Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
June 15, 2022
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United
Jim Zanotti
States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million
Specialist in Middle
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
Eastern Affairs
appropriations. Some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of

U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the
following matters:

Current government and coalition uncertainty. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party and Foreign Minister
Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party lead a power-sharing government featuring a group of disparate parties from across the
political spectrum (including an Arab-led party) that replaced the government of the long-serving Benjamin Netanyahu in
June 2021. To date, the government has focused on pragmatic management of Israel’s security and economy rather than
comprehensive policies such as those related to the Palestinians. Even so, disagreements have occurred between various
elements of the coalition. As of June 2022, two members of Yamina have resigned from the coalition. With the coalition’s
support down to 59 out of 120 Knesset (parliament) members, it is struggling to survive and function. Under the power-
sharing agreement, Lapid could become a caretaker prime minister if the Knesset votes to hold new elections, while
Netanyahu—who leads the opposition and is on trial for allegations of criminal corruption—could return to power under
some scenarios.
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials regularly speak out
against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for
individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. Violence in 2022 has triggered heightened counterterrorism measures and some
controversy, including in relation to the killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. With the Gaza Strip
still under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States
and other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority states. The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced
normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address
Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.
Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader
regional cooperation—including on air and missile defense—that inclines Saudi Arabia and other Muslim-majority countries
toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging more normalization and
greater regional security cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran in the region. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement
that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Prime Minister Bennett has made statements opposing the Biden Administration
reentering or revising the agreement. Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence
nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations against Iran and
its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s
missile arsenal.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. To date, Israel has not provided lethal
assistance to Ukraine, but has provided protective equipment to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian groups. Since 2015,
Russia’s air defense capabilities in Syria have compelled Israel to deconflict its airstrikes there with Russia.
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Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (see Figure 1 for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). A few lawmakers
seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding
Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—
though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty
in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy will remain in Jerusalem.2
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include
 Israel’s current power-sharing government and its uncertain future.
 Israeli-Palestinian problems and their implications for U.S. policy, including
violence and controversy in 2022, Gaza and its challenges, and human rights
considerations.
 Developments regarding Israel’s normalization or improvement of relations with
various Arab and Muslim-majority states since the Abraham Accords.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
 Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

1 Rebecca Kheel, “Progressives ramp up scrutiny of US funding for Israel,” The Hill, May 23, 2021. One bill, the Two-
State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), would expressly prohibit U.S. assistance (including defense articles or services) to
further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise permanent control over any part of the West Bank
(including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
2 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021.
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Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2022 unless otherwise
specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
Domestic Issues
Current Government
A power-sharing government headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett took office in June 2021.
This leadership change ended Benjamin Netanyahu’s 12-year tenure as prime minister and two
years of political turmoil following Netanyahu’s February 2019 criminal indictment on corruption
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charges.3 Netanyahu and his Likud party now lead the Knesset’s opposition, as was the case from
2006 to 2009.
While Bennett—a right-of-center figure who leads the Yamina party—currently heads the
government, the centrist Yesh Atid party leader Yair Lapid played a leading role in arranging the
coalition. If the government remains intact, Bennett is scheduled to serve as prime minister until
August 27, 2023, at which point Lapid would become prime minister. The government draws its
support from a disparate coalition of parties on the right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu),
center (Yesh Atid and Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the political spectrum, as well as
from the Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) (see Table 1).4 UAL is the first
independent Arab party to join an Israeli government.5 Women make up approximately one-third
of Israel’s cabinet, with nine female ministers, more than in any previous government.6
Table 1. Israeli Power-Sharing Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett
Yamina
Foreign Minister and
Yair Lapid
Yesh Atid
Alternate Prime Minister
Defense Minister
Benny Gantz
Kahol Lavan
Finance Minister
Avigdor Lieberman
Yisrael Beitenu
Justice Minister
Gideon Sa’ar
New Hope
Interior Minister
Ayelet Shaked
Yamina
Transportation Minister
Merav Michaeli
Labor
Public Security Minister
Omer Bar Lev
Labor
Health Minister
Nitzan Horowitz
Meretz
The Coalition’s Uncertain Future
In April 2022, the power-sharing government weakened when coalition whip Idit Silman from
Yamina resigned from the coalition. She expressed concerns that the government’s actions had
harmed Jewish identity in Israel, and voiced support for an alternative, right-of-center
government. In June 2022, Nir Orbach from Yamina also left the coalition, pledging to work
toward an alternative coalition without initially voting to trigger new elections.
With the coalition’s support down to 59 out of 120 Knesset members, it faces difficulties in
surviving and functioning. If the Netanyahu-led opposition can garner majority support in a
Knesset vote, it can either form an alternative government or require new elections.7 The
following considerations could be relevant:

3 Netanyahu also served an earlier 1996-1999 term as prime minister.
4 For a comprehensive list of Israeli parties in the Knesset, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
5 Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3,
2021.
6 Mazal Mualem, “Israeli female ministers introduce reforms, shake up agenda,” Al-Monitor, September 10, 2021.
7 David Makovsky, “Political Tempest in Israel: Can Bennett Right the Ship?” Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, April 11, 2022.
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 To lead a new government, Netanyahu might need more coalition supporters to
switch sides, because the six Knesset members of the Arab-led Joint List from the
opposition are unlikely to support him.
 Under the power-sharing agreement, a Knesset vote for new elections could lead
to Lapid taking over as caretaker prime minister until the formation of a
permanent government.
 A Knesset failure to pass a 2023-2024 budget by March 2023 would
automatically trigger new elections.
 Another figure (such as Defense Minister Benny Gantz) could conceivably try to
form a new government with support from current coalition and opposition
elements.
In June 2022, the Netanyahu-led opposition in the Knesset withheld its support for a bill to renew
the application of certain aspects of civilian law to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and the bill—
which is also opposed by some members of the coalition—failed to pass. The renewal is normally
a routine matter, but right-of-center members of the opposition refused to vote for it in hopes of
bringing down the coalition. Some observers speculate that stalemate on the settler law or other
triggers could lead Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar (a former Likud member) to defect from the
coalition and form a government with Netanyahu, or lead the Knesset to vote for new elections.8
Israeli-Palestinian Issues9
Overview
Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for
direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.10 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster
Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump
Administration. These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians
that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement
expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for
individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.11
Some Israeli settlement construction plans for East Jerusalem and the West Bank have
advanced,12 but Israel has reportedly delayed a few plans flagged as especially damaging to the
two-state vision by the Biden Administration or some Members of Congress.13 In May 2022,

8 Rory Jones and Yardena Schwartz, “Israeli Coalition In Danger After Vote,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2022; Mazal
Mualem, “Israel’s Lapid courts Arab parties with eye toward early elections,” Al-Monitor, June 9, 2022.
9 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
10 White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,”
September 21, 2021.
11 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett After Their Meeting,”
Jerusalem, March 27, 2022.
12 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances Thousands of Settlement Homes Despite Harsh U.S. Rebuke,” haaretz.com, October
27, 2021.
13 “Israel stops plan for contentious east Jerusalem settlement,” Associated Press, December 6, 2021; “Plans to move
forward with E1 settlement construction reportedly on hold,” Times of Israel, January 6, 2022.
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Israel advanced plans for nearly 4,500 additional housing units for West Bank settlements,14
drawing statements of strong opposition from the Administration.15
Biden Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based Palestinian
Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for
Palestinians.16 Additionally, as part of FY2021 appropriations legislation, the Nita M. Lowey
Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized
the establishment of two funds to support development in the West Bank and Gaza, along with
various types of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation.17 For allocation between the two
MEPPA funds, Congress appropriated $50 million for FY2021 and the same amount for FY2022,
with additional $50 million tranches authorized for FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025.
Reopening of U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem?
Biden Administration officials have said that they plan to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that had
previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians, without
specifying when the consulate might reopen.18 The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S.
Embassy in Israel in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU)
within the embassy. Competing Israeli and Palestinian national narratives influence this issue, with both sides
appealing to U.S. officials about its importance of Jerusalem and its holy sites to their domestic constituencies.19
A December 2021 media report claimed that controversy on the issue led the Biden Administration to effectively
shelve plans to reopen the consulate. It also said that the PAU was communicating directly with State Department
officials in Washington, rather than working through other embassy channels.20 In June 2022, the PAU was re-
branded as the Office of Palestinian Affairs (OPA), with the OPA operating under the auspices of the embassy
while reporting directly to Washington.21 This type of direct communication was a core aspect of the previous
consulate general’s independent status. Nevertheless, PA President Abbas reportedly continues to press for the
reopening of the consulate.22
Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances,
including through loans and work permits.23 However, some critics charge that the measures
mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its
causes through negotiation with Palestinians.24

14 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances over 4,000 West Bank Housing Units for Jews,” haaretz.com, May 12, 2022.
15 State Department Press Briefing, May 6, 2022.
16 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
17 For information on the Partnership for Peace Fund (PPF), see https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/meppa. For
information on the Joint Investment for Peace Initiative (JIPI), see https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-
announces-joint-investment-peace-initiative-promote-middle-east-peace. According to USAID FY2022 Congressional
Notification #43, January 20, 2022, the Administration plans to allocate $46.5 million of FY2021 funding for MEPPA
toward the PPF, and $3.5 million toward the JIPI.
18 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021.
19 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel to form team to solve consulate dispute,” Axios, October 20, 2021; Jack Khoury and
Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves
Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021.
20 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel,” Times of Israel,
December 15, 2021.
21 Barak Ravid, “State Department separates Palestinian office from U.S. Embassy to Israel,” Axios, June 9, 2022.
22 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. sending senior diplomat to Ramallah to reassure Palestinians,” Axios, June 8, 2022.
23 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of
Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to
20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022.
24 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021.
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Some international bodies have subjected alleged Israeli human rights violations against
Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny. In March 2021, the International Criminal
Court (ICC) prosecutor began an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.25
Members of Congress have taken varying positions on human rights-related concerns.
Violence and Controversy in 2022
A number of complicated factors may contribute to heightened tensions and episodic violence
between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel. With prospects dim for
diplomatic resolution of final-status issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem’s status, militants
and activists on both sides may seek to shape outcomes or express protest. Arab states’ greater
willingness—despite Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic stalemate—to cooperate openly with Israel
could feed increased tensions (see “The Abraham Accords” below).
Since March 2022, a wave of Israeli-Palestinian violence has resulted to date in the deaths of 19
Israelis or foreigners in Israel and more than 40 Palestinians,26 amid the following:
 Protests and violent altercations around Jerusalem holy sites, including during
religious holidays and other sensitive times commemorating historical events.27
 Heightened Israeli and PA security measures to counter alleged Palestinian
lawlessness and militancy in West Bank cities such as Jenin.28
In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a Palestinian Christian from
East Jerusalem who was a U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli
security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered a major international
outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning
Abu Akleh’s killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department
spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and full accountability, and said
that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive
investigation.”29 Some evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces,30 with
the PA claiming that its investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but
Israel denying any such intent.31 It is unclear whether and how Israel, the PA, or other parties
might further investigate the matter, and whether U.S. authorities could be involved.32 Fifty-seven
Members of Congress sent a letter to the State Department and FBI requesting that they
investigate.33 In April 2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers had filed a complaint with the
ICC alleging that Israel has systematically targeted Palestinian journalists for years.34

25 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
26 David S. Cloud and Anas Baba, “Israeli Work Permits Ease Gaza Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2022.
27 CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
28 Ahmad Melhem, “Israeli forces find tough resistance in Jenin camp,” Al-Monitor, May 25, 2022.
29 State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022.
30 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” May 16, 2022.
31 “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” Associated Press, May 26, 2022.
32 Joseph Krauss, “US has not been asked to help in probe of reporter’s killing,” Associated Press, May 25, 2022; Lazar
Berman, “PA refers Abu Akleh death to International Criminal Court prosecutors” Times of Israel, May 23, 2022.
33 Text of letter available at
https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf.
34 International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian
journalists,” April 26, 2022.
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Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.35
Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.36
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.37 Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.38 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.39 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.40
The Abraham Accords
In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with
four members of the Arab League: the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump
Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and (as
mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the
countries in question.41 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both
countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had
operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported the UAE
and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords, even allowing the use of Saudi
airspace for direct commercial airline flights between those countries and Israel.42
Trade, tourism, and investment ties have generally deepened since the signing of the Accords—
including a May 2022 Israel-UAE free-trade agreement (pending Israeli ratification) and a major
Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative focused on desalinated water and solar energy.43 One exception is

35 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
36 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
37 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
38 Ibid.
39 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021.
40 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
41 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international
economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of
sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked
Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel.
42 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021.
43 “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan
sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021.
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that implementing Israel-Sudan normalization appears to be on hold following the Sudanese
military’s seizure of power in October 2021.44 As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the
Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the foreign
ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern
Negev desert.
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Israel-UAE-Bahrain
agreements in October 2021, Secretary Blinken said that “we’re committed to continue building
on the efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations
with Israel in the years ahead.”45 However, the Biden Administration appetite for offering major
U.S. policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.46
The Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and
Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.47 Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE
normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League
states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition
for improved ties.48
Prospects for Saudi normalization. As Israel has drawn closer to some Arab states, the
likelihood of a future normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia may be increasing. Given
Saudi Arabia’s importance as an economic and military power in the region, the kingdom’s
history of firm opposition to such normalization, and its status as the custodian of Islam’s most
holy and foundational sites, such a development could boost any precedent that the Abraham
Accords may set for other Muslim-majority countries considering cooperation with Israel.49 In
June 2022, Secretary Blinken said that Saudi Arabia is a “critical partner” of the United States in
dealing with regional challenges from extremism and Iran and in “continuing the process of
building relationships between Israel and its neighbors both near and further away through the
continuation, the expansion of the Abraham Accords.”50
While senior Saudi officials say that full Israel-Saudi normalization still remains contingent on
progress with Palestinian issues,51 the two countries are reportedly engaging in serious talks in the
meantime to build business ties and coordinate on regional security matters. Top Israeli and Saudi
officials say that the countries could take certain incremental steps toward eventual normalization
irrespective of the Palestinian question.52 Future steps could include the expansion of Israel’s

44 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
45 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
Availability,” October 13, 2021.
46 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October
14, 2021.
47 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,”
March 28, 2022.
48 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
14, 2020.
49 Dion Nissenbaum, “Saudis Expand Talks with Israel,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2022.
50 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Foreign Affairs Magazine Centennial Celebration,” June 1,
2022.
51 “Saudi foreign minister reiterates Kingdom’s position on Israel,” Arab News, May 24, 2022.
52 Nissenbaum, “Saudi Arabia Moves Toward Eventual Ties with Israel.”
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transit privileges through Saudi airspace, and Saudi Arabia’s full assumption of control and
security responsibility for the Red Sea islands Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt.53 One Israeli
journalist has argued that in talks regarding the two islands, U.S. officials are essentially
encouraging Israel to agree to a weakening of security protocols from the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace
treaty in exchange for a future and still unclear hope of Israeli-Saudi normalization.54
Security cooperation. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would
add Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.55 Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,56
and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.57
Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the other Abraham
Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt,
and Pakistan.58
Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by
Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly
expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.59 Earlier, both Morocco (November
2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.60 These
MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.
In his February 8, 2022, confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
then-nominee as CENTCOM Commander (then-) Lieutenant General Michael Kurilla testified
that Israel and other regional countries were cooperating on integrated air and missile defense and
in other security areas. At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab
counterparts reportedly discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time
intelligence sharing on inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense
systems.61
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.62 In March, Congress enacted the

53 Ibid.; Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. negotiating deal among Saudis, Israelis and Egyptians,” Axios, May 23, 2022.
54 Amos Harel, “In UAE, Bennett Inches Closer to the Biggest Prize of All,” haaretz.com, June 10, 2022.
55 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,
2021.
56 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021.
57 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of
Israel, October 29, 2021.
58 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for 2022
International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
59 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25,
2022.
60 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021;
Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. During the
same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense
minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all
parties involved.
61 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022.
62 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
01/Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.
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Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other
things, the IRNA requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening
and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of
measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization
efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.
In June 2022, several Members in the Senate and House introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces
and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act of 2022. The bill would require the Secretary of
Defense to submit a strategy and feasibility study on cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council
states, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt for an integrated air and missile defense capability to
counter Iran-related threats.
Countering Iran
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through
coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.63 Israeli
observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s
2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert
actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”64
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister
Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.65
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional
tensions.66
As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy and considers the possibility of
reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israel is reportedly still seeking to influence diplomatic
outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international negotiations with Iran, Prime
Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return to the JCPOA.67 A January

63 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York
Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” jpost.com, March 11, 2022.
64 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” jpost.com,
November 14, 2021.
65 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” New York Times, September 13, 2021.
66 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel's shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24, 2022;
Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, “With
missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16, 2022.
67 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Bennett’s Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for
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2022 report suggested that some leading Israeli security officials might prefer an international
deal to no deal because an agreement could provide “increased certainty about the limitations on
Iran’s nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for escalation
scenarios.”68 Bennett has stated a preference for no deal,69 but has said he does not intend to fight
publicly with U.S. officials about it.70
As international discussions around the JCPOA continued in March 2022, Bennett and Foreign
Minister Lapid issued a joint statement arguing against reports that the United States might
remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from its Foreign Terrorist
Organizations list in exchange for a promise not to harm Americans.71 In an April 26, 2022,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Blinken said that he could only envision
the IRGC’s de-listing if Iran takes steps necessary to justify it.72 On May 4, 62 Senators voted in
favor of a motion that any Iran nuclear deal must address Iran’s ballistic missile program, support
for terrorism, and oil trade with China, and not lift sanctions on or de-list the IRGC.73 Later in
May, Bennett claimed that President Biden told him in April that he would not de-list the IRGC.74
Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear
program,75 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the
overall effectiveness of such operations.76 In between his August 2021 White House meetings
with Prime Minister Bennett, President Biden said that the United States will first use diplomacy
to “ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon,” but if that fails, “we’re ready to turn to other
options.”77 In a September 2021 interview, Defense Minister Gantz suggested that he would be
prepared to accept a U.S. return to the JCPOA, while also calling for a “viable, U.S.-led plan B”
to pressure Iran in case negotiations are unsuccessful, and alluding to Israeli military contingency
plans.78
As of May 2022, one source reported that divisions persist among Israeli officials over which
approach or combination of approaches—among options including international diplomacy, U.S.-
led sanctions, and Israeli military and intelligence operations—may be likelier to prevent or slow
Iranian nuclear advances.79 Some sources allude to upgrades in Israeli military capabilities,80 but

Policy and Strategy Conference, Reichman University,” November 23, 2021.
68 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel’s military intel chief says Iran deal better than no deal,” Axios, January 5, 2022.
69 Jonathan Lis, “Bennett Announces Laser-based Missile Defense System ‘Within a Year,’” haaretz.com, February 1,
2022.
70 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022.
71 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Joint Announcement from PM Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid,” March
18, 2022.
72 Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6518577?11.
73 H.R. 4521, Roll Call Vote #155: Motion Agreed to 62-33, R 46-1, D 15-31, I 1-1, May 4, 2022; Congressional
Record, S.2321, May 4, 2022.
74 Jacob Magid, “Bennett: Biden notified me last month of decision to keep Iran Guards on terror list,” Times of Israel,
May 25, 2022.
75 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022.
76 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021.
77 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett of the State of Israel Before Expanded
Bilateral Meeting,” August 27, 2021.
78 Neri Zilber, “Israel Can Live with a New Iran Nuclear Deal, Defense Minister Says,” foreignpolicy.com, September
14, 2021.
79 Ben Caspit, “Israeli leadership divided on Iran deal,” Al-Monitor, May 27, 2022.
80 “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” jpost.com (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022.
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questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against Iran’s nuclear
program.81
Hezbollah and Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.82 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications,
including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.83
Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied
weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and
its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.84 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership
and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture
precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.85
Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster
Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other
military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-
backed targets that could present threats to its security.86
Russia’s advanced air defense systems in Syria could affect Israeli operations there.87 Russia has
reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian targets,88 but
has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.89 This deconfliction has
apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has criticized some
Israeli strikes.90 In May 2022, a Russian-origin S-300 air defense system in Syria reportedly fired
on Israeli jets for the first time, raising questions about the status of Israel-Russia deconfliction.91

81 Amos Harel, “Israel’s Saber-rattling on Iran Lacks One Critical Element,” haaretz.com, May 20, 2022.
82 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E.
Humud.
83 Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The Israeli Card,”
Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022.
84 See, e.g., “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben
Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times,
April 23, 2020.
85 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press,
February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies
Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.
86 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022.
87 Paul Iddon, “Is Russia Helping Syria Intercept Israeli Missile Strikes?” forbes.com, July 30, 2021.
88 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27,
2021.
89 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel,
February 27, 2022.
90 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel
Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12,
2022.
91 Dan Parsons and Tyler Rogoway, “S-300 Surface-To-Air Missile Fired at Israeli Jets over Syria for First Time:
Report,” The Drive, May 16, 2022.
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Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in
international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and
humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing over 15,000 Jewish and non-Jewish
refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.92 As mentioned above, Israel has counted on
airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those
related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.93
Perhaps partly owing to Israel’s careful stance on the conflict, Israeli officials have served in
some instances as communicators between their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts.94 Despite
entreaties from Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from providing lethal assistance to
Ukraine or approving third-party transfers of weapons with proprietary Israeli technology.95
Under some Western pressure, Israel has contemplated providing defensive equipment, personal
combat gear, and/or warning systems to Ukraine’s military, partly to project to existing arms
export clients that it would be a reliable supplier in crisis situations.96 Israel announced an initial
shipment of helmets and flak jackets to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations in May
2022.97
While Israel has not directly joined Western economic sanctions against Russia, Foreign Minister
Lapid has said that Israel is determined to prevent Russians from using Israel to bypass
sanctions.98 Observers debate the influence of prominent Russian or Russian-speaking Israelis
within Israel.99 In a March 2022 interview on Israeli television, U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said, “You don’t want to become the last haven for dirty money
that’s fueling Putin’s wars.”100

Author Information

Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

92 Isabel Kershner, “Israelis Debate How Many, and What Kind of, Refugees to Accept,” New York Times, March 24,
2022.
93 Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022.
94 Barak Ravid, “Israel’s Bennett emerges as key mediator between Putin and Zelensky,” Axios, March 9, 2022.
95 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel rejects U.S. request to approve missile transfer to Ukraine,” Axios, May 25, 2022.
96 Yaniv Kubovich and Jonathan Lis, “Israeli Officials Inclined to Increase Ukraine Aid in Face of Russian Atrocities,”
haaretz.com, May 3, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com,
May 4, 2022.
97 “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022.
98 Rina Bassist, “Israel vows country won’t become safe haven for sanctioned Russian oligarchs,” Al-Monitor, March
14, 2022.
99 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Cautious Tone on Ukraine Puts Focus on Israeli Oligarchs,” New York Times, April 11,
2022.
100 “US official warns Israel: ‘Don’t be last haven for dirty money fueling Putin’s war,’” Times of Israel, March 11,
2022.
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Disclaimer
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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Congressional Research Service
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