank outposts ‘previously illegal under Israeli law,’” Times of Israel, September 8, 2023.
112 Department of State, “Aqaba Joint Communique,” February 26, 2023.
113 Department of State, “Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh,” March 19, 2023.
114 Department of State Press Briefing, March 21, 2023.
115 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on the Knesset Decision to Repeal Parts of the
Disengagement Law,” March 22, 2023.
116 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Netanyahu further provokes Biden with relocation of outpost yeshiva,” Al-Monitor, May 30,
2023.
117 State Department, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18, 2023.
118 Barak Ravid, “Inside Biden’s call with Israel’s Netanyahu,” Axios, July 18, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

14

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Policy Change on U.S.-Israel Science/Technology Cooperation in Settlements
In June 2023, the State Department announced that the Biden Administration would return to pre-Trump
Administration U.S. policies that limit U.S.-Israel scientific and technological cooperation to areas administered by
Israel before the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.119 In 2020, the Trump Administration signed agreements with Israel
removing geographic restrictions on three U.S.-Israel binational foundations.120 In July, 14 Senators sent a letter to
President Biden and Secretary Blinken denouncing the June 2023 policy change as an “antisemitic boycott of Israel”
that undermines bilateral cooperation. The Senators threatened to block the Biden Administration’s nominees if it
does not reverse course.121
Summer escalation and PA efforts to restore order. In summer 2023, clashes between Israeli
forces and Palestinian militants intensified in the northern West Bank. Reports indicate that
Hamas and PIJ may have increased their direct involvement, perhaps helping West Bank militants
employ tactics similar in sophistication to those used by Iran-supported groups in Lebanon and
Gaza, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).122 After a Palestinian shooting attack in June
killed four Israeli settlers, and a group of Israeli settlers stormed a Palestinian town, setting fire to
multiple homes and cars in a scene reminiscent of a similar reprisal attack by settlers in
February.123
In early July, the IDF launched a major two-day raid into Jenin featuring around 1,000 ground
troops, aerial cover, and armored vehicles to counter IEDs. During the raid, which Israel
apparently carried out in hopes of reducing militants’ ability to use Jenin’s refugee camp as a
haven for stockpiling weapons and planning attacks against Israelis, 12 Palestinians and one
Israeli died.124
Israel’s operation in Jenin was its largest since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 during the
second intifada. According to one Israeli officer, the scale of the challenge in 2023 is smaller than
in 2002, when general Palestinian involvement in violence was more widespread.125 Some IDF
officials reportedly worry that a more overt war footing in the West Bank could harden negative
Palestinian popular attitudes toward Israel.126
After the IDF raid, the PA deployed more security forces in Jenin and elsewhere in the northern
West Bank. Reportedly, Secretary Blinken had encouraged President Abbas privately to
implement a security plan backed by the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian
Authority (USSC) and aimed at helping PA forces regain greater control in Jenin and Nablus.127

119 Department of State Press Briefing, June 26, 2023.
120 For more information on these foundations, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M.
Sharp.
121 Text of letter available at https://www.cruz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/cruz_bds_final.pdf.
122 Isabel Kershner, “Five Palestinians, Including 15-Year-Old Boy, Are Killed in Israeli Raid in the West Bank,” New
York Times, June 20, 2023; Ben Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas,” Al-Monitor, June
20, 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “After roadside bomb during Jenin raid, Gallant says ‘all options on the table,’” Times of
Israel, June 20, 2023.
123 Euronews with Associated Press, “Hundreds of Israeli settlers torch Palestinian homes and cars after deadly
shooting at settlement,” June 21, 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “Palestinian killed as settlers rampage in Huwara after deadly
terror attack,” Times of Israel, February 26, 2023.
124 Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?”; Agence France Presse, “Israel ends
large-scale West Bank raid that left 13 dead,” July 2, 2023; Reuters, “Israeli troops withdraw in West Bank, Gaza
rockets fired,” July 5, 2023.
125 Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?”
126 Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas.”
127 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Axios, February 1, 2023;
Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023. For
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service

15

link to page 20 link to page 20 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

PA officials reportedly expressed reservations about the plan, partly because of concerns that it
might not reduce Israeli incursions into West Bank cities or include other provisions calculated to
attract Palestinian public support.128
PA forces in Jenin have taken steps toward restoring order, apparently in line with the USSC plan,
but their operations have not extended into policing Jenin’s refugee camp—the city’s greatest
source of instability.129 Some Palestinians express general support for PA efforts to maintain
order, but warn that increased Israeli raids in the area make PA personnel look like collaborators
with Israel against their own people.130 Amid some media reports in September that PA forces
received armored vehicles and perhaps also some weapons as a result of U.S. and Jordanian
efforts, the Department of State said that U.S. security assistance to the PA “does not include
provision of weapons or ammunition.”131 In the meantime, top Israeli security officials reportedly
support Israeli diplomacy with Saudi Arabia that could potentially calm tensions in the West Bank
(as discussed below).132
Potential U.S.-Israel-Saudi Deal: Palestinian Elements
As the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia engage in initial discussions aimed at normalizing
Israel-Saudi relations amid other potential agreements involving the three countries (see “The
Abraham Accords” below), media reports have speculated that the Biden Administration and
Saudi leaders may insist on Israeli concessions to Palestinian demands as integral to any deal.
However, the current Israeli government may have difficulty in considering such concessions.133
How Palestinian issues are addressed may be an important factor for some Members of
Congress.134
PA leaders have reportedly engaged in some initial discussions with U.S., Israeli, and Saudi
counterparts about whether they might accept measures short of immediate Palestinian statehood.
According to various sources, PA officials are seeking “irreversible” steps to advance Palestinian
statehood aspirations. They reportedly are asking for Israel to give the PA more control over some
parts of the West Bank and to demolish illegal Israeli outposts.135 The PA also apparently wants
Saudi Arabia to resume funding to the PA and open a consulate in Jerusalem. Additionally, the PA
seems to be pressing the Biden Administration to follow through on its pledge to reopen the
consulate in Jerusalem that the Trump Administration closed in 2019, to back full Palestinian
representation at the United Nations, and to work with Congress to remove the legislative

background on the USSC, which is a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem and headed by a U.S. three-star flag
officer, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations.
128 Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin.”
129 Isabel Debre, “After Israeli raids, Palestinian police struggle in militant hotbed, reflecting region on the brink,”
Associated Press, August 18, 2023.
130 Raice and Abdulkarim.
131 “Fuming at reported weapons transfer to PA, far-right ministers threaten Netanyahu,” Times of Israel, September 13,
2023.
132 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s security brass advocates Saudi deal as way to calm tensions with Palestinians,” Al-Monitor,
September 8, 2023.
133 Barak Ravid, “Senior Biden adviser heading to Saudi Arabia to talk mega-deal with Palestinians,” Axios, September
3, 2023, and “Scoop: Palestinians gave Saudis list of what they want in Israel-Saudi peace deal,” Axios, August 30,
2023
134 Ben Samuels and Amir Tibon, “Israeli-Saudi Normalization Pact Could Die in Congress if Palestinians Overlooked,
Senators Warn,” Haaretz, August 8, 2023.
135 Jacob Magid, “Officials: Saudis assured Palestinians they won’t be abandoned in normalization talks,” Times of
Israel, September 14, 2023; “Palestinians seek ‘irreversible’ measures as part of Israel-Saudi deal, officials say,” Times
of Israel, August 31, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

16

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

designation of the PLO as a terrorist group.136 Without necessarily addressing other PA asks, a
U.S. official reportedly told PA officials that U.N. recognition “wasn’t in the cards.”137
The Abraham Accords
General overview. In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or
improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements,
known as the Abraham Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives
for most of the countries in question.138 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and
Bahrain, and both countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices
that each country had operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Israel’s July 2023
recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the disputed territory of Western Sahara could lead to full
Israel-Morocco diplomatic relations via the mutual opening of embassies. The Sudanese
military’s seizure of power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.139 In
January 2023, the Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal
with Israel after it transitions to a civilian government,140 but the outbreak of Sudanese civil
conflict in April may delay any major developments on that front for the foreseeable future.
While Saudi Arabia has not normalized its relations with Israel, it reportedly supported the UAE
and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords.141 Additionally, Saudi Arabia and
Oman have opened their airspace to Israeli civilian airlines, significantly reducing their travel
time to Asian destinations.
Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened,
particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include an Israel-UAE free
trade agreement that went into effect in March 2023, and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative
focused on desalinated water and solar energy. Additionally, since 2022, Israel and the UAE have
been part of a larger “I2U2” grouping with the United States and India that focuses on joint
investments and initiatives in various areas.142 In September 2023, the I2U2 countries, Saudi

136 Ibid.; Ravid, “Senior Biden adviser heading to Saudi Arabia to talk mega-deal with Palestinians” and “Scoop:
Palestinians gave Saudis list of what they want in Israel-Saudi peace deal”; Dion Nissenbaum and Summer Said,
“Palestinians Press Saudis for Israeli Concessions in Deal,” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 2023. The Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA, Title X of P.L. 100-204) included a congressional determination that “the PLO and its
affiliates are a terrorist organization and a threat to the interests of the United States, its allies, and to international law
and should not benefit from operating in the United States,” along with various prohibitions on PLO-related actions.
Section 1003(3) of the ATA prohibits the PLO from having an office in the United States; subsequent legal provisions
have permitted the executive branch to temporarily waive this prohibition from time to time under specified
circumstances.
137 Ravid, “Senior Biden adviser heading to Saudi Arabia to talk mega-deal with Palestinians.”
138 See https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/. These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and
Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and
U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports
suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its
agreement to recognize Israel.
139 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
140 Reuters, “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” February 3, 2023.
141 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021.
142 White House, “Joint Statement of the Leaders of India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the United States (I2U2),”
July 14, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

17

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Arabia, and the European Union committed to establish an India-Middle East-Europe Economic
Corridor featuring infrastructure links such as rail, clean energy, and digital connectivity.143
As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken
met the foreign ministers of Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022
summit in Israel’s southern Negev desert to inaugurate a regional cooperation framework. The
framework features periodic Negev Forum meetings, as well as working groups engaging
regularly on clean energy, education and coexistence, food and water security, health, regional
security, and tourism.144 Participants have expected that a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting would
take place in Morocco, but U.S. officials reportedly told Israel that plans for holding the meeting
in July would be postponed due to an Israeli settlement construction announcement in June.145
Developments since the new Israeli government took office have reportedly fueled some concerns
among Arab governments about closer ties with Israel, including the new government’s actions
against Palestinians, Israeli domestic discord, and some apparent U.S.-Israel differences.146
Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation,
public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional
governments recognizing Israel remains strong.147 According to one poll, support in the UAE and
Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in
2022.148 However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the
UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.149
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the
efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with
Israel in the years ahead.”150 In June 2023, Blinken announced the appointment of Daniel Shapiro
(formerly U.S. ambassador to Israel) as senior adviser on regional integration, a new position
focused on deepening and broadening the Accords. Reportedly, Shapiro will be less engaged in
diplomacy aimed at Israel-Saudi normalization (discussed below) than in boosting other aspects
of the Abraham Accords.151

143 White House, “Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India – Middle East – Europe Economic
Corridor,” September 9, 2023.
144 Department of State, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10,
2023; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens
in Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023.
145 Itamar Eichner, “US responds to new settlement construction: postpones Negev Forum in Morocco,” Ynetnews, June
18, 2023.
146 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel’s Ties with Arabs Falter,” Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2023; Yoav Limor, “Exclusive:
Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence,” Israel Hayom, April 4, 2023.
147 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2022 Arab Opinion Index, January 3, 2023.
148 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2022; Dylan
Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022.
149 Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.”
150 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
Availability,” October 13, 2021.
151 Jacob Magid, “Ex-US ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro tapped as Biden’s first Abraham Accords envoy,” Times of
Israel, June 29, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

18

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

The Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S. policy inducements to countries in
connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.152 It has sought to avoid portraying Israeli
normalization with Arab and Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a
negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.153 Negev Forum members
acknowledge that part of their mandate is to “create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian
relations.”154 However, the PA has opted not to join the forum. Palestinian leaders denounced the
initial announcement of UAE normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian
national cause, given Arab League states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian
negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.155 Jordan also has remained on the
sidelines of the Negev Forum, conditioning its involvement on PA participation.156
Normalization efforts with Saudi Arabia. In May 2023, an unnamed senior Israeli diplomatic
source was cited as saying that “the Saudi [normalization] issue is now more important than
anything else” for Netanyahu’s foreign policy. “He knows that Israel cannot stop Iran on its
own.”157 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has expressed general support
for normalization with Israel but stated in January 2023 that “true normalization and true stability
will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the Palestinians dignity. That
requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”158 Various factors could
complicate an Israel-Saudi normalization process, including the March 2023 Saudi-Iran
normalization deal brokered by China, Saudi desires for stronger U.S. support for Saudi security
and civilian nuclear priorities (which might require congressional approval), and Arab concerns
regarding increased Israeli-Palestinian tensions and violence.159 One media report has suggested
that while Arab states like Saudi Arabia “may see Iran as a menace, they see little gain in isolating
and opposing Tehran to the extent that Israel does.”160 A 2023 public opinion poll suggests that
large majorities of Saudis oppose normalization with both Israel and Iran, and that about 18%
support cooperation with Israel against Iran.161
During Secretary Blinken’s June 2023 visit to Saudi Arabia, he said that helping normalize
Israeli-Saudi ties is a U.S. priority, saying, “We discussed it here, and we will continue to work at

152 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October
14, 2021.
153 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Their
Meeting,” January 30, 2023.
154 The Negev Forum Regional Cooperation Framework Adopted by the Steering Committee on November 10th, 2022,
hyperlink to document available at https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-
framework/.
155 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
14, 2020.
156 Jacob Magid, “US laments Jordan’s absence from Negev Forum, aims to keep Palestinians in loop,” Times of Israel,
January 8, 2023.
157 Ben Caspit, “For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia not impossible,” Al-Monitor, May 16, 2023.
158 Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Al-Monitor,
January 20, 2023.
159 Mark Mazzetti et al., “U.S., in Long Shot, Seeks Saudi Deal with Netanyahu,” New York Times, June 19, 2023;
Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Israeli-Saudi normalization still elusive despite US push,” Al-Monitor, May 25, 2023; Barak
Ravid, “Biden admin pushing for Saudi-Israeli peace deal by end of year, officials say,” Axios, May 17, 2023. See also
CRS In Focus IF10799, Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul
K. Kerr.
160 Patrick Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran,” New York Times,
March 11, 2023.
161 David Pollock, “New Saudi Opinion Poll Shows 40 Percent Still Back Some Ties with Israel,” Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (Fikra Forum), May 15, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

19

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

it, to advance it in the days, weeks, and months ahead.”162 In the same briefing, Saudi Foreign
Minister Al Saud said
I have said before and it’s quite clear that we believe that normalization is in the interest of
the region, that it would bring significant benefits to all. But without finding a pathway to
peace for the Palestinian people, without addressing that challenge, any normalization will
have limited benefits. And therefore, I think we should continue to focus on finding a
pathway towards a two-state solution, on finding a pathway towards giving the Palestinians
dignity and justice.163
In a July CNN interview, President Biden said that “We’re a long way” from an Israel-Saudi
normalization deal that could partly depend on what Saudi Arabia might ask of the United
States.164 Amid speculation in August about possible progress in negotiations, and reported Israeli
interest in a U.S.-Israel security agreement as part of a potential deal,165 a White House
spokesperson was cited as saying, “There is no agreed to set of negotiations, there’s no agreed-to
framework to codify normalization or any of the other security considerations that we and our
friends have in the region.”166 In September, U.S., Israeli, and Saudi leaders have alluded to their
ongoing discussions, expressing some optimism while acknowledging a number of outstanding
issues.167
Security cooperation and Israel in CENTCOM. In January 2021, President Trump determined
that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most
countries in the Middle East, would add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR), partly to
encourage military interoperability as a means of reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many
Arab states.168 Israel had previously been under the purview of U.S. European Command.
CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,169 and in October an Israeli Defense
Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.170 Since then, Israel has joined military
exercises with the United States and the other Abraham Accords states, as well as other
CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.171
Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by
Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government reportedly expressed
interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.172 Earlier, both Morocco (November 2021) and

162 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at a
Joint Press Availability,” June 8, 2023.
163 Ibid.
164 Transcript: Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden. See also Thomas L. Friedman, “Biden Is Weighing a Big
Middle East Deal,” New York Times, July 27, 2023.
165 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Bibi wants security agreement from Biden as part of mega Saudi deal,” Axios, August 9,
2023.
166 Reuters, “White House: No framework agreed yet for an Israel-Saudi deal,” August 9, 2023.
167 Barak Ravid, “Inside the Biden-Netanyahu Meeting,” Axios, September 20, 2023; Reuters, “Saudi deal could be in
place early 2024 - Israel FM,” September 20, 2023.
168 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,
2021.
169 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021.
170 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” Times of Israel,
October 29, 2021.
171 Reuters, “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” November 11, 2021. Participant list for
2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
172 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25,
2022.
Congressional Research Service

20

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.173 These MOUs
appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.
Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be
contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.174 In late 2022, Israel’s defense
ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.175
At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly
discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on
inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.176 Speculation
about specific measures has continued since then.177 In January 2023, the Department of
Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on
cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.178
Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel,
certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their
involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”179 Actions
by this Israeli government may be fueling any such reluctance to some degree.180 Regional
countries might be hesitate to share the real-time intelligence data that underlies less sensitive
basic threat information.181 Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM
apparently plans to help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners
using the X-band radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air
defense systems and fighter jets.182 Additionally, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
(NAVCENT) is reportedly working with Israel and some Arab states to develop a network of
unmanned maritime drones to monitor Iranian naval activity and narcotics smuggling in
NAVCENT’s area of responsibility.183
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.184 In March, Congress enacted the

173 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021;
Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022.
174 Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Breaking
Defense, October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” Wall Street Journal,
October 10, 2022.
175 Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.”
176 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022.
177 Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Breaking Defense,
June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia—report,” Times of Israel, June
28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York
Times, June 21, 2022.
178 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim
Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Washington Post,
January 31, 2023.
179 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” New York Times, July 14,
2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” Wall Street
Journal, July 13, 2022.
180 “UAE, Jordan consider reducing diplomacy with Israel—report,” Jerusalem Post, March 22, 2023.
181 Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,”
Politico, July 12, 2022.
182 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Haaretz, July 13, 2022.
183 Dion Nissenbaum, “Inside a U.S. Navy Maritime Drone Operation Aimed at Iran,” Wall Street Journal, August 31,
2022.
184 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/
Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.
Congressional Research Service

21

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other
things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening
and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of
measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization
efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.
The FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263), enacted in
December 2022, included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the
Secretary of State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees, within 180 days of
enactment:
a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United
States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense
architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise
and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran
and groups linked to Iran.
Some Members have introduced legislation in the 118th Congress aimed at strengthening the
Abraham Accords, including the following:
• H.R. 3099, which seeks to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 to establish a Senate-confirmed position of “Special Envoy for the Abraham
Accords.” The House passed the bill in June 2023.
• S. 2413, which among other things would authorize the creation of a Regional
Integration Office within the State Department, to be headed by a Senate-
confirmed position of “Special Presidential Envoy for the Abraham Accords,
Negev Forum, and Related Normalization Agreements” (this provision is also
included in S.Amdt. 717 to S. 2226, the FY2024 National Defense Authorization
Act). S. 2413 also would establish a $105 million Regional Integration
Opportunity Fund for FY2024-FY2030, authorize additional cooperative Arab-
Israeli funding, and expand the reach of U.S.-Israel foundations to include
Abraham Accords and Negev Forum countries.
• H.R. 2973/S. 1334, which seeks to require the Administration to submit a
strategy to some congressional committees for greater regional maritime and
interdiction cooperation to counter Iranian and Iran-related naval capabilities and
threats to lawful commerce.
• H.R. 3792, which, among other things, encourages U.S. officials to use three
existing regional or global programs—the Middle East Partnership Initiative,
Middle East Research Cooperation, and the International Visitor Leadership
Program—to fund activities to expand and deepen the Accords.
• S. 1777, which, among other things, would authorize the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to engage in activities to
strengthen network defense and cybersecurity collaboration between Abraham
Accords countries and the United States.
• S.Amdt. 255 to S. 2226, which would authorize the President to enter into
“trilateral and multilateral cooperative project agreements with Israel and
Abraham Accords countries, Negev Forum countries, and countries that have
signed peace treaties with Israel, under the authority of section 27 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2767), to carry out research on and development,
testing, evaluation, and joint production (including follow-on support) of defense
articles and defense services to detect, track, and destroy armed unmanned aerial
systems that threaten the United States, Israel, and partners in the Middle East.”
Congressional Research Service

22

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Countering Iran185
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE through coordinated drone
and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.186 Israeli observers who
anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war
against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since
then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”187
The IDF’s Military Intelligence directorate reportedly warned Israeli officials in early 2023 that
the “anti-Israeli axis led by Iran”—including Hezbollah and Hamas—appears to be emboldened
by Israeli domestic discord and some purported U.S.-Israel differences.188 According to one
media report’s profile of the intelligence warning, Iran doubts that Israel can “carry out an
offensive against it or strike its nuclear program with US support.”189 Another media report said
that Iran and its allies are not “necessarily interested in a direct, all-out clash,” but are “willing to
risk more daring offensive operations,” while arguing that closer U.S.-Israel security coordination
may at least partly reflect a pragmatic U.S. desire to prevent being dragged into a confrontation
with Iran.190 This same report surmised that Iran may calculate it has bolstered its position vis-á-
vis Israel and the United States because Iran and the Syrian regime have improved their relations
with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab governments, Iran is approaching “nuclear threshold
state” status, and Iran has a growing partnership with Russia.
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister
Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.191
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional

185 See also CRS Report R47321, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas.
186 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York
Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” Jerusalem Post, March 11,
2022.
187 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post,
November 14, 2021.
188 Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence.”
189 Ibid.
190 Amos Harel, “Washington’s Mideast Pullout Sets Israel and Iran on a Collision Course,” Haaretz, April 11, 2023.
See also Jared Szuba, “US, Israel war games underscore warnings to Iran on nuclear enrichment,” Al-Monitor, July 11,
2023.
191 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “UN report: Uranium particles enriched to 83.7% found in Iran,” Associated Press,
February 28, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

23

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

tensions.192 In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some
operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military
capabilities.193
As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the
possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence
diplomatic outcomes.194 Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and
government crackdowns in Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in
Ukraine, near-term prospects for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.195
During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July 2022, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the
Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment
“never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is
prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”196 Additionally, Biden
said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from
acquiring nuclear weapons.197 In February 2023, then-Ambassador Nides said that the United
States would not engage in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program while Iran provides drones for
Russia in its war in Ukraine. He also said that U.S.-Israel cooperation vis-à-vis Iran was
“lockstep”:
As President Biden has said, we will not stand by and watch Iran get a nuclear weapon,
number one. Number two, he said, all options are on the table. Number three, Israel can
and should do whatever they need to deal with and we’ve got their back.198
In January 2023, the United States and Israel held their largest-ever bilateral military exercise,
named Juniper Oak. According to CENTCOM, the exercise “enhanced interoperability and the
ability of CENTCOM forces to rapidly move combat power into the region,” and provides
opportunities to incorporate lessons learned with all U.S. partners in the CENTCOM AOR.199 The
two militaries held another stage of Juniper Oak in July.200
Various sources have documented reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s
nuclear program,201 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on
the overall effectiveness of such operations.202 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military

192 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24,
2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi,
“With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16,
2022.
193 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022.
194 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022; Israeli
Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022.
195 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran,
November 2022.
196 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022.
197 Associated Press, “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” July 15, 2022.
198 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve got their back,’”
Times of Israel, February 19, 2023.
199 U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26, 2023. See also Michael Eisenstadt,
“The Juniper Oak Military Exercise: Implications for Innovation, Experimentation, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2023.
200 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command and the Israel Defense Forces Begin Military Exercise,” July 10,
2023.
201 Agence France Presse, “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” March 15, 2022.
202 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

24

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

capabilities,203 questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against
Iran’s nuclear program.204
In a January 2023 CNN interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted
attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons
development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting
nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing
is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to
take action.”205 Amid some international concerns about advanced levels of Iranian uranium
enrichment, Defense Minister Gallant stated in February that Israel would not allow Iran to enrich
uranium to 90%.206
While an imminent return to the JCPOA may be unlikely, media reports emerged in June 2023 of
indirect U.S.-Iran discussions aimed at a possible informal, unwritten understanding,207 despite
public statements by U.S. officials denying that a deal is in the offing. The reports said that such a
U.S.-Iran arrangement might feature various elements, including
• Iranian agreement not to enrich uranium beyond 60%, and to release some
Iranian-American prisoners; and
• U.S. agreement not to tighten sanctions, and to unfreeze billions of dollars in
Iranian funds held abroad for Iran to use for humanitarian purposes.208
Netanyahu has reportedly indicated to members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee that Israel “could live with” such a U.S.-Iran understanding,209 though on June 13 he
said
Our position is clear: No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue
to do everything to defend itself. Our opposition to a return to the original agreement, I
think it is working, but there are still differences of outlook and we do not hide them, also
about smaller agreements.210
Additionally, Netanyahu is apparently wary of U.S. efforts aimed at persuading Israel to promise
not to surprise the United States with military action against Iran.211
In August, Iran and the United States reportedly reached an agreement by which the countries
would each release five detained nationals of the other country and Iran would obtain limited

203 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel’s ‘Top Gun’: The US-Israeli aircraft that can take down Iran,” Jerusalem Post, February
25, 2023.
204 Ethan Bronner and Henry Meyer, “Will Israel Attack Iran? What to Know About Netanyahu’s Military Posturing,”
Bloomberg, June 13, 2023; Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Haaretz, September 1,
2022.
205 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
206 “Netanyahu said to huddle repeatedly with military brass over possible attack on Iran,” Times of Israel, February 22,
2023.
207 Michael Crowley et al., “U.S. and Iran Quietly Discussing a Deal to Ease Nuclear Tensions,” New York Times, June
15, 2023; Laurence Norman and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Begins Quiet Push to Reduce Tensions with Iran,” Wall Street
Journal, June 15, 2023.
208 Ibid.
209 “Report: Netanyahu says US and Iran in talks for a ‘mini-deal’ Israel can live with,” Times of Israel, June 13, 2023.
210 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee: ‘No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue to do everything to defend itself,’”
June 13, 2023.
211 Lahav Harkov, “Herzog to fly to Washington for White House visit, Congress speech,” Jerusalem Post, July 16,
2023.
Congressional Research Service

25

link to page 36 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

access to some frozen funds, triggering speculation that a U.S.-Iran understanding on Iran’s
nuclear program might follow.212 The mutual prisoner release and some unfreezing of funds
occurred in September.213
Hezbollah and Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict—most notably in a 2006 war.214
Some developments in 2022 and 2023, such as greater Hezbollah activity in disputed border
areas, and occasional cross-border drone incursions and projectile fire, have fueled speculation
about a possible outbreak of hostilities.215 One July 2023 report citing Israeli security sources
assessed that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah does not appear to want all-out confrontation
with Israel, but “no longer has deep-seated concern about a possible escalation into a day or a few
days of limited fighting,” which might increase the risk of 2006-style intensified conflict.216
Nasrallah’s possible interest in probing for limits to Israeli deterrence may be due in part to
domestic upheavals in Israel. In response to Israeli protests over the July Basic Law provision
affecting the judiciary, Nasrallah said that Israel “is on the path to collapse, fragmentation, and
disappearance, God willing.”217
Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied
weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and
its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.218 In 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership and
Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture
precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.219 Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon that Israel
could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling, based on
reports that Iran has planned flights that could carry equipment directly to Hezbollah in
Lebanon.220
In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime
boundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (see Appendix C).
Public debate in Israel centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal were worth the

212 Zvi Bar’el, “U.S.-Iran Prisoner Deal Signals Possible Path to New Nuclear Deal,” Haaretz, August 13, 2023.
213 Michael D. Shear and Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Releases 5 Americans as U.S. Unfreezes Billions in Oil Revenue for
Tehran,” New York Times, September 18, 2023.
214 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah.
215 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Hezbollah deterrence is eroding as Lebanon border heats up,” Al-Monitor, July 14, 2023;
Associated Press, “Lebanon’s militant Hezbollah group says it shot down an Israeli drone near the southern border,”
June 26, 2023; Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program—opinion,” Jerusalem
Post, December 28, 2022.
216 Caspit, “Israel’s Hezbollah deterrence is eroding as Lebanon border heats up.”
217 “Hezbollah chief gloats: Israel had its ‘worst day,’ is on ‘path to disappearance,’” Times of Israel, July 25, 2023.
218 See, for example, Associated Press, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” December 28,
2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York
Times, April 23, 2020.
219 Associated Press, “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,”
February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies
Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.
220 Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

26

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.221 While Prime Minister Netanyahu
made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the
maritime boundary agreement,222 his government has not taken action to date.223
Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster
Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other
military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-
backed targets that could present threats to its security.224
Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian
targets,225 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.226 This
deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has
criticized some Israeli strikes.227
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in
international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and
humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish
refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.228 As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel
has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment,
especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to
Hezbollah in Lebanon.229
Despite entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal
assistance to Ukraine.230 Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian
rescue forces and civilian organizations.231

221 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022.
222 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Times
of Israel, October 31, 2022.
223 Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Jerusalem Post,
January 31, 2023.
224 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” Jerusalem Post, March 29,
2022.
225 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27,
2021.
226 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel,
February 27, 2022.
227 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine—report,” Jerusalem Post, May 4, 2022;
Emanuel Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel,
June 12, 2022.
228 Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar
Ukrainians Arriving Since October from Working,” Haaretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who
entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered
Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and
Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022.
229 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply
the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022.
230 Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,”
Breaking Defense, October 18, 2022.
231 “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ Times of Israel, September 23,
2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

27

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an
early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine
aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.232 In November 2022, one news outlet reported
that Israel had funded the purchase of “strategic materials” by a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) member, which then transferred the materials to Ukraine for its use.233
In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells
from War Reserve Stocks for Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.234 According to
multiple reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation
with the United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and
they don’t really need our permission to take it.”235
In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for the possible sale of anti-drone
jamming systems that could help Ukraine down drones. Israeli officials have claimed that this
step does not change Israel’s policy against providing lethal assistance because the systems are
defensive in nature and do not target Russian soldiers. While Ukrainian officials appear interested
in the systems, they view them as less critical than air defense systems that can counter ballistic
missiles.236
In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian
branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate
emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel.
Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about
emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on
Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.237 As of
early 2023, the agency had reportedly frozen most activities related to promoting Jewish
emigration to Israel from former Soviet Union countries, except Ukraine.238

232 Reuters, “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” October 19, 2022; “Israel giving
intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine—report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022.
233 Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Haaretz, November 17,
2022.
234 Eric Schmitt et al., “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023.
235 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023.
236 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel approves export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine,” Axios, March 15, 2023.
237 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” New
York Times, July 22, 2022.
238 Zvika Klein, “Jewish Agency lowers profile in Russia, less activity in FSU countries—exclusive,” Jerusalem Post,
February 21, 2023.
Congressional Research Service

28

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are projections for 2023 unless otherwise
specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
Congressional Research Service

29

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Appendix B. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022.
Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to
1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received
his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has
been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with
the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional
influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a
security-minded nationalist.
National Unity (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats)
Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New
Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led
Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary
and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.
Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from
2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.
Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of
West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious
law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister within the
defense ministry with some responsibilities over West Bank administration. He has
headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained
lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and
religiously conservative causes.
Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a
common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam.
Leader: Itamar Ben Gvir
Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to
Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir
Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir
was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says
that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a
lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a
regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign
minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and
canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the
Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked
under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to
consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a
platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in
a 2013 case.
Congressional Research Service

30

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Noam (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues
(including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the conversion
process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish Power.
Leader: Avi Maoz
Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has
headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. In the current government, he
nominally headed an office in the prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity,
but resigned from that post in February 2023 based on concerns that he was not
given the authority to change policy as he desired.
LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the
Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that
supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and
university lecturer.
CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013,
when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-
place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government
from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh
Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for
Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and
then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in
January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November
2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could not
serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had
indicated in the 2022 plea deal that he would permanently leave politics.
United Torah Judaism – Coalition (7 seats)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its
interpretation of traditional Jewish law.
Leader: Yitzhak Goldknopf
Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been
prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day
care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance.
Congressional Research Service

31

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

ARAB
Hadash-Ta’al – Opposition (5 seats)
Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with
the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before
becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the
UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the
government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for
Arab Israelis.

Sources: Various open sources.
Congressional Research Service

32

link to page 37 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Appendix C. Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement
Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the
United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-
Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to
eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line
extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon
agreement (see Figure C-1). According to a senior Biden Administration official
This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a
boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without
conflict.239
On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal.240 Reportedly,
President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the
agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural
gas drilling.241

239 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime
Agreement,” October 11, 2022.
240 Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Times of Israel, October
29, 2022.
241 Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Haaretz,
October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” Jerusalem Post,
October 11, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

33

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Figure C-1. Map: Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Agreement

Source: Haaretz.
Note: All boundaries are approximate.
Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future
side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will
settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field
that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can
begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.242
The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly
before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had
threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute.

242 Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Times of Israel,
October 12, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

34

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Author Information

Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R44245 · VERSION 137 · UPDATED
35

Download PDF

Download EPUB

Revision History

Sep. 27, 2023

HTML · PDF

<1% changed

Sep. 21, 2023

HTML · PDF

<1% changed

Aug. 15, 2023

HTML · PDF

<1% changed