Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from June 15, 2022 to July 1, 2022

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
~~June 15~~July 1, 2022 , 2022
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United
Jim Zanotti
States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
appropriations. Some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of appropriations. Some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of

U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the
following matters: following matters:

Current government and coalition uncertainty. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party and Foreign Minister
~~Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party lead a power-sharing government featuring a group of disparate parties from across the~~
~~political spectrum (including an Arab-led party) that replaced the government of the long-serving Benjamin Netanyahu in~~
~~June 2021. To date, the government has focused on pragmatic management of Israel’s security and economy rather than~~
~~comprehensive policies such as those related to the Palestinians. Even so, disagreements have occurred between various~~
~~elements of the coalition. As of June 2022, two members of Yamina have resigned from the coalition. With the coalition’s~~
~~support down to 59 out of 120 Knesset (parliament) members, it is struggling to survive and function. Under the power-~~
~~sharing agreement, Lapid could become a caretaker prime minister if the Knesset votes to hold new elections, while~~
~~Netanyahu—who leads the opposition and is on trial for allegations of criminal corruption—could return to power under~~
~~some scenarios~~Political instability and fall 2022 election. Israel has experienced a period of unprecedented political instability since April 2019. During this time, the country has held four elections with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing criminal prosecution on political corruption charges. After the coalition government that replaced Netanyahu in June 2021 broke down in June 2022, another election—the fifth round in four years—is scheduled to take place on November 1, 2022. With the collapse of the coalition, Israel’s prime minister changed from Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party (who had held the office since June 2021) to Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party. Lapid is to serve in a caretaker capacity along with Israel’s other cabinet ministers until a new Knesset installs a new government. The elections and the subsequent government formation process are likely to be a showdown between Netanyahu’s Likud party and the parties inclined to support him, and Prime Minister Lapid and others across the political spectrum who oppose Netanyahu leading another government. .
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials regularly speak out strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials regularly speak out
against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for including settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for
individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. Violence in 2022 has triggered heightened counterterrorism measures and some individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. Violence in 2022 has triggered heightened counterterrorism measures and some
controversy, including in relation to the killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. With the Gaza Strip controversy, including in relation to the killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. With the Gaza Strip
still under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States still under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States
and other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group. and other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority states. The Biden Administration has followed The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced
normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address
Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties. Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.
Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader
regional cooperation—including on air and missile defense—that inclines Saudi Arabia and other Muslim-majority countries regional cooperation—including on air and missile defense—that inclines Saudi Arabia and other Muslim-majority countries
toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging more normalization and toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging more normalization and
greater regional security cooperation involving Israel. greater regional security cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran in the region. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement
that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. ~~Prime Minister Bennett has made statements opposing the Biden Administration~~
~~reentering or revising~~Israel’s leaders have varying views about a possible U.S. return to the agreement. Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence the agreement. Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence
nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations against Iran and nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations against Iran and
its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s
missile arsenal. missile arsenal.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. To date, Israel has not provided lethal support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. To date, Israel has not provided lethal
assistance to Ukraine, but has provided protective equipment to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian groups. Since 2015, assistance to Ukraine, but has provided protective equipment to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian groups. Since 2015,
Russia’s air defense capabilities in Syria have compelled Israel to deconflict its airstrikes there with Russia. Russia’s air defense capabilities in Syria have compelled Israel to deconflict its airstrikes there with Russia.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 5 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (Israel (~~see~~see Figure 1 for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). A few lawmakers Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). A few lawmakers
seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1 Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding
Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—
though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty
in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy will remain in Jerusalem.2 in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy will remain in Jerusalem.2
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include include
 Israel’s  Israel’s ~~current power-sharing government and its uncertain future~~ongoing political instability and the upcoming fall 2022 election. .
 Israeli-Palestinian problems and their implications for U.S. policy, including  Israeli-Palestinian problems and their implications for U.S. policy, including
violence and controversy in 2022, Gaza and its challenges, and human rights violence and controversy in 2022, Gaza and its challenges, and human rights
considerations. considerations.
 Developments regarding Israel’s normalization or improvement of relations with  Developments regarding Israel’s normalization or improvement of relations with
various Arab and Muslim-majority states since the Abraham Accords. various Arab and Muslim-majority states since the Abraham Accords.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah. Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
 Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.  Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

1 Rebecca Kheel, “Progressives ramp up scrutiny of US funding for Israel,” 1 Rebecca Kheel, “Progressives ramp up scrutiny of US funding for Israel,” The Hill, May 23, 2021. One bill, the Two-, May 23, 2021. One bill, the Two-
State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), would expressly prohibit U.S. assistance (including defense articles or services) to State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), would expressly prohibit U.S. assistance (including defense articles or services) to
further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise permanent control over any part of the West Bank further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise permanent control over any part of the West Bank
(including East Jerusalem) or Gaza. (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
2 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” 2 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. , February 9, 2021.
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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA, DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2022 unless otherwise ; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2022 unless otherwise
specified. specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights ~~control ed~~controlled by Israel’s military is occupied by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
~~Domestic Issues~~
~~Current Government~~
~~A power-sharing government headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett took office in June 2021.~~
~~This leadership change ended Benjamin Netanyahu’s 12-year tenure as prime minister and two~~
~~years of political turmoil following Netanyahu’s February 2019 criminal indictment on corruption~~
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~~charges.3 Netanyahu and his Likud party now lead the Knesset’s opposition, as was the case from~~
~~2006 to 2009.~~
~~While Bennett—a right-of-center figure who leads the Yamina party—currently heads the~~
~~government, the centrist Yesh Atid party leader Yair Lapid played a leading role in arranging the~~
~~coalition. If the government remains intact, Bennett is scheduled to serve as prime minister until~~
~~August 27, 2023, at which point Lapid would become prime minister. The government draws its~~
~~support from a disparate coalition of parties on the right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu),~~
~~center (Yesh Atid and Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the political spectrum, as well as~~
~~from the Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) (see Table 1).4 UAL is the first~~
~~independent Arab party to join an Israeli government.5 Women make up approximately one-third~~
~~of Israel’s cabinet, with nine female ministers, more than in any previous government.6~~
~~Table 1. Israeli Power-Sharing~~Israeli Political Instability and Fall 2022 Election Israel has experienced a period of unprecedented political instability since April 2019. During this time, the country has held four elections with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing criminal prosecution on political corruption charges. After the coalition government that replaced Netanyahu in June 2021 broke down in June 2022 (as discussed below), another election—the fifth round in four years—is scheduled to take place on November 1, 2022. With the collapse of the coalition, Israel’s prime minister changed from Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party (who had held the office since June 2021) to Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party. Lapid is to serve in a Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 6 link to page 19 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief caretaker capacity along with Israel’s other cabinet ministers (see Table 1) until a new Knesset installs a new government. Bennett, as alternate prime minister, is to maintain significant responsibility for Iran-related issues, but he has announced that he will not run in the fall election. Table 1. Israeli Caretaker Government: Key Positions Position Name Party Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ~~Government: Key Positions~~
~~Position~~
~~Name~~
~~Party~~
~~Prime Minister~~
~~Naftali Bennett~~
~~Yamina~~
~~Foreign Minister and~~
Yair Lapid Yair Lapid
Yesh Atid Yesh Atid
Alternate Prime Minister Alternate Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett Yamina Defense Minister Defense Minister
Benny Gantz Benny Gantz
Kahol Lavan Kahol Lavan
Finance Minister Finance Minister
Avigdor Lieberman Avigdor Lieberman
Yisrael Beitenu Yisrael Beitenu
Justice Minister Justice Minister
Gideon Sa’ar Gideon Sa’ar
New Hope New Hope
Interior Minister Interior Minister
Ayelet Shaked Ayelet Shaked
Yamina Yamina
Transportation Minister Transportation Minister
Merav Michaeli Merav Michaeli
Labor Labor
Public Security Minister Public Security Minister
Omer Bar Lev Omer Bar Lev
Labor Labor
Health Minister Health Minister
Nitzan Horowitz Nitzan Horowitz
Meretz Meretz
~~The Coalition’s Uncertain Future~~
~~In April 2022, the power-sharing government weakened when coalition whip Idit Silman from~~
~~Yamina resigned from the coalition. She expressed concerns that the government’s actions had~~
~~harmed Jewish identity in Israel, and voiced support for an alternative, right-of-center~~
~~government. In June 2022, Nir Orbach from Yamina also left the coalition, pledging to work~~
~~toward an alternative coalition without initially voting to trigger new elections.~~
~~With the coalition’s support down to 59 out of 120 Knesset members, it faces difficulties in~~
~~surviving and functioning. If the Netanyahu-led opposition can garner majority support in a~~
~~Knesset vote, it can either form an alternative government or require new elections.7 The~~
~~following considerations could be relevant:~~

~~3 Netanyahu also served an earlier 1996-1999 term as prime minister.~~
~~4 For a comprehensive list of Israeli parties in the Knesset, see CRS Report RL33476,~~ ~~Israel: Background and U.S.~~
~~Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~5 Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3,~~
~~2021.~~
~~6 Mazal Mualem, “Israeli female ministers introduce reforms, shake up agenda,” Al-Monitor, September 10, 2021.~~
~~7 David Makovsky, “Political Tempest in Israel: Can Bennett Right the Ship?” Washington Institute for Near East~~
~~Policy, April 11, 2022.~~
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~~ To lead a new government, Netanyahu might need more coalition supporters to~~
~~switch sides, because the six Knesset members of the Arab-led Joint List from the~~
~~opposition are unlikely to support him.~~
~~ Under the power-sharing agreement, a Knesset vote for new elections could lead~~
~~to Lapid taking over as caretaker prime minister until the formation of a~~
~~permanent government.~~
~~ A Knesset failure to pass a 2023-2024 budget by March 2023 would~~
~~automatically trigger new elections.~~
~~ Another figure (such as Defense Minister Benny Gantz) could conceivably try to~~
~~form a new government with support from current coalition and opposition~~
~~elements.~~
~~In June 2022, the Netanyahu-led opposition in the Knesset withheld its support for a bill to renew~~
~~the application of certain aspects of civilian law to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and the bill—~~
~~which is also opposed by some members of the coalition—failed to pass. The renewal is normally~~
~~a routine matter, but right-of-center members of the opposition refused to vote for it in hopes of~~
~~bringing down the coalition. Some observers speculate that stalemate on the settler law or other~~
~~triggers could lead Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar (a former Likud member) to defect from the~~
~~coalition and form a government with Netanyahu, or lead the Knesset to vote for new elections.8~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian Issues9~~
~~Overview~~
~~Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated~~
~~two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for~~
~~direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.10 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster~~
~~Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump~~
~~Administration. These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians~~
~~that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement~~
~~expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for~~
~~individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.11~~
~~Some Israeli settlement construction plans for East Jerusalem and the West Bank have~~
~~advanced,12 but Israel has reportedly delayed a few plans flagged as especially damaging to the~~
~~two-state vision by the Biden Administration or some Members of Congress.13 In May 2022,~~

~~8 Rory Jones and Yardena Schwartz, “Israeli Coalition In Danger After Vote,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2022; Mazal~~
~~Mualem, “Israel’s Lapid courts Arab parties with eye toward early elections,” Al-Monitor, June 9, 2022.~~
~~9 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~10 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,”~~
~~September 21, 2021.~~
~~11 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett After Their Meeting,”~~
~~Jerusalem, March 27, 2022.~~
~~12 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances Thousands of Settlement Homes Despite Harsh U.S. Rebuke,” haaretz.com, October~~
~~27, 2021.~~
~~13 “Israel stops plan for contentious east Jerusalem settlement,” Associated Press, December 6, 2021; “Plans to move~~
~~forward with E1 settlement construction reportedly on hold,” Times of Israel, January 6, 2022.~~
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~~Israel advanced plans for nearly 4,500 additional housing units for West Bank settlements,14~~
~~drawing statements of strong opposition from the Administration.15~~
~~Biden Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based Palestinian~~
~~Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for~~
~~Palestinians.16 Additionally, as part of FY2021 appropriations legislation, the Nita M. Lowey~~
~~Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized~~
~~the establishment of two funds to support development in the West Bank and Gaza, along with~~
~~various types of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation.17 For allocation between the two~~
~~MEPPA funds, Congress appropriated $50 million for FY2021 and the same amount for FY2022,~~
~~with additional $50 million tranches authorized for FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025.~~
~~Reopening of U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem?~~
~~Biden Administration officials have said that they plan to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that had~~
~~previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians, without~~
~~specifying when the consulate might reopen.18 The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S.~~
~~Embassy in Israel in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU)~~
~~within the embassy. Competing Israeli and Palestinian national narratives influence this issue, with both sides~~
~~appealing to U.S. officials about its importance of Jerusalem and its holy sites to their domestic constituencies.19~~
~~A December 2021 media report claimed that controversy on the issue led the Biden Administration to effectively~~
~~shelve plans to reopen the consulate. It also said that the PAU was communicating directly with State Department~~
~~officials in Washington, rather than working through other embassy channels.20 In June 2022, the PAU was re-~~
~~branded as the Office of Palestinian Affairs (OPA), with the OPA operating under the auspices of the embassy~~
~~while reporting directly to Washington.21 This type of direct communication was a core aspect of the previous~~
~~consulate general’s independent status. Nevertheless, PA President Abbas reportedly continues to press for the~~
~~reopening of the consulate.22~~
~~Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances,~~
~~including through loans and work permits.23 However, some critics charge that the measures~~
~~mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its~~
~~causes through negotiation with Palestinians.24~~

~~14 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances over 4,000 West Bank Housing Units for Jews,” haaretz.com, May 12, 2022.~~
~~15 State Department Press Briefing, May 6, 2022.~~
~~16 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~17 For information on the Partnership for Peace Fund (PPF), see https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/meppa. For~~
~~information on the Joint Investment for Peace Initiative (JIPI), see https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-~~
~~announces-joint-investment-peace-initiative-promote-middle-east-peace. According to USAID FY2022 Congressional~~
~~Notification #43, January 20, 2022, the Administration plans to allocate $46.5 million of FY2021 funding for MEPPA~~
~~toward the PPF, and $3.5 million toward the JIPI.~~
~~18 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021.~~
~~19 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel to form team to solve consulate dispute,” Axios, October 20, 2021; Jack Khoury and~~
~~Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves~~
~~Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021.~~
~~20 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel,” Times of Israel,~~
~~December 15, 2021.~~
~~21 Barak Ravid, “State Department separates Palestinian office from U.S. Embassy to Israel,” Axios, June 9, 2022.~~
~~22 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. sending senior diplomat to Ramallah to reassure Palestinians,” Axios, June 8, 2022.~~
~~23 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of~~
~~Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to~~
~~20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022.~~
~~24 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021.~~
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~~Some international bodies have subjected alleged Israeli human rights violations against~~
~~Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny. In March 2021, the International Criminal~~
~~Court (ICC) prosecutor began an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.25~~Over nearly four years, Israel’s efforts at establishing political leadership have unfolded as follows. Netanyahu was selected by Israel’s president as the Knesset member best situated to form a government after both the April 2019 and September 2019 elections, but was unable to do so in either case—the first time such a stalemate had occurred in Israel. After the March 2020 election, Netanyahu formed a power-sharing government in May 2020 with Benny Gantz’s Kahol Lavan party, but the government collapsed later that year over a failure to pass a national budget. The resulting election in March 2021 led to the replacement of Netanyahu’s government by a wide-ranging but fractious coalition of parties in June 2021 (see Appendix A). While Bennett—a right-of-center figure—served as prime minister of this power-sharing government, the centrist Lapid played a leading role in arranging the coalition. In June 2022, the Netanyahu-led opposition in the Knesset withheld its support for a bill to renew the application of certain aspects of civilian law to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and the bill failed to pass after two members of Bennett’s Yamina party left the coalition in hopes of bringing a more right-leaning government to power. To trigger an automatic renewal of the civilian laws’ application to West Bank settlers, Bennett and Lapid got the Knesset to dissolve the coalition and vote for the election now scheduled for the fall. Under the government’s power-sharing agreement, once the Knesset voted for a new election, Lapid (see text box below for a brief biography) became Israel’s caretaker prime minister because members of Bennett’s party were responsible for the coalition’s demise. Prime Minister Yair Lapid: Biography Lapid, born in 1963, transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, when he founded the centrist, pro-secular Yesh Atid (There is a Future) party. His father Tommy was also a media personality-turned-politician who led the Shinui (Change) party in the Knesset from 1999-2006 and served briefly as justice minister. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid and Yesh Atid joined a combined list with Benny Gantz’s Kahol Lavan to oppose Netanyahu for three straight elections beginning in April 2019, but split from Kahol Lavan when Gantz formed a power-sharing Congressional Research Service 3 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief government with Netanyahu in May 2020. After Yesh Atid’s second-place finish in the March 2021 election, then-Israeli President Reuven Rivlin chose Lapid as the Knesset member best positioned to form a government. He established a power-sharing government in June 2021 featuring eight parties across Israel’s political spectrum, serving as foreign minister and alternate prime minister as part of a rotation agreement with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party. Under the power-sharing agreement, Lapid became caretaker prime minister in July 2022 after members of Yamina caused the government’s dissolution. In conducting Israel’s foreign policy since June 2021, Lapid, Bennett, and Gantz have avoided major military conflict to date while supporting efforts to counter Iran, including in coordination with the United States and various Arab countries. While he is constrained from major political initiatives while serving in a caretaker capacity, Lapid favors a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,3 and has expressed opposition to West Bank settlement construction that could impede such a solution—particularly in isolated areas away from settlement blocs closer to Israel.4 In past public statements, Lapid has said that he would not accept dividing Jerusalem with the Palestinians.5 The elections and the subsequent government formation process are likely to be a showdown between Netanyahu’s Likud party and the parties inclined to support him, and Prime Minister Lapid’s Yesh Atid party and others across the political spectrum who oppose Netanyahu leading another government. The previous coalition achieved little consensus on controversial subjects—the Palestinians, how to balance judicial review and majority rule, and religion’s role in the state. Nevertheless, Lapid and Bennett maintain that this coalition competently addressed important issues such as Iran, the budget, and the COVID-19 crisis.6 Netanyahu’s trial is ongoing and may continue for years without legally preventing him from leading a government. Some observers speculate that he might be open to political compromises with other parties in return for measures to end or disrupt his prosecution, even though Netanyahu denies this.7 Such compromises could include efforts to increase formal Israeli control over parts of the West Bank and reduce the judiciary’s power over legislation or government action. Itamar Ben Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party are possible Likud coalition partners—perhaps as part of a broader Religious Zionism electoral list—and have links with a Jewish ultra-nationalist movement based on the ideology of Meir Kahane (1932-1990).8 Kahane served in the Knesset from 1984 until 1988, when his party was banned from elections after Israel passed legislation disqualifying those who incite racism. The U.S. government has designated a Kahanist group (Kahane Chai) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, even though the government de-listed the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2022 due to its inactivity.9 The following could be significant factors regarding the elections and government formation process: 3 Josef Federman, “Lapid, set to be Israel’s next premier, faces critical test,” Associated Press, June 21, 2022. 4 Tovah Lazaroff, “Lapid, Gantz now control the fate of settlers in Israel’s West Bank,” jpost.com, June 20, 2022. 5 Noa Landau, “Yair Lapid Says Jerusalem Is Non-negotiable Even if It Means No Peace,” haaretz.com, December 25, 2017. 6 Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview”; “Lapid says Bennett has shown responsibility, thanks him for friendship: ‘I love you very much,’” Times of Israel, June 20, 2022. 7 Patrick Kingsley and Isabel Kershner, “As Government Collapses, Netanyahu Makes Case to Lead Israel Again,” New York Times, June 22, 2022. 8 David B. Green, “Israel Election Results: Who Was Meir Kahane, and Why Is His Racist Legacy Relevant Again,” haaretz.com, March 26, 2021. 9 State Department, “Revocation of Five Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designations and the Delisting of Six Deceased Individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” May 20, 2022. Congressional Research Service 4 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief  Another stalemate? Initial polling suggests that Likud will probably win more votes than any other party, but pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs may both have difficulty achieving Knesset support to form a government.10 In such an event, Lapid and other caretaker officials might continue in their positions through multiple election rounds, as Netanyahu did when serving in a caretaker capacity from December 2018 until May 2020.  Potential game changers. The electoral math could change if some parties near the electoral threshold fall beneath it, or, alternatively, run with one or more other parties as a combined list. Other changes could come from key political figures entering or departing the political scene, or making new alignments. The political future of the Yamina party without Bennett is in question.11 Also, Gadi Eizenkot, a prominent retired general and former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff, is reportedly considering running alongside Lapid.12 Leaders of the Kahol Lavan, New Hope, and Yisrael Beitenu parties all currently oppose sitting in government with Netanyahu, but also have a history of working with him.  Arab-led parties. As in the previous government, Arab-led parties could be decisive in determining future political outcomes. The Islamist United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) was the first independent Arab party to join an Israeli government when it joined the Lapid-Bennett coalition in June 2021.13 The Joint List (made up of three smaller parties with socialist or nationalist leanings) has stayed aloof from the pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs to date. Voter turnout among Arab citizens of Israel has fluctuated between 45% and 65% in the past four elections,14 and could determine whether UAL reaches the electoral threshold, while also generally affecting Arab-led parties’ ability to influence government formation or critical legislation.15 Israeli-Palestinian Issues16 Overview Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.17 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians 10 Michael Horovitz, “Polls point to return of dreaded deadlock in next elections, unless alliances shift,” Times of Israel, June 21, 2022. 11 Yossi Verter, “Israel’s Government of Change Nears End Along With Bennet’s Political Career,” haaretz.com, June 21, 2022. 12 Ibid. 13 Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3, 2021. 14 Arik Rudnitzky, “The Arab Vote in the Elections for the 24th Knesset (March 2021),” Israel Democracy Institute, April 27, 2021. 15 “Israel’s electoral threshold: Will it change and who will be affected?” jpost.com, June 26, 2022. 16 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 17 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 21, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.18 Some Israeli settlement construction plans for East Jerusalem and the West Bank have advanced,19 but Israel has reportedly delayed a few plans flagged as especially damaging to the two-state vision by the Biden Administration or some Members of Congress.20 In May 2022, Israel advanced plans for nearly 4,500 additional housing units for West Bank settlements,21 drawing statements of strong opposition from the Administration.22 Biden Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for Palestinians.23 Additionally, as part of FY2021 appropriations legislation, the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the establishment of two funds to support development in the West Bank and Gaza, along with various types of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation.24 For allocation between the two MEPPA funds, Congress appropriated $50 million for FY2021 and the same amount for FY2022, with additional $50 million tranches authorized for FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025. Reopening of U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem? Biden Administration officials have said that they plan to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that had previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians, without specifying when the consulate might reopen.25 The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S. Embassy in Israel in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU) within the embassy. Competing Israeli and Palestinian national narratives influence this issue, with both sides appealing to U.S. officials about its importance of Jerusalem and its holy sites to their domestic constituencies.26 A December 2021 media report claimed that controversy on the issue led the Biden Administration to effectively shelve plans to reopen the consulate. It also said that the PAU was communicating directly with State Department officials in Washington, rather than working through other embassy channels.27 In June 2022, the PAU was re- branded as the Office of Palestinian Affairs (OPA), with the OPA operating under the auspices of the embassy while reporting directly to Washington.28 This type of direct communication was a core aspect of the previous consulate general’s independent status. Nevertheless, PA President Abbas reportedly continues to press for the reopening of the consulate.29 18 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett After Their Meeting,” Jerusalem, March 27, 2022. 19 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances Thousands of Settlement Homes Despite Harsh U.S. Rebuke,” haaretz.com, October 27, 2021. 20 “Israel stops plan for contentious east Jerusalem settlement,” Associated Press, December 6, 2021; “Plans to move forward with E1 settlement construction reportedly on hold,” Times of Israel, January 6, 2022. 21 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances over 4,000 West Bank Housing Units for Jews,” haaretz.com, May 12, 2022. 22 State Department Press Briefing, May 6, 2022. 23 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 25 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021. 26 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel to form team to solve consulate dispute,” Axios, October 20, 2021; Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021. 27 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel,” Times of Israel, December 15, 2021. 28 Barak Ravid, “State Department separates Palestinian office from U.S. Embassy to Israel,” Axios, June 9, 2022. 29 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. sending senior diplomat to Ramallah to reassure Palestinians,” Axios, June 8, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 11 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances, including through loans and work permits.30 However, some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.31 Some international bodies have subjected alleged Israeli human rights violations against Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny. In March 2021, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor began an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.32
Members of Congress have taken varying positions on human rights-related concerns. Members of Congress have taken varying positions on human rights-related concerns.
Violence and Controversy in 2022
A number of complicated factors may contribute to heightened tensions and episodic violence A number of complicated factors may contribute to heightened tensions and episodic violence
between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel. With prospects dim for between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel. With prospects dim for
diplomatic resolution of final-status issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem’s status, militants diplomatic resolution of final-status issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem’s status, militants
and activists on both sides may seek to shape outcomes or express protest. Arab states’ greater and activists on both sides may seek to shape outcomes or express protest. Arab states’ greater
willingness—despite Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic stalemate—to cooperate openly with Israel willingness—despite Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic stalemate—to cooperate openly with Israel
could feed increased tensions (see could feed increased tensions (see “The Abraham Accords” below). below).
Since March 2022, a wave of Israeli-Palestinian violence has resulted to date in the deaths of 19 Since March 2022, a wave of Israeli-Palestinian violence has resulted to date in the deaths of 19
Israelis or foreigners in Israel and more than 40 Palestinians,Israelis or foreigners in Israel and more than 40 Palestinians,2633 amid the following: amid the following:
 Protests and violent altercations around Jerusalem holy sites, including during  Protests and violent altercations around Jerusalem holy sites, including during
religious holidays and other sensitive times commemorating historical events. religious holidays and other sensitive times commemorating historical events.2734
 Heightened Israeli and PA security measures to counter alleged Palestinian  Heightened Israeli and PA security measures to counter alleged Palestinian
lawlessness and militancy in West Bank cities such as Jenin. lawlessness and militancy in West Bank cities such as Jenin.2835
In May 2022, prominent In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a Palestinian Christian from journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a Palestinian Christian from
East Jerusalem who was a U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli East Jerusalem who was a U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli
security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered a major international security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered a major international
outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning
Abu Akleh’s killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department Abu Akleh’s killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department
spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and full accountability, and said spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and full accountability, and said
that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive
investigation.”investigation.”2936 Some evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces, Some evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces,3037 with with
the PA claiming that its investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but the PA claiming that its investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but
Israel denying any such intent.Israel denying any such intent.3138 It is unclear whether and how Israel, the PA, or other parties It is unclear whether and how Israel, the PA, or other parties
~~might further investigate the matter, and whether U.S. authorities could be involved.32 Fifty-seven~~
~~Members of Congress sent a letter to the State Department and FBI requesting that they~~
~~investigate.33 In April 2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers had filed a complaint with the~~
~~ICC alleging that Israel has systematically targeted Palestinian journalists for years.34~~

25 29 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. sending senior diplomat to Ramallah to reassure Palestinians,” Axios, June 8, 2022. 30 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to 20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022. 31 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021. 32 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
2633 David S. Cloud and Anas Baba, “Israeli Work Permits Ease Gaza Tensions,” David S. Cloud and Anas Baba, “Israeli Work Permits Ease Gaza Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2022. , May 28, 2022.
2734 CRS Report RL33476, CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
2835 Ahmad Melhem, “Israeli forces find tough resistance in Jenin camp,” Ahmad Melhem, “Israeli forces find tough resistance in Jenin camp,” Al-Monitor, May 25, 2022. , May 25, 2022.
2936 State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022. State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022.
3037 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” May 16, 2022. Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” May 16, 2022.
3138 “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” Associated Press, May 26, 2022. , May 26, 2022.
~~32 Joseph Krauss, “US has not been asked to help in probe of reporter’s killing,” Associated Press, May 25, 2022; Lazar~~
~~Berman, “PA refers Abu Akleh death to International Criminal Court prosecutors” Times of Israel, May 23, 2022.~~
~~33 Text of letter available at~~
~~https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf.~~
~~34 International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian~~
~~journalists,” April 26, 2022.~~
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~~Gaza and Its Challenges~~
~~The Gaza Strip—control ed~~ Congressional Research Service 7 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief might further investigate the matter, and whether U.S. authorities could be involved.39 Some Members of the House and Senate have sent letters to the executive branch requesting that the State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct an independent investigation.40 In April 2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers had filed a complaint with the ICC alleging that Israel has systematically targeted Palestinian journalists for years.41 Gaza and Its Challenges The Gaza Strip—controlled by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.35
42 Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.3643
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.3744 Because of the PA’s Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been inability to control security in Gaza, it has been ~~unwil ing~~unwilling to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.3845 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.Nations.3946 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.conflict.4047
The Abraham Accords
In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with
four members of the Arab League: the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump four members of the Arab League: the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump
Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and (as Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and (as
mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the
countries in question.countries in question.4148 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both 39 Joseph Krauss, “US has not been asked to help in probe of reporter’s killing,” Associated Press, May 25, 2022; Lazar Berman, “PA refers Abu Akleh death to International Criminal Court prosecutors” Times of Israel, May 23, 2022. 40 Text of letters available at https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf and https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Final%20Abu%20Akleh%20Letter%20(PDF).pdf. 41 International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian journalists,” April 26, 2022. 42 ~~In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both~~
~~countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had~~
~~operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported the UAE~~
~~and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords, even allowing the use of Saudi~~
~~airspace for direct commercial airline flights between those countries and Israel.42~~
~~Trade, tourism, and investment ties have generally deepened since the signing of the Accords—~~
~~including a May 2022 Israel-UAE free-trade agreement (pending Israeli ratification) and a major~~
~~Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative focused on desalinated water and solar energy.43 One exception is~~

35 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
3643 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor, ,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
3744 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
3845 Ibid. Ibid.
3946 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021. , September 12, 2021.
4047 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29, Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” 2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
4148 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international
economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of
~~sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked~~
~~Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel.~~
~~42 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021.~~
~~43 “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan~~
~~sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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Congressional Research Service 8 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported the UAE and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords, even allowing the use of Saudi airspace for direct commercial airline flights between those countries and Israel.49 Trade, tourism, and investment ties have generally deepened since the signing of the Accords—including a May 2022 Israel-UAE free-trade agreement (pending Israeli ratification) and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative focused on desalinated water and solar energy.50 One exception is that implementing Israel-Sudan normalization appears to be on hold following the Sudanese that implementing Israel-Sudan normalization appears to be on hold following the Sudanese
military’s seizure of power in October 2021.military’s seizure of power in October 2021.4451 As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the
Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the foreign Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the foreign
ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern
Negev desert. Negev desert.
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim- U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Israel-UAE-Bahrain majority countries. Commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Israel-UAE-Bahrain
agreements in October 2021, Secretary Blinken said that “we’re committed to continue building agreements in October 2021, Secretary Blinken said that “we’re committed to continue building
on the efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations on the efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations
with Israel in the years ahead.”with Israel in the years ahead.”4552 However, the Biden Administration appetite for offering major However, the Biden Administration appetite for offering major
U.S. policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.U.S. policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.4653
The Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and The Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and
Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Israeli-Palestinian conflict.4754 Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE
normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League
states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition
for improved ties.for improved ties.4855
Prospects for Saudi normalization. As Israel has drawn closer to some Arab states, the As Israel has drawn closer to some Arab states, the
likelihood of a future normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia may be increasing. Given likelihood of a future normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia may be increasing. Given
Saudi Arabia’s importance as an economic and military power in the region, the kingdom’s Saudi Arabia’s importance as an economic and military power in the region, the kingdom’s
history of firm opposition to such normalization, and its status as the custodian of Islam’s most history of firm opposition to such normalization, and its status as the custodian of Islam’s most
holy and foundational sites, such a development could boost any precedent that the Abraham holy and foundational sites, such a development could boost any precedent that the Abraham
Accords may set for other Muslim-majority countries considering cooperation with Israel.Accords may set for other Muslim-majority countries considering cooperation with Israel.4956 In In
June 2022, Secretary Blinken said that Saudi Arabia is a “critical partner” of the United States in June 2022, Secretary Blinken said that Saudi Arabia is a “critical partner” of the United States in
~~dealing with regional challenges from extremism and Iran and in “continuing the process of~~
~~building relationships between Israel and its neighbors both near and further away through the~~
~~continuation, the expansion of the Abraham Accords.”50~~
~~While senior Saudi officials say that full Israel-Saudi normalization still remains contingent on~~
~~progress with Palestinian issues,51 the two countries are reportedly engaging in serious talks in the~~
~~meantime to build business ties and coordinate on regional security matters. Top Israeli and Saudi~~
~~officials say that the countries could take certain incremental steps toward eventual normalization~~
~~irrespective of the Palestinian question.52 Future steps could include the expansion of Israel’s~~

44 sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel. 49 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021. 50 “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021. 51 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
4552 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
Availability,” October 13, 2021. Availability,” October 13, 2021.
4653 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October , October
14, 2021. 14, 2021.
4754 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,” State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,”
March 28, 2022. March 28, 2022.
4855 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
4956 Dion Nissenbaum, “Saudis Expand Talks with Israel,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Saudis Expand Talks with Israel,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2022. , June 7, 2022.
~~50 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Foreign Affairs Magazine Centennial Celebration,” June 1,~~
~~2022.~~
~~51 “Saudi foreign minister reiterates Kingdom’s position on Israel,” Arab News, May 24, 2022.~~
~~52 Nissenbaum, “Saudi Arabia Moves Toward Eventual Ties with Israel.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

Congressional Research Service 9 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief dealing with regional challenges from extremism and Iran and in “continuing the process of building relationships between Israel and its neighbors both near and further away through the continuation, the expansion of the Abraham Accords.”57 While senior Saudi officials say that full Israel-Saudi normalization still remains contingent on progress with Palestinian issues,58 the two countries are reportedly engaging in serious talks in the meantime to build business ties and coordinate on regional security matters. Top Israeli and Saudi officials say that the countries could take certain incremental steps toward eventual normalization irrespective of the Palestinian question.59 Future steps could include the expansion of Israel’s transit privileges through Saudi airspace, and Saudi Arabia’s full assumption of control and transit privileges through Saudi airspace, and Saudi Arabia’s full assumption of control and
security responsibility for the Red Sea islands Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt.security responsibility for the Red Sea islands Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt.5360 One Israeli One Israeli
journalist has argued that in talks regarding the two islands, U.S. officials are essentially journalist has argued that in talks regarding the two islands, U.S. officials are essentially
encouraging Israel to agree to a weakening of security protocols from the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace encouraging Israel to agree to a weakening of security protocols from the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace
treaty in exchange for a future and still unclear hope of Israeli-Saudi normalization.treaty in exchange for a future and still unclear hope of Israeli-Saudi normalization.5461
Security cooperation. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would
add Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of add Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.5562 Israel had previously been under the Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,5663
and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.5764
Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the other Abraham Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the other Abraham
Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt,
and Pakistan.and Pakistan.5865
Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by
Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly
expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.5966 Earlier, both Morocco (November Earlier, both Morocco (November
2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.6067 These These
MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales. MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.
~~In his February 8, 2022, confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee,~~
~~then-nominee as CENTCOM Commander (then-) Lieutenant General Michael Kurilla testified~~
~~that Israel and other regional countries were cooperating on integrated air and missile defense and~~
~~in other security areas. At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab~~
~~counterparts reportedly discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time~~
~~intelligence sharing on inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense~~
~~systems.61~~
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
~~formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.62 In March, Congress enacted the~~

53 57 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Foreign Affairs Magazine Centennial Celebration,” June 1, 2022. 58 “Saudi foreign minister reiterates Kingdom’s position on Israel,” Arab News, May 24, 2022. 59 Nissenbaum, “Saudi Arabia Moves Toward Eventual Ties with Israel.” 60 Ibid.; Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. negotiating deal among Saudis, Israelis and Egyptians,” Ibid.; Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. negotiating deal among Saudis, Israelis and Egyptians,” Axios, May 23, 2022. , May 23, 2022.
5461 Amos Harel, “In UAE, Bennett Inches Closer to the Biggest Prize of All,” haaretz.com, June 10, 2022. Amos Harel, “In UAE, Bennett Inches Closer to the Biggest Prize of All,” haaretz.com, June 10, 2022.
5562 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, , January 15,
2021. 2021.
5663 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1, U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021. 2021.
5764 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of
Israel, October 29, 2021. , October 29, 2021.
5865 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for 2022 , November 11, 2021. Participant list for 2022
International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list. International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
5966 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25, , January 25,
2022. 2022.
6067 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021; , November 26, 2021;
Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. During the , February 3, 2022. During the
same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense
minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all
parties involved. parties involved.
~~61 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022.~~
~~62 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-~~
~~01/Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

9

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief In his February 8, 2022, confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, then-nominee as CENTCOM Commander (then-) Lieutenant General Michael Kurilla testified that Israel and other regional countries were cooperating on integrated air and missile defense and in other security areas. At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.68 Speculation about specific measures has continued since then,69 and Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz said in June 2022 that a “Middle East Air Defense Alliance” is already working together with the United States.70 Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.71 In March, Congress enacted the Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other
things, the IRNA requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening things, the IRNA requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening
and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of
measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization
efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts. efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.
In June 2022, several Members in the Senate and House introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces In June 2022, several Members in the Senate and House introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces
and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act of 2022and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act of 2022~~. The bill~~ (S. 4366 and H.R. 7987). The bill has provisions that would require the Secretary of would require the Secretary of
Defense to submit a strategy and feasibility study on cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council Defense to submit a strategy and feasibility study on cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council
states, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt for an integrated air and missile defense capability to states, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt for an integrated air and missile defense capability to
~~counter Iran-related threats.~~
counter Iran-related threats. Later in June, similar provisions were added to the Senate and House Armed Services Committee-approved versions of the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act. Countering Iran
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through
coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.6372 Israeli Israeli
observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s
2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert
actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”64
73 68 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022. 69 “Israeli radars to be used in UAE to detect Iran missiles, drones – report,” jpost.com, June 28, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” Times of Israel, June 28, 2022. 70 Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York Times, June 21, 2022. 71 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf. 72 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” jpost.com, March 11, 2022. 73 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” jpost.com, November 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 11 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister
Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.6574
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace, Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional
tensions.tensions.6675 In June 2022, then-Prime Minister Bennett characterized some operations inside Iran in the past year as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military capabilities.76
As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy and considers the possibility of As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy and considers the possibility of
reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israel is reportedly still seeking to influence diplomatic reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israel is reportedly still seeking to influence diplomatic
outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international negotiations with Iran, outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international negotiations with Iran, then-Prime Prime
Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return to the JCPOA.Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return to the JCPOA.6777 A A January 2022 report suggested that some leading Israeli security officials might prefer an international deal to no deal because an agreement could provide “increased certainty about the limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for escalation scenarios.”78 During his time as prime minister, Bennett opposed the deal,79 but largely abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.80 As international discussions around the JCPOA continued in March 2022, Bennett and Lapid issued a joint statement arguing against reports that the United States might remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from its Foreign Terrorist Organizations list in exchange for a promise not to harm Americans.81 In an April 26, 2022, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Blinken said that he could only envision the IRGC’s de-listing if Iran takes steps necessary to justify it.82 On May 4, 62 Senators voted in favor of a motion that any Iran nuclear deal must address Iran’s ballistic missile program, support for terrorism, and oil trade 74~~January~~

~~63 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” jpost.com, March 11, 2022.~~
~~64 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” jpost.com,~~
~~November 14, 2021.~~
65 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” New York Times, September 13, 2021. , September 13, 2021.
6675 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel's shift in tactics against Iran,” Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel's shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24, 2022; , May 24, 2022;
Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, “With , April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, “With
missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16, 2022. , March 16, 2022.
~~67 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Bennett’s Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

10

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~2022 report suggested that some leading Israeli security officials might prefer an international~~
~~deal to no deal because an agreement could provide “increased certainty about the limitations on~~
~~Iran’s nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for escalation~~
~~scenarios.”68 Bennett has stated a preference for no deal,69 but has said he does not intend to fight~~
~~publicly with U.S. officials about it.70~~
~~As international discussions around the JCPOA continued in March 2022, Bennett and Foreign~~
~~Minister Lapid issued a joint statement arguing against reports that the United States might~~
~~remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from its Foreign Terrorist~~
~~Organizations list in exchange for a promise not to harm Americans.71 In an April 26, 2022,~~
~~Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Blinken said that he could only envision~~
~~the IRGC’s de-listing if Iran takes steps necessary to justify it.72 On May 4, 62 Senators voted in~~
~~favor of a motion that any Iran nuclear deal must address Iran’s ballistic missile program, support~~
~~for terrorism, and oil trade with China, and not lift sanctions on or de-list the IRGC.73 Later in~~
76 Dion Nissenbaum, et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022. 77 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Bennett’s Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for Policy and Strategy Conference, Reichman University,” November 23, 2021. 78 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel’s military intel chief says Iran deal better than no deal,” Axios, January 5, 2022. 79 Jonathan Lis, “Bennett Announces Laser-based Missile Defense System ‘Within a Year,’” haaretz.com, February 1, 2022. 80 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022. 81 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Joint Announcement from PM Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid,” March 18, 2022. 82 Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6518577?11. Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief with China, and not lift sanctions on or de-list the IRGC.83 Later in May, Bennett claimed that President Biden told him in April that he would not de-list the IRGC.May, Bennett claimed that President Biden told him in April that he would not de-list the IRGC.7484
Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear
program,program,7585 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the
overall effectiveness of such operations.overall effectiveness of such operations.7686 In between his August 2021 White House meetings In between his August 2021 White House meetings
with with then-Prime Minister Bennett, President Biden said that the United States will first use diplomacy Prime Minister Bennett, President Biden said that the United States will first use diplomacy
to “ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon,” but if that fails, “we’re ready to turn to other to “ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon,” but if that fails, “we’re ready to turn to other
options.”options.”7787 In a September 2021 interview, Defense Minister Gantz suggested that he would be In a September 2021 interview, Defense Minister Gantz suggested that he would be
prepared to accept a U.S. return to the JCPOA, while also calling for a “viable, U.S.-led plan B” prepared to accept a U.S. return to the JCPOA, while also calling for a “viable, U.S.-led plan B”
to pressure Iran in case negotiations are unsuccessful, and alluding to Israeli military contingency to pressure Iran in case negotiations are unsuccessful, and alluding to Israeli military contingency
plans.plans.7888
As of May 2022, one source reported that divisions persist among Israeli officials over which As of May 2022, one source reported that divisions persist among Israeli officials over which
approach or combination of approaches—among options including international diplomacy, U.S.-approach or combination of approaches—among options including international diplomacy, U.S.-
led sanctions, and Israeli military and intelligence operations—may be likelier to prevent or slow led sanctions, and Israeli military and intelligence operations—may be likelier to prevent or slow
Iranian nuclear advances.Iranian nuclear advances.7989 Some sources allude to upgrades in Israeli military capabilities, Some sources allude to upgrades in Israeli military capabilities,~~80 but~~

~~Policy and Strategy Conference, Reichman University,” November 23, 2021.~~
~~68 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel’s military intel chief says Iran deal better than no deal,” Axios, January 5, 2022.~~
~~69 Jonathan Lis, “Bennett Announces Laser-based Missile Defense System ‘Within a Year,’” haaretz.com, February 1,~~
~~2022.~~
~~70 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022.~~
~~71 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Joint Announcement from PM Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid,” March~~
~~18, 2022.~~
~~72 Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6518577?11.~~
7390 but questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against Iran’s nuclear program.91 Hezbollah and Syria Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict.92 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications, including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.93 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.94 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership 83 H.R. 4521, Roll Call Vote #155: Motion Agreed to 62-33, R 46-1, D 15-31, I 1-1, May 4, 2022; H.R. 4521, Roll Call Vote #155: Motion Agreed to 62-33, R 46-1, D 15-31, I 1-1, May 4, 2022; Congressional
Record, S.2321, May 4, 2022. , S.2321, May 4, 2022.
7484 Jacob Magid, “Bennett: Biden notified me last month of decision to keep Iran Guards on terror list,” Jacob Magid, “Bennett: Biden notified me last month of decision to keep Iran Guards on terror list,” Times of Israel, ,
May 25, 2022. May 25, 2022.
7585 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022. , March 15, 2022.
7686 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
7787 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett of the State of Israel Before Expanded White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett of the State of Israel Before Expanded
Bilateral Meeting,” August 27, 2021. Bilateral Meeting,” August 27, 2021.
7888 Neri Zilber, “Israel Can Live with a New Iran Nuclear Deal, Defense Minister Says,” foreignpolicy.com, September Neri Zilber, “Israel Can Live with a New Iran Nuclear Deal, Defense Minister Says,” foreignpolicy.com, September
14, 2021. 14, 2021.
7989 Ben Caspit, “Israeli leadership divided on Iran deal,” Ben Caspit, “Israeli leadership divided on Iran deal,” Al-Monitor, May 27, 2022. , May 27, 2022.
8090 “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” jpost.com (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022. “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” jpost.com (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022.
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11

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against Iran’s nuclear~~
~~program.81~~
~~Hezbollah and Syria~~
~~Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s~~
~~forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with~~
~~the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader~~
~~conflict.82 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications,~~
~~including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.83~~
~~Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied~~
~~weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and~~
~~its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.84 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership~~
91 Amos Harel, “Israel’s Saber-rattling on Iran Lacks One Critical Element,” haaretz.com, May 20, 2022. 92 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. Humud. 93 Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The Israeli Card,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022. 94 See, e.g., “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times, April 23, 2020. Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture
precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.8595
Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster
Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other
military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-
backed targets that could present threats to its security.backed targets that could present threats to its security.8696
Russia’s advanced air defense systems in Syria could affect Israeli operations there. Russia’s advanced air defense systems in Syria could affect Israeli operations there.8797 Russia has Russia has
reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian targets,reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian targets,8898 but but
has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.8999 This deconfliction has This deconfliction has
apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has criticized some apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has criticized some
Israeli strikes.Israeli strikes.90100 In May 2022, a Russian-origin S-300 air defense system in Syria reportedly fired In May 2022, a Russian-origin S-300 air defense system in Syria reportedly fired
on Israeli jets for the first time, raising questions about the status of Israel-Russia deconfliction.on Israeli jets for the first time, raising questions about the status of Israel-Russia deconfliction.91

~~81 Amos Harel, “Israel’s Saber-rattling on Iran Lacks One Critical Element,” haaretz.com, May 20, 2022.~~
~~82 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E.~~
~~Humud.~~
~~83 Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The Israeli Card,”~~
~~Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022.~~
~~84 See, e.g., “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben~~
~~Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times,~~
~~April 23, 2020.~~
85101 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 35,000 Jewish and non-Jewish refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.102 As mentioned above, Israel has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.103 Perhaps partly owing to Israel’s careful stance on the conflict, Israeli officials have served in some instances as communicators between their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts.104 Despite entreaties from Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from providing lethal assistance to Ukraine or approving third-party transfers of weapons with proprietary Israeli technology.105 Under some Western pressure, Israel has contemplated providing defensive equipment, personal combat gear, and/or warning systems to Ukraine’s military, partly to project to existing arms export clients that it would be a reliable supplier in crisis situations.106 Israel announced an initial 95 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press, ,
February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies
Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022. Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.
8696 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022. Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022.
8797 Paul Iddon, “Is Russia Helping Syria Intercept Israeli Missile Strikes?” forbes.com, July 30, 2021. Paul Iddon, “Is Russia Helping Syria Intercept Israeli Missile Strikes?” forbes.com, July 30, 2021.
8898 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27, , July 27,
2021. 2021.
8999 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel, ,
February 27, 2022. February 27, 2022.
90100 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel
Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12, , June 12,
2022. 2022.
91101 Dan Parsons and Tyler Rogoway, “S-300 Surface-To-Air Missile Fired at Israeli Jets over Syria for First Time: Dan Parsons and Tyler Rogoway, “S-300 Surface-To-Air Missile Fired at Israeli Jets over Syria for First Time:
Report,” Report,” The Drive, May 16, 2022. , May 16, 2022.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

12

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine~~
~~Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in~~
~~international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and~~
~~humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing over 15,000 Jewish and non-Jewish~~
~~refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.92 As mentioned above, Israel has counted on~~
~~airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those~~
~~related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.93~~
~~Perhaps partly owing to Israel’s careful stance on the conflict, Israeli officials have served in~~
~~some instances as communicators between their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts.94 Despite~~
~~entreaties from Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from providing lethal assistance to~~
~~Ukraine or approving third-party transfers of weapons with proprietary Israeli technology.95~~
~~Under some Western pressure, Israel has contemplated providing defensive equipment, personal~~
~~combat gear, and/or warning systems to Ukraine’s military, partly to project to existing arms~~
~~export clients that it would be a reliable supplier in crisis situations.96 Israel announced an initial~~
102 Isabel Kershner, “Israelis Debate How Many, and What Kind of, Refugees to Accept,” New York Times, March 24, 2022; Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022. 103 Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022. 104 Barak Ravid, “Israel’s Bennett emerges as key mediator between Putin and Zelensky,” Axios, March 9, 2022. 105 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel rejects U.S. request to approve missile transfer to Ukraine,” Axios, May 25, 2022. 106 Yaniv Kubovich and Jonathan Lis, “Israeli Officials Inclined to Increase Ukraine Aid in Face of Russian Congressional Research Service 14 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief shipment of helmets and flak jackets to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations in May shipment of helmets and flak jackets to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations in May
2022.2022.97107
While Israel has not directly joined Western economic sanctions against Russia, Foreign Minister While Israel has not directly joined Western economic sanctions against Russia, Foreign Minister
Lapid has said that Israel is determined to prevent Russians from using Israel to bypass Lapid has said that Israel is determined to prevent Russians from using Israel to bypass
sanctions.sanctions.98108 Observers debate the influence of prominent Russian or Russian-speaking Israelis Observers debate the influence of prominent Russian or Russian-speaking Israelis
within Israel.within Israel.99109 In a March 2022 interview on Israeli television, U.S. Under Secretary of State for In a March 2022 interview on Israeli television, U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said, “You don’t want to become the last haven for dirty money Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said, “You don’t want to become the last haven for dirty money
that’s fueling Putin’s wars.”that’s fueling Putin’s wars.”~~100~~

~~Author Information~~

~~Jim Zanotti~~

~~Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs~~

~~92 Isabel Kershner, “Israelis Debate How Many, and What Kind of, Refugees to Accept,” New York Times, March 24,~~
~~2022.~~
93 Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg110 Atrocities,” haaretz.com, May 3, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022. 107 “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022. 108 Rina Bassist, “Israel vows country won’t become safe haven for sanctioned Russian oligarchs,” Al-Monitor, March 14, 2022. 109 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Cautious Tone on Ukraine Puts Focus on Israeli Oligarchs,” New York Times, April 11, 2022. 110 “US official warns Israel: ‘Don’t be last haven for dirty money fueling Putin’s war,’” Times of Israel, March 11, , March 11, 2022. Congressional Research Service 15 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Appendix A. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders RIGHT Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. Leader: Benjamin Netanyahu Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian speakers from the former Soviet Union. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. Leader: Avigdor Lieberman Born in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as defense minister and foreign minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disillusioned by Netanyahu’s willingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in a 2013 case. Yamina (Right) – 6 seats Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews); includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation. A majority of its members were part of the 2021-2022 coalition. Leader: Ayelet Shaked Born in 1976, Shaked had a brief career as a software engineer before entering politics and working under Netanyahu from 2006 to 2010. She was first elected to the Knesset in 2013 and has been a close political colleague of former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, serving previously as justice minister and now as interior minister. She resigned her Knesset seat shortly after becoming interior minister in June 2021. She favors the eventual annexation of most West Bank settlements and autonomy short of statehood for the Palestinians. She also supports a greater role for Jewish nationalism in law and society and a reduced role for the judiciary. New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. Leader: Gideon Sa’ar Born in 1966, Sa’ar serves as justice minister. He served as cabinet secretary in the 1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon). He became an influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the Knesset in 2003. He served as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior minister from 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019 but left Likud to form New Hope a year later. Congressional Research Service 16 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections. Leader: Bezalel Smotrich Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and religiously conservative causes. LEFT Labor (Avoda) – 7 seats Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. Leader: Merav Michaeli Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a regular national media presence and university lecturer. Meretz (Vigor) – 6 seats Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and peace with the Palestinians. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. Leader: Nitzan Horowitz Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister. He became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and was first elected to the Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent journalist before entering politics. CENTER Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – 17 seats Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. Leader: Prime Minister Yair Lapid (biography in text box in the main body of the report) Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 8 seats Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Likud that claimed itself more committed to preserving long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary, articulating a vision of Israeli nationalism more inclusive of Druze and Arab citizens, and having greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian issues. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. Leader: Benny Gantz Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015. Congressional Research Service 17 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief ULTRA-ORTHODOX Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over Jerusalem. Leader: Aryeh Deri Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In January 2022, he resigned his Knesset seat in connection with a criminal plea deal involving tax-related offenses, but maintained his leadership of the party. United Torah Judaism – 7 seats Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel Ha’torah); favors welfare and education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its interpretation of traditional Jewish law. Leader: Moshe Gafni Born in 1952, Gafni was educated in a yeshiva (traditional Jewish school) and headed a kollel (institute for advanced rabbinic study). He was first elected to the Knesset in 1988. ARAB Joint List – 6 seats Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist political strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab Movement for Renewal), and Balad (National Democratic Assembly). Leader: Ayman Odeh Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006. United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – 4 seats Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. Leader: Mansour Abbas Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the UAL into the previous coalition in June 2021 after receiving promises that the government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for Arab Israelis. Sources: Various open sources. Notes: Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election. Yamina expelled Knesset member Amichai Chikli in April 2022. Author Information Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Congressional Research Service 18~~2022.~~
~~94 Barak Ravid, “Israel’s Bennett emerges as key mediator between Putin and Zelensky,” Axios, March 9, 2022.~~
~~95 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel rejects U.S. request to approve missile transfer to Ukraine,” Axios, May 25, 2022.~~
~~96 Yaniv Kubovich and Jonathan Lis, “Israeli Officials Inclined to Increase Ukraine Aid in Face of Russian Atrocities,”~~
~~haaretz.com, May 3, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com,~~
~~May 4, 2022.~~
~~97 “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022.~~
~~98 Rina Bassist, “Israel vows country won’t become safe haven for sanctioned Russian oligarchs,” Al-Monitor, March~~
~~14, 2022.~~
~~99 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Cautious Tone on Ukraine Puts Focus on Israeli Oligarchs,” New York Times, April 11,~~
~~2022.~~
~~100 “US official warns Israel: ‘Don’t be last haven for dirty money fueling Putin’s war,’” Times of Israel, March 11,~~
~~2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

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