Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
October 25, 2021
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. U.S. law
requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
Jim Zanotti
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additionally, a 10-
Specialist in Middle
year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United
Eastern Affairs
States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million

annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. In 2021, some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s

use of U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses
the following matters:
New government and domestic issues. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party heads a power-sharing
government featuring a group of disparate parties from across the political spectrum that replaced the government of the
long-serving Binyamin Netanyahu in June 2021. Despite reportedly holding more nationalistic positions than Netanyahu on
Palestinian issues and settlements, Bennett may be constrained by left-of-center and Arab-led parties in the coalition from
taking action in line with those positions. Although Bennett’s policies on various foreign policy matters may not differ
significantly from those of Netanyahu, his government has thus far offered a less confrontational approach to disagreements
with U.S. officials. The government will likely try to focus on pragmatic management of Israel’s security and economy rather
than controversial political initiatives, but Netanyahu and others in opposition may challenge its cohesion. To prevent the
government’s dissolution, Israel’s Knesset (its unicameral parliament) must pass a budget for 2021-2022 by mid-November
2021. The Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List is part of the coalition and is seeking to have the government address
socioeconomic inequalities among the Arab citizens who make up around 20% of Israel’s population.
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. In May 2021, an 11-day conflict took place
between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza. It was the
fourth major conflict of its kind, with previous ones occurring in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014. Intercommunal protests and
violence also took place among Arabs and Jews within Israel and Jerusalem—with existing tensions in Jerusalem
contributing to the conflict’s outbreak. In the conflict’s aftermath, President Biden has pledged to replenish Israel’s Iron
Dome anti-rocket system, and the House has passed a supplemental bill that would provide $1 billion for Iron Dome through
FY2024. With Gaza still under Hamas control, obstacles to post-conflict recovery persist. Beyond providing short-term
humanitarian assistance, the United States and other international actors face sig nificant challenges in seeking to help with
longer-term reconstruction without bolstering Hamas.
The Biden Administration has followed agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved
relations between Israel and four Arab states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden
Administration officials have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist with Israel-Arab state normalization would seek to
preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced
normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address
Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties. Possible economic benefits and U.S. arms sales
stemming from Israel-Arab state normalization may influence relationships among regional actors.
Iran and other regional issues. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement
that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Prime Minister Bennett has made statements opposing the Biden Administration’s
possible reentry into the agreement. Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence
nuclear diplomacy. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon against
Iran and its allies due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal.
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. concerns. U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over Chinese
investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability to gather intelligence
and acquire security-related technologies. While Chinese state-owned companies remain engaged in some specific
infrastructure projects, including the management of a seaport terminal in Haifa, Israel has taken some steps to reduce
Chinese investment in strategically important areas.
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Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, including on aid, arms sales, and missile
defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim
Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. embassy to
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future negotiations and
outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future
national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of
Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in
Jerusalem.
The Biden Administration also has announced—without specifying the timing—that it plans to
reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that had previously functioned as an independent
diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians. The Trump Administration merged
the consulate into the embassy in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a
Palestinian Affairs Unit within the embassy. Some media reports suggest that the Biden
Administration may delay the consulate’s reopening until sometime after a critical budget
deadline for Israel’s new government in mid-November 2021 (discussed below).1 Several top
Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, have
voiced opposition to the proposed reopening.2 It is unclear whether Israel’s approval of a U.S.
consulate reopening is essential y a practical matter—given Israel’s control over Jerusalem—or is
also founded on law such as the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.3 For more
information on this issue, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additional y, a 10-
year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the
United States to provide Israel $3.3 bil ion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend
$500 mil ion annual y on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to
congressional appropriations. Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter. Congress also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a
number of specific security-related areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countermeasures for
drone aircraft.
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include

1 See, for example, Jonathan Lis and Ben Samuels, “ Ahead of First Meeting, Biden and Bennett T ry to Dismantle a
Jerusalem Landmine,” haaretz.com, August 16, 2021.
2 Shalom Yerushalmi, “ Bennett suggested Biden reopen consulate in Ramallah or Abu Dis, US said no,” Times of
Israel, September 28, 2021; “ Israel opposes Biden plan to reopen U.S. Palestinian mission in Jerusalem ,” Reuters,
September 1, 2021; “ Israeli minister sees no compromise on U.S. Palestinian mission in Jerusalem ,” Reuters, October
12, 2021.
3 For varying views, see Efron and Dalalsha, “Reopening the U.S. Consulate”; Alan Baker, “ A U.S. Consulate for the
Palestinians Should Be on Palestinian T erritory – Not in Jerusalem,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 15,
2021. T he text of the Vienna Convention is available at
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf .
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 Chal enges facing the Israeli power-sharing government that took office in June
2021, headed by Prime Minister Bennett.
 Israeli-Palestinian issues, including the aftermath of May 2021 Israel-Gaza Strip
violence, some human rights considerations and heightened scrutiny of U.S. aid,
and Israel’s normalization of relations with various Arab states.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
 Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure, and U.S. concerns
about implications for U.S. national security.
New Israeli Government
A new power-sharing government headed by Prime Minister Bennett (see the text box below for a
brief biography) took office on June 13, 2021, ending Binyamin Netanyahu’s 12-year tenure as
prime minister.4 Since Netanyahu’s criminal indictment on corruption charges in February 2019,
Israel has held four separate elections—the most recent in March 2021—and experienced
considerable political turmoil. Netanyahu had stayed in power during that time for various
reasons, including lack of Israeli consensus on replacing him during the crisis over the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, and his prominence on national security
issues. Netanyahu and his Likud party now lead the Knesset’s opposition, as was the case from
2006 to 2009.
Bennett—a right-of-center figure who leads the Yamina party—and the centrist Yesh Atid party
leader Yair Lapid reached agreement with other key political party leaders to form a new
government and replace Netanyahu. Bennett is scheduled to serve as prime minister until August
27, 2023, at which point Lapid would become prime minister. The new government draws its
support from a disparate coalition of parties on the right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu),
center (Yesh Atid and Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the political spectrum, as wel as
from the Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) (see Table 1 and Appendix B).
The participation of UAL in the coalition is the first instance of an independent Arab party joining
an Israeli government.5 Women make up approximately one-third of Israel’s new cabinet, with
nine female ministers, more than in any previous government.6
Table 1. Israeli Power-Sharing Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett
Yamina
Foreign Minister and
Yair Lapid
Yesh Atid
Alternate Prime Minister
Defense Minister
Benny Gantz
Kahol Lavan
Finance Minister
Avigdor Lieberman
Yisrael Beitenu

4 Netanyahu also served an earlier 1996-1999 term as prime minister.
5 According to one Israeli media source, “Only twice have Arab Israeli parties backed an Israeli government. In the
1950s, a small faction composed of one Arab parliamentarian entered the coalition. The faction was far from
independent, essentially operating as an Arab franchise of Israel’s ruling socialist party, Mapai. In the 1990s, when the
government of left -wing Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin was in danger of collapsing, the Arab parties stepped in to
prevent a vote of no confidence.” Aaron Boxerman, “ History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett -Lapid
coalition,” Tim es of Israel, June 3, 2021.
6 Mazal Mualem, “Israeli female ministers introduce reforms, shake up agenda,” Al-Monitor, September 10, 2021.
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Justice Minister
Gideon Sa’ar
New Hope
Interior Minister
Ayelet Shaked
Yamina
Transportation Minister
Merav Michaeli
Labor
Public Security Minister
Omer Bar Lev
Labor
Health Minister
Nitzan Horowitz
Meretz
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett: Biography
Bennett, born in 1972, is a leading figure of the Israeli national religious, pro-settler right. He
hails from a modern Orthodox Jewish background. Having parents who emigrated from the
United States, Bennett lived in America at multiple times as a youth and adult. He served in
various Israeli special forces units (and remains a reservist) before starting what became a very
successful career as a software entrepreneur.
Entering politics in 2006, Bennett served as chief of staff for Binyamin Netanyahu until 2008,
while Netanyahu was serving as opposition leader in the Knesset. Later, Bennett served as
director-general of the Yesha Council (the umbrel a organization for Israeli West Bank
settlers) from 2010 to 2012.
He then became the party leader for HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) and led the party into the Knesset in
2013. In 2018 he left The Jewish Home, seeking various right-of-center electoral al iances before final y becoming
head of Yamina in 2020. Bennett has participated in several coalition governments led by Netanyahu, serving as
economy minister (2013-2015), education minister (2015-2019), and defense minister (2019-2020). In May 2020,
he led Yamina into the opposition when Netanyahu and Likud formed a power-sharing government with Benny
Gantz and Kahol Lavan.
Bennett openly opposes the creation of a Palestinian state, though he approves of greater Palestinian autonomy in
West Bank urban areas. He supports continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the
annexation of Jewish-settled areas. However, he has agreed not to pursue annexation as prime minister in the
current power-sharing government.
On domestic issues, Bennett general y supports free-market policies, a modest government safety net, and a focus
on equality of opportunity and education for economical y chal enged Israelis. He has supported efforts by his
close political col eague Ayelet Shaked, who served as justice minister from 2015 to 2019, to limit the power of
the judiciary and other justice sector and public security institutions to curb executive and legislative actions.7
Key Domestic Issues
In its first few months in office, the government has focused largely on addressing pragmatic
solutions to chal enges such as enacting a budget and addressing the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic. The fractious nature of the coalition makes it less likely to pursue
comprehensive action on more political y contentious issues like those pertaining to the
Palestinians. Significant disagreements within or defections from the government could lead to its
collapse and new elections—perhaps leaving open the possibility of a return by Netanyahu to
power.
In early August, Israel’s cabinet approved a budget for the first time in more than three years.
Israeli law requires that the Knesset approve the budget by mid-November to prevent the
government’s dissolution and a new round of elections. As of late October, one report signaled
possible discontent—which could conceivably spil over to the budget’s legislative prospects—
from left-of-center coalition members over other ministers’ actions to designate Palestinian civil
society groups as terrorist organizations (discussed in the textbox below) and advance West Bank
settlement construction.8

7 Dahlia Scheindlin, “T he Assault on Israel’s Judiciary,” T he Century Foundation, July 7, 2021.
8 Raoul Wootliff, “ Coalition increasingly split on left -right lines as budget deadline looms.” Times of Israel, October
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The budget, which covers 2021-2022, would emphasize spending on infrastructure and pandemic
recovery as wel as various reforms.9 Of the $360 bil ion budgeted for these two years,
approximately $11 bil ion would be specifical y al ocated to the infrastructure, education, health
care, and crime prevention needs of Arab Israelis,10 whose income and education levels are
markedly lower than those of Jewish Israelis. Securing this level of funding for Arab citizens of
Israel would be a major accomplishment for UAL leader Mansour Abbas, who joined the
government based on budgetary assurances from coalition partners.11
Issues for U.S. Policy
The new Israeli government’s approach to regional chal enges related to Iran and the Palestinians
wil affect its relations with the United States. Prime Minister Bennett met with President Biden
at the White House in August 2021. A White House readout of the meeting said that Bennett and
Biden “reiterated their commitments to work constructively and deepen cooperation to address al
aspects of Israel’s security against Iran and other threats,” and the statement included additional
points on the Palestinians (see below).12 Although Bennett’s policies on regional issues may not
differ significantly from those of former Prime Minister Netanyahu, his government has thus far
publicized a less confrontational approach to disagreements with U.S. officials on Iran—
apparently seeking to improve Israel’s bipartisan standing with Democrats.13
Israeli-Palestinian Issues
Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for
direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.14 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster
Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump
Administration. In May 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke out against steps taken by
Israelis or Palestinians that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of
two states—including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and
payment to terrorists.15 In October 2021, the State Department spokesperson voiced concern
about prospective Israeli actions to advance settlements deep in the West Bank, and cal ed upon
Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to “refrain from unilateral steps that exacerbate tension
and undercut efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution. This certainly includes settlement
activity, as wel as retroactive legalization of settlement outposts.”16

25, 2021.
9 “Israel’s 2021/22 budget set for parliament battle after cabinet approval,” Reuters, August 2, 2021.
10 Mazel Mualem, “Israeli budget approved in victory for Arab coalition party,” Al-Monitor, August 3, 2021.
11 Aaron Boxerman, “ History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett -Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3,
2021.
12 White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,”
August 27, 2021.
13 Steven A. Cook, “Netanyahu Is Gone. Netanyahu-ism Still Reigns.” foreignpolicy.com, September 1, 2021; “ Lapid
vows to rebuild international ties after ‘reckless’ last government ,” Times of Israel, June 14, 2021.
14 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly ,”
September 21, 2021.
15 State Department, “ Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021.
16 State Department Press Briefing, October 22, 2021.
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During 2021, Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based PA
President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for Palestinians.17 As part of
the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey
Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the future
establishment of a fund to support Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, and
an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.
A White House summary of the August 2021 meeting between President Biden and Prime
Minister Bennett said:
The President underscored the importance of steps to improve the lives of Palestinians and
support greater economic opportunities for them. He also noted the importance of
refraining from actions that could exacerbate tensions, contribute to a sense of unfairness,
and undermine efforts to build trust. President Biden reaffirmed his view that a negotiated
two-state solution is the only viable path to achieving a lasting resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.18
Days before the Biden-Bennett meeting, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz met PA President
Abbas—the first meeting between Abbas and an Israeli cabinet minister since 2010. Gantz said
that the two discussed steps to improve security coordination and assist the PA financial y,
including a $155 mil ion Israeli loan.19 Bennett said in late August that while Israel is open to
helping the PA economical y, Israel had no intention of engaging in a diplomatic process at the
time.20
In addition to the loan mentioned above, Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’
circumstances, “including issuing 15,000 new work permits inside Israel for [West Bank]
Palestinians… re-establishing Joint Economic Committees to discuss future projects, al owing
reunification (i.e. legal status) for Palestinian spouses in the West Bank, and tentatively approving
2,000 new housing units for Palestinians in the part of the West Bank under full Israeli control.”21
In October 2021, Israeli authorities announced an additional 3,000 work permits inside Israel for
Gazans.22 However, some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the
conflict’s effects unilateral y rather than responsively address its causes through dialogue and
negotiation with Palestinians.23
Israeli Terrorist Designations Against Palestinian Civil Society Groups
In October 2021, Defense Minister Gantz—apparently acting with the approval of the state prosecutor, but
without consulting Prime Minister Bennett or other key cabinet ministers—announced the designation of six
Palestinian civil society groups as terrorist organizations under Israeli law because of purported links to the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).24 According to the
New York Times, “The six [groups] are variously involved in highlighting rights abuses by Israel, the Palestinian
Authority and Hamas, as wel as in promoting the rights of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, women,

17 CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview, Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues, by Jim Zanotti.
18 White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,”
August 27, 2021.
19 Yaniv Kubovich, “Gantz Says Agreed with Abbas on Confidence-building Measures, Including $155m Loan,”
haaretz.com, August 30, 2021.
20 Ibid.
21 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict. Here’s what that looks like,” CNN,
September 16, 2021.
22 “Israel announces 3,000 new Gaza work permits,” Al-Monitor, October 20, 2021.
23 Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict.”
24 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US over outlawed Palestinian groups,” Times of Israel, October 24, 2021.
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farmworkers and children.”25 The designations, which have sparked some domestic and international criticism,
could significantly curtail these groups’ funding and activities, and subject their supporters to Israeli criminal
prosecution. Some of the groups receive funding from the European Union and other international actors. In
response to a U.S. request for clarification, Israeli officials were preparing as of late October to share evidence
that they claim supports the terrorist designations.26
May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict
From May 10 through May 21, 2021, a conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza.27 The following
were key aspects of the conflict:
 Overview. Palestinian militants fired rockets with unprecedented intensity from
Gaza into central Israel. The Iron Dome anti-rocket system played a prominent
role in defending Israeli population centers. Israel conducted sustained air and
artil ery strikes in Gaza. Additional y, intercommunal protests and violence took
place within Israel and Jerusalem (see below for a description of events in
Jerusalem prior to the conflict)—involving some Arab citizens of Israel,
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities.
 Political context. Some factors that may have influenced the outbreak and
trajectory of conflict included tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, the
presence of a new U.S. Administration, and significant domestic political
uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including a recent postponement of
PA elections).
 Fatalities. In exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza, 12 people in Israel
(including 2 Thai nationals) and more than 250 people in Gaza (including more
than 60 children) were kil ed.28 Amid unrest in the West Bank during that same
timeframe (May 10-21), one source estimates that Israeli security forces kil ed 27
Palestinians.29
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.30
Palestinian militants in Gaza periodical y clash with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilian areas in southern Israel and Gaza,
respectively. These incidents periodical y escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel
reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent
or manage conflict escalation.

25 Patrick Kingsley, “ Palestine Rights Groups Called T errorists by Israel,” New York Times, October 23, 2021.
26 “Shin Bet, Foreign Ministry rep heading to US.”
27 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza.
28 Dina Kraft and Laura King, “ Israel’s Netanyahu, master of political survival, tested by conflict with Gaza,” Los
Angeles Tim es, May 23, 2021; “ 2 T hai workers killed, several people injured as Hamas bombards southern Israel,”
Tim es of Israel, May 18, 2021.
29 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian T erritory, “ West Bank: Escalation
of Violence 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021.
30 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
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Various actions exacerbated the tension in Jerusalem that led to conflict. These included Israeli
measures restricting Palestinian movement and worship in and around the Temple Mount/Haram
al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) holy sites in the Old City,31 disputes about and responses to these
measures, isolated attacks by Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish nationalist groups.32
Unrest intensified in response to controversy over the possible eviction of several Palestinian
families from their longtime residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem,
stemming from an Israeli law that al ows for Jewish recovery of property abandoned in
connection with the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.33 The case remains ongoing in Israel’s Supreme Court,
which reportedly may be seeking an outcome calculated to defuse tensions.34 Palestinian leaders
and some activists and international actors claim that the Sheikh Jarrah case is part of a
systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem since the area’s capture and
effective annexation as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.35
Critics of Israeli actions connect controversies in Jerusalem with concerns about Jewish
settlement activity and other al egations that Israel violates international law and Palestinian
human rights.36 During the conflict, some Members of Congress who criticized Israel’s conduct
during hostilities, and/or voiced concern about the impact of conflict on civilians in Gaza, sought
to restrict the sale of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to Israel.37
The Conflict’s Aftermath: Aid for Iron Dome and Gaza Relief
In the aftermath of the May 2021 conflict, the Biden Administration has sought to strengthen
Israel’s defensive capabilities, restore regional calm, and improve humanitarian conditions.38
Within Congress, there has been broad bipartisan support for replenishing the Iron Dome
system.39 During the conflict, Palestinian armed groups (mostly Hamas and Palestine Islamic
Jihad) fired some 4,300 rockets into Israel, and the Israel Defense Forces reported that Iron Dome
intercepted around 1,500 (representing 90% of those projectiles that were headed toward

31 For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,
by Jim Zanotti.
32 “From T ikTok to T emple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem ,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021.
33 Nir Hasson, “ Jerusalem Clashes: How Palestinians Rallied Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some
Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of
cases are at risk of being evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss, “ Palestinians fear loss of family homes
as evictions loom,” Associated Press, May 10, 2021.
34 T he court has proposed a compromise that would allow the Palestinian defendants to stay in their homes on the
condition that they recognize the Israeli plaintiff as being registered as the property’s owner in Israel (without
necessarily conceding ownership claims). Jacob Magid, “ Israel asking US to push Palestinians toward compromise on
Sheikh Jarrah,” Tim es of Israel, August 10, 2021; T aghreed Ali, “ Israel offers Sheikh Jarrah residents to remain tenants
for 15 years,” Al-Monitor, October 12, 2021.
35 Patrick Kingsley, “ Israel’s Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem ,” New York
Tim es, May 10, 2021.
36 Al-Haq, “Action Alert: International Community Must T ake Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s
Aggression against Palestinian Jerusalemites,” May 10, 2021. For additional information, see CRS Report R46433,
Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti.
37 “U.S. Sen. Sanders Offers Resolution Blocking Arms Sales to Israel,” Reuters, May 20, 2021.
38 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East ,” May 20, 2021.
39 Representative Josh Gottheimer, “Release: Bipartisan Group o f 56 House Members Back Urgent Funding for Israel’s
Iron Dome Missile Defense System,” June 2, 2021.
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populated areas).40 Each of Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptors, which are co-produced in Israel and
the United States, cost approximately $50,000.41
A provision in the 2016 MOU al ows the United States and Israel to agree on amounts beyond the
regular annual U.S. aid al ocations under exceptional circumstances (such as major armed
conflict), subject to congressional action. In August 2014, near the end of the last major Israel-
Gaza conflict, Congress enacted an emergency supplemental appropriations resolution (P.L. 113-
145) to provide $225 mil ion in Department of Defense funding for Iron Dome on an expedited
basis, without co-production requirements. Since FY2011, Congress has provided $1.72 bil ion
(in current dollars) for Iron Dome.
In September 2021, the House voted (by a 420-9 margin, with two voting “present”) to pass the
Iron Dome Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 5323), which would provide $1 bil ion
in supplemental funding for Iron Dome over the next three years (FY2022-FY2024). H.R. 5323
awaits possible action in the Senate.
President Biden also has committed to “working with the United Nations and other international
stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the
people of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts” in partnership with the PA “in a manner that
does not permit Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal.”42 With Gaza under Hamas control,
the obstacles to international y-supported post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after
previous Israel-Hamas conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.43 Because of the PA’s inability to
control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction.
Without the PA’s involvement, international organizations and governments reportedly general y
have less confidence that they can prevent Hamas from diverting assistance for its own
purposes.44 Since 2018, Qatar has provided $300 mil ion in cash assistance for Gaza, but due to
Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar began an arrangement in September
2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United Nations.45 However, this
mechanism does not address the unresolved issue of providing salaries to Gaza’s civil servants.46
Other Israel-Hamas disputes have continued and could conceivably escalate, including over what
Israel al ows into Gaza, and Israelis in Hamas custody.47
Certain Human Rights Considerations: International Criminal
Court and U.S. Aid
Some international bodies have taken actions that open al eged Israeli human rights violations
against Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny, in the context of broader debate on this
subject. The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor announced the start of an

40 Sebastien Roblin, “ How Hamas’ Arsenal Shaped the Gaza War of May 2021 ,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021.
41 Manuel T rajtenberg and T omer Fadlon, “ T he Economic Costs of Operation Guardian of the Walls,” INSS Insight,
No. 1485, June 13, 2021.
42 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East ,” May 20, 2021.
43 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a T ough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
44 Ibid.
45 Aaron Boxerman, “ UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021.
46 Ibid.
47 Judah Ari Gross, “ Gaza arson attacks spark 9 fires in Israel; terror groups plan border protests,” Times of Israel,
August 23, 2021.
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investigation in March into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.48 The investigation might
draw from the findings of an ongoing commission of inquiry established by the U.N. Human
Rights Council in May in the wake of the recent Israel-Gaza conflict.49 The Biden Administration
responded skeptical y to the creation of the “open-ended” commission of inquiry.50 Like its
predecessors, the Administration has criticized the Human Rights Council for what it
characterizes as a disproportionate focus on Israel.51
In 2021, some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S.
security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. In April 2021 a bil was introduced in
the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the amount of U.S. aid provided to
Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some human rights al egations.52 Later in
April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the chair and ranking member of the House
Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or adding conditions on security
assistance to Israel,53 quoting remarks that President Biden made during the 2020 presidential
race.54 In July, the House passed a Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs appropriations bil for FY2022 that would require U.S. consultation with a recipient
government to ensure that any arms sale involving U.S. FMF complies with relevant oversight
provisions of the Arms Export Control Act and is consistent with U.S. national security policy,
while also requiring the State Department to report to Congress any credible information that U.S.
assistance may have been used contrary to these parameters (Section 7035(b)(8) of H.R. 4373).
Considerations regarding Israel may have partly motivated the inclusion of these legislative
requirements.55
Arab State Normalization with Israel
The Administration has followed agreements reached during the Trump Administration (the
“Abraham Accords”) that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab states—
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.56 Biden Administration officials
have said that U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Arab states wil continue alongside
efforts to increase the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.57 Palestinian leaders denounced the Abraham Accords as an abandonment of the

48 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
49 U.N. document, A/HRC/S-30/L.1, as orally revised, May 27, 2021.
50 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “ Press Statement: UN Human Rights Council Session on the
Israeli-Palestinian Situation,” May 27, 2021.
51 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “ Secretary Blinken: Remarks to the 46th Session of the
Human Rights Council,” February 24, 2021.
52 “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel of apartheid over treatment of Palestinians,” Associated Press, April 27, 2021
(underlying Human Rights Watch report available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-
authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution, with the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights
Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-
rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/).
53 T ext of letter available at https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf.
54 Omri Nahmias, “ Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020.
55 Ron Kampeas, “ Pro-Israel groups split over whether new US spending bill conditions foreign aid,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, August 5, 2021.
56 Steps taken in connection with these agreements include a proposed U.S. sale to the UAE of F-35s, drone aircraft,
and munitions; Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list; and U.S. recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara.
57 Department of State, Yael Lempert, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Re marks at the
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Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian
negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.58 In the August Biden-Bennett White
House meeting, the two leaders discussed ways to deepen the Abraham Accords relationships and
identify “new opportunities to expand such partnerships.”59
The Pathway to the Abraham Accords, and Its Implications for Palestinians
Before the Abraham Accords, Egypt and Jordan had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations
with Israel.60 In 1981, Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later
enshrined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions, including
on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it.61 After Israel started
negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited diplomatic relations with Morocco, and
informal ties with a number of other Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain.62 These countries downgraded
their ties with Israel after the onset of the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past
decade discreet Israeli links with Arab states on issues including intel igence, security, and trade have become
closer and more public. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common concerns, such as Iran’s
regional influence and military capabilities (see “Iran and the Region” below) and Sunni Islamist populist
movements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches and affiliates).63
To cement its normalization of relations with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex
part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitment from Trump Administration
officials that they would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024.64 Palestinian leaders claimed
that the UAE legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank
status quo that some observers label “de facto annexation.”65 UAE officials countered that by significantly delaying
Israeli declarations of sovereignty over West Bank areas, they preserved prospects for future negotiations toward
a Palestinian state.66 Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Israeli officials have appealed to
domestic pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements related to settlement construction and
expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Official statements from Saudi Arabian officials continue to condition Saudi normalization with Israel on the API’s
provisions.67 Some key Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be wil ing to

Abraham Accords Institute of Peace,” September 14, 2021.
58 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “ Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
14, 2020.
59 White House, “ Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.’s Meeting with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of Israel,”
August 27, 2021.
60 Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel did the same in 1994.
61 T he Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and
provide for the “ [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
Assembly Resolution 194.” T he initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57 -
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. T he text of the initiative is available at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
62 Miriam Berger, “ Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam
Entous, “Donald T rump’s New World Order,” New Yorker, June 11, 2018; CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
63 Steve Hendrix, “ Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,”
washingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.
64 Jacob Magid, “ US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, T oI told,” Times of Israel,
September 13, 2020.
65 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “ Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
14, 2020.
66 “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” Times of Israel, August 14,
2020.
67 HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama
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drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specific
incentives to do so could include heightened regional cooperation on Iran, U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects
to boost Saudi economic diversification, and greater Saudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.68
Nevertheless, developments in 2021 such as Israel-Gaza conflict and ongoing tensions over Jerusalem might have
strengthened Saudi inclinations to take a cautious, gradual approach toward normalization.69
Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and
rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical
trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states
to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for
Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add
Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.70 Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and
some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might
encounter political chal enges in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel.
Other factors may influence regional cooperation and rivalry. These could include U.S. arms sales
to Arab states and possible economic benefits from Israel-Arab state relations.71 Additional y,
Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining normalization with Israel might gauge
whether expected benefits from normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism
or unrest they might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.72 Normalization efforts
to date have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public opinion, its
drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of authoritarian Arab regimes.
Iran and the Region
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (especial y in
Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),73 and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war

Dialogue, December 5, 2020.
68 Yoel Guzansky, “ Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No.
1396, October 29, 2020.
69 Hussein Ibish, “ Why Saudi Arabia Is Now in No Rush to Recognize Israel,” haaretz.com, July 7, 2021.
70 Jared Szuba, “T rump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,
2021.
71 T heresa Hitchens, “ UAE Arms Sale Remains In Limbo Pending Biden Review,” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2021.
Agnes Helou, “ Morocco and Israel to sign kamikaze drone deal,” Defense News, October 1, 2021. T he Israel-UAE
treaty signed in September 2020 says, “ Recognizing also their shared goal to advance regional economic development
and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promote collaborations on strategic regional
infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a multilateral working group for the ‘T racks for Regional
Peace’ project.” T he Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from Israel to Saudi Arabia
and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in August 2019. A major part of its appeal would be allowing the
participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab al -Mandab
(Red Sea). See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ T racks for regional peace—regional land bridge and hub
initiative,” August 5, 2019.
72 See, for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” Wall Street
Journal, December 17, 2020.
73 For information on this topic, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
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similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the
smal -scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their al ies as
the “the campaign between wars.”74
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister
Netanyahu opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration,
and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA
and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the
intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement.
U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional
uncertainty, with implications for Israel.75 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s
demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could
transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.76 In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence
that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab
Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.77 Additional y, reported low-level
Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—including cyberspace, international waters, and the
territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—has further exacerbated regional tensions.78
As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy and considers the possibility of
reentering the JCPOA, Israel—whose officials are general y skeptical of U.S. reentry—is seeking
to influence diplomatic outcomes.79 Just before his instal ation as prime minister, Naftali Bennett
said to the Knesset, “Resuming a nuclear deal with Iran is a mistake that wil legitimize one of the
world’s most violent regimes.”80
Some observers have speculated that Israeli covert or military operations might influence or
disrupt diplomacy on the nuclear issue.81 In between his August White House meetings with
Prime Minister Bennett, President Biden said that the United States wil first use diplomacy to
“ensure Iran never develops a nuclear weapon,” but if that fails, “we’re ready to turn to other
options.”82 According to one account, during these meetings Bennett restated his opposition to a

74 See, for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: T he Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security,
January 6, 2021.
75 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman,
Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton T homas.
76 Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reacto r,” haaretz.com,
October 6, 2019.
77 T om O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as Red Sea T ensions Rise,” Newsweek,
January 13, 2021.
78 Isabel Kershner et al., “ Hezbollah Admits to Rocket Strike on Northern Israel, Deepening Border T ensions,” New
York Tim es, August 7, 2021; “ Fighting in the Shadows: Israel and Iran,” Soufan Center, March 30, 2021.
79 See also Yaniv Kubovich and Judy Maltz, “Israel’s Chief of Staff: Return to Iran Deal Is ‘Wrong,’ Military Action
‘Should Be on the T able,’” haaretz.com, January 27, 2021.
80 Noa Shpigel, “ Incoming PM Bennett Says Resuming Iran Nuclear Deal Would Be Mistake in Knesset Address,”
haaretz.com, June 13, 2021.
81 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “ Israel and Iran Are Pulling the United States T oward
Conflict ,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “ T he ramifications of a US return to the
2015 Iran deal—opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021.
82 White House, “ Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett of the State of Israel Before Expanded
Bilateral Meeting,” August 27, 2021.
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U.S. return to the JCPOA, and Biden did not seem optimistic about Iran returning to compliance
with the deal.83 Bennett also reportedly presented a strategy to Biden that involves “countering
Iran through a combination of many smal actions across several fronts—both military and
diplomatic—instead of a single dramatic strike.”84 In a September interview, Defense Minister
Gantz suggested that he would be prepared to accept a U.S. return to the JCPOA, while also
cal ing for a “viable, U.S.-led plan B” to pressure Iran in case negotiations are unsuccessful, and
al uding to Israeli military contingency plans.85 In October, amid ongoing U.S.-Israel
consultations on the issue and reported Israeli uncertainty about U.S. wil ingness to strike Iran
militarily,86 Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi, the Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff, said, “The
operational plans against Iran’s nuclear program wil continue to evolve and improve … it is our
duty to provide an effective and timely military response.”87
Hezbollah
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state al y in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadical y clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.88 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional
implications.89 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly
Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its
projectiles—and its al eged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.90
Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah
conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build
precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.91 Following some cross-border fire between Israeli
forces and Hezbollah in August 2021, one report assessed that neither party desired a major
escalation, but also cited Israeli military officials saying that they would not permit unobstructed
attacks.92

83 Barak Ravid, “ Israeli PM presented Biden with ‘death by a thousand cuts’ Iran strategy,” Axios, August 27, 2021.
84 Ibid.
85 Neri Zilber, “ Israel Can Live with a New Iran Nuclear Deal, Defense Minister Says,” foreignpolicy.com, September
14, 2021.
86 Ben Caspit, “ Israel still fears US approach to Iran,” Al-Monitor, October 8, 2021.
87 “Israeli military chief hints of covert action against Iran,” Associated Press, October 5, 2021.
88 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E.
Humud.
89 Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion, Counting the cost: Avoiding another war between Israel and Hezbollah , Atlantic
Council, May 13, 2020.
90 See, for example, “ Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28,
2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “ Who Warns Hezbollah T hat Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York
Tim es, April 23, 2020.
91 “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press; Ben Caspit, “ Hezbollah, Israel
losing red lines,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2019.
92 Kershner et al., “ Hezbollah Admits to Rocket Strike on Northern Israel.”
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China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns93
U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in
Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure.94 Israel-China investment ties have grown
since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,95 with Israel as an attractive hub of
innovation for Chinese partners, and China as a huge potential export market and source of
investment for Israeli businesses.96
Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U.S. expressions of concern,97
apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather intel igence or acquire technologies
with the potential to threaten U.S. national security in such fields as cybersecurity, artificial
intel igence, satel ite communications, and robotics. Previously, China-Israel defense industry
cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U.S.-Israel defense relationship
and to an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China.98 Partly due to U.S.
concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on
foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.99 However, this panel reportedly does not have the
authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s
investments in Israel in the previous decade.100 According to a 2021 study by Israel’s Institute for
National Security Studies:
Chinese investments, especially in the high-tech sector, did indeed show progressive
growth both in number and scale, especially between 2014 and their peak in 2018.
However, in 2019 and 2020 the pendulum swung again, as China slowed its penetration
into the Israeli economy [see Appendix C], just as it did elsewhere in the world. The
reasons for this were a combination of changes in domestic Chinese priorities regarding
the export of capital out of the country and external causes, such as the coronavirus
pandemic and a less inviting climate for Chinese investments due to American pressure.101
Additional y, U.S. officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement in
specific Israeli infrastructure projects. President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister
Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be
limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel,
in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U.S. al ies and
partners.102 Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials reportedly blocked

93 For background on past U.S. concerns regarding Israeli defense transactions with China, see CRS Report RL33476,
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy
M. Sharp.
94 Shira Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and
the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020; Shira Efron, et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, RAND
Corporation, 2019; Jewish Institute for National Security of America, Countering Chinese Engagem ent with Israel: A
Com prehensive and Cooperative U.S.-Israeli Strategy, February 2021.
95 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations, coordinated by
Susan V. Lawrence.
96 Danny Zaken, “Chinese-operated port opens in Israel despite American concerns,” Al-Monitor, September 9, 2021.
97 Ron Kampeas, “ Breaking China: A rupture looms between Israel and the United States,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency,
June 2, 2020.
98 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, pp. 15-20.
99 Arie Egozi, “ Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China T argeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019.
100 Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology, 2020, pp. 24-25.
101 Doron Ella, Chinese Investments in Israel: Developments and a Look to the Future, Institute for National Security
Studies, February 1, 2021.
102 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “ My Way or the Huawei? T he United States-China Race for 5G
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Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure.103 In May 2020,
shortly after then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that
Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U.S.-Israel cooperation, Israel’s finance
ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1.5 bil ion desalination plant, turning down
the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group.104
Additional y, the U.S. Navy reportedly reconsidered its practice of periodical y docking at the
Israeli naval base in Haifa, because a state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International
Port Group) secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years.105 This
terminal opened in September 2021.106 Biden Administration officials have reportedly pressed
Israeli counterparts to regularly check heavy machinery at the port for technology that could be
employed to spy on the nearby naval base.107 Other state-owned Chinese companies are
developing a new port in Ashdod (which also hosts an Israeli naval base), and taking part in
construction for Tel Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa.108

Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019.
103 Hiddai Segev and Assaf Orion, “ T he Great Power Competition over 5G Communications: Limited Success for the
American Campaign against Huawei,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1268, March 3, 2020.
104 “Amid US pressure, Israel taps local firm over China for $1.5b desalination plant ,” Times of Israel, May 26, 2020.
105 Roie Yellinek, “ T he Israel-China-U.S. T riangle and the Haifa Port Project,” Middle East Institute, November 27,
2018. Reportedly, the Israeli government planned to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances.
Jack Detsch, “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2019.
106 Galia Lavi and Assaf Orion, “ T he Launch of the Haifa Bayport T erminal: Economic and Security Considerations,”
Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1516, September 12, 2021.
107 Arie Egozi, “ US Presses Israel on Haifa Port amid China Espionage Concerns: Sources,” Breaking Defense, October
5, 2021.
108 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, p. 38.
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Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intel igence Agency GeoNames
Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from CIA, The World Factbook; and Economist Intel igence
Unit. Al numbers are forecasts for 2021 unless otherwise specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status subject
to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additional y, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
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Appendix B. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset
and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats (Opposition)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Binyamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also
was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces
unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career
in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the
exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s
nuclear program and regional influence. He is general y regarded as both a
consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as
defense minister and foreign minister. He is general y viewed as an ardent nationalist
and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in
the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He
worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s
wil ingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael
Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption
al egations in a 2013 case.
Yamina (Right) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National
Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews);
includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation.
Leader: Prime Minister Naftali Bennett (biography in text box in the main body of the report)

New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats (Coalition)
New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu
and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters.
Leader: Gideon Sa’ar
Born in 1966, Sa’ar serves as justice minister. He served as cabinet secretary in the
1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon). He became an influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the
Knesset in 2003. He served as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior
minister from 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019
but left Likud to form New Hope a year later.
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Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats (Opposition)
Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-
Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism
since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish
nationalist and religiously conservative causes.

LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leader in 2020

and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she
founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a
regular national media presence and university lecturer.
Meretz (Vigor) – 6 seats (Coalition)
Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and
peace with the Palestinians.
Leader: Nitzan Horowitz
Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister. He became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and
was first elected to the Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent
journalist before entering politics.

CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – 17 seats (Coalition)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid is foreign minister and alternate prime minister. Under the
government’s power-sharing agreement, he is set to become prime minister in
August 2023. He came to politics after a career as a journalist, television presenter,
and author. He founded the Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from 2013 to 2014 he
served as finance minister.
Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 8 seats (Coalition)
Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu,
ostensibly seeking to preserve long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary,
articulate a vision of Israeli nationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab
citizens, and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian
issues.
Leader: Benny Gantz

Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff
of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.
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ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats (Opposition)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In April 2021, he al owed a party col eague
to take his Knesset seat.

United Torah Judaism – 7 seats (Opposition)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel Ha’torah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; general y seeks greater application of Jewish
law.
Leader: Yaakov Litzman
Born in 1948, Litzman was born in Germany and raised in the United States before
immigrating to Israel in 1965. Educated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he
later served as principal of a Hasidic girls’ school in Jerusalem. In April 2021, he
alowed a party coleague to take his Knesset seat.
ARAB
Joint List – 6 seats (Opposition)
Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal), and Balad (National Democratic Assembly).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the
Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s
national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – 4 seats (Coalition)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist.

Sources: Various open sources.
Note: Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election.
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Appendix C. Chinese Investments in Israeli
Technology Companies: 2011-2020

Source: Institute for National Security Studies.
Notes: Publicly available information on these types of investments may be limited. An outlier transaction
included in this figure is the 2016 purchase by China-based Alpha Frontier of the Israel-based mobile gaming
company Playtika for $4.4 bil ion.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Congressional Research Service
R44245 · VERSION 99 · UPDATED
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