Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from August 15, 2023 to September 21, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations
~~August 15~~September 21, 2023 , 2023
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel
Jim Zanotti
$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance, Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance,

contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters: contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters:

Netanyahu government and controversy over judicial system changes. In December 2022, In December 2022,
Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new coalition government, despite facing an ongoing Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new coalition government, despite facing an ongoing
criminal trial for corruption. Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the criminal trial for corruption. Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the
new Israeli government has triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions new Israeli government has triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions
with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States. The government has proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States. The government has proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s
judicial system. Despite major domestic controversy over whether changes—or responses to them—might impact checks and judicial system. Despite major domestic controversy over whether changes—or responses to them—might impact checks and
balances, cohesion, and military readiness, and efforts by President Biden to encourage compromise, the coalition passed a balances, cohesion, and military readiness, and efforts by President Biden to encourage compromise, the coalition passed a
law in July 2023 to prevent Israeli courts from using a “reasonableness” standard to invalidate government actions. Israel’s law in July 2023 to prevent Israeli courts from using a “reasonableness” standard to invalidate government actions. Israel’s
High Court of Justice High Court of Justice ~~plans to hear~~has heard arguments challenging the legislation in September, raising the possibility of a arguments challenging the legislation in September, raising the possibility of a
constitutional crisis. The government may consider additional legislation that could modify how judges are selected, though constitutional crisis. The government may consider additional legislation that could modify how judges are selected, though
Netanyahu has stated openness to dialogue with the opposition into November. Netanyahu has stated openness to dialogue with the opposition into November.
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken
out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of
Jerusalem’s holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered Jerusalem’s holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered
heightened West Bank counterterrorism measures. As the Gaza Strip remains under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant heightened West Bank counterterrorism measures. As the Gaza Strip remains under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant
group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and other international actors face significant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and other international actors face significant
challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group. challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and possible Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia. The Biden Administration has followed The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ongoing efforts to deepen security and the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ongoing efforts to deepen security and
economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on
various types of defense. After China helped broker diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the various types of defense. After China helped broker diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the
Administration has declared that Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia is a U.S. priority. Any negotiations toward that end Administration has declared that Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia is a U.S. priority. Any negotiations toward that end
would likely consider Saudi security and civilian nuclear demands, as well as a pathway toward a two-state solution. would likely consider Saudi security and civilian nuclear demands, as well as a pathway toward a two-state solution.
Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging expanded and deepened regional cooperation involving Israel. Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging expanded and deepened regional cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran and other regional dynamics. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015
international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran
amid questions about the tenor of U.S.-Israel cooperation on Iran-related issues. Israel also has reportedly conducted a amid questions about the tenor of U.S.-Israel cooperation on Iran-related issues. Israel also has reportedly conducted a
number of covert or military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq for various purposes, including number of covert or military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq for various purposes, including
to prevent Lebanese Hezbollah from bolstering its weapons arsenal and capabilities. Some reports suggest the future to prevent Lebanese Hezbollah from bolstering its weapons arsenal and capabilities. Some reports suggest the future
possibility of an informal, unwritten U.S.-Iran understanding by which Iran might limit some uranium enrichment and possibility of an informal, unwritten U.S.-Iran understanding by which Iran might limit some uranium enrichment and
receive some financial relief for humanitarian purposes, raising questions about how Israel might respond to such a deal. receive some financial relief for humanitarian purposes, raising questions about how Israel might respond to such a deal.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. Israel has shown reluctance to provide support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. Israel has shown reluctance to provide
lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However, Israel is lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However, Israel is
reportedly providing or planning to provide Ukraine with basic intelligence, assistance with early warning systems, and anti-reportedly providing or planning to provide Ukraine with basic intelligence, assistance with early warning systems, and anti-
drone jamming systems to counter Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.drone jamming systems to counter Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.
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Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (seeIsrael (see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, , by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers
seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1 Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
In July 2023, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 57,2 expressing the sense of Congress that In July 2023, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 57,2 expressing the sense of Congress that
1. the State of Israel is not a racist or apartheid state; 1. the State of Israel is not a racist or apartheid state;
2. Congress rejects all forms of antisemitism and xenophobia; and 2. Congress rejects all forms of antisemitism and xenophobia; and
3. the United States will always be a staunch partner and supporter of Israel. 3. the United States will always be a staunch partner and supporter of Israel.
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include the following: include the following:
• Domestic Israeli issues, including action by the government of Prime Minister • Domestic Israeli issues, including action by the government of Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu to reduce the power of Israel’s judiciary that has triggered a Benjamin Netanyahu to reduce the power of Israel’s judiciary that has triggered a
highly charged national debate. highly charged national debate.
• Israeli-Palestinian violence and ongoing disputes. • Israeli-Palestinian violence and ongoing disputes.
• Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords, • Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords,
including speculation about potential Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization. including speculation about potential Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization.
• Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with • Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria. Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria.
• Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. • Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S. 1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S.
assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise
permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza. permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
2 The House passed the resolution on July 18 by a vote of 412-9, with one voting present. The Senate passed it by 2 The House passed the resolution on July 18 by a vote of 412-9, with one voting present. The Senate passed it by
unanimous consent on July 25. unanimous consent on July 25.
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Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Domestic Issues
Netanyahu’s Return to Power and New Coalition Partners
On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) voted to reinstall Likud party leader On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) voted to reinstall Likud party leader
Benjamin Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and Benjamin Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and
2009-2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox 2009-2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox
parties (separties (see Figure 1 and Appendix B).
Figure 1. November 2022 Knesset Election Results

Source: Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious
Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1). Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1).
The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption
allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could
last for months or years.3 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a last for months or years.3 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a
government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021 government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021
government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him. government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him.
Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may
have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.4 have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.4
Key Government Figures and Decisionmaking
Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new
Israeli government (seIsraeli government (see Table 1) has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s
democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its
relations with the United States and other countries.5 Coalition agreements state that the Jewish relations with the United States and other countries.5 Coalition agreements state that the Jewish
people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,6 people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,6
appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to
expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious
law in Israeli society.7 Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at law in Israeli society.7 Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at

3 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand—and where they are going—analysis,” 3 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand—and where they are going—analysis,” Jerusalem
Post, August 16, 2022. , August 16, 2022.
4 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” 4 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, December 30, 2022. , December 30, 2022.
5 Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” 5 Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” Associated Press, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
6 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” 6 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” ~~Axios~~Axios, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
7 “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” 7 “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” Ynetnews/i24News, December 30, 2022. , December 30, 2022.
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contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.8 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007 contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.8 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007
for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.9 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.9
Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work
with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the
two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests
and values.”10 Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge and values.”10 Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge
the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”11 In July 2023, the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”11 In July 2023,
President Biden said in a CNN interview that some of the members of Israel’s cabinet are among President Biden said in a CNN interview that some of the members of Israel’s cabinet are among
the most extreme he has seen.12 the most extreme he has seen.12
Table 1. Israeli Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu Benjamin Netanyahu
Likud Likud
Defense Minister Defense Minister
Yoav Gallant Yoav Gallant
Likud Likud
Foreign Minister Foreign Minister
Eli Cohen Eli Cohen
Likud Likud
Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry
Bezalel Smotrich Bezalel Smotrich
Religious Zionism Religious Zionism
Justice Minister Justice Minister
Yariv Levin Yariv Levin
Likud Likud
National Security Minister National Security Minister
Itamar Ben Gvir Itamar Ben Gvir
Jewish Power Jewish Power
Transportation Minister Transportation Minister
Miri Regev Miri Regev
Likud Likud
Strategic Affairs Minister Strategic Affairs Minister
Ron Dermer Ron Dermer
No formal affiliation No formal affiliation
Energy Minister Energy Minister
Israel Katz Israel Katz
Likud Likud
Agriculture and Rural Development Minister Agriculture and Rural Development Minister
Avi Dichter Avi Dichter
Likud Likud
Smotrich and Ben Gvir have each assumed some security responsibilities. Under the coalition Smotrich and Ben Gvir have each assumed some security responsibilities. Under the coalition
agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over civil affairs agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over civil affairs
units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning commission that units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning commission that
oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.13 Ben Gvir heads a national oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.13 Ben Gvir heads a national
security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including personnel that patrol security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including personnel that patrol
Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.14 He also expects to oversee the border police, including Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.14 He also expects to oversee the border police, including
units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) authority.15 Ben Gvir units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) authority.15 Ben Gvir
supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their legal immunity.16 supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their legal immunity.16

8 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” 8 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” France24, ,
May 15, 2021. May 15, 2021.
9 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” 9 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007. , June 25, 2007.
10 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29, 10 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29,
2022. 2022.
11 11 ~~State Department~~U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022. , “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022.
12 Transcript: Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden, 12 Transcript: Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden, ~~CNN~~CNN, July 9, 2023. , July 9, 2023.
13 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” 13 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” Times of
Israel, December 5, 2022. , December 5, 2022.
14 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” 14 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” Times of
Israel, December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, , December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations. .
15 “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” 15 “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” Times of Israel, December 29, , December 29,
2022. 2022.
16 Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’” 16 Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’”
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Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and top IDF leaders have apparently sought to prevent changes to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and top IDF leaders have apparently sought to prevent changes to
the defense ministry and border police from disrupting the chain of command.17 In February the defense ministry and border police from disrupting the chain of command.17 In February
2023, Smotrich received general responsibilities to direct settlement planning and enforcement 2023, Smotrich received general responsibilities to direct settlement planning and enforcement
over illegal construction in the West Bank, while Gallant maintained formal powers to intervene over illegal construction in the West Bank, while Gallant maintained formal powers to intervene
in Smotrich’s decisions with cause.18 In June, the Israeli government eased and expedited the in Smotrich’s decisions with cause.18 In June, the Israeli government eased and expedited the
process for settlement construction approval. While the process reportedly remains subject to process for settlement construction approval. While the process reportedly remains subject to
final authorization by the prime minister, this move makes it harder for the defense minister or final authorization by the prime minister, this move makes it harder for the defense minister or
prime minister to slow the efforts of Smotrich or any successor in his position.19 U.S. and prime minister to slow the efforts of Smotrich or any successor in his position.19 U.S. and
Palestinian Authority (PA) officials have criticized the Israeli action.20 Palestinian Authority (PA) officials have criticized the Israeli action.20
In anticipation of the government’s formation in late 2022, Netanyahu asserted that he would In anticipation of the government’s formation in late 2022, Netanyahu asserted that he would
personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.21 One Israeli journalist argued that personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.21 One Israeli journalist argued that
Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition partners and Western countries Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition partners and Western countries
concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing the support of one or the concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing the support of one or the
other.22 Two former U.S. officials wrote that if a government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir other.22 Two former U.S. officials wrote that if a government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir
featured open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to change Israel’s democracy, opponents of featured open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to change Israel’s democracy, opponents of
strong U.S.-Israel relations would exploit the situation “to try to undo aspects of the relationship, strong U.S.-Israel relations would exploit the situation “to try to undo aspects of the relationship,
and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”23 and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”23
The coalition agreements are not legally binding.24 The degree of their implementation could have The coalition agreements are not legally binding.24 The degree of their implementation could have
significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the
rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to
Israel.25 The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank Israel.25 The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank
areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.26 areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.26
Controversy over Judicial System Changes and Proposals
Shortly after Netanyahu’s government took office, it advanced proposals in January 2023 aimed Shortly after Netanyahu’s government took office, it advanced proposals in January 2023 aimed
at reducing the power of the judiciary—particularly Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJat reducing the power of the judiciary—particularly Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ, also known as the Supreme Court)—to )—to
check actions approved by Israel’s government.27 The check actions approved by Israel’s government.27 The ~~proposals have triggered several months of~~

17 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within—analysis,” 17 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within—analysis,” Jerusalem Post, January , January
2, 2023; Ash Obel, “Smotrich refuses to attend meeting with IDF chief on transfer of West Bank powers,” 2, 2023; Ash Obel, “Smotrich refuses to attend meeting with IDF chief on transfer of West Bank powers,” Times of
Israel, January 25, 2023. , January 25, 2023.
18 Jeremy Sharon, “Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning,” 18 Jeremy Sharon, “Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning,” Times of
Israel, February 23, 2023. , February 23, 2023.
19 Isabel Kershner, “Israel Eases Rules for Settlements in West Bank,” 19 Isabel Kershner, “Israel Eases Rules for Settlements in West Bank,” New York Times, June 19, 2023. , June 19, 2023.
20 Ibid.; 20 Ibid.; ~~State Department~~Department of State, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18, , “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18,
2023. 2023.
21 Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,” 21 Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,”
NPR, December 15, 2022. , December 15, 2022.
22 Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” 22 Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” Al-Monitor, December 9, , December 9,
2022. 2022.
23 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,” 23 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,”
Times of Israel, November 2, 2022. , November 2, 2022.
24 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” 24 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” ~~Axios~~Axios, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
25 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” 25 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” Jerusalem Post, ,
December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” Al-Monitor, ,
December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Jerusalem
Post, December 22, 2022. , December 22, 2022.
26 26 Associated Press, “Netanyahu government: West Bank settlements top priority,” “Netanyahu government: West Bank settlements top priority,” ~~Associated Press~~, December 28, 2022. December 28, 2022.
27 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” 27 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” Times of Israel, ,
January 4, 2023. January 4, 2023.
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proposals have triggered several months of highly charged national debate. In March, Netanyahu dropped or delayed plans on various highly charged national debate. In March, Netanyahu dropped or delayed plans on various
proposals to give the government control over Israel’s Judicial proposals to give the government control over Israel’s Judicial ~~Appointments~~Selection Committee ( Committee (~~JAC)~~
JSC) and allow the Knesset to override most HCJ decisions, in the face of pressure from various and allow the Knesset to override most HCJ decisions, in the face of pressure from various
sectors of society and President Biden. In June, a dialogue aimed at achieving national consensus sectors of society and President Biden. In June, a dialogue aimed at achieving national consensus
between government and opposition leaders broke down. Despite appeals from President Biden between government and opposition leaders broke down. Despite appeals from President Biden
for Netanyahu to pursue compromise, the coalition proceeded in July to advance legislation that for Netanyahu to pursue compromise, the coalition proceeded in July to advance legislation that
would prevent Israeli courts from using a “reasonableness” standard to invalidate government would prevent Israeli courts from using a “reasonableness” standard to invalidate government
actions.28 Netanyahu defended his action by saying that after trying to compromise for three actions.28 Netanyahu defended his action by saying that after trying to compromise for three
months without success, he “decided to proceed with this minor correction.”29 months without success, he “decided to proceed with this minor correction.”29
“Reasonableness” Law, Next Political Steps, and Popular Sentiment
The new law, which the Knesset passed on July 24, amends Israel’s Basic Law on the judiciary. The new law, which the Knesset passed on July 24, amends Israel’s Basic Law on the judiciary.
The amendment prohibits courts from evaluating the reasonableness of administrative decisions The amendment prohibits courts from evaluating the reasonableness of administrative decisions
made by the cabinet or its ministers (see text box below).30 The opposition, which vehemently made by the cabinet or its ministers (see text box below).30 The opposition, which vehemently
contested the bill, boycotted the vote. contested the bill, boycotted the vote.
The Role of Israel’s Reasonableness Clause
One of the government’s January 2023 proposals for changing the judiciary’s role was to prevent courts from One of the government’s January 2023 proposals for changing the judiciary’s role was to prevent courts from
invalidating government actions on the grounds that they are “unreasonable in the extreme.” The reasonableness invalidating government actions on the grounds that they are “unreasonable in the extreme.” The reasonableness
test does not apply to laws, but only to administrative decisions such as executive orders, cabinet actions, matters test does not apply to laws, but only to administrative decisions such as executive orders, cabinet actions, matters
that require ministerial sign-off, and municipal planning and zoning rulings.31 that require ministerial sign-off, and municipal planning and zoning rulings.31
As the courts have developed the reasonableness framework over time, they have applied it in various cases As the courts have developed the reasonableness framework over time, they have applied it in various cases
where they determine that an action might be arbitrary, reckless, or unethical, even if it does not contradict a where they determine that an action might be arbitrary, reckless, or unethical, even if it does not contradict a
specific provision of law.32 Among other things, the HCJ has used this clause as a basis for some decisions to specific provision of law.32 Among other things, the HCJ has used this clause as a basis for some decisions to
vacate cabinet appointments, including the current Netanyahu government’s December 2022 designation of Shas vacate cabinet appointments, including the current Netanyahu government’s December 2022 designation of Shas
party leader Aryeh Deri (seeparty leader Aryeh Deri (see Appendix B) as interior and health minister.33 The HCJ found Deri’s appointment as interior and health minister.33 The HCJ found Deri’s appointment
to be unreasonable because of his past criminal convictions for corruption and his promise in a plea bargain not to to be unreasonable because of his past criminal convictions for corruption and his promise in a plea bargain not to
return to public life.34 return to public life.34
Debate was vigorous over the July 2023 bil to end courts’ use of the reasonableness standard. The coalition and Debate was vigorous over the July 2023 bil to end courts’ use of the reasonableness standard. The coalition and
its supporters argued that because the clause is not clearly defined in law, its potentially broad application infringes its supporters argued that because the clause is not clearly defined in law, its potentially broad application infringes
on the government’s popular mandate and chil s executive action.35 Despite the new limitation on using the on the government’s popular mandate and chil s executive action.35 Despite the new limitation on using the
reasonableness clause, some supporters of the limitation have said that courts can stil resort to other common reasonableness clause, some supporters of the limitation have said that courts can stil resort to other common
law standards that could protect against certain government decisions. These grounds include proportionality, law standards that could protect against certain government decisions. These grounds include proportionality,
anti-discrimination, conflict of interest, and lack of good faith.36 Some opponents of the bil maintained that the anti-discrimination, conflict of interest, and lack of good faith.36 Some opponents of the bil maintained that the
~~HCJ has shown restraint in rejecting most petitions challenging reasonableness, and that courts should have~~

28 Barak Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats,” 28 Barak Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats,” ~~Axios~~Axios, July , July
23, 2023. 23, 2023.
29 Morgan Winsor, “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks out on divisive judicial overhaul: ‘It’s a minor 29 Morgan Winsor, “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks out on divisive judicial overhaul: ‘It’s a minor
correction,’” correction,’” ABC News, July 27, 2023. , July 27, 2023.
30 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset begins final votes on reasonableness law, curbing court review of decisions,” 30 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset begins final votes on reasonableness law, curbing court review of decisions,” Times of
Israel, July 23, 2023. Under the bill, courts can still use reasonableness to examine the actions of lower-level civil , July 23, 2023. Under the bill, courts can still use reasonableness to examine the actions of lower-level civil
servants or municipal officials. servants or municipal officials.
31 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “What the ‘reasonableness’ law does—and doesn’t—mean for judicial overhaul,” 31 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “What the ‘reasonableness’ law does—and doesn’t—mean for judicial overhaul,” Times of
Israel, July 27, 2023. , July 27, 2023.
32 Amichai Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness,” Israel Democracy Institute, June 32 Amichai Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness,” Israel Democracy Institute, June
22, 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “The reason for reasonableness: A doctrine at the heart of the overhaul explained,” 22, 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “The reason for reasonableness: A doctrine at the heart of the overhaul explained,” Times of
Israel, July 8, 2023. , July 8, 2023.
33 Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness.” 33 Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness.”
34 Jeremy Sharon, “Deri v. High Court: What did he actually pledge in his 2022 plea bargain?” 34 Jeremy Sharon, “Deri v. High Court: What did he actually pledge in his 2022 plea bargain?” Times of Israel, January , January
24, 2023. 24, 2023.
35 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Is Torn by Debate over How Much Power to Allow Supreme Court,” July 22, 2023. 35 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Is Torn by Debate over How Much Power to Allow Supreme Court,” July 22, 2023.
36 Sharon, “The reason for reasonableness: A doctrine at the heart of the overhaul explained.” 36 Sharon, “The reason for reasonableness: A doctrine at the heart of the overhaul explained.”
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HCJ has shown restraint in rejecting most petitions challenging reasonableness, and that courts should have flexibility to employ the reasonableness standard to protect uncodified rights and prevent public corruption and flexibility to employ the reasonableness standard to protect uncodified rights and prevent public corruption and
malfeasance.37 Israeli President Isaac Herzog and the opposition had sought a compromise with Netanyahu that malfeasance.37 Israeli President Isaac Herzog and the opposition had sought a compromise with Netanyahu that
would have preserved some use of reasonableness to review government action, suspended additional legislation would have preserved some use of reasonableness to review government action, suspended additional legislation
on judicial changes for a period of time, and stipulated that the government could not fire the attorney general,38 on judicial changes for a period of time, and stipulated that the government could not fire the attorney general,38
but these efforts fell short. but these efforts fell short.
When the Knesset reconvenes in October, it may consider additional legislation affecting the When the Knesset reconvenes in October, it may consider additional legislation affecting the ~~JAC~~JSC
and perhaps other issues related to the judiciary. Netanyahu has said that the coalition is willing to and perhaps other issues related to the judiciary. Netanyahu has said that the coalition is willing to
return to dialogue with the opposition until sometime in November in an effort to “reach a return to dialogue with the opposition until sometime in November in an effort to “reach a
comprehensive agreement,”39 but opposition leader Yair Lapid has said that he will not join talks comprehensive agreement,”39 but opposition leader Yair Lapid has said that he will not join talks
that are an “empty show.”40 Lapid has demanded an 18-month moratorium on further judiciary-that are an “empty show.”40 Lapid has demanded an 18-month moratorium on further judiciary-
related legislation (unless it has support from a two-thirds majority in the Knesset) before related legislation (unless it has support from a two-thirds majority in the Knesset) before
resuming talks.41resuming talks.41 ~~Some prominent members of Netanyahu’s Likud party have made public~~
~~statements that appear to advise caution on future steps.42~~
Polls have suggested that a majority of Israelis may support some form of judicial reform, but Polls have suggested that a majority of Israelis may support some form of judicial reform, but
generally favors efforts toward compromise. The specific measures introduced by the government generally favors efforts toward compromise. The specific measures introduced by the government
seem to attract only minority support.seem to attract only minority support.4342 One July 2023 poll had 43% of Israelis opposing the One July 2023 poll had 43% of Israelis opposing the
Knesset’s reasonableness legislation, 31% supporting it, and the rest undecided. Moreover, polls Knesset’s reasonableness legislation, 31% supporting it, and the rest undecided. Moreover, polls
also indicate a downturn in general support for Netanyahu and other coalition members.also indicate a downturn in general support for Netanyahu and other coalition members.4443 A poll A poll
taken after the passage of the reasonableness law said that a majority of Israelis worry that civil taken after the passage of the reasonableness law said that a majority of Israelis worry that civil
conflict is possible, while 22% support the government advancing legislation unilaterally.conflict is possible, while 22% support the government advancing legislation unilaterally.4544
The reaction within Israeli society—including from protests and potential military service and The reaction within Israeli society—including from protests and potential military service and
workforce disruptions—appears likely to affect how the legislative process continues. The workforce disruptions—appears likely to affect how the legislative process continues. The
proposed judicial changes have galvanized and polarized substantial portions of the Jewish Israeli proposed judicial changes have galvanized and polarized substantial portions of the Jewish Israeli
populace, with some broad divisions manifest betweenpopulace, with some broad divisions manifest between:
• • Opponents, many of whom are members of the largely secular and Ashkenazi , many of whom are members of the largely secular and Ashkenazi
(Jews of European origin) communities that have traditionally occupied leading (Jews of European origin) communities that have traditionally occupied leading
roles in government, the military, and the burgeoning high-tech sector; and roles in government, the military, and the burgeoning high-tech sector; and
• • Supporters, including many from certain groups with growing populations like , including many from certain groups with growing populations like
West Bank settlers, Jewish nationalists, and the ultra-Orthodox (some of whom West Bank settlers, Jewish nationalists, and the ultra-Orthodox (some of whom
hail from a Mizrahi, or Middle Eastern Jewish, background).hail from a Mizrahi, or Middle Eastern Jewish, background).4645

37 Ibid.; Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness.” 37 Ibid.; Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness.”
38 Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats.” 38 Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats.”
39 “Netanyahu vows to continue dialogue to reach judicial reform compromise,” 39 “Netanyahu vows to continue dialogue to reach judicial reform compromise,” i24News, July 24, 2023. , July 24, 2023.
40 Dov Lieber, “Israelis Vow to Intensify Protests Against New Judicial Legislation,” 40 Dov Lieber, “Israelis Vow to Intensify Protests Against New Judicial Legislation,” Wall Street Journal, July 28, , July 28,
2023. 2023.
41 Knesset News, “Opposition Leader MK Lapid to Knesset Plenum: The only possible solution, and the only thing that 41 Knesset News, “Opposition Leader MK Lapid to Knesset Plenum: The only possible solution, and the only thing that
will enable a return to dialogue, is a moratorium on legislation,” July 30, 2023. will enable a return to dialogue, is a moratorium on legislation,” July 30, 2023.
42 42 ~~“Israeli air chief warns of security threat from judicial reform crisis,” Reuters, July 28, 2023.~~
43 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Only a Minority of Israelis Support the Proposed Judicial Overhaul,” Israel Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Only a Minority of Israelis Support the Proposed Judicial Overhaul,” Israel
Democracy Institute, February 21, 2023, and “Overhauling the Judicial System—What Do Israelis Think?” Israel Democracy Institute, February 21, 2023, and “Overhauling the Judicial System—What Do Israelis Think?” Israel
Democracy Institute, February 3, 2023; “Direct Polls: 3/4 of Israelis support judicial reform,” Democracy Institute, February 3, 2023; “Direct Polls: 3/4 of Israelis support judicial reform,” Israel National News, ,
March 7, 2023. March 7, 2023.
4443 “43% of Israelis opposed to judicial reform Reasonableness Clause—poll,” “43% of Israelis opposed to judicial reform Reasonableness Clause—poll,” Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2023. , July 9, 2023.
4544 Moshe Cohen, “58% of Israelis fear a civil war amid judicial reform crisis,” Moshe Cohen, “58% of Israelis fear a civil war amid judicial reform crisis,” Jerusalem Post/Maariv, July 28, 2023. , July 28, 2023.
~~46 Dov Lieber and Shandi Raice, “Protests Break Out in Israel After Judicial Revamp Passes,” Wall Street Journal, July~~
25, 2023; Patrick Kingsley, “Parliament Set to Vote in Israel on Judicial Bill,” New York Times~~, July 24~~45 Patrick Kingsley and Moises Saman, “Israelis Feeling Pain of Discord in Daily Lives,” New York Times, September 13, 2023; Dov Lieber and Shandi Raice, “Protests Break Out in Israel After Judicial Revamp Passes,” Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2023. , 2023.
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Since January, hundreds of thousands of opponents have joined in regular non-violent protests Since January, hundreds of thousands of opponents have joined in regular non-violent protests
against the proposed changes in conjunction with opposition politicians,against the proposed changes in conjunction with opposition politicians,4746 and several former HCJ and several former HCJ
justices and attorneys general have strongly criticized the proposals.justices and attorneys general have strongly criticized the proposals.4847 At some times, the protests At some times, the protests
have disrupted traffic and operations at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport. Widespread opposition also have disrupted traffic and operations at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport. Widespread opposition also
has come from Israel’s financial and economic sector.has come from Israel’s financial and economic sector.4948 Thousands of supporters of the proposed Thousands of supporters of the proposed
changes have engaged in several non-violent counter-protests. A July poll suggested that majority changes have engaged in several non-violent counter-protests. A July poll suggested that majority
approval in Israel of popular protests does not extend to disruptions of traffic or airport access, or approval in Israel of popular protests does not extend to disruptions of traffic or airport access, or
to refusals to report for military reserve duty.to refusals to report for military reserve duty.50
~~Israeli authorities’ approach to protestors also has become a hotly contested subject. In July, Tel~~
~~Aviv’s police commander announced his resignation, alleging blatant political interference in the~~
~~exercise of his duties—a probable reference to National Security Minister Ben Gvir’s call for~~
~~more assertive efforts to counter disorderly protests.51 Following the commander’s resignation,~~
~~crowd control measures escalated in force and arrests increased.52~~
~~Potential Court Review~~
~~The HCJ is planning to hold a hearing on petitions challenging the reasonableness law on~~
~~September 12.53 Disagreement between the HCJ and Knesset majority on the law’s~~
~~implementation could spark a national crisis.54~~
49 Potential Court Review In September, the HCJ has held hearings on petitions challenging the reasonableness law. Disagreement between the HCJ and Knesset majority on the law’s implementation could spark a national crisis.50 Some media reports suggest that Netanyahu might be seeking some form of compromise with opposition figures in hopes of avoiding such a crisis, perhaps partly in response to polling that suggests his coalition may have lost support from the political center.51 The HCJ could strike down the reasonableness law, uphold it, or narrowly interpret it to curb its The HCJ could strike down the reasonableness law, uphold it, or narrowly interpret it to curb its
impact. To date, the HCJ has not invalidated any provision of Israel’s Basic Laws, which in the impact. To date, the HCJ has not invalidated any provision of Israel’s Basic Laws, which in the
absence of a written constitution lay down the rules of government and enumerate fundamental absence of a written constitution lay down the rules of government and enumerate fundamental
rights. Nevertheless, the HCJ has indicated that it could reverse a Basic Law if it fundamentally rights. Nevertheless, the HCJ has indicated that it could reverse a Basic Law if it fundamentally
changes the nature of democracy in Israel or abuses the constitutional process.changes the nature of democracy in Israel or abuses the constitutional process.5552 One Israeli legal One Israeli legal
expert has speculated that the HCJ could refrain from deciding on the July law’s validity in the expert has speculated that the HCJ could refrain from deciding on the July law’s validity in the
abstract, but opt to engage on the issue when presented with a concrete case if the government abstract, but opt to engage on the issue when presented with a concrete case if the government
tries to replace the attorney general or change the composition of the tries to replace the attorney general or change the composition of the ~~JAC~~JSC—both of which could —both of which could
represent red lines for the court on the issue of judicial independence.represent red lines for the court on the issue of judicial independence.56

4753 General Assessment The following implications of the judicial system changes and proposals may have relevance for U.S. policy. Israel’s security and economy. Reportedly, thousands within Israel’s military reserves have threatened to suspend their service, and some in the workforce (including doctors) have gone on strike or warned that they might. Consequently, observers have raised questions about effects on 46 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2023; “Anti-overhaul , January 24, 2023; “Anti-overhaul
protesters call to turn up heat as over 300,000 estimated at rallies,” protesters call to turn up heat as over 300,000 estimated at rallies,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2023. , March 11, 2023.
4847 Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Jerusalem Post, ,
January 12, 2023. January 12, 2023.
4948 Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
5049 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Flash Survey: Most Israelis Assess that the Protest Movement Has Delayed Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Flash Survey: Most Israelis Assess that the Protest Movement Has Delayed
Progression of the Judicial Overhaul,” Israel Democracy Institute, July 17, 2023. Progression of the Judicial Overhaul,” Israel Democracy Institute, July 17, 2023.
~~51 “Tel Aviv police chief quits, citing government meddling against protesters,” Reuters, July 6, 2023; “Tel Aviv police~~
chief skips Ben Gvir ceremony removing him from his post,” Times of Israel~~, July 4~~50 Neri Zilber, “Will Israel’s Supreme Court Fight Back?” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2023. David Horovitz, “Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,” Times of Israel, January 12, 2023. 51 See, for example, Haviv Rettig Gur, “Neither coalition nor High Court respects Basic Laws. Urgently needed: A constitution,” Times of Israel, September 12, 2023. 52~~, 2023.~~
~~52 Marissa Newman and Lisa Fleischer, “Protests in Israel Turn Violent After Firing of Police Chief,” Bloomberg, July~~
~~6, 2023.~~
~~53 Michael Starr, “High Court to Discuss Israel’s Reasonableness Law on September 12,” Jerusalem Post, July 31,~~
~~2023.~~
~~54 Neri Zilber, “Will Israel’s Supreme Court Fight Back?” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2023. David Horovitz,~~
~~“Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,” Times of Israel, January 12,~~
~~2023.~~
55 Lieber and Raice; Emily Bazelon, “How Israel’s Supreme Court Might React to the Challenge to Its Power,” Lieber and Raice; Emily Bazelon, “How Israel’s Supreme Court Might React to the Challenge to Its Power,” New
York Times, July 25, 2023. , July 25, 2023.
5653 Bazelon. Bazelon.
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~~General Assessment~~
~~The following implications of the judicial system changes and proposals may have relevance for~~
~~U.S. policy.~~
Israel’s security and economy. Reportedly, thousands within Israel’s military reserves have
~~threatened to suspend their service, and some in the workforce (including doctors) have gone on~~
~~strike or warned that they might. Consequently, observers have raised questions about effects on~~
~~the country’s defense readiness and economic strength.57~~the country’s defense readiness and economic strength.54 According to a media report citing an According to a media report citing an
unnamed U.S. official, the Pentagon “is concerned that the crisis facing the Israeli military could unnamed U.S. official, the Pentagon “is concerned that the crisis facing the Israeli military could
have negative implications for Israel’s deterrence strategy and encourage Iran or Hezbollah to have negative implications for Israel’s deterrence strategy and encourage Iran or Hezbollah to
conduct military provocations that could escalate the situation in the region.”conduct military provocations that could escalate the situation in the region.”5855 In late July, In late July,
Israel’s air force commander said, “It is possible that at a time like this they (Israel’s enemies) Israel’s air force commander said, “It is possible that at a time like this they (Israel’s enemies)
will try to test the frontiers, our cohesion and our alertness.”will try to test the frontiers, our cohesion and our alertness.”5956
Additionally, disputes continue about whether reservists and other military personnel—many of Additionally, disputes continue about whether reservists and other military personnel—many of
whom fulfill key roles—are justified in linking their service to legislative outcomes.whom fulfill key roles—are justified in linking their service to legislative outcomes.~~60 As of mid-~~
57 In August, protest leaders August, protest leaders ~~have~~ claimed that thousands of reservists claimed that thousands of reservists ~~have~~had stopped reporting for duty, stopped reporting for duty,
and the militaryand the military ~~has~~ acknowledged a “limited” impact from no-shows. acknowledged a “limited” impact from no-shows.6158
One news source has reported that the main problem for the military would be decreased One news source has reported that the main problem for the military would be decreased
cohesion and readiness over the long term rather than an immediate breakdown in performance. cohesion and readiness over the long term rather than an immediate breakdown in performance.
This source cites analysis arguing that highly skilled reservists (fighter pilots, special operations This source cites analysis arguing that highly skilled reservists (fighter pilots, special operations
troops, and intelligence analysts) who stop volunteering would probably return in the event of a troops, and intelligence analysts) who stop volunteering would probably return in the event of a
crisis, and the IDF would retain the capacity to handle most short-term threats.crisis, and the IDF would retain the capacity to handle most short-term threats.6259 Another source Another source
postulates that the IDF’s recruitment of mandatory conscripts to combat duty might face postulates that the IDF’s recruitment of mandatory conscripts to combat duty might face
challenges.challenges.6360
Democracy, governance, and Israel’s international standing. Much of the national debate Much of the national debate
focuses on the potential long-term implications for Israeli democracy and governance that might focuses on the potential long-term implications for Israeli democracy and governance that might
stem from changes to the judiciary’s power. The discourse highlights the challenge Israel faces in stem from changes to the judiciary’s power. The discourse highlights the challenge Israel faces in
respecting the actions of an elected government while protecting minority rights at a time when respecting the actions of an elected government while protecting minority rights at a time when
the prime minister’s personal stake in judicial outcomes—owing to his criminal trial—may the prime minister’s personal stake in judicial outcomes—owing to his criminal trial—may
complicate efforts to build trust with the opposition. complicate efforts to build trust with the opposition.
Weakening judicial review could allow the government to take actions that the HCJ might have Weakening judicial review could allow the government to take actions that the HCJ might have
previously resisted. Such actions could include expanding Israel’s West Bank control at previously resisted. Such actions could include expanding Israel’s West Bank control at
Palestinians’ expense, increasing economic preferences and military service exemptions for ultra-Palestinians’ expense, increasing economic preferences and military service exemptions for ultra-
Orthodox Jews, or changing minority rights and the religious-secular balance in Israel.Orthodox Jews, or changing minority rights and the religious-secular balance in Israel.~~64 Some~~

5761 Some debate whether Israel might face heightened condemnation and legal prosecution in international fora if the independence of its judiciary arguably erodes.62 54 David S. Cloud and Dov Lieber, “Israel Faces New Security Threats if Protesting Military Reservists Refuse to David S. Cloud and Dov Lieber, “Israel Faces New Security Threats if Protesting Military Reservists Refuse to
Serve,” Serve,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2023;, July 26, 2023; Associated Press, “Israeli doctors walk off the job and more strikes are threatened after law “Israeli doctors walk off the job and more strikes are threatened after law
weakening courts passes,” weakening courts passes,” ~~Associated Press~~, July 25, 2023; Dov Lieber, “Economic, Political Tumult Roil Israel,” July 25, 2023; Dov Lieber, “Economic, Political Tumult Roil Israel,” Wall
Street Journal, July 26, 2023. , July 26, 2023.
5855 Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats.” Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats.”
5956 Reuters, “Israeli air chief warns of security threat from judicial reform crisis,” “Israeli air chief warns of security threat from judicial reform crisis,” Reuters.
60July 28, 2023. 57 Associated Press, “Here’s how reservists are playing a crucial role in opposing Israel’s judicial reforms,” “Here’s how reservists are playing a crucial role in opposing Israel’s judicial reforms,” ~~Associated Press~~, July 25, July 25,
2023. 2023.
6158 Reuters, “Israel’s Netanyahu cools censure of protesting reservists as judicial crisis simmers,” “Israel’s Netanyahu cools censure of protesting reservists as judicial crisis simmers,” ~~Reuters~~, August 14, 2023. August 14, 2023.
6259 Cloud and Lieber. Cloud and Lieber.
6360 Lilach Shoval, “Israel’s army readiness, Air Force cohesion at risk over judicial overhaul rift,” Lilach Shoval, “Israel’s army readiness, Air Force cohesion at risk over judicial overhaul rift,” Al-Monitor, July 30, , July 30,
2023. 2023.
6461 Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions”; Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions”; Associated Press, “Israel unveils controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,” “Israel unveils controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,”
~~Associated Press, January 4, 2023.~~January 4, 2023. 62 Michael Starr, “Judicial reform reasonableness bill advances to final Knesset votes,” Jerusalem Post, July 20, 2023; Eugene Kontorovich and Avraham Russel Shalev, “Arguments about judicial reform, ICC are legally baseless—opinion,” Jerusalem Post, July 21, 2023.
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~~debate whether Israel might face heightened condemnation and legal prosecution in international~~
~~fora if the independence of its judiciary arguably erodes.65~~
Many of those supporting the proposed changes assert that the HCJ needs corrective balance Many of those supporting the proposed changes assert that the HCJ needs corrective balance
because Israel lacks a constitution providing explicit boundaries to judicial review. because Israel lacks a constitution providing explicit boundaries to judicial review. 6663 Some also Some also
allege that elites from Israeli society who oppose the coalition’s proposals are at least partly allege that elites from Israeli society who oppose the coalition’s proposals are at least partly
focused on maintaining their power and position.focused on maintaining their power and position.6764
Netanyahu’s legal future. Changes to the judicial system also might affect the status of Changes to the judicial system also might affect the status of
Netanyahu’s ongoing criminal trial. Some have speculated that legislative changes could lead to Netanyahu’s ongoing criminal trial. Some have speculated that legislative changes could lead to
Netanyahu replacing the current attorney general with one amenable to dismissing the legal case Netanyahu replacing the current attorney general with one amenable to dismissing the legal case
against Netanyahu.against Netanyahu.6865 One source quoted Netanyahu as saying he would not make such a move, One source quoted Netanyahu as saying he would not make such a move,
while citing an Israeli legal expert who questioned Netanyahu’s credibility. Netanyahu and while citing an Israeli legal expert who questioned Netanyahu’s credibility. Netanyahu and
Israel’s attorney general have publicly disagreed on her insistence that a conflict-of-interest Israel’s attorney general have publicly disagreed on her insistence that a conflict-of-interest
agreement bars him from participating in debates surrounding proposed judicial system agreement bars him from participating in debates surrounding proposed judicial system
changes.changes.~~69 Following the passage of the July law, the HCJ held a hearing to consider~~66 In late September, the HCJ is scheduled to hear a petition a petition
(supported by the attorney general) seeking the reversal of an earlier Basic Law provision (passed (supported by the attorney general) seeking the reversal of an earlier Basic Law provision (passed
in March) that prevents the judiciary from ordering a prime minister to step down.in March) that prevents the judiciary from ordering a prime minister to step down.67
U.S. role. President Biden’s repeated efforts to steer Netanyahu toward compromise may have President Biden’s repeated efforts to steer Netanyahu toward compromise may have
helped delay some measures, but did not stop the enactment of the July reasonableness law. helped delay some measures, but did not stop the enactment of the July reasonableness law.
Biden’s attempts also have generated debate about U.S. input into Israel’s domestic politics.Biden’s attempts also have generated debate about U.S. input into Israel’s domestic politics.70
~~Before leaving his post in July as previously announced, then-U.S. Ambassador to Israel Tom~~
~~Nides said that most Israelis want the United States to be involved in Israel’s business, and that~~
~~the Administration is trying to stop Israel from “going off the rails.”71~~ 68 Members of Congress have Members of Congress have
articulated varying opinions about U.S. engagement in the discourse over Israel’s judicial articulated varying opinions about U.S. engagement in the discourse over Israel’s judicial
~~system.72 Biden reportedly agreed in July to meet with Netanyahu in the United States at some~~

~~65 Michael Starr, “Judicial reform reasonableness bill advances to final Knesset votes,” Jerusalem Post, July 20, 2023;~~
~~Eugene Kontorovich and Avraham Russel Shalev, “Arguments about judicial reform, ICC are legally baseless—~~
~~opinion,” Jerusalem Post, July 21, 2023.~~
66system.69 Israeli-Palestinian Issues70 Overview (Including Jerusalem, Gaza, and Visa Waiver Program) Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for 63 “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” Times of Israel, ,
January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, ~~CNN~~CNN, January 31, 2023. , January 31, 2023.
For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s
Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s , January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s
Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Real Clear Politics, February 5, 2023. For some historical context, see Patrick , February 5, 2023. For some historical context, see Patrick
Kingsley, “Social Rifts, Spread over Decades, at the Root of Israel’s Judicial Crisis,” Kingsley, “Social Rifts, Spread over Decades, at the Root of Israel’s Judicial Crisis,” New York Times, March 11, 2023. , March 11, 2023.
6764 Moshe Koppel, “This reform will end limitless power for unelected elites,” Moshe Koppel, “This reform will end limitless power for unelected elites,” Times of Israel (blog), February 5, 2023. (blog), February 5, 2023.
6865 Tia Goldenberg, “What is the latest on Netanyahu’s corruption trial?” Tia Goldenberg, “What is the latest on Netanyahu’s corruption trial?” Associated Press, April 27, 2023. , April 27, 2023.
6966 Reuters, “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” ~~Reuters~~, February 2, 2023; Chen February 2, 2023; Chen
Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Haaretz, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
~~70 See, for example, Robert Satloff, “President Biden can show his support for Israel by staying silent,” The Hill, July~~
~~29, 2023.~~
~~71 Dov Lieber and Michael Amon, “U.S. Ambassador Warned Israel Against ‘Going off the Rails’ with Judicial~~
~~Overhaul,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2023.~~
7267 Pending its decision on the matter, the HCJ has issued a temporary injunction against the law. Michael Starr, “Israel's High Court issues injunction against Netanyahu's protection law,” Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2023. 68 See, for example, Robert Satloff, “President Biden can show his support for Israel by staying silent,” The Hill, July 29, 2023. 69 Peter Baker and Lisa Lerer, “U.S. Navigates Turbulent Ties to a Close Ally,” Peter Baker and Lisa Lerer, “U.S. Navigates Turbulent Ties to a Close Ally,” New York Times, July 24, 2023; Marc , July 24, 2023; Marc
Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform,” Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform,” Jewish Insider, ,
February 16, 2023. Full text of three letters available at https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/February 16, 2023. Full text of three letters available at https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/
files/evo-media-document/final-3.8.23-delauro-schakowsky-mcgovern-letter-to-biden-administration-on-two-state-files/evo-media-document/final-3.8.23-delauro-schakowsky-mcgovern-letter-to-biden-administration-on-two-state-
solution-compressed.pdf, https://nadler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.9.23_letter_to_israeli_government_final.pdf, and solution-compressed.pdf, https://nadler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.9.23_letter_to_israeli_government_final.pdf, and
https://eshoo.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/eshoo.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/open-letter-to-israeli-pro-https://eshoo.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/eshoo.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/open-letter-to-israeli-pro-
democracy-protesters-5.24.23.pdf. See also H.Con.Res. 61, introduced in July 2023. democracy-protesters-5.24.23.pdf. See also H.Con.Res. 61, introduced in July 2023.
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~~point later in the year,73 after saying in March that they would not meet at the White House “in~~
~~the near term.”74~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian Issues75~~
~~Overview (Including Jerusalem, Gaza, and Visa Waiver Program)~~
~~Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated~~
~~two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for~~
70 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service 9 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.7671 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster
Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump
Administration.Administration.7772 These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians
that that they argue could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.7873 In January 2023 remarks In January 2023 remarks
made alongside PA President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West Bank, Secretary of State made alongside PA President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West Bank, Secretary of State
Antony Blinken said Antony Blinken said
Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution] Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution]
more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like
settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions
to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to
violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless
of the victim or the perpetrator.of the victim or the perpetrator.7974
U.S. Policy on Jerusalem
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as
Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018.
These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem
as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of
Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.8075
Israel’s previous government initiated some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living Israel’s previous government initiated some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living
circumstances, including through loans and work permits,circumstances, including through loans and work permits,8176 and some of these measures have and some of these measures have
continued under its current government. Some critics have charged that the measures mirror past continued under its current government. Some critics have charged that the measures mirror past
Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its causes through Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its causes through
negotiation with Palestinians.negotiation with Palestinians.8277 During President Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel and the West During President Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel and the West
Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had committed to expanding the Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had committed to expanding the

~~73 Kevin Liptak, “White House says Biden and Netanyahu will ‘probably’ meet this year,” CNN, July 17, 2023.~~
~~74 Josef Federman, “Israeli PM, Biden exchange frosty words over legal overhaul,” Associated Press, March 29, 2023.~~
~~75 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~76 State Department~~number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.78 As of April 2023, Israeli personnel began 24-hour operations at the Allenby crossing five days a week.79 In July 2023, the United States and Israel announced that Israel would begin allowing Palestinian-Americans to travel to Israel and the West Bank from Israeli airports, as part of Israel’s effort to qualify for entry into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program—under the program’s reciprocity requirement—by the end of September. Past Israeli practice had been to generally require 71 Department of State Press Briefing, February 23, 2023; White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Press Briefing, February 23, 2023; White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President
Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.
7772 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations. .
7873 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022. Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022.
~~79 State Department~~74 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their , “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting,” January 31, 2023. Meeting,” January 31, 2023.
8075 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. , February 9, 2021.
8176 Thomas Grove and Fatima Thomas Grove and Fatima ~~AbdulKarim~~Abdulkarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of , “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of
Hamas,” Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to , February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to
20,000,” 20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022. , March 26, 2022.
8277 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” ~~CNN~~CNN, September 16, 2021. 78 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing started operating on a nearly continuous basis in April 2023. 79 Rina Bassist, “Israel expands border crossing hours for Palestinians going to Jordan,” Al-Monitor, April 3, 2023. Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Palestinian-Americans to enter the West Bank via the Allenby crossing with Jordan.80~~, September 16, 2021.~~
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~~number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the Allenby border crossing between~~
~~the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank and Gaza to 4G communications~~
~~infrastructure.83 As of April 2023, Israeli personnel began 24-hour operations at the Allenby~~
~~crossing five days a week.84~~
~~In July 2023, the United States and Israel announced that Israel would begin allowing Palestinian-~~
~~Americans to travel to Israel and the West Bank from Israeli airports, as part of Israel’s effort to~~
~~qualify for entry into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program—under the program’s reciprocity~~
~~requirement—by the end of September. Past Israeli practice had been to generally require~~
~~Palestinian-Americans to enter the West Bank via the Allenby crossing with Jordan.85~~ Reportedly, Reportedly,
Israel also plans to take steps regarding Palestinian-Americans traveling to and from Gaza in an Israel also plans to take steps regarding Palestinian-Americans traveling to and from Gaza in an
effort to address reciprocity.effort to address reciprocity.8681 Fifteen Senators sent a letter to Secretary Blinken in September expressing skepticism that Israeli steps, as currently described, meet the reciprocity requirement.82
In January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/Haram In January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/Haram
al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of condemnation al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of condemnation
or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and globally.or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and globally.8783
Netanyahu pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims to worship at Netanyahu pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims to worship at
the holy site, and downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous ministerial visits to the the holy site, and downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous ministerial visits to the
site.site.8884 Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of Ben Gvir’s visit, the Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of Ben Gvir’s visit, the
State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his commitment on the status quo.State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his commitment on the status quo.8985
During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of Jordan, which has a custodial role During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of Jordan, which has a custodial role
over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel should respect the “historic over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel should respect the “historic
and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate it.”and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate it.”9086 Ben Gvir made additional Ben Gvir made additional
visits to the Mount/Haram in May and July. visits to the Mount/Haram in May and July.

~~83 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing is~~
~~scheduled to operate on a nearly continuous basis starting in April 2023. Jacob Magid, “After US pressure, Allenby~~
~~crossing to Jordan set to open at all hours on weekdays,” Times of Israel, November 24, 2022.~~
~~84 Rina Bassist, “Israel expands border crossing hours for Palestinians going to Jordan,” Al-Monitor, April 3, 2023.~~
8580 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel agree on conditions that could see Israelis join visa waiver program,” Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel agree on conditions that could see Israelis join visa waiver program,” ~~Axios~~Axios, July 19, , July 19,
2023; Rina Bassist, “Israel signs deal with US to join visa waiver program,” 2023; Rina Bassist, “Israel signs deal with US to join visa waiver program,” Al-Monitor, July 19, 2023. An unofficial , July 19, 2023. An unofficial
version of the draft U.S.-Israel MOU on the issue is available at https://ammannet.net/english/text-us-israel-visa-version of the draft U.S.-Israel MOU on the issue is available at https://ammannet.net/english/text-us-israel-visa-
waiver-mou. waiver-mou. See also Department of State, “Israel’s Commitments to Extend Reciprocal Privileges to All U.S. Citizens,” August 24, 2023. For more information on the Visa Waiver Program, see CRS Report R46300, For more information on the Visa Waiver Program, see CRS Report R46300, Adding Countries to the
Visa Waiver Program: Effects on National Security and Tourism, by Abigail F. Kolker and Michaela D. Platzer. , by Abigail F. Kolker and Michaela D. Platzer.
8681 Reuters, “Israel to include Gaza Americans in U.S. visa waiver pilot next month,” “Israel to include Gaza Americans in U.S. visa waiver pilot next month,” ~~Reuters~~, August 7, 2023. August 7, 2023.
8782 Text of letter available at https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/van_hollen_vwp_letter_to_blinken_090823.pdf. 83 Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” ~~Axios~~Axios, January 3, , January 3,
2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain 2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain
Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023. Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023.
88 84 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report
RL33476, RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations. .
~~89 State Department~~85 Department of State Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
9086 Reuters, “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” ~~Reuters~~, January 24, 2023. January 24, 2023.
For background, see CRS Report RL33546, For background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
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Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.9187
Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.9288
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.9389 Because of the PA’s Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.9490 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.Nations.9591 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.conflict.9692
Israel-West Bank Violence and Settlement Tensions
Overview of violence, Palestinian militant groups, and some countermeasures. After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian
violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30 Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30 Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least
170 Palestinians in the West Bank,170 Palestinians in the West Bank,9793 violence has spiked in 2023. For this year, at least 30 Israelis violence has spiked in 2023. For this year, at least 30 Israelis
and and ~~155~~180 West Bank Palestinians have died from attacks by militants and/or extremists on both West Bank Palestinians have died from attacks by militants and/or extremists on both
sides against civilians and/or their property, or clashes involving Israeli security forces and sides against civilians and/or their property, or clashes involving Israeli security forces and
Palestinian militants.Palestinian militants.98
94 Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on northern West Bank cities like Nablus and
Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and
production, and establish order.production, and establish order.~~99 As the increase in Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted~~
~~greater U.S. policy attention,100 Israeli and PA forces have approached West Bank militants in~~

9195 Newer groups like the Jenin Brigades and Nablus-based Lion’s Den—which polls suggest enjoy high levels of Palestinian domestic popularity—feature young fighters from across and even outside of the spectrum of Palestinian militant factions that includes the secular, Fatah-linked Tanzim, and Islamist groups like PIJ and Hamas.96 According to some 87 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations. .
9288 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor, ,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
9389 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
9490 Ibid. Ibid.
9591 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021. , September 12, 2021.
9692 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” Haaretz, November 29, , November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” 2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
9793 Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” New York Times, ,
January 29, 2023. January 29, 2023.
~~98 Patrick Kingsley, “Israeli Guard Is Shot Dead After Settler Kills Palestinian,” New York Times, August 6, 2023; Raja~~
~~Abdulrahim, “West Bank Teenagers Are Writing Out Their Last Words,” New York Times, July 5, 2023.~~
9994 Shayndi Raice and Fatima Abdulkarim, “Palestinian Authority Fights Its Own,” Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2023; Patrick Kingsley, “Israeli Guard Is Shot Dead After Settler Kills Palestinian,” New York Times, August 6, 2023. 95 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” New York Times, November 16, 2022. , November 16, 2022.
~~100 State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022 and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda~~
~~Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074,~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S.~~
~~Relations~~.
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96 Ayman Oghanna, “Inside the Lions’ Den: the West Bank’s Gen Z fighters,” Economist (1843 Magazine), July 7, 2023; Udi Dekel, “The Lion’s Den: A Wake-Up Call for Imminent Challenges,” Institute for National Security Studies, October 19, 2022; Hani al-Masri, “The Jenin Brigades and The Lions’ Den: Palestine’s new resistance,” Middle East Eye, October 21, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations open sources, various factors may fuel increased Palestinian militancy, including Israeli actions in the West Bank, PA weakness, socioeconomic challenges, and the easy availability of weapons.97 One article suggests that much of the funding comes from Iran, supposedly allowing some fighters to earn $300 to $700 per month in an area of chronic unemployment, but that Iran defers to the local groups on operational planning and implementation. This same article says, “Much of the weaponry used by the Jenin fighters comes from Israel itself, stolen and sold on through criminal gangs, Israeli officials say. Some is smuggled across the Jordanian border, and some is improvised in local workshops.”98 As the increase in Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,99 Israeli and PA forces have approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of future escalation.different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of future escalation.~~101~~100 The PA The PA
reportedly has sought time and flexibility to address militancy independent of reportedly has sought time and flexibility to address militancy independent of ~~Israeli dictates~~Israel’s preferred methods, as , as
part of an effort to reach compromises that part of an effort to reach compromises that ~~avoid~~minimize major armed confrontations or arrests. In 2022, major armed confrontations or arrests. In 2022,
some PA personnel some PA personnel reportedly acted outside their authority by ~~reportedly~~ directly directly ~~targeted~~targeting Israeli forces or settlers, raising questions about Israeli forces or settlers, raising questions about
the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.~~102~~101
Israel’s government approved measures in January that Prime Minister Netanyahu said were Israel’s government approved measures in January that Prime Minister Netanyahu said were
aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps ~~reducing benefits for~~
~~families of accused terrorists,~~ accelerating home demolitions and West Bank settlement building, accelerating home demolitions and West Bank settlement building,
reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for Israelis.reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for Israelis.~~103~~102 In In
defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate circle,” defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate circle,”
Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has reduced Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has reduced
security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners in the security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners in the
Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.~~104~~103
After a deadly January Israeli raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security After a deadly January Israeli raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security
coordination with Israel,coordination with Israel,~~105~~104 but its practical meaning is unclear. but its practical meaning is unclear.~~106~~105 Previously, the PA publicly Previously, the PA publicly
suspended security coordination with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was suspended security coordination with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was
contemplating annexation of West Bank areas.contemplating annexation of West Bank areas.~~107~~106 In February, Central Intelligence Agency In February, Central Intelligence Agency
Director Bill Burns remarked that the tensions resembled “some of the realities” of the 2000-2005 Director Bill Burns remarked that the tensions resembled “some of the realities” of the 2000-2005
period of Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the second Palestinian period of Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising). (or uprising).~~108 An~~
~~Israeli observer has argued that PA leadership under President Abbas is unlikely to coordinate~~
~~efforts against Israelis in the way Palestinian leaders supposedly did during the intifada.109~~
Challenges related to de-escalation efforts and settlements. During Secretary Blinken’s
~~January visit to the West Bank, he said that “it’s important to take steps to de-escalate, to stop the~~
~~violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the foundation for more positive actions~~
~~going forward.”110 He also said that he discussed with President Abbas “the importance of the~~
~~Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its governance and accountability,~~
~~strengthening the institutions of the PA.”111 According to one media report, Blinken encouraged~~
~~Abbas privately to implement a security plan presented to Israel and the PA weeks earlier by the~~

~~101~~107 An 97 Dekel, “The Lion’s Den”; al-Masri, “The Jenin Brigades and The Lions’ Den.” 98 Reuters, “Palestinian gunmen say they’re fighting for Jenin, not foreign backers,” August 14, 2023. 99 Department of State Press Briefings, October 25, 2022 and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations. 100 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” New York Times, October 26, 2022; Yaniv , October 26, 2022; Yaniv
Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian
Authority,” Authority,” Haaretz, October 12, 2022. , October 12, 2022.
~~102~~101 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Al-Monitor, ,
October 12, 2022. October 12, 2022.
~~103~~102 Dov Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows,” Dov Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2023; Raja Abdulrahim, , January 30, 2023; Raja Abdulrahim,
“Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement in West Bank as Violence Rages,” “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement in West Bank as Violence Rages,” New York Times, January 30, , January 30,
2023. 2023.
~~104~~103 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
~~105~~104 WAFA News Agency, “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” ~~WAFA~~
~~News Agency~~, January 26, 2023. January 26, 2023.
~~106~~105 Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in
the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023. the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023.
~~107~~106 Reuters, “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” ~~Reuters~~, November 17, 2020November 17, 2020.
~~108~~107 Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Times of Israel, ,
February 7, 2023. February 7, 2023.
~~109 Micah Halpern, “Terror wave in Israel not an intifada, but still very dangerous—opinion,” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~November 28, 2022.~~
~~110 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their~~
~~Meeting.”~~
~~111 Ibid.~~
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~~U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), Lieutenant General~~
~~Michael Fenzel.112 The plan supposedly lays out steps for PA security forces to regain control in~~
~~Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA force. Reportedly, PA officials expressed~~
~~reservations about the plan, partly because of concerns that it might not reduce Israeli incursions~~
~~into West Bank cities or include other provisions calculated to attract Palestinian public~~
~~support.113~~Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations unnamed “senior Israeli security source” was cited in September as saying that terrorist threats from the West Bank are “rising tremendously” because restraining factors are weakening and accelerating factors are growing, but that “it is not close to what happened” with a deep terror infrastructure during the second intifada.108 Challenges related to de-escalation efforts and settlements. During Secretary Blinken’s January visit to the West Bank, he said that “it’s important to take steps to de-escalate, to stop the violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the foundation for more positive actions going forward.”109 He also said that he discussed with President Abbas “the importance of the Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its governance and accountability, strengthening the institutions of the PA.”110
In February, the Israeli government decided to advance West Bank plans to construct nearly In February, the Israeli government decided to advance West Bank plans to construct nearly
10,000 additional settlement units and begin a process to retroactively legalize nine outposts that 10,000 additional settlement units and begin a process to retroactively legalize nine outposts that
had previously been illegal under Israeli law—triggering a statement of strong opposition from had previously been illegal under Israeli law—triggering a statement of strong opposition from
Secretary Blinken.Secretary Blinken.~~114~~111 A few days later, the United States, Israel, the PA, Jordan, and Egypt issued A few days later, the United States, Israel, the PA, Jordan, and Egypt issued
a communique from Aqaba, Jordan aimed at de-escalating tensions and violence by committing a communique from Aqaba, Jordan aimed at de-escalating tensions and violence by committing
Israel and the PA to suspend unilateral measures for a few months.Israel and the PA to suspend unilateral measures for a few months.~~115~~112 In March, the five parties In March, the five parties
reconvened as scheduled in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, and restated the commitments from reconvened as scheduled in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, and restated the commitments from ~~Aqaba.~~
~~They also specified plans to work toward empowering PA security forces, develop a mechanism~~
~~to curb violence, and establish a separate mechanism to improve Palestinian economic~~
~~conditions.116 Reportedly, the PA had agreed in February to start implementing the USSC security~~
~~plan,117 which one source has said would involve “the recruitment and training of thousands of~~
~~Palestinian security personnel to be deployed in the northern West Bank.”118 The status of the~~
~~USSC plan is unclear given subsequent escalation in Jenin and heightened Israeli operations (as~~
~~discussed below) at a time when PA security forces appear to be less engaged.119~~
Aqaba.113 Also in March, the Knesset passed legislation to overturn parts of a 2005 law that had made Also in March, the Knesset passed legislation to overturn parts of a 2005 law that had made
Jewish settlements in certain areas of the northern West Bank illegal. In that year, then-Israeli Jewish settlements in certain areas of the northern West Bank illegal. In that year, then-Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had affirmed in writing to then-President George W. Bush that Israel Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had affirmed in writing to then-President George W. Bush that Israel
committed to evacuate settlements and outposts in that region. A State Department spokesperson committed to evacuate settlements and outposts in that region. A State Department spokesperson
said that the United States is extremely troubled about the legislation, and that it clearly said that the United States is extremely troubled about the legislation, and that it clearly
contradicts Israel’s longtime undertaking to the United States, as well commitments it made contradicts Israel’s longtime undertaking to the United States, as well commitments it made
earlier in March to de-escalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions.earlier in March to de-escalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions.~~120~~ 114 Despite the legal change, Netanyahu’s office issued a Netanyahu’s office issued a
statement saying that Israel’s government has “no intention of establishing new communities” in statement saying that Israel’s government has “no intention of establishing new communities” in
the West Bank areas in question.the West Bank areas in question.~~121~~115 The relocation of a yeshiva (Jewish religious school) within The relocation of a yeshiva (Jewish religious school) within
one of these areas in May triggered additional criticism from the State Department,one of these areas in May triggered additional criticism from the State Department,~~122~~116 as did as did
additional settlement-related announcements from Israel in June.additional settlement-related announcements from Israel in June.~~123~~ 117 Reportedly, when President Biden raised concerns about settlement expansion in a July call with Netanyahu, Netanyahu said that no additional settlement plans would be approved in 2023.118 108 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s security brass advocates Saudi deal as way to calm tensions with Palestinians,” Al-Monitor, September 8, 2023. 109 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their Meeting.” 110 Ibid. 111 Department of State~~Reportedly, when President~~

~~112 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Axios, February 1, 2023. For~~
~~background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074,~~
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations.
~~113 Ibid.~~
~~114 State Department, “Israeli Settlement and Outpost Legalization Announcement,” February 13, 2023.~~
~~115 State Department, “Aqaba Joint Communique,” February 26, 2023.~~
~~116 State Department, “Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh,” March 19, 2023.~~
~~117 Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023.~~
~~118 Yoni Ben Menachem, “American-Israeli Military Coordination and the Possibility of Regional Escalation,”~~
~~Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 9, 2023.~~
~~119 Ben Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?” Al-Monitor, July 4, 2023~~
~~120 State Department Press Briefing, March 21, 2023.~~
~~121~~, “Israeli Settlement and Outpost Legalization Announcement,” February 13, 2023. Israel announced the legalization of three of the nine outposts in September in the face of U.S. criticism. Jacob Magid, “US slams legalization of 3 West Bank outposts ‘previously illegal under Israeli law,’” Times of Israel, September 8, 2023. 112 Department of State, “Aqaba Joint Communique,” February 26, 2023. 113 Department of State, “Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh,” March 19, 2023. 114 Department of State Press Briefing, March 21, 2023. 115 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on the Knesset Decision to Repeal Parts of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on the Knesset Decision to Repeal Parts of the
Disengagement Law,” March 22, 2023. Disengagement Law,” March 22, 2023.
~~122~~116 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Netanyahu further provokes Biden with relocation of outpost yeshiva,” Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Netanyahu further provokes Biden with relocation of outpost yeshiva,” Al-Monitor, May 30, , May 30,
2023. 2023.
~~123~~117 State Department, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18 State Department, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18, 2023. 118 Barak Ravid, “Inside Biden’s call with Israel’s Netanyahu,” Axios, July 18, 2023. , 2023.
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~~link to page 18~~ Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

~~Biden raised concerns about settlement expansion in a July call with Netanyahu, Netanyahu said~~
~~that no additional settlement plans would be approved in 2023.124~~
Policy Change on U.S.-Israel Science/Technology Cooperation in Settlements
In June 2023, the State Department announced that the Biden Administration would return to pre-Trump In June 2023, the State Department announced that the Biden Administration would return to pre-Trump
Administration U.S. policies that limit U.S.-Israel scientific and technological cooperation to areas administered by Administration U.S. policies that limit U.S.-Israel scientific and technological cooperation to areas administered by
Israel before the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.Israel before the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.~~125~~119 In 2020, the Trump Administration signed agreements with Israel In 2020, the Trump Administration signed agreements with Israel
removing geographic restrictions on three U.S.-Israel binational foundations.removing geographic restrictions on three U.S.-Israel binational foundations.~~126~~120 In July, 14 Senators sent a letter to In July, 14 Senators sent a letter to
President Biden and Secretary Blinken denouncing the June 2023 policy change as an “antisemitic boycott of Israel” President Biden and Secretary Blinken denouncing the June 2023 policy change as an “antisemitic boycott of Israel”
that undermines bilateral cooperation. The Senators threatened to block the Biden Administration’s nominees if it that undermines bilateral cooperation. The Senators threatened to block the Biden Administration’s nominees if it
does not reverse course.does not reverse course.~~127~~
~~June-July escalation.~~ ~~In June~~121 Summer escalation and PA efforts to restore order. In summer 2023, clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants intensified , clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants intensified
in the northern West Bank. Reports indicate that Hamas and PIJ may have increased their direct in the northern West Bank. Reports indicate that Hamas and PIJ may have increased their direct
involvement, perhaps helping West Bank militants employ tactics similar in sophistication to involvement, perhaps helping West Bank militants employ tactics similar in sophistication to
those used by Iran-supported groups in Lebanon and Gaza, such as improvised explosive devices those used by Iran-supported groups in Lebanon and Gaza, such as improvised explosive devices
(IEDs).(IEDs).~~128 One~~122 After a Palestinian shooting attack Palestinian shooting attack in June killed four Israeli settlers, and killed four Israeli settlers, and ~~then~~ a group of Israeli a group of Israeli
settlers stormed a Palestinian town, setting fire to multiple homes and cars in a scene reminiscent settlers stormed a Palestinian town, setting fire to multiple homes and cars in a scene reminiscent
of a similar reprisal attack by settlers in February.of a similar reprisal attack by settlers in February.~~129~~
~~After reported consultations within Israel’s security and political leadership weighing the benefits~~
~~and drawbacks of larger-scale counterterrorism operations,130 in~~123 In early July early July, the IDF launched a the IDF launched a
major two-day raid into Jenin featuring around 1,000 ground troops, aerial cover, and armored major two-day raid into Jenin featuring around 1,000 ground troops, aerial cover, and armored
vehicles to counter IEDs. During the raid, which vehicles to counter IEDs. During the raid, which ~~Israeli~~ Israel apparently carried out in hopes of apparently carried out in hopes of
reducing militants’ ability to use Jenin’s refugee camp as a haven for stockpiling weapons and reducing militants’ ability to use Jenin’s refugee camp as a haven for stockpiling weapons and
planning attacks against Israelis, 12 Palestinians and one planning attacks against Israelis, 12 Palestinians and one Israeli died.124 Israel’s operation in Jenin was its largest since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 during the second intifada. According to one Israeli officer, the scale of the challenge in 2023 is smaller than in 2002, when general Palestinian involvement in violence was more widespread.125 Some IDF officials reportedly worry that a more overt war footing in the West Bank could harden negative Palestinian popular attitudes toward Israel.126 After the IDF raid, the PA deployed more security forces in Jenin and elsewhere in the northern West Bank. Reportedly, Secretary Blinken had encouraged President Abbas privately to implement a security plan backed by the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) and aimed at helping PA forces regain greater control in Jenin and Nablus.127 119 Department of State Press Briefing, June 26, 2023. 120~~Israeli died. Israel reportedly arrested~~
~~some 300 suspects while confiscating weapons caches and destroying weapons production~~
~~facilities in and around several civilian areas (including a mosque). Around 3,000 residents of the~~
~~camp (which houses approximately between 14,000 and 18,000 people) fled during the~~
~~fighting.131 In a possible response to the Jenin raid, a Palestinian wounded eight people at a Tel~~
~~Aviv bus stop in a car-ramming and stabbing attack before he was shot and killed.132~~
~~Israel’s operation in Jenin was its largest since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 during the~~
~~second intifada. According to one Israeli officer, the scale of the challenge in 2023 is smaller than~~

~~124 Barak Ravid, “Inside Biden’s call with Israel’s Netanyahu,” July 18, 2023.~~
~~125 State Department Press Briefing, June 26, 2023.~~
~~126~~ For more information on these foundations, see CRS Report RL33222, For more information on these foundations, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. , by Jeremy M.
Sharp. Sharp.
~~127~~121 Text of letter available at https://www.cruz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/cruz_bds_final.pdf. Text of letter available at https://www.cruz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/cruz_bds_final.pdf.
~~128~~122 Isabel Kershner, “Five Palestinians, Including 15-Year-Old Boy, Are Killed in Israeli Raid in the West Bank,” Isabel Kershner, “Five Palestinians, Including 15-Year-Old Boy, Are Killed in Israeli Raid in the West Bank,” New
York Times, June 20, 2023; Ben Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas,” , June 20, 2023; Ben Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas,” Al-Monitor, June , June
20, 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “After roadside bomb during Jenin raid, Gallant says ‘all options on the table,’” 20, 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “After roadside bomb during Jenin raid, Gallant says ‘all options on the table,’” Times of
Israel, June 20, 2023. , June 20, 2023.
~~129~~123 Euronews with Associated Press, “Hundreds of Israeli settlers torch Palestinian homes and cars after deadly shooting at settlement,” “Hundreds of Israeli settlers torch Palestinian homes and cars after deadly shooting at settlement,” Euronews with
~~Associated Press~~, June 21, 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “Palestinian killed as settlers rampage in Huwara after deadly terror June 21, 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “Palestinian killed as settlers rampage in Huwara after deadly terror
attack,” attack,” Times of Israel, February 26, 2023. , February 26, 2023.
~~130 See footnote 128.~~
~~131~~124 Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?”; Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?”; Agence France Presse, “Israel ends large-scale West Bank “Israel ends large-scale West Bank
raid that left 13 dead,” raid that left 13 dead,” ~~Agence France Presse~~, July 2, 2023;July 2, 2023; Reuters, “Israeli troops withdraw in West Bank, Gaza rockets “Israeli troops withdraw in West Bank, Gaza rockets
fired,” fired,” Reuters, July 5, 2023.
~~132 “Eight injured in Tel Aviv car ramming and stabbing attack, Israeli officials say,” CNN, July 4, 2023.~~
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~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~in 2002, when general Palestinian involvement in violence was more widespread.133 Some IDF~~
~~officials reportedly worry that a more overt war footing in the West Bank could harden negative~~
~~Palestinian popular attitudes toward Israel.134~~
July 5, 2023. 125 Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?” 126 Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas.” 127 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Axios, February 1, 2023; Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023. For (continued...) Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 20 link to page 20 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations PA officials reportedly expressed reservations about the plan, partly because of concerns that it might not reduce Israeli incursions into West Bank cities or include other provisions calculated to attract Palestinian public support.128 PA forces in Jenin have taken steps toward restoring order, apparently in line with the USSC plan, but their operations have not extended into policing Jenin’s refugee camp—the city’s greatest source of instability.129 Some Palestinians express general support for PA efforts to maintain order, but warn that increased Israeli raids in the area make PA personnel look like collaborators with Israel against their own people.130 Amid some media reports in September that PA forces received armored vehicles and perhaps also some weapons as a result of U.S. and Jordanian efforts, the Department of State said that U.S. security assistance to the PA “does not include provision of weapons or ammunition.”131 In the meantime, top Israeli security officials reportedly support Israeli diplomacy with Saudi Arabia that could potentially calm tensions in the West Bank (as discussed below).132 Potential U.S.-Israel-Saudi Deal: Palestinian Elements As the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia engage in initial discussions aimed at normalizing Israel-Saudi relations amid other potential agreements involving the three countries (see “The Abraham Accords” below), media reports have speculated that the Biden Administration and Saudi leaders may insist on Israeli concessions to Palestinian demands as integral to any deal. However, the current Israeli government may have difficulty in considering such concessions.133 How Palestinian issues are addressed may be an important factor for some Members of Congress.134 PA leaders have reportedly engaged in some initial discussions with U.S., Israeli, and Saudi counterparts about whether they might accept measures short of immediate Palestinian statehood. According to various sources, PA officials are seeking “irreversible” steps to advance Palestinian statehood aspirations. They reportedly are asking for Israel to give the PA more control over some parts of the West Bank and to demolish illegal Israeli outposts.135 The PA also apparently wants Saudi Arabia to resume funding to the PA and open a consulate in Jerusalem. Additionally, the PA seems to be pressing the Biden Administration to follow through on its pledge to reopen the consulate in Jerusalem that the Trump Administration closed in 2019, to back full Palestinian representation at the United Nations, and to work with Congress to remove the legislative background on the USSC, which is a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem and headed by a U.S. three-star flag officer, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations. 128 Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin.” 129 Isabel Debre, “After Israeli raids, Palestinian police struggle in militant hotbed, reflecting region on the brink,” Associated Press, August 18, 2023. 130 Raice and Abdulkarim. 131 “Fuming at reported weapons transfer to PA, far-right ministers threaten Netanyahu,” Times of Israel, September 13, 2023. 132 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s security brass advocates Saudi deal as way to calm tensions with Palestinians,” Al-Monitor, September 8, 2023. 133 Barak Ravid, “Senior Biden adviser heading to Saudi Arabia to talk mega-deal with Palestinians,” Axios, September 3, 2023, and “Scoop: Palestinians gave Saudis list of what they want in Israel-Saudi peace deal,” Axios, August 30, 2023 134 Ben Samuels and Amir Tibon, “Israeli-Saudi Normalization Pact Could Die in Congress if Palestinians Overlooked, Senators Warn,” Haaretz, August 8, 2023. 135 Jacob Magid, “Officials: Saudis assured Palestinians they won’t be abandoned in normalization talks,” Times of Israel, September 14, 2023; “Palestinians seek ‘irreversible’ measures as part of Israel-Saudi deal, officials say,” Times of Israel, August 31, 2023. Congressional Research Service 16 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations designation of the PLO as a terrorist group.136 Without necessarily addressing other PA asks, a U.S. official reportedly told PA officials that U.N. recognition “wasn’t in the cards.”137 The Abraham Accords
General overview. In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or
improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements,
known as the Abraham Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives known as the Abraham Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives
for most of the countries in question.for most of the countries in question.~~135~~138 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and
Bahrain, and both countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices Bahrain, and both countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices
that each country had operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Israel’s July 2023 that each country had operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Israel’s July 2023
recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the disputed territory of Western Sahara could lead to full recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the disputed territory of Western Sahara could lead to full
Israel-Morocco diplomatic relations via the mutual opening of embassies. The Sudanese Israel-Morocco diplomatic relations via the mutual opening of embassies. The Sudanese
military’s seizure of power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.military’s seizure of power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.~~136~~139 In In
January 2023, the Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal January 2023, the Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal
with Israel after it transitions to a civilian government,with Israel after it transitions to a civilian government,~~137~~140 but the outbreak of Sudanese civil but the outbreak of Sudanese civil
conflict in April may delay any major developments on that front for the foreseeable future. conflict in April may delay any major developments on that front for the foreseeable future.
While Saudi Arabia has not normalized its relations with Israel, it reportedly supported the UAE While Saudi Arabia has not normalized its relations with Israel, it reportedly supported the UAE
and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords.and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords.~~138~~141 Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Additionally, Saudi Arabia and
Oman have opened their airspace to Israeli civilian airlines, significantly reducing their travel Oman have opened their airspace to Israeli civilian airlines, significantly reducing their travel
time to Asian destinations. time to Asian destinations.
Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened, Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened,
particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include an Israel-UAE free particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include an Israel-UAE free
trade agreement that went into effect in March 2023, and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative trade agreement that went into effect in March 2023, and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative
focused on desalinated water and solar energy. focused on desalinated water and solar energy. ~~As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the~~
~~Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met the foreign ministers of Israel, the UAE,~~
~~Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern Negev desert to~~
~~inaugurate a regional cooperation framework. The framework features periodic Negev Forum~~
~~meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education and~~
~~coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.139 Participants have~~
~~expected that a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting would take place in Morocco, but U.S. officials~~
~~reportedly told Israel that plans for holding the meeting in July would be postponed due to an~~

~~133 Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?”~~
~~134 Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas.”~~
~~135~~Additionally, since 2022, Israel and the UAE have been part of a larger “I2U2” grouping with the United States and India that focuses on joint investments and initiatives in various areas.142 In September 2023, the I2U2 countries, Saudi 136 Ibid.; Ravid, “Senior Biden adviser heading to Saudi Arabia to talk mega-deal with Palestinians” and “Scoop: Palestinians gave Saudis list of what they want in Israel-Saudi peace deal”; Dion Nissenbaum and Summer Said, “Palestinians Press Saudis for Israeli Concessions in Deal,” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 2023. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA, Title X of P.L. 100-204) included a congressional determination that “the PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist organization and a threat to the interests of the United States, its allies, and to international law and should not benefit from operating in the United States,” along with various prohibitions on PLO-related actions. Section 1003(3) of the ATA prohibits the PLO from having an office in the United States; subsequent legal provisions have permitted the executive branch to temporarily waive this prohibition from time to time under specified circumstances. 137 Ravid, “Senior Biden adviser heading to Saudi Arabia to talk mega-deal with Palestinians.” 138 See https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/. These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and See https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/. These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and
Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and
U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports
suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its
agreement to recognize Israel. agreement to recognize Israel.
~~136~~139 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
~~137~~140 Reuters, “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” ~~Reuters~~, February 3, 2023. February 3, 2023.
~~138~~141 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021.
~~139 State Department, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023;~~
~~Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in~~
~~Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023~~Axios, October 20, 2021. 142 White House, “Joint Statement of the Leaders of India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the United States (I2U2),” July 14, 2022. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1617 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Arabia, and the European Union committed to establish an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor featuring infrastructure links such as rail, clean energy, and digital connectivity.143 As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met the foreign ministers of Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern Negev desert to inaugurate a regional cooperation framework. The framework features periodic Negev Forum meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education and coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.144 Participants have expected that a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting would take place in Morocco, but U.S. officials reportedly told Israel that plans for holding the meeting in July would be postponed due to an

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

Israeli settlement construction announcement in June.Israeli settlement construction announcement in June.~~140~~ 145 Developments since the new Israeli Developments since the new Israeli
government took office have reportedly fueled some concerns among Arab governments about government took office have reportedly fueled some concerns among Arab governments about
closer ties with Israel, including the new government’s actions against Palestinians, Israeli closer ties with Israel, including the new government’s actions against Palestinians, Israeli
domestic discord, and some apparent U.S.-Israel differences.domestic discord, and some apparent U.S.-Israel differences.~~141~~146
Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation, Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation,
public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional
governments recognizing Israel remains strong.governments recognizing Israel remains strong.~~142~~147 According to one poll, support in the UAE and According to one poll, support in the UAE and
Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in
2022.2022.~~143~~148 However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the
UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.~~144~~149
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim- U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the
efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with
Israel in the years ahead.”Israel in the years ahead.”~~145~~150 In June 2023, Blinken announced the appointment of Daniel Shapiro In June 2023, Blinken announced the appointment of Daniel Shapiro
(formerly U.S. ambassador to Israel) as senior adviser on regional integration, a new position (formerly U.S. ambassador to Israel) as senior adviser on regional integration, a new position
focused on deepening and broadening the Accords. Reportedly, Shapiro will be less engaged in focused on deepening and broadening the Accords. Reportedly, Shapiro will be less engaged in
diplomacy aimed at Israel-Saudi normalization (discussed below) than in boosting other aspects diplomacy aimed at Israel-Saudi normalization (discussed below) than in boosting other aspects
of the Abraham Accords.of the Abraham Accords.~~146~~
~~The Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S. policy inducements to countries in~~
~~connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.147 It has sought to avoid portraying Israeli~~
~~normalization with Arab and Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a~~
~~negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.148 Negev Forum members~~
~~acknowledge that part of their mandate is to “create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian~~
~~relations.”149 However, the PA has opted not to join the forum. Palestinian leaders denounced the~~
~~initial announcement of UAE normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian~~
~~national cause, given Arab League states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian~~

~~140~~151 143 White House, “Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor,” September 9, 2023. 144 Department of State, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023; Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023. 145 Itamar Eichner, “US responds to new settlement construction: postpones Negev Forum in Morocco,” Itamar Eichner, “US responds to new settlement construction: postpones Negev Forum in Morocco,” Ynetnews, June , June
18, 2023. 18, 2023.
~~141~~146 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel’s Ties with Arabs Falter,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel’s Ties with Arabs Falter,” Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2023; Yoav Limor, “Exclusive: , April 10, 2023; Yoav Limor, “Exclusive:
Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence,” Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence,” Israel Hayom, April 4, 2023. , April 4, 2023.
~~142~~147 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2022 Arab Opinion Index, January 3, 2023. , January 3, 2023.
~~143~~148 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2022; Dylan , December 5, 2022; Dylan
Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022. Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022.
~~144~~149 Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.” Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.”
~~145 State Department~~150 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair , “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
Availability,” October 13, 2021. Availability,” October 13, 2021.
~~146~~151 Jacob Magid, “Ex-US ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro tapped as Biden’s first Abraham Accords envoy,” Jacob Magid, “Ex-US ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro tapped as Biden’s first Abraham Accords envoy,” Times of
Israel, June 29, 2023. , June 29, 2023.
~~147 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October~~
~~14, 2021.~~
~~148 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Their~~
~~Meeting,” January 30, 2023.~~
~~149 The Negev Forum Regional Cooperation Framework Adopted by the Steering Committee on November 10th, 2022,~~
~~hyperlink to document available at https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-~~
~~framework/.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

17

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.150~~Congressional Research Service 18 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations The Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S. policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.152 It has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.153 Negev Forum members acknowledge that part of their mandate is to “create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian relations.”154 However, the PA has opted not to join the forum. Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.155 Jordan also has remained on the Jordan also has remained on the
sidelines of the Negev Forum, conditioning its involvement on PA participation.sidelines of the Negev Forum, conditioning its involvement on PA participation.~~151~~156
Normalization efforts with Saudi Arabia. In May 2023, an unnamed senior Israeli diplomatic In May 2023, an unnamed senior Israeli diplomatic
source was cited as saying that “the Saudi [normalization] issue is now more important than source was cited as saying that “the Saudi [normalization] issue is now more important than
anything else” for Netanyahu’s foreign policy. “He knows that Israel cannot stop Iran on its anything else” for Netanyahu’s foreign policy. “He knows that Israel cannot stop Iran on its
own.”own.”~~152~~157 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has expressed general support Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has expressed general support
for normalization with Israel but stated in January 2023 that “true normalization and true stability for normalization with Israel but stated in January 2023 that “true normalization and true stability
will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the Palestinians dignity. That will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the Palestinians dignity. That
requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”~~153~~158 Various factors could Various factors could
complicate an Israel-Saudi normalization process, including the March 2023 Saudi-Iran complicate an Israel-Saudi normalization process, including the March 2023 Saudi-Iran
normalization deal brokered by China, Saudi desires for stronger U.S. support for Saudi security normalization deal brokered by China, Saudi desires for stronger U.S. support for Saudi security
and civilian nuclear priorities (which might require congressional approval), and Arab concerns and civilian nuclear priorities (which might require congressional approval), and Arab concerns
regarding increased Israeli-Palestinian tensions and violence.regarding increased Israeli-Palestinian tensions and violence.~~154~~159 One media report has suggested One media report has suggested
that while Arab states like Saudi Arabia “may see Iran as a menace, they see little gain in isolating that while Arab states like Saudi Arabia “may see Iran as a menace, they see little gain in isolating
and opposing Tehran to the extent that Israel does.”and opposing Tehran to the extent that Israel does.”~~155~~160 A 2023 public opinion poll suggests that A 2023 public opinion poll suggests that
large majorities of Saudis oppose normalization with both Israel and Iran, and that about 18% large majorities of Saudis oppose normalization with both Israel and Iran, and that about 18%
support cooperation with Israel against Iran.support cooperation with Israel against Iran.~~156~~161
During Secretary Blinken’s June 2023 visit to Saudi Arabia, he said that helping normalize During Secretary Blinken’s June 2023 visit to Saudi Arabia, he said that helping normalize
Israeli-Saudi ties is a U.S. priority, saying, “We discussed it here, and we will continue to work at Israeli-Saudi ties is a U.S. priority, saying, “We discussed it here, and we will continue to work at
~~it, to advance it in the days, weeks, and months ahead.”157 In the same briefing, Saudi Foreign~~
~~Minister Al Saud said~~
~~I have said before and it’s quite clear that we believe that normalization is in the interest of~~
~~the region, that it would bring significant benefits to all. But without finding a pathway to~~
~~peace for the Palestinian people, without addressing that challenge, any normalization will~~
~~have limited benefits. And therefore, I think we should continue to focus on finding a~~
~~pathway towards a two-state solution, on finding a pathway towards giving the Palestinians~~
~~dignity and justice.158~~
~~In a July CNN interview, President Biden said that “We’re a long way” from an Israel-Saudi~~
~~normalization deal that could partly depend on what Saudi Arabia might ask of the United~~
~~States.159 According to one media report, Biden has authorized Administration officials to “probe~~

~~150~~ 152 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October 14, 2021. 153 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Their Meeting,” January 30, 2023. 154 The Negev Forum Regional Cooperation Framework Adopted by the Steering Committee on November 10th, 2022, hyperlink to document available at https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-framework/. 155 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
~~151~~156 Jacob Magid, “US laments Jordan’s absence from Negev Forum, aims to keep Palestinians in loop,” Jacob Magid, “US laments Jordan’s absence from Negev Forum, aims to keep Palestinians in loop,” Times of Israel, ,
January 8, 2023. January 8, 2023.
~~152~~157 Ben Caspit, “For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia not impossible,” Ben Caspit, “For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia not impossible,” Al-Monitor, May 16, 2023. , May 16, 2023.
~~153~~158 Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Al-Monitor, ,
January 20, 2023. January 20, 2023.
~~154~~159 Mark Mazzetti et al., “U.S., in Long Shot, Seeks Saudi Deal with Netanyahu,” Mark Mazzetti et al., “U.S., in Long Shot, Seeks Saudi Deal with Netanyahu,” New York Times, June 19, 2023; , June 19, 2023;
Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Israeli-Saudi normalization still elusive despite US push,” Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Israeli-Saudi normalization still elusive despite US push,” Al-Monitor, May 25, 2023; Barak , May 25, 2023; Barak
Ravid, “Biden admin pushing for Saudi-Israeli peace deal by end of year, officials say,” Ravid, “Biden admin pushing for Saudi-Israeli peace deal by end of year, officials say,” ~~Axios~~Axios, May 17, 2023. See also , May 17, 2023. See also
CRS In Focus IF10799, CRS In Focus IF10799, Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul , by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul
K. Kerr. K. Kerr.
~~155~~160 Patrick Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran,” Patrick Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran,” New York Times, ,
March 11, 2023. March 11, 2023.
~~156~~161 David Pollock, “New Saudi Opinion Poll Shows 40 Percent Still Back Some Ties with Israel,” Washington Institute David Pollock, “New Saudi Opinion Poll Shows 40 Percent Still Back Some Ties with Israel,” Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (Fikra Forum), May 15, 2023. for Near East Policy (Fikra Forum), May 15, 2023.
~~157 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and~~Congressional Research Service 19 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations it, to advance it in the days, weeks, and months ahead.”162 In the same briefing, Saudi Foreign Saudi Foreign Minister Al Saud said I have said before and it’s quite clear that we believe that normalization is in the interest of the region, that it would bring significant benefits to all. But without finding a pathway to peace for the Palestinian people, without addressing that challenge, any normalization will have limited benefits. And therefore, I think we should continue to focus on finding a pathway towards a two-state solution, on finding a pathway towards giving the Palestinians dignity and justice.163 In a July CNN interview, President Biden said that “We’re a long way” from an Israel-Saudi normalization deal that could partly depend on what Saudi Arabia might ask of the United States.164~~Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at a~~
~~Joint Press Availability,” June 8, 2023.~~
~~158 Ibid.~~
~~159 Transcript: Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden.~~
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~~with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia to see if some kind of deal is possible~~
~~and at what price.”160~~ Amid speculation in August about possible progress in negotiations, and Amid speculation in August about possible progress in negotiations, and
reported Israeli interest in a U.S.-Israel security agreement as part of a potential deal,reported Israeli interest in a U.S.-Israel security agreement as part of a potential deal,~~161~~165 a White a White
House spokesperson was cited as saying, “There is no agreed to set of negotiations, there’s no House spokesperson was cited as saying, “There is no agreed to set of negotiations, there’s no
agreed-to framework to codify normalization or any of the other security considerations that we agreed-to framework to codify normalization or any of the other security considerations that we
and our friends have in the region.”and our friends have in the region.”~~162~~166 In September, U.S., Israeli, and Saudi leaders have alluded to their ongoing discussions, expressing some optimism while acknowledging a number of outstanding issues.167
Security cooperation and Israel in CENTCOM. In January 2021, President Trump determined In January 2021, President Trump determined
that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most
countries in the Middle East, would add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR), partly to countries in the Middle East, would add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR), partly to
encourage military interoperability as a means of reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many encourage military interoperability as a means of reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many
Arab states.Arab states.~~163~~168 Israel had previously been under the purview of U.S. European Command. Israel had previously been under the purview of U.S. European Command.
CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,~~164~~169 and in October an Israeli Defense and in October an Israeli Defense
Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.~~165~~170 Since then, Israel has joined military Since then, Israel has joined military
exercises with the United States and the other Abraham Accords states, as well as other exercises with the United States and the other Abraham Accords states, as well as other
CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.~~166~~171
Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by
Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government reportedly expressed Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government reportedly expressed
interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.~~167~~172 Earlier, both Morocco (November 2021) and 162 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at a Joint Press Availability,” June 8, 2023. 163 Ibid. 164 Transcript: Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden. See also ~~Earlier, both Morocco (November 2021) and~~
~~Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.168 These MOUs~~
~~appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.~~
~~Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be~~
~~contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.169 In late 2022, Israel’s defense~~
~~ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.170~~
~~At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly~~
~~discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on~~
~~inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.171 Speculation~~

~~160~~ Thomas L. Friedman, “Biden Is Weighing a Big Middle East Deal,” Thomas L. Friedman, “Biden Is Weighing a Big Middle East Deal,” New York Times, July 27, 2023. , July 27, 2023.
~~161~~165 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Bibi wants security agreement from Biden as part of mega Saudi deal,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Bibi wants security agreement from Biden as part of mega Saudi deal,” ~~Axios~~Axios, August 9, , August 9,
2023. 2023.
~~162~~166 Reuters, “White House: No framework agreed yet for an Israel-Saudi deal,” “White House: No framework agreed yet for an Israel-Saudi deal,” Reuters, August 9, 2023.
~~163~~August 9, 2023. 167 Barak Ravid, “Inside the Biden-Netanyahu Meeting,” Axios, September 20, 2023; September 21, 2023; Reuters, “Saudi deal could be in place early 2024 - Israel FM,” September 20, 2023. 168 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, , January 15,
2021. 2021.
~~164~~169 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1, U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021. 2021.
~~165~~170 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” ~~The~~ Times of
Israel, October 29, 2021. , October 29, 2021.
~~166~~171 Reuters, “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” ~~Reuters~~, November 11, 2021. Participant list for November 11, 2021. Participant list for
2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list. 2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
~~167~~172 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25, , January 25,
2022. 2022.
~~168 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021;~~
~~Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022.~~
~~169 Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,”~~ ~~Breaking~~
~~Defense, October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” Wall Street Journal,~~
~~October 10, 2022.~~
~~170 Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.”~~
~~171 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~about specific measures has continued since then.172~~Congressional Research Service 20 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.173 These MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales. Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.174 In late 2022, Israel’s defense ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.175 At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.176 Speculation about specific measures has continued since then.177 In January 2023, the Department of In January 2023, the Department of
Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on
cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.~~173~~178
Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel, Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel,
certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their
involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”~~174~~179 Actions Actions
by this Israeli government may be fueling any such reluctance to some degree.by this Israeli government may be fueling any such reluctance to some degree.~~175~~180 Regional Regional
countries might be hesitate to share the real-time intelligence data that underlies less sensitive countries might be hesitate to share the real-time intelligence data that underlies less sensitive
basic threat information.basic threat information.~~176~~181 Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM
apparently plans to help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners apparently plans to help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners
using the X-band radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air using the X-band radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air
defense systems and fighter jets.defense systems and fighter jets.~~177~~182 Additionally, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Additionally, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
(NAVCENT) is reportedly working with Israel and some Arab states to develop a network of (NAVCENT) is reportedly working with Israel and some Arab states to develop a network of
unmanned maritime drones to monitor Iranian naval activity and narcotics smuggling in unmanned maritime drones to monitor Iranian naval activity and narcotics smuggling in
NAVCENT’s area of responsibility.NAVCENT’s area of responsibility.~~178~~183
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.~~179~~184 In March, Congress enacted the 173 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021; Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. 174 Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Breaking Defense, October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2022. 175 Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.” 176 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022. 177 ~~In March, Congress enacted the~~
~~Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other~~
~~things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening~~
~~and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of~~
~~measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization~~
~~efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.~~
~~The FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263), enacted in~~
~~December 2022, included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the~~
~~Secretary of State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees, within 180 days of~~
~~enactment:~~
~~a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United~~
~~States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense~~
~~architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise~~
~~and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran~~
~~and groups linked to Iran.~~

~~172~~ Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Breaking Defense, ,
June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia—report,” June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia—report,” Times of Israel, June , June
28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” 28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York
Times, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~173~~178 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim
Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Washington Post, ,
January 31, 2023. January 31, 2023.
~~174~~179 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” New York Times, July 14, , July 14,
2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” 2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” Wall Street
Journal, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
~~175~~180 “UAE, Jordan consider reducing diplomacy with Israel—report,” “UAE, Jordan consider reducing diplomacy with Israel—report,” Jerusalem Post, March 22, 2023. , March 22, 2023.
~~176~~181 Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,” Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,”
Politico, July 12, 2022. , July 12, 2022.
~~177~~182 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Haaretz, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
~~178~~183 Dion Nissenbaum, “Inside a U.S. Navy Maritime Drone Operation Aimed at Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Inside a U.S. Navy Maritime Drone Operation Aimed at Iran,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, , August 31,
2022. 2022.
~~179~~184 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/ For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/
Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf. Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2021 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts. The FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263), enacted in December 2022, included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Secretary of State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees, within 180 days of enactment: a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran and groups linked to Iran.

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

Some Members have introduced legislation in the 118th Congress aimed at strengthening the Some Members have introduced legislation in the 118th Congress aimed at strengthening the
Abraham Accords, includingAbraham Accords, including:
• H.R. 3099, which seeks to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of • H.R. 3099, which seeks to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 to establish a Senate-confirmed position of “Special Envoy for the Abraham 1956 to establish a Senate-confirmed position of “Special Envoy for the Abraham
Accords.” The House passed the bill in June 2023.Accords.” The House passed the bill in June 2023.
• S. 2413, which among other things would authorize the creation of a Regional • S. 2413, which among other things would authorize the creation of a Regional
Integration Office within the State Department, to be headed by a Senate- Integration Office within the State Department, to be headed by a Senate-
confirmed position of “Special Presidential Envoy for the Abraham Accords, confirmed position of “Special Presidential Envoy for the Abraham Accords,
Negev Forum, and Related Normalization AgreementsNegev Forum, and Related Normalization Agreements~~.” It~~” (this provision is also included in S.Amdt. 717 to S. 2226, the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act). S. 2413 also would establish a also would establish a
$105 million Regional Integration Opportunity Fund for FY2024-FY2030, $105 million Regional Integration Opportunity Fund for FY2024-FY2030,
authorize additional cooperative Arab-Israeli funding, and expand the reach of authorize additional cooperative Arab-Israeli funding, and expand the reach of
U.S.-Israel foundations to include Abraham Accords and Negev Forum countries. U.S.-Israel foundations to include Abraham Accords and Negev Forum countries.
• H.R. 2973/S. 1334, which seeks to require the Administration to submit a • H.R. 2973/S. 1334, which seeks to require the Administration to submit a
strategy to some congressional committees for greater regional maritime and strategy to some congressional committees for greater regional maritime and
interdiction cooperation to counter Iranian and Iran-related naval capabilities and interdiction cooperation to counter Iranian and Iran-related naval capabilities and
threats to lawful commerce. threats to lawful commerce.
• H.R. 3792, which, among other things, encourages U.S. officials to use three • H.R. 3792, which, among other things, encourages U.S. officials to use three
existing regional or global programs—the Middle East Partnership Initiative, existing regional or global programs—the Middle East Partnership Initiative,
Middle East Research Cooperation, and the International Visitor Leadership Middle East Research Cooperation, and the International Visitor Leadership
Program—to fund activities to expand and deepen the Accords. Program—to fund activities to expand and deepen the Accords.
• S. 1777, which, among other things, would authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to engage in activities to strengthen network defense and cybersecurity collaboration between Abraham Accords countries and the United States. • S.Amdt. 255 to S. 2226, which would authorize the President to enter into “trilateral and multilateral cooperative project agreements with Israel and Abraham Accords countries, Negev Forum countries, and countries that have signed peace treaties with Israel, under the authority of section 27 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2767), to carry out research on and development, testing, evaluation, and joint production (including follow-on support) of defense articles and defense services to detect, track, and destroy armed unmanned aerial systems that threaten the United States, Israel, and partners in the Middle East.” Congressional Research Service 22 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Countering Iran185~~Countering Iran180~~
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE through coordinated drone penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE through coordinated drone
and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.~~181~~186 Israeli observers who Israeli observers who
anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war
against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since
then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”~~182~~187
The IDF’s Military Intelligence directorate reportedly warned Israeli officials in early 2023 that The IDF’s Military Intelligence directorate reportedly warned Israeli officials in early 2023 that
the “anti-Israeli axis led by Iran”—including Hezbollah and Hamas—appears to be emboldened the “anti-Israeli axis led by Iran”—including Hezbollah and Hamas—appears to be emboldened
by Israeli domestic discord and some purported U.S.-Israel differences.by Israeli domestic discord and some purported U.S.-Israel differences.~~183~~188 According to one According to one
media report’s profile of the intelligence warning, Iran doubts that Israel can “carry out an media report’s profile of the intelligence warning, Iran doubts that Israel can “carry out an
offensive against it or strike its nuclear program with US support.”offensive against it or strike its nuclear program with US support.”~~184~~189 Another media report said Another media report said
that Iran and its allies are not “necessarily interested in a direct, all-out clash,” but are “willing to that Iran and its allies are not “necessarily interested in a direct, all-out clash,” but are “willing to
risk more daring offensive operations,” while arguing that closer U.S.-Israel security coordination risk more daring offensive operations,” while arguing that closer U.S.-Israel security coordination
may at least partly reflect a pragmatic U.S. desire to prevent being dragged into a confrontation may at least partly reflect a pragmatic U.S. desire to prevent being dragged into a confrontation

~~180 See also CRS Report R47321, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas.~~
~~181 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” Jerusalem Post, March 11,~~
~~2022.~~
~~182 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~November 14, 2021.~~
~~183 Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence.”~~
~~184 Ibid.~~
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~~with Iran.185~~with Iran.190 This same report surmised that Iran may calculate it has bolstered its position vis-á- This same report surmised that Iran may calculate it has bolstered its position vis-á-
vis Israel and the United States because Iran and the Syrian regime have improved their relations vis Israel and the United States because Iran and the Syrian regime have improved their relations
with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab governments, Iran is approaching “nuclear threshold with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab governments, Iran is approaching “nuclear threshold
state” status, and Iran has a growing partnership with Russia. state” status, and Iran has a growing partnership with Russia.
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister
Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.~~186~~191
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace, Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional
185 See also CRS Report R47321, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas. 186 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” Jerusalem Post, March 11, 2022. 187 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post, November 14, 2021. 188 Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence.” 189 Ibid. 190 Amos Harel, “Washington’s Mideast Pullout Sets Israel and Iran on a Collision Course,” Haaretz, April 11, 2023. See also Jared Szuba, “US, Israel war games underscore warnings to Iran on nuclear enrichment,” Al-Monitor, July 11, 2023. 191 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “UN report: Uranium particles enriched to 83.7% found in Iran,” Associated Press, February 28, 2023. Congressional Research Service 23 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations tensions.192~~tensions.187~~ In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some
operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military
capabilities.capabilities.~~188~~193
As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the
possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence
diplomatic outcomes.diplomatic outcomes.~~189~~194 Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and
government crackdowns in Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in government crackdowns in Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in
Ukraine, near-term prospects for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.Ukraine, near-term prospects for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.~~190~~195
During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July 2022, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July 2022, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the
Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment
“never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is “never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is
prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”~~191~~196 Additionally, Biden Additionally, Biden
said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from
acquiring nuclear weapons.acquiring nuclear weapons.~~192~~197 In February 2023, then-Ambassador Nides said that the United In February 2023, then-Ambassador Nides said that the United
States would not engage in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program while Iran provides drones for States would not engage in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program while Iran provides drones for
Russia in its war in Ukraine. He also said that U.S.-Israel cooperation vis-à-vis Iran was Russia in its war in Ukraine. He also said that U.S.-Israel cooperation vis-à-vis Iran was
“lockstep”: “lockstep”:

~~185 Amos Harel, “Washington’s Mideast Pullout Sets Israel and Iran on a Collision Course,” Haaretz, April 11, 2023.~~
~~See also Jared Szuba, “US, Israel war games underscore warnings to Iran on nuclear enrichment,” Al-Monitor, July 11,~~
~~2023.~~
~~186 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “UN report: Uranium particles enriched to 83.7% found in Iran,” Associated Press,~~
~~February 28, 2023.~~
~~187~~ As President Biden has said, we will not stand by and watch Iran get a nuclear weapon, number one. Number two, he said, all options are on the table. Number three, Israel can and should do whatever they need to deal with and we’ve got their back.198 In January 2023, the United States and Israel held their largest-ever bilateral military exercise, named Juniper Oak. According to CENTCOM, the exercise “enhanced interoperability and the ability of CENTCOM forces to rapidly move combat power into the region,” and provides opportunities to incorporate lessons learned with all U.S. partners in the CENTCOM AOR.199 The two militaries held another stage of Juniper Oak in July.200 Various sources have documented reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear program,201 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the overall effectiveness of such operations.202 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military 192 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24, , May 24,
2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, , April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi,
“With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” “With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16, , March 16,
2022. 2022.
~~188~~193 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~189~~194 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022; Israeli , March 21, 2022; Israeli
Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022. Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022.
~~190~~195 International Institute for Strategic Studies, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran, ,
November 2022. November 2022.
~~191~~196 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022. White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022.
~~192~~197 Associated Press, “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” Associated Press, July 15, 2022.
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~~As President Biden has said, we will not stand by and watch Iran get a nuclear weapon,~~
~~number one. Number two, he said, all options are on the table. Number three, Israel can~~
~~and should~~July 15, 2022. 198 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need do whatever they need ~~to deal with~~ ’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve got their back,’” Times of Israel, February 19, 2023. 199 U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26, 2023. See also Michael Eisenstadt, “The Juniper Oak Military Exercise: Implications for Innovation, Experimentation, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2023. 200 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command and the Israel Defense Forces Begin Military Exercise,” July 10, 2023. 201 Agence France Presse, “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” March 15, 2022. 202 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021. Congressional Research Service 24 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations capabilities,203~~and we’ve got their back.193~~
~~In January 2023, the United States and Israel held their largest-ever bilateral military exercise,~~
~~named Juniper Oak. According to CENTCOM, the exercise “enhanced interoperability and the~~
~~ability of CENTCOM forces to rapidly move combat power into the region,” and provides~~
~~opportunities to incorporate lessons learned with all U.S. partners in the CENTCOM AOR.194 The~~
~~two militaries held another stage of Juniper Oak in July.195~~
~~Various sources have documented reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s~~
~~nuclear program,196 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on~~
~~the overall effectiveness of such operations.197 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military~~
~~capabilities,198~~ questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against
Iran’s nuclear program.Iran’s nuclear program.~~199~~204
In a January 2023 CNN interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted In a January 2023 CNN interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted
attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons
development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting
nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing
is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to
take action.”take action.”~~200~~205 Amid some international concerns about advanced levels of Iranian uranium Amid some international concerns about advanced levels of Iranian uranium
enrichment, Defense Minister Gallant stated in February that Israel would not allow Iran to enrich enrichment, Defense Minister Gallant stated in February that Israel would not allow Iran to enrich
uranium to 90%.uranium to 90%.~~201~~206
While an imminent return to the JCPOA may be unlikely, media reports emerged in June 2023 of While an imminent return to the JCPOA may be unlikely, media reports emerged in June 2023 of
indirect U.S.-Iran discussions aimed at a possible informal, unwritten understanding,indirect U.S.-Iran discussions aimed at a possible informal, unwritten understanding,~~202~~207 despite despite
public statements by U.S. officials denying that a deal is in the offing. The reports said that such a public statements by U.S. officials denying that a deal is in the offing. The reports said that such a
U.S.-Iran arrangement might feature various elements, including U.S.-Iran arrangement might feature various elements, including
• Iranian agreement not to enrich uranium beyond 60%, and to release some • Iranian agreement not to enrich uranium beyond 60%, and to release some
Iranian-American prisoners; and Iranian-American prisoners; and

~~193 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve got their back,’”~~
Times of Israel, February 19, 2023.
~~194 U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26, 2023. See also Michael Eisenstadt,~~
~~“The Juniper Oak Military Exercise: Implications for Innovation, Experimentation, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran,”~~
~~Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2023.~~
~~195 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command and the Israel Defense Forces Begin Military Exercise,” July 10,~~
~~2023.~~
~~196 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022.~~
~~197 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021.~~
~~198~~ • U.S. agreement not to tighten sanctions, and to unfreeze billions of dollars in Iranian funds held abroad for Iran to use for humanitarian purposes.208 Netanyahu has reportedly indicated to members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Israel “could live with” such a U.S.-Iran understanding,209 though on June 13 he said Our position is clear: No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue to do everything to defend itself. Our opposition to a return to the original agreement, I think it is working, but there are still differences of outlook and we do not hide them, also about smaller agreements.210 Additionally, Netanyahu is apparently wary of U.S. efforts aimed at persuading Israel to promise not to surprise the United States with military action against Iran.211 In August, Iran and the United States reportedly reached an agreement by which the countries would each release five detained nationals of the other country and Iran would obtain limited 203 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel’s ‘Top Gun’: The US-Israeli aircraft that can take down Iran,” Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel’s ‘Top Gun’: The US-Israeli aircraft that can take down Iran,” Jerusalem Post, February , February
25, 2023. 25, 2023.
~~199~~204 Ethan Bronner and Henry Meyer, “Will Israel Attack Iran? What to Know About Netanyahu’s Military Posturing,” Ethan Bronner and Henry Meyer, “Will Israel Attack Iran? What to Know About Netanyahu’s Military Posturing,”
Bloomberg, June 13, 2023; Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” , June 13, 2023; Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Haaretz, September 1, , September 1,
2022. 2022.
~~200~~205 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
~~201~~206 “Netanyahu said to huddle repeatedly with military brass over possible attack on Iran,” “Netanyahu said to huddle repeatedly with military brass over possible attack on Iran,” Times of Israel, February 22, , February 22,
2023. 2023.
~~202~~207 Michael Crowley et al., “U.S. and Iran Quietly Discussing a Deal to Ease Nuclear Tensions,” Michael Crowley et al., “U.S. and Iran Quietly Discussing a Deal to Ease Nuclear Tensions,” New York Times, June , June
15, 2023; Laurence Norman and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Begins Quiet Push to Reduce Tensions with Iran,” 15, 2023; Laurence Norman and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Begins Quiet Push to Reduce Tensions with Iran,” Wall Street
Journal, June 15, 2023. , June 15, 2023.
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~~• U.S. agreement not to tighten sanctions, and to unfreeze billions of dollars in~~
~~Iranian funds held abroad for Iran to use for humanitarian purposes.203~~
~~Netanyahu has reportedly indicated to members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense~~
~~Committee that Israel “could live with” such a U.S.-Iran understanding,204 though on June 13 he~~
~~said~~
~~Our position is clear:~~ 208 Ibid. 209 “Report: Netanyahu says US and Iran in talks for a ‘mini-deal’ Israel can live with,” Times of Israel, June 13, 2023. 210 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee: ‘No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue
~~to do everything to defend itself. Our opposition to a return to the original agreement, I~~
~~think it is working, but there are still differences of outlook and we do not hide them, also~~
~~about smaller agreements.205~~
~~Additionally, Netanyahu is apparently wary of U.S. efforts aimed at persuading Israel to promise~~
~~not to surprise the United States with military action against Iran.206~~
~~In August, Iran and the United States reportedly reached an agreement by which the countries~~
~~would each release five detained nationals of the other country and Iran would obtain limited~~
to do everything to defend itself,’” June 13, 2023. 211 Lahav Harkov, “Herzog to fly to Washington for White House visit, Congress speech,” Jerusalem Post, July 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 36 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations access to some frozen funds, triggering speculation that a U.S.-Iran understanding on Iran’s access to some frozen funds, triggering speculation that a U.S.-Iran understanding on Iran’s
nuclear program might follow.nuclear program might follow.~~207~~
~~Some unnamed Israeli senior officials have been cited as speculating that the Biden~~
~~Administration may seek a more informal understanding with Iran because of concerns about~~
~~potential congressional opposition to a formal agreement, though a source close to the~~
~~Administration has expressed that President Biden is more “a creature of Congress” than most~~
~~presidents.208~~212 The mutual prisoner release and some unfreezing of funds occurred in September.213
Hezbollah and Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict—most notably in a 2006 war.conflict—most notably in a 2006 war.~~209~~214
Some developments in 2022 and 2023, such as greater Hezbollah activity in disputed border Some developments in 2022 and 2023, such as greater Hezbollah activity in disputed border
areas, and occasional cross-border drone incursions and projectile fire, have fueled speculation areas, and occasional cross-border drone incursions and projectile fire, have fueled speculation
about a possible outbreak of hostilities.about a possible outbreak of hostilities.~~210~~215 One July 2023 report citing Israeli security sources One July 2023 report citing Israeli security sources
assessed that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah does not appear to want all-out confrontation assessed that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah does not appear to want all-out confrontation
with Israel, but “no longer has deep-seated concern about a possible escalation into a day or a few with Israel, but “no longer has deep-seated concern about a possible escalation into a day or a few

~~203 Ibid.~~
~~204 “Report: Netanyahu says US and Iran in talks for a ‘mini-deal’ Israel can live with,” Times of Israel, June 13, 2023.~~
~~205 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense~~
~~Committee: ‘No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue to do everything to defend itself,’”~~
~~June 13, 2023.~~
~~206 Lahav Harkov, “Herzog to fly to Washington for White House visit, Congress speech,” Jerusalem Post, July 16,~~
~~2023.~~
~~207 Zvi Bar’el, “U.S.-Iran Prisoner Deal Signals Possible Path to New Nuclear Deal,” Haaretz, August 13, 2023.~~
~~208 Amir Tibon and Ben Samuels, “Israeli Officials Believe U.S. Will Avoid Calling New Iran Understandings an~~
~~‘Agreement,’” Haaretz, June 13, 2023.~~
~~209 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah.~~
~~210 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Hezbollah deterrence is eroding as Lebanon border heats up,” Al-Monitor, July 14, 2023;~~
~~“Lebanon’s militant Hezbollah group says it shot down an Israeli drone near the southern border,” Associated Press,~~
~~June 26, 2023; Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program—opinion,”~~ ~~Jerusalem~~
~~Post, December 28, 2022.~~
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~~link to page 35~~ ~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~days of limited fighting,” which might increase the risk of 2006-style intensified conflict.211~~days of limited fighting,” which might increase the risk of 2006-style intensified conflict.216
Nasrallah’s possible interest in probing for limits to Israeli deterrence may be due in part to Nasrallah’s possible interest in probing for limits to Israeli deterrence may be due in part to
domestic upheavals in Israel. In response to Israeli protests over the July Basic Law provision domestic upheavals in Israel. In response to Israeli protests over the July Basic Law provision
affecting the judiciary, Nasrallah said that Israel “is on the path to collapse, fragmentation, and affecting the judiciary, Nasrallah said that Israel “is on the path to collapse, fragmentation, and
disappearance, God willing.”disappearance, God willing.”~~212~~217
Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied
weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and
its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.~~213~~218 In 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership and In 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership and
Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture
precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.~~214~~219 Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon that Israel Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon that Israel
could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling, based on could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling, based on
reports that Iran has planned flights that could carry equipment directly to Hezbollah in reports that Iran has planned flights that could carry equipment directly to Hezbollah in
Lebanon.Lebanon.~~215~~220
In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime
boundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (seeboundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (see Appendix C). .
Public debate in Israel centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal were worth the Public debate in Israel centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal were worth the
~~concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.216 While Prime Minister Netanyahu~~
~~made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the~~
~~maritime boundary agreement,217 his government has not taken action to date.218~~
~~Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster~~
~~Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other~~
~~military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-~~
~~backed targets that could present threats to its security.219~~
~~Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian~~
~~targets,220 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.221 This~~

~~211 Caspit, “Israel’s Hezbollah deterrence is eroding as Lebanon border heats up,”~~
~~212~~ 212 Zvi Bar’el, “U.S.-Iran Prisoner Deal Signals Possible Path to New Nuclear Deal,” Haaretz, August 13, 2023. 213 Michael D. Shear and Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Releases 5 Americans as U.S. Unfreezes Billions in Oil Revenue for Tehran,” New York Times, September 18, 2023. 214 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah. 215 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Hezbollah deterrence is eroding as Lebanon border heats up,” Al-Monitor, July 14, 2023; Associated Press, “Lebanon’s militant Hezbollah group says it shot down an Israeli drone near the southern border,” June 26, 2023; Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program—opinion,” Jerusalem Post, December 28, 2022. 216 Caspit, “Israel’s Hezbollah deterrence is eroding as Lebanon border heats up.” 217 “Hezbollah chief gloats: Israel had its ‘worst day,’ is on ‘path to disappearance,’” “Hezbollah chief gloats: Israel had its ‘worst day,’ is on ‘path to disappearance,’” Times of Israel, July 25, 2023. , July 25, 2023.
~~213~~218 See, for example, See, for example, Associated Press, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” ~~Associated Press~~, December 28, December 28,
2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” 2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York
Times, April 23, 2020. , April 23, 2020.
~~214~~219 Associated Press, “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press,
February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies
Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022. Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.
~~215~~220 Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2022. , December 16, 2022.
~~216 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022.~~
~~217 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,”~~ ~~Times~~
~~of Israel, October 31, 2022.~~
~~218 Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~January 31, 2023.~~
~~219 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” Jerusalem Post, March 29,~~
~~2022.~~
~~220 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27,~~
~~2021.~~
~~221 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel,~~
~~February 27, 2022.~~
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Congressional Research Service 26 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.221 While Prime Minister Netanyahu made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the maritime boundary agreement,222 his government has not taken action to date.223 Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-backed targets that could present threats to its security.224 Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian targets,225 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.226 This deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has
criticized some Israeli strikes.criticized some Israeli strikes.~~222~~227
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in
international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and
humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish
refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.~~223~~228 As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel
has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment,
especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to
Hezbollah in Lebanon.Hezbollah in Lebanon.~~224~~229
Despite entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal Despite entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal
assistance to Ukraine.assistance to Ukraine.~~225~~230 Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian
rescue forces and civilian organizations.rescue forces and civilian organizations.~~226~~
~~Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an~~
~~early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine~~
~~aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.227 In November 2022, one news outlet reported~~
~~that Israel had funded the purchase of “strategic materials” by a North Atlantic Treaty~~
~~Organization (NATO) member, which then transferred the materials to Ukraine for its use.228~~
~~In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells~~
~~from War Reserve Stocks for Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.229 According to~~
~~multiple reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation~~
~~with the United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and~~
~~they don’t really need our permission to take it.”230~~
~~In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for the possible sale of anti-drone~~
~~jamming systems that could help Ukraine down drones. Israeli officials have claimed that this~~
~~step does not change Israel’s policy against providing lethal assistance because the systems are~~
~~defensive in nature and do not target Russian soldiers. While Ukrainian officials appear interested~~

~~222~~231 221 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022. 222 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Times of Israel, October 31, 2022. 223 Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Jerusalem Post, January 31, 2023. 224 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” Jerusalem Post, March 29, 2022. 225 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27, 2021. 226 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel, February 27, 2022. 227 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine—report,” Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine—report,” Jerusalem Post, May 4, 2022; , May 4, 2022;
Emanuel Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Emanuel Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, ,
June 12, 2022. June 12, 2022.
~~223~~228 Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar , June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar
Ukrainians Arriving Since October from Working,” Ukrainians Arriving Since October from Working,” Haaretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who , December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who
entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered
Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and
Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022. , October 16, 2022.
~~224~~229 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply
the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” ~~Bloomberg~~Bloomberg, March 11, 2022. , March 11, 2022.
~~225~~230 Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,” Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,”
Breaking Defense, October 18, 2022. , October 18, 2022.
~~226~~231 “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ Times of Israel, September 23, , September 23,
2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” 2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022. , May 18, 2022.
~~227 “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” Reuters, October 19, 2022; “Israel giving~~
~~intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine—report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022.~~
~~228 Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Haaretz, November 17,~~
~~2022.~~
~~229 Eric Schmitt et al., “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023.~~
~~230 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023.~~
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~~in the systems, they view them as less critical than air defense systems that can counter ballistic~~
~~missiles.231~~Congressional Research Service 27 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.232 In November 2022, one news outlet reported that Israel had funded the purchase of “strategic materials” by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, which then transferred the materials to Ukraine for its use.233 In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells from War Reserve Stocks for Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.234 According to multiple reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation with the United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and they don’t really need our permission to take it.”235 In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for the possible sale of anti-drone jamming systems that could help Ukraine down drones. Israeli officials have claimed that this step does not change Israel’s policy against providing lethal assistance because the systems are defensive in nature and do not target Russian soldiers. While Ukrainian officials appear interested in the systems, they view them as less critical than air defense systems that can counter ballistic missiles.236
In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian
branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate
emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel. emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel.
Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about
emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on
Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.~~232~~237 As of As of
early 2023, the agency had reportedly frozen most activities related to promoting Jewish early 2023, the agency had reportedly frozen most activities related to promoting Jewish
emigration to Israel from former Soviet Union countries, except Ukraine.emigration to Israel from former Soviet Union countries, except Ukraine.~~233~~

~~231~~238 232 Reuters, “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” October 19, 2022; “Israel giving intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine—report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022. 233 Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Haaretz, November 17, 2022. 234 Eric Schmitt et al., “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023. 235 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023. 236 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel approves export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel approves export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine,” ~~Axios~~Axios, March 15, 2023. , March 15, 2023.
~~232~~237 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” New
York Times, July 22, 2022. , July 22, 2022.
~~233~~238 Zvika Klein, “Jewish Agency lowers profile in Russia, less activity in FSU countries—exclusive,” Zvika Klein, “Jewish Agency lowers profile in Russia, less activity in FSU countries—exclusive,” Jerusalem Post, ,
February 21, 2023. February 21, 2023.
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Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA, DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are projections for 2023 unless otherwise ; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are projections for 2023 unless otherwise
specified. specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
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Appendix B. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats) (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022. Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022.
Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to
1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received
his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has
been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with
the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional
influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a
security-minded nationalist. security-minded nationalist.
National Unity (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats) (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats)
Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New
Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led
Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary
and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.
Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from
2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.
Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats) (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of
West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious
law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam. law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister within the Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister within the
defense ministry with some responsibilities over West Bank administration. He has defense ministry with some responsibilities over West Bank administration. He has
headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained
lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and
religiously conservative causes. religiously conservative causes.
Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats) (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a
common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam. common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam.
Leader: Itamar Ben Gvir
Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to
Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir
Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir
was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says
that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a
lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a
regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats) (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union. speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign
minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and
canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the
Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked
under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to
consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a
platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in
a 2013 case. a 2013 case.
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Noam (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat) (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues
(including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the conversion (including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the conversion
process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish Power. process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish Power.
Leader: Avi Maoz
Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has
headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. In the current government, he headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. In the current government, he
nominally headed an office in the prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity, nominally headed an office in the prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity,
but resigned from that post in February 2023 based on concerns that he was not but resigned from that post in February 2023 based on concerns that he was not
given the authority to change policy as he desired. given the authority to change policy as he desired.
LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats) (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza. in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the
Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition. Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that
supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and
university lecturer. university lecturer.
CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats) (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013,
when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-
place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government
from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh
Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for
Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and
then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition. then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats) (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in
January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November
2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could not 2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could not
serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had
indicated in the 2022 plea deal that he would permanently leave politics. indicated in the 2022 plea deal that he would permanently leave politics.
United Torah Judaism – Coalition (7 seats) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its
interpretation of traditional Jewish law. interpretation of traditional Jewish law.
Leader: Yitzhak Goldknopf
Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been
prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day
care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance. care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance.
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ARAB
Hadash-Ta’al – Opposition (5 seats) – Opposition (5 seats)
Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadashpolitical strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal). Movement for Renewal).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with
the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before
becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006. becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats) (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the
UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the
government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for
Arab Israelis.Arab Israelis.

Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
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Appendix C. Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement
Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the
United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-
Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to
eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line
extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon
agreement (seagreement (see Figure C-1). According to a senior Biden Administration official . According to a senior Biden Administration official
This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a
boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without
conflict.conflict.~~234~~239
On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal. On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal.~~235~~240 Reportedly, Reportedly,
President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the
agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural
gas drilling.gas drilling.~~236~~241

~~234~~239 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime
Agreement,” October 11, 2022. Agreement,” October 11, 2022.
~~235~~240 Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Times of Israel, October , October
29, 2022. 29, 2022.
~~236~~241 Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Haaretz, ,
October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” Jerusalem Post, ,
October 11, 2022. October 11, 2022.
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Figure C-1. Map: Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Agreement

Source: Haaretz. Haaretz.
Note: All boundaries are approximate. All boundaries are approximate.
Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future
side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will
settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field
that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can
begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.~~237~~242
The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly
before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had
threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute. threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute.

~~237~~242 Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Times of Israel, ,
October 12, 2022. October 12, 2022.
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Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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