Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from June 15, 2021 to September 16, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Israel: ~~New Prime Minister~~Background and U.S. Relations in Brief September 16, 2021 Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. U.S. law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military Jim Zanotti edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additionally, a 10- Specialist in Middle year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United Eastern Affairs States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. In 2021, some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters: New government and domestic issues. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party heads a power-sharing government featuring a group of disparate parties from across the political spectrum that replaced the government of the long-serving Binyamin Netanyahu in June 2021. Despite reportedly holding more ~~and U.S. Relations~~
~~June 15, 2021~~
~~in Brief~~
~~Jim Zanotti~~
~~The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations.~~
~~Specialist in Middle~~
~~Eastern Affairs~~
New prime minister and an end to Netanyahu’s rule. A group of disparate parties from across

~~the political spectrum agreed in June 2021 to form a power-sharing government to replace long-~~
~~serving Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who is being tried in an Israeli court on corruption~~

~~charges. On June 13, the Knesset (Israel’s unicameral parliament) approved the new government,~~
~~headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party. Despite holding more right-of-center and~~ nationalistic nationalistic
positions than Netanyahu on Palestinian issues and settlements, Bennett may be constrained by left-of-center and Arab-led positions than Netanyahu on Palestinian issues and settlements, Bennett may be constrained by left-of-center and Arab-led
parties in the coalition from taking action in line with those positions. parties in the coalition from taking action in line with those positions. ~~The government is generally expected~~Although Bennett’s policies on various foreign policy matters may not differ significantly from those of Netanyahu, his government has thus far offered a less confrontational approach to disagreements with U.S. officials. The government will likely try to focus on to focus on
pragmatic management of Israel’s security and economy rather than controversial political initiatives, but Netanyahu and pragmatic management of Israel’s security and economy rather than controversial political initiatives, but Netanyahu and
others in opposition may challenge its cohesion. others in opposition may challenge its cohesion. ~~If the government survives, Yair Lapid of the centrist Yesh Atid party—the~~
~~current foreign minister—will rotate into the prime minister’s office in August 2023, under the terms of the power-sharing~~
~~agreement~~To prevent the government’s dissolution, Israel’s Knesset (its unicameral parliament) must pass a budget for 2021-2022 by early November 2021. The Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List is . The Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List is ~~seeking to use its status as~~ part of the coalition part of the coalition and is seeking to have the government to have the government
address socioeconomic inequalities among the Arab citizens who make up around 20% of Israel’s population.address socioeconomic inequalities among the Arab citizens who make up around 20% of Israel’s population. ~~It is unclear to~~
~~what extent the new government might change Israel’s approach to relations with the United States, including on important~~
~~regional matters involving the Palestinians and Iran.~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian disputes, including the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict and its aftermath~~ Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the In hopes of preserving the
viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to
help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the
Trump Administration. In May 2021, an 11-day conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist Trump Administration. In May 2021, an 11-day conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza. It was the fourth major conflict of its kind, with previous ones organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza. It was the fourth major conflict of its kind, with previous ones
occurring in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014. Intercommunal protests and violence also took place among Arabs and Jews within occurring in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014. Intercommunal protests and violence also took place among Arabs and Jews within
Israel and JerusalemIsrael and Jerusalem~~. Hamas apparently sought to capitalize on Arab-Jewish~~—with existing tensions tensions ~~over~~in Jerusalem contributing to the conflict’s outbreak. In the conflict’s aftermath, ~~Jerusalem to increase its domestic~~
~~popularity vis-à-vis rival faction Fatah. In April, Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas—the West Bank-based Palestinian~~
~~Authority (PA) president—had postponed plans for 2021 PA elections that many Palestinians had eagerly anticipated.~~
~~In the conflict’s aftermath, the Biden Administration appears focused on restoring regional calm and improving humanitarian~~
~~conditions. It is unclear that the conflict decisively changed dynamics between the key parties affected—Israel, Hamas, and~~
~~the PA.~~ President Biden has pledged to replenish Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system, and legislative proposals may be President Biden has pledged to replenish Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system, and legislative proposals may be
forthcoming on supplemental U.S. military aid for Israel. With Gaza still under Hamas control, forthcoming on supplemental U.S. military aid for Israel. With Gaza still under Hamas control, ~~the~~ obstacles to post-conflict obstacles to post-conflict
~~recovery remain largely the same as in the past~~recovery persist. Beyond providing short-term humanitarian assistance, the United States and . Beyond providing short-term humanitarian assistance, the United States and
other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with longer-term reconstruction without bolstering other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with longer-term reconstruction without bolstering
~~Hamas.~~
~~Palestinians and Arab state normalization.~~ ~~To date, the Biden Administration has not reversed steps taken by~~Hamas. The Biden Administration has followed agreements reached during the Trump the Trump
~~Administration in apparent connection with 2020 normalization agreements~~Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and between Israel and four Arab states—the United Arab Emirates the United Arab Emirates
~~(UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend~~
~~plans to annex part of the West Bank, though announcements related to settlement activity accelerated after the agreement.~~
~~Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and rivalry among key actors in~~
~~the Middle East. Arab-Israeli common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate in countering Iran and perhaps even~~
~~Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for Sunni Islamist movements.~~
(UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist with Israel-Arab state normalization would seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties. Possible economic benefits and U.S. arms sales stemming from Israel-Arab state normalization may influence relationships among regional actors. Iran and other regional issues. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement
that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. ~~Facing intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015~~
~~agreement. Israeli officials have~~Prime Minister Bennett has made statements opposing the Biden Administration’s possible reentry into the agreement. made statements opposing the Biden Administration’s possible reentry into the agreement.
~~In light of recent incidents targeting Iran’s nuclear program that may have been Israeli covert actions, observers have~~
~~speculated about future Israeli~~Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence actions to influence ~~or disrupt~~ nuclear diplomacy. Israel also has reportedly conducted a nuclear diplomacy. Israel also has reportedly conducted a
number of military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to number of military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal. China: Investments in Israel and U.S. concerns. U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over Chinese investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability to gather intelligence and acquire security-related technologies. While Chinese state-owned companies remain engaged in some specific infrastructure projects, including the management of a seaport terminal in Haifa, Israel has taken some steps to reduce Chinese investment in strategically important areas~~concerns about Iran’s efforts to~~
~~establish a permanent presence in these areas and improve the accuracy of Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal~~. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page 18 link to page 18 ~~link to page 5 link to page 19~~ ~~Israel: New Prime Minister~~ Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

~~Introduction~~Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (seeIsrael (see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areasUnited States in many areas~~; issues with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations include~~
~~the following.~~
~~ The June 2021 formation of a new Israeli power-sharing government, headed by~~
~~Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, after 12 years with Binyamin Netanyahu serving~~
~~as prime minister.~~
~~ Israel’s security cooperation with the United States.~~
~~ Issues relevant to Israeli-Palestinian disputes~~. For more background, including on aid, arms sales, and missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future negotiations and outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy will remain in Jerusalem. The Biden Administration also has announced—without specifying the timing—that it plans to reopen the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem that had previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians. The Trump Administration merged the consulate general into the embassy in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit within the embassy. Some media reports suggest that the Biden Administration may delay the consulate’s reopening until sometime after a critical budget deadline for Israel’s new government in early November 2021 (discussed below).1 Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid has voiced opposition to the reopening, stating concerns that it could destabilize the government and insisting that “Jerusalem is the sovereign capital of Israel and Israel alone.”2 U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Congress also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a number of specific security-related areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countermeasures for drone aircraft. Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations include:  Challenges facing the Israeli power-sharing government that took office in June 2021, headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett.  Israeli-Palestinian issues, including the aftermath of May ~~, including the aftermath of May~~
2021 Israel-Gaza Strip 2021 Israel-Gaza Strip ~~violence, human rights considerations,~~ violence, some human rights considerations and heightened scrutiny of U.S. aid, and Israel’s and Israel’s
normalization of relations with various Arab states. normalization of relations with various Arab states.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah. Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
~~For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and~~
~~missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,~~
~~by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
~~New Prime Minister and End of Netanyahu’s Rule~~
1 See, for example, Jonathan Lis and Ben Samuels, “Ahead of First Meeting, Biden and Bennett Try to Dismantle a Jerusalem Landmine,” haaretz.com, August 16, 2021. 2 “Israel opposes Biden plan to reopen U.S. Palestinian mission in Jerusalem,” Reuters, September 1, 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 link to page 5 link to page 19 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief  Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure, and U.S. concerns about implications for U.S. national security. New Israeli Government A new power-sharing government headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett (see the A new power-sharing government headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett (see the ~~textbox~~text box
below for a brief biography) took office on June 13, 2021, below for a brief biography) took office on June 13, 2021, ~~putting an end to a 12-year-run as~~
~~prime minister by Binyamin Netanyahu.1 The government was approved by a slim margin (60-59,~~
~~with one abstention) in Israel’s Knesset (its unicameral parliament).~~
ending Binyamin Netanyahu’s 12-year tenure as prime minister.3 Since Netanyahu’s criminal indictment on corruption charges in February 2019, Israel has held Since Netanyahu’s criminal indictment on corruption charges in February 2019, Israel has held
four separate elections—the most recent in March 2021—and experienced considerable political four separate elections—the most recent in March 2021—and experienced considerable political
turmoil. Netanyahu had stayed in power during that time for various reasons, including lack of turmoil. Netanyahu had stayed in power during that time for various reasons, including lack of
Israeli consensus on replacing him during the crisis over the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Israeli consensus on replacing him during the crisis over the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, pandemic,
and his prominence on national security and his prominence on national security issues. ~~issues. With his efforts to block the new government~~
~~unsuccessful,~~ Netanyahu and his Likud party Netanyahu and his Likud party ~~will~~now lead the Knesset’s opposition, as was the case lead the Knesset’s opposition, as was the case
from from 2006 to 2009. Bennett—a right-of-center figure who leads the Yamina party—and the centrist Yesh Atid party leader Yair Lapid reached agreement with other key political party leaders to form a new government and replace Netanyahu. Bennett is scheduled to serve as prime minister until August 27, 2023, at which point Lapid would become prime minister. The ~~2006 to 2009. Questions surround Netanyahu’s prospects for continuing as Likud’s leader~~
~~and his overall future.~~
~~The Power-Sharing Government and Arab Participation~~
~~Bennett—a right-of-center figure who leads the Yamina party—and the centrist Yesh Atid party~~
~~leader Yair Lapid reached agreement across Israel’s political spectrum to oust Netanyahu. The~~
new government draws its support from a disparate coalition of parties on the right (Yamina, New new government draws its support from a disparate coalition of parties on the right (Yamina, New
Hope, Yisrael Beitenu), center (Yesh Atid and Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the Hope, Yisrael Beitenu), center (Yesh Atid and Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the
political spectrum, as well as from the Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) (see political spectrum, as well as from the Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) (see
Table 1 andand Appendix B).

~~1 Netanyahu also served an earlier 1996-1999 term as prime minister.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

1

~~Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief~~
Appendix B). The participation of UAL in the coalition is the first instance of an independent Arab party joining an Israeli government.4 Women make up approximately one-third of Israel’s new cabinet, with nine female ministers, more than in any previous government.5
Table 1. Israeli Power-Sharing Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett Naftali Bennett
Yamina Yamina
Foreign Minister and Foreign Minister and
Yair Lapid Yair Lapid
Yesh Atid Yesh Atid
Alternate Prime Minister Alternate Prime Minister
Defense Minister Defense Minister
Benny Gantz Benny Gantz
Kahol Lavan Kahol Lavan
Finance Minister Finance Minister
Avigdor Lieberman Avigdor Lieberman
Yisrael Beitenu Yisrael Beitenu
Justice Minister Justice Minister
Gideon Sa’ar Gideon Sa’ar
New Hope New Hope
Interior Minister Interior Minister
Ayelet Shaked Ayelet Shaked
Yamina Yamina
Transportation Minister Transportation Minister
Merav Michaeli Merav Michaeli
Labor Labor
Public Security Minister Public Security Minister
Omer Bar Lev Omer Bar Lev
Labor Labor
Health Minister Health Minister
Nitzan Horowitz Nitzan Horowitz
Meretz Meretz

3 Netanyahu also served an earlier 1996-1999 term as prime minister. 4 According to one Israeli media source, “Only twice have Arab Israeli parties backed an Israeli government. In the 1950s, a small faction composed of one Arab parliamentarian entered the coalition. The faction was far from independent, essentially operating as an Arab franchise of Israel’s ruling socialist party, Mapai. In the 1990s, when the government of left-wing Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin was in danger of collapsing, the Arab parties stepped in to prevent a vote of no confidence.” Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3, 2021. 5 Mazal Mualem, “Israeli female ministers introduce reforms, shake up agenda,” Al-Monitor, September 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 2 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Prime Minister Naftali Bennett: Biography
Bennett, born in 1972, is a leading figure of the Israeli national religious, pro-settler right. He Bennett, born in 1972, is a leading figure of the Israeli national religious, pro-settler right. He
hails from a modern Orthodox Jewish background. Having parents who emigrated from the hails from a modern Orthodox Jewish background. Having parents who emigrated from the
United States, Bennett lived in America at United States, Bennett lived in America at ~~various points~~multiple times as a youth and adult. He served in as a youth and adult. He served in
various Israeli special forces units (and remains a reservist) before starting what became a very various Israeli special forces units (and remains a reservist) before starting what became a very
successful career as a software entrepreneur. successful career as a software entrepreneur.
Entering politics in 2006, Bennett served as chief of staff for Binyamin Netanyahu until 2008, Entering politics in 2006, Bennett served as chief of staff for Binyamin Netanyahu until 2008,
while Netanyahu was serving as opposition leader in the Knesset.while Netanyahu was serving as opposition leader in the Knesset. ~~Reportedly, the Netanyahu~~
~~family harbors some personal animosity toward Bennett dating from his time on Netanyahu’s~~
~~staff.2~~ Later, Bennett served as director-general of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization for Israeli West Later, Bennett served as director-general of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization for Israeli West
Bank Bank settlers) from 2010 to 2012. settlers) from 2010 to 2012.
He then became the party leader for HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) and led the party into the Knesset in He then became the party leader for HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) and led the party into the Knesset in
2013. In 2018 he left The Jewish Home, seeking various right-of-center electoral alliances before finally becoming 2013. In 2018 he left The Jewish Home, seeking various right-of-center electoral alliances before finally becoming
head of Yamina in 2020. Bennett has participated in several coalition governments led by Netanyahu, serving as head of Yamina in 2020. Bennett has participated in several coalition governments led by Netanyahu, serving as
economy minister (2013-2015), education minister (2015-2019), and defense minister (2019-2020). In May 2020, economy minister (2013-2015), education minister (2015-2019), and defense minister (2019-2020). In May 2020,
he led Yamina into the opposition when Netanyahu and Likud formed a power-sharing government with Benny he led Yamina into the opposition when Netanyahu and Likud formed a power-sharing government with Benny
Gantz and Kahol Lavan. Gantz and Kahol Lavan.
Bennett openly opposes the creation of a Palestinian state, though he approves of greater Palestinian autonomy in Bennett openly opposes the creation of a Palestinian state, though he approves of greater Palestinian autonomy in
West Bank urban areas. He supports continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the West Bank urban areas. He supports continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the
annexation of Jewish-settled areas. However, he has agreed not to pursue annexation as prime minister in the annexation of Jewish-settled areas. However, he has agreed not to pursue annexation as prime minister in the
current power-sharing government. current power-sharing government.
On domestic issues, Bennett generally supports free-market policies, a modest government safety net, and a focus On domestic issues, Bennett generally supports free-market policies, a modest government safety net, and a focus
on equality of opportunity and education for economically challenged Israelis. He on equality of opportunity and education for economically challenged Israelis. He ~~and~~has supported efforts by his close political col eague his close political col eague
~~Ayelet Shaked, who served as justice minister from 2015 to 2019, support limiting the power of the judiciary to~~
~~constrain what appears to be increasingly nationalistic voter sentiment among Jewish Israelis.~~
~~The participation of UAL in the coalition is the first instance of an independent Arab party joining~~
~~an Israeli government.3 Generally, Arab parties have not joined ruling coalitions, partly because~~

~~2 Laurie Kellman, “Bennett, Netanyahu’s former protege, poised to succeed him,” Associated Press, June 3, 2021.~~
~~3 According to one Israeli media source, “Only twice have Arab Israeli parties backed an Israeli government. In the~~
~~1950s, a small faction composed of one Arab parliamentarian entered the coalition. The faction was far from~~
~~independent, essentially operating as an Arab franchise of Israel’s ruling socialist party, Mapai. In the 1990s, when the~~
~~government of left-wing Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin was in danger of collapsing, the Arab parties stepped in to~~
~~prevent a vote of no confidence.” Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid~~
~~coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~of historical and cultural Arab-Jewish tensions in Israel, as well as Arab desires to avoid direct~~
~~involvement in Israel’s actions in the West Bank and Gaza.~~
~~During this year’s election and government formation cycle, UAL leader Mansour Abbas~~
~~expressed his willingness to support a government of any nature if doing so could elicit specific~~
~~government promises to benefit Arab Israelis. With the outbreak of Arab-Jewish unrest and~~
~~violence in some Israeli cities during the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict, Abbas temporarily~~
~~withdrew from coalition negotiations, but he publicly called for an end to violence, and returned~~
~~to talks with Jewish parties after tensions largely subsided. The power-sharing agreement~~
~~reportedly includes promises to provide more than $16 billion in targeted funding to assist with~~
~~economic development, infrastructure, and other needs in Arab-populated areas of Israel, and~~
~~contemplates relaxing some government restrictions on the expansion of Arab communities.4~~
~~Looking Ahead and Issues for U.S. Policy~~
~~Various questions beset the new government. According to its power-sharing agreement, Bennett~~
~~is scheduled to serve as prime minister until August 27, 2023, at which point Lapid would~~
~~become prime minister. Given the fractious nature of the coalition, a New York Times article~~
~~anticipated that the new government may not address “contentious issues such as a solution to the~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or judicial reform. Instead it will likely focus on more straight-ahead~~
~~policies, such as creating a new state budget, restoring the post-pandemic economy and~~
~~improving infrastructure.”5 With ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties absent from the coalition, some~~
~~observers speculate about the prospects for a new government to reduce religious influence over~~
~~Israeli society on matters such as marriage, gay rights, and public services on the Sabbath.6~~
Ayelet Shaked, who served as justice minister from 2015 to 2019, to limit the power of the judiciary and other justice sector and public security institutions to curb executive and legislative actions.6 Key Domestic Issues In its first few months in office, the government has focused largely on addressing pragmatic solutions to challenges such as enacting a budget and addressing the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The fractious nature of the coalition makes it less likely to pursue comprehensive action on more politically contentious issues like those pertaining to the Palestinians. Significant disagreements within or defections from the government could lead to its collapse and Significant disagreements within or defections from the government could lead to its collapse and
new elections—perhaps leaving open the possibility of a return by Netanyahu to new elections—perhaps leaving open the possibility of a return by Netanyahu to power. In early August, Israel’s cabinet approved a budget for the first time in more than three years. Israeli law requires that the Knesset approve the budget by early November to prevent the government’s dissolution and a new round of elections. The budget, which covers 2021-2022, would emphasize spending on infrastructure and pandemic recovery as well as various reforms.7 Of the $360 billion budgeted for these two years, approximately $11 billion would be specifically allocated to the infrastructure, education, health care, and crime prevention needs of Arab Israelis,8 whose income and education levels are markedly lower than those of Jewish Israelis. Securing this level of funding for Arab citizens of Israel would be a major accomplishment for UAL leader Mansour Abbas, who joined the government based on budgetary assurances from coalition partners.9 6 Dahlia Scheindlin, “The Assault on Israel’s Judiciary,” The Century Foundation, July 7, 2021. 7 “Israel's 2021/22 budget set for parliament battle after cabinet approval,” Reuters, August 2, 2021. 8 Mazel Mualem, “Israeli budget approved in victory for Arab coalition party,” Al-Monitor, August 3, 2021. 9 Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 3 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Issues for U.S. Policy The new Israeli government’s approach to regional challenges related to Iran and the Palestinians will affect its relations with the United States. Prime Minister Bennett met with President Biden at the White House in August 2021. A White House readout of the meeting said that Bennett and Biden “reiterated their commitments to work constructively and deepen cooperation to address all aspects of Israel’s security against Iran and other threats,” and the statement included additional points on the Palestinians (see below).10 Although Bennett’s policies on regional issues may not differ significantly from those of former Prime Minister Netanyahu, his government has thus far publicized a less confrontational approach to disagreements with U.S. officials on Iran—apparently seeking to improve Israel’s bipartisan standing with Democrats.11 Israeli-Palestinian Issues Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. In May 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke out against steps taken by either Israelis or Palestinians that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payment to terrorists.12 During 2021, Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for Palestinians.13~~power.~~
~~Netanyahu and other right-of-center figures have criticized members from Yamina and New Hope~~
~~for abandoning their natural ideological partners, in an apparent effort to weaken the coalition’s~~
~~cohesion. However, if Bennett and Lapid can convince others to join the coalition, the~~
~~government’s lasting power could increase.~~
~~Netanyahu’s departure from office and the new government’s formation have the potential to~~
~~affect U.S.-Israel relations. Three former U.S. officials wrote that the Biden Administration might~~
~~expect “a few months of calm on the Palestinian issue and the Iran nuclear deal—thanks as much~~
~~to gridlock in the Knesset as to Jerusalem’s desire to smooth relations with Washington.”7~~
~~However, Prime Minister Bennett’s positions on Palestinian issues are more nationalistic than~~
~~Netanyahu’s, even if Bennett’s left-leaning and Arab coalition partners are likely to constrain his~~
~~actions. Some specific policy questions of importance include:~~
~~ U.S. relations. What changes in approach, if any, will the new government make~~
~~to relations with the Biden Administration and Members of Congress from both~~
~~parties?~~

~~4 Boxerman.~~
~~5 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel on Edge as Politicians Wrangle Over Coalition to Oust Netanyahu,” New York Times, June~~
~~3, 2021.~~
~~6 Isabel Kershner, “Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox Jews Face a Loss of Power,” New York Times, June 7, 2021.~~
~~7 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “Netanyahu’s On the Way Out. Here’s What Biden~~
~~Can Expect Next,” Politico, June 2, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~ Iran. What public line will the government take on a possible U.S. return to the~~
~~Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program, and~~
~~what means will it use to influence international diplomacy on the issue?~~
~~ Palestinian issues. How will the government approach sensitive Arab-Jewish~~
~~intercommunal issues in Israel and Jerusalem, settlement expansion in East~~
~~Jerusalem and the West Bank, and efforts to maintain calm with Gaza and allow~~
~~post-conflict recovery?~~
~~ Regional challenges. How will Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq,~~
~~Yemen, and Gaza seek to test the government’s resolve, and how will the~~
~~government respond?~~
~~U.S. Aid and Security Cooperation with Israel8~~
~~Israel maintains robust military and homeland security capabilities, partly owing to its close~~
~~cooperation with the United States on national security matters. U.S. law requires the executive~~
~~branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” or QME, and~~
~~expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military~~
~~aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to~~
~~provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on~~
~~joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations.~~
~~Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Congress~~
~~also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a number of specific security-related~~
~~areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countering drone aircraft.~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian Disputes~~
~~Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated~~
~~two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In doing so, they seek to help manage~~
~~tensions—such as during the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict mentioned below, bolster Israel’s~~
~~defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump~~
~~Administration. They also have played down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian~~
~~negotiations, and have respected agreements reached during the Trump Administration that~~
~~normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab states—the United Arab Emirates~~
~~(UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.~~ As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act
enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020
(Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the future establishment of a fund to support Israeli-(Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the future establishment of a fund to support Israeli-
Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian
~~economic cooperation.~~
~~May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict~~
~~In May 2021, an 11-day conflict (see textbox below) took place between Israel and Hamas (a~~
~~U.S.-designated terrorist organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza.9 Amid~~
~~unrest in the West Bank during the conflict (May 10-21), one source estimates that 27~~

~~8 For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
~~9 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces.10 Intercommunal protests and violence also~~
~~took place within Israel and Jerusalem—involving some Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinian~~
~~residents of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities. In the aftermath, the Biden~~
~~Administration appears focused on restoring regional calm and improving humanitarian~~
~~conditions.~~
~~Major Israel-Hamas Conflicts Since 2008~~
~~December 2008-January 2009: Israeli codename “Operation Cast Lead”~~

~~Three-week duration, first meaningful display of Palestinians’ Iranian-origin rockets, Israeli air strikes and~~
~~ground offensive~~

~~Political context: Impending leadership transitions in Israel and United States, struggling Israeli-Palestinian~~
~~peace talks (Annapolis process)~~

~~Fatalities: More than 1,100 (possibly more than 1,400) Palestinians, 13 Israelis (three civilians)~~
~~November 2012: “Operation Pillar of Defense (or Cloud)”~~

~~Eight-day duration, Palestinian projectiles of greater range and variety, Israeli air strikes, prominent role~~
~~for Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system (became operational in 2011)~~

~~Political context: Widespread Arab political change, including rise of Muslim Brotherhood to power in~~
~~Egypt; three months before Israeli elections~~

~~Fatalities: More than 100 Palestinians, six Israelis (four civilians)~~
~~July-August 2014: “Operation Protective Edge/Mighty Cliff”~~

~~About 50-day duration, Palestinian projectiles of greater range and variety, Israeli air strikes and ground~~
~~offensive, extensive Palestinian use of and Israeli countermeasures against tunnels within Gaza,~~
~~prominent role for Iron Dome~~

~~Political context: Shortly after an unsuccessful round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and the prominent~~
~~kil ings of Israeli and Palestinian youth in the West Bank and Jerusalem~~

~~Fatalities: More than 2,100 Palestinians, 71 Israelis (five civilians), and one foreign worker~~
~~May 2021: “Operation Guardian of the Walls”~~

~~11-day duration, unprecedented Palestinian rocket barrages into central Israel, Israeli air and artil ery~~
~~strikes, prominent role for Iron Dome, major Arab-Jewish unrest within Israel for much of the conflict~~

~~Political context: Tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, new U.S. Administration, significant domestic~~
~~political uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including recent postponement of PA elections).~~

~~Fatalities: More than 240 Palestinians, 12 in Israel (including two Thai nationals)~~
~~During the conflict, Palestinian militants fired rockets at Israeli populated areas, leading to major~~
~~disruptions to daily life and other challenges for millions of Israelis. Israeli strikes targeting~~
~~militants largely focused on targets in the densely populated urban areas of Gaza. While the Israel~~
~~Defense Forces claimed, as in previous conflicts, that they took measures to warn civilians of~~
~~impending strikes,11 some strikes killed or injured civilians and damaged residential areas.12~~
~~Various factors contribute to civilians’ humanitarian plight in Gaza, including deficient~~
~~infrastructure and health care facilities, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic, and challenges~~

~~10 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territory, “West Bank: Escalation~~
~~of Violence 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021.~~
~~11 Felicia Schwartz and Jared Malsin, “Israel Says Strikes to Go On As Gaza Death Toll Mounts,” Wall Street Journal,~~
~~May 17, 2021.~~
~~12 Aaron Boxerman, “‘Screams under the rubble’: 42 said killed in Israeli airstrike in Gaza City,” Times of Israel, May~~
~~16, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~to delivering needed utilities and resources.13 In connection with the fighting, this plight worsened~~
~~from damage sustained to health care facilities, water and sewage infrastructure, and schools.14~~economic cooperation. A White House summary of the August 2021 meeting between President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett said: The President underscored the importance of steps to improve the lives of Palestinians and support greater economic opportunities for them. He also noted the importance of refraining from actions that could exacerbate tensions, contribute to a sense of unfairness, and undermine efforts to build trust. President Biden reaffirmed his view that a negotiated two-state solution is the only viable path to achieving a lasting resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.14 Days before the Biden-Bennett meeting, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz met PA President Abbas—the first meeting between Abbas and an Israeli cabinet minister since 2010. Gantz said that the two discussed steps to improve security coordination and assist the PA financially, 10 White House, “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,” August 27, 2021. 11 Steven A. Cook, “Netanyahu Is Gone. Netanyahu-ism Still Reigns.” foreignpolicy.com, September 1, 2021; “Lapid vows to rebuild international ties after ‘reckless’ last government,” Times of Israel, June 14, 2021. 12 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021. 13 CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview, Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues, by Jim Zanotti. 14 White House, “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,” August 27, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief including a $155 million Israeli loan.15 Bennett later said that while Israel is open to helping the PA economically, Israel has no intention of engaging in a diplomatic process at this time.16 May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict From May 10 through May 21, 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza.17 The following were key aspects of the conflict:  Overview. Palestinian militants fired rockets with unprecedented intensity from Gaza into central Israel. The Iron Dome anti-rocket system played a prominent role in defending Israeli population centers. Israel conducted sustained air and artillery strikes in Gaza. Additionally, intercommunal protests and violence took place within Israel and Jerusalem (see below for a description of events in Jerusalem prior to the conflict)—involving some Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities.  Political context. Some factors that may have influenced the outbreak and trajectory of conflict included tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, the presence of a new U.S. Administration, and significant domestic political uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including a recent postponement of PA elections).  Fatalities. In exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza, 12 people in Israel (including 2 Thai nationals) and more than 250 people in Gaza (including more than 60 children) were killed.18 Amid unrest in the West Bank during that same timeframe (May 10-21), one source estimates that Israeli security forces killed 27 Palestinians.19
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.1520
Palestinian militants in Gaza periodically clash with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with Palestinian militants in Gaza periodically clash with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilian areas in southern Israel and Gaza, militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilian areas in southern Israel and Gaza,
respectively. These incidents periodically escalate toward larger conflictrespectively. These incidents periodically escalate toward larger conflict ~~(see textbox above)~~, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel . Hamas and Israel
reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent
or manage conflict escalation. or manage conflict escalation.
~~By engaging in conflict with Israel, Hamas apparently sought to capitalize on Arab-Jewish~~
~~tensions over Jerusalem to increase its domestic popularity vis-à-vis rival faction Fatah.16 In~~
~~April, Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas—the West Bank-based PA president—had postponed plans~~
~~for 2021 PA elections that many Palestinians had eagerly anticipated.17 Abbas cited Israel’s~~
~~unwillingness to allow East Jerusalem Palestinians to vote in PA elections (which were scheduled~~
~~for May) as grounds for their postponement.18~~
~~Mounting tension in Jerusalem was fueled by provocations—reportedly aided by social media—~~
~~tied to Israeli measures restricting Palestinian movement and worship in and around the Temple~~
~~Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) holy sites in the Old City,19~~Various actions exacerbated the tension in Jerusalem that led to conflict. These included Israeli measures restricting Palestinian movement and worship in and around the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) holy sites in the Old City,21 disputes about and responses to these 15 Yaniv Kubovich, “Gantz Says Agreed with Abbas on Confidence-building Measures, Including $155m Loan,” haaretz.com, August 30, 2021. 16 Ibid. 17 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza. 18 Dina Kraft and Laura King, “Israel’s Netanyahu, master of political survival, tested by conflict with Gaza,” Los Angeles Times, May 23, 2021; “2 Thai workers killed, several people injured as Hamas bombards southern Israel,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2021. 19 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territory, “West Bank: Escalation of Violence 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021. 20 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 21 For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief measures, isolated attacks by isolated attacks by
Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish nationalist groups.Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish nationalist groups.20 22 Unrest intensified in response to Unrest intensified in response to
controversy over the possible eviction of several Palestinian families from their longtime controversy over the possible eviction of several Palestinian families from their longtime
residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, stemming from an Israeli law residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, stemming from an Israeli law
that allows for Jewish recovery of property abandoned in connection with the 1948 Arab-Israeli that allows for Jewish recovery of property abandoned in connection with the 1948 Arab-Israeli
~~war.21 Israel’s Supreme Court temporarily delayed a hearing on the case amid the unrest, but the~~
~~case may be decided in mid-2021.22~~war.23 The case remains ongoing in Israel’s Supreme Court, which reportedly may be seeking an outcome calculated to defuse tensions.24 Palestinian leaders and some activists and international actors Palestinian leaders and some activists and international actors
claim that the claim that the Sheikh Jarrah case is part of a systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem case is part of a systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem
since the area’s capture and since the area’s capture and effective annexation as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.25 Critics of Israeli actions connect controversies in Jerusalem with concerns about Jewish settlement activity and other allegations that Israel violates international law and Palestinian human rights.26 During the conflict, some Members of Congress who criticized Israel’s conduct during hostilities, and/or voiced concern about the impact of conflict on civilians in Gaza, sought to restrict the sale of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Israel.27 In August, Israel announced approvals for more than 2,200 homes in West Bank settlements, while also announcing the approval of construction permits for more than 800 Palestinian homes in Israel-controlled areas of the West Bank that have featured little Palestinian development in recent years.28 The Conflict’s Aftermath: Aid for Iron Dome and Gaza Relief In the aftermath of the May 2021 conflict, the Biden Administration has sought to strengthen Israel’s defensive capabilities, restore regional calm, and improve humanitarian conditions.29 Within Congress, there has been broad bipartisan support for replenishing the Iron Dome system.30 During the conflict, Palestinian armed groups (mostly Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad) fired some 4,300 rockets into Israel, and the Israel Defense Forces reported that Iron Dome intercepted around 1,500 (representing 90% of those projectiles that were headed toward populated areas).31 Each of Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptors, which are co-produced in Israel and 22~~effective annexation as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.23 Critics~~

~~13 Raja Abdulrahim, “Thousands of Civilians Flee Airstrikes in Gaza,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2021.~~
~~14 Iyad Abuheweila, et al., “Gaza Reels From Strikes That Underscore Scope Of Deep-Rooted Misery,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, May 19, 2021.~~
~~15 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~16 Amos Harel, “Israel Wants to Win in Gaza, but Erasing Hamas’ Accomplishments Won’t Come Easy,” Haaretz,~~
~~May 13, 2021.~~
~~17 Patrick Kingsley, “Palestinian Vote Postponed, Prolonging Tensions,” New York Times, April 30, 2021.~~
~~18 Daoud Kuttab, “Palestinian president decides —on his own— to postpone elections,” Al-Monitor, April 30, 2021.~~
~~19 For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,~~
~~by Jim Zanotti.~~
20 “From TikTok to Temple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. “From TikTok to Temple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021.
2123 Nir Hasson, “Jerusalem Clashes: How Palestinians Rallied Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some Nir Hasson, “Jerusalem Clashes: How Palestinians Rallied Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some
Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of
cases are at risk of being evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss, “Palestinians fear loss of family homes cases are at risk of being evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss, “Palestinians fear loss of family homes
as evictions loom,” as evictions loom,” Associated Press, May 10, 2021. May 10, 2021.
~~22 Netael Bandel, “Israel Won’t Intervene in Sheikh Jarrah Case, Making Eviction of Palestinian Families More~~
~~Likely,” haaretz.com, June 7, 2021.~~
~~23 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, May 10, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~of Israeli actions connect this situation with concerns about Jewish settlement activity and other~~
~~allegations that Israel violates international law and Palestinian human rights.24~~
~~The Conflict’s Aftermath~~
~~Assessment~~
~~It is unclear that the conflict decisively changed the positions of the key parties affected—Israel,~~
~~Hamas, and the PA—vis-à-vis one another. Factors that may influence developments going~~
~~forward include:~~
~~ whether Hamas assesses that renewed conflict could boost its domestic~~
~~popularity, and further fuel Arab-Jewish unrest in Israel and the West Bank;~~
~~ the extent to which Israeli measures (including its Iron Dome anti-rocket system~~
~~and operations targeting Palestinian militants) prevent, deter, or provoke~~
~~additional violence;25~~
~~ disruptions or perceived disruptions to the “status quo” arrangement governing~~
~~worship at Jerusalem’s holy sites, especially the Mount/Haram;26~~
~~ open questions regarding leadership stability within both Israel and the PA;~~
~~ diplomacy and post-conflict aid involving international actors, including the~~
~~United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Arab states who have recently improved or~~
~~sought to improve their relations with Israel.~~
~~Observers have shared varying views about how the relatively greater volume and intensity of~~
~~Palestinian militants’ rocket fire in this conflict might affect future military calculations. Two~~
~~analysts asserted that the saturation tactic employed by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad~~
~~achieved only limited success, “since improvements to Iron Dome largely negated the heavier~~
~~barrages.”27 Another analyst wrote that the barrages stretched Israel’s air defenses in a way that~~
~~suggested “they may one day not be enough to hinder volumes of rockets,” whether against~~
~~threats from Gaza or from other Iran-backed actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon.28~~

2424 The court has proposed a compromise that would allow the Palestinian defendants to stay in their homes on the condition that they recognize the Israeli plaintiff as being registered as the property’s owner in Israel (without necessarily conceding ownership claims). Jacob Magid, “Israel asking US to push Palestinians toward compromise on Sheikh Jarrah,” Times of Israel, August 10, 2021; “Ruling on East Jerusalem flashpoint evictions postponed,” Reuters, August 2, 2021. 25 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem,” New York Times, May 10, 2021. 26 Al-Haq, “Action Alert: International Community Must Take Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s Al-Haq, “Action Alert: International Community Must Take Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s
Aggression against Palestinian Jerusalemites,” May 10, 2021. For additional information, see CRS Report R46433, Aggression against Palestinian Jerusalemites,” May 10, 2021. For additional information, see CRS Report R46433,
Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
~~25 Sebastien Roblin, “How Hamas’ Arsenal Shaped the Gaza War of May 2021,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021. For more~~
~~on Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
~~26 “From TikTok to Temple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. Under the~~
~~“status quo” arrangement (largely based on past practices dating from the 16th century that Israel pledges to uphold),~~
~~Muslims can access the Mount/Haram and worship there, while Jews and other non-Muslims are permitted limited~~
~~access but not permitted to worship. Jewish worship is permitted at the Western Wall at the base of the Mount/Haram.~~
~~27 Grant Rumley and Neri Zilber, “A Military Assessment of the Israel-Hamas Conflict,” Washington Institute for Near~~
~~East Policy, PolicyWatch 3489, May 25, 2021: “4,300 rockets were launched (of which over 600 fell in Gaza). Over~~
~~eleven days of conflict, this averages out to around 390 launches daily, compared to approximately 650 total rockets~~
~~fired over twenty-two days in 2008-2009 (29 per day), 1,500 over eight days in 2012 (187 per day), and more than~~
~~4,500 spread out over fifty days in 2014 (90 per day).”~~
~~28 Seth Frantzman, “Israel’s Iron Dome Won’t Last Forever,” foreignpolicy.com, June 3, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

7

~~Israel: New Prime Minister~~27 “U.S. Sen. Sanders Offers Resolution Blocking Arms Sales to Israel,” Reuters, May 20, 2021. 28 “Israel set to approve new Palestinian and Jewish building in West Bank,” Times of Israel, August 11, 2021; Foundation for Middle East Peace, Settlement & Annexation Report: August 13, 2021. 29 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East,” May 20, 2021. 30 Representative Josh Gottheimer, “Release: Bipartisan Group of 56 House Members Back Urgent Funding for Israel’s Iron Dome Missile Defense System,” June 2, 2021. 31 Sebastien Roblin, “How Hamas’ Arsenal Shaped the Gaza War of May 2021,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief the United States, cost approximately $50,000.32 In an August 10 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East Dana Stroul communicated the Administration’s “unequivocal support” for emergency or supplemental appropriations to sustain Iron Dome, and said that the Administration has consulted with Congress and provided paperwork to support how Congress chooses to proceed in “funding the request.”33 A proposal for supplemental appropriations is likely to come in connection with a provision in the 2016 MOU that allows the United States and Israel to agree on amounts beyond the regular annual U.S. aid allocations under exceptional circumstances (such as major armed conflict), subject to congressional action. ~~and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Military Aid for Israel~~
~~As the cease-fire was about to come into effect, President Biden reiterated U.S. support for~~
~~Israel’s right to defend itself and pledged to replenish Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system.29~~
~~During the conflict, some Members of Congress objected to Israeli airstrikes that resulted in~~
~~civilian casualties and displacement, and sought to restrict a recent proposed $735 million~~
~~commercial sale of U.S. precision-guided munitions to Israel.30 On June 2, 56 Representatives~~
~~sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin urgently requesting a report on Israel’s military~~
~~needs in the conflict’s wake.31~~
~~Some statements suggest that legislative proposals may be forthcoming on supplemental U.S.~~
~~military aid to Israel. In early June, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz traveled to Washington,~~
~~DC, for meetings with top Biden Administration officials, and Senator Lindsey Graham spoke of~~
~~a potential Israeli request for up to $1 billion in aid.32~~ In August 2014, near the end of the last In August 2014, near the end of the last
major Israel-Gaza conflict, Congress enacted an emergency supplemental appropriations major Israel-Gaza conflict, Congress enacted an emergency supplemental appropriations
resolution (P.L. 113-145) to provide $225 million in Department of Defense funding for Iron resolution (P.L. 113-145) to provide $225 million in Department of Defense funding for Iron
~~Dome.~~
~~Post-Conflict Recovery in Gaza~~
~~In anticipation of the cease fire, President Biden said:~~
~~The United States is committed to working with the United Nations, and we remain~~
~~committed to working with the United Nations and other international stakeholders to~~
Dome on an expedited basis, without co-production requirements. Since FY2011, Congress has provided $1.72 billion (in current dollars) for Iron Dome. President Biden also has committed to “working with the United Nations and other international stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the people provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the people
of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction effortsof Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts.
~~We will do this in full partnership with the Palestinian Authority—not Hamas, the~~
~~Authority—~~” in partnership with the PA “in a manner that in a manner that does not permit Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.”34 With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally-supported post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Hamas conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.35 Because of the PA’s inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwilling to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction. Without the PA’s involvement, international organizations and governments reportedly generally have less confidence that they can prevent Hamas from diverting assistance for its own purposes.36 Since 2018, Qatar has provided $300 million in cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United Nations.37 However, this mechanism does not address the unresolved issue of providing salaries to Gaza’s civil servants.38 Other Israel-Hamas disputes have continued and could conceivably escalate, including over what Israel allows into Gaza, and Israelis in Hamas custody.39 Certain Human Rights Considerations: International Criminal Court and U.S. Aid Some international bodies have taken actions that open alleged Israeli human rights violations against Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny, in the context of broader debate on this 32 Manuel Trajtenberg and Tomer Fadlon, “The Economic Costs of Operation Guardian of the Walls,” INSS Insight, No. 1485, June 13, 2021. 33 Transcript accessed at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6317506?0. 34 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East,” May 20, 2021. 35 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. 36 Ibid. 37 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of Israel, September 12, 2021. 38 Ibid. 39 Judah Ari Gross, “Gaza arson attacks spark 9 fires in Israel; terror groups plan border protests,” Times of Israel, August 23, 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief subject. The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor announced the start of an investigation in March into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.40 The investigation might draw from the findings of an ongoing commission of inquiry established by the U.N. Human Rights Council in May in the wake of the recent Israel-Gaza conflict.41 The Biden Administration responded skeptically to the creation of~~does not permit Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.~~
~~I believe the Palestinians and Israelis equally deserve to live safely and securely and to~~
~~enjoy equal measures of freedom, prosperity, and democracy.~~
~~During a visit to the region, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced some economic and~~
~~humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians in partial connection with post-conflict recovery.33~~
~~Blinken also spoke out against steps taken by either side that he said could risk sparking violence~~
~~and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions,~~
~~incitement to violence, and payment to terrorists.34~~
~~With Gaza still under Hamas control, the obstacles to post-conflict recovery remain largely the~~
~~same as after the 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 conflicts.35 Beyond providing short-term~~
~~humanitarian assistance, the United States and other international actors face significant~~

~~29 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East,” May 20, 2021.~~
~~30 Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, “Ocasio-Cortez, Pocan & Tlaib Lead Joint Resolution to Block Weapon~~
~~Sales to Netanyahu,” May 19, 2021. Senator Bernie Sanders, “NEWS: Sanders Moves to Block Weapons Sale to~~
~~Israel,” May 20, 2021.~~
~~31 See text of letter at https://gottheimer.house.gov/uploadedfiles/letter_to_sec_def_re_iron_dome_replenishment.pdf.~~
~~32 Jacob Magid, “Gantz urges softer tone with US on Iran, seems to knock Netanyahu’s ‘provoking,’” Times of Israel,~~
~~June 4, 2021.~~
~~33 For information on U.S. aid announced for Palestinians in 2021, see CRS In Focus IF10644,~~ ~~The Palestinians:~~
~~Overview, 2021 Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~34 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021.~~
~~35 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~challenges in seeking to help with longer-term reconstruction. Because of the PA’s inability to~~
~~control security in Gaza, it has been unwilling to manage international pledges toward~~
~~reconstruction. Without the PA’s involvement, international organizations and governments~~
~~generally have less confidence that they can prevent Hamas from diverting assistance for its own~~
~~purposes.36 Some Arab Gulf states may seek to establish independent committees inside Gaza to~~
~~distribute funds, modeled after one that Qatar maintains.37~~
~~Human Rights Considerations: ICC Investigation and U.S. Aid~~
~~International public debate has taken place over alleged Israeli human rights violations against~~
~~Palestinians. The International Criminal Court prosecutor announced the opening of an~~
~~investigation in March into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.38 The investigation might~~
~~draw from the findings of an ongoing commission of inquiry established by the U.N. Human~~
~~Rights Council in May in the wake of the recent Israel-Gaza conflict.39 The U.S. Mission to~~
~~International Organizations in Geneva issued a statement saying that~~ the “open-ended” the “open-ended”
~~commission of inquiry would “not help bring about lasting solutions to the challenges in the~~
~~region, nor provide greater dignity, freedom, or prosperity for either Palestinians or Israelis.”40~~
~~The Biden Administration, like its predecessors, has criticized the Human Rights Council for~~
~~what it characterizes as a disproportionate focus on Israel.41~~
~~In April~~ commission of inquiry.42 Like its predecessors, the Administration has criticized the Human Rights Council for what it characterizes as a disproportionate focus on Israel.43 In 2021, some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. In April 2021 a bill was introduced in the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the a bill was introduced in the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the
amount of U.S. aid provided to Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some amount of U.S. aid provided to Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some ~~of those~~
human rights allegations.human rights allegations.4244 Later in April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the chair and Later in April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the chair and
ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or
adding conditions on security assistance to Israel,adding conditions on security assistance to Israel,~~43 citing a similar argument~~45 quoting remarks that President Biden that President Biden
made during the 2020 presidential made during the 2020 presidential race.46 In July, the House passed a Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill for FY2022 that would require U.S. consultation with a recipient government to ensure that any arms sale involving U.S. FMF complies with relevant oversight provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and is consistent with U.S. national security policy, while also requiring the State Department to report to Congress any credible information that U.S. assistance may have been used contrary to these parameters (Section 7035(b)(8) of H.R. 4373). Considerations regarding Israel may have partly motivated the inclusion of these legislative requirements.47 Arab State Normalization with Israel The Administration has followed agreements reached during the Trump Administration (the “Abraham Accords”) that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.48 Biden Administration officials have said that U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Arab states will continue alongside efforts to increase the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 40~~race.44~~
~~Arab State Normalization with Israel~~
~~To date, the Biden Administration has not reversed steps that the Trump Administration took in~~
~~apparent connection with Israel’s recent agreements to normalize or improve relations with the~~
~~UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco (known as the “Abraham Accords”).45 Biden Administration~~

~~36 Ibid.~~
~~37 Adnan Abu Amer, “Gaza reconstruction deepens PA-Hamas dispute,” May 28, 2021.~~
38 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
3941 U.N. document, A/HRC/S-30/L.1, as orally revised, May 27, 2021. U.N. document, A/HRC/S-30/L.1, as orally revised, May 27, 2021.
4042 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Press Statement: UN Human Rights Council Session on the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Press Statement: UN Human Rights Council Session on the
Israeli-Palestinian Situation,” May 27, 2021. Israeli-Palestinian Situation,” May 27, 2021.
4143 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Secretary Blinken: Remarks to the 46th Session of the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Secretary Blinken: Remarks to the 46th Session of the
Human Rights Council,” February 24, 2021. Human Rights Council,” February 24, 2021.
4244 “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel of apartheid over treatment of Palestinians,” “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel of apartheid over treatment of Palestinians,” Associated Press, April 27, 2021 , April 27, 2021
(underlying Human Rights Watch report available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-(underlying Human Rights Watch report available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-
authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution, with the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution, with the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights
Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-
rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/). rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/).
4345 Text of letter available at https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ Text of letter available at https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf. 2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf.
4446 Omri Nahmias, “Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020. Omri Nahmias, “Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020.
~~45 These steps~~47 Ron Kampeas, “Pro-Israel groups split over whether new US spending bill conditions foreign aid,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, August 5, 2021. 48 Steps taken in connection with these agreements include a proposed U.S. sale to the UAE of F-35s, drone aircraft, and munitions; Sudan’s removal from include a proposed U.S. sale to the UAE of F-35s, drone aircraft, and munitions; Sudan’s removal from
the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list; and U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty claims over the disputed the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list; and U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty claims over the disputed
territory of Western Sahara. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

98

link to page link to page 1513 Israel: ~~New Prime Minister~~Background and U.S. Relations in Brief conflict.49 ~~and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~officials have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israel’s normalization efforts with Arab~~
~~states would seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-~~
~~Palestinian conflict.~~ Palestinian leaders denounced the Abraham Accords as an abandonment of Palestinian leaders denounced the Abraham Accords as an abandonment of
the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address
Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.4650 In the August Biden-Bennett White House meeting, the two leaders discussed ways to deepen the Abraham Accords relationships and identify “new opportunities to expand such partnerships.”51
The Pathway to the Abraham Accords, and Its Implications for Palestinians
Before the Abraham Accords, Egypt and Jordan had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations Before the Abraham Accords, Egypt and Jordan had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations
with Israel.with Israel.4752 In 1981, Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later In 1981, Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later
enshrined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions, including enshrined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions, including
on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it. on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it.4853 After Israel started After Israel started
negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited diplomatic relations with Morocco, and negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited diplomatic relations with Morocco, and
informal ties with a number of other Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain.informal ties with a number of other Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain.4954 These countries downgraded These countries downgraded
their ties with Israel after the onset of the second Palestinian their ties with Israel after the onset of the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past (or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past
decade discreet Israeli links with Arab states on issues including intelligence, security, and trade have become decade discreet Israeli links with Arab states on issues including intelligence, security, and trade have become
closer and more public. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common concerns, such as Iran’s closer and more public. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common concerns, such as Iran’s
regional influence and military capabilities (seeregional influence and military capabilities (see “Iran and the Region” below) and Sunni Islamist populist elow) and Sunni Islamist populist
movements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches and affiliates).movements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches and affiliates).5055
To cement its normalization of relations with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex To cement its normalization of relations with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex
part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitment from part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitment from ~~U.S.~~ Trump Administration officials that they officials that they
would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024.would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024.56 Palestinian leaders claimed that the UAE Palestinian leaders claimed that the UAE
legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank status quo legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank status quo
that some observers label “de facto annexation.”that some observers label “de facto annexation.”5157 UAE officials countered that by significantly delaying Israeli UAE officials countered that by significantly delaying Israeli
declarations of sovereignty over West Bank areas, they preserved prospects for future negotiations toward declarations of sovereignty over West Bank areas, they preserved prospects for future negotiations toward a a
Palestinian state.Palestinian state.5258 Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Israeli officials have appealed to domestic Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Israeli officials have appealed to domestic
pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements related to settlement construction and expansion in pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements related to settlement construction and expansion in
~~the West Bank and East Jerusalem.~~
~~Official statements from Saudi Arabian officials continue to condition Saudi normalization with Israel on the API’s~~
~~provisions.53 Some key Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be wil ing to~~
~~drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specific~~

~~territory of Western Sahara.~~
~~46 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August~~
~~14, 2020.~~
47the West Bank and East Jerusalem. 49 Department of State, Yael Lempert, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Remarks at the Abraham Accords Institute of Peace,” September 14, 2021. 50 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August 14, 2020. 51 White House, “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,” August 27, 2021. 52 Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel did the same in 1994. Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel did the same in 1994.
4853 The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and
provide for the “[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General provide for the “[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
Assembly Resolution 194.” The initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of Assembly Resolution 194.” The initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57-Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57-
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. The text of the initiative is available at member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. The text of the initiative is available at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
4954 Miriam Berger, “Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam Miriam Berger, “Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam
Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” Entous, “Donald Trump’s New World Order,” New Yorker, June 11, 2018; CRS Report 95-1013, June 11, 2018; CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
5055 Steve Hendrix, “Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,” Steve Hendrix, “Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,”
washingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRS Report 95-1013, washingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth , by Kenneth
Katzman. Katzman.
5156 Jacob Magid, “US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, ToI told,” Times of Israel, September 13, 2020. 57 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
5258 “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” Times of Israel, August 14, , August 14,
2020. 2020.
~~53 HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama~~
~~Dialogue, December 5, 2020.~~
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Israel: ~~New Prime Minister~~Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Official statements from Saudi Arabian officials continue to condition Saudi normalization with Israel on the API’s provisions.59 Some key Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be wil ing to drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specific ~~and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

incentives to do so could include heightened regional cooperation on Iran, U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects incentives to do so could include heightened regional cooperation on Iran, U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects
to boost Saudi economic diversification, and greater Saudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.to boost Saudi economic diversification, and greater Saudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.5460 Nevertheless, developments in 2021 such as Israel-Gaza conflict and ongoing tensions over Jerusalem might have strengthened Saudi inclinations to take a cautious, gradual approach toward normalization.61
Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and
rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical
trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states
to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for
Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add
Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.5562 Israel had previously been under the Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and
some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might
encounter political challenges in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel. encounter political challenges in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel.
Other factors Other factors ~~influencing~~may influence regional cooperation and rivalry regional cooperation and rivalry ~~might include the following:~~
~~ Arms sales. Shortly after the UAE’s normalization deal with Israel, the Trump~~
~~Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale to the UAE of F-35 Joint~~
~~Strike Fighters, armed MQ-9 Reaper drones, and munitions.56 While noting the~~
~~U.S. legal requirement to maintain Israel’s QME, Israeli officials stated that they~~
~~would not oppose the sale. The United States and UAE reportedly signed a letter~~
~~of offer and acceptance for the sale in the final hours of the Trump~~
~~Administration.57 Implementing the deal and delivering the items is expected to~~
~~take years. The outcome of this transaction and others that might follow to Arab~~
~~states in connection with normalization could depend on issues including QME~~
~~considerations, human rights concerns (such as those involved in Yemen’s~~
~~ongoing conflict), and prospects for regional arms races involving suppliers such~~
~~as Russia and China.58~~
~~ Mutual economic benefits. Wider access to markets, technology sharing, and~~
~~road or rail infrastructure linking the Gulf with the Mediterranean are some of the~~
~~potential economic benefits of expanded Israel-Arab relations.59 Gulf states may~~
~~feel urgency to attract investment that could help them diversify their fossil-fuel~~
~~export-centered economies, and many regional countries may anticipate the need~~

~~54 Yoel Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No.~~
~~1396, October 29, 2020.~~
~~55 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,~~
~~2021.~~
~~56 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittals 21-01, 21-03, and 21-05, November 10, 2020.~~
~~57 Valerie Insinna, “Just hours before Biden’s inauguration, the UAE and US come to a deal on F-35 sales,”~~ ~~Defense~~
~~News, January 20, 2021.~~
~~58 CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates,~~
~~coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.~~
59 . These could include U.S. arms sales to Arab states and possible economic benefits from Israel-Arab state relations.63 Additionally, Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining normalization with Israel might gauge whether expected benefits from normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism or unrest they might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.64 Normalization efforts to date have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public opinion, its drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of authoritarian Arab regimes. Iran and the Region Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (especially in 59 HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama Dialogue, December 5, 2020. 60 Yoel Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 1396, October 29, 2020. 61 Hussein Ibish, “Why Saudi Arabia Is Now in No Rush to Recognize Israel,” haaretz.com, July 7, 2021. 62 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, 2021. 63 Theresa Hitchens, “UAE Arms Sale Remains In Limbo Pending Biden Review,” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2021. The Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “Recognizing also their shared goal to advance regional The Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “Recognizing also their shared goal to advance regional
economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promote collaborations on economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promote collaborations on
strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a multilateral working group for the strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a multilateral working group for the
‘Tracks for Regional Peace’ project.” The Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from ‘Tracks for Regional Peace’ project.” The Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from
Israel to Saudi Arabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in August 2019. A major part of its appeal would be Israel to Saudi Arabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in August 2019. A major part of its appeal would be
allowing the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab allowing the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab
al-Mandab (Red Sea). See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Tracks for regional peace—regional land bridge and al-Mandab (Red Sea). See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Tracks for regional peace—regional land bridge and
hub initiative,” August 5, 2019. hub initiative,” August 5, 2019.
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~~Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~to boost their appeal as trade and investment partners in light of new~~
~~opportunities amid increased global competition (including between the United~~
~~States and China) for markets, resources, and infrastructure projects.~~
~~Additionally, UAE sovereign wealth fund Mubadala signed a memorandum of~~
~~understanding in April 2021 to purchase a stake in Israel’s Tamar offshore natural~~
~~gas field. Section 1279 of the U.S.-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act~~
~~of 2020 (Title XII, Subtitle H of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act,~~
~~P.L. 116-283) authorized the establishment of a program to support Arab-Israeli~~
~~cooperation on innovation and advanced technologies.~~
~~ Arab public opinion. Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining~~
~~normalization with Israel might gauge whether expected benefits from~~
~~normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism or unrest they~~
~~might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.60 Public opinion polls~~
~~from the past decade suggest relatively unchanging and widespread Arab~~
~~opposition to diplomatic recognition of Israel.61 Normalization efforts to date~~
~~have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public~~
~~opinion, its drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of~~
~~authoritarian Arab regimes. It is unclear whether Gulf populations with no direct~~
~~history of armed conflict with Israel might be more willing to accept pragmatic~~
~~cooperation with Israel than those in Egypt, Jordan, and other countries who have~~
~~fought Israel in the past.~~
~~Iran and the Region~~
~~Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward~~
~~Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (especially in~~
~~Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),62~~64 See, for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2020. Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),65 and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war
similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the
small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as
the “the campaign between wars.”the “the campaign between wars.”6366
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister
Netanyahu opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration, Netanyahu opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration,
and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA
and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the
intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement. intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement.

~~60 See, for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, December 17, 2020.~~
~~61 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief, Figure 88,~~
~~available at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab-Opinion-Index-2019-2020-~~
~~Inbreef-English-Version.pdf.~~
~~62 For information on this topic, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.~~
~~63 See, for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: The Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security,~~
~~January 6, 2021.~~
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U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional
uncertainty, with implications for Israel.uncertainty, with implications for Israel.6467 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s
demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could
transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.6568 In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence
that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab
Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.6669 Additionally, reported low-level Additionally, reported low-level
Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—including cyberspace, international waters, and the territory of cyberspace, international waters, and the territory of ~~other~~
~~regional countries~~Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—has further exacerbated regional tensions.—has further exacerbated regional tensions.6770
As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy ~~to consider possibly~~ and considers the possibility of reentering reentering
the JCPOA, Israel—whose officials are generally skeptical of U.S. reentry—is the JCPOA, Israel—whose officials are generally skeptical of U.S. reentry—is ~~one of several~~
~~regional U.S. partners voicing interest in having its views taken into account.68~~seeking to influence diplomatic outcomes.71 Just before his Just before his
installation as prime minister, Naftali Bennett said to the Knesset, “Resuming a nuclear deal with installation as prime minister, Naftali Bennett said to the Knesset, “Resuming a nuclear deal with
Iran is a mistake that will legitimize one of the Iran is a mistake that will legitimize one of the ~~world'~~world’s most violent regimes.”s most violent regimes.”6972
Some observers have speculated that Israeli covert or military operations might influence or Some observers have speculated that Israeli covert or military operations might influence or
disrupt diplomacy on the nuclear issue.disrupt diplomacy on the nuclear issue.7073 It is unclear whether Israel’s recent change in government may affect this dynamic. In between his August White House meetings with Prime 65 For information on this topic, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman. 66 See, for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: The Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, January 6, 2021. 67 ~~It is unclear whether the June government transition~~
~~may affect this dynamic. An April 2021 explosion and power outage—widely attributed to~~
~~Israel—that reportedly disabled thousands of centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment~~
~~facility led Iran to begin enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, closer to weapons-grade levels.71~~
~~Hezbollah~~
~~Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state ally in the region. Hezbollah’s~~
~~forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with~~
~~the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader~~
~~conflict.72 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional~~
~~implications.73 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly~~

64 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, , by Kenneth Katzman,
Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas. Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas.
6568 Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reactor,” haaretz.com, Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reactor,” haaretz.com,
October 6, 2019. October 6, 2019.
6669 Tom O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as Red Sea Tensions Rise,” Tom O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as Red Sea Tensions Rise,” Newsweek,
January 13, 2021. January 13, 2021.
~~67 “Fighting in the Shadows: Israel and Iran,” Soufan Center, March 30, 2021; Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Has Israel been~~
~~sabotaging Iran? Here’s what we know,” washingtonpost.com, July 15, 2020.~~
6870 Isabel Kershner et al., “Hezbollah Admits to Rocket Strike on Northern Israel, Deepening Border Tensions,” New York Times, August 7, 2021; “Fighting in the Shadows: Israel and Iran,” Soufan Center, March 30, 2021. 71 See also Yaniv Kubovich and Judy Maltz, “Israel’s Chief of Staff: Return to Iran Deal Is ‘Wrong,’ Military Action See also Yaniv Kubovich and Judy Maltz, “Israel’s Chief of Staff: Return to Iran Deal Is ‘Wrong,’ Military Action
‘Should Be on the Table,’” haaretz.com, January 27, 2021. ‘Should Be on the Table,’” haaretz.com, January 27, 2021.
6972 Noa Shpigel, “Incoming PM Bennett Says Resuming Iran Nuclear Deal Would Be Mistake in Knesset Address,” Noa Shpigel, “Incoming PM Bennett Says Resuming Iran Nuclear Deal Would Be Mistake in Knesset Address,”
haaretz.com, June 13, 2021. haaretz.com, June 13, 2021.
7073 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “Israel and Iran Are Pulling the United States Toward Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “Israel and Iran Are Pulling the United States Toward
Conflict,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “The ramifications of a US return to the Conflict,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “The ramifications of a US return to the
2015 Iran deal—opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021. 2015 Iran deal—opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021.
~~71 “Iran Begins 60 Percent Uranium Enrichment After Natanz Attack, Top Negotiator Says,” haaretz.com (with content~~
~~from Associated Press and Reuters), April 13, 2021.~~
~~72 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E.~~
~~Humud.~~
~~73 For possible conflict scenarios, see Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion,~~ ~~Counting the cost: Avoiding another war~~
~~between Israel and Hezbollah, Atlantic Council, May 13, 2020; Hanin Ghaddar, “How Will Hezbollah Respond to~~
~~Israel’s Drone Attack?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch 3171, August 28, 2019.~~
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Congressional Research Service 11 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Minister Bennett, President Biden said that the United States will first use diplomacy to “ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon,” but if that fails, “we’re ready to turn to other options.”74 According to one account, during these meetings Bennett restated his opposition to a U.S. return to the JCPOA, and Biden did not seem optimistic about Iran returning to compliance with the deal.75 Bennett also reportedly presented a strategy to Biden that involves “countering Iran through a combination of many small actions across several fronts—both military and diplomatic—instead of a single dramatic strike.”76 In a September interview, Defense Minister Gantz suggested that he would be prepared to accept a U.S. return to the JCPOA, while also calling for a “viable, U.S.-led plan B” to pressure Iran in case negotiations are unsuccessful, and alluding to Israeli military contingency plans.77 Hezbollah Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state ally in the region. Hezbollah’s forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict.78 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications.79 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its
projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.7480
Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah
conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build
precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.~~75 Some reports assess that Hezbollah does not want~~
~~escalation, partly due to significant political and economic problems in Lebanon, but do not rule~~
~~out the potential for heightened conflict owing to miscalculation between Hezbollah and Israel.76~~

7481 Following some cross-border fire between Israeli forces and Hezbollah in August 2021, one report assessed that neither party desired a major escalation, but also cited Israeli military officials saying that they would not permit unobstructed attacks.82 74 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett of the State of Israel Before Expanded Bilateral Meeting,” August 27, 2021. 75 Barak Ravid, “Israeli PM presented Biden with ‘death by a thousand cuts’ Iran strategy,” Axios, August 27, 2021. 76 Ibid. 77 Neri Zilber, “Israel Can Live with a New Iran Nuclear Deal, Defense Minister Says,” foreignpolicy.com, September 14, 2021. 78 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. Humud. 79 Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion, Counting the cost: Avoiding another war between Israel and Hezbollah, Atlantic Council, May 13, 2020. 80 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, December 28,
2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” 2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York
Times, April 23, 2020. , April 23, 2020.
7581 “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press; Ben Caspit, “Hezbollah, Israel ; Ben Caspit, “Hezbollah, Israel
losing red lines,” losing red lines,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2019. , September 4, 2019.
~~76 See, for example, Amos Harel, “For Hezbollah, Beirut Devastation Makes Provoking Israel Even Riskier,”~~
~~haaretz.com, August 6, 2020.~~
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~~Israel: New Prime Minister~~82 Kershner et al., “Hezbollah Admits to Rocket Strike on Northern Israel.” Congressional Research Service 12 link to page 22 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns83 U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure.84 Israel-China investment ties have grown since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,85 with Israel as an attractive hub of innovation for Chinese partners, and China as a huge potential export market and source of investment for Israeli businesses.86 Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U.S. expressions of concern,87 apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather intelligence or acquire technologies with the potential to threaten U.S. national security in such fields as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, satellite communications, and robotics. Previously, China-Israel defense industry cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U.S.-Israel defense relationship and to an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China.88 Partly due to U.S. concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.89 However, this panel reportedly does not have the authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s investments in Israel in the previous decade.90 According to a 2021 study by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies: Chinese investments, especially in the high-tech sector, did indeed show progressive growth both in number and scale, especially between 2014 and their peak in 2018. However, in 2019 and 2020 the pendulum swung again, as China slowed its penetration into the Israeli economy [see Appendix C], just as it did elsewhere in the world. The reasons for this were a combination of changes in domestic Chinese priorities regarding the export of capital out of the country and external causes, such as the coronavirus pandemic and a less inviting climate for Chinese investments due to American pressure.91 Additionally, U.S. officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement in specific Israeli infrastructure projects. President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel, in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U.S. allies and partners.92 Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials reportedly blocked 83 For background on past U.S. concerns regarding Israeli defense transactions with China, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 84 Shira Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020; Shira Efron, et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, RAND Corporation, 2019; Jewish Institute for National Security of America, Countering Chinese Engagement with Israel: A Comprehensive and Cooperative U.S.-Israeli Strategy, February 2021. 85 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations, coordinated by Susan V. Lawrence. 86 Danny Zaken, “Chinese-operated port opens in Israel despite American concerns,” Al-Monitor, September 9, 2021. 87 Ron Kampeas, “Breaking China: A rupture looms between Israel and the United States,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, June 2, 2020. 88 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, pp. 15-20. 89 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China Targeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019. 90 Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology, 2020, pp. 24-25. 91 Doron Ella, Chinese Investments in Israel: Developments and a Look to the Future, Institute for National Security Studies, February 1, 2021. 92 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “My Way or the Huawei? The United States-China Race for 5G Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure.93 In May 2020, shortly after then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U.S.-Israel cooperation, Israel’s finance ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1.5 billion desalination plant, turning down the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group.94 Additionally, the U.S. Navy reportedly reconsidered its practice of periodically docking at the Israeli naval base in Haifa, because a state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International Port Group) secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years.95 This terminal opened in September 2021.96 In the conference report (H.Rept. 116-333) accompanying the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92), Congress recommended that the U.S. government “convey to the Government of Israel the serious security concerns with respect to the leasing arrangements of the Port of Haifa, and urge consideration of the security implications of such foreign investment in Israel.” Other state-owned Chinese companies are developing a new port in Ashdod (which also hosts an Israeli naval base), and taking part in construction for Tel Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa.97 Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019. 93 Hiddai Segev and Assaf Orion, “The Great Power Competition over 5G Communications: Limited Success for the American Campaign against Huawei,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1268, March 3, 2020. 94 “Amid US pressure, Israel taps local firm over China for $1.5b desalination plant,” Times of Israel, May 26, 2020. 95 Roie Yellinek, “The Israel-China-U.S. Triangle and the Haifa Port Project,” Middle East Institute, November 27, 2018. Reportedly, the Israeli government planned to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances. Jack Detsch, “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2019. 96 Ricky Ben-David, “Israel inaugurates Chinese-run Haifa port terminal, in likely boost for economy,” Times of Israel, September 2, 2021. 97 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, p. 38. Congressional Research Service 14 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames
Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from CIA, Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from CIA, The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence ; and Economist Intelligence
Unit. All numbers are forecasts for 2021 unless otherwise specified. Unit. All numbers are forecasts for 2021 unless otherwise specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at
https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
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Appendix B. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset
and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats (Opposition) (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats (Opposition)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Binyamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also
was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces
unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career
in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the
exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s
nuclear program and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a nuclear program and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a
consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats (Coalition) (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union. speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as Born in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as
defense minister and foreign minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist defense minister and foreign minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist
and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in
the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He
worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s
wil ingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael wil ingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael
Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption
allegations in a 2013 case. allegations in a 2013 case.
Yamina (Right) – 7 seats (Coalition) (Right) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National
Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews); Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews);
includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation. includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation.
Leader: Prime Minister Naftali Bennett (biography in ~~textbox~~text box in the main body of the report)

New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats (Coalition) (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats (Coalition)
New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu
and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters. and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters.
Leader: Gideon Sa’ar
Born in 1966, Sa’ar serves as justice minister. He served as cabinet secretary in the Born in 1966, Sa’ar serves as justice minister. He served as cabinet secretary in the
1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel 1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon). He became an influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the Sharon). He became an influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the
Knesset in 2003. He served as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior Knesset in 2003. He served as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior
minister from 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019 minister from 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019
but left Likud to form New Hope a year later. but left Likud to form New Hope a year later.
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Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats (Opposition) (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats (Opposition)
Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-
Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections. Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism
since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish
nationalist and religiously conservative causes. nationalist and religiously conservative causes.

LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – 7 seats (Coalition) (Avoda) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza. in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leader in 2020 Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leader in 2020
and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she
founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a
regular national media presence and university lecturer. regular national media presence and university lecturer.
Meretz (Vigor) – 6 seats (Coalition) (Vigor) – 6 seats (Coalition)
Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and
peace with the Palestinians. peace with the Palestinians.
Leader: Nitzan Horowitz
Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister. He became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister. He became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and
was first elected to the Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent was first elected to the Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent
journalist before entering politics. journalist before entering politics.

CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future)(There Is a Future) – 17 seats (Coalition) – 17 seats (Coalition)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid is foreign minister and alternate prime minister. Under the Born in 1963, Lapid is foreign minister and alternate prime minister. Under the
government’s power-sharing agreement, he is set to become prime minister in government’s power-sharing agreement, he is set to become prime minister in
August 2023. He came to politics after a career as a journalist, television presenter, August 2023. He came to politics after a career as a journalist, television presenter,
and author. He founded the Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from 2013 to 2014 he and author. He founded the Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from 2013 to 2014 he
served as finance minister. served as finance minister.
Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 8 seats (Coalition) (Blue and White) – 8 seats (Coalition)
Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu, Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu,
ostensibly seeking to preserve long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary, ostensibly seeking to preserve long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary,
articulate a vision of Israeli nationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab articulate a vision of Israeli nationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab
citizens, and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian citizens, and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian
issues. issues.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff
of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.
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ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats (Opposition) (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats (Opposition)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In April 2021, he allowed a party col eague He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In April 2021, he allowed a party col eague
to take his Knesset seat. to take his Knesset seat.

United Torah Judaism – 7 seats (Opposition) – 7 seats (Opposition)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel Ha’torah); favors welfare and Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel Ha’torah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of Jewish Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of Jewish
law. law.
Leader: Yaakov Litzman
Born in 1948, Litzman was born in Germany and raised in the United States before Born in 1948, Litzman was born in Germany and raised in the United States before
immigrating to Israel in 1965. Educated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he immigrating to Israel in 1965. Educated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he
later served as principal of a Hasidic girls’ school in Jerusalem. In April 2021, he later served as principal of a Hasidic girls’ school in Jerusalem. In April 2021, he
allowed a party col eague to take his Knesset seat. allowed a party col eague to take his Knesset seat.
ARAB
Joint List – 6 seats (Opposition) – 6 seats (Opposition)
Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadashpolitical strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal), and BaladMovement for Renewal), and Balad (National Democratic Assembly). (National Democratic Assembly).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the
Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s
national leader in 2006. national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am)(UAL or Ra’am) – 4 seats (Coalition) – 4 seats (Coalition)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist.

Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
Note: Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election. Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election.

Congressional Research Service 18 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Appendix C. Chinese Investments in Israeli Technology Companies: 2011-2020 Source: Institute for National Security Studies Note: Publicly available information on these types of investments may be limited. An outlier transaction included in this figure is the 2016 purchase by China-based Alpha Frontier of the Israel-based mobile gaming company Playtika for $4.4 bil ion. Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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