Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from February 9, 2023 to March 22, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~
~~February 9~~ March 22, 2023 , 2023
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel
Jim Zanotti
$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance, Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance,

contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters: contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters:

Netanyahu’s December 2022 return to power and new coalition partners. In December 2022, In December 2022,
Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new government, replacing a 2021-2022 coalition that Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new government, replacing a 2021-2022 coalition that
had formed in opposition to Netanyahu. He previously served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999 and 2009 to 2021. The had formed in opposition to Netanyahu. He previously served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999 and 2009 to 2021. The
November 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process began in December 2018 addressing corruption November 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process began in December 2018 addressing corruption
allegations against Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the allegations against Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the
new Israeli government has triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions new Israeli government has triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions
with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States and other countries. The government has with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States and other countries. The government has
proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s judicial system, triggering a highly charged national debate over checks and balances proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s judicial system, triggering a highly charged national debate over checks and balances
in Israel with potential international implications. in Israel with potential international implications. ~~Netanyahu has reportedly said that any final legislation will reflect wide~~
~~agreement and be softened from the version introduced~~With President Biden and some Members of Congress encouraging a compromise solution, Netanyahu’s government may pass a measure giving it considerable control over judicial appointments, but provide more time for dialogue on other aspects of its proposal. .
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken
out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of
the holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered heightened the holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered heightened
counterterrorism measures and controversy, with another spike in counterterrorism measures and controversy, with another spike in ~~January~~early 2023 leading the Palestinian Authority to announce 2023 leading the Palestinian Authority to announce
the suspension of security coordination with Israelthe suspension of security coordination with Israel~~; U.S. officials seek to facilitate coordination~~. The United States, Jordan, and Egypt have convened periodic talks aimed at bolstering Israel-PA coordination, de-escalating tensions, and minimizing unilateral measures. As the Gaza Strip remains . As the Gaza Strip remains
under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and
other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group. other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority states. The Biden Administration has followed The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ~~Palestinian leaders have denounced~~
~~normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address~~
~~Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.~~ Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties
between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on ~~air and missile~~
various types of defense—that inclines other Arab and Muslim-majority countries toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has defense—that inclines other Arab and Muslim-majority countries toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has
passed legislation encouraging more normalization and greater regional security cooperation involving Israel. passed legislation encouraging more normalization and greater regional security cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran and other regional dynamics. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015
international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Amid seemingly diminished prospects for a possible U.S. international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Amid seemingly diminished prospects for a possible U.S.
return to the agreement, Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran. Observers have speculated about Israeli return to the agreement, Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran. Observers have speculated about Israeli
covert or military actions to influence nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number covert or military actions to influence nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number
of military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these of military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these
areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal. Via U.S. mediation, Israel and Lebanon—which do not have formal areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal. Via U.S. mediation, Israel and Lebanon—which do not have formal
relations—reached agreement in October 2022 on maritime boundaries to allow both countries to extract offshore natural gas. relations—reached agreement in October 2022 on maritime boundaries to allow both countries to extract offshore natural gas.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. ~~To date, Israel has not directly~~
~~provided~~ Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However, lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However,
Israel is reportedly providing or planning to provide basic intelligenceIsrael is reportedly providing or planning to provide basic intelligence ~~and~~, assistance with early warning assistance with early warning systems, and anti-drone jamming systems to counter systems to counter
Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page link to page 2224 link to page 5 link to page link to page 5 link to page 2325 Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (seeIsrael (see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, , by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers seek Islamic Jihad (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers seek
oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1 Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include the following: include the following:
 The December 2022 return of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister at  The December 2022 return of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister at
the head of a coalition government the head of a coalition government~~. Ministers~~ that includes ministers from ultra-nationalist from ultra-nationalist ~~parties could~~
~~affect Israeli policies on Palestinian and some domestic matters in ways~~parties. The new government’s judicial reform proposal has triggered a highly charged national debate in Israel that has prompted public statements of support by President Biden and some Members of Congress for compromise measures ~~that~~
~~complicate U.S.-Israel relations~~. .
 Israeli-Palestinian violence and other problems, and their implications for U.S.  Israeli-Palestinian violence and other problems, and their implications for U.S.
policy. policy.
 Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the  Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords. Abraham Accords.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria. Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria.
 Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.  Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Netanyahu’s Return to Power and New Coalition
Partners
On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) voted to reinstall Likud party leader Benjamin voted to reinstall Likud party leader Benjamin
Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and 2009-Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and 2009-
2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox parties 2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox parties
(se(see Figure 1 andand Appendix B).

1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S. 1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S.
assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise
permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza. permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1 1

link to page 6 link to page 6

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

Figure 1. November 2022 Knesset Election Results

Source: Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious
Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1). Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1).
The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption
allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could
last for months or years.2 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a last for months or years.2 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a
government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021 government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021
government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him. government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him.
Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may
have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.3 have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.3
~~In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ, also known as the Supreme Court) required~~
~~Netanyahu to dismiss Aryeh Deri—leader of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party—as interior and~~
~~health minister because of a January 2022 tax fraud conviction. Perhaps partly to maintain Shas~~
~~support for the coalition, Netanyahu pledged to find any legal way whereby Deri might “continue~~
~~to contribute to the State of Israel.”4~~
Key Government Figures and Decisionmaking
Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new
Israeli government (seIsraeli government (see Table 1) has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s
democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its
relations with the United States and other countries.relations with the United States and other countries.54 Coalition agreements state that the Jewish Coalition agreements state that the Jewish
people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,65
appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to
expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious
law in Israeli society.law in Israeli society.76 Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at
contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.7 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.8 Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests
2 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand – and where they are going – analysis,” 2 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand – and where they are going – analysis,” Jerusalem
Post, August 16, 2022. , August 16, 2022.
3 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” 3 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, December 30, 2022. , December 30, 2022.
4 4 ~~Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu fires Deri ‘with a heavy heart’ after High Court nixes convicted minister,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, January 22, 2023.~~
5 Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” Associated Press, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
65 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
76 “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” Ynetnews/i24News, December 30, 2022. , December 30, 2022.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

2

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.8 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007~~
~~for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.9~~
~~Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work~~
~~with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the~~
~~two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests~~
~~and values.”10~~7 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” May 15, 2021. 8 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007. Congressional Research Service 2 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations and values.”9 Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge
the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”1110
Table 1. Israeli Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu Benjamin Netanyahu
Likud Likud
Defense Minister Defense Minister
Yoav Galant Yoav Galant
Likud Likud
Foreign Minister Foreign Minister
Eli Cohen Eli Cohen
Likud Likud
Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry
Bezalel Smotrich Bezalel Smotrich
Religious Zionism Religious Zionism
Justice Minister Justice Minister
Yariv Levin Yariv Levin
Likud Likud
National Security Minister National Security Minister
Itamar Ben Gvir Itamar Ben Gvir
Jewish Power Jewish Power
Transportation Minister Transportation Minister
Miri Regev Miri Regev
Likud Likud
Strategic Affairs Minister Strategic Affairs Minister
Ron Dermer Ron Dermer
No formal affiliation No formal affiliation
Energy Minister Energy Minister
Israel Katz Israel Katz
Likud Likud
Agriculture and Rural Development Minister Agriculture and Rural Development Minister
Avi Dichter Avi Dichter
Likud Likud
Smotrich and Ben Gvir are each in the process of assuming some security responsibilities. Under Smotrich and Ben Gvir are each in the process of assuming some security responsibilities. Under
the coalition agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over the coalition agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over
civil affairs units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning civil affairs units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning
commission that oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.commission that oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.1211 Ben Gvir Ben Gvir
heads a national security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including heads a national security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including
personnel that patrol Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.personnel that patrol Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.1312 He also expects to oversee the border He also expects to oversee the border
police, including units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) police, including units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
authority.authority.1413 Ben Gvir supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their Ben Gvir supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their
legal immunity.legal immunity.15

~~8 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” May 15,~~
~~2021.~~
~~9 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007.~~
1014 Defense Minister Yoav Galant and top IDF leaders have apparently sought to prevent changes to the defense ministry and border police from disrupting the chain of command.15 In February 2023, Smotrich received general responsibilities to direct settlement planning and enforcement over illegal construction in the West Bank, while Galant maintained formal powers to intervene in Smotrich’s decisions with cause.16 It is unclear how the arrangement will work in practice, 9 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29, White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29,
2022. 2022.
1110 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022.
1211 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” Times of
Israel, December 5, 2022. , December 5, 2022.
1312 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” Times of
Israel, December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, , December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
1413 “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” Times of Israel, December 29, , December 29,
2022. 2022.
1514 Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’” 15 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2023; Ash Obel, “Smotrich refuses to attend meeting with IDF chief on transfer of West Bank powers,” Times of Israel, January 25, 2023. 16 Jeremy Sharon, “Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning,” Times of Israel, February 23, 2023. Congressional Research Service 3 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations especially if Galant and Smotrich disagree on an issue that arguably has both civilian and national security implications. Netanyahu has asserted that he will personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.17 ~~Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

3

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Defense Minister Yoav Galant apparently seeks to prevent changes to the defense ministry and~~
~~border police from disrupting the chain of command.16 Based on media accounts of deliberations~~
~~between Netanyahu, Galant, and then IDF chief of staff Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi,~~
~~Kochavi reportedly said that the IDF would not be answerable to Smotrich or Ben Gvir.17~~
~~Netanyahu and Galant reportedly assured Kochavi that decisions on whether to practically~~
~~implement any changes in command structure would occur only after the military could apprise~~
~~the government of the potential consequences.18 Media reports suggest that Netanyahu supports~~
~~the specified transfers of authority to Smotrich despite continued opposition from Galant and~~
~~senior IDF commanders.19 However, a former legal adviser to the defense ministry has said that~~
~~any changes bypassing the defense minister would not be legally valid unless the government~~
~~amends two of Israel’s basic laws. The adviser also has warned, “If civilian issues [in the West~~
~~Bank] are not managed by the defense minister, there is serious potential for security harm, and~~
~~that needs to be stopped.”20~~
~~Netanyahu has asserted that he will personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.21~~ One One
Israeli journalist has argued that Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition Israeli journalist has argued that Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition
partners and Western countries concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing partners and Western countries concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing
the support of one or the other.the support of one or the other.2218 Two former U.S. officials have written that if a new Israeli Two former U.S. officials have written that if a new Israeli
government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir features open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir features open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to
change Israel’s democracy, opponents of strong U.S.-Israel relations will exploit the situation “to change Israel’s democracy, opponents of strong U.S.-Israel relations will exploit the situation “to
try to undo aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”try to undo aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”2319
The coalition agreements are not legally binding. The coalition agreements are not legally binding.2420 The degree of their implementation could have The degree of their implementation could have
significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the
rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to
Israel.Israel.2521 The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank
areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.26

~~16 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, January~~
~~2, 2023.~~
~~17 “Kohavi said to tell Netanyahu IDF won’t answer in any way to Smotrich and Ben Gvir,” Times of Israel, January 5,~~
~~2023.~~
~~18 Ibid.~~
~~19 “Netanyahu said to back Smotrich over Gallant in dispute over West Bank authority,” Times of Israel, January 25,~~
~~2023.~~
~~20 Emanuel Fabian, “Former defense legal adviser warns against planned government moves in West Bank,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, January 23, 2023.~~
2122 Proposed Judicial System Changes Justice Minister Yariv Levin proposed legislation in January 2023 to overhaul Israel’s judicial system in the following ways:23  Require larger HCJ majorities to invalidate laws or government decisions.  Allow the Knesset to override HCJ decisions, unless the full 15-judge panel decides unanimously.  Give the government greater control of the panel that selects judges.  Prevent the HCJ from applying a “reasonableness” test to legislation and government action.  Allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisers from outside the Justice Ministry’s aegis. Reducing the judiciary’s power to curb Knesset majority-backed government action could allow this coalition to enact laws that have encountered or would likely encounter HCJ resistance. Such laws could include legalizing Jewish West Bank outposts on private Palestinian land, exempting ultra-Orthodox Jews from military conscription, or changing minority rights and the religious-secular balance in Israel.24 It is unclear whether Prime Minister Netanyahu can participate in the 17 Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,” Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,”
NPR, December 15, 2022. , December 15, 2022.
2218 Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” Al-Monitor, December 9, , December 9,
2022. 2022.
2319 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,” Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,”
Times of Israel, November 2, 2022. , November 2, 2022.
2420 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
2521 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” Jerusalem Post, ,
December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” Al-Monitor, ,
December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Jerusalem
Post, December 22, 2022. , December 22, 2022.
2622 “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Associated Press, December 28, 2022. 23 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” Times of Israel, January 4, 2023. 24 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2023; “Israel unveils Congressional Research Service 4 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~“Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Associated Press, December 28, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

4

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Proposed Judicial System Changes~~
~~Justice Minister Yariv Levin has proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s judicial system in the~~
~~following ways:27~~
~~ Require larger HCJ majorities to invalidate laws or government decisions.~~
~~ Allow the Knesset to override HCJ decisions, unless the full 15-judge panel~~
~~decides unanimously.~~
~~ Give the government greater control of the panel that selects judges.~~
~~ Prevent the HCJ from applying a “reasonableness” test to legislation and~~
~~government action.~~
~~ Allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisers from outside the Justice~~
~~Ministry’s aegis.~~
~~Reducing the judiciary’s power to curb Knesset majority-backed government action could allow~~
~~this coalition to enact laws that have encountered or would likely encounter HCJ resistance. Such~~
~~laws could include legalizing Jewish West Bank outposts on private Palestinian land, exempting~~
~~ultra-Orthodox Jews from military conscription, or changing minority rights and the religious-~~
~~secular balance in Israel.28 It is unclear whether Prime Minister Netanyahu can participate in the~~
legislative process for the judicial reform proposal because of an existing conflict of interest legislative process for the judicial reform proposal because of an existing conflict of interest
agreement barring him from matters that could affect his criminal case.agreement barring him from matters that could affect his criminal case.2925
The proposal has triggered a highly charged national debate over checks and balances in Israel. The proposal has triggered a highly charged national debate over checks and balances in Israel.
Since its announcement, Since its announcement, ~~tens~~hundreds of thousands of Israelis have joined protests in conjunction with of thousands of Israelis have joined protests in conjunction with
opposition politicians,opposition politicians,3026 and many former HCJ justices and attorneys general and many former HCJ justices and attorneys general ~~signed a letter~~
~~strongly criticizing~~have strongly criticized the proposal and the proposal and ~~calling~~called on the government to withdraw it to prevent “serious on the government to withdraw it to prevent “serious
damage” to the rule of law.damage” to the rule of law.~~31 Additionally, a~~27 As widespread opposition to the proposal has continued for more than two months, it has encompassed other sectors of society. A number of leading figures in Israel’s financial and number of leading figures in Israel’s financial and
economic sector—including the head of Israel’s central bank and several executives in the economic sector—including the head of Israel’s central bank and several executives in the
country’s high-tech industry—have country’s high-tech industry—have ~~reportedly indicated some~~expressed concern about the proposed concern about the proposed
judicial reforms’ potential impact on Israel’s economy and its global appeal.judicial reforms’ potential impact on Israel’s economy and its global appeal.32 28 Additionally, many military and security personnel—including several reservists who play critical roles in the Israel Air Force—have joined protests and/or threatened to suspend their service if the proposals pass without significant change. In March, IDF chief of staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that the IDF could not operate without “the volunteering spirit of the reservists ... which depends on the preservation of the IDF as the ‘people’s army’ in a Jewish and democratic country.”29 Netanyahu has Netanyahu has
defended the need for reform—including by arguing that the HCJ defended the need for reform—including by arguing that the HCJ ~~exercises~~ has exercised broad powers of broad powers of
judicial reviewjudicial review since the 1990s despite Israel’s lack of a written constitution as a clear reference point—while despite Israel’s lack of a written constitution as a clear reference point—while
calling for substantive dialogue during the legislative process to ensure that the changes can be calling for substantive dialogue during the legislative process to ensure that the changes can be
made responsibly.made responsibly.3330 More than More than ~~170~~150 North American law professors with varying views on North American law professors with varying views on
whether the HCJ should face more checks have signed a statement whether the HCJ should face more checks have signed a statement expressing worry that the speed and scale of the proposed reforms could weaken the independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers and the rule of law.31 HCJ President Esther Hayut has said that the HCJ intends to examine any legislation enacted, raising the possibility of a constitutional crisis if the HCJ rules that the legislation is invalid.32 Some observers warn about international implications of efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary. For example, a former legal adviser for Israel’s defense ministry has said that international or foreign courts have to date largely trusted Israel’s justice system to deal with politicians or soldiers accused of illegal actions. He then speculated, “But if we get rid of that [current levels of ~~expressing worry that the~~

~~27 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” Times of Israel,~~
~~January 4, 2023.~~
~~28 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2023; “Israel unveils~~
controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,” controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,” Associated Press, January 4, 2023. , January 4, 2023.
2925 “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” Reuters, February 2, 2023; Chen , February 2, 2023; Chen
Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Ha’aretz, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
3026 Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions.”
31”; “Anti-overhaul protesters call to turn up heat as over 300,000 estimated at rallies,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2023. 27 Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Jerusalem Post, ,
January 12, 2023. January 12, 2023.
3228 Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
3329 Neri Zilber, “Netanyahu Holds the Key to De-escalating Israel’s Crisis,” Newlines Magazine, March 16, 2023. 30 “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” Times of Israel, ,
January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, CNN, January 31, 2023. , January 31, 2023.
For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s
Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s , January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s
Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Real Clear Politics, February 5, 2023. , February 5, 2023.
For some historical context, see Patrick Kingsley, “Social Rifts, Spread over Decades, at the Root of Israel’s Judicial Crisis,” New York Times, March 11, 2023. 31 Michael Starr, “Over 150 US law professors sign statement opposing judicial reform,” Jerusalem Post, February 2, 2023. 32 David Horovitz, “Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,” Times of Israel, January 12, 2023. Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: Major Issues ~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~Israel: Background~~ and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

~~speed and scale of the proposed reforms would “seriously weaken the independence of the~~
~~judiciary, the separation of powers and the rule of law.”34 HCJ President Esther Hayut has said~~
~~that the HCJ intends to examine any legislation enacted, raising the possibility of a constitutional~~
~~crisis if the HCJ rules that the legislation is invalid.35~~
~~Some observers warn about international implications of efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary. For~~
~~example, two Members of Congress have expressed concerns that such moves might strain U.S.-~~
~~Israel relations.36 Additionally, a former legal adviser for Israel’s defense ministry has said that~~
~~international or foreign courts have to date largely trusted Israel’s justice system to deal with~~
~~politicians or soldiers accused of illegal actions. He then speculated, “But if we get rid of that~~
~~[current levels of domestic legal accountability] and give carte blanche to [soldiers to] do what~~
~~they want and give them immunity from prosecution, it would open up all sorts of measures.”37~~ domestic legal accountability] and give carte blanche to [soldiers to] do what they want and give them immunity from prosecution, it would open up all sorts of measures.”33 Polls suggest that a majority of Israelis may support some form of judicial reform, but the specific reforms introduced by the government seem to attract only minority support. Majorities appear to favor compromises that would preserve at least some judicial review powers and a role for justices alongside politicians in making judicial appointments.34 In mid-March, Israeli President Isaac Herzog introduced a framework that he promoted as facilitating a compromise to preserve Israeli democracy and unity. It would aim to strengthen civil rights and limit the potential for a government backed by a narrow Knesset majority to make swift and major changes to the judiciary, absent broader support from national institutions.35 Netanyahu has rejected Herzog’s proposal, with the issue of judicial appointments reportedly a sticking point, but Netanyahu and some other figures that generally support the government’s initial proposal have hinted that they remain willing to consider a deal.36
During Secretary of State Blinken’s January 2023 visit to Israel, he said (in remarks alongside During Secretary of State Blinken’s January 2023 visit to Israel, he said (in remarks alongside
Netanyahu) that both America and Israel support “core democratic principles and institutions, Netanyahu) that both America and Israel support “core democratic principles and institutions,
including respect for human rights, the equal administration of justice for all, the equal rights of including respect for human rights, the equal administration of justice for all, the equal rights of
minority groups, the rule of law, free press, a robust civil society.” He further said that “building minority groups, the rule of law, free press, a robust civil society.” He further said that “building
consensus for new proposals is the most effective way to ensure they’re embraced and that they consensus for new proposals is the most effective way to ensure they’re embraced and that they
endure.”endure.”3837 A few days before Blinken’s visit, Netanyahu reportedly told visiting National Security A few days before Blinken’s visit, Netanyahu reportedly told visiting National Security
Advisor Jake Sullivan that any final legislation will reflect wide agreement and be softened from Advisor Jake Sullivan that any final legislation will reflect wide agreement and be softened from
the version Justice Minister Levin introduced.the version Justice Minister Levin introduced.39
~~Israeli-Palestinian Issues40~~38 As the debate has progressed, some Members of Congress have shared varying views on the reform proposal. For example, two Members of Congress expressed concerns in January that it might strain U.S.-Israel relations.39 In February and March, a number of other Members voiced opinions. Some joined letters to President Biden or Israeli leaders—or made separate 33 Fabian, “Former defense legal adviser warns against planned government moves in West Bank.” 34 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Only a Minority of Israelis Support the Proposed Judicial Overhaul,” Israel Democracy Institute, February 21, 2023, and “Overhauling the Judicial System – What Do Israelis Think?” Israel Democracy Institute, February 3, 2023; “Direct Polls: 3/4 of Israelis support judicial reform,” Israel National News, March 7, 2023. 35 “Warning of civil war, Herzog unveils framework for judicial reform; PM rejects it,” Times of Israel, March 15, 2023. 36 Patrick Kingsley, “An Effort to Resolve Israel’s Impasse Stalls on How to Pick Judges,” New York Times, March 17, 2023; Elliott Abrams, “Israel and the Debate over the Role of the Judiciary in Democratic Government,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 16, 2023. 37 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu After Their Meeting,” January 30, 2023. 38 “Netanyahu said to tell US nat’l security adviser judicial reform plan to be softened,” Times of Israel, January 22, 2023. 39 Representative Jerrold Nadler, “As the Most Senior Jewish Member of Congress, I Now Fear Deeply for the U.S.-Israel Relationship,” Ha’aretz, January 25, 2023; Representative Brad Sherman, interviewed in Ben Samuels, “Top pro-Israel Democrat Warns Netanyahu Government ‘Mistakes’ Could Erode U.S. Support,” Ha’aretz, January 23, 2023. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations statements—expressing support for the principles of judicial review and minority rights.40 Others stated confidence in Israelis to make their own democratic decisions.41 In March, President Biden called Prime Minister Netanyahu—according to an unnamed senior Administration official—to express concern about the judicial reform issue.42 A White House readout of the call said that the President “offered support for efforts underway to forge a compromise” consistent with democratic values such as “genuine checks and balances” and “the broadest possible base of popular support.”43 After the Biden-Netanyahu call, the Israeli government announced that most of the judicial reform legislation would be postponed until the Knesset returns from a spring recess in late April, potentially allowing for dialogue among differing viewpoints on those issues. However, the government reportedly intends to pass a bill giving it a large amount of—though not total—control over judicial appointments before the Knesset recess begins on April 2.44 Its announcement has elicited criticism from some government supporters as well as the opposition.45 Israeli-Palestinian Issues46
Overview
Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for
direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.4147 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster
Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump
Administration.Administration.4248 These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians
that could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.that could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.4349 In January 2023 remarks made alongside Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West Bank, Secretary Blinken said: 40 Full text of two letters available at https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/final-3.8.23-delauro-schakowsky-mcgovern-letter-to-biden-administration-on-two-state-solution-compressed.pdf and https://nadler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.9.23_letter_to_israeli_government_final.pdf. See also Laura Kelly, “Netanyahu’s judicial reforms have US lawmakers worried about Israeli democracy,” The Hill, March 9, 2023; Marc Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform,” Jewish Insider, February 16, 2023. 41 Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform.” 42 “Biden calls Israel’s Netanyahu to express judicial plan ‘concern,’” Associated Press, March 19, 2023. 43 White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,” March 19, 2023. 44 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Biden tells Bibi he’s never seen such anxiety over Israel’s political situation,” Axios, March 20, 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “Ostensibly softened, Rothman bill gives coalition broad control over choice of judges,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2023. 45 Patrick Kingsley, “Israeli Leaders Plan to Start Judicial Overhaul by April, Stoking Anger,” New York Times, March 21, 2023. 46 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 47 State Department Press Briefing, February 23, 2023; ~~In January 2023 remarks~~

~~34 Text of statement available at https://uslawprofstatementisrael.com/.~~
~~35 David Horovitz, “Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, January 12, 2023.~~
~~36 Representative Jerrold Nadler, “As the Most Senior Jewish Member of Congress, I Now Fear Deeply for the U.S.-~~
~~Israel Relationship,” Ha’aretz, January 25, 2023; Representative Brad Sherman, interviewed in Ben Samuels, “Top~~
~~pro-Israel Democrat Warns Netanyahu Government ‘Mistakes’ Could Erode U.S. Support,” Ha’aretz, January 23,~~
~~2023.~~
~~37 Fabian, “Former defense legal adviser warns against planned government moves in West Bank.”~~
~~38 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu After Their~~
~~Meeting,” January 30, 2023.~~
~~39 “Netanyahu said to tell US nat’l security adviser judicial reform plan to be softened,” Times of Israel, January 22,~~
~~2023.~~
~~40 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
41 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press
Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.
4248 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
4349 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022. Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

67

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

~~made alongside Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West~~
~~Bank, Secretary Blinken said:~~
Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution] Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution]
more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like
settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions
to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to
violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless
of the victim or the perpetrator.of the victim or the perpetrator.4450
U.S. Policy on Jerusalem
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as
Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018.
These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem
as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of
Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.4551
Israel’s previous government took some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living Israel’s previous government took some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living
circumstances, including through loans and work permits.circumstances, including through loans and work permits.4652 However, some critics charged that However, some critics charged that
the measures mirrored past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than the measures mirrored past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than
address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.4753 During President Biden’s July 2022 During President Biden’s July 2022
visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had
committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the
Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank
and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.4854
Israeli-Palestinian tensions have heightened in 2023. In response to a Palestinian-backed U.N. Israeli-Palestinian tensions have heightened in 2023. In response to a Palestinian-backed U.N.
General Assembly resolution in December 2022 requesting an International Court of Justice General Assembly resolution in December 2022 requesting an International Court of Justice
advisory opinion on Israeli actions in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, the advisory opinion on Israeli actions in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, the
Netanyahu government has taken a number of retaliatory actions. These include withholding tax Netanyahu government has taken a number of retaliatory actions. These include withholding tax
revenue due the PA (partly authorized by existing Israeli law) and rerouting some of it to Israeli revenue due the PA (partly authorized by existing Israeli law) and rerouting some of it to Israeli
families victimized by terrorism, freezing construction plans for Palestinians in parts of the West families victimized by terrorism, freezing construction plans for Palestinians in parts of the West
Bank, and rescinding expedited travel privileges at checkpoints for PA officials.Bank, and rescinding expedited travel privileges at checkpoints for PA officials.4955 Some countries Some countries
(including France, Germany, and Japan) signed a statement expressing deep concern regarding (including France, Germany, and Japan) signed a statement expressing deep concern regarding
these Israeli steps, calling them “punitive measures against the Palestinian people, leadership, and these Israeli steps, calling them “punitive measures against the Palestinian people, leadership, and
civil society.”civil society.”50

4456 In early January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of condemnation or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and 50 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting,” January 31, 2023. Meeting,” January 31, 2023.
4551 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. , February 9, 2021.
4652 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of
Hamas,” Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to , February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to
20,000,” 20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022. , March 26, 2022.
4753 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021. , September 16, 2021.
4854 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing is White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing is
scheduled to operate on a nearly continuous basis starting in April 2023. Jacob Magid, “After US pressure, Allenby scheduled to operate on a nearly continuous basis starting in April 2023. Jacob Magid, “After US pressure, Allenby
crossing to Jordan set to open at all hours on weekdays,” crossing to Jordan set to open at all hours on weekdays,” Times of Israel, November 24, 2022. , November 24, 2022.
4955 “Israel to withhold PA tax revenue, impose other sanctions after Abbas’s UN success,” “Israel to withhold PA tax revenue, impose other sanctions after Abbas’s UN success,” Times of Israel, January 6, , January 6,
2023; Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich doubles penalties for pay-for-slay, withholds NIS 100m,” 2023; Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich doubles penalties for pay-for-slay, withholds NIS 100m,” Jerusalem Post, February , February
2, 2023. 2, 2023.
5056 Luke Tress, “Over 90 countries urge Israel to lift sanctions put on Palestinians after UN vote,” Luke Tress, “Over 90 countries urge Israel to lift sanctions put on Palestinians after UN vote,” Times of Israel, ,
January 17, 2023. January 17, 2023.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

78

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

~~In early January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple~~
~~Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of~~
~~condemnation or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and~~
globally.globally.5157 Netanyahu has pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims Netanyahu has pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims
to worship at the holy site, and has downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous to worship at the holy site, and has downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous
ministerial visits to the site.ministerial visits to the site.5258 Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of
Ben Gvir’s visit, the State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his Ben Gvir’s visit, the State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his
commitment on the status quo.commitment on the status quo.5359 During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of
Jordan, which has a custodial role over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that Jordan, which has a custodial role over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that
Israel should respect the “historic and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate Israel should respect the “historic and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate
it.”it.”5460
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.5561
Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.5662
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.5763 Because of the PA’s Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.5864 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.Nations.5965 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.conflict.6066 Israel-West Bank Violence After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30 Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least 170 Palestinians in the West Bank,67 violence has

5157 Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Axios, January 3, , January 3,
2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain 2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain
Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023. Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023.
5258 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report
RL33476, RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
5359 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
5460 “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” Reuters, January 24, 2023. , January 24, 2023.
For background, see CRS Report RL33546, For background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
5561 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
5662 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor, ,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
5763 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
5864 Ibid. Ibid.
5965 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021. , September 12, 2021.
6066 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29, Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” 67 Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” New York Times,
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

89

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

~~Israel-West Bank Violence~~
~~After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30~~
~~Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least 170 Palestinians in the West Bank (see text box below~~
~~on the death of U.S. citizen Shireen Abu Akleh),61 violence spiked again during the last weekend~~
~~in January 2023. After an Israeli raid killed 10 Palestinians in a refugee camp in the West Bank~~
~~city of Jenin, a Palestinian gunman killed seven people the following night outside a Jerusalem~~
~~synagogue.62 Additional attacks ensued in Jerusalem and the West Bank over the next two days,~~
~~with a teenage Palestinian gunman wounding two Israelis and one report alleging 144 attacks by~~
~~Israeli settlers on Palestinian civilians or their properties in the West Bank.63~~ spiked in early 2023. For this year as of mid-March, at least 15 Israelis and 87 Palestinians have died from attacks by militants and/or extremists on both sides against civilians and/or their property, or clashes involving Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants.68 In late February, Palestinian gunmen shot and killed two Israeli settlers passing through the village of Huwara, triggering retaliatory attacks by dozens of settlers that killed one Palestinian and injured more than 300, and burned around 30 homes and 100 cars in the village.69 Amid negative U.S. and international reactions to the retaliatory attacks, Netanyahu and several other officials criticized them. Finance Minister Smotrich appealed to settlers to leave the response to Palestinian violence to the government, and then called for the government to “wipe out” Huwara. After receiving heavy U.S. and international condemnation for the statement, he expressed regret and insisted it was not intended literally.70
Since at least the second half of 2022, Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on Since at least the second half of 2022, Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on
northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism
suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.6471 As the increase in As the increase in
Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,6572 Israeli and PA forces have Israeli and PA forces have
approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of
future escalation.future escalation.6673 The PA reportedly The PA reportedly ~~seeks~~has sought time and flexibility to address militancy independent time and flexibility to address militancy independent
of Israeli dictates, of Israeli dictates, ~~with efforts~~as part of an effort to reach compromises that avoid major armed confrontations or to reach compromises that avoid major armed confrontations or
arrests. Some PA personnel reportedly have directly targeted Israeli forces or settlers, raising arrests. Some PA personnel reportedly have directly targeted Israeli forces or settlers, raising
questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.67
~~Following the late January spike in violence, Israel’s government approved measures that~~
74 Israel’s government approved measures in January that Prime Minister Netanyahu said were aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps Netanyahu said were aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps
reducing benefits for families of accused terrorists, reducing benefits for families of accused terrorists, ~~expediting~~accelerating home demolitions and West Bank home demolitions and West Bank
settlement building, reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for settlement building, reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for
Israelis.Israelis.6875 In defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate In defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate
circle,” Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has circle,” Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has
reduced security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners reduced security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners
in the Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.in the Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.6976

~~61 Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” New York Times,~~
~~January 29, 2023.~~
~~62 Dov Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2023.~~
~~63 Raja Abdulrahim, “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement in West Bank as Violence Rages,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, January 30, 2023.~~
64January 29, 2023. 68 Aaron Boxerman and Dov Lieber, “Israel Reverses Settlement Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2023; Aaron Boxerman, “Violence Flares in West Bank as Summit Seeks Calm,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2023. 69 “‘They burned everything’: Israeli settlers torch Palestinian homes, cars after West Bank attack,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2023. 70 State Department Press Briefing, March 1, 2023; Omri Nahmias and Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich walks back Huwara comments during US visit,” March 13, 2023. 71 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” New York Times, November 16, 2022. , November 16, 2022.
6572 State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022, and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022, and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda
Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
6673 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” New York Times, October 26, 2022; Yaniv , October 26, 2022; Yaniv
Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian
Authority,” Authority,” Haaretz, October 12, 2022. , October 12, 2022.
67 74 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Al-Monitor, ,
October 12, 2022. October 12, 2022.
6875 Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows”; Abdulrahim, “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows”; Abdulrahim, “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement
in West Bank.” in West Bank.”
6976 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

910

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

After After ~~the~~a deadly January Israeli raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security coordination with Israel, raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security coordination with Israel,7077 but but
its practical meaning is unclear.its practical meaning is unclear.7178 Previously, the PA publicly suspended security coordination Previously, the PA publicly suspended security coordination
with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was contemplating annexation of West Bank with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was contemplating annexation of West Bank
areas.areas.7279 In early February, President Abbas reportedly told Central Intelligence Agency Director In early February, President Abbas reportedly told Central Intelligence Agency Director
Bill Burns that Israel-PA intelligence sharing has continued, and that he would fully resume Bill Burns that Israel-PA intelligence sharing has continued, and that he would fully resume
coordination once calm is restored.coordination once calm is restored.7380 Burns later remarked that the ongoing tensions have an Burns later remarked that the ongoing tensions have an
“unhappy resemblance to some of the realities” of the 2000-2005 period of Israeli-Palestinian “unhappy resemblance to some of the realities” of the 2000-2005 period of Israeli-Palestinian
violence known as the second Palestinian violence known as the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising). (or uprising).7481 An Israeli observer has argued An Israeli observer has argued
that PA leadership under Abbas is unlikely to coordinate efforts against Israelis in the way that PA leadership under Abbas is unlikely to coordinate efforts against Israelis in the way
Palestinian leaders supposedly did during the intifada.Palestinian leaders supposedly did during the intifada.75
~~While in the West Bank, Secretary Blinken~~82 During Secretary Blinken’s January visit to the West Bank, he said that “it’s important to take steps to de-escalate, to said that “it’s important to take steps to de-escalate, to
stop the violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the foundation for more positive stop the violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the foundation for more positive
actions going forward.”actions going forward.”7683 He also said that he discussed with President Abbas “the importance of He also said that he discussed with President Abbas “the importance of
the Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its governance and accountability, the Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its governance and accountability,
strengthening the institutions of the PA.”strengthening the institutions of the PA.”7784 According to one media report, Blinken encouraged According to one media report, Blinken encouraged
Abbas privately to implement a security plan presented to Israel and the PA weeks earlier by the Abbas privately to implement a security plan presented to Israel and the PA weeks earlier by the
U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), Lieutenant General U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), Lieutenant General
Michael Fenzel.Michael Fenzel.7885 The plan supposedly lays out steps for PA security forces to regain control in The plan supposedly lays out steps for PA security forces to regain control in
Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA force. Reportedly, PA officials Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA force. Reportedly, PA officials ~~have~~
expressed reservations about the plan, partly because it may not explicitly call for Israel to reduce incursions reservations about the plan, partly because it may not explicitly call for Israel to reduce incursions
into West Bank cities or include other provisions into West Bank cities or include other provisions calculated to attract Palestinian public support.86 In February, the Israeli government decided to advance West Bank plans to construct nearly 10,000 additional settlement units and begin a process to retroactively legalize nine outposts that had previously been illegal under Israeli law—triggering a statement of strong opposition from Secretary Blinken.87 Over the next week, U.S.-brokered diplomacy reportedly averted a Palestinian-supported U.N. Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution condemning the Israeli action.88 Instead, the UNSC issued a presidential statement that expressed deep concern and 77~~calculated to attract Palestinian public support.79~~
~~Shireen Abu Akleh Killing and Controversy~~
~~In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a U.S. citizen) was kil ed by a gunshot in an area~~
~~of Jenin where Israeli security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Abu Akleh was an East Jerusalem resident~~
~~of Palestinian background. Her death triggered a major international outcry, as did images of Israeli police~~
~~disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning Abu Akleh’s kil ing and an injury suffered by one of her~~
~~col eagues, the State Department spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and ful~~
~~accountability, and said that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive~~
~~investigation.”80 Evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces,81 with the PA asserting that its~~

70 “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” WAFA
News Agency, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
7178 Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in
the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023. the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023.
7279 “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” Reuters, November 17, 2020, November 17, 2020.
7380 Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Times of Israel, ,
February 7, 2023. February 7, 2023.
7481 Ibid. Ibid.
7582 Micah Halpern, “Terror wave in Israel not an intifada, but still very dangerous – opinion,” Micah Halpern, “Terror wave in Israel not an intifada, but still very dangerous – opinion,” Jerusalem Post, ,
November 28, 2022. November 28, 2022.
7683 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting.” Meeting.”
7784 Ibid. Ibid.
7885 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Axios, February 1, 2023. For , February 1, 2023. For
background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074, background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074,
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
7986 Ibid. Ibid.
8087 State Department, “Israeli Settlement and Outpost Legalization Announcement,” 88 Michelle Nichols, “No U.N. vote Monday on Israel settlements, diplomats say,” Reuters, February 19, 2023; Barak ~~State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022.~~
~~81 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,”~~ ~~Associated~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1011

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

~~investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but Israel denying any such intent.82 In April~~
~~2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers filed a complaint with the ICC alleging that Israel has systematically~~
~~targeted Palestinian journalists for years.83~~
~~After some Members of the House and Senate sent letters to the executive branch requesting that the State~~
~~Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conduct an independent investigation into Abu Akleh’s~~
~~death,84 the State Department issued a statement in July. The statement said that the U.S. Security Coordinator~~
~~(USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority oversaw an independent process, and in summarizing Israeli and PA~~
~~investigations concluded that Israeli gunfire likely kil ed Abu Akleh, but “found no reason to believe that this was~~
~~intentional.”85 PA officials and members of Abu Akleh’s family have publicly criticized the part of the USSC’s finding~~
~~regarding intent.86 A June 2022 public opinion pol indicated that 92% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza~~
~~believe that Abu Akleh was deliberately targeted.87~~
~~After conducting an internal investigation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said in September 2022 that there was a~~
~~“high possibility” that Abu Akleh was accidentally hit by IDF gunfire88—eliciting additional public criticism from PA~~
~~officials and Abu Akleh family members who assert that the shooting was not accidental.89 In response, the State~~
~~Department welcomed the IDF review,90 later adding that U.S. officials would continue to press Israel to “closely~~
~~review its policies and practices on rules of engagement and consider additional steps to mitigate the risk of~~
~~civilian harm, protect journalists, and prevent similar tragedies in the future.”91 Then-Prime Minister Yair Lapid and~~
~~then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz defended Israel’s rules of engagement and said that no outside party could~~
~~dictate them.92~~
~~In November 2022, media reports said that the FBI has opened an investigation into Abu Akleh’s death.93 In~~
~~response, then-Defense Minister Gantz said that the alleged U.S. decision was a mistake and that Israel, after~~
~~having conducted an “independent and professional investigation,” would not cooperate with an external~~
~~investigation.94~~
~~The Abraham Accords~~
~~In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with~~
~~four members of the Arab League: the UAE~~ dismay about the Israeli decision, strongly opposed “all unilateral measures that impede peace,” and called for “upholding unchanged the historic status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem in word and in practice” and Jordan’s custodial role.89 A few days later, the United States, Israel, the PA, Jordan, and Egypt issued a communique from Aqaba, Jordan aimed at de-escalating tensions and violence by committing Israel and the PA to suspend unilateral measures for a few months.90 In March, with incidents of violence recurring, the five parties reconvened as scheduled in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, and restated the commitments from Aqaba. They also specified plans to work toward empowering PA security forces, develop a mechanism to curb violence, establish a separate mechanism to improve Palestinian economic conditions, and resume talks in April.91 Reportedly, the PA agreed in February to start implementing the USSC security plan,92 which one source has said would involve “the recruitment and training of thousands of Palestinian security personnel to be deployed in the northern West Bank.”93 On March 20, the Knesset passed legislation to overturn parts of a 2005 law that had made Jewish settlements in certain areas of the northern West Bank illegal. In that year, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had affirmed in writing to then-President George W. Bush that Israel committed to evacuate settlements and outposts in that region. A State Department spokesperson said that the United States is extremely troubled about the legislation, and that it clearly contradicts Israel’s longtime undertaking to the United States, as well the commitments it made earlier in the month to de-escalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions.94 After Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Herzog to convey U.S. concern about the legislation,95 Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying that Israel’s government has “no intention of establishing new communities” in the West Bank areas in question.96 The Abraham Accords In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump , Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump
Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the countries in question.97 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both countries Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023. 89 U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2023/1), February 20, 2023. 90 State Department, “Aqaba Joint Communique,” February 26, 2023. 91 State Department, “Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh,” March 19, 2023. 92 Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023. 93 Yoni Ben Menachem, “American-Israeli Military Coordination and the Possibility of Regional Escalation,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 9, 2023. 94 State Department Press Briefing, March 21, 2023. 95 State Department, “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Herzog,” March 21, 2023. 96 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on the Knesset Decision to Repeal Parts of the Disengagement Law,” March 22, 2023. 97 See https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/. These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~Accords, and (as~~

Press, May 16, 2022.
~~82 “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” Associated Press, May 26, 2022.~~
~~83 International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian~~
~~journalists,” April 26, 2022.~~
~~84 Text of letters available at https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/~~
~~Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf and https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/~~
~~Final%20Abu%20Akleh%20Letter%20(PDF).pdf.~~
~~85 State Department press statement, “On the Killing of Shireen Abu Akleh,” July 4, 2022.~~
~~86 “US: Israeli fire likely killed reporter; no final conclusion,” Associated Press, July 4, 2022.~~
~~87 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 84, June 22-25, 2022.~~
~~88 Hiba Yazbek and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Says Reporter Was Probably Shot By One of Its Forces,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, September 6, 2022.~~
~~89 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinians reject IDF probe into Shireen Abu Akleh killing, vow to bring case to ICC,”~~
Jerusalem Post, September 5, 2022.
~~90 State Department, “IDF Releases Shireen Abu Akleh Report,” September 5, 2022.~~
~~91 State Department Press Briefing, September 6, 2022.~~
~~92 Emanuel Fabian and Jacob Magid, “Rebuffing US, Lapid and Gantz say ‘no one will dictate’ IDF’s open-fire~~
~~regulations,” Times of Israel, September 7, 2022.~~
~~93 Barak Ravid, “FBI opens investigation into killing of Palestinian American Shireen Abu Akleh,” Axios, November~~
~~14, 2022.~~
~~94 Laura Kelly, “Israel calls US probe into journalist’s death ‘grave mistake,’ says it ‘will not cooperate,’” The Hill,~~
~~November 14, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

11

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the~~
~~countries in question.95 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both~~
~~countries~~ reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had
operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. While Saudi Arabia has not normalized its relations with Israel, it ~~Saudi Arabia~~ reportedly supported the UAE reportedly supported the UAE
and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords.and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords.9698 Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Oman have opened their airspace to Israeli civilian airlines, significantly reducing their travel time to Asian destinations. The Sudanese military’s seizure of The Sudanese military’s seizure of
power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.9799 In January 2023, the In January 2023, the
Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal with Israel after it Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal with Israel after it
transitions to a civilian government, but some Sudanese civilian groups reportedly remain unsure transitions to a civilian government, but some Sudanese civilian groups reportedly remain unsure
about this step.about this step.98100
Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened, Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened,
particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include ~~a May 2022~~an Israel- Israel-
UAE freeUAE free- trade agreement trade agreement ~~(pending Israeli ratification)~~that was ratified in December 2022, and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative
focused on desalinated water and solar energy.focused on desalinated water and solar energy.99 As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to
the Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the the Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the
foreign ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s foreign ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s
southern Negev desert to inaugurate a regional cooperation frameworksouthern Negev desert to inaugurate a regional cooperation framework ~~featuring~~. The framework features periodic Negev periodic Negev
Forum meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education and Forum meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education and
coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.~~100~~101 Participants expect Participants expect
a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting to take place in Morocco. a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting to take place in Morocco.
Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation, Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation,
public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional
governments recognizing Israel remains strong.governments recognizing Israel remains strong.~~101~~102 According to one poll, support in the UAE and According to one poll, support in the UAE and
Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in
2022.2022.~~102~~103 However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the
UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.~~103~~104
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim- U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the
efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with
Israel in the years ahead.”Israel in the years ahead.”~~104~~105 However, the Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S. However, the Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S.

~~95 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international~~
~~economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of~~
~~sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked~~
~~Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its~~ policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.106 The agreement to recognize Israel. agreement to recognize Israel.
96 98 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021. , October 20, 2021.
9799 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
98100 “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” Reuters, February 3, 2023. , February 3, 2023.
~~99 “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan~~
~~sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021.~~
~~100~~101 State Department, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023; State Department, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023;
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in
Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023. Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023.
~~101~~102 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2022 Arab Opinion Index, January 3, 2023. , January 3, 2023.
~~102~~103 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2022; Dylan , December 5, 2022; Dylan
Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022. Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022.
~~103~~104 Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.” Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.”
~~104~~105 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
Availability,” October 13, 2021. 106 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1213

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

~~policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.105 The~~
Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and
Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Israeli-Palestinian conflict.~~106~~107 Negev Forum members acknowledge that part of their mandate is to “create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian relations.”108 However, the PA has opted not to join the forum. Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE
normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League
states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition
for improved ties.for improved ties.~~107~~ 109 Jordan also has remained on the sidelines of the Negev Forum, conditioning its involvement on PA participation.110 In January 2023, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al In January 2023, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al
Saud expressed general support for normalization with Israel but stated that “true normalization Saud expressed general support for normalization with Israel but stated that “true normalization
and true stability will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the and true stability will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the
Palestinians dignity. That requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”Palestinians dignity. That requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”~~108~~111 Various factors could complicate an Israel-Saudi normalization process, including the March 2023 Saudi-Iran normalization deal brokered by China, Saudi desires for stronger U.S. support for Saudi security and civilian nuclear priorities, and Arab concerns regarding increased Israeli-Palestinian tensions and violence.112 One media report has suggested that while Arab states like Saudi Arabia “may see Iran as a menace, they see little gain in isolating and opposing Tehran to the extent that Israel does.”113
Security cooperation. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would
add Israel to its area of responsibilityadd Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR), partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of , partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.~~109~~114 Israel had previously been under Israel had previously been under
the purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September the purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September
2021,2021,~~110~~115 and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM
headquarters.headquarters.~~111~~116 Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the 107 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Their Meeting,” January 30, 2023. 108 The Negev Forum Regional Cooperation Framework Adopted by the Steering Committee on November 10th, 2022, hyperlink to document available at https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-framework/. 109 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August 14, 2020. 110 Jacob Magid, “US laments Jordan’s absence from Negev Forum, aims to keep Palestinians in loop,” Times of Israel, January 8, 2023. 111 Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Al-Monitor, January 20, 2023. 112 Patrick Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran,” New York Times, March 11, 2023; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Saudis Seek Edge in Israel Talks,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2023; David Makovsky, “Netanyahu’s Potential Friction Points with Biden (Part 2): Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and Domestic Issues,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 10, 2023. 113 Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran.” 114 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, 2021. 115 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1, 2021. 116 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of Israel, October 29, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations other Abraham Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.117 Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government reportedly expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.118 Earlier, both Morocco (November 2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.119 These MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales. Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.120 In late 2022, Israel’s defense ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.121 ~~Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the~~
~~other Abraham Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman,~~
~~Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.112~~
~~Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by~~
~~Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly~~
~~expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.113 Earlier, both Morocco (November~~
~~2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.114 These~~
~~MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.~~
~~Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be~~

~~Availability,” October 13, 2021.~~
~~105 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October~~
~~14, 2021.~~
~~106 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,”~~
~~March 28, 2022.~~
~~107 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August~~
~~14, 2020.~~
~~108 Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Al-Monitor,~~
~~January 20, 2023.~~
~~109 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,~~
~~2021.~~
~~110 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,~~
~~2021.~~
~~111 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,”~~ ~~The Times of~~
~~Israel, October 29, 2021.~~
~~112 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for~~
~~2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.~~
~~113 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25,~~
~~2022.~~
~~114 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021;~~
~~Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. During the~~
~~same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense~~
~~minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all~~
~~parties involved.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.115 In late 2022, Israel’s defense~~
~~ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.116~~
At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly
discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on
inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.~~117~~122 Speculation Speculation
about specific measures has continued since then.about specific measures has continued since then.~~118~~123 In January 2023, the Department of In January 2023, the Department of
Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on
cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.~~119~~124
Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel, Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel,
certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their
involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”~~120~~125 One One
obstacle could be the apparent reluctance of countries in the region to share the real-time obstacle could be the apparent reluctance of countries in the region to share the real-time
intelligence data that underlies basic threat information that they might be more willing to intelligence data that underlies basic threat information that they might be more willing to
share.share.~~121~~126 Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM apparently plans to Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM apparently plans to
help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners using the X-band help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners using the X-band
radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air defense systems and radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air defense systems and
~~fighter jets.122~~
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
~~formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.123 In March, Congress enacted the~~
~~Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other~~
~~things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening~~
~~and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of~~
~~measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization~~
~~efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.~~
~~The FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263) enacted in December 2022~~
~~included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Secretary of~~
~~State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees:~~

~~115~~ 117 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for 2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list. 118 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25, 2022. 119 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021; Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. During the same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all parties involved. 120 Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Breaking
Defense, October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” , October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” Wall Street Journal, ,
October 10, 2022. October 10, 2022.
~~116~~121 Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.” Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.”
~~117~~122 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022. , March 29, 2022.
~~118~~123 Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Breaking Defense, ,
June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” Times of Israel, June , June
28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” 28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York
Times, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~119~~124 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim
Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Washington Post, ,
January 31, 2023. January 31, 2023.
~~120~~125 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” New York Times, July 14, , July 14,
2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” 2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” Wall Street
Journal, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
~~121~~126 Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,” Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,”
Politico, July 12, 2022. , July 12, 2022.
~~122 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Haaretz, July 13, 2022.~~
~~123 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/~~
~~Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

Congressional Research Service 15 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations fighter jets.127 Additionally, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) is reportedly working with Israel and some Arab states to develop a network of unmanned maritime drones to monitor Iranian naval activity and narcotics smuggling in NAVCENT’s area of responsibility.128 Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.129 In March, Congress enacted the Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts. The FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263) enacted in December 2022 included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Secretary of State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees: a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United
States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense
architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise
and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran
and groups linked to Iran.and groups linked to Iran. In the 118th Congress, H.R. 1268 seeks to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 to establish the position of “Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords.”
Countering Iran
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the ~~United Arab Emirates~~UAE through through
coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.~~124~~130 Israeli Israeli
observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s
2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert
actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”~~125~~131
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister
Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
127 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Haaretz, July 13, 2022. 128 Dion Nissenbaum, “Inside a U.S. Navy Maritime Drone Operation Aimed at Iran,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2022. 129 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf. 130 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” Jerusalem Post, March 11, 2022. 131 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post, November 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 16 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.~~126~~132
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace, Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional
tensions.tensions.~~127~~133 In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some
operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military
capabilities.capabilities.~~128~~134
As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the
possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence
diplomatic outcomes. During their stints as prime minister, Bennett (2021-2022) and Yair Lapid diplomatic outcomes. During their stints as prime minister, Bennett (2021-2022) and Yair Lapid
(2022) opposed the deal but largely abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.(2022) opposed the deal but largely abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.~~129~~

~~124 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” Jerusalem Post, March 11,~~
~~2022.~~
~~125 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~November 14, 2021.~~
~~126 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” New York Times, September 13, 2021.~~
~~127~~135 Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and government crackdowns in Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in Ukraine, near-term prospects for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.136 During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment “never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”137 Additionally, Biden said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.138 In February 2023, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Tom Nides said that the United States will not engage in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program while Iran provides drones for Russia in its war in Ukraine. He also said that U.S.-Israel cooperation vis-à-vis Iran was “lockstep”: As President Biden has said, we will not stand by and watch Iran get a nuclear weapon, number one. Number two, he said, all options are on the table. Number three, Israel can and should do whatever they need to deal with and we’ve got their back.139 In January, the United States and Israel held their largest-ever bilateral military exercise, named Juniper Oak. According to CENTCOM, the exercise “enhanced interoperability and the ability of 132 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “UN report: Uranium particles enriched to 83.7% found in Iran,” Associated Press, February 28, 2023. 133 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24, , May 24,
2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, , April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi,
“With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” “With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16, , March 16,
2022. 2022.
~~128~~134 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~129~~135 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022; Israeli , March 21, 2022; Israeli
Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022. Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

15

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and government crackdowns in~~
~~Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in Ukraine, near-term prospects~~
~~for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.130~~
~~During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the~~
~~Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment~~
~~“never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is~~
~~prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”131 Additionally, Biden~~
~~said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from~~
~~acquiring nuclear weapons.132 Lapid said that Israel wants a credible military threat to be the basis~~
~~for international negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, and that the United States “didn’t~~
~~necessarily agree on this” during President Biden’s visit.133~~
136 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran, November 2022. 137 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022. 138 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” Associated Press, July 15, 2022. 139 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve got their back,’” Times of Israel, February 19, 2023. Congressional Research Service 17 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations CENTCOM forces to rapidly move combat power into the region,” and provides opportunities to incorporate lessons learned with all U.S. partners in the CENTCOM AOR.140 Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear
program,program,~~134~~141 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the
overall effectiveness of such operations.overall effectiveness of such operations.~~135~~142 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military
capabilities,capabilities,~~136~~143 questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against
Iran’s nuclear program.Iran’s nuclear program.~~137~~144
In a January 2023 In a January 2023 CNN interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted
attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons
development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting
nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing
is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to
take action.”take action.”~~138~~145 Amid some international concerns about advanced levels of Iranian uranium enrichment, Defense Minister Galant stated in February that Israel would not allow Iran to enrich uranium to 90%.146
Hezbollah and Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.conflict.~~139~~147 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications, Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications,
including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.~~140~~148
Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied
weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and

~~130 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran,~~
~~November 2022.~~
~~131 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022.~~
~~132 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” Associated Press, July 15, 2022.~~
~~133 “Lapid: Israel, US don’t ‘necessarily agree’ on need for military threat against Iran,” Times of Israel, July 17, 2022.~~
~~134~~its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.149 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.150 In late 2022, Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon 140 U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26, 2023. See also Michael Eisenstadt, “The Juniper Oak Military Exercise: Implications for Innovation, Experimentation, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2023. 141 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022. , March 15, 2022.
~~135~~142 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
~~136 “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” Jerusalem Post (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022.~~
~~137~~143 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel’s ‘Top Gun’: The US-Israeli aircraft that can take down Iran,” Jerusalem Post, February 25, 2023. 144 Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Haaretz, September 1, 2022. , September 1, 2022.
~~138~~145 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
~~139~~146 “Netanyahu said to huddle repeatedly with military brass over possible attack on Iran,” Times of Israel, February 22, 2023. 147 CRS Report R44759, CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, , by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. , by Carla E.
Humud. Humud.
~~140~~148 Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program – opinion,” Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program – opinion,” Jerusalem Post, ,
December 28, 2022; Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The December 28, 2022; Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The
Israeli Card,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022. Israeli Card,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

16

~~link to page 26~~ ~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.141 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership~~
~~and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture~~
~~precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.142 In late 2022, Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon~~
149 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times, April 23, 2020. 150 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press, February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 28 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations that Israel could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling, that Israel could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling,
based on reports that Iran has begun or planned flights that could carry equipment directly to based on reports that Iran has begun or planned flights that could carry equipment directly to
Hezbollah in Lebanon.Hezbollah in Lebanon.~~143~~151
Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster
Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other
military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-
backed targets that could present threats to its security.backed targets that could present threats to its security.~~144~~152
Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian
targets,targets,~~145~~153 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel. but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.~~146~~154 This This
deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has
criticized some Israeli strikes.criticized some Israeli strikes.~~147~~155
In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime
boundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (seeboundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (see Appendix C). .
Public debate in Israel has centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal are worth the Public debate in Israel has centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal are worth the
concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.~~148~~156 While Prime Minister Netanyahu While Prime Minister Netanyahu
made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the
maritime boundary agreement,maritime boundary agreement,~~149~~157 his government has not taken action to date. his government has not taken action to date.~~150~~158
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in
international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and
humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish
refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.~~151~~159 As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.160 Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022. 151 ~~As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel~~

~~141 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28,~~
~~2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, April 23, 2020.~~
~~142 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press,~~
~~February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies~~
~~Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.~~
~~143~~ Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2022. , December 16, 2022.
~~144~~152 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022. Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022.
~~145~~153 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27, , July 27,
2021. 2021.
~~146~~154 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel, ,
February 27, 2022. February 27, 2022.
~~147~~155 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel
Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12, , June 12,
2022. 2022.
~~148~~156 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022. , October 28, 2022.
~~149~~157 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Times
of Israel, October 31, 2022. , October 31, 2022.
~~150~~158 Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Jerusalem Post, ,
January 31, 2023. January 31, 2023.
~~151~~159 Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar , June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar
~~Congressional Research Service~~

17

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment,~~
~~especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to~~
~~Hezbollah in Lebanon.152~~
~~Despite reported entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from~~
~~directly providing lethal assistance to Ukraine.153~~Ukrainians Arriving Since October From Working,” Ha’aretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022. 160 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply Congressional Research Service 19 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Despite entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine.161 Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some
protective gear to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations.protective gear to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations.~~154~~162
Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an
early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine
aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.~~155~~163 In November 2022, one news outlet reported In November 2022, one news outlet reported
that Israel had begun supplying “strategic materials” to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization that Israel had begun supplying “strategic materials” to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) member for use in Ukraine.(NATO) member for use in Ukraine.~~156~~164
In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells
from War Reserves Stock Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.from War Reserves Stock Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.~~157~~165 According to multiple According to multiple
reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation with the reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation with the
United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and they don’t United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and they don’t
really need our permission to take it.”really need our permission to take it.”~~158~~166 In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for the possible sale of anti-drone jamming systems that could help Ukraine down drones. Israeli officials have claimed that this step does not change Israel’s policy against providing lethal assistance because the systems are defensive in nature and do not target Russian soldiers. While Ukrainian officials appear interested in the systems, they view them as less critical than air defense systems that can counter ballistic missiles.167
In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian
branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate
emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel. emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel.
Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about
emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on
Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.~~159~~168 the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022. 161

~~Ukrainians Arriving Since October From Working,” Ha’aretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who~~
~~entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered~~
~~Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and~~
~~Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022.~~
~~152 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply~~
~~the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022.~~
~~153~~ Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,” Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,”
Breaking Defense, October 18, 2022. , October 18, 2022.
~~154~~162 “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ Times of Israel, September 23, , September 23,
2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” 2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022. , May 18, 2022.
~~155~~163 “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” Reuters, October 19, 2022; “Israel giving “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” Reuters, October 19, 2022; “Israel giving
intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022. , October 24, 2022.
~~156~~164 Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Ha’aretz, November 17, , November 17,
2022. 2022.
~~157~~165 Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms
Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023. , January 17, 2023.
~~158~~166 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023. , January 18, 2023.
~~159~~167 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel approves export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine,” Axios, March 15, 2023. 168 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” New
York Times, July 22, 2022. , July 22, 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1820

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA, DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are ; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are ~~estimates for 2022~~projections for 2023 unless otherwise unless otherwise
specified. specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1921

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

Appendix B. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats) (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022. Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022.
Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to
1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received
his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has
been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with
the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional
influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a
security-minded nationalist. security-minded nationalist.
National Unity (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats) (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats)
Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New
Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led
Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary
and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.
Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from
2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.
Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats) (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of
West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious
law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam. law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister within the defense ministry with some with some
nominal responsibilities over West Bank administration. nominal responsibilities over West Bank administration. He has headed the He has headed the
underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has trained lawyer, he has
engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and religiously conservative engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and religiously conservative
causes. causes.
Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats) (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a
common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam. common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam.
Leader: Itamar Ben Gvir
Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to
Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir
Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir
was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says
that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a
lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a
regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats) (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union. speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign
minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and
canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the
Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked
under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to
consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a
platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in
a 2013 case. a 2013 case.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2022

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

Noam (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat) (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues
(including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the (including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the
~~conversation~~ conversion process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish
Power. Power.
Leader: Avi Maoz
Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has
headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. ~~He nominally heads~~In the current government, he nominally headed an office in the an office in the
prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identityprime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity ~~that includes responsibilities to~~
~~integrate immigrants from post-Soviet states and regulate educational content in~~
~~public schools~~, but resigned from that post in February 2023 based on concerns that he was not given the authority to change policy as he desired..
LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats) (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza. in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the
Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition. Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that
supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and
university lecturer. university lecturer.
CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats) (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013,
when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-
place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government
from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh
Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for
Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and
then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition. then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats) (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in
January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November
2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could 2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could no
~~longer~~ not serve as interior and health minister serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had because he had indicated in the 2022 plea indicated in the 2022 plea
deal that he would permanently leave politics. deal that he would permanently leave politics.
United Torah Judaism – Coalition (7 seats) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its
interpretation of traditional Jewish law. interpretation of traditional Jewish law.
Leader: Yitzhak Goldknopf
Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been

~~Congressional Research Service~~

21

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day
care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance. care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance.
Congressional Research Service 23 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations ARAB
Hadash-Ta’al – Opposition (5 seats) – Opposition (5 seats)
Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadashpolitical strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal). Movement for Renewal).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with
the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before
becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006. becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats) (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the
UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the
government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for
Arab Israelis.Arab Israelis.

Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2224

link to page link to page 2729 Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

Appendix C. Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement
Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon and the Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon and the
United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-
Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to
eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line
extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon
agreement (seagreement (see Figure C-1). According to a senior Biden Administration official . According to a senior Biden Administration official
This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a
boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without
conflict.conflict.~~160~~169
On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal. On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal.~~161~~170 Reportedly, Reportedly,
President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the
agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural
gas drilling.gas drilling.~~162~~171

~~160~~169 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime
Agreement,” October 11, 2022. Agreement,” October 11, 2022.
~~161~~170 Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Times of Israel, October , October
29, 2022. 29, 2022.
~~162~~171 Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Haaretz, ,
October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” Jerusalem Post, ,
October 11, 2022. October 11, 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2325

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

Figure C-1. Map: Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Agreement

Source: Haaretz. Haaretz.
Note: All boundaries are approximate. All boundaries are approximate.
Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future
side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will
settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field
that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can
begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.~~163~~172
The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly
before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had
threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute. threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute.

~~163~~172 Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Times of Israel, ,
October 12, 2022. October 12, 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

2426

Israel: ~~Background~~Major Issues and U.S. Relations ~~in Brief~~

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R44245 R44245 · VERSION ~~119~~121 · UPDATED
2527