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Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
December 2, 2021February 3, 2022
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. U.S. law Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. U.S. law
requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
Jim Zanotti
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additionally, a 10- edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additionally, a 10-
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million

annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028,to FY2028, subject to congressional subject to congressional
appropriations. appropriations. In 2021, someSome Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s

use of use of U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses
the following matters: the following matters:
Current government and domestic issues. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party heads a power-sharing Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party heads a power-sharing
government featuring a group of disparate parties from across the political spectrum that replaced the government of the government featuring a group of disparate parties from across the political spectrum that replaced the government of the
long-serving Binyamin Netanyahu in June 2021. To date, the government has focused on pragmatic management of Israel’s long-serving Binyamin Netanyahu in June 2021. To date, the government has focused on pragmatic management of Israel’s
security and economy rather than comprehensive policies such as those related to the Palestinians. However, some actions, security and economy rather than comprehensive policies such as those related to the Palestinians. However, some actions,
including steps toward West Bank settlement building, have generated some discontent among coalition partners, triggering including steps toward West Bank settlement building, have generated some discontent among coalition partners, triggering
speculation about future government cohesion. The Knesset (Israel’s unicameral parliament) passed a budget for 2021-2022 speculation about future government cohesion. The Knesset (Israel’s unicameral parliament) passed a budget for 2021-2022
that represented the first major test for the Bennett government. Due largely to the influence within the coalition of the Arab-that represented the first major test for the Bennett government. Due largely to the influence within the coalition of the Arab-
led, Islamist United Arab List, the budget includes a plan to have the government address socioeconomic concerns among the led, Islamist United Arab List, the budget includes a plan to have the government address socioeconomic concerns among the
Arab citizens who make up around 20% of Israel’s population.Arab citizens who make up around 20% of Israel’s population.
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Israeli officials and some Members of Congress strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Israeli officials and some Members of Congress
have publicly opposed a Biden Administration plan to reopen a U.S. consulate in Jerusalem to handle relations with have publicly opposed a Biden Administration plan to reopen a U.S. consulate in Jerusalem to handle relations with
Palestinians. In May 2021, an 11-day conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), Palestinians. In May 2021, an 11-day conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization),
which maintains de facto control within Gaza. It was the fourth major conflict of its kind, with previous ones occurring in which maintains de facto control within Gaza. It was the fourth major conflict of its kind, with previous ones occurring in
2008-2009,2008-2009, 2012,2012, and 2014. Intercommunal protests and violence also took place among Arabs and Jews within Israel and and 2014. Intercommunal protests and violence also took place among Arabs and Jews within Israel and
Jerusalem—with existing tensions in Jerusalem contributing to the conflict’s outbreak. In the conflict’s aftermath, President Jerusalem—with existing tensions in Jerusalem contributing to the conflict’s outbreak. In the conflict’s aftermath, President
Biden Biden has pledged to replenish Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system, and the House has passed a supplemental bill awaiting pledged to replenish Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system, and the House has passed a supplemental bill awaiting
Senate action that would provide $1 billion for Iron Dome through FY2024. With Gaza still under Hamas control, obstacles Senate action that would provide $1 billion for Iron Dome through FY2024. With Gaza still under Hamas control, obstacles
to post-conflict recovery persist. Beyond providing short-term humanitarian assistance, the United States and other to post-conflict recovery persist. Beyond providing short-term humanitarian assistance, the United States and other
international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with longer-term reconstruction without bolstering Hamas. international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with longer-term reconstruction without bolstering Hamas.
The Abraham Accords. The Biden Administration has followed agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved The Biden Administration has followed agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved
relations between Israel and four Arab relations between Israel and four Arab or Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden
Administration officials have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Administration officials have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist with Israel-Arab state normalizationIsraeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to would seek to
preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced
normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address
Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties. improved ties. Possible economic benefits and U.S. arms sales
stemming from Israel-Arab state normalization may influence relationships among regional actors.
Iran and other regional issues. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement
that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Prime Minister Bennett has made statements opposing the Biden Administrationthat constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Prime Minister Bennett has made statements opposing the Biden Administration’s
possible reentry into reentering or revising the agreement. Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence the agreement. Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence
nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations in Syria, Iraq, nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations in Syria, Iraq,
and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s
missile arsenal. missile arsenal.
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. concerns. U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over Chinese U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over Chinese
investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability to gather intelligence investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability to gather intelligence
and acquire security-related technologies. While Chinese state-owned companies remain engaged in some specific and acquire security-related technologies. While Chinese state-owned companies remain engaged in some specific
infrastructure projects, including the management of a seaport terminal in Haifa, Israel has taken some steps to reduce infrastructure projects, including the management of a seaport terminal in Haifa, Israel has taken some steps to reduce
Chinese investment in strategically important areas. Chinese investment in strategically important areas.
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Contents
Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations ........................................................................... 1
Current Israeli Government and Domestic Issues ........................................................................... 1
Israeli-Palestinian Issues ................................................................................................................. 3
U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem ...................................................................................................... 5
May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict ................................................................................................. 6
The Conflict’s Aftermath: Aid for Iron Dome and Gaza Relief ................................................ 8 8
Certain Human Rights Considerations: International Criminal Court and U.S. Aid ................. 9 The Abraham Accords .................................... 9
Arab State Normalization with Israel ............................................................................... 10
Iran and the Region ....................................................................................................................... 12
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions ......................................................................... 12
Hezbollah ................................................................................................................................ 14
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns ........................................................................... 14

Tables
Table 1. Israeli Power-Sharing Government: Key Positions ........................................................... 2 2

Appendixes
Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts ..................................................................................... 17
Appendix B. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset and Their Leaders ........................................ 18
Appendix C. Chinese Investments in Israeli Technology Companies: 2011-2020 ........................ 21

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 21


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Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (Israel (seesee Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, including on aid, arms sales, and missile United States in many areas. For more background, including on aid, arms sales, and missile
defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim , by Jim
Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. embassy to recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. embassy to
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future negotiations and Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future negotiations and
outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future
national capital (see national capital (see “U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem” below)—though the Trump Administration below)—though the Trump Administration
did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden
Administration has said that the embassy Administration has said that the embassy wil will remain in Jerusalem. remain in Jerusalem.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additional yAdditionally, a 10-, a 10-
year bilateralyear bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the
United States to provide Israel $3.3 United States to provide Israel $3.3 bil ion billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend
$500 $500 mil ion annual ymillion annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to
congressional appropriations. Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35 congressional appropriations. Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter. Congress also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a Joint Strike Fighter. Congress also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a
number of specific security-related areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countermeasures for number of specific security-related areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countermeasures for
drone aircraft. drone aircraft.
Additional Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include include
  Chal engesChallenges facing the Israeli power-sharing government that took office in June facing the Israeli power-sharing government that took office in June
2021, headed by Prime Minister Bennett. 2021, headed by Prime Minister Bennett.
 Israeli-Palestinian issues, including the possible reopening of a U.S. consulate in  Israeli-Palestinian issues, including the possible reopening of a U.S. consulate in
Jerusalem, the aftermath of May 2021 Israel-Gaza Strip violence, some human Jerusalem, the aftermath of May 2021 Israel-Gaza Strip violence, some human
rights considerations and heightened scrutiny of U.S. aidrights considerations and heightened scrutiny of U.S. aid.  The Abraham Accords, or, and Israel’s Israel’s
normalization normalization or improvement of relations of relations with various Arab with various Arab and Muslim-majority states. states.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah. Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
 Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure, and U.S. concerns  Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure, and U.S. concerns
about implications for U.S. national security. about implications for U.S. national security.
Current Israeli Government and Domestic Issues
A power-sharing government headed by Prime Minister Bennett (see the text box below for a A power-sharing government headed by Prime Minister Bennett (see the text box below for a
brief biography) took office on June 13, 2021, ending Binyamin Netanyahu’s 12-year tenure as brief biography) took office on June 13, 2021, ending Binyamin Netanyahu’s 12-year tenure as
prime minister.1 Since Netanyahu’s criminal indictment on corruption charges in February 2019, prime minister.1 Since Netanyahu’s criminal indictment on corruption charges in February 2019,
Israel has held four separate elections—the most recent in March 2021—and experienced Israel has held four separate elections—the most recent in March 2021—and experienced
considerable political turmoil. Netanyahu had stayed in power during that time for various considerable political turmoil. Netanyahu had stayed in power during that time for various
reasons, including lack of Israeli consensus on replacing him during the crisis over the reasons, including lack of Israeli consensus on replacing him during the crisis over the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and his prominence on national security

1 Netanyahu also served an earlier 1996-1999 term as prime minister. 1 Netanyahu also served an earlier 1996-1999 term as prime minister.
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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and his prominence on national security issues. Netanyahu and his Likud party now lead the Knesset’s opposition, as was the case from issues. Netanyahu and his Likud party now lead the Knesset’s opposition, as was the case from
2006 to 2009. 2006 to 2009.
Bennett—a right-of-center figure who leads the Yamina party—and the centrist Yesh Atid party Bennett—a right-of-center figure who leads the Yamina party—and the centrist Yesh Atid party
leader Yair Lapid reached agreement with other key political party leaders to form a new leader Yair Lapid reached agreement with other key political party leaders to form a new
government and replace Netanyahu. Bennett is scheduled to serve as prime minister until August government and replace Netanyahu. Bennett is scheduled to serve as prime minister until August
27, 2023, at which point Lapid would become prime minister. The government draws its support 27, 2023, at which point Lapid would become prime minister. The government draws its support
from a disparate coalition of parties on the right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisraelfrom a disparate coalition of parties on the right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu), center Beitenu), center
(Yesh Atid and Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the political(Yesh Atid and Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the political spectrum, as spectrum, as wel well as from as from
the Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List (UALthe Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) (or Ra’am) (seesee Table 1 andand Appendix B). The . The
participation of UALparticipation of UAL in the coalition is the first instance of an independent Arab party joining an in the coalition is the first instance of an independent Arab party joining an
Israeli government.2 Women make up approximately one-third of Israel’s Israeli government.2 Women make up approximately one-third of Israel’s new cabinet, with nine cabinet, with nine
female ministers, more than in any previous government.3female ministers, more than in any previous government.3
Table 1. Israeli Power-Sharing Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Prime Minister Minister
Naftali Bennett Naftali Bennett
Yamina Yamina
Foreign Minister Foreign Minister and and
Yair Lapid Yair Lapid
Yesh Atid Yesh Atid
Alternate Prime Alternate Prime Minister Minister
Defense Minister Defense Minister
Benny Gantz Benny Gantz
Kahol Lavan Kahol Lavan
Finance Minister Finance Minister
Avigdor Lieberman Avigdor Lieberman
Yisrael Yisrael Beitenu Beitenu
Justice Minister Justice Minister
Gideon Sa’ar Gideon Sa’ar
New Hope New Hope
Interior Minister Interior Minister
Ayelet Ayelet Shaked Shaked
Yamina Yamina
Transportation Minister Transportation Minister
Merav Michaeli Merav Michaeli
Labor Labor
Public Security Minister Public Security Minister
Omer Omer Bar Lev Bar Lev
Labor Labor
Health Minister Health Minister
Nitzan Horowitz Nitzan Horowitz
Meretz Meretz
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett: Biography
Bennett, born in 1972, is a leading figure of the Israeli Bennett, born in 1972, is a leading figure of the Israeli national religious,national religious, pro-settlerpro-settler right. He right. He
hails from a modern Orthodox Jewish background. Having parents who emigratedhails from a modern Orthodox Jewish background. Having parents who emigrated from the from the
United States, Bennett lived in AmericaUnited States, Bennett lived in America at multipleat multiple times as a youth and adult. He served in times as a youth and adult. He served in
various Israelivarious Israeli special forces units (and remainsspecial forces units (and remains a reservist)a reservist) before starting what became a very before starting what became a very
successful career as a software entrepreneur. successful career as a software entrepreneur.
Entering politics in 2006, Bennett served as chief of staff for Binyamin Netanyahu until 2008, Entering politics in 2006, Bennett served as chief of staff for Binyamin Netanyahu until 2008,
while Netanyahu was serving as opposition leader in the Knesset.while Netanyahu was serving as opposition leader in the Knesset. Later,Later, Bennett served as Bennett served as
director-generaldirector-general of the Yesha Council (the of the Yesha Council (the umbrel a umbrella organization for Israeliorganization for Israeli West Bank West Bank
settlers) settlers) from 2010 to 2012. from 2010 to 2012.
He then became the party leader for HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) and led the party into the Knesset in He then became the party leader for HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) and led the party into the Knesset in
2013. In 2018 he left The Jewish Home,2013. In 2018 he left The Jewish Home, seeking various right-of-center electoralseeking various right-of-center electoral al iances before final y alliances before finally becoming becoming
head of Yamina in 2020. Bennett has participated in severalhead of Yamina in 2020. Bennett has participated in several coalition governmentscoalition governments led by Netanyahu, serving as led by Netanyahu, serving as
economy ministereconomy minister (2013-2015), education minister(2013-2015), education minister (2015-2019), and defense minister(2015-2019), and defense minister (2019-2020). In May 2020, (2019-2020). In May 2020,

2 According to one Israeli media source, “Only twice have Arab2 According to one Israeli media source, “Only twice have Arab Israeli parties backed an Israeli government. In the Israeli parties backed an Israeli government. In the
1950s, a small faction composed of one Arab1950s, a small faction composed of one Arab parliamentarian entered the coalition. The faction was far from parliamentarian entered the coalition. The faction was far from
independent, essentially operating as an Arab franchise of Israel’s rulingindependent, essentially operating as an Arab franchise of Israel’s ruling socialist party, Mapai. In the 1990s, when the socialist party, Mapai. In the 1990s, when the
government of leftgovernment of left -wing Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin was-wing Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin was in danger of collapsing, the Arab parties stepped in to in danger of collapsing, the Arab parties stepped in to
prevent a vote of no confidence.” Aaron Boxerman, “prevent a vote of no confidence.” Aaron Boxerman, “ History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins BennettHistory made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett -Lapid -Lapid
coalition,” coalition,” Tim esTimes of Israel, June, June 3, 2021. 3, 2021.
3 Mazal Mualem, “Israeli female ministers introduce reforms, shake up agenda,” 3 Mazal Mualem, “Israeli female ministers introduce reforms, shake up agenda,” Al-Monitor, September 10, 2021. , September 10, 2021.
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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

he led Yamina into the opposition when Netanyahu and Likud formed he led Yamina into the opposition when Netanyahu and Likud formed a power-sharing government with Benny a power-sharing government with Benny
Gantz and Kahol Lavan. Gantz and Kahol Lavan.
Bennett openly opposes the creation of a Palestinian state, though he approves of greater Palestinian autonomy in Bennett openly opposes the creation of a Palestinian state, though he approves of greater Palestinian autonomy in
West Bank urban areas. He supports continued expansion of IsraeliWest Bank urban areas. He supports continued expansion of Israeli settlements settlements in the Westin the West Bank and the Bank and the
annexation of Jewish-settled areas.annexation of Jewish-settled areas. However,However, he has agreed not to pursue annexation as primehe has agreed not to pursue annexation as prime minister minister in the in the
current power-sharing government. current power-sharing government.
On domesticOn domestic issues,issues, Bennett Bennett general ygenerally supports free-market supports free-market policies,policies, a modest government safety net, and a focus a modest government safety net, and a focus
on equality of opportunity and education for on equality of opportunity and education for economical y chal engedeconomically challenged Israelis. Israelis. He has supported efforts by his He has supported efforts by his
close politicalclose political col eague Ayelet Shaked, who servedcol eague Ayelet Shaked, who served as justice ministeras justice minister from 2015 to 2019, to limitfrom 2015 to 2019, to limit the power of the power of
the judiciary and other justice sector and public security institutions to curb executive and legislativethe judiciary and other justice sector and public security institutions to curb executive and legislative actions.4 actions.4
The government has focused largely on pragmatic matters of governance, such as enacting a The government has focused largely on pragmatic matters of governance, such as enacting a
budget and addressing the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The fractious budget and addressing the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The fractious
nature of the coalition makes it less likelynature of the coalition makes it less likely to pursue comprehensive action on to pursue comprehensive action on political y
politically contentious issues like those pertaining to the Palestinians.5 Significant disagreements within or contentious issues like those pertaining to the Palestinians.5 Significant disagreements within or
defections from the government could lead to its collapse and new elections—perhaps leaving defections from the government could lead to its collapse and new elections—perhaps leaving
open the possibility of a return by Netanyahu to power. open the possibility of a return by Netanyahu to power.
In November 2021, the Knesset’s approval of a national budget for 2021-2022 prevented the In November 2021, the Knesset’s approval of a national budget for 2021-2022 prevented the
government’s early dissolution and another round of elections. Observers continue to debate the government’s early dissolution and another round of elections. Observers continue to debate the
government’s staying power, with many saying that its primary purpose remains keeping government’s staying power, with many saying that its primary purpose remains keeping
Netanyahu from the premiership.6 Some issues relating to the Palestinians have generated Netanyahu from the premiership.6 Some issues relating to the Palestinians have generated
discontent among left-of-center members of the coalition, discontent among left-of-center members of the coalition, specifical yincluding action toward additional action toward additional
settlement construction and the October 2021 designation of six Palestinian civil society groups
as terrorist organizations (discussed in the textbox below).7
settlement construction.7 The budget (roughly $194 The budget (roughly $194 bil ion billion for 2021 and $180 for 2021 and $180 bil ion billion for 2022) aims at reform and for 2022) aims at reform and
expansion in a number of Israel’s key socioeconomic sectors.8 Due largely to the influence of expansion in a number of Israel’s key socioeconomic sectors.8 Due largely to the influence of
UALUAL leader Mansour Abbas within the government, the budget leader Mansour Abbas within the government, the budget additional yadditionally plans to plans to al ocateallocate
more than $10 more than $10 bil ion billion over the next five years for the infrastructure, education, health care, and over the next five years for the infrastructure, education, health care, and
crime prevention needs of Arab Israelis,9 whose income and education levels are markedly lower crime prevention needs of Arab Israelis,9 whose income and education levels are markedly lower
than those of Jewish Israelis. than those of Jewish Israelis.
Israeli-Palestinian Issues
Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for
direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.10 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.10 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster
Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump
Administration. In May 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke out against steps taken by Administration. In May 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke out against steps taken by

4 Dahlia Scheindlin, “T he Assault on Israel’s Judiciary,” T he Century Foundation, July 7, 2021.
5 Isabel Kershner, “ Israel Passes First Budget In 3 Years, Easing Chaos,” New Israelis or Palestinians that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of 4 Dahlia Scheindlin, “The Assault on Israel’s Judiciary,” The Century Foundation, July 7, 2021. 5 Isabel Kershner, “Israel Passes First Budget In 3 Years, Easing Chaos,” New York Times, November 5, 2021. , November 5, 2021.
6 Ibid. 6 Ibid.
7 Raoul Wootliff, “7 Raoul Wootliff, “ Coalition increasingly split on leftCoalition increasingly split on left -right lines as budget-right lines as budget deadline deadline looms.” looms.” Times of Israel, October , October
25, 2021. 25, 2021.
8 Ricky Ben-David, “8 Ricky Ben-David, “ How much of a revolution? 13 key reforms in Israel’s newHow much of a revolution? 13 key reforms in Israel’s new state budgetstate budget ,” ,” Times of Israel, ,
November 4, 2021. November 4, 2021.
9 “Mansour Abbas’s 9 “Mansour Abbas’s star turn rattles Israeli politics” star turn rattles Israeli politics” Al-Monitor, November 12, 2021. , November 12, 2021.
10 White House, “10 White House, “ Remarks by President BidenRemarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General AssemblyBefore the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ,” ,”
September 21, 2021. September 21, 2021.
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Israelis or Palestinians that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of
two states—including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and two states—including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and
payment to terrorists.11payment to terrorists.11
In October 2021, the State Department spokesperson voiced concern about prospective Israeli In October 2021, the State Department spokesperson voiced concern about prospective Israeli
actions to advance settlements deep in the West Bank, and actions to advance settlements deep in the West Bank, and cal edcalled upon Israel and the Palestinian upon Israel and the Palestinian
Authority (PA) to “refrain from unilateral steps that exacerbate tension and undercut efforts to Authority (PA) to “refrain from unilateral steps that exacerbate tension and undercut efforts to
advance a negotiated two-state solution. This certainly includes settlement activity, as advance a negotiated two-state solution. This certainly includes settlement activity, as wel well as as
retroactive legalizationretroactive legalization of settlement outposts.”12 Some Israeli settlement construction plans for East Jerusalem and the West Bank have advanced,13 but Israel has reportedly delayed a few plans flagged as especially damaging to the two-state vision by the Biden Administration or some Members of Congress.14 Separately, in December 2021 Israel announced a plan to double Israeli settlement in the Golan Heights (see Appendix A for information on the status of the Golan Heights).15 of settlement outposts.”12 Shortly thereafter, a planning council under the
authority of Israel’s defense ministry provided the next approvals in a multi-step process for
around 3,000 new settlement units in the West Bank.13
During 2021, Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based PA Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based PA
President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for Palestinians.President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for Palestinians.1416 As part of As part of
the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey
Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the future
establishment of establishment of a fundtwo funds to support Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, to support Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, andand
an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.17 P.L. 116-260 (via an accompanying explanatory statement) appropriated $50 million for FY2021 to be allocated between the two MEPPA funds. P.L. 116-260 also authorized $50 million annually for the funds from FY2022 to FY2025. A White House summary of an.
A White House summary of the August 2021 meeting between President Biden and Prime August 2021 meeting between President Biden and Prime
Minister Bennett said: Minister Bennett said:
The President underscored the importance of steps to improve the lives of Palestinians and The President underscored the importance of steps to improve the lives of Palestinians and
supportsupport greater greater economic opportunitieseconomic opportunities for them. He also notedfor them. He also noted the importance of the importance of
refraining from actions that could exacerbate tensions, contribute to a sense of unfairness, refraining from actions that could exacerbate tensions, contribute to a sense of unfairness,
and undermine efforts to build trust. President Biden reaffirmed his view that a negotiated and undermine efforts to build trust. President Biden reaffirmed his view that a negotiated
two-statetwo-state solution is the onlysolution is the only viable path to achieving a lasting resolution to the Israeli-viable path to achieving a lasting resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.Palestinian conflict.1518 Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances, including through loans and work permits19 However, some critics charge that the measures 11 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021. 12 State Department Press Briefing, October 22, 2021. 13 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances Thousands of Settlement Homes Despite Harsh U.S. Rebuke,” haaretz.com, October 27, 2021. 14 “Israel stops plan for contentious east Jerusalem settlement,” Associated Press, December 6, 2021; “Plans to move forward with E1 settlement construction reportedly on hold,” Times of Israel, January 6, 2022. 15 “Israel plans to double settlement in Golan Heights,” Associated Press, December 26, 2021. 16 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 17 For information on the Partnership for Peace Fund (PPF), see https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/meppa. For information on the Joint Investment for Peace Initiative (JIPI), see https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-announces-joint-investment-peace-initiative-promote-middle-east-peace. According to USAID FY2022 Congressional Notification #43, the Administration has proposed to allocate $46.5 million of FY2021 funding toward the PPF, and $3.5 million toward the JIPI. 18 White House, “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,” August 27, 2021. 19 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict. Here’s what that looks like,” CNN, September 16, 2021; “Israel announces 3,000 new Gaza work permits,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2021.
Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances. In
summer 2021 Israel agreed to provide the PA with a $155 mil ion loan,16 while also “issuing
15,000 new work permits inside Israel for [West Bank] Palestinians … re-establishing Joint
Economic Committees to discuss future projects, al owing reunification (i.e. legal status) for
Palestinian spouses in the West Bank, and tentatively approving 2,000 new housing units for
Palestinians in the part of the West Bank under full Israeli control.”17 In October 2021, Israeli
authorities announced an additional 3,000 work permits inside Israel for Gazans.18 However,
some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects
unilateral y rather than responsively address its causes through dialogue and negotiation with
Palestinians.19

11 State Department, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021.
12 State Department Press Briefing, October 22, 2021.
13 Hagar Shezaf, “ Israel Advances T housands of Settlement Homes Despite Harsh U.S. Rebuke,” haaretz.com, October
27, 2021.
14 CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview, Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues, by Jim Zanotti.
15 White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,”
August 27, 2021.
16 Yaniv Kubovich, “Gantz Says Agreed with Abbas on Confidence-building Measures, Including $155m Loan,”
haaretz.com, August 30, 2021.
17 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict. Here’s what that looks like,” CNN,
September 16, 2021.
18 “Israel announces 3,000 new Gaza work permits,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2021.
19 Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict.”
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Israeli Terrorist Designations Against Palestinian Civil Society Groups
In October 2021, Defense Minister Gantz—apparently acting with the approval of the state prosecutor, but
without consulting Prime Minister Bennett or other key cabinet ministers—announced the designation of six
Palestinian civil society groups as terrorist organizations under Israeli law because of purported links to the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).20 According to the
New York Times, “The six [groups] are variously involved in highlighting rights abuses by Israel, the Palestinian
Authority and Hamas, as wel as in promoting the rights of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, women,
farmworkers and children.”21 The designations, which some domestic and international critics have al eged are
political y motivated,22 could significantly curtail these groups’ funding and activities, and subject their supporters
to Israeli criminal prosecution. Some of the groups receive funding from the European Union an d other
international actors. In response to a U.S. request for clarification, Israeli officials reportedly have shared evidence
that they claim supports the terrorist designations.23 According to one Israeli media outlet, the six groups could
stil legal y operate in the West Bank as of November 2021.24 Congressional Research Service 4 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than responsively address its causes through dialogue and negotiation with Palestinians.20 As of February 2022, Israel’s military police are actively investigating a case from January in which a dual U.S.-Palestinian national died after reported rough treatment by Israeli soldiers who detained him in the West Bank.21
U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem
At various points in 2021, Biden Administration officials have referred to plans to reopen the U.S. At various points in 2021, Biden Administration officials have referred to plans to reopen the U.S.
consulate in Jerusalem that had previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in consulate in Jerusalem that had previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in
handling relations with the Palestinians, without specifying when the consulate might reopen.handling relations with the Palestinians, without specifying when the consulate might reopen.2522
The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S. embassy to Israel in March 2019, The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S. embassy to Israel in March 2019,
with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU) within the embassy. within the embassy.
Reversing the merger would presumably reestablish the consulate as an independent diplomatic Reversing the merger would presumably reestablish the consulate as an independent diplomatic
mission that would work in mission that would work in paral el parallel with, rather than as a part of, the embassy. A senior with, rather than as a part of, the embassy. A senior
Palestinian official was quoted in October 2021 as saying that reopening the consulate is very Palestinian official was quoted in October 2021 as saying that reopening the consulate is very
important to Palestinians because “the consulate is the seed of the American Embassy to the important to Palestinians because “the consulate is the seed of the American Embassy to the
future Palestinian state and a statement about everything related to the administration’s position future Palestinian state and a statement about everything related to the administration’s position
on Jerusalem.”on Jerusalem.”2623 Several top Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Bennett and Foreign Several top Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Bennett and Foreign
Minister Lapid, have voiced strong opposition to the proposed reopening.Minister Lapid, have voiced strong opposition to the proposed reopening.2724 A number of other A number of other
countries have operated independent consulates within Jerusalem for decades and continue to do countries have operated independent consulates within Jerusalem for decades and continue to do
so, including the United Kingdom and France. For information on so, including the United Kingdom and France. For information on thesome possible locations of a possible locations of a
reopened consulate, see CRS Report RL34074, reopened consulate, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
by Jim Zanotti. by Jim Zanotti.
Reestablishing the consulate would apparently require Israel’s approval given the need for Reestablishing the consulate would apparently require Israel’s approval given the need for
cooperation from Israeli authorities to issue visas to and help protect U.S. diplomats.cooperation from Israeli authorities to issue visas to and help protect U.S. diplomats.28 In a

20 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US over outlawed Palestinian groups,” Times of Israel, October 24, 2021.
For information on the purported links, see Matthew Levitt, A Blurred Line Between Civil Society and Terrorism :
Exam ining Charges of Palestinian NGOs Funding the PFLP
, Washington Inst itute for Near East Policy, November
2021.
21 Patrick Kingsley, “ Palestine Rights Groups Called T errorists by Israel,” New York Times, October 23, 2021.
22 Yousef Munayyer, “T he Long Arm of Israeli Repression,” foreignpolicy.com, November 5, 2021.
23 Daniel Estrin, “T hey got hacked with NSO spyware. Now Israel wants Palestinian activists’ funding cut,” NPR,
November 10, 2021.
24 Hagar Shezaf, “ T he NGOs Israel Designated as T error Groups Remain Legal in the West Bank ,” haaretz.com,
November 1, 2021.
25 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021.
26 Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “ Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem
After Israel Approves Budget ,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021.
27 “Next test for Israel PM: US plan for P alestinian mission,” Agence France Presse, November 8, 2021.
28 Shira Efron and Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem: Subject to Israeli Discretion?”
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November 3, 2021, hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy Secretary of
State for Management and Resources Brian McKeon said that “the practical reality is we would
need privileges and immunities, which only the state of Israel can provide.”29 Given Israel’s
insistence that the entire Jerusalem municipality is its capital, reflecting competition between
Israeli and Palestinian national narratives over Jerusalem and its holy sites, the idea of a separate
U.S. diplomatic mission in Jerusalem focusing on the Palestinians could place Israel’s coalition
government under domestic political pressure from the Netanyahu-led opposition.
It is unclear whether Israel’s approval of a U.S. consulate reopening is essential y a practical
matter—given Israel’s control over Jerusalem—or is also founded on law such as the 1963
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.30 President Trump’s December 2017 proclamation on
Jerusalem recognized it as Israel’s capital, but did not delineate specific boundaries of Israeli
sovereignty in Jerusalem.31 After the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, the
U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem continued to operate independently until it was subsumed
into the embassy in March 2019.
Members of Congress have introduced bil s25 In a November 3, 2021, hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Brian McKeon said that “the practical reality is we would need privileges and immunities, which only the state of Israel can provide.”26 Given Israel’s insistence that the entire Jerusalem municipality is its capital, reflecting competition between Israeli and Palestinian national narratives over Jerusalem and its holy sites, the idea of a separate U.S. diplomatic mission in Jerusalem focusing on the Palestinians could place Israel’s coalition government under domestic political pressure from the Netanyahu-led opposition. It is unclear whether Israel’s approval of a U.S. consulate reopening is essentially a practical matter—given Israel’s control over Jerusalem—or is also founded on law such as the 1963 20 Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict.” 21 The State Department spokesperson has called for a thorough investigation and full accountability, and while the Israeli military police investigation continues, Israel’s military has already acted to discipline three commanders from the battalion involved in the incident. State Department, “Statement on Israeli Defense Forces Report on Death of Omar Assad,” February 1, 2022; Raja Abdulrahim, “Israeli Commanders Punished in West Bank Death,” New York Times, February 2, 2022. 22 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021. 23 Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021. 24 “Next test for Israel PM: US plan for Palestinian mission,” Agence France Presse, November 8, 2021. 25 Shira Efron and Ibrahim Eid Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem: Subject to Israeli Discretion?” Israel Policy Forum, January 14, 2021. 26 Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6386943?5&search=6Qx4QHFb. Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.27 President Trump’s December 2017 proclamation on Jerusalem recognized it as Israel’s capital, but did not delineate specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem.28 After the May 2018 opening of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem continued to operate independently until it was subsumed into the embassy in March 2019. Members of Congress have introduced bills in both Houses that would oppose reopening a in both Houses that would oppose reopening a
consulate to handle relations with the Palestinians, and prohibit funding for any diplomatic consulate to handle relations with the Palestinians, and prohibit funding for any diplomatic
facility in Jerusalem other than the U.S. embassy to Israel. S. 3063, with facility in Jerusalem other than the U.S. embassy to Israel. S. 3063, with 3840 co-sponsors, was co-sponsors, was
introduced in October and H.R. 6004, with introduced in October and H.R. 6004, with 114123 co-sponsors, was introduced in November. co-sponsors, was introduced in November. In
light of controversy over this issue, some observers have expressed skepticism that the
Administration will seek urgent action on a consulate, with one predicting that U.S. officials
might focus on economic assistance or other means to improve U.S.-Palestinian relations.32
A December 2021 media report claimed that controversy on the issue led the Biden Administration to effectively shelve plans to reopen the consulate, but also said that the PAU is now communicating directly with State Department officials in Washington, rather than working through other embassy channels.29 This type of direct communication was a core aspect of the previous consulate general’s independent status. May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict
From May 10 through May 21, 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-From May 10 through May 21, 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza.designated terrorist organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza.3330 The following The following
were key aspects of the conflict: were key aspects of the conflict:
  Overview. Palestinian militants fired rockets with unprecedented intensity from Palestinian militants fired rockets with unprecedented intensity from
Gaza into central Israel. The Iron Dome anti-rocket system played a prominent Gaza into central Israel. The Iron Dome anti-rocket system played a prominent
role in defending Israeli population centers. Israel conducted sustained air and role in defending Israeli population centers. Israel conducted sustained air and
artil eryartillery strikes in Gaza. strikes in Gaza. Additional y, Additionally, intercommunal protests and violence took intercommunal protests and violence took
place within Israel and Jerusalem (see below for a description of events in place within Israel and Jerusalem (see below for a description of events in
Jerusalem prior to the conflict)—involving some Arab citizens of Israel, Jerusalem prior to the conflict)—involving some Arab citizens of Israel,
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities. Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities.

Israel Policy Forum, January 14, 2021.
29 T ranscript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6386943?5&search=6Qx4QHFb.
30 For varying views, see Efron and Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate”; Alan Baker, “ A U.S. Consulate for the
Palestinians Should Be on Palestinian T erritory – Not in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 15,
2021. T hePolitical context. Some factors that may have influenced the outbreak and trajectory of conflict included tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, the presence of a new U.S. Administration, and significant domestic political uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including a recent postponement of PA elections).  Fatalities. In exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza, 12 people in Israel (including 2 Thai nationals) and more than 250 people in Gaza (including more 27 For varying views, see Efron and Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate”; Alan Baker, “A U.S. Consulate for the Palestinians Should Be on Palestinian Territory – Not in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 15, 2021. The text of the Vienna Convention is available at text of the Vienna Convention is available at
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdfhttps://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf . .
3128 Presidential Proclamation 9683 of December 6, 2017, “Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel Presidential Proclamation 9683 of December 6, 2017, “Recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of the State of Israel
and Relocating the United States Embassyand Relocating the United States Embassy to Israel to Jerusalem,” availableto Israel to Jerusalem,” available at at
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-12-11/pdf/2017-26832.pdf. After the May 2018 opening of the U.S. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-12-11/pdf/2017-26832.pdf. After the May 2018 opening of the U.S.
embassy embassy in Jerusalem,in Jerusalem, the U.S. consulate general continued to operate independently until it was subsumedthe U.S. consulate general continued to operate independently until it was subsumed into the into the
embassy embassy in March 2019. Several other countries have operated independent consulates within Jerusalem for decades in March 2019. Several other countries have operated independent consulates within Jerusalem for decades
and continue to do so, includingand continue to do so, including the United Kingdom andthe United Kingdom and France.
32 “Next test for Israel PM: US plan for Palestinian mission.”
33 France. 29 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel,” Times of Israel, December 15, 2021. 30 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza. Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza.
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Political context. Some factors that may have influenced the outbreak and
trajectory of conflict included tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, the
presence of a new U.S. Administration, and significant domestic political
uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including a recent postponement of
PA elections).
Fatalities. In exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza, 12 people in Israel
(including 2 Thai nationals) and more than 250 people in Gaza (including more
than 60 children) were kil ed.34than 60 children) were killed.31 Amid unrest in the West Bank during that same Amid unrest in the West Bank during that same
timeframe (May 10-21), one source estimates that Israeli security forces timeframe (May 10-21), one source estimates that Israeli security forces kil edkilled 27 27
Palestinians.Palestinians.3532
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas,by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israelibut significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and and Egyptian access and
import/exportimport/export restrictions—facesrestrictions—faces difficult and complicated political,difficult and complicated political, economic,economic, and humanitarian conditions.and humanitarian conditions.3633
Palestinian militants in Gaza Palestinian militants in Gaza periodical y periodically clash with Israel’sclash with Israel’s military military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel,as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with with
militant actions and Israeli responsesmilitant actions and Israeli responses sometimes sometimes endangering civilianendangering civilian areas in southern Israel and Gaza, areas in southern Israel and Gaza,
respectively.respectively. These incidents These incidents periodical y periodically escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel
reportedlyreportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resourceswork through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent into Gaza and prevent
or manage conflict escalation.or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with tacit IsraeliSince 2018, Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with tacit Israeli approval) have permitted approval) have permitted
somesome commercial commercial trade via the informaltrade via the informal Salah al Din crossing that bypassesSalah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at the formal PA controls and taxes at
other Gaza crossings.other Gaza crossings.3734
Various actions exacerbated the tension in Jerusalem that led to conflict. These included Israeli Various actions exacerbated the tension in Jerusalem that led to conflict. These included Israeli
measures restricting Palestinian movement and worship in and around the Temple Mount/Haram measures restricting Palestinian movement and worship in and around the Temple Mount/Haram
al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) holy sites in the Old City,al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) holy sites in the Old City,3835 disputes about and responses to these disputes about and responses to these
measures, isolated attacks by Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish nationalist groups.measures, isolated attacks by Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish nationalist groups.3936
Unrest intensified in response to controversy over the possible eviction of several Palestinian Unrest intensified in response to controversy over the possible eviction of several Palestinian
families from their longtime residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, families from their longtime residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem,
stemming from an Israeli law that stemming from an Israeli law that al owsallows for Jewish recovery of property abandoned in for Jewish recovery of property abandoned in
connection with the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.connection with the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.4037 In November, Palestinian residents rejected a In November, Palestinian residents rejected a
proposed settlement to the case that remains pending before Israel’s Supreme Court, reportedly proposed settlement to the case that remains pending before Israel’s Supreme Court, reportedly
because of concerns that acceptance could be seen as legitimizing Jewish ownership of the because of concerns that acceptance could be seen as legitimizing Jewish ownership of the
property.property.4138 Palestinian leaders and some activists and international actors claim that the Sheikh Palestinian leaders and some activists and international actors claim that the Sheikh

34 Dina Kraft and Laura King, “ Jarrah case is part of a systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem since the area’s capture and effective annexation as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.39 Critics of Israeli actions connect controversies in Jerusalem with concerns about Jewish settlement activity and other allegations that Israel violates international law and Palestinian 31 Dina Kraft and Laura King, “Israel’s Netanyahu, master of political survival, tested by conflict with Gaza,”Israel’s Netanyahu, master of political survival, tested by conflict with Gaza,” Los
Angeles Tim es
Times, May 23, 2021; “, May 23, 2021; “ 2 T hai2 Thai workers killed, several people injured workers killed, several people injured as Hamas bombardsas Hamas bombards southern Israel,” southern Israel,”
Tim esTimes of Israel, May 18, 2021. , May 18, 2021.
3532 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Palestinian T erritory, “ Territory, “West Bank: Escalation West Bank: Escalation
of Violenceof Violence 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021. 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021.
3633 CRS CRS Report RL34074, Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
3734 Ahmad Abu Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for GazaAmer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” economy,” Al-Monitor, ,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber,November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber,New Gaza CrossingNew Gaza Crossing Raises Raises Questions About BlockadeQuestions About Blockade Policies,” Washington Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
3835 For background For background on Jerusalemon Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRSand its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
by Jim Zanotti. by Jim Zanotti.
39 “From T ikTok to T emple36 “From TikTok to Temple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem,”in Jerusalem,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. haaretz.com, May 10, 2021.
4037 Nir Hasson, “ Nir Hasson, “ Jerusalem Clashes:Jerusalem Clashes: How How Palestinians RalliedPalestinians Rallied Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some
Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of
casescases are at risk of beingare at risk of being evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss,evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss,Palestinians fear loss of family homes Palestinians fear loss of family homes
as evictions loom,” as evictions loom,” Associated Press, May 10, 2021. May 10, 2021.
4138 Daoud Daoud Kuttab, “Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah reject dealKuttab, “Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah reject deal with settlement organization,” with settlement organization,” Al-Monitor, November 8, , November 8,
2021. 2021.
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Jarrah case is part of a systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem since
the area’s capture and effective annexation as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.42
Critics of Israeli actions connect controversies in Jerusalem with concerns about Jewish
settlement activity and other al egations that Israel violates international law and Palestinian
human rights.4339 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem,” New York Times, May 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief human rights.40 During the conflict, some Members of Congress who criticized Israel’s conduct During the conflict, some Members of Congress who criticized Israel’s conduct
during hostilities, and/or voiced concern about the impact of conflict on civilians in Gaza, sought during hostilities, and/or voiced concern about the impact of conflict on civilians in Gaza, sought
to restrict the sale of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Israel.to restrict the sale of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Israel.4441
The Conflict’s Aftermath: Aid for Iron Dome and Gaza Relief
In the aftermath of the May 2021 conflict, the Biden Administration has sought to strengthen In the aftermath of the May 2021 conflict, the Biden Administration has sought to strengthen
Israel’s defensive capabilities, restore regional calm, and improve humanitarian conditions.Israel’s defensive capabilities, restore regional calm, and improve humanitarian conditions.4542
Within Congress, there has been broad bipartisan support for replenishing the Iron Dome Within Congress, there has been broad bipartisan support for replenishing the Iron Dome
system.system.4643 During the conflict, Palestinian armed groups (mostly Hamas and Palestine Islamic During the conflict, Palestinian armed groups (mostly Hamas and Palestine Islamic
Jihad) fired some 4,300 rockets into Israel, and the Israel Defense Forces reported that Iron Dome Jihad) fired some 4,300 rockets into Israel, and the Israel Defense Forces reported that Iron Dome
intercepted around 1,500 (representing 90% of those projectiles that were headed toward intercepted around 1,500 (representing 90% of those projectiles that were headed toward
populated areas).populated areas).4744 Each of Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptors, which are co-produced in Israel and Each of Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptors, which are co-produced in Israel and
the United States, cost approximately $50,000.the United States, cost approximately $50,000.48
45 A provision in the 2016 MOU A provision in the 2016 MOU al ows allows the United States and Israel to agree on amounts beyond the the United States and Israel to agree on amounts beyond the
regular annual U.S. aid regular annual U.S. aid al ocationsallocations under exceptional circumstances (such as major armed under exceptional circumstances (such as major armed
conflict), subject to congressional action. In August 2014, near the end of the last major Israel-conflict), subject to congressional action. In August 2014, near the end of the last major Israel-
Gaza conflict, Congress enacted an emergency supplemental appropriations resolution (P.L. 113-Gaza conflict, Congress enacted an emergency supplemental appropriations resolution (P.L. 113-
145) to provide $225 145) to provide $225 mil ion million in Department of Defense funding for Iron Dome on an expedited in Department of Defense funding for Iron Dome on an expedited
basis, without co-production requirements. Since FY2011, Congress has provided $1.72 basis, without co-production requirements. Since FY2011, Congress has provided $1.72 bil ion
billion (in current dollars) for Iron Dome. (in current dollars) for Iron Dome.
In September 2021, the House voted (by a 420-9 margin, with two voting “present”) to pass the In September 2021, the House voted (by a 420-9 margin, with two voting “present”) to pass the
Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 5323), which would provide $1 Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 5323), which would provide $1 bil ionbillion
in supplemental funding for Iron Dome over the next three years (FY2022-FY2024). Some in supplemental funding for Iron Dome over the next three years (FY2022-FY2024). Some bil s
bills that would supplement funding for Iron Dome have been introduced in the Senate. that would supplement funding for Iron Dome have been introduced in the Senate.
President Biden also has committed to “working with the United Nations and other international President Biden also has committed to “working with the United Nations and other international
stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the
people of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts” in partnership with the PA “in a manner that people of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts” in partnership with the PA “in a manner that
does not permit Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.”does not permit Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.”4946 With Gaza under Hamas control, With Gaza under Hamas control,
the obstacles to the obstacles to international yinternationally-supported post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after -supported post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after

42 Patrick Kingsley, “ Israel’s Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem ,” New York
Tim es
, May 10, 2021.
43 Al-Haq, “Action Alert: International Community Must T ake Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s
Aggression previous Israel-Hamas conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.47 Because of the PA’s inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwilling to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction. Without the PA’s involvement, international organizations and governments reportedly generally have less confidence that they can prevent Hamas from diverting assistance for its own 40 Al-Haq, “Action Alert: International Community Must Take Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s Aggression against Palestinian Jerusalemites,” May 10, 2021. For additional information, see CRSagainst Palestinian Jerusalemites,” May 10, 2021. For additional information, see CRS Report R46433, Report R46433,
Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
4441 “U.S. Sen. Sanders “U.S. Sen. Sanders Offers Resolution Blocking Arms SalesOffers Resolution Blocking Arms Sales to Israel,” to Israel,” Reuters, May 20, 2021. , May 20, 2021.
4542 White House, “ White House, “ Remarks by President BidenRemarks by President Biden on the Middleon the Middle East East,” May 20, 2021. ,” May 20, 2021.
4643 Representative Josh Gottheimer, “Release: Bipartisan Group Representative Josh Gottheimer, “Release: Bipartisan Group o fof 56 House Members 56 House Members Back Urgent FundingBack Urgent Funding for Israel’s for Israel’s
Iron Dome MissileIron Dome Missile Defense System,” JuneDefense System,” June 2, 2021. 2, 2021.
47 44 Sebastien Sebastien Roblin, “Roblin, “ How Hamas’ Arsenal ShapedHow Hamas’ Arsenal Shaped the Gazathe Gaza War of May 2021War of May 2021 ,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021. ,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021.
48 Manuel T rajtenberg and T omer Fadlon, “ T he45 Manuel Trajtenberg and Tomer Fadlon, “The Economic Costs of Operation Guardian of the Walls,” Economic Costs of Operation Guardian of the Walls,” INSS Insight,
No. 1485, June 13, 2021. No. 1485, June 13, 2021.
4946 White House, “ White House, “ Remarks by President BidenRemarks by President Biden on the Middleon the Middle East ,” May 20 East,” May 20, 2021. 47 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. , 2021.
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previous Israel-Hamas conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.50 Because of the PA’s inability to
control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction.
Without the PA’s involvement, international organizations and governments reportedly general y
have less confidence that they can prevent Hamas from diverting assistance for its own
purposes.51purposes.48 Since 2018, Qatar has provided $300 Since 2018, Qatar has provided $300 mil ionmillion in cash assistance for Gaza, but due to in cash assistance for Gaza, but due to
Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar began an arrangement in September Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar began an arrangement in September
2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United Nations.2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United Nations.5249 In November, In November,
Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to restart the Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to restart the
assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak
of conflict.of conflict.53
50 Certain Human Rights Considerations: International Criminal
Court and U.S. Aid
Some international bodies have taken actions that open Some international bodies have taken actions that open al egedalleged Israeli human rights violations Israeli human rights violations
against Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny, in the context of broader debate on this against Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny, in the context of broader debate on this
subject. The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor announced the start of an subject. The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor announced the start of an
investigation in Marchinvestigation in March 2021 into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza. into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.5451 The investigation might The investigation might
draw from the findings of an ongoing commission of inquiry established by the U.N. Human draw from the findings of an ongoing commission of inquiry established by the U.N. Human
Rights Council in May in the wake of the recent Israel-Gaza conflict.Rights Council in May in the wake of the recent Israel-Gaza conflict.5552 The Biden Administration The Biden Administration
responded responded skeptical yskeptically to the creation of the “open-ended” commission of inquiry. to the creation of the “open-ended” commission of inquiry.5653 Like its Like its
predecessors, the Administration has criticized the Human Rights Council for what it predecessors, the Administration has criticized the Human Rights Council for what it
characterizes as a disproportionate focus on Israel.characterizes as a disproportionate focus on Israel.5754
In 2021, some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. In 2021, some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S.
security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. In April 2021 a security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. In April 2021 a bil bill was introduced in was introduced in
the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the amount of U.S. aid provided to the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the amount of U.S. aid provided to
Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some human rights Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some human rights al egations.58allegations.55 Later in Later in
April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the chair and ranking member of the House April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the chair and ranking member of the House
Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or adding conditions on security Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or adding conditions on security
assistance to Israel,assistance to Israel,5956 quoting remarks that President Biden made during the 2020 presidential quoting remarks that President Biden made during the 2020 presidential

50 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a T ough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
51 Ibid.
52 48 Ibid. 49 Aaron Boxerman, “ Aaron Boxerman, “ UN to begin dispensingUN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday underQatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,”new deal,” Times of
Israel
, September 12, 2021. , September 12, 2021.
5350 Yaniv Kubovich, “ Yaniv Kubovich, “ Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,”Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29, haaretz.com, November 29,
2021; Abu2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
5451 CRS CRS Report RL34074, Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
5552 U.N. document, A/HRC U.N. document, A/HRC/RES/S-30/1, May 27, 2021. The Council mandated the commission “to investigate in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel all alleged violations of international humanitarian law and all alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law leading up to and since 13 April 2021, and all underlying root causes of recurrent tensions, instability and protraction of conflict, including systematic discrimination and repression based on national, ethnic, racial or religious identity.” 53 U.S. /S-30/L.1, as orally revised, May 27, 2021.
56 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “ Press Statement: UN Human RightsPress Statement: UN Human Rights Council SessionCouncil Session on the on the
Israeli-Palestinian Situation,” May 27, 2021. Israeli-Palestinian Situation,” May 27, 2021.
57 54 U.S. U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “ Secretary Blinken: Remarks to the 46th Session of the Secretary Blinken: Remarks to the 46th Session of the
Human Rights Council,” FebruaryHuman Rights Council,” February 24, 2021. For more on Israel and the U.N. Human Rights Council, see CRS Report RL33608, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Background and Policy Issues, by Luisa Blanchfield and Michael A. Weber. 55 See, for example, Amnesty International, Israel’s apartheid against Palestinians: Cruel system of domination and crime against humanity, February 2022; Human Rights Watch, A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution, April 27, 2021. The24, 2021.
58 “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel of apartheid over treatment of Palestinians,” Associated Press, April 27, 2021
(underlying Human Rights Watch report available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-
authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution, with the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights
Practices: Israel, West Bank and GazaPractices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza is available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-
rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/).
59 T ext. 56 Text of letter available at https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ of letter available at https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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race. race.6057 In July, the House passed a Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related In July, the House passed a Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs appropriations Programs appropriations bil bill for FY2022 that would require U.S. consultation with a recipient for FY2022 that would require U.S. consultation with a recipient
government to ensure that any arms sale involving U.S. FMF complies with relevant oversight government to ensure that any arms sale involving U.S. FMF complies with relevant oversight
provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and is consistent with U.S. national security policy, provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and is consistent with U.S. national security policy,
while also requiring the State Department to report to Congress any credible information that U.S. while also requiring the State Department to report to Congress any credible information that U.S.
assistance may have been used contrary to these parameters (Section 7035(b)(8) of H.R. 4373). assistance may have been used contrary to these parameters (Section 7035(b)(8) of H.R. 4373).
Considerations regarding Israel may have partly motivated the inclusion of these legislative Considerations regarding Israel may have partly motivated the inclusion of these legislative
requirements.requirements.61
Arab State Normalization with Israel58 The Abraham Accords
The Administration has followed agreements reached during the Trump Administration (the The Administration has followed agreements reached during the Trump Administration (the
“Abraham Accords”) that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab “Abraham Accords”) that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or Muslim-majority states—states—
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.62 59 Biden Administration officials Biden Administration officials
have said that U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Arab have said that U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Arab states wil or Muslim-majority states will continue alongside continue alongside
efforts to increase the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian efforts to increase the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.conflict.6360 Palestinian leaders denounced the Abraham Accords as an abandonment of the Palestinian leaders denounced the Abraham Accords as an abandonment of the
Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian
negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.64
61 The Pathway to the Abraham Accords, and Its Implications for Palestinians
Before Before the Abraham Accords,the Abraham Accords, Egypt and Jordan had been the only Arab states with formalEgypt and Jordan had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations diplomatic relations
with Israel.with Israel.65 62 In 1981, Saudi Arabia’sIn 1981, Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later
enshrined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israelenshrined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions,would make certain concessions, including including
on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalizeon Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it.their relations with it.6663 After Israel After Israel started started
negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limitednegotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited diplomatic relationsdiplomatic relations with Morocco, and with Morocco, and
informalinformal ties with a number of other Arab states,ties with a number of other Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain.including the UAE and Bahrain.6764 These countries downgraded These countries downgraded
their ties with Israel after the onset of the second Palestiniantheir ties with Israel after the onset of the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) in 2000. However,(or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past in the past
decade discreetdecade discreet Israeli Israeli links with Arab states on issues including links with Arab states on issues including intel igence, intelligence, security, and trade have become security, and trade have become

2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf.
60 57 Omri Nahmias, “ Omri Nahmias, “ Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020. Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020.
6158 Ron Kampeas, “ Ron Kampeas, “ Pro-Israel groups split over whether new USPro-Israel groups split over whether new US spending spending bill conditions foreign aid,”bill conditions foreign aid,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency
, August, August 5, 2021. 5, 2021.
6259 Steps taken in connection with these agreements include a proposed U.S. Steps taken in connection with these agreements include a proposed U.S. sale sale to the UAE of F-35s, drone aircraft, to the UAE of F-35s, drone aircraft,
and munitions; Sudan’sand munitions; Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list; and U.S.removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list; and U.S. recognition of Moroccan recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty claims over the disputedsovereignty claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. territory of Western Sahara.
63 60 Department of State, Yael Lempert, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Remarks at the Department of State, Yael Lempert, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Remarks at the
Abraham Accords Institute of Peace,” September 14, 2021. Abraham Accords Institute of Peace,” September 14, 2021.
6461 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada,Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
6562 Egypt and Israel signed Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel dida peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel did the same in 1994.the same in 1994.
66 T he 63 The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdrawto withdraw fully from the fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem,territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and and
provide for the “provide for the “ [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
AssemblyAssembly Resolution 194.” Resolution 194.” T heThe initiative was proposed by Saudi initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57 --
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. T heThe text of the initiative is available at text of the initiative is available at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
6764 Miriam Berger, Miriam Berger,Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam
Entous, “Donald Entous, “Donald T rumpTrump’s New World Order,” ’s New World Order,” New Yorker, June 11, 2018; CRS June 11, 2018; CRS Report 95-1013, Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest,
Security, and U.S. Policy
, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
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closer closer and moreand more public. Israelpublic. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common concerns, such as Iran’s has worked with these countries to counter common concerns, such as Iran’s
regional influence and militaryregional influence and military capabilities (seecapabilities (see “Iran and the Region” below below) and Sunni Islamist) and Sunni Islamist populist populist
movementsmovements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches and affiliates).(including various Muslim Brotherhood branches and affiliates).68
65 To cement its normalization of relationsTo cement its normalization of relations with the UAE, Israelwith the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex
part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE receivedpart of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitmenta commitment from Trump Administration from Trump Administration
officials that they would not approve Israeliofficials that they would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024.annexation until at least January 2024.6966 Palestinian leaders claimed Palestinian leaders claimed
that the UAE legitimizedthat the UAE legitimized Israel’sIsrael’s annexation threats by bargaining over them, and thus acquiesced to a Westannexation threats by bargaining over them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank Bank
status quo that somestatus quo that some observers observers label “de facto annexation.”label “de facto annexation.”7067 UAE officials UAE officials countered that by significantly delaying countered that by significantly delaying
IsraeliIsraeli declarations of sovereignty overdeclarations of sovereignty over West Bank areas,West Bank areas, they preservedthey preserved prospects for future negotiations toward prospects for future negotiations toward
a Palestinian state.a Palestinian state.7168 Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Israeli Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Israeli officials officials have appealed to have appealed to
domesticdomestic pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements relatedpro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements related to settlement construction and to settlement construction and
expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Official statements from Saudi Arabian officials continue to condition Saudi Official statements from Saudi Arabian officials continue to condition Saudi normaliz ationnormalization with Israel with Israel on the API’s on the API’s
provisions.provisions.72 Some 69 Some key Saudi figures—possiblykey Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be wil ingincluding Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be wil ing to to
drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalizationdrop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinianthat relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specific conflict. Specific
incentives to do so could include heightened regionalincentives to do so could include heightened regional cooperation on Iran, U.S. offers of advanced arms,cooperation on Iran, U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects prospects
to boost Saudi economicto boost Saudi economic diversification,diversification, and greaterand greater Saudi influence over MuslimSaudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.holy sites in Jerusalem.7370
Nevertheless,Nevertheless, developments in 2021 such as Israel-Gaza conflict and ongoing tensions over Jerusalemdevelopments in 2021 such as Israel-Gaza conflict and ongoing tensions over Jerusalem might might have have
strengthened Saudi inclinations to take a cautious, gradual approach toward normalization.strengthened Saudi inclinations to take a cautious, gradual approach toward normalization.7471
Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and
rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical
trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states
to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for
Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add
Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.7572 Israel had previously been under the Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and
some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might
encounter political encounter political chal engeschallenges in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel. in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel.
Other factors may influence regional cooperation and rivalry. These could include U.S. arms sales Other factors may influence regional cooperation and rivalry. These could include U.S. arms sales
to Arab states and possible economic benefits from Israel-Arab state relations.to Arab states and possible economic benefits from Israel-Arab state relations.76 Additional y,

68 Steve Hendrix, “ 73 Additionally, 65 Steve Hendrix, “Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,” Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,”
washingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRSwashingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRS Report 95-1013, Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth , by Kenneth
Katzman. Katzman.
6966 Jacob Magid, Jacob Magid,US assuredUS assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, T oIToI told,” told,” Times of Israel, ,
September 13, 2020. September 13, 2020.
7067 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada,Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
71 68 “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” Times of Israel, August, August 14, 14,
2020. 2020.
7269 HRH Prince Faisal HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud,bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session,First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama
Dialogue,Dialogue, December 5, 2020. December 5, 2020.
7370 Yoel Guzansky, Yoel Guzansky, “ Saudi “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies,Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. Insight No.
1396, October 29, 2020. 1396, October 29, 2020.
74 71 Hussein Hussein Ibish, “Ibish, “ Why SaudiWhy Saudi Arabia Arabia Is NowIs Now in No Rushin No Rush to Recognize Israel,” haaretz.com, July 7, 2021. to Recognize Israel,” haaretz.com, July 7, 2021.
7572 Jared Szuba, Jared Szuba, “T rump “Trump orders US orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, , January 15,
2021. 2021.
76 T heresa 73 Theresa Hitchens, “ Hitchens, “ UAE Arms SaleUAE Arms Sale Remains In Limbo Pending Biden Review,”Remains In Limbo Pending Biden Review,” Breaking Defense, August, August 5, 2021. 5, 2021.
T heThe Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “ Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “ Recognizing also their shared goal to advance regional Recognizing also their shared goal to advance regional
economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promote collaborations on economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promote collaborations on
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Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining normalization with Israel might gauge Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining normalization with Israel might gauge
whether expected benefits from normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism whether expected benefits from normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism
or unrest they might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.or unrest they might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.7774 Normalization efforts Normalization efforts
to date have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public opinion, its to date have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public opinion, its
drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of authoritarian Arab regimes. drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of authoritarian Arab regimes.
In the August Biden-Bennett White House meeting, the two leaders discussed ways to deepen the In the August Biden-Bennett White House meeting, the two leaders discussed ways to deepen the
Abraham Accords relationships and identify “new opportunities to expand such partnerships.”Abraham Accords relationships and identify “new opportunities to expand such partnerships.”78
Notable developments75 Developments since include a since include a majorgeneral deepening of Israel-UAE Israel-UAE-Jordan trade and investment trade and investment ties76—including a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative initiative
focused on desalinated water and solar focused on desalinated water and solar energy,79 energy77—and more formal Israel-Morocco defense and more formal Israel-Morocco defense
cooperation.cooperation.8078
Iran and the Region
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (especial yespecially in in
Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),8179 and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war
similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the
smal small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their -scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their al iesallies as as
the “the campaign between wars.”the “the campaign between wars.”82
80 Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister
Netanyahu opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration, Netanyahu opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration,
and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA
and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the
intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weaponssignificantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons .83
U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional
uncertainty, with implications for Israel.84 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s

.81 strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a mult ilateralmultilateral working group for the working group for the
‘‘T racksTracks for Regional Peace’ project.” for Regional Peace’ project.” T heThe Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from
Israel to SaudiIsrael to Saudi Arabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in AugustArabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in August 2019. A major part of its appeal would2019. A major part of its appeal would be be
allowingallowing the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) andthe participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab Bab
al Mandabal Mandab (Red Sea).(Red Sea). See See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ T racksTracks for regional peace—regional land bridge for regional peace—regional land bridge and and
hubhub initiative,” August 5, 2019. initiative,” August 5, 2019.
7774 See, See, for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” Wall Street
Journal
, December 17, 2020. , December 17, 2020.
78 75 White House, “ White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden,Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett ofJr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,” Israel,”
AugustAugust 27, 2021. 27, 2021.
7976 Dov Lieber, “U.A.E. Invests in Israel's Tech Sector,” Wall Street Journal 77 “Israel, Jordan sign “Israel, Jordan sign huge UAE-brokered dealhuge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
8078 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021. , November 26, 2021.
8179 For information on this topic, see CRS For information on this topic, see CRS Report R44017, Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
8280 See, See, for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: T heThe Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security,
January 6, 2021. January 6, 2021.
8381 David E. Sanger David E. Sanger and William J. Broad,and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” New York Times, September 13, 2021. , September 13, 2021.
84 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman,
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Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional uncertainty, with implications for Israel.82 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could
transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.8583 In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence
that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab
Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.86 Additional y, 84 Additionally, reported low-level reported low-level
Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—including cyberspace, international waters, and the Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—including cyberspace, international waters, and the
territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—has further exacerbated regional tensions.territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—has further exacerbated regional tensions.8785
As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy and considers the possibility of As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy and considers the possibility of
reenteringreentering or revising the JCPOA, Israel the JCPOA, Israel—whose officials are general y skeptical of U.S. reentry— is seeking is seeking
to influence diplomatic outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international to influence diplomatic outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international
negotiations with Iran, Prime Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return negotiations with Iran, Prime Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return
to the JCPOA.to the JCPOA.86 In January 2022, one media report suggested that some leading Israeli security officials might prefer some kind of international deal to no deal because an agreement could provide “increased certainty about the limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for escalation scenarios.”87 However, on February 1, Prime Minister Bennett stated a preference for no deal.88 88
Some observers have speculated that Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear Some observers have speculated that Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear
program might influence or disrupt diplomacy on the issue,89 and some U.S. officials have program might influence or disrupt diplomacy on the issue,89 and some U.S. officials have
reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the overal overall effectiveness of such covert effectiveness of such covert
operations.90 In between his August operations.90 In between his August 2021 White House meetings with Prime Minister Bennett, White House meetings with Prime Minister Bennett,
President BidenPresident Biden said that the United States said that the United States wil will first use diplomacy to “ensure Iran never develops first use diplomacy to “ensure Iran never develops
a nuclear weapon,” but if that fails, “we’re ready to turn to other options.”91 a nuclear weapon,” but if that fails, “we’re ready to turn to other options.”91 According to one
account, during these meetings Bennett restated his opposition to a U.S. return to the JCPOA, and
Biden did not seem optimistic about Iran returning to compliance with the deal.92 Bennett also Bennett also
reportedly presented a strategy to Biden that involves “countering Iran through a combination of reportedly presented a strategy to Biden that involves “countering Iran through a combination of
many many smal small actions across several fronts—both military and diplomatic—instead of a single actions across several fronts—both military and diplomatic—instead of a single
dramatic strike.”dramatic strike.”9392 In a September interview, Defense Minister Gantz suggested that he would be In a September interview, Defense Minister Gantz suggested that he would be
prepared to accept a U.S. return to the JCPOA, while also prepared to accept a U.S. return to the JCPOA, while also cal ingcalling for a “viable, U.S.-led plan B” for a “viable, U.S.-led plan B”
to pressure Iran in case negotiations are unsuccessful, and to pressure Iran in case negotiations are unsuccessful, and al udingalluding to Israeli military contingency to Israeli military contingency
plans.plans.9493 In October, amid ongoing U.S.-Israel consultations on the issue and reported Israeli In October, amid ongoing U.S.-Israel consultations on the issue and reported Israeli
uncertainty about U.S. wil ingness to strike Iran militarily,95 Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi,
the Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff, said, “The operational plans against Iran’s nuclear

82 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton T homas.
85Thomas. 83 Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must ShutWhy Israel Must Shut Down Its NuclearDown Its Nuclear Reactor,” haaretz.com, Reactor,” haaretz.com,
October 6, 2019. October 6, 2019.
86 T om84 Tom O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as RedDrones’ in Yemen as Red Sea T ensions Sea Tensions Rise,” Rise,” Newsweek,
January 13, 2021. January 13, 2021.
87 85 Isabel Kershner et al., “ Isabel Kershner et al., “ Hezbollah Admits to Rocket Strike on Northern Israel, Deepening Border Hezbollah Admits to Rocket Strike on Northern Israel, Deepening Border T ensionsTensions,” ,” New
York Tim es
Times, August, August 7, 2021; “7, 2021; “ Fighting in the Shadows:Fighting in the Shadows: Israel and Iran,” Soufan Center, MarchIsrael and Iran,” Soufan Center, March 30, 2021. 30, 2021.
8886 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “ Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “ PM BennettPM Bennett's Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for s Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for
Policy and Strategy Conference, Reichman UniversityPolicy and Strategy Conference, Reichman University ,” November 23, 2021.
,” November 23, 2021. 87 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel’s military intel chief says Iran deal better than no deal,” Axios, January 5, 2022. 88 Jonathan Lis, “Bennett Announces Laser-based Missile Defense System ‘Within a Year,’” haaretz.com, February 1, 2022. 89 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “89 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “ Israel and Iran Are PullingIsrael and Iran Are Pulling the United States the United States T owardToward
ConflictConflict ,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “ T heThe ramifications of a US return to the ramifications of a US return to the
2015 Iran deal—opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021. 2015 Iran deal—opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021.
90 David E. Sanger90 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgradeet al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
91 White House, “91 White House, “ Remarks by President BidenRemarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett of the State of Israel Before Expanded and Prime Minister Bennett of the State of Israel Before Expanded
Bilateral Meeting,” AugustBilateral Meeting,” August 27, 2021.
92 Barak Ravid, “ Israeli PM presented Biden with ‘death by a thousand cuts’ Iran strategy,” Axios, August 27, 2021.
93 Ibid.
94 27, 2021. 92 Ibid. 93 Neri Zilber, “ Neri Zilber, “ Israel Can Live with a NewIsrael Can Live with a New Iran Nuclear Deal, Defense Minister Says,”Iran Nuclear Deal, Defense Minister Says,” foreignpolicy.com, September Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief uncertainty about U.S. willingness to strike Iran militarily,94 Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi, the Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff, said, “The operational plans against Iran’s nuclear program will foreignpolicy.com, September
14, 2021.
95 Ben Caspit, “ Israel still fears US approach to Iran,” Al-Monitor, October 8, 2021.
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program wil continue to evolve and improve … it is our duty to provide an effective and timely continue to evolve and improve … it is our duty to provide an effective and timely
military response.”military response.”9695
Hezbollah
Lebanese HezbollahLebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state al yally in the region. Hezbollah’s in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have forces and Israel’s military have sporadical ysporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.conflict.9796 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional
implications.implications.9897 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly
Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its
projectiles—and its projectiles—and its al egedalleged use of Lebanese civilian use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.areas as strongholds.99
98 Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah
conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build
precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.10099 Following some cross-border fire between Israeli Following some cross-border fire between Israeli
forces and Hezbollah in August 2021, one report assessed that neither party desired a major forces and Hezbollah in August 2021, one report assessed that neither party desired a major
escalation, but also cited Israeli military officials saying that they would not permit unobstructed escalation, but also cited Israeli military officials saying that they would not permit unobstructed
attacks.attacks.101100
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns102Concerns101
U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in
Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure.Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure.103102 Israel-China investment ties have grown Israel-China investment ties have grown
since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,104103 with Israel as an attractive hub of with Israel as an attractive hub of
innovation for Chinese partners, and China as a huge potential export market and source of
investment for Israeli businesses.105

96 14, 2021. 94 Ben Caspit, “Israel still fears US approach to Iran,” Al-Monitor, October 8, 2021. 95 “Israeli military chief hints of covert action against Iran,” “Israeli military chief hints of covert action against Iran,” Associated Press, October 5, 2021. , October 5, 2021.
9796 CRS CRS Report R44759, Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud;, by Carla E. Humud; CRS CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10703, IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. , by Carla E.
Humud. Humud.
98 97 Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion, Orion, Counting the cost: Avoiding another war between Israel and Hezbollah , , Atlantic
Council
, May 13, 2020. , May 13, 2020.
9998 See, See, for example, “for example, “ Hezbollah says it has doubledHezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guidedits arsenal of guided missiles,”missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, December 28,
2020; Ben Hubbard2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “and Ronen Bergman, “ Who Warns Hezbollah Who Warns Hezbollah T hatThat Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York
Tim es
Times, April 23, 2020. , April 23, 2020.
10099 “Hezbollah says it has doubled “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guidedits arsenal of guided missiles,”missiles,” Associated Press;; Ben Caspit, “Ben Caspit, “ Hezbollah, Israel Hezbollah, Israel
losing red lines,” losing red lines,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2019. , September 4, 2019.
101 100 Kershner et al., “ Kershner et al., “ Hezbollah Admits to Rocket Strike on Northern Israel.” Hezbollah Admits to Rocket Strike on Northern Israel.”
102101 For background For background on past U.S.on past U.S. concerns regardingconcerns regarding Israeli defense transactions with China, see CRSIsraeli defense transactions with China, see CRS Report RL33476, Report RL33476,
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, , by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy , by Jeremy
M. Sharp. M. Sharp.
103 102 Shira Efron et al., Shira Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and
the United States
, RAND, RAND Corporation, 2020; Shira Efron, et al., Corporation, 2020; Shira Efron, et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, RAND , RAND
Corporation, 2019; Jewish Institute for National Security of America, Corporation, 2019; Jewish Institute for National Security of America, Countering Chinese Engagem entEngagement with Israel: A
Com prehensiveComprehensive and Cooperative U.S.-Israeli Strategy
, February, February 2021. 2021.
104103 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations, coordinated , coordinated
by Susanby Susan V. Lawrence.
105 Danny Zaken, “Chinese-operated port opens in Israel despite American concerns,” Al-Monitor, September 9, 2021.
V. Lawrence. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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link to page 24 link to page 24 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

innovation for Chinese partners, and China as a huge potential export market and source of investment for Israeli businesses.104 Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U.S. expressions of concern,Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U.S. expressions of concern,106105
apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather intel igenceintelligence or acquire technologies or acquire technologies
with the potential to threaten U.S. national security in such fields as cybersecurity, artificial with the potential to threaten U.S. national security in such fields as cybersecurity, artificial
intel igence, satel iteintelligence, satellite communications, and robotics. Previously, China-Israel defense industry communications, and robotics. Previously, China-Israel defense industry
cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U.S.-Israel defense relationship cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U.S.-Israel defense relationship
and to an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China.and to an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China.107106 Partly due to U.S. Partly due to U.S.
concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on
foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.108107 However, this panel reportedly does not have the However, this panel reportedly does not have the
authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s
investments in Israel in the previous decade.investments in Israel in the previous decade.109108 According to a 2021 study by Israel’s Institute for According to a 2021 study by Israel’s Institute for
National Security Studies: National Security Studies:
Chinese Chinese investments,investments, especially in the high-tech sector, did indeed show progressive
growth both in number and scale, especially between 2014 and especially in the high-tech sector, did indeed show progressive growth both in number and scale, especially between 2014 and their peak in 2018. their peak in 2018.
However, in 2019However, in 2019 and 2020 the pendulum swung again, as China slowed its penetration and 2020 the pendulum swung again, as China slowed its penetration
intointo the Israeli economy [see Appendix C], just as it did elsewhere in the world. the Israeli economy [see Appendix C], just as it did elsewhere in the world. The The
reasons for this were a combination of changes in domestic Chinese priorities regarding reasons for this were a combination of changes in domestic Chinese priorities regarding
thethe export of capital out of the country and external causes, such as the export of capital out of the country and external causes, such as the coronavirus coronavirus
pandemic and a less inviting climate for Chinese investments due to American pressure.pandemic and a less inviting climate for Chinese investments due to American pressure.110
Additional y, 109 Additionally, U.S. officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement in U.S. officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement in
specific Israeli infrastructure projects. President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister specific Israeli infrastructure projects. President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister
Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be
limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel, limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel,
in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U.S. in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U.S. al iesallies and and
partners.partners.111110 Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials reportedly blocked Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials reportedly blocked
Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure.Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure.112111 In May 2020, In May 2020,
shortly after then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that shortly after then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that
Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U.S.-Israel cooperation, Israel’s finance Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U.S.-Israel cooperation, Israel’s finance
ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1.5 ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1.5 bil ionbillion desalination plant, turning down desalination plant, turning down
the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group.the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group.113
Additional y, 112 Additionally, the U.S. Navy reportedly reconsidered its practice of the U.S. Navy reportedly reconsidered its practice of periodical yperiodically docking at the docking at the
Israeli naval base in Haifa, because a state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International Israeli naval base in Haifa, because a state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International
Port Group) secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years.114 This
terminal opened in September 2021.115 Biden Administration officials have reportedly pressed

106 Ron Kampeas, “ 104 Danny Zaken, “Chinese-operated port opens in Israel despite American concerns,” Al-Monitor, September 9, 2021. 105 Ron Kampeas, “Breaking China: A rupture looms betweenBreaking China: A rupture looms between Israel and the United States,” Israel and the United States,” Jewish Telegraphic
Agency
, June 2, 2020. , June 2, 2020.
107 106 Efron et al., Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, pp. 15-20. , 2019, pp. 15-20.
108 Arie Egozi, “ In late 2021, three Israeli companies and 10 suspects were indicted on charges of exporting cruise missiles to China without a permit. “10 Israelis set to be Indicted for Illegally Exporting Missiles to China,” Times of Israel, December 20, 2021. 107 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China T argetedTargeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019. ,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019.
109108 Efron et al., Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology,, 2020, pp. 24-25. 2020, pp. 24-25.
110109 Doron Ella, Doron Ella, Chinese Investments in Israel: Developments and a Look to the Future, Institute for National Security , Institute for National Security
Studies,Studies, February 1, 2021. February 1, 2021.
111110 Hiddai Hiddai Segev,Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “ My Way or the Huawei?My Way or the Huawei? T he The United States-China Race for 5G United States-China Race for 5G
Dominance,” Institute for National Security StudiesDominance,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019. Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019.
112 Hiddai Segev 111 Hiddai Segev and Assaf Orion, “and Assaf Orion, “ T heThe Great Power Competition over 5G Communications: Limited Success Great Power Competition over 5G Communications: Limited Success for the for the
American Campaign against Huawei,”American Campaign against Huawei,” Institute for National Security StudiesInstitute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1268, March 3, 2020. Insight No. 1268, March 3, 2020.
113112 “Amid US “Amid US pressure,pressure, Israel taps local firm over China for $1.5b desalination Israel taps local firm over China for $1.5b desalination p lantplant,” Times of Israel, May 26, 2020. Congressional Research Service 15 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Port Group) secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years.113 This terminal opened in September 2021.114 Biden Administration officials have reportedly pressed ,” Times of Israel, May 26, 2020.
114 Roie Yellinek, “ T he Israel-China-U.S. T riangle and the Haifa Port Project,” Middle East Institute, November 27,
2018. Reportedly, the Israeli government planned to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances.
Jack Detsch, “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2019.
115 Galia Lavi and Assaf Orion, “ T he Launch of the Haifa Bayport T erminal: Economic and Security Considerations,”
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Israeli counterparts to regularly check heavy machinery at the port for technology that could be Israeli counterparts to regularly check heavy machinery at the port for technology that could be
employed to spy on the nearby naval base.employed to spy on the nearby naval base.116115 Other state-owned Chinese companies are Other state-owned Chinese companies are
developing a new port in Ashdod (which also hosts an Israeli naval base), and taking part in developing a new port in Ashdod (which also hosts an Israeli naval base), and taking part in
construction for Tel Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa.construction for Tel Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa.117

Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1516, September 12, 2021.
116 Arie Egozi, “ US Presses Israel on Haifa Port amid China Espionage Concerns: Sources,” Breaking Defense, October
5, 2021.
117 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, p. 38.
116 In early 2022, an Israeli official was cited as saying that Israel has agreed to “update Washington about any major deals with Beijing, especially in infrastructure and technology” and “would reconsider any such deals at America’s request.”117 113 Roie Yellinek, “The Israel-China-U.S. Triangle and the Haifa Port Project,” Middle East Institute, November 27, 2018. Reportedly, the Israeli government planned to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances. Jack Detsch, “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2019. 114 Galia Lavi and Assaf Orion, “The Launch of the Haifa Bayport Terminal: Economic and Security Considerations,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1516, September 12, 2021. 115 Arie Egozi, “US Presses Israel on Haifa Port amid China Espionage Concerns: Sources,” Breaking Defense, October 5, 2021. 116 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, p. 38. 117 Lahav Harkov, “Israel Agrees to Update US About China Trade to Avoid Tension,” Jerusalem Post, January 3, 2022. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah FischerGraphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using using
Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intel igence Intelligence Agency GeoNames Agency GeoNames
Database (2015); DeLormeDatabase (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from(2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, WorldInternational Monetary Fund, World Economic Economic
Outlook Database; CIA, Outlook Database; CIA, The World Factbook; and Economist ; and Economist Intel igence Unit. Al numbers are estimates Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2021 for 2021
unless otherwiseunless otherwise specified. specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch (1) The West Bank is Israeli According to the U.S. executive branch (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status subject occupied with current status subject
to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinianto the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determinedInterim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolvednegotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized JerusalemUnited States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’sas Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeliof Israeli sovereignty.sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily(4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. authoritative. Additional yAdditionally, the United States , the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on Decemberon December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’sby Israel’s military military is occupied is occupied
territoryterritory belonging to Syria.belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of IsraelThe current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
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Appendix B. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset
and Their Leaders

RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats (Opposition) (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats (Opposition)
Israel’sIsrael’s historical repository historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorialterritorial compromise;compromise; has also championed free-markethas also championed free-market policies.policies.
Leader: Binyamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as primeBorn in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also from 2009 to June 2021, and also
was primewas prime minister from minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces special forces
unit (Sayeret Matkal), and receivedunit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career
in politicsin politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticismand diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the regarding the
exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desireexchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s to counter Iran’s
nuclear program nuclear program and regional influence. He is and regional influence. He is general ygenerally regarded as both a regarded as both a
consummate political dealmaker consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. and a security-minded nationalist.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats (Coalition) (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Pro-secular,Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakersspeakers from the formerfrom the former Soviet Union. Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, LiebermanBorn in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’sis Israel’s finance minister,finance minister, and has previously servedand has previously served as as
defense ministerdefense minister and foreign minister.and foreign minister. He is He is general ygenerally viewed as an ardent nationalist viewed as an ardent nationalist
and canny politicaland canny political actor with primeactor with prime ministerial ministerial aspirations. Liebermanaspirations. Lieberman was born in was born in
the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigratedthe Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He to Israel in 1978. He
worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usionedworked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s by Netanyahu’s
wil ingness wil ingness to considerto consider concessions to the Palestinians, Liebermanconcessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael founded Yisrael
Beitenu as a platform for former Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants.Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption He was acquitted of corruption
al egationsallegations in a 2013 case. in a 2013 case.
Yamina
(Right) – 7 seats (Coalition) (Right) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Right-of-center mergerRight-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home,of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National and National
Union; base of support among religiousUnion; base of support among religious Zionists Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews); (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews);
includes core constituencies supporting Westincludes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlementsBank settlements and annexation. and annexation.
Leader: Prime Minister Naftali Bennett (biography in text box in the main body of the report)

New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats (Coalition) (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats (Coalition)
New Hope is a party formedNew Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Ministerin 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu Netanyahu
and Likud for mainstreamand Likud for mainstream right-wing voters. right-wing voters.
Leader: Gideon Sa’ar
Born in 1966, Sa’ar servesBorn in 1966, Sa’ar serves as justice minister.as justice minister. He served as cabinet secretary in the He served as cabinet secretary in the
1990s (for Prime1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for PrimeMinister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel Minister Ariel
Sharon). He became an influential and popular memberSharon). He became an influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the of Likud, first elected to the
Knesset in 2003. He served Knesset in 2003. He served as education ministeras education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior from 2009 to 2013 and interior
minister minister from from 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019
but left Likud to form New Hope a year later. but left Likud to form New Hope a year later.
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Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats (Opposition) (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats (Opposition)
Grouping of right-of-center parties including ReligiousGrouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/NationalZionism/National Union-Union-
Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections. Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism
since 2019. A trained lawyer,since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promotehe has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish Jewish
nationalist and religiouslynationalist and religiously conservative conservative causes. causes.

LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – 7 seats (Coalition) (Avoda) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Labor is Israel’sLabor is Israel’s historical repositoryhistorical repository of social democratic,of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’sZionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility responsibility for Palestinians for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza. in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister.Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leaderShe became Labor’s leader in 2020 in 2020

and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Beforeand was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she entering national politics, she
founded and headed an organization that supports victimsfounded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a of sexual assault, and was a
regular national media presence and university lecturer.regular national media presence and university lecturer.
Meretz (Vigor) – 6 seats (Coalition) (Vigor) – 6 seats (Coalition)
Meretz is a pro-secular ZionistMeretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiativesparty that supports initiatives for social justice and for social justice and
peace with the Palestinians. peace with the Palestinians.
Leader: Nitzan Horowitz
Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister.Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister. He became Meretz’sHe became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and leader in 2019 and
was first elected to the Knessetwas first elected to the Knesset in 2009. He had a long careerin 2009. He had a long career as a prominent as a prominent
journalist before entering politics. journalist before entering politics.

CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future)(There Is a Future) – 17 seats (Coalition) – 17 seats (Coalition)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomicsocioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid is foreign ministerBorn in 1963, Lapid is foreign minister and alternate primeand alternate prime minister.minister. Under the Under the
government’sgovernment’s power-sharing agreement,power-sharing agreement, he is set to become primehe is set to become prime minister minister in in
August 2023. He came to politics after a career August 2023. He came to politics after a career as a journalist,as a journalist, television television presenter, presenter,
and author. He founded the Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from and author. He founded the Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from 2013 to 2014 he 2013 to 2014 he
served as finance minister. served as finance minister.
Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 8 seats (Coalition) (Blue and White) – 8 seats (Coalition)
Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime MinisterCentrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu, Netanyahu,
ostensibly seekingostensibly seeking to preserveto preserve long-standing Israelilong-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary, institutions such as the judiciary,
articulate a visionarticulate a vision of Israeliof Israeli nationalism that is morenationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab inclusive of Druze and Arab
citizens, and have greatercitizens, and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian
issues.issues.
Leader: Benny Gantz

Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’sBorn in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister.defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff He served as Chief of General Staff
of the Israel Defenseof the Israel Defense Forces Forces from 2011 to 2015.from 2011 to 2015.
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ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats (Opposition) (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats (Opposition)
Mizrahi HarediMizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare(“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle;support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromiseopposes compromise with Palestinians on control over with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, DeriBorn in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interiorfraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In April 2021, he al owed a party col eague
to take his Knesset seat.

United January 2022, he resigned his Knesset seat in connection with a criminal plea deal involving tax-related offenses, but maintained his leadership of the party. United Torah Judaism – 7 seats (Opposition) – 7 seats (Opposition)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat YisraelAshkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degeland Degel Ha’torah); favors welfareHa’torah); favors welfare and and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle;education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorialopposes territorial compromise compromise with with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; general y seeks generally seeks greater application of Jewish greater application of Jewish
law. law.
Leader: Yaakov Litzman
Born in 1948, Litzman was born in GermanyBorn in 1948, Litzman was born in Germany and raised in the United States before and raised in the United States before
immigratingimmigrating to Israelto Israel in 1965. Educated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he in 1965. Educated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he
later served as principal of a Hasidic girls’later served as principal of a Hasidic girls’ school in Jerusalem.school in Jerusalem. In April 2021, he
alowed a party coleague to take his Knesset seat In January 2022, he agreed to a criminal plea deal for breach of trust for action he took while serving as deputy health minister to thwart the extradition of an Israeli citizen accused of sexual assault in Australia. .
ARAB
Joint List – 6 seats (Opposition) – 6 seats (Opposition)
Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialistElectoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist and Arab nationalist
political strains:political strains: HadashHadash (Democratic(Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal), and BaladMovement for Renewal), and Balad (National Democratic(National Democratic Assembly). Assembly).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialistBorn in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the party, and of the
Joint List.Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becomingAn attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s Hadash’s
national leader in 2006. national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am)(UAL or Ra’am) – 4 seats (Coalition) – 4 seats (Coalition)
IslamistIslamist Arab party that embodiesArab party that embodies conservative socialconservative social values while seekingvalues while seeking state state
support to improvesupport to improve Arabs’ socioeconomicArabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist.

Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
Note: Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election.Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election.
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Appendix C. Chinese Investments in Israeli
Technology Companies: 2011-2020


Source: Institute for National Security Studies. Institute for National Security Studies.
Notes: Publicly available information on these types of investments Publicly available information on these types of investments may be limited.may be limited. An outlierAn outlier transaction transaction
included in this figure is the 2016 purchase by China-based Alpha Frontier of the Israel-based mobileincluded in this figure is the 2016 purchase by China-based Alpha Frontier of the Israel-based mobile gaming gaming
company Playtika for $4.4 bil ion.company Playtika for $4.4 bil ion.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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