Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
September 20November 16, 2022 , 2022
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understandingbilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United commits the United States to provide Israel
Jim Zanotti
States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. Some Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
appropriations. Some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of

U.S. security assistance, U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the
following matters:

Political instability and fall 2022 election. Israel has experienced a period of unprecedented political instability since April
2019. During this time, the country has held four elections with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing criminal
prosecution on political corruption charges. After the coalition government that replaced Netanyahu in June 2021 broke down
in June 2022, another election—the fifth round in four years—is scheduled to take place on November 1, 2022. With the
collapse of the coalition, Israel’s prime minister changed from Naftali Bennett (who had held the office since June 2021) to
Yair Lapid. Lapid, of the Yesh Atid party, is to serve in a caretaker capacity along with Israel’s other cabinet ministers until a
new Knesset installs a new government. The elections and the subsequent government formation process are likely to feature
competition between Netanyahu’s Likud party and the parties inclined to support him, and Prime Minister Lapid and others
who oppose Netanyahu leading another governmentfollowing matters: November 2022 election and Netanyahu’s likely return to power. After elections held on November 1, 2022, for Israel’s Knesset (parliament), Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be headed back to the prime minister’s post that he held twice previously (1996-1999 and 2009-2021). The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a formal process began in December 2018 addressing corruption allegations against Netanyahu. Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021 government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him. Until Netanyahu or someone else forms a government with Knesset backing, Yair Lapid of the centrist Yesh Atid party will serve as caretaker prime minister. The rise of the ultra-nationalist Religious Zionism faction as a likely Netanyahu coalition partner has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions with Arabs and Palestinians, and its relations with the United States and other countries. .
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials regularly speak have regularly spoken out out
against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for including settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for
individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. Violence in 2022 amid ongoing disputes over JerusalemIsraeli-Palestinian violence in 2022 and increased West and increased West
Bank militancy has triggered heightened counterterrorism measures and some controversy, including in relation to the killing Bank militancy has triggered heightened counterterrorism measures and some controversy, including in relation to the killing
of Palestinian-American of journalist Shireen Abu Aklehjournalist Shireen Abu Akleh, a U.S. citizen who was a resident of East Jerusalem. With the Gaza Strip still under the control of the Sunni Islamist . With the Gaza Strip still under the control of the Sunni Islamist
militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and other international actors face militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and other international actors face
significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group. significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority states. The Biden Administration has followed The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced
normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address
Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.
Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader
regional cooperation—including on air and missile defense—that inclines regional cooperation—including on air and missile defense—that inclines Saudi Arabia and other other Arab and Muslim-majority countries Muslim-majority countries
toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging more normalization and toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging more normalization and
greater regional security cooperation involving Israel. greater regional security cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran in the regionand other regional dynamics. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement
that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israel’s leaders reportedly have varying views about a possible U.S. return to the that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israel’s leaders reportedly have varying views about a possible U.S. return to the
agreementagreement and the general handling of the issue. Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence nuclear diplomacy and . Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence nuclear diplomacy and
Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria,
Lebanon, and Iraq due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal. Lebanon, and Iraq due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal.
Via U.S. mediation, Israel and Lebanon—which do not have formal relations—reached agreement in October 2022 on maritime boundaries to allow both countries to extract offshore natural gas. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. To date, Israel has not directly support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. To date, Israel has not directly
provided lethal assistance to Ukraine, but has provided provided lethal assistance to Ukraine, but has provided protective equipment to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian groups.
basic intelligence to counter Iran-made drones used by Russia. Since 2015, Russia’s defense capabilities in Syria have Since 2015, Russia’s defense capabilities in Syria have compelledprompted Israel to deconflict its airstrikes there with Russia. Israel to deconflict its airstrikes there with Russia. Russia
has started action toLegal action in Russia is pending that might close the Russian branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, a move that could strain bilateral ties. close the Russian branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, a move that could strain bilateral ties.
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Contents
Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations ........................................................................... 1
Israeli Political Instability and Fall 2022 Election ..November 2022 Election and Netanyahu’s Likely Return to Power .............................................. 1 Religious Zionism’s Rise and Its Implications ......................................................................... 2 Initial U.S. Responses ............................................................................................................... 4 2
Israeli-Palestinian Issues ................................................................................................................. 5
Overview ................................................................................................................................... 5
Violence and Controversy in 2022 and Shireen Abu Akleh Killing Israel-West Bank Violence ........................................................................................................ 7
The Abraham Accords ................................................................................................................... 10.. 9
Countering Iran .............................................................................................................................. 1312
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions ......................................................................... 1312
Hezbollah and Syria ................................................................................................................ 1514
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine ......................................................................................................... 1615

Figures
Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic FactsNovember 2022 Knesset Election Results ....................................................................... 2 Figure C-1. Map: Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Agreement ............................................... 2

Tables
Table 1. Israeli Caretaker Government: Key Positions 22 Appendixes Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts ..................................................................... 3

Appendixes................ 17
Appendix AB. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders .................................................................... 18
Appendix C. Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement ....................................................................... 21
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 2023


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Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (Israel (see Figure 1see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). A fewSome lawmakers lawmakers
seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1 Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding
Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—
though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty
in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy will remain in Jerusalem.2
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include
 Israel’s ongoing political instability and the upcoming fall 2022 election.
 Israeli-Palestinian problems and their implications for U.S. policy, including
violence and controversy in 2022, Gaza and its challenges, and human rights
considerations.
 Developments regarding Israel’s normalization or improvement of relations with
various Arab and Muslim-majority states since the Abraham Accords.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
 Russia’s 2022 invasion of UkraineAdditional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations include  Israel’s November 2022 election and the likely return to power of Benjamin Netanyahu, perhaps in a government with figures who could complicate relations and interactions with the Biden Administration and Congress.  Israeli-Palestinian problems and their implications for U.S. policy.  Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the Abraham Accords.  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria.  Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. November 2022 Election and Netanyahu’s Likely Return to Power After elections held on November 1, 2022, for Israel’s Knesset (parliament), Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu appears to be headed back to the prime minister’s post that he held twice previously (1996-1999 and 2009-2021). Parties supporting Netanyahu obtained 64 out of 120 seats in the Knesset (see Figure 1 and Appendix B). .

1 Rebecca Kheel, “Progressives ramp up scrutiny of US funding for Israel,” 1 Rebecca Kheel, “Progressives ramp up scrutiny of US funding for Israel,” The Hill, May 23, 2021. One bill, the Two-, May 23, 2021. One bill, the Two-
State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), would expressly prohibit U.S. assistance (including defense articles or services) to State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), would expressly prohibit U.S. assistance (including defense articles or services) to
further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise permanent control over any part of the West Bank further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise permanent control over any part of the West Bank
(including East Jerusalem) or Gaza. (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
2 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021.
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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2022 unless otherwise
specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
Israeli Political Instability and Fall 2022 Election
Israel has experienced a period of unprecedented political instability since April 2019. During this
time, the country has held four elections with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing
criminal prosecution on political corruption charges. After the coalition government that replaced
Netanyahu in June 2021 broke down in June 2022 (as discussed below), another election—the
fifth round in four years—is scheduled to take place on November 1, 2022. With the collapse of
the coalition, Israel’s prime minister changed from Naftali Bennett of the now-defunct Yamina
party (who had held the office since June 2021) to Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party. Lapid is to
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serve in a caretaker capacity along with Israel’s other cabinet ministers (see Table 1) until a new
Knesset installs a new government. Bennett, as alternate prime minister, is to maintain significant
responsibility for Iran-related issues, but he has announced that he will not run in the fall election.
Table 1. Israeli Caretaker Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Yair Lapid
Yesh Atid
Alternate Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett
N/A
Defense Minister
Benny Gantz
National Unity
Finance Minister
Avigdor Lieberman
Yisrael Beitenu
Justice Minister
Gideon Sa’ar
National Unity
Interior Minister
Ayelet Shaked
HaBayit HaYehudi
Transportation Minister
Merav Michaeli
Labor
Public Security Minister
Omer Bar Lev
Labor
Health Minister
Nitzan Horowitz
Meretz
Over nearly four years, Israel’s efforts at establishing political leadership have unfolded as
follows. Netanyahu was selected by Israel’s president as the Knesset member best situated to
form a government after both the April 2019 and September 2019 elections, but was unable to do
so in either case—the first time such a stalemate had occurred in Israel. After the March 2020
election, Netanyahu formed a power-sharing government in May 2020 with Benny Gantz’s Kahol
Lavan party (now part of the National Unity party), but the government collapsed later that year
over a failure to pass a national budget.
The resulting election in March 2021 led to the replacement of Netanyahu’s government by a
wide-ranging but fractious coalition of parties in June 2021. While Bennett—a right-of-center
figure—served as prime minister of this power-sharing government, the centrist Lapid played a
leading role in arranging the coalition.
In June 2022, the Netanyahu-led opposition in the Knesset withheld its support for a bill to renew
the application of certain aspects of civilian law to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and the bill
failed to pass after two members of Bennett’s Yamina party left the coalition in hopes of bringing
a more right-leaning government to power. To trigger an automatic renewal of the civilian laws’
application to West Bank settlers, Bennett and Lapid got the Knesset to dissolve the coalition and
vote for the election now scheduled for the fall. Under the government’s power-sharing
agreement, once the Knesset voted for a new election, Lapid (see text box below for a brief
biography) became Israel’s caretaker prime minister because members of Bennett’s party were
responsible for the coalition’s demise.
Prime Minister Yair Lapid: Biography
Lapid, born in 1963, transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, when he
founded the centrist, pro-secular Yesh Atid (There is a Future) party. His father Tommy was
also a media personality-turned-politician who led the Shinui (Change) party in the Knesset
from 1999-2006 and served briefly as justice minister.
In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-place finish and Lapid served as finance
minister in the Netanyahu-led government from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided
allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading
political option for Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties.
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Lapid and Yesh Atid joined a combined list with Benny Gantz’s Kahol Lavan to oppose Netanyahu for three
straight elections beginning in April 2019, but split from Kahol Lavan when Gantz formed a power-sharing
government with Netanyahu in May 2020. After Yesh Atid’s second-place finish in the March 2021 election, then-
Israeli President Reuven Rivlin chose Lapid as the Knesset member best positioned to form a government. He
established a power-sharing government in June 2021 featuring eight parties across Israel’s political spectrum,
serving as foreign minister and alternate prime minister as part of a rotation agreement with Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party. Under the power-sharing agreement, Lapid became caretaker prime minister
in July 2022 after members of Yamina caused the government’s dissolution. In conducting Israel’s foreign policy
since June 2021, Lapid, Bennett, and Gantz have avoided major military conflict to date while supporting efforts to
counter Iran, including in coordination with the United States and various Arab countries.
While he is constrained from major political initiatives while serving in a caretaker capacity, Lapid favors a two-
state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,3 and has expressed opposition to West Bank settlement
construction that could impede such a solution—particularly in isolated areas away from settlement blocs closer
to Israel.4 In past public statements, Lapid has said that he would not accept dividing Jerusalem with the
Palestinians.5
The elections and the subsequent government formation process are likely to feature competition
between Netanyahu’s Likud party and the parties inclined to support him, and Prime Minister
Lapid’s Yesh Atid party and others across the political spectrum who oppose Netanyahu leading
another government (see Appendix A). The previous coalition achieved little consensus on
controversial subjects—the Palestinians, how to balance judicial review and majority rule, and
religion’s role in the state. Nevertheless, Lapid and Bennett maintain that this coalition
competently addressed important issues such as Iran, the budget, and the COVID-19 crisis.6
Netanyahu’s trial is ongoing and may continue for years without legally preventing him from
leading a government. Some observers speculate that he might be open to political compromises
with other parties in return for measures to end or disrupt his prosecution, even though Netanyahu
denies this.7 Such compromises could include efforts to increase formal Israeli control over parts
of the West Bank and reduce the judiciary’s power over legislation or government action.
Itamar Ben Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party are possible Likud coalition
partners—as part of a broader Religious Zionism electoral list—and have links with a Jewish
ultra-nationalist movement based on the ideology of Meir Kahane (1932-1990).8 Kahane served
in the Knesset from 1984 until 1988, when his party was banned from elections after Israel passed
legislation disqualifying those who incite racism. The U.S. government has designated a Kahanist
group (Kahane Chai) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, even though the
government de-listed the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2022 due to its inactivity.9
The following could be significant factors regarding the elections and government formation
process:

3 Josef Federman, “Lapid, set to be Israel’s next premier, faces critical test,” Associated Press, June 21, 2022.
4 Tovah Lazaroff, “Lapid, Gantz now control the fate of settlers in Israel’s West Bank,” jpost.com, June 20, 2022.
5 Noa Landau, “Yair Lapid Says Jerusalem Is Non-negotiable Even if It Means No Peace,” haaretz.com, December 25,
2017.
6 Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview”; “Lapid says Bennett has shown responsibility, thanks him for
friendship: ‘I love you very much,’” Times of Israel, June 20, 2022.
7 Patrick Kingsley and Isabel Kershner, “As Government Collapses, Netanyahu Makes Case to Lead Israel Again,”
New York Times, June 22, 2022.
8 David B. Green, “Israel Election Results: Who Was Meir Kahane, and Why Is His Racist Legacy Relevant Again,”
haaretz.com, March 26, 2021.
9 State Department, “Revocation of Five Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designations and the Delisting of Six
Deceased Individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” May 20, 2022.
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 Another stalemate? Initial polling suggests that Likud will probably win more
votes than any other party. Pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs may both have
difficulty achieving Knesset support to form a government,10 with the pro-
Netanyahu bloc appearing more likely to obtain it.11 In such an event, Lapid and
other caretaker officials might continue in their positions through multiple
election rounds, as Netanyahu did when serving in a caretaker capacity from
December 2018 until May 2020.
 Potential game changers. The electoral math could change in the wake of some
parties combining or breaking apart, and if some parties near the electoral
threshold fall beneath it. In July 2022, Kahol Lavan and New Hope agreed to
merge for November’s election as the National Unity party, and former Israel
Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot has since joined the party. These
developments may boost Defense Minister Gantz’s prime ministerial chances.
Leaders of the National Unity and Yisrael Beitenu parties currently oppose sitting
in government with Netanyahu, but also have a history of working with him.
 Arab-led parties. As in the previous government, Arab-led parties could be
decisive in determining future political outcomes. The Islamist United Arab List
(UAL or Ra’am) was the first independent Arab party to join an Israeli
government when it joined the Lapid-Bennett coalition in June 2021.12 The Joint
List (made up of three smaller parties with socialist or nationalist leanings)
stayed aloof from pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs in the past coalition. One of the
parties that was part of the Joint List, an Arab nationalist party known as Balad,
plans to run in the November election separately from the other two (Hadash and
Ta’al) and may not clear the threshold—possibly boosting the chances for a pro-
Netanyahu Knesset majority. Voter turnout among Arab citizens of Israel has
fluctuated between 45% and 65% in the past four elections.13 It could affect the
Arab parties’ prospects of reaching the electoral threshold, and thus their ability
to influence government formation or critical legislation.14
Israeli-Palestinian Issues15
Overview
Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for
direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.16 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster

10 Michael Horovitz, “Polls point to return of dreaded deadlock in next elections, unless alliances shift,” Times of
Israel, June 21, 2022.
11 Mazal Mualem, “Lapid’s coalition crumbles ahead of Israeli elections,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2022.
12 Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3,
2021.
13 Arik Rudnitzky, “The Arab Vote in the Elections for the 24th Knesset (March 2021),” Israel Democracy Institute,
April 27, 2021.
14 “Israel’s electoral threshold: Will it change and who will be affected?” jpost.com, June 26, 2022.
15 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
16 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press
Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.
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Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump
Administration. These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians
that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement
expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for
individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.17
Some Israeli settlement construction plans for East Jerusalem and the West Bank have
advanced,18 but Israel has reportedly delayed a few plans flagged as especially damaging to the
two-state vision by the Biden Administration or some Members of Congress.19 In May 2022,
Israel advanced plans for nearly 4,500 additional housing units for West Bank settlements,20
drawing statements of strong opposition from the Administration.21
Reopening of U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem?
Biden Administration officials have said that they plan to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that had
previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians, without
specifying when the consulate might reopen.22 The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S.
Embassy in Israel in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU)
within the embassy. Competing Israeli and Palestinian national narratives influence this issue, with both sides
appealing to U.S. officials about its importance of Jerusalem and its holy sites to their domestic constituencies.23
A December 2021 media report claimed that controversy on the issue led the Biden Administration to effectively
shelve plans to reopen the consulate. It also said that the PAU was communicating directly with State Department
officials in Washington, rather than working through other embassy channels.24 In June 2022, the PAU was re-
branded as the Office of Palestinian Affairs (OPA), with the OPA operating under the auspices of the embassy
while reporting directly to Washington.25 This type of direct communication was a core aspect of the previous
consulate general’s independent status. Nevertheless, PA President Abbas continues to press for the reopening of
the consulate.26
Biden Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based Palestinian
Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for
Palestinians.27 Additionally, as part of FY2021 appropriations legislation, the Nita M. Lowey
Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized
the establishment of two funds to support development in the West Bank and Gaza, along with

17 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett After Their Meeting,”
Jerusalem, March 27, 2022.
18November 2022 Knesset Election Results Source: Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a formal process began in December 2018 addressing corruption allegations against Netanyahu. Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021 government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him. Until Netanyahu or someone else forms a government with Knesset backing, Yair Lapid of the centrist Yesh Atid party will serve as caretaker prime minister. On November 13, Israeli President Isaac Herzog assigned Netanyahu to form a government. From that date, Netanyahu has 28 days to assemble a coalition, and the president can extend this period for an additional 14 days, with provisions allowing the president to authorize others to form a government if Netanyahu is unsuccessful in the task. A successful vote of confidence in the Knesset would install a new government. If there is insufficient support, another round of elections would take place. For the first time since Netanyahu’s corruption allegations surfaced,2 he appears to have won a Knesset majority with his right-of-center Likud party and other parties that support his return to power: the ultra-nationalist Religious Zionism slate and the ultra-Orthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism parties. Netanyahu made efforts during the campaign to ensure that Itamar Ben Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party stayed within the Religious Zionism electoral list so that the list would clear the electoral threshold;3 it is now the third-largest faction in the Knesset. Some reports suggest that Jewish Israeli concerns about Arab-Jewish violence since 2021 and the inclusion of an Arab-led party (the United Arab List) in the previous government coalition may have partly driven support for Religious Zionism.4 Religious Zionism’s Rise and Its Implications The rise of Religious Zionism has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States and other countries.5 The electoral list’s two leading figures, Bezalel Smotrich 2 For information on the allegations, see Yonette Joseph and Patrick Kingsley, “Netanyahu Will Return with Corruption Charges Unresolved. Here’s Where the Case Stands,” New York Times, November 3, 2022. 3 Israeli election law requires that an electoral list receive at least 3.25% of the popular vote to be represented in the Knesset. 4 Neri Zilber, “For Israel’s hard-right alliance, how high a priority is democracy?” Christian Science Monitor, November 11, 2022; Patrick Kingsley, “Anxiety About Jewish Identity Drives Israel’s Lurch Toward Far Right,” New York Times, November 6, 2022. 5 Dov Lieber, et al., “Religious Zionism Flexes Its Muscles,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2022; Laura Kelly and Congressional Research Service 2 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief and Ben Gvir, openly support policies to favor Israel’s Jewish citizens over its Arab citizens and annex the West Bank.6 Religious Zionism leaders aspire to cabinet positions giving them greater control over West Bank issues.7 Additionally, they advocate legislation that would allow the Knesset to override decisions from Israel’s High Court of Justice (or Supreme Court).8 According to the Wall Street Journal: If the law is passed, lawmakers in Mr. Netanyahu's bloc say they aim to quickly overturn judicial rulings striking down the yearslong detention of African asylum seekers, a law retroactively legalizing illegal Israeli outposts built on private Palestinian land and a law formally excluding ultraorthodox Israelis from the country’s mandatory military service.... Critics of the judicial overhaul say it will undermine Israel’s democracy by giving absolute power to the ruling coalition and leave minorities without protection from the will of the majority. Advocates for the changes say they will restore power to elected officials hamstrung by activist judges.9 A Netanyahu-led coalition reliant on Religious Zionism and ultra-Orthodox parties may lead to political shifts favoring stricter application of Jewish law in society, including less inclusion of women in state religious councils and some rollback of LGBTQ rights.10 However, some observers expect secular figures within Likud—including possibly Netanyahu himself—to limit the changes.11 Ben Gvir once belonged to Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir Kahane (1932-1990) that was finally banned from elections in the 1990s.12 A Kahanist offshoot of Kach (Kahane Chai) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States from 1997 until 2022 and remains a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity.13 Ben Gvir was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism,14 but says that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs.15 Ben Gvir has been a regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem, and Israel’s police chief blamed him for provoking major May 2021 Israeli-Palestinian violence there.16 Jared Gans, “Five ways Netanyahu’s return could shake up Israel and the world,” The Hill, November 3, 2022. 6 David Horovitz, “With rise of Ben Gvir and Smotrich, Israel risks a catastrophic lurch to extremism,” Times of Israel, October 27, 2022. 7 Hagar Shezaf, “Religious Zionism Will Seek Portfolios with Most Control over West Bank,” Haaretz, November 6, 2022. 8 Jeremy Sharon, “After strong showing, Religious Zionism says High Court override bill a top priority,” Times of Israel, November 2, 2022. 9 Dov Lieber and Aaron Boxerman, “Israeli Lawmakers Aim to Remake Court,” Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2022. 10 Judah Ari Gross, “Israel poised to have its most religious government; experts say no theocracy yet,” Times of Israel, November 4, 2022. 11 Ibid; “Slapping down far-right partners, Netanyahu vows no change to LGBT status quo,” Times of Israel, November 4, 2022. 12 Adam Lucente, “Explainer: Kahanism, far-right ideology linked to Netanyahu’s election win,” Al-Monitor, November 2, 2022. 13 State Department, “Revocation of Five Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designations and the Delisting of Six Deceased Individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” May 20, 2022. 14 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007. 15 Lucente, “Explainer: Kahanism, far-right ideology linked to Netanyahu’s election win.” 16 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” France24, May 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service 3 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Netanyahu may feel some inclination to accommodate demands from Smotrich and Ben Gvir to serve in the cabinet and pass legislation because Religious Zionism might support legal measures that could retroactively bar corruption charges against serving prime ministers.17 Yet, Religious Zionism’s political leverage over Netanyahu might be limited because (1) some other Netanyahu supporters may oppose blocking the trial, and (2) Netanyahu may expect a trial outcome or plea bargain that allows him to remain in power.18 To date, Netanyahu has said that he will not allow legislation to influence his trial.19 Ben Gvir has publicly asked to become public security minister, which would give him responsibility for policing Israeli cities and Jerusalem’s sensitive holy sites.20 Despite his 2021 criticism of Ben Gvir, Israel’s police chief has said that he could work with him.21 Perhaps anticipating Arab and international concerns about Religious Zionism leaders having responsibility for sensitive issues regarding the Palestinians, Netanyahu has pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims to worship at the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) in Jerusalem’s Old City.22 Jordanian officials have warned that any change to the status quo or provocative Ben Gvir visits to the Mount/Haram would harm Israel-Jordan ties.23 With Israeli-Palestinian violence in the West Bank at a point arguably higher than any time since the second Palestinian intifada (2000-2005), U.S. officials have increased efforts in late 2022 to encourage de-escalation and greater Israel-Palestinian Authority security coordination alongside socioeconomic initiatives to help Palestinians (as discussed below). Initial U.S. Responses Reportedly, U.S. officials plan to work with the new Israeli government, but may have a problem working with Ben Gvir because of “his party’s racist rhetoric and positions against Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the Arab minority in Israel.”24 Before the election, a Member of Congress reportedly warned Netanyahu that a government including Religious Zionism leaders could undermine U.S.-Israel relations,25 and another Member tweeted similar concerns.26 Netanyahu has said that he refuses to allow U.S. lawmakers to dictate who can be 17 “Ben Gvir says he’ll demand law that will cancel Netanyahu’s corruption trial,” Times of Israel, October 30, 2022; Lieber and Boxerman, “Israeli Lawmakers Aim to Remake Court”; Amos Harel, “Israel Elections: With the West Bank on the Brink, Netanyahu Ushers in the Pyromaniacs,” Haaretz, November 4, 2022. 18 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel Elections: How is the vote impacting Netanyahu's trial? – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, November 1, 2022. 19 Lieber and Boxerman, “Israeli Lawmakers Aim to Remake Court.” 20 Shalom Yerushalmi, “Netanyahu may have no choice but to give Ben Gvir the Public Security Ministry,” Times of Israel, November 7, 2022. 21 “Police chief says he’ll work with Ben Gvir, whom he reportedly blamed for 2021 riots,” Times of Israel, November 8, 2022. 22 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Times of Israel, October 31, 2022. For background on the status quo, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 23 “Jordan said to warn incoming government against touching Temple Mount status quo,” Times of Israel, November 7, 2022. See also Jeremy Sharon, “Fire on the Mount?” Times of Israel, November 8, 2022. 24 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: U.S. unlikely to work with Jewish supremacist expected to be made Israeli minister,” Axios, November 2, 2022. 25 Barak Ravid and Alayna Treene, “Scoop: Menendez warns Netanyahu against working with Jewish supremacists,” Axios, October 1, 2022. 26 Twitter, Congressman Brad Sherman, 7:05 PM, October 3, 2022, https://twitter.com/bradsherman/status/1577072440731000833. Congressional Research Service 4 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief included in Israel’s government.27 Yet, Netanyahu has reportedly cited U.S. concerns in resisting Smotrich’s demand to become defense minister to date.28 On November 2, the State Department spokesperson said that “we hope that all Israeli Government officials will continue to share the values of an open, democratic society, including tolerance and respect for all in civil society, particularly for minority groups.”29 On November 7, President Biden called to congratulate Netanyahu on his party’s victory, commending Israel’s free and fair elections, underscoring his “unwavering support” for Israel’s security, and reaffirming that the strong U.S.-Israel partnership is based on “shared democratic values and mutual interests.”30 Two former U.S. officials have written that if a new Israeli government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir features open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to change Israel’s democracy, opponents of strong U.S.-Israel relations will exploit the situation “to try to undo aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”31 U.S. Ambassador to Israel Thomas Nides has said that he plans to work closely with the next prime minister, but would push back on areas of disagreement with the new government, including if it were to move toward West Bank annexation, but also said that he did not expect such a move.32 Some speculation that Netanyahu might engage in coalition talks with Yesh Atid and the National Unity list (headed by current Defense Minister Benny Gantz)—as a possible alternative to a government with Religious Zionism—has been denied to date by all three parties.33 Israeli-Palestinian Issues34 Overview Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.35 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including terrorist attacks and incitement to violence against Israelis, settlement expansion and settler violence against Palestinians, Israeli demolitions and evictions affecting Palestinians, and Palestine Liberation Organization/Palestinian Authority (PA) payments for individuals imprisoned for acts 27 “Netanyahu: ‘Won’t bow my head’ to US lawmakers’ warning against Ben Gvir partnership,” Times of Israel, October 25, 2022. 28 Tobias Siegal, “Netanyahu said to tell Smotrich he won’t get defense job, because of US objections,” Times of Israel, November 16, 2022. 29 State Department Press Briefing, November 2, 2022. 30 White House, “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Call with Former Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu,” November 7, 2022. 31 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,” Times of Israel, November 2, 2022. 32 Amy Spiro, “US envoy says White House ‘will fight’ any Israeli West Bank annexation efforts,” Times of Israel, November 10, 2022. 33 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Likud, Lapid and Gantz deny report that they’re in unity government talks,” Times of Israel, November 16, 2022. 34 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 35 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief of terrorism.36 Biden Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based PA President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for Palestinians.37 The Trump Administration and U.S. Policy on Jerusalem The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy will remain in Jerusalem.38 Some Israeli settlement construction plans for East Jerusalem and the West Bank have advanced,39 but Israel has reportedly delayed a few plans flagged as especially damaging to the two-state vision by the Biden Administration or some Members of Congress.40 In May 2022, Israel advanced plans for nearly 4,500 additional housing units for West Bank settlements,41 drawing statements of strong opposition from the Administration.42 Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances, including through loans and work permits.43 However, some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.44 During President Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.45 36 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022; State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett After Their Meeting,” Jerusalem, March 27, 2022. 37 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 38 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. 39 Nir Hasson, “Israel Presses Forward with Plan to Expand West Bank Settlement Near Jerusalem,” Haaretz, September 12, 2022; Jeremy Sharon, “Israel advances plan for controversial Jewish neighborhood in East Jerusalem,” Times of Israel, September 5, 2022; Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances Thousands of Settlement Homes Despite Harsh U.S. Rebuke,” haaretz.com, October Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances Thousands of Settlement Homes Despite Harsh U.S. Rebuke,” haaretz.com, October
27, 202127, 2021; Jeremy Sharon, “Israel advances plan for controversial Jewish neighborhood in East Jerusalem. 40 Jeremy Sharon, “Hearing on controversial E1 settlement plan postponed again,” ,” Times of
Israel, September , September 58, 2022, 2022.
19 ; “Israel stops plan for contentious east Jerusalem settlement,” “Israel stops plan for contentious east Jerusalem settlement,” Associated Press, December 6, 2021, December 6, 2021; Jeremy Sharon,
“Hearing on controversial E1 settlement plan postponed again,” Times of Israel, September 8, 2022.
20. 41 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances over 4,000 West Bank Housing Units for Jews,” Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances over 4,000 West Bank Housing Units for Jews,” haaretz.comHaaretz, May 12, 2022. , May 12, 2022.
2142 State Department Press Briefing, May 6, 2022. State Department Press Briefing, May 6, 2022.
22 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021.
23 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel to form team to solve consulate dispute,” Axios, October 20, 2021; Jack Khoury and
Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves
Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021.
24 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel43 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to 20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022. 44 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021. 45 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 12 link to page 12 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Gaza and Its Challenges The Gaza Strip—controlled by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.46 Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.47 With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.48 Because of the PA’s inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwilling to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.49 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United Nations.50 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of conflict.51 Israel-West Bank Violence To date in 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has resulted in the deaths of at least 19 Israelis or foreigners in Israel and around 140 Palestinians in the West Bank (see text box below on the death of U.S. citizen Shireen Abu Akleh).52 Israeli forces have concentrated many counterterrorism efforts on northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.53 With prospects apparently dim for ,” Times of Israel,
December 15, 2021.
25 Barak Ravid, “State Department separates Palestinian office from U.S. Embassy to Israel,” Axios, June 9, 2022.
26 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press
Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.
27 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
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link to page 13 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

various types of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation.28 For allocation between the two
MEPPA funds, Congress appropriated $50 million for FY2021 and the same amount for FY2022,
with additional $50 million tranches authorized for FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025.
Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances,
including through loans and work permits.29 However, some critics charge that the measures
mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its
causes through negotiation with Palestinians.30 During President Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel
and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had committed to
expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the Allenby border
crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank and Gaza to
4G communications infrastructure.31
Some international bodies have subjected alleged Israeli human rights violations against
Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny. In March 2021, the International Criminal
Court (ICC) prosecutor began an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.32
Members of Congress have taken varying positions on human rights-related concerns.
Violence and Controversy in 2022 and Shireen Abu Akleh Killing
A number of complicated factors may contribute to heightened tensions and episodic violence
between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel. With prospects dim for
diplomatic resolution of final-status issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem’s status, militants diplomatic resolution of final-status issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem’s status, militants
and activists on both sides may seek to shape outcomes or express protest. Arab states’ greater and activists on both sides may seek to shape outcomes or express protest. Arab states’ greater
willingness—despite Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic stalemate—to cooperate openly with Israel willingness—despite Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic stalemate—to cooperate openly with Israel
could feed increased tensions (see could feed increased tensions (see “The Abraham Accords” below). In September 2022 remarks before the U.N. Security Council, U.S. Representative to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield lamented unilateral actions opposed to peace, saying that they include “terrorist attacks and incitement to violence against Israelis” and “violence inflicted by Israeli settlers on Palestinians in their neighborhoods, and in some cases escorted by Israeli 46 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 47 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor, November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. 48 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. 49 Ibid. 50 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of Israel, September 12, 2021. 51 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29, 2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” 52 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” New York Times, November 16, 2022. 53 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 7 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Security Forces.”54 The same day, the State Department spokesperson said, “The United States and other international partners stand ready to help but we cannot substitute for vital actions by the parties to mitigate conflict and to restore calm.”55 In a September 2022 phone briefing, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf said that U.S. officials seek to ensure that Israel-PA “security cooperation is robust and continuing,” while also encouraging an improvement in economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza “because those can help and sustain improvement in security conditions.”56 As the increase in Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,57 Israeli and PA forces have approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of future escalation.58 The PA reportedly seeks time and flexibility to address militancy independent of Israeli dictates, with efforts to reach compromises that avoid major armed confrontations or arrests. Some PA personnel reportedly have directly targeted Israeli forces or settlers, raising questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.59 Shireen Abu Akleh Killing and Controversy In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a Accords” below).
To date in 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has resulted in the deaths of at least 19 Israelis or
foreigners in Israel and more than 85 Palestinians in the West Bank,33 amid the following:
 Protests and violent altercations around Jerusalem holy sites, including during
religious holidays and other sensitive times commemorating historical events.34
 Heightened Israeli and PA security measures to counter alleged Palestinian
lawlessness and militancy in West Bank cities such as Jenin and Nablus.35
In light of widespread domestic disaffection with 87-year-old PA President Abbas and apparent
early jockeying for influence in anticipation of the end of his rule, some younger West Bank

28 For information on the Partnership for Peace Fund (PPF), see https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/meppa. For
information on the Joint Investment for Peace Initiative (JIPI), see https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-
announces-joint-investment-peace-initiative-promote-middle-east-peace. According to USAID FY2022 Congressional
Notification #43, January 20, 2022, the Administration plans to allocate $46.5 million of FY2021 funding for MEPPA
toward the PPF, and $3.5 million toward the JIPI.
29 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of
Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to
20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022.
30 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021.
31 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,”
32 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
33 “Palestinian West Bank death toll highest in years amid Israeli terror crackdown,” Times of Israel, August 29, 2022;
David S. Cloud and Anas Baba, “Israeli Work Permits Ease Gaza Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2022.
34 CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
35 Ahmad Melhem, “Israel watches closely as West Bank seethes,” Al-Monitor, September 12, 2022;
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militants who are linked to Abbas’s secular faction Fatah may be working across factional lines
with Islamists from Hamas and PIJ.36
In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a Palestinian Christian from
East Jerusalem who was a U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli
security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered a major international security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered a major international
outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning
Abu Akleh’s killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department Abu Akleh’s killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department
spokesperson called for an immediate and spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and full accountability, and said thorough investigation and full accountability, and said
that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive
investigation.”investigation.”37 Some evidence60 Evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces, suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces,3861 with with
the PA the PA claimingasserting that its investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but that its investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but
Israel denying any such intent.Israel denying any such intent.3962 In April 2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers In April 2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers had filed a filed a
complaint with the ICC alleging that Israel has systematically targeted Palestinian journalists for complaint with the ICC alleging that Israel has systematically targeted Palestinian journalists for
years.years.40
63 After some Members of the House and Senate sent letters to the executive branch requesting that After some Members of the House and Senate sent letters to the executive branch requesting that
the State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigationthe State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conduct an independent investigation conduct an independent investigation
into Abu Akleh’s death,into Abu Akleh’s death,4164 the State Department issued a statement in July. The statement said that the State Department issued a statement in July. The statement said that
the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority oversaw an the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority oversaw an
independent process, and in summarizing Israeli and PA investigations concluded that Israeli independent process, and in summarizing Israeli and PA investigations concluded that Israeli
gunfire likely killed Abu Akleh, but “found no reason to believe that this was intentional.”42 PA
officials and members of Abu Akleh’s family have publicly criticized the part of the USSC’s
finding regarding intent.43
After conducting an internal investigation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said in September that
there was a “high possibility” that Abu Akleh was accidentally hit by IDF gunfire44—eliciting
additional public criticism from PA officials and Abu Akleh family members who assert that the
shooting was not accidental.45 In response, the State Department welcomed the IDF review, later
adding that U.S. officials would continue to press Israel to “closely review its policies and
practices on rules of engagement and consider additional steps to mitigate the risk of civilian
harm, protect journalists and prevent similar tragedies in the future.”46 Prime Minister Lapid and

36 Patrick Kingsley, “Militant's Death Fuels Fears of Lasting Violence in West Bank,” New York Times, September 17,
2022. For background on Palestinian governance and succession, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview, Aid, and U.S.
Policy Issues, by Jim Zanotti.
37 State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022.
38gunfire likely killed Abu Akleh, but “found no reason to believe that this was 54 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022. 55 State Department Press Briefing, September 28, 2022. 56 State Department, “Special Briefing with Ambassador Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs,” September 14, 2022. 57 State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022, and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 58 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” New York Times, October 26, 2022; Yaniv Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Authority,” Haaretz, October 12, 2022. 59 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Al-Monitor, October 12, 2022. 60 State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022. 61 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” Associated Press, May 16, 2022. 62 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” May 16, 2022.
39 “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” Associated Press, May 26, 2022. , May 26, 2022.
4063 International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian
journalists,” April 26, 2022. journalists,” April 26, 2022.
4164 Text of letters available at https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/ Text of letters available at https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/
Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf and https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf and https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Final%20Abu%20Akleh%20Letter%20(PDF).pdf. Final%20Abu%20Akleh%20Letter%20(PDF).pdf.
42 State Department press statement, “On the Killing of Shireen Abu Akleh,” July 4, 2022.
43 “US: Israeli fire likely killed reporter; no final conclusion,” Associated Press, July 4, 2022.
44 Hiba Yazbek and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Says Reporter Was Probably Shot By One of Its Forces,” New York
Times, September 6, 2022.
45 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinians reject IDF probe into Shireen Abu Akleh killing, vow to bring case to ICC,”
jpost.com, September 5, 2022.
46 Emanuel Fabian and Jacob Magid, “Rebuffing US, Lapid and Gantz say ‘no one will dictate’ IDF’s open-fire
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Defense Minister Gantz then defended Israel’s rules of engagement and said that no outside party
could dictate them.47
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.48
Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.49
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.50 Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.51 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.52 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.53
For three days in early August 2022, Israel and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants in Gaza exchanged fire. Hamas
stayed out of the violence, with some sources intimating that Israeli measures loosening access restrictions on
goods and permitting thousands of Gazans to work in Israel may have provided Hamas with economic incentives
not to fight.54 A few days before that, Israel had arrested a PIJ leader in the West Bank, and PIJ threats of
retaliation led to lockdowns in much of southern Israel. Israel conducted its military operation with the stated aim
of thwarting any possible retaliation, and Israeli officials claimed to have kil ed the top echelon of PIJ militants in
Gaza. More than 40 Palestinians died and hundreds more were injured, with some of these casualties possibly
resulting from errant Palestinian rockets; several Israelis were injured, but no Israeli deaths were reported.55 The
Iron Dome anti-rocket system intercepted several PIJ projectiles.56 After a cease-fire took hold on August 7,
President Biden thanked Egyptian and Qatari officials for helping broker an end to hostilities while expressing
support for Israel’s right to defend itself and lamenting civilian casualties.57 A similar round of violence between
Israel and PIJ (with Hamas abstaining) took place in November 2019.

regulations,” Times of Israel, September 7, 2022.
47 Ibid.
48 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
49 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
50 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
51 Ibid.
52 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021.
53 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
54 See, e.g., Dov Lieber et al., “Hamas Considers Cost of Conflict,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2022.
55 Dov Lieber and Aaron Boxerman, “Palestinian Militants, Israel Set Cease-Fire,” Wall Street Journal, August 8,
2022.
56 Ibid.
57 White House, “Statement by President Biden on the Ceasefire in Gaza,” August 7, 2022.
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The Abraham Accords
In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with
four members of the Arab League: the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump
Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and (as
mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the
countries in question.58 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both
countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had
operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported the UAE
and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords, even allowing the use of Saudi
airspace for direct commercial airline flights between those countries and Israel.59
Trade, tourism, and investment ties have generally deepened since the signing of the Accords—
including a May 2022 Israel-UAE free-trade agreement (pending Israeli ratification) and a major
Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative focused on desalinated water and solar energy.60 One exception is
that implementing Israel-Sudan normalization appears to be on hold following the Sudanese
military’s seizure of power in October 2021.61Congressional Research Service 8 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief intentional.”65 PA officials and members of Abu Akleh’s family have publicly criticized the part of the USSC’s finding regarding intent.66 A June 2022 public opinion poll indicated that 92% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza believe that Abu Akleh was deliberately targeted.67 After conducting an internal investigation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said in September 2022 that there was a “high possibility” that Abu Akleh was accidentally hit by IDF gunfire68—eliciting additional public criticism from PA officials and Abu Akleh family members who assert that the shooting was not accidental.69 In response, the State Department welcomed the IDF review,70 later adding that U.S. officials would continue to press Israel to “closely review its policies and practices on rules of engagement and consider additional steps to mitigate the risk of civilian harm, protect journalists, and prevent similar tragedies in the future.”71 Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid and Defense Minister Benny Gantz then defended Israel’s rules of engagement and said that no outside party could dictate them.72 In November 2022, media reports said that the FBI has opened an investigation into Abu Akleh’s death.73 In response, Defense Minister Gantz said that the alleged U.S. decision was a mistake and that Israel, after having conducted an “independent and professional investigation,” would not cooperate with an external investigation.74 To accompany the Senate Appropriations Committee July 2022 markup of the 2023 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (S. 4662), the explanatory statement would require a report from the Secretary of State on steps taken to facilitate an independent, credible, and transparent investigation into Abu Akleh’s death, including whether 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (also known as the Leahy Law, pertaining to the possibility of gross human rights violations by a foreign security force unit) applies.75 The Abraham Accords In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and (as mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the countries in question.76 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had 65 State Department press statement, “On the Killing of Shireen Abu Akleh,” July 4, 2022. 66 “US: Israeli fire likely killed reporter; no final conclusion,” Associated Press, July 4, 2022. 67 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 84, June 22-25, 2022. 68 Hiba Yazbek and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Says Reporter Was Probably Shot By One of Its Forces,” New York Times, September 6, 2022. 69 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinians reject IDF probe into Shireen Abu Akleh killing, vow to bring case to ICC,” Jerusalem Post, September 5, 2022. 70 State Department, “IDF Releases Shireen Abu Akleh Report,” September 5, 2022. 71 State Department Press Briefing, September 6, 2022. 72 Emanuel Fabian and Jacob Magid, “Rebuffing US, Lapid and Gantz say ‘no one will dictate’ IDF’s open-fire regulations,” Times of Israel, September 7, 2022. 73 Barak Ravid, “FBI opens investigation into killing of Palestinian American Shireen Abu Akleh,” Axios, November 14, 2022. 74 Laura Kelly, “Israel calls US probe into journalist’s death ‘grave mistake,’ says it ‘will not cooperate,’” The Hill, November 14, 2022. 75 For background on the Leahy Law, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 76 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel. Congressional Research Service 9 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported the UAE and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords.77 Trade, tourism, and investment ties have generally deepened since the signing of the Accords—including a May 2022 Israel-UAE free-trade agreement (pending Israeli ratification) and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative focused on desalinated water and solar energy.78 One exception is that implementing Israel-Sudan normalization appears to be on hold following the Sudanese military’s seizure of power in October 2021.79 As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the
Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the foreign Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the foreign
ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern
Negev desert. Negev desert.
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim- U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Israel-UAE-Bahrain majority countries. Commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Israel-UAE-Bahrain
agreements in October 2021, Secretary Blinken said that “we’re committed to continue building agreements in October 2021, Secretary Blinken said that “we’re committed to continue building
on the efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations on the efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations
with Israel in the years ahead.”with Israel in the years ahead.”6280 However, the Biden Administration However, the Biden Administration appetite for offering’s willingness to offer major major
U.S. policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.U.S. policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.6381
The Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and The Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and
Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Israeli-Palestinian conflict.6482 Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE
normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League
states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition
for improved ties.for improved ties.65

58 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international
economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of
sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked
Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel.
5983 In October 2022, the UAE’s foreign minister reportedly warned Benjamin Netanyahu that including leaders from the Religious Zionism list in a new Israeli government could harm Israel-UAE ties and the Abraham Accords.84 Security cooperation. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would add Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.85 Israel had previously been under the purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,86 77 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021. , October 20, 2021.
6078 “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan , May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan
sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
6179 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
6280 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
Availability,” October 13, 2021. Availability,” October 13, 2021.
6381 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October , October
14, 2021. 14, 2021.
6482 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,” State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,”
March 28, 2022. March 28, 2022.
6583 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August 14, 2020. 84 Jacob Magid, “UAE warns Netanyahu against government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich,” Times of Israel, October 26, 2022. 85 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, 2021. 86 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1, Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.87 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
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Prospects for Saudi normalization. As Israel has drawn closer to some Arab states, the
likelihood of a future normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia may increase. Given Saudi
Arabia’s importance as an economic and military power in the region, the kingdom’s history of
firm opposition to such normalization, and its status as the custodian of Islam’s most holy and
foundational sites, such a development could boost any precedent that the Abraham Accords may
set for other Muslim-majority countries considering cooperation with Israel.66 In June 2022,
Secretary Blinken said that Saudi Arabia is a “critical partner” of the United States in dealing with
regional challenges from extremism and Iran and expressed his “hope” that the kingdom would
be a partner in “continuing the process of building relationships between Israel and its neighbors
both near and further away through the continuation, the expansion of the Abraham Accords.”67
While senior Saudi officials say that full Israel-Saudi normalization still remains contingent on
progress with Palestinian issues—including the establishment of a Palestinian state68—Israel and
Saudi Arabia are reportedly engaging in serious talks in the meantime to build business ties and
coordinate on regional security matters. While Saudi leaders continue discreetly coordinating
with Israel on regional defense, they apparently prefer to hedge by keeping diplomatic options
open with Iran rather than formalizing an anti-Iran coalition.69
During President Biden’s trip to the region in July 2022, he announced certain steps that could
point toward eventual normalization. These included the opening of Saudi airspace to Israeli
civilian overflights, and an arrangement that is to allow Saudi Arabia to take full control of the
Red Sea islands Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt while guaranteeing Israel’s freedom of navigation,
despite the planned withdrawal of a Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping contingent
that includes U.S. troops.70
Security cooperation. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would
add Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.71 Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,72
and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.73
Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the other Abraham
Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt,
and Pakistan.74

14, 2020.
66 Dion Nissenbaum, “Saudis Expand Talks with Israel,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2022.
67 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Foreign Affairs Magazine Centennial Celebration,”
June 1, 2022.
68 Jacob Magid, “Saudi minister: Peace with Israel ‘strategic option’ but not before 2-state solution,” Times of Israel,
July 16, 2022.
69 Michael J. Koplow, “Israel’s Regional Ambitions Are Hitting an Iranian Wall, Not a Palestinian One,” Israel Policy
Forum, July 21, 2022; Anchal Vohra, “Could There Ever Be a Middle East NATO?” foreignpolicy.com, July 28, 2022.
70 White House, “FACT SHEET: Results of Bilateral Meeting Between the United States and the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia,” July 15, 2022.
71 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,
2021.
72 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021.
73 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of
Israel, October 29, 2021.
74 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for 2022
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Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the other Abraham Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.88
Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by
Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly
expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.7589 Earlier, both Morocco (November Earlier, both Morocco (November
2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.7690 These These
MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales. MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.
In his February 8, 2022, confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
soon-to-be CENTCOM Commander and General Michael Kurilla testified that Israel and other
regional countries were cooperating on integrated air and missile defense and in other security
areas. Reports in fall 2022 indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries, and may be contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.91 Israel’s defense ministry has estimated that deals to date with the three countries are worth $3 billion.92 At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly
discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on
inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.7793 Speculation Speculation
about specific measures has continued since thenabout specific measures has continued since then,78 and Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz
said in June 2022 that a “Middle East Air Defense Alliance” is already working together with the
United States.79.94
Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel, Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel,
certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their
involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”8095 One One
obstacle could be the apparent reluctance of obstacle could be the apparent reluctance of regional countriescountries in the region to share the real-time intelligence to share the real-time intelligence
data that underlies basic threat information data that underlies basic threat information that they might be more willing to share.they might be more willing to share.81 96 Unless and Unless and
until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM apparently plans to help coordinate air until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM apparently plans to help coordinate air
defense and response with various U.S. regional partners using the X-band radar stationed in
Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air defense systems and fighter jets.82
Israel appears to welcome the increased operational capabilities, geographical depth, and political
cover that coordination with Arab Gulf states can provide in countering Iran. While some Gulf
States may welcome closer coordination with Israel, others, including the UAE, also maintain ties
to Iran and might want to preserve these by avoiding any direct deployment of Israeli forces on
their territory. Over the past year, the UAE has pursued a policy of limited engagement with Iran.
In summer 2022, the UAE announced that it would return its ambassador to Tehran after a six-
year hiatus.

defense and response with various U.S. regional partners using the X-band radar 2021. 87 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of Israel, October 29, 2021. 88 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for 2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list. International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
7589 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25, , January 25,
2022. 2022.
7690 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021; , November 26, 2021;
Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. During the , February 3, 2022. During the
same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense
minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all
parties involved. parties involved.
7791 Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Breaking Defense, October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2022. 92 Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.” 93 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022. , March 29, 2022.
7894 Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Breaking Defense, June , June
29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” Times of Israel, June 28, , June 28,
20222022.
79; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York Times, ,
June 21, 2022. June 21, 2022.
8095 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” New York Times, July 14, , July 14,
2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” 2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” Wall Street
Journal, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
8196 Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,” Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,”
Politico, July 12, July 12, 2022.
82 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Ha’aretz, July 13, 2022. , 2022.
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stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air defense systems and fighter jets.97 Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.8398 In March, Congress enacted the In March, Congress enacted the
Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other
things, the IRNA requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening things, the IRNA requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening
and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of
measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization
efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts. efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.
In June 2022, several Members in the Senate and House introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces In June 2022, several Members in the Senate and House introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces
and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act of 2022 (S. 4366 and H.R. 7987). The bill has and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act of 2022 (S. 4366 and H.R. 7987). The bill has
provisions that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a strategy and feasibility study provisions that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a strategy and feasibility study
on cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt for an on cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt for an
integrated air and missile defense capability to counter Iran-related threats. Large portions of the integrated air and missile defense capability to counter Iran-related threats. Large portions of the
bill have been incorporated bill have been incorporated as amendments to the House Armed Services Committeein the House version version
(H.R. 7900) and (H.R. 7900) and as amendments to the Senate Armed Services Committee version (S. 4543) of the National Defense Senate Armed Services Committee version (S. 4543) of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023. Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023.
Countering Iran
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through
coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.8499 Israeli Israeli
observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s
2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert
actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”85100
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister
Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.86
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional
tensions.87 In June 2022, then-Prime Minister Bennett characterized some operations inside Iran

83101 97 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Haaretz, July 13, 2022. 98 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/ For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/
Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf. Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.
8499 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York
Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” , May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” jpost.comJerusalem Post, March 11, 2022. , March 11, 2022.
85100 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” jpost.comJerusalem Post, ,
November 14, 2021. November 14, 2021.
86101 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” New York Times, September 13, 2021. , September 13, 2021.
87 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24,
2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi,
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Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace, international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional tensions.102 In June 2022, then-Prime Minister Bennett characterized some operations inside Iran in the past year as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military in the past year as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military
capabilities.capabilities.88103
As the Biden Administration As the Biden Administration engageshas engaged in international diplomacy and in international diplomacy and considersconsidered the possibility of the possibility of
reentering or revising the JCPOA, reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israel is reportedly still seekingIsraeli leaders have sought to influence diplomatic to influence diplomatic
outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international negotiations with Iran, then-outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international negotiations with Iran, then-
Prime Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return to the JCPOA.Prime Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return to the JCPOA.89104 A A
January 2022 report suggested that some leading Israeli security officials might prefer an January 2022 report suggested that some leading Israeli security officials might prefer an
international deal to no deal because an agreement could provide “increased certainty about the international deal to no deal because an agreement could provide “increased certainty about the
limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for
escalation scenarios.”escalation scenarios.”90105 During During his timetheir stints as prime minister, Bennett as prime minister, Bennett and Yair Lapid have opposed the deal,opposed the deal,91 but largely but largely
abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.92 Prime Minister Yair Lapid replaced
Bennett in July 2022 and has maintained a consistent stance on the issue.93
As international discussions around the JCPOA continued in March 2022, Bennett and then-
Foreign Minister Lapid issued a joint statement arguing against reports that the United States
might remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from its Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTO) list in exchange for a promise not to harm Americans.94 In an April 26,
2022, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Blinken said that he could only
envision the IRGC’s de-listing if Iran takes steps necessary to justify it.95 On May 4, 62 Senators
voted in favor of a motion that any Iran nuclear deal must address Iran’s ballistic missile
program, support for terrorism, and oil trade with China, and not lift sanctions on or de-list the
IRGC.96 During his July 2022 trip to Israel, President Biden confirmed that he would not remove
the IRGC from the FTO list.97
During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and Prime Minister Lapid signed the Jerusalem
U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment “never to
allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is prepared to use
all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”98 Reportedly, Lapid said to Biden that
talks regarding the JCPOA must have a deadline. Biden has not specified a deadline and said that
diplomacy was his preferred method to resolve the issue, but also said that “we’re not going to

“With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16,
2022.
88 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022.
89abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.106 During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and Prime Minister Lapid signed the Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment “never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”107 Reportedly, Lapid said to Biden that talks regarding the JCPOA must have a deadline. Biden has not specified a deadline and said that diplomacy was his preferred method to resolve the issue, but also said that “we’re not going to wait forever.”108 Additionally, Biden said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.109 Lapid said that Israel wants a credible military threat to be the basis for international negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, and that the United States “didn’t necessarily agree on this” during President Biden’s visit.110 As of November 2022, prospects for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear uncertain.111 Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear program,112 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the 102 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, “With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16, 2022. 103 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022. 104 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Bennett’s Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Bennett’s Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for
Policy and Strategy Conference, Reichman University,” November 23, 2021. Policy and Strategy Conference, Reichman University,” November 23, 2021.
90105 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel’s military intel chief says Iran deal better than no deal,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel’s military intel chief says Iran deal better than no deal,” Axios, January 5, 2022. See also , January 5, 2022. See also
Ronen Bergman, “Israel’s Military Leans in Favor of Iran Nuclear Deal. Its Spy Agency Won't Budge,” Ronen Bergman, “Israel’s Military Leans in Favor of Iran Nuclear Deal. Its Spy Agency Won't Budge,” New York
Times, July 15, 2022. , July 15, 2022.
91 Jonathan Lis, “Bennett Announces Laser-based Missile Defense System ‘Within a Year,’” haaretz.com, February 1,
2022.
92106 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022, March 21, 2022.
93; Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022. Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022.
94 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Joint Announcement from PM Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid,” March
18, 2022.
95 Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6518577?11.
96 H.R. 4521, Roll Call Vote #155: Motion Agreed to 62-33, R 46-1, D 15-31, I 1-1, May 4, 2022; Congressional
Record, S.2321, May 4, 2022.
97107 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022. 108 Lahav Harkov, “Biden says US won’t wait forever for Iran deal, doesn’t set deadline,” Jerusalem Post, July 14, 2022. 109 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” Associated Press, July 15, 2022.
98 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022.
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wait forever.”99 Additionally, Biden said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a
“last resort” to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.100 Lapid said that Israel wants a
credible military threat to be the basis for international negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue,
and that the United States “didn’t necessarily agree on this” during President Biden’s visit.101
One source reported in May 2022 that divisions persist among Israeli officials over which
approach or combination of approaches—among options including international diplomacy, U.S.-
led sanctions, and Israeli military and intelligence operations—may be likelier to prevent or slow
Iranian nuclear advances.102 Under Lapid, Israeli officials have continued to publicly criticize a
renewed or revised international nuclear deal, but appear less likely than previously under
Netanyahu to actively encourage congressional opposition to U.S. executive branch decisions.103
Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear
program,104 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the
overall effectiveness of such operations.105 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military
capabilities,106.” 110 “Lapid: Israel, US don’t ‘necessarily agree’ on need for military threat against Iran,” Times of Israel, July 17, 2022. 111 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran,” November 2022. 112 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022. Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief overall effectiveness of such operations.113 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military capabilities,114 questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against
Iran’s nuclear program.Iran’s nuclear program.107115
Hezbollah and Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.conflict.108116 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications, Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications,
including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.109117
Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied
weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and
its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.110118 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership
and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture
precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.111

99 Lahav Harkov, “Biden says US won’t wait forever for Iran deal, doesn’t set deadline,” jpost.com, July 14, 2022.
100 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit.”
101 “Lapid: Israel, US don’t ‘necessarily agree’ on need for military threat against Iran,” Times of Israel, July 17, 2022.
102 Ben Caspit, “Israeli leadership divided on Iran deal,” Al-Monitor, May 27, 2022.
103 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Lapid, Mossad chief diverge on emerging Iran nuclear deal,” August 30, 2022.
104 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022.
105119 Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-backed targets that could present threats to its security.120 Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian targets,121 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.122 This deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has criticized some Israeli strikes.123 In May 2022, a Russian-origin S-300 air defense system in Syria reportedly fired on Israeli jets for the first time, raising questions about the status of Israel-Russia 113 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
106114 “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” jpost.comJerusalem Post (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022. (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022.
107115 Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” haaretz.comHaaretz, September 1, 2022. , September 1, 2022.
108116 CRS Report R44759, CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, , by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. , by Carla E.
Humud. Humud.
109117 Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The Israeli Card,” Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The Israeli Card,”
Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022. Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022.
110118 See, e.g., “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” See, e.g., “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben , December 28, 2020; Ben
Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times, ,
April 23, 2020. April 23, 2020.
111119 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press, ,
February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies
Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022. Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.
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Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster
Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other
military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-
backed targets that could present threats to its security.112
Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian
targets,113 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.114 This
deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has
criticized some Israeli strikes.115 In May 2022, a Russian-origin S-300 air defense system in Syria
reportedly fired on Israeli jets for the first time, raising questions about the status of Israel-Russia
deconfliction.116120 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022. 121 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27, 2021. 122 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel, February 27, 2022. 123 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 24 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief deconfliction.124 In August, a private Israeli company published images indicating that Russia has In August, a private Israeli company published images indicating that Russia has
since taken the S-300 back to Russia as part of its Ukraine-related military efforts.since taken the S-300 back to Russia as part of its Ukraine-related military efforts.117
In June and July 2022, Israel’s military intercepted Hezbollah drones heading either for the Israel-
Lebanon border or Israeli infrastructure at the Karish offshore gas field that is the subject of an
Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. In July, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah threatened
additional action and said that Hezbollah was prepared to go to war over the gas field dispute,118
prompting responses from Prime Minister Lapid and Defense Minister Gantz warning against
escalation and stating Israel’s readiness to act against any threat and its interest in Lebanon’s
stability and prosperity.119125 In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a longstanding maritime boundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (see Appendix C). Public debate in Israel centers on whether the economic benefits from the deal are worth the concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.126 As he prepares to return to power, Benjamin Netanyahu has pledged to “neutralize” the maritime boundary agreement,127 though his past efforts as prime minister to secure a similar Israel-Lebanon deal suggest that any rhetorical opposition may be an effort to placate his political base rather than a serious threat to the agreement’s implementation.128
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in
international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and
humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 35,000 Jewish and non-Jewish humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 35,000 Jewish and non-Jewish
refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.120129 As mentioned above As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel has counted on , Israel has counted on
airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those
related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.121

112 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022.
113 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27,
2021.
114 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel,
February 27, 2022.
115 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel
Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12,
2022.
116130 Despite entreaties from Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from directly providing lethal assistance to Ukraine.131 Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations.132 Additionally, an Israeli media outlet reported in September that an Israeli company is in the process of supplying anti-drone systems to Poland, and that Poland is then able to sell the systems to Ukraine.133 With Russia apparently using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel has reportedly begun sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine aimed at helping it counter these drones.134 Defense Minister 124 Dan Parsons and Tyler Rogoway, “S-300 Surface-To-Air Missile Fired at Israeli Jets over Syria for First Time: Dan Parsons and Tyler Rogoway, “S-300 Surface-To-Air Missile Fired at Israeli Jets over Syria for First Time:
Report,” Report,” The Drive, May 16, 2022. , May 16, 2022.
117125 Emanuel Fabian, “Russia sends S-300 back home from Syria amid Ukraine invasion, satellite images show,” Emanuel Fabian, “Russia sends S-300 back home from Syria amid Ukraine invasion, satellite images show,” Times
of Israel, August 26, 2022. , August 26, 2022.
118 Tobias Siegal, “Nasrallah threatens war over Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute126 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022. 127 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” ,” Times of Israel, , July 13,
2022.
119 Emanuel Fabian, “Lapid, Gantz warn that Hezbollah drones, threats could lead region to ‘escalation,’” Times of
Israel, July 19, 2022.
120October 31, 2022. 128 Shlomo Maital, “The Lebanon-Israel gas deal: A lifeline for Beirut,” Jerusalem Report, November 7, 2022; Ben Caspit, “Will Israel’s Netanyahu upend Lebanon gas deal, Iran policy?” Al-Monitor, November 2, 2022. 129 Isabel Kershner, “Israelis Debate How Many, and What Kind of, Refugees to Accept,” Isabel Kershner, “Israelis Debate How Many, and What Kind of, Refugees to Accept,” New York Times, March 24, , March 24,
2022; Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” 2022; Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
121130 Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022. , March 11, 2022.
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Despite entreaties from Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from directly providing
lethal assistance to Ukraine.122 Under some Western pressure, Israel has contemplated providing
defensive equipment, personal combat gear, and/or warning systems to Ukraine’s military, partly
to project to existing arms export clients that it would be a reliable supplier in crisis situations.123
Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian
organizations.124 Additionally, an Israeli media outlet reported in September that an Israeli
company is in the process of supplying anti-drone systems to Poland, and that Poland is then able
to sell the systems to Ukraine.125131 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel rejects U.S. request to approve missile transfer to Ukraine,” Axios, May 25, 2022. 132 “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ Times of Israel, September 23, 2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022. 133 Tani Goldstein, “Israeli defense firm selling anti-drone systems to Ukraine by way of Poland,” Times of Israel, September 12, 2022. 134 “Israel giving intel on Russia's Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022. Congressional Research Service 15 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Gantz has said that Israel might provide Ukraine with early warning systems, but not weapons systems.135
While Israel has not directly joined Western economic sanctions against Russia, Foreign Minister While Israel has not directly joined Western economic sanctions against Russia, Foreign Minister
Lapid has said that Israel is determined to prevent Russians from using Israel to bypass Lapid has said that Israel is determined to prevent Russians from using Israel to bypass
sanctions.sanctions.126136 Observers debate the influence of prominent Russian or Russian-speaking Israelis Observers debate the influence of prominent Russian or Russian-speaking Israelis
within Israel.within Israel.127137 In a March 2022 interview on Israeli television, U.S. Under Secretary of State for In a March 2022 interview on Israeli television, U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said, “You don’t want to become the last haven for dirty money Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said, “You don’t want to become the last haven for dirty money
that’s fueling Putin’s wars.”that’s fueling Putin’s wars.”128138
In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it is seeking to close the Russian In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it is seeking to close the Russian
branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate
emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel. emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel.
Russia is claiming that the agency has violated privacy laws by storing personal information Russia is claiming that the agency has violated privacy laws by storing personal information
about emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspect that Russian concerns about Israeli policy about emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspect that Russian concerns about Israeli policy
on Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may be motivating the pending legal action.on Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may be motivating the pending legal action.129139
Prime Minister Lapid has warned Russia that closing the agency’s Russian branch would be a Prime Minister Lapid has warned Russia that closing the agency’s Russian branch would be a
“grave event” with consequences for Israel-Russia relations.“grave event” with consequences for Israel-Russia relations.130140

122 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel rejects U.S. request to approve missile transfer to Ukraine,” Axios, May 25, 2022.
123 Yaniv Kubovich and Jonathan Lis, “Israeli Officials Inclined to Increase Ukraine Aid in Face of Russian
Atrocities,” haaretz.com, May 3, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,”
jpost.com, May 4, 2022.
124 Emanuel Fabian, “Israel to send new batch of defensive equipment to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, July 12, 2022; “In
first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022.
125 Tani Goldstein, “Israeli defense firm selling anti-drone systems to Ukraine by way of Poland,” Times of Israel,
September 12, 2022.
126135 Emanuel Fabian, “Gantz: Israel may supply Ukraine with rocket and drone alert system, but not weapons,” Times of Israel, October 19, 2022. 136 Rina Bassist, “Israel vows country won’t become safe haven for sanctioned Russian oligarchs,” Rina Bassist, “Israel vows country won’t become safe haven for sanctioned Russian oligarchs,” Al-Monitor, March , March
14, 2022. 14, 2022.
127137 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Cautious Tone on Ukraine Puts Focus on Israeli Oligarchs,” Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Cautious Tone on Ukraine Puts Focus on Israeli Oligarchs,” New York Times, April 11, , April 11,
2022. 2022.
128138 “US official warns Israel: ‘Don’t be last haven for dirty money fueling Putin’s war,’” “US official warns Israel: ‘Don’t be last haven for dirty money fueling Putin’s war,’” Times of Israel, March 11, , March 11,
2022. 2022.
129139 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” New
York Times, July 22, 2022. , July 22, 2022.
130140 Judah Ari Gross, “Lapid warns Russia: Jewish Agency closure would be ‘grave event’ with impact on ties,” Judah Ari Gross, “Lapid warns Russia: Jewish Agency closure would be ‘grave event’ with impact on ties,” Times
of Israel, July 24, 2022. , July 24, 2022.
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Appendix A16 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA, The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2022 unless otherwise specified. Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights controlled by Israel’s military is occupied territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. Congressional Research Service 17 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Appendix B. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) (Consolidation)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Benjamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also
was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces
unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career
in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the
exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s
nuclear program and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a nuclear program and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a
consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist.
National Unity (HaMachane HaMamlachti) (HaMachane HaMamlachti)
Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New
Hope (led by Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Has sought to present a contrast Hope (led by Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Has sought to present a contrast
to the Netanyahu-led Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions to the Netanyahu-led Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions
such as the judiciary and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and such as the judiciary and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and
non-Jewish citizens. Also includes former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff non-Jewish citizens. Also includes former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff

Gadi Eizenkot. Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Gadi Eizenkot. Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Part of the 2021-2022
coalition.
Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff
of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) (Israel Our Home)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union.speakers from the former Soviet Union. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as Born in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as
defense minister and foreign minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist defense minister and foreign minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist
and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in
the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He
worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usionedDisillusioned by Netanyahu’s by Netanyahu’s
wil ingnesswillingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael
Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption
allegations in a 2013 case. allegations in a 2013 case.
HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home)
Right-of-center party with base of support among religious Zionists (mostly
Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews); includes core constituencies supporting West Bank
settlements and annexation.
Leader: Ayelet Shaked
Born in 1976, Shaked had a brief career as a software engineer before entering
politics and working under Netanyahu from 2006 to 2010. She was first elected to
the Knesset in 2013 and has been a close political col eague of former Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett, serving previously as justice minister and now as interior minister.
She resigned her Knesset seat shortly after becoming interior minister in June 2021.
She favors the eventual annexation of most West Bank settlements and autonomy
short of statehood for the Palestinians. She also supports a greater role for Jewish
nationalism in law and society and a reduced role for the judiciary.
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Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) (HaTzionut HaDatit)
Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-
Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam. Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism
since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish
nationalist and religiously conservative causes. nationalist and religiously conservative causes. He served as transportation minister during a transitional period from 2019 to 2020.

LEFT
Labor (Avoda) (Avoda)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza.in the West Bank and Gaza. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leader in 2020 Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leader in 2020
and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she
founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a
regular national media presence and university lecturer. regular national media presence and university lecturer.
Meretz (Vigor)
Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and
peace with the Palestinians. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Zehava Gal-On
Born in 1956, Gal-On was Meretz’s leader from 2012 to 2018 and returned to lead
the party in August 2022. She was first elected to the Knesset in 1999. She previously
directed the B’Tselem human rights organization and has also been a media
columnist. She was born in the Soviet Union (in what is now Lithuania) and
immigrated with her family to Israel in 1960.
CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. Part of
the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Prime Minister Yair Lapid (biography in text box in the main body of the report)

Congressional Research Service 18 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief CENTER Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. Leader: Prime Minister Yair Lapid Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second- place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and has expressed opposition to West Bank settlement construction that could impede such a solution—particularly in isolated areas away from settlement blocs closer to Israel. ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) (Sephardic Torah Guardians)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In January 2022, he resigned his Knesset
seat in connection with a criminal plea deal involving tax-related offenses, but
maintained his leadership of the party.

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United Torah Judaism
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its
interpretation of traditional Jewish law. interpretation of traditional Jewish law.
Leader: Moshe GafniYitzhak Goldknopf
Born in Born in 1952, Gafni was educated in a yeshiva (traditional Jewish school) and headed
a kollel (institute for advanced rabbinic study). He was first elected to the Knesset in
19881951, Goldknopf is prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance. The 2022 election is his first for the Knesset. .
ARAB
Hadash-Ta’al
Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadashpolitical strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal). Movement for Renewal).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with
the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before
becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006. becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) (UAL or Ra’am)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. Part of the 2021-
2022 coalition.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the
UAL into the previous coalition in June 2021 after receiving promises that the UAL into the previous coalition in June 2021 after receiving promises that the
government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for
Arab Israelis.
Balad (National Democratic Assembly)
Arab nationalist party that opposes the idea of Israel as a Jewish state, and supports a
binational Israeli state alongside a Palestinian state in the West Bank (including East
Jerusalem) and Gaza.
Leader: Sami Abu Shehadeh
Born in 1975, Abu Shehadeh was a member of the Tel Aviv-Jaffa city council and has
served as director of the Yaffa (Jaffa) Youth Movement. He became Balad’s chairman
in 2021.

Sources: Various open sources.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Congressional Research Service

20Arab Israelis. Congressional Research Service 19 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Sources: Various open sources. Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 25 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Appendix C. Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon and the United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a longstanding Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon agreement (see Figure C-1). According to a senior Biden Administration official: This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without conflict.141 On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal.142 Reportedly, President Biden has drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural gas drilling.143 Implementation may hinge in part on domestic political outcomes connected with Israel’s November 1 election and subsequent government formation process. 141 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement,” October 11, 2022. 142 Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Times of Israel, October 29, 2022. 143 Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Haaretz, October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” Jerusalem Post, October 11, 2022. Congressional Research Service 21 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Figure C-1. Map: Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Agreement Source: Haaretz. Note: All boundaries are approximate. Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.144 The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute. As mentioned above, public debate in Israel centers on whether the economic benefits from the deal are worth the concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.145 As he prepares to return to power, Benjamin Netanyahu has pledged to “neutralize” the maritime boundary agreement,146 though his past efforts as prime minister to secure a similar Israel-Lebanon deal 144 Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Times of Israel, October 12, 2022. 145 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022. 146 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Times of Israel, October 31, 2022. Congressional Research Service 22 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief suggest that any rhetorical opposition may be an effort to placate his political base rather than a serious threat to the agreement’s implementation.147 Author Information Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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147 Shlomo Maital, “The Lebanon-Israel gas deal: A lifeline for Beirut,” Jerusalem Report, November 7, 2022; Ben Caspit, “Will Israel’s Netanyahu upend Lebanon gas deal, Iran policy?” Al-Monitor, November 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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