Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from January 27, 2021 to May 11, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
~~January 27~~May 11, 2021 , 2021
The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations. The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations.
Jim Zanotti
Domestic issues: March 2021 election. After the collapse of its power-sharing
~~Specialist in Middle~~
~~government in December 2020, Israel is scheduled to hold another election for its~~
~~Eastern Affairs~~
~~Knesset (parliament) on March 23, 2021. The election will be Israel’s fourth in the past~~

~~two years—a frequency without parallel in the country’s history~~Violence and unrest over Gaza and Jerusalem. Violence and unrest has flared in May 2021 Specialist in Middle around Gaza and Jerusalem, largely in connection with a controversial case about the possible Eastern Affairs eviction of several Palestinians from their East Jerusalem homes. It is unclear to what extent violence might escalate as the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) and other militants fire rockets into Israel, and Israel retaliates inside Gaza. Domestic issues: An end to or continuation of Netanyahu’s rule? After the collapse of its power-sharing government in December 2020, Israel held another round of elections—an unprecedented fourth in two years—for its Knesset (parliament) in March 2021. Prime Minister . Prime Minister
~~Binyamin Netanyahu has managed to maintain power despite an ongoing criminal trial~~

~~on corruption charges that is set to resume in February 2021. Netanyahu apparently~~
~~hopes to create a coalition government that will grant him legal immunity or to remain indefinitely~~Binyamin Netanyahu of the Likud party—the largest in the Knesset—has been unable to form a new government in the face of significant opposition to his continued rule, while he faces an ongoing criminal corruption trial. Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party has until early June to forge a coalition supported by disparate parties from across the political spectrum. If Lapid is successful, Naftali Bennett—a former defense minister whose Yamina party supports Israeli settlements and partial West Bank annexation—might precede Lapid in an initial 27-month rotation as prime minister. If no one can form a government, another round of elections would probably take place in the fall of 2021, and Netanyahu would remain as caretaker as caretaker
prime minister (as he did from December 2018 to May 2020) prime minister (as he did from December 2018 to May 2020) ~~by preventing anyone from forming a coalition~~
~~without him and his Likud party.~~
Palestinians and Arab state normalization. On the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump
~~Administration policies largely sided with Israeli positions, thus alienating Palestine Liberation Organization~~
~~(PLO) Chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. In the second half of 2020, the~~
~~Administration pivoted from its January 2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal to helping Israel reach~~
~~agreements—known as the Abraham Accords—on normalizing its relations with~~until November 17, when the power-sharing arrangement Netanyahu entered into last year would lead to Defense and Justice Minister Benny Gantz of the Kahol Lavan party taking over in the caretaker role. Palestinians and Arab state normalization. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and Palestinians, the Biden Administration has stated its intention to reengage with Palestinian leaders and people, after the Trump Administration took several actions that generally favored Israeli positions and appeared to alienate Palestinian leadership. In April, the Biden Administration announced the resumption of some types of aid to the Palestinians. Amid some debate on issues that could affect aid to Israel and the Palestinians, the Administration has voiced opposition to unilateral steps—including annexation, settlement activity, or incitement to violence—by either side. Additionally, the Administration has expressed support for continuing the Arab-Israeli normalization efforts that began in 2020 under the Trump Administration, as reflected in agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to
suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank, though announcements related to settlement activity have suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank, though announcements related to settlement activity have
accelerated since then. accelerated since then.
Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and rivalry among key Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and rivalry among key
actors in the Middle East. Arab-Israeli common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate in countering Iran and actors in the Middle East. Arab-Israeli common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate in countering Iran and
perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for Sunni Islamist movements. The perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for Sunni Islamist movements. The
January 2021 shift of Israel from the purview of U.S. European Command to U.S. Central Command may January 2021 shift of Israel from the purview of U.S. European Command to U.S. Central Command may
increase Arab-Israeli military interoperability. Other factors affecting regional cooperation and rivalry might increase Arab-Israeli military interoperability. Other factors affecting regional cooperation and rivalry might
include U.S. arms sales (including a proposed sale of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and MQ-9 drone aircraft to the include U.S. arms sales (including a proposed sale of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and MQ-9 drone aircraft to the
UAE), mutual economic benefits, and Arab public opinion. Some of these factors could determine whether Saudi UAE), mutual economic benefits, and Arab public opinion. Some of these factors could determine whether Saudi
Arabia drops preconditions related to Palestinian national demands on normalizing its Arabia drops preconditions related to Palestinian national demands on normalizing its relations with Israel. ~~relations with Israel.~~
~~Incoming Biden Administration figures signal support for further Arab-Israel normalization, but may be hesitant~~
~~to sell advanced arms in connection with it. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution~~
~~among Israelis and Palestinians, the Administration appears inclined to reengage with Palestinian leaders and~~
~~people—including by resuming some types of aid—and has stated its opposition to annexation, settlement~~
~~activity, incitement to violence, or other unilateral steps by either side.~~
Iran and other regional issues. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Netanyahu strongly supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the acquiring nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Netanyahu strongly supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the
United States from the 2015 international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Facing intensified United States from the 2015 international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Facing intensified
U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement. Netanyahu has made statements U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement. Netanyahu has made statements
opposing the Biden Administration’s possible reentry into the agreementopposing the Biden Administration’s possible reentry into the agreement~~, and~~ . In light of recent incidents targeting Iran’s nuclear program that may have been Israeli covert actions, observers have speculated about observers have speculated about
~~possible~~future Israeli actions to influence or disrupt nuclear diplomacy. Israel Israeli actions to influence or disrupt nuclear diplomacy. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of has reportedly conducted a number of
military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to concerns about Iran’s efforts to military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to concerns about Iran’s efforts to
establish a permanent presence in these areas and improve the accuracy of Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal. establish a permanent presence in these areas and improve the accuracy of Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal.
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. concerns. U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over
Chinese investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability Chinese investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability
to gather intelligence and acquire security-related technologies. While Chinese state-owned companies remain to gather intelligence and acquire security-related technologies. While Chinese state-owned companies remain
engaged in some specific infrastructure projects, including at seaports in Haifa and Ashdod, in May 2020 Israel engaged in some specific infrastructure projects, including at seaports in Haifa and Ashdod, in May 2020 Israel
turned down the bid of a Chinese-affiliated company to construct a major desalination plant. turned down the bid of a Chinese-affiliated company to construct a major desalination plant.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 5 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Introduction: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (Israel (~~see~~see Figure 1) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas; has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas;
issues with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations include the following. issues with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations include the following.
  ~~Israeli domestic political issues, including an election scheduled for March 2021~~
~~and an ongoing criminal trial against Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu~~Violence and unrest in May 2021 over the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.  Israeli domestic political issues, including questions about whether March 2021 election results wil lead to a new government or more elections, while Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s criminal trial continues. .
 Israel’s security cooperation with the United States.  Israel’s security cooperation with the United States.
 Israeli-Palestinian issues and Israel’s normalization of relations with various  Israeli-Palestinian issues and Israel’s normalization of relations with various
Arab states. Arab states.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah Lebanon-based Hezbollah~~, Syria, and Iraq~~. .
 Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure, and U.S. concerns  Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure, and U.S. concerns
about implications for U.S. national security. about implications for U.S. national security.
For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and
missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah FischerGraphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using using
Department of State Boundaries (Department of State Boundaries (~~2011~~2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-~~Intelligence~~ Intel igence Agency GeoNames Agency GeoNames
Database (2015); DeLormeDatabase (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from CIA,(2014). Fact information from CIA, The World Factbook; and Economist ; and Economist ~~Intelligence~~Intel igence
Unit. Unit. ~~All~~ Al numbers are forecasts for 2021 unless otherwisenumbers are forecasts for 2021 unless otherwise specified. specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestiniansubject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement;Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determinedpermanent status to be determined through further through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolvednegotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized JerusalemUnited States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’sas Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeliof Israeli sovereignty.sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily(4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. authoritative. ~~Additionally~~Additional y, the United States , the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on Decemberon December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’sby Israel’s ~~military~~ military is occupied is occupied
territoryterritory belonging to Syria.belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of IsraelThe current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at is available at
https://www.cia.gov/https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. Violence and Unrest over Gaza and Jerusalem Various factors have combined to fuel an escalation of unrest and violence in and around the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem in May 2021. To date, the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) and other militants based in the Gaza Strip have fired hundreds of rockets into Israel—reportedly causing at least three deaths and several injuries, including with a major barrage in the Tel Aviv area. Hamas has cast itself as a defender of Jerusalem amid unrest there, including at the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) holy sites—a place of frequent Congressional Research Service 2 link to page 15 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Jewish-Muslim contention.1 Hamas’s rocket attacks have contributed to a risk of full-blown conflict as Israel’s military has retaliated, reportedly kil ing at least 28 people in Gaza, and has increased troop deployments near Gaza’s borders. Gaza and Its Challenges The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.2 Palestinian militants in Gaza periodical y clash with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilian areas in southern Israel and Gaza, respectively. These incidents periodical y escalate toward larger conflict—with major hostilities taking place in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent conflict escalation. The tension in Jerusalem has mounted throughout the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which ends on or around May 12. Some provocations—reportedly fueled by social media—have been tied to Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement and worship in and around the Mount/Haram and Old City, isolated attacks by Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish nationalist groups.3 Unrest has intensified in response to controversy that surrounds the possible eviction of several Palestinian families from their longtime residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, and stems from Israeli legal assertions that Jewish groups acquired the property years ago.4 Israel’s Supreme Court temporarily delayed a hearing on the case amid the unrest. Palestinian leaders and some activists and international actors claim that the case is part of a systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem since the area’s capture and effective annexation as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.5 Critics of Israeli actions connect this situation with concerns about Jewish settlement activity and other al egations that Israel violates international law and Palestinian human rights.6 In response to the violence and unrest, U.S. officials have expressed concern about the possible Sheikh Jarrah evictions and have cal ed for general de-escalation, while also supporting Israel’s right to self-defense.7 See “The Biden Administration and 117th Congress” section below for more on U.S. policy on Israeli-Palestinian issues. It is unclear to what extent the situation might escalate further among Israelis and Palestinians. Reports have emerged from Israeli cities such as Lod and Haifa of widespread unrest involving Arab citizens of Israel. Since the last major conflict between Israel and Hamas in 2014, subsequent flare-ups have subsided short of that level. Factors affecting escalation or de- escalation could include: 1 For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 2 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 3 “From T ikTok to T emple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem ,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. 4 Nir Hasson, “ Jerusalem Clashes: How Palestinians Rallied Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of cases are at risk of being evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss, “ Palestinians fear loss of family homes as evictions loom,” Associated Press, May 10, 2021. 5 Patrick Kingsley, “ Israel's Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem ,” New York Tim es, May 10, 2021. 6 Al-Haq, Action Alert: International Community Must T ake Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s Aggression against Palestinian Jerusalemites, May 10, 2021. 7 State Department Press Briefing – May 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 20 link to page 8 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief  whether Hamas assesses that an extended period of conflict—despite expected casualties and damage in Gaza—could boost its domestic popularity, further fuel unrest around in Jerusalem and elsewhere, and increase pressure on Israel’s leaders;  the extent to which Israeli measures (including its Iron Dome anti-rocket system) prevent, deter, or provoke additional violence, and protect or harm Israeli and Palestinian civilians;8  disruptions or perceived disruptions to the “status quo” arrangement governing worship at Jerusalem’s holy sites, especial y the Mount/Haram;9  unsettled questions of leadership and succession within both Israel and the Palestinian Authority;10  how international actors respond, including U.S. officials and lawmakers, and Arab states who have recently improved or sought to improve their relations with Israel; and  diplomacy addressing various parties’ grievances and concerns. After March 2021 Elections: Will Netanyahu’s Rule End or Continue? On March 23, 2021, Israel held its fourth election in the past two years (previous elections took place in April and September 2019 and March 2020). The Likud party, led by Prime Minister Netanyahu, won the most Knesset seats in the March 23 election (see Appendix), despite criminal indictments against Netanyahu for corruption (see Figure 2). 8 For more on Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 9 “From T ikTok to T emple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem ,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. Under the “status quo” arrangement (largely based on past practices dating from the 16th century that Israel pledges to uphold), Muslims can access the Mount/Haram and worship there, while Jews and other non -Muslims are permitted limited access but not permitted to worship. Jewish worship is permitted at the Western Wall at the base of the Mount/Haram. 10 Neri Zilber, “ Violent Jerusalem Clashes Just the Start of Bloody Days to Come,” Daily Beast, May 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4~~the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.~~

~~Domestic Issues: March 2021 Election~~
~~Israel is scheduled to hold another election for its Knesset (parliament) on March 23, 2021, which~~
~~will be its fourth in the past two years—a frequency without parallel in the country’s history.~~
~~Elections in April and September 2019 did not produce a coalition government, and the power-~~
~~sharing government formed after the March 2020 election collapsed in December 2020 when it~~
~~failed to agree on an annual budget. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~link to page 19 link to page 7~~

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Benny Gantz (see Appendix), along with other cabinet members, are expected to remain in their~~
~~positions until a new government can be formed with the backing of a Knesset majority.~~
~~Netanyahu’s Time as Prime Minister: 2009-20211~~

~~Although the 2020 power-sharing government nominally collapsed over the budget, the issue of~~
~~Netanyahu’s continued leadership had a significant impact as well. Had the government~~
~~continued, Gantz was scheduled to become prime minister in November 2021, and the two were~~
~~unwilling to reach a compromise on the succession issue. Gantz’s initial willingness to form the~~
~~government was based largely on the national emergency connected with the Coronavirus~~
~~Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Because this decision fractured his Kahol Lavan party, Gantz’s~~
~~political influence now appears to be greatly diminished.~~
~~Netanyahu has managed to maintain power despite serious corruption allegations that led to a~~
~~criminal indictment in November 2019 and a trial that is set to resume in February 2021 (see~~
Figure 2). While the past three elections and Israel’s governance challenges over the past two
~~years have focused significantly on the question of Netanyahu’s continuation in office, the initial~~
~~stages of this election campaign appear to be even more heavily influenced by Netanyahu’s~~
~~status. As one analyst has written, “the fundamental split in Israeli politics is no longer a right-left~~
~~divide over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or security, but a divide between Netanyahu partisans~~
~~and Netanyahu opponents that transcends ideological commitments.”2 Some politicians on the~~
~~right of the political spectrum—ideologically close to Netanyahu—have adopted critiques of~~
~~Netanyahu previously made by many from the left and center that claim he prioritizes his~~
~~individual power and survival over Israeli national interests, institutions, and rule of law.~~

~~1 Netanyahu served an earlier term as prime minister from 1996 to 1999.~~
~~2 Michael Koplow, “Things to Watch in 2021,” Israel Policy Forum, December 23, 2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Figure 2. Indictments Against Netanyahu and Steps of the Legal Process
Indictments
Case 1000: Netanyahu received favors from Hol ywood mogul Arnon Milchan and Australian bil ionaire James
Packer, in return for taking actions in Milchan’s favor.
The charge: Fraud and breach of trust : Fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: There is no legal problem in receiving gifts from friends; did not know that his : There is no legal problem in receiving gifts from friends; did not know that his
family members requested gifts. family members requested gifts.
Case 2000: Netanyahu and Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Arnon Mozes struck a deal: Favorable ~~coverage for~~
~~Netanyahu~~ coverage for Netanyahu in return for limiting the circulation of the Sheldon Adelson-owned newspaper Israel Hayom.
The charge: Fraud and breach of trust : Fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: He had no intention of implementing the deal, and relations: He had no intention of implementing the deal, and relations ~~between~~
~~politicians~~ between politicians and the mediaand the media should not be criminalized.should not be criminalized.
Case 4000: As communication minister, Netanyahu took steps that benefited Shaul Elovitch who control ed
telecom company Bezeq—in return for favorable coverage in Bezeq’s Wal a News site
The charge: Bribery, fraud and breach of trust : Bribery, fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: There is no evidence that he was aware of making regulations contingent on : There is no evidence that he was aware of making regulations contingent on
favorable coverage.favorable coverage.
Selected Steps in the Legal Process, and
the Time Between Them

Sources: For “Indictments,” the content comes from For “Indictments,” the content comes from Ha’aretz graphics adapted by CRS. For “Selected Steps in the Legal graphics adapted by CRS. For “Selected Steps in the Legal
Process, and the Time Between Them,” CRS prepared the Process, and the Time Between Them,” CRS prepared the ~~graphic~~graphics and made slight content adjustments to underlying and made slight content adjustments to underlying
source material fromsource material from Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre. The interval listedBritain Israel Communications and Research Centre. The interval listed between Steps 4-5 is an between Steps 4-5 is an
~~estimate.~~

~~Netanyahu apparently hopes to create a coalition government that will grant him legal immunity~~
~~or, if he lacks the support, to remain indefinitely as caretaker prime minister (as he did from~~
~~December 2018 to May 2020) by preventing anyone from forming a coalition without him and~~
~~his Likud party. The core of any anti-Netanyahu coalition would likely come from the Tikva~~
~~Hadasha party founded by ex-Likud member and former Education and Interior Minister Gideon~~
~~Sa’ar,3 alongside other Netanyahu opponents Yair Lapid (Yesh Atid party) and Avigdor~~
~~Lieberman (Yisrael Beitenu party). Naftali Bennett is another key figure. He and his Yamina party~~
~~have a complicated history with Netanyahu and could either join or oppose him. Sa’ar and~~

~~3 Josef Federman, “AP Interview: Netanyahu challenger pledges change with Biden,” Associated Press, January 15,~~
~~2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Bennett are generally more outspokenly supportive of~~ estimate. The bloc of parties that openly support Netanyahu is short of majority backing in the Knesset. Some politicians on the right of the political spectrum—ideological y close to Netanyahu—have adopted critiques of Netanyahu previously made by many from the left and center, claiming that he prioritizes his individual power and survival over Israeli national interests, institutions, and rule of law. Nevertheless, it is not clear that parties who oppose Netanyahu’s continued rule can garner a Knesset majority. The possible stalemate could result in another election taking place later in 2021. A March Wall Street Journal article analyzed some effects of the ongoing political dysfunction: Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 20 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Israel has been without a permanent budget for 13 months now, the longest period in its history. Infrastructure spending and other government programs are stalled, including plans for a high-speed rail link between Tel Aviv and Eilat, a port and resort on the Red Sea. The beginning of the school term earlier this year was delayed when the parliament neglected to pass a special budget for schools to open. The lack of a long -term budget also has affected the Israeli military's midterm procurement plans.11 In April, Netanyahu received the initial task from Israeli President Reuven Rivlin to try to form a government, but could not do so within the al otted four weeks. Netanyahu might expect a government he leads to end or mitigate the ongoing criminal proceedings against him, while agreeing to support priorities of coalition partners who may seek West Bank annexation, less independence for Israel’s judiciary, and continued preferential treatment for ultra-Orthodox citizens. Some Israeli and international observers have expressed concern about the possibility of far-right figures under the new Religious Zionism list gaining influence in a Netanyahu-led government.12 On May 5, Rivlin gave four weeks to the Yesh Atid party’s Yair Lapid to form a government. Lapid, in seeking to oust Netanyahu, has proposed a unity government supported by parties on the right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu), center (Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the political spectrum, as wel as the Arab-led Joint List and possibly the United Arab List (Ra’am) as wel (see Appendix).13 To secure the support of right-leaning parties, Lapid has proposed that Yamina leader Naftali Bennett serve as prime minister for the first 27 months of the government’s term, with Lapid rotating into the prime minister’s office after that. However, forging and maintaining a coalition from such disparate elements may be difficult, as the Joint List has expressed opposition to Bennett—a staunch advocate of Israeli West Bank settlements West Bank settlements and partial West Bank annexation—serving as prime minister.14 Having such a government address domestical y controversial issues beyond basic administration and budgeting could present serious chal enges. If Lapid cannot form a government by June 2, and no one else from the Knesset can do so in the subsequent two weeks, a new election would be scheduled for a few months later~~and annexation than~~
~~Netanyahu~~. .
Developments on the following issues could impact the Developments on the following issues could impact the ~~campaign,~~ government formation government formation
~~process, and various policy outcomes:~~
~~ Efforts to manage the COVID-19~~process and political outcomes:  Violence and unrest over Gaza and Jerusalem, and the international response.  Israeli foreign policy issues involving the Biden Administration, Iran, Arab states, the Palestinians, and other key actors.  Israel’s efforts to manage the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, ~~pandemic, vaccinations, and associated~~
~~socioeconomic issues.~~
~~ Foreign policy involving the incoming Biden Administration, Iran, Arab states,~~
~~the Palestinians, and other key actors.~~
~~U.S. Security Cooperation4~~
~~While Israel maintains robust military and homeland security capabilities, it also cooperates~~
vaccinations, and associated socioeconomic issues. Netanyahu and other members of the power-sharing government that formed in May 2020—or their successors, if any of them leave office—are to serve in an interim capacity until someone establishes a majority-backed coalition. By its terms, the power-sharing agreement would make Defense and Justice Minister Benny Gantz prime minister in November 17, 2021 in the absence of a new coalition agreement. 11 Felicia Schwartz, “ Israel's Election Impasse T hreatens Covid Recovery,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2021. 12 Joseph Krauss, “ Far-right party set to gain new influence after Israeli vote,” Associated Press, March 23, 2021. 13 Guillaume Lavallee, “ Israel's Lapid Faces Daunting Path T o Anti-Netanyahu Govt,” Agence France Presse, May 6, 2021. 14 In Israel’s history, no Arab-led party has joined a government, but there is a precedent for outside Arab support for a coalition led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in the 1990s. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief U.S. Security Cooperation15 While Israel maintains robust military and homeland security capabilities, it also cooperates closely with the United States on national security matters. U.S. law requires the executive branch closely with the United States on national security matters. U.S. law requires the executive branch
to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” or QME, and expedites aid to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” or QME, and expedites aid
and arms sales to Israel in various ways. and arms sales to Israel in various ways. ~~Additionally~~Additional y, a 10-year bilateral, a 10-year bilateral military aid military aid
memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide
Israel $3.3 Israel $3.3 ~~billion~~ bil ion in Foreign Militaryin Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 Financing and to spend $500 ~~million annually~~mil ion annual y on joint on joint
missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations.
Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Congress Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Congress
also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a number of specific security-related also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a number of specific security-related
areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countering drone aircraft. In January 2021, one source areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countering drone aircraft. In January 2021, one source
reported that Israel has provided the United States with two batteries of its Iron Dome missile reported that Israel has provided the United States with two batteries of its Iron Dome missile
defense system for deployment at U.S. military bases in the region or elsewhere, with additional defense system for deployment at U.S. military bases in the region or elsewhere, with additional
batteries planned for U.S. use or possible export via U.S.-Israel batteries planned for U.S. use or possible export via U.S.-Israel ~~co-production.5~~coproduction.16
Key Foreign Policy Issues
The Palestinians and Arab State ~~Normalization6~~Normalization17
Trump Administration
During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions on the During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions on the
decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict that favored Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, as decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict that favored Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, as
set forth below. set forth below.
Selected Trump Administration Actions Impacting Israeli-Palestinian Issues
December December 2017 2017
President Trump recognizes President Trump recognizes ~~Jerusalem~~ Jerusalem as Israel’sas Israel’s capital, prompting the Palestine capital, prompting the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) to cut off high-level Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) to cut off high-level
diplomatic relationsdiplomatic relations with the United States. with the United States.
May 2018 May 2018
The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem. The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem.
August 2018 August 2018
The Administration The Administration ~~ends~~ suspends U.S. contributions to the U.N. Relief U.S. contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency and Works Agency
~~for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).~~

~~4 For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
~~5 Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel allows U.S. to deploy Iron Dome missile defense in the Gulf,” haaretz.com, January 24,~~
~~2021.~~
~~6 For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF11237,~~ ~~Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State~~
~~Solution, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~September~~ for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). September 2018 2018
The Administration The Administration ~~reprograms~~ reprograms FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and
Gaza to other locations,Gaza to other locations, and announces the closureand announces the closure of the PLO office in of the PLO office in
Washington, DC. Washington, DC.
January 2019 January 2019
As a result of the Anti-Terrorism As a result of the Anti-Terrorism ~~Clarification~~ Clarification Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the
AdministrationAdministration ends ends ~~all~~ al bilateral U.S.bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians. aid to the Palestinians.
March 2019 March 2019
The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously an independent diplomatic an independent diplomatic
missionmission to the Palestinians—isto the Palestinians—is subsumed under the authority of the U.S. embassy subsumed under the authority of the U.S. embassy
to Israel.to Israel. President Trump recognizesPresident Trump recognizes Israeli sovereigntyIsraeli sovereignty ~~claims~~ claims in the Golan in the Golan
Heights. Heights.
~~November~~ 15 For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 16 Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel allows U.S. to deploy Iron Dome missile defense in the Gulf,” haaretz.com, January 24, 2021. 17 For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF11237, Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State Solution, by Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service 7 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief November 2019 2019
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration ~~disagrees~~ disagrees with a with a
1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli settlements in the West settlements in the West
Bank are inconsistent with international law. Bank are inconsistent with international law.
January 2020 January 2020
President Trump releases President Trump releases Israeli-PalestinianIsraeli-Palestinian peace proposal that largely favors peace proposal that largely favors
IsraeliIsraeli positions and contemplates possiblepositions and contemplates possible U.S. recognition of IsraeliU.S. recognition of Israeli annexation of annexation of
somesome West Bank areas. West Bank areas.
August 2020 August 2020
Israel and the United Arab Emirates Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announce the first of four cases in (UAE) announce the first of four cases in
which the Trump Administrationwhich the Trump Administration facilitates somefacilitates some normalization of Israel’snormalization of Israel’s relations relations
with Arab states (Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco fol ow later in the year). Israel with Arab states (Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco fol ow later in the year). Israel
suspends consideration of Westsuspends consideration of West Bank annexation in connection with the UAE Bank annexation in connection with the UAE
deal. deal.
October 2020 October 2020
The United States and Israel sign agreements The United States and Israel sign agreements ~~removing restrictions~~ removing restrictions on three on three
binational foundations frombinational foundations from funding projects in areas administeredfunding projects in areas administered by Israelby Israel after after
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The foundations are the Binational Industrial Research The foundations are the Binational Industrial Research
and Developmentand Development Foundation (BIRD), the Binational Science Foundation (BSF), Foundation (BIRD), the Binational Science Foundation (BSF),
and the Binational Agricultural Research and Developmentand the Binational Agricultural Research and Development Foundation (BARD)Foundation (BARD) . .
November November 2020 2020
Secretary Pompeo announces a change in U.S. product labeling regulations, Secretary Pompeo announces a change in U.S. product labeling regulations,
requiring products from Israelirequiring products from Israeli ~~settlements~~ settlements in the West Bank to be identified as in the West Bank to be identified as
coming from Israel. coming from Israel.
As mentioned above, in the second half of 2020 the Trump Administration’s diplomatic focus As mentioned above, in the second half of 2020 the Trump Administration’s diplomatic focus
pivoted from its January 2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal to helping Israel reach pivoted from its January 2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal to helping Israel reach
agreements on normalization with some Arab countries, as follows: agreements on normalization with some Arab countries, as follows:
  United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. In September 2020, Israel signed In September 2020, Israel signed
the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain at the White House. Under the the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain at the White House. Under the
Accords, the UAE and Bahrain have established full diplomatic relations with Accords, the UAE and Bahrain have established full diplomatic relations with
Israel, and seek to boost cooperation in a number of other areas, including trade, Israel, and seek to boost cooperation in a number of other areas, including trade,
investment, and tourism.investment, and tourism.
  Sudan. Sudan signed onto the Abraham Accords in January 2021 after an Sudan signed onto the Abraham Accords in January 2021 after an
October 2020 joint statement with Israel announcing their plans to normalize October 2020 joint statement with Israel announcing their plans to normalize
relations, and after Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism relations, and after Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism
list.list.718 The Sudanese transitional leadership has said that normalization remains The Sudanese transitional leadership has said that normalization remains
contingent on ratification by a yet-to-be-formed legislative council. contingent on ratification by a yet-to-be-formed legislative council.
  Morocco. Morocco agreed to sign onto the Abraham Accords in December 2020 Morocco agreed to sign onto the Abraham Accords in December 2020
at the same time President Trump announced U.S. recognition of Moroccan at the same time President Trump announced U.S. recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara.sovereignty claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara.~~8 While~~

~~7 CRS~~ 19 While Morocco’s initial plan—perhaps pending the opening of a U.S. consulate in Western Sahara20—is to restore the diplomatic liaison offices it maintained with Israel from 1994 to 2000, the countries’ agreement could lead to full diplomatic relations along with increased economic and tourism links. 18 CRS Insight IN11531, Insight IN11531, Sudan’s Removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard. , by Lauren Ploch Blanchard. ~~The~~T he
United States also agreedUnited States also agreed to provide around $1 billion in bridgeto provide around $1 billion in bridge financing to clear Sudan’sfinancing to clear Sudan’s arrears with the World Bank arrears with the World Bank
and allowand allow it to receive future funding.it to receive future funding. ~~Sami Magdy, “~~ Sami Magdy, “ Sudan saysSudan says it signsit signs pact on normalizing ties with Israel,” pact on normalizing ties with Israel,”
Associated Press, January 6, 2021. , January 6, 2021.
819 CRS CRS Insight IN11555, Insight IN11555, Morocco-Israel Normalization and U.S. Policy Change on Western Sahara ~~Sahara~~~~, by Alexis Arieff,~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

~~link to page 14~~ ~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Morocco’s initial plan—perhaps pending the opening of a U.S. consulate in~~
~~Western Sahara9—is to restore the diplomatic liaison offices it maintained with~~
~~Israel from 1994 to 2000, the countries’ agreement could lead to full diplomatic~~
~~relations along with increased economic and tourism links.~~
~~In connection with its deal with the UAE,~~ , by Alexis Arieff, Jim Zanotti, and Brock R. Williams. T he signing took place later that month. 20 Mohammed Ayesh, “ Arabic press review: Morocco-Israel deal frozen until Biden’s Western Sahara stance clear,” Middle East Eye, January 22, 2021. Congressional Research Service 8 link to page 16 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex
part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitment from U.S. part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitment from U.S.
officials that they would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024.officials that they would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024.10
21 Before Israel’s late 2020 dealings with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, Egypt and Jordan Before Israel’s late 2020 dealings with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, Egypt and Jordan
had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations with Israel.had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations with Israel.1122 In 1981, Saudi In 1981, Saudi
Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later enshrined Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later enshrined
in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions, in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions,
including on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it.including on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it.1223
After Israel started negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited After Israel started negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited
diplomatic relations with Morocco, and informal ties with a number of other Arab states, diplomatic relations with Morocco, and informal ties with a number of other Arab states,
including the UAE and Bahrain.including the UAE and Bahrain.1324 These countries downgraded their ties with Israel after the These countries downgraded their ties with Israel after the
onset of the second Palestinian onset of the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past decade (or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past decade
discreet Israeli links with Arab states on issues including discreet Israeli links with Arab states on issues including ~~intelligence~~intel igence, security, and trade have , security, and trade have
become closer and more public. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common become closer and more public. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common
concerns, such as Iran’s regional influence and military capabilities (see concerns, such as Iran’s regional influence and military capabilities (see “Iran and the Region”
below) and Sunni Islamist populist movements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches below) and Sunni Islamist populist movements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches
and affiliates).and affiliates).1425
Strategic Assessment
Assessing Arab-Israeli normalization to date involves considering its implications both for Israeli- Assessing Arab-Israeli normalization to date involves considering its implications both for Israeli-
Palestinian issues and the future of regional cooperation and rivalry. Palestinian issues and the future of regional cooperation and rivalry.

~~Jim Zanotti, and Brock R. Williams. The signing took place later that month.~~
~~9 Mohammed Ayesh, “Arabic press review: Morocco-Israel deal frozen until Biden's Western Sahara stance clear,”~~
Middle East Eye, January 22, 2021.
~~10 Jacob Magid, “US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, ToI~~ Israeli-Palestinian Issues Israel’s deals with Arab states could be interpreted as vindicating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s long-standing claim that he could normalize Israel’s relations with Arab countries before reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians. They also signal some change to Arab states’ previous insistence—in the 2002 API—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.26 However, official statements from Saudi Arabian officials continue to condition Saudi normalization with Israel on the API’s provisions.27 In late 2020, 21 Jacob Magid, “ US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, T oI told,” told,” Times of Israel, ,
September 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, see CRSSeptember 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, see CRS Report R46433, Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of
West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
1122 Egypt and Israel signed Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel dida peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel did the same in 1994.the same in 1994.
~~12 The~~ 23 T he Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdrawto withdraw fully from the fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem,territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and and
provide for the “provide for the “ [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
AssemblyAssembly Resolution 194.” Resolution 194.” ~~The~~T he initiative was proposed by Saudi initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57 --
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. ~~The~~T he text of the initiative is text of the initiative is ~~available~~a vailable at at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
1324 Miriam Berger, Miriam Berger, “ “Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam
Entous, “Donald Entous, “Donald ~~Trump~~T rump’s New World Order,” ’s New World Order,” New Yorker, June 11, 2018; CRS June 11, 2018; CRS Report 95-1013, Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
1425 Steve Hendrix, “ Steve Hendrix, “ Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,” Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,”
washingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRSwashingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRS Report 95-1013, Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth , by Kenneth
Katzman. Katzman.
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~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Israeli-Palestinian Issues~~
~~Israel’s deals with Arab states could be interpreted as vindicating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s~~
~~long-standing claim that he could normalize Israel’s relations with Arab countries before reaching~~
~~a peace agreement with the Palestinians. They also signal some change to Arab states’ previous~~
~~insistence—in the 2002 API—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a~~
~~precondition for improved ties.15 However, official statements from Saudi Arabian officials~~
~~continue to condition Saudi normalization with Israel on the API’s provisions.16 In late 2020,~~
26 Annelle Sheline, “ T rump’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle East,” Politico Magazine, August 14, 2020. 27 HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama Dialogue, December 5, 2020. Congressional Research Service 9 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Saudi Arabia granted Israel flyover rights within its airspace to facilitate direct Israeli airline Saudi Arabia granted Israel flyover rights within its airspace to facilitate direct Israeli airline
travel to the UAEtravel to the UAE and Bahrain.and Bahrain.1728
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) officials Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) officials ~~have~~ denounced denounced
Arab states’ normalization of relations with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national Arab states’ normalization of relations with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national
cause. They expressed particular concern over the UAE deal, perhaps partly because the UAE has cause. They expressed particular concern over the UAE deal, perhaps partly because the UAE has
provided sanctuary and political support for Mohammad Dahlan, a former top PA figure provided sanctuary and political support for Mohammad Dahlan, a former top PA figure
vehemently opposed by PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Dahlan may have vehemently opposed by PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Dahlan may have
aspirations to succeed Abbas.aspirations to succeed Abbas.18
29 PLO/PA officials claimed that the UAE PLO/PA officials claimed that the UAE ~~legitimized~~ legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over
them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto
annexation.”annexation.”1930 UAE UAE officials countered that by significantly delaying Israeli declarations of officials countered that by significantly delaying Israeli declarations of
sovereignty over West Bank areas, they preserved prospects for future negotiations toward a sovereignty over West Bank areas, they preserved prospects for future negotiations toward a
Palestinian state.Palestinian state.2031 Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Prime Minister Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Prime Minister
Netanyahu has appealed to domestic pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements Netanyahu has appealed to domestic pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements
related to settlement construction and expansion in the West Bankrelated to settlement construction and expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. .
Questions surround the impact that Arab states with open relations with Israel might have on Questions surround the impact that Arab states with open relations with Israel might have on
Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. ~~Will~~ Wil these states influence Israeli positions regarding the these states influence Israeli positions regarding the
Palestinians, due to their closer access to Israeli leaders and Israeli interests in maintaining and Palestinians, due to their closer access to Israeli leaders and Israeli interests in maintaining and
improving ties with these countries? Or improving ties with these countries? Or ~~will~~ wil these states have less leverage with Israel and these states have less leverage with Israel and
possibly even support efforts to have Palestinians compromise their traditional demands? possibly even support efforts to have Palestinians compromise their traditional demands?
Future of Regional ~~Cooperation~~ Cooperation and Rivalry
Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and
rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical
trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states
to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for
Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add
Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of

~~15 Annelle Sheline, “Trump’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle East,” Politico Magazine, August 14, 2020.~~
~~16 HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama~~
~~Dialogue, December 5, 2020.~~
~~17 Yoel Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No.~~
~~1396, October 29, 2020.~~
~~18 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “The Talented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020.~~
~~19 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August~~
~~14, 2020.~~
20reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.32 Israel had previously been under the purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might encounter political chal enges in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel. Other factors influencing regional cooperation and rivalry might include the following:  Arms sales. Shortly after the UAE’s normalization deal with Israel, the Trump Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale to the UAE of F-35 Joint 28 Yoel Guzansky, “ Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 1396, October 29, 2020. 29 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “T he T alented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020. 30 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “ Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August 14, 2020. 31 “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” Times of Israel, August, August 14, 2020. 32 Jared Szuba, “T rump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Strike Fighters, armed MQ-9 Reaper drones, and munitions.33~~14,~~
~~2020.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

8

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.21 Israel had previously been under the~~
~~purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and~~
~~some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might~~
~~encounter political challenges in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel.~~
~~Other factors influencing regional cooperation and rivalry might include:~~
~~ Arms sales. Shortly after the UAE’s normalization deal with Israel, the Trump~~
~~Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale to the UAE of F-35 Joint~~
~~Strike Fighters, armed MQ-9 Reaper drones, and munitions.22~~ While noting the While noting the
U.S. legal requirement to maintain Israel’s QME, Israeli officials stated that they U.S. legal requirement to maintain Israel’s QME, Israeli officials stated that they
would not oppose the sale. The United States and UAEwould not oppose the sale. The United States and UAE reportedly signed a letter reportedly signed a letter
of offer and acceptance for the sale in the final hours of the Trump of offer and acceptance for the sale in the final hours of the Trump
Administration.Administration.2334 Implementing the deal and delivering the items is expected to Implementing the deal and delivering the items is expected to
take years. The outcome of this transaction and others that might follow to Arab take years. The outcome of this transaction and others that might follow to Arab
states in connection with normalization could depend on issues including QME states in connection with normalization could depend on issues including QME
considerations, human rights concerns (such as those involved in Yemen’s considerations, human rights concerns (such as those involved in Yemen’s
ongoing conflict), and prospects for regional arms races involving suppliers such ongoing conflict), and prospects for regional arms races involving suppliers such
as Russia and China.as Russia and China.2435
  Mutual economic benefits. Wider access to markets, technology sharing, and Wider access to markets, technology sharing, and
road or rail infrastructure linking the Gulf with the Mediterranean are some of the road or rail infrastructure linking the Gulf with the Mediterranean are some of the
potential economic benefits of expanded Israel-Arab relations.potential economic benefits of expanded Israel-Arab relations.2536 Gulf states may Gulf states may
feel urgency to attract investment that could help them diversify their fossil-fuel feel urgency to attract investment that could help them diversify their fossil-fuel
export-centered economies, and many regional countries may anticipate the need export-centered economies, and many regional countries may anticipate the need
to boost their appeal as trade and investment partners in light of new to boost their appeal as trade and investment partners in light of new
opportunities amid increased global competition (including between the United opportunities amid increased global competition (including between the United
States and China) for markets, resources, and infrastructure projects. States and China) for markets, resources, and infrastructure projects. Additional y, UAE sovereign wealth fund Mubadala signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2021 to purchase a stake in Israel’s Tamar offshore natural gas field. Section Section
1279 of the U.S.-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020 (Title XII, 1279 of the U.S.-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020 (Title XII,
Subtitle H of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, Subtitle H of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 116-283) P.L. 116-283)
authorized the establishment of a program to support Arab-Israeli cooperation on authorized the establishment of a program to support Arab-Israeli cooperation on
innovation and advanced technologies.innovation and advanced technologies.
  Arab public opinion. Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining
normalization with Israel might gauge whether expected benefits from normalization with Israel might gauge whether expected benefits from
normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism or unrest they normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism or unrest they
might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.2637 Public opinion polls from the past decade suggest relatively unchanging and widespread Arab opposition to diplomatic recognition of Israel.38 Normalization efforts to date have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public opinion, its drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of 33 Defense Security Cooperation Agency T ransmittals ~~Public opinion polls~~

~~21 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,~~
~~2021.~~
~~22 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittals~~ 21-01, 21-03, and 21-05, November 10, 2020. 21-01, 21-03, and 21-05, November 10, 2020.
2334 Valerie Valerie Insinna, “Insinna, “ Just hours before Biden’sJust hours before Biden’s inauguration, the UAE and USinauguration, the UAE and US come to a deal on F-35 sales,”come to a deal on F-35 sales,” Defense
News,, January 20, 2021. January 20, 2021.
2435 CRS CRS Report R46580, Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, ,
coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
~~25 The~~36 T he Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “ Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “ Recognizing also their shared goalRecognizing also their shared goal to advance regional to advance regional
economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promote collaborations on economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promote collaborations on
strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a ~~multilateral~~mult ilateral working group for the working group for the
‘‘~~Tracks~~T racks for Regional Peace’ project.” for Regional Peace’ project.” ~~The~~T he Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from
Israel to SaudiIsrael to Saudi Arabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in AugustArabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in August 2019. A major 2019. A major ~~part~~pa rt of its appeal would of its appeal would be be
allowingallowing the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab
al-Mandabal-Mandab (Red Sea).(Red Sea). ~~See~~ See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ~~Tracks~~T racks for regional peace - regional land bridge for regional peace - regional land bridge and hub and hub
initiative, August 5, 2019. initiative, August 5, 2019.
2637 See, See, for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” Wall ~~Street~~
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~~from the past decade suggest relatively unchanging and widespread Arab~~
~~opposition to diplomatic recognition of Israel.27 Normalization efforts to date~~
~~have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public~~
~~opinion, its drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of~~
Street Journal, December 17, 2020. 38 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief, Figure 88, available at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab-Opinion-Index-2019-2020-Inbreef-English-Version.pdf. Congressional Research Service 11 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief authoritarian Arab regimes. It is unclear whether Gulf populations with no direct authoritarian Arab regimes. It is unclear whether Gulf populations with no direct
history of armed conflict with Israel might be more history of armed conflict with Israel might be more ~~willing~~wil ing to accept pragmatic to accept pragmatic
cooperation with Israel than those in Egypt, Jordan, and other countries who have cooperation with Israel than those in Egypt, Jordan, and other countries who have
fought Israel in the past. fought Israel in the past.
The above factors could influence future Saudi decisions on normalization with Israel. Some key The above factors could influence future Saudi decisions on normalization with Israel. Some key
Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be ~~willing~~ wil ing to to
drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinian drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. Specific incentives to do so could include heightened regionalpeace process. Specific incentives to do so could include heightened regional cooperation on Iran, cooperation on Iran,
U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects to boost Saudi economic diversification, and greater U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects to boost Saudi economic diversification, and greater
Saudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.Saudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.28
~~Prospects Under the~~39 The Biden Administration and 117th Congress The Biden Administration has said that it seeks to help Israel normalize its relations with Arab states in ways that preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the 117th Congress, companion bil s encouraging Israel-Arab state normalization have been introduced in the Senate in March 2021 (S. 1061) and House in April (H.R. 2748). While the Administration briefly paused the UAE arms sales described above, it announced in April that the sales would proceed.40 In the same month, the Administration announced a resumption of economic, humanitarian, and non-lethal security assistance to the Palestinians at a level somewhat lower than previously provided, perhaps partly owing to some legal constraints on U.S. economic aid that are linked to PLO/PA welfare payments that arguably incentivize acts of terror.41 As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the future establishment of a fund to support Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation. It is uncertain how the Biden Administration’s resumption of U.S. aid for Palestinians and its other policies might affect Israeli-Palestinian issues broadly. Reports suggest that the Administration may not urgently press Israelis and Palestinians to resume direct negotiations.42 It is also unclear whether the Administration wil reverse Trump-era actions affecting U.S.- Palestinian diplomacy and the status of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. International public debate has taken place over al eged Israeli human rights violations against Palestinians. International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced in March that she was opening an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.43 Additional y, in April a bil was introduced in the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the amount of U.S. aid provided to Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some of those human rights al egations.44 Later in April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the Chair and 39 Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel.” 40 Jacob Magid, “ Biden aide on UAE F-35 sale: Only Israel was meant to have those jets in region,” Times of Israel, November 1, 2020. For background on various issues at play, see CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arm s Sales to the United Arab Em irates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. 41 CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti. 42 Jacob Magid, “ Biden hopes to deprioritize Israel-Palestinian conflict but might not be able to,” Times of Israel, December 11, 2020. 43 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 44 “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel of apartheid over treatment of Palestinians,” Associated Press, April 27, 2021 (underlying Human Rights Watch report available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli- Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Ranking Member of the House Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or adding conditions on security assistance to Israel,45 citing a similar argument that President Biden made during the 2020 presidential race.46 Iran and the Region Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns ~~Biden Administration and 117th Congress~~
~~Before President Biden took office, some of his foreign policy advisors expressed intentions to~~
~~support further Arab-Israeli normalization,29 while also voicing interest in repairing U.S. ties with~~
~~the Palestinians.30 However, the Biden Administration may be hesitant—partly due to sentiment~~
~~within Congress—to consider selling the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, drone aircraft, or other~~
~~advanced arms to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or other states in connection with such normalization.31~~
~~During his Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearing on January 19, 2020,~~
~~Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that “there are certain commitments that may have been~~
~~made in the context of getting those countries to normalize relations with Israel that I think we~~
~~should take a hard look at.... But the work that was done to push forward on the normalization~~
~~with Israel, I applaud…. I would hope that we could build on that as well.”~~
~~Regarding the Palestinians, Ambassador Richard Mills, Acting U.S. Representative to the United~~
~~Nations, announced on January 26 that the Biden Administration would seek to reengage with~~
~~Palestinian leaders and people, resume economic development and humanitarian aid, and~~
~~preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution. Ambassador Mills also stated:~~
~~In this vein, the United States will urge Israel’s government and the Palestinian Authority~~
~~to avoid unilateral steps that make a two-state solution more difficult, such as annexation~~
~~of territory, settlement activity, demolitions, incitement to violence, and providing~~
~~compensation for individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. We hope it will be possible~~

Journal, December 17, 2020.
~~27 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief, Figure 88,~~
~~available at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab-Opinion-Index-2019-2020-~~
~~Inbreef-English-Version.pdf.~~
~~28 Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel.”~~
~~29 Barak Ravid and Alayna Treene, “The only Trump foreign policy Biden wants to keep,” Axios, December 6, 2020.~~
30 David M. Halbfinger, “Biden’s Win Means a Demotion for Netanyahu and Less Focus on Israel,” New York Times,
~~November 9, 2020.~~
~~31 Jacob Magid, “Biden aide on UAE F-35 sale: Only Israel was meant to have those jets in region,” Times of Israel,~~
~~November 1, 2020. For background on various issues at play, see CRS Report R46580,~~ ~~Israel’s Qualitative Military~~
~~Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

10

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~to start working to slowly build confidence on both sides to create an environment in which~~
~~we might once again be able to help advance a solution.32~~
~~As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M.~~
~~Lowey Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the future~~
~~establishment of a fund to support Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, and~~
~~an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.~~
~~The impact that policy changes from the incoming Biden Administration might have is unclear.~~
~~Partly due to diminished prospects for a peace process, some reports suggest that the incoming~~
~~Administration may not urgently press Israelis and Palestinians to resume direct negotiations.33~~
~~Additionally, the Administration may confront legal constraints or political opposition to restoring~~
~~certain types of aid for Palestinians unless the PLO/PA is willing to significantly change~~
~~domestically popular welfare payments that arguably incentivize acts of terror.34 It is also unclear~~
~~whether and how the Administration or Congress might specifically address Trump-era policy~~
~~changes mentioned above that were aimed at legitimizing Israeli settlements in the West Bank.~~
~~Gaza and Its Challenges~~
~~The Gaza Strip—controlled by the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist~~
~~organization)—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian~~
~~conditions.35 Palestinian militants in Gaza regularly clash with Israel’s military as it patrols~~
~~Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, and the clashes periodically escalate toward larger conflict. Since~~
~~2018, Hamas and Israel have reportedly worked through Egypt and Qatar in efforts to establish a~~
~~long-term cease-fire around Gaza that could ease Israel-Egypt access restrictions for people and~~
~~goods.~~
~~Iran and the Region~~
~~Israeli officials cite Iran as a primary concern to Israeli officials~~, largely because of (1) antipathy , largely because of (1) antipathy
toward Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence toward Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence
~~(especially~~(especial y in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon), in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),3647 and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and
advanced conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a advanced conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a
future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer
to the to the ~~small~~ smal -scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their -scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their
~~allies~~al ies as as the “the campaign between wars.”the “the campaign between wars.”37
48 Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement
on Iran’s nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). He on Iran’s nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). He
opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration, and welcomed opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration, and welcomed

~~32 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Richard Mills, Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate on~~
~~the Situation in the Middle East (via VTC), January 26, 2021.~~
~~33 Jacob Magid, “Biden hopes to deprioritize Israel-Palestinian conflict but might not be able to,” Times of Israel,~~
~~December 11, 2020.~~
~~34 CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~35 Ibid.~~
~~36 For information on this topic, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.~~
~~37 See, for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: The Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security,~~
~~January 6, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

11

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and
accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the
intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement. intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement.
U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional
uncertainty, with implications for Israel.uncertainty, with implications for Israel.3849 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s
demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could
transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.3950 In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence
that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab
Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.~~40 Additionally, Iran and Israel~~
~~reportedly exchanged cyberattacks during 2020—with Iran supposedly targeting Israel’s drinking~~
~~water supply and various companies, and Israel an Iranian seaport and government agencies.41~~
~~As the Biden Administration considers diplomacy with Iran on the nuclear issue, including~~
51 Additional y, reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—cyberspace, international waters, and the territory of other regional countries—has further exacerbated regional tensions.52 As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy to consider possibly reentering possibly reentering the JCPOA, Israel—with Prime Minister Netanyahu and other key figures opposing such a U.S. authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution, with the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/). 45 T ext of letter available at https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf . 46 Omri Nahmias, “ Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020. 47 For information on this topic, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman. 48 See, for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: T he Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, January 6, 2021. 49 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton T homas. 50 Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reactor,” haaretz.com, October 6, 2019. 51 T om O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as Red Sea T ensions Rise,” Newsweek, January 13, 2021. 52 “Fighting in the Shadows: Israel and Iran,” Soufan Center, March 30, 2021; Dalia Dassa Kaye, “ Has Israel been sabotaging Iran? Here’s what we know,” washingtonpost.com, July 15, 2020. Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief reentry—is one of several regional U.S. partners voicing interest in having its views taken into account.53 Some observers speculate that Israeli covert or military operations might influence or disrupt diplomacy on the nuclear issue.54 An April 2021 explosion and power outage—widely attributed to Israel—that reportedly disabled thousands of centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility led Iran to begin enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, closer to weapons- grade levels.55 Hezbollah Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state al y in the region. Hezbollah’s forces and Israel’s military have sporadical y clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict.56 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional implications.57 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its al eged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.58 Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.59 Some reports assess that Hezbollah does not want escalation, partly due to significant political and economic problems in Lebanon, but do not rule out the potential for heightened conflict owing to miscalculation between Hezbollah and Israel.60 China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns61 U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure.62 Israel-China investment ties have grown 53 See also Yaniv Kubovich and Judy Maltz, “Israel’s Chief of Staff: Return to Iran Deal Is ‘Wrong,’ Military Action ‘Should Be on the T able,’” haaretz.com, January 27, 2021. 54 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “ Israel and Iran Are Pulling the United States T oward Conflict,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “ T he ramifications of a US return to the 2015 Iran deal - opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021. 55 “Iran Begins 60 Percent Uranium Enrichment After Natanz Attack, Top Negotiator Says,” haaretz.com (with content from Associated Press and Reuters), April 13, 2021. 56 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. Humud. 57 For possible conflict scenarios, see Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion, Counting the cost: Avoiding another war between Israel and Hezbollah, Atlantic Council, May 13, 2020; Hanin Ghaddar, “ How Will Hezbollah Respond to Israel’s Drone Attack?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch 3171, August 28, 2019. 58 See, for example, “ Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “ Who Warns Hezbollah T hat Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Tim es, April 23, 2020. 59 “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press; Ben Caspit, “ Hezbollah, Israel losing red lines,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2019. 60 See, for example, Amos Harel, “ For Hezbollah, Beirut Devastation Makes Provoking Israel Even Riskier,” haaretz.com, August 6, 2020. 61 For background on past U.S. concerns regarding Israeli defense transactions with China, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 62 Shira Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020; Shira Efron, et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, RAND Corporation, 2019; Jewish Institut e for National Security of America, Countering Chinese Engagem ent with Israel: A Congressional Research Service 14 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,63 with Israel as an attractive hub of innovation for Chinese partners, and China as a huge potential export market and source of investment for Israeli businesses. Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U.S. expressions of concern,64 apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather intel igence or acquire technologies with the potential to threaten U.S. national security in such fields as cybersecurity, artificial intel igence, satel ite communications, and robotics. Previously, China-Israel defense industry cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U.S.-Israel defense relationship and to an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China.65 Partly due to U.S. concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.66 However, this panel reportedly does not have the authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s investments in Israel in the previous decade.67 Apparently, debate continues within Israel’s government about how to balance economic interests with national security concerns.68 In the past two years, U.S. officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement in specific Israeli infrastructure projects. President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel, in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U.S. al ies and partners.69 Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials reportedly blocked Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure.70 In May 2020, shortly after then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U.S.-Israel cooperation, Israel’s finance ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1.5 bil ion desalination plant, turning down the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group.71 Additional y, the U.S. Navy reportedly reconsidered its practice of periodical y docking at the Israeli naval base in Haifa, because a state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International Port Group) secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years (beginning in 2021).72 In the conference report (H.Rept. 116-333) accompanying the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92), Congress recommended that the U.S. Com prehensive and Cooperative U.S.-Israeli Strategy, February 2021. 63 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations, coordinated by Susan V. Lawrence. 64 Ron Kampeas, “ Breaking China: A rupture looms between Israel and the United States,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, June 2, 2020. 65 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, pp. 15-20. 66 Arie Egozi, “ Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China T argeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019. 67 Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology, 2020, pp. 24-25. 68 James M. Dorsey, “ Israel-China Relations: Staring into the Abyss of US-Chinese Decoupling,” The Globalist, June 9, 2020; Mercy A. Kuo, “ US-China-Israel Relations: Pompeo’s Visit ,” The Diplomat, May 27, 2020. 69 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “ My Way or the Huawei? T he United States-China Race for 5G Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019. 70 Hiddai Segev and Assaf Orion, “ T he Great Power Competition over 5G Communications: Limited Success for the American Campaign against Huawei,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1268, March 3, 2020. 71 “Amid US pressure, Israel taps local firm over China for $1.5b desalination plant ,” Times of Israel, May 26, 2020. 72 Roie Yellinek, “ T he Israel-China-U.S. T riangle and the Haifa Port Project,” Middle East Institute, November 27, 2018. Reportedly, the Israeli government plans to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances. Jack Detsch, “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2019. Congressional Research Service 15 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief government “convey to the Government of Israel the serious security concerns with respect to the leasing arrangements of the Port of Haifa, and urge consideration of the security implications of such foreign investment in Israel.” Other state-owned Chinese companies are developing a new port in Ashdod (which also hosts an Israeli naval base), and taking part in construction for Tel Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa.73 73 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, p. 38. Congressional Research Service 16 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Appendix. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset and Their Leaders RIGHT Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. Leader: Binyamin Netanyahu Born in 1949, Netanyahu has served as prime minister since 2009 and also was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence. He is general y regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. However, he has negotiated with the Palestinians, and many observers discern cautiousness in Netanyahu’s decisions regarding the nature and scale of military operations. His rhetorical support for more assertive populist and nationalistic measures (including diminishing judicial powers and annexing West Bank territory) has increased after criminal al egations surfaced against him for corruption. Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian speakers from the former Soviet Union. Leader: Avigdor Lieberman Born in 1958, Lieberman served as Israel’s defense minister until his resignation in November 2018. He served as Israel’s foreign minister for most of the period from 2009 to May 2015 and is general y viewed as an ardent nationalist and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption al egations in a 2013 case. Yamina (Right) – 7 seats Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews); includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation. Leader: Naftali Bennett Born in 1972, Bennett served previously as defense, education, and economy minister. He served in various special forces units (including as a reservist during the 2006 Hezbol ah conflict in Lebanon). Bennett was a successful software entrepreneur and has lived in America. He served as Netanyahu’s chief of staff from 2006 to 2008 while Netanyahu was opposition leader. He led the Yesha Council (the umbrel a organization for Israeli West Bank settlers) from 2010 to 2012. Congressional Research Service 17 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters. Leader: Gideon Sa’ar Born in 1966, Sa’ar served as cabinet secretary in the 1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon). He became an influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the Knesset in 2003. He served as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior minister from 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019 but left Likud to form New Hope a year later. Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections. Leader: Bezalel Smotrich Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and religiously conservative causes. LEFT Labor (Avoda) – 7 seats Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Leader: Merav Michaeli Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a regular national media presence and university lecturer. Meretz (Vigor) – 6 seats Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and peace with the Palestinians. Leader: Nitzan Horowitz Born in 1965, Horowitz became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and was first elected to the Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent journalist before entering politics. Congressional Research Service 18 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief CENTER Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – 17 seats Yesh Atid~~the JCPOA, Israel is one of several regional U.S. partners voicing interest in~~
~~having its views taken into account. During his confirmation hearing on January 19, Secretary of~~
~~State Blinken said that consulting with Israel and Arab Gulf states on the nuclear issue would be~~
~~vitally important. Netanyahu has voiced support for continuing the intensified sanctions against~~
~~Iran instead of “just go[ing] back to the JCPOA.”42 In light of possible Israeli covert action during~~
~~2020 that was related to Iran’s nuclear program, including an explosion at its Natanz uranium~~
~~enrichment facility and the assassination of a top scientist, some observers speculate about the~~
~~possibility that future Israeli operations might influence or disrupt diplomacy on the nuclear~~
~~issue.43 In late January, Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi, Chief of Staff for the Israel Defense~~
~~Forces (IDF), stated his opposition to anything that resembles the 2015 JCPOA and said that the~~
~~IDF is developing plans to counter Iran’s possible advancement toward nuclear weapons.44~~
~~Hezbollah~~
~~Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state ally in the region. Hezbollah’s~~
~~forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with~~
~~the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader~~
~~conflict.45 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional~~
~~implications.46 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly~~

~~38 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman,~~
~~Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas.~~
~~39 Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reactor,” haaretz.com,~~
~~October 6, 2019.~~
40 Tom O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as Red Sea Tensions Rise,” Newsweek,
~~January 13, 2021.~~
~~41 “Cyberattack hits Israeli companies, with Iran reportedly the likely culprit,” Times of Israel, December 13, 2020;~~
~~Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Has Israel been sabotaging Iran? Here’s what we know,” washingtonpost.com, July 15, 2020.~~
~~42 Israeli Prime Minister’s office, Additional Remarks by PM Netanyahu at his Meeting with US Treasury Secy. Steven~~
~~Mnuchin, January 7, 2021.~~
~~43 Ben Caspit, “Netanyahu bristles in warning as Biden seeks reentry to Iran deal,” Al-Monitor, January 26, 2021;~~
~~David Wainer and Ivan Levingston, “Israel Wants to Derail Biden’s Plan to Rejoin Iran Nuclear Deal,” Bloomberg,~~
~~January 12, 2021.~~
~~44 Yaniv Kubovich and Judy Maltz, “Israel’s Chief of Staff: Return to Iran Deal Is ‘Wrong,’ Military Action ‘Should~~
~~Be on the Table,’” haaretz.com, January 27, 2021.~~
~~45 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E.~~
~~Humud.~~
46 For possible conflict scenarios, see Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion, Counting the cost: Avoiding another war
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its~~
~~projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.47~~
~~Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah~~
~~conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build~~
~~precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.48 Some reports assess that Hezbollah does not want~~
~~escalation, partly due to significant political and economic problems in Lebanon, but do not rule~~
~~out the potential for heightened conflict owing to miscalculation between Hezbollah and Israel.49~~
~~Syria and Iraq: Reported Israeli Airstrikes Against Iran-Backed Forces~~
~~Israel has reportedly undertaken airstrikes in conflict-plagued Syria and Iraq based on concerns~~
~~that Iran and its allies could pose threats to Israeli security from there. Iran’s westward expansion~~
~~of influence into Iraq and Syria over the past two decades has provided it with more ways to~~
~~supply and support Hezbollah, apparently leading Israel to broaden its regional theater of military~~
~~action.50 The U.S. base At Tanf in southern Syria reportedly serves as an impediment to Iranian~~
~~efforts to create a land route for weapons from Iran to Lebanon.51 Russia, its airspace~~
~~deconfliction mechanism with Israel, and some advanced air defense systems that it has deployed~~
~~or transferred to Syria also influence the various actors involved.52~~
~~Since 2018, Israeli and Iranian forces have repeatedly targeted one another in Syria or around the~~
~~Syria-Israel border. After Iran helped Syria’s government regain control of much of the country,~~
~~Israeli leaders began pledging to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced~~
~~weapons manufacturing facilities in Syria.53 In April 2020, then-Defense Minister Naftali Bennett~~
~~said that Israeli policy had shifted from blocking Iran’s entrenchment in Syria to forcing it out~~
~~entirely.54~~
~~In Iraq, reports suggest that in the summer of 2019, Israel conducted airstrikes against weapons~~
~~depots or convoys that were connected with Iran-allied Shiite militias. A December 2019 media~~
~~report citing U.S. officials claimed that Iran had built up a hidden arsenal of short-range ballistic~~
~~missiles in Iraq that could pose a threat to U.S. regional partners, including Israel.55 Perhaps~~
~~owing to sensitivities involving U.S. forces in Iraq, then-Defense Minister Bennett suggested in~~

between Israel and Hezbollah, Atlantic Council, May 13, 2020; Hanin Ghaddar, “How Will Hezbollah Respond to
~~Israel’s Drone Attack?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch 3171, August 28, 2019.~~
~~47 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28,~~
~~2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, April 23, 2020.~~
~~48 “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press; Ben Caspit, “Hezbollah, Israel~~
~~losing red lines,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2019.~~
~~49 See, for example, Amos Harel, “For Hezbollah, Beirut Devastation Makes Provoking Israel Even Riskier,”~~
~~haaretz.com, August 6, 2020.~~
~~50 Seth J. Frantzman, “Are Israeli Drones Targeting Hezbollah Officers in Syria?” nationalinterest.org, April 17, 2020;~~
~~Caspit, “Hezbollah, Israel losing red lines.”~~
~~51 Seth Jones, “War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East,” Center for Strategic and International~~
~~Studies, March 11, 2019.~~
~~52 Anna Ahronheim, “Russia: Syrian air defense nearly hit passenger plane after Israeli attack,” jpost.com, February 8,~~
~~2020; Seth J. Frantzman, “What’s behind Russia’s criticism of Israeli airstrikes in Syria,” jpost.com, February 8, 2020.~~
~~53 See, for example, Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, PM Netanyahu’s Speech at the United Nations General Assembly,~~
~~September 27, 2018.~~
~~54 “Defense minister: We’ve moved from blocking Iran in Syria to forcing it out,” Times of Israel, April 28, 2020.~~
~~55 Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt, “Iran Is Secretly Moving Missiles Into Iraq, U.S. Officials Say,” New York Times,~~
~~December 5, 2019.~~
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~~February 2020 that Israel would avoid further direct involvement there—leaving any efforts to~~
~~counter Iran-backed forces in Iraq to the United States.56~~
~~China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns57~~
~~U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in~~
~~Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure.58 Israel-China investment ties have grown~~
~~since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,59 with Israel as an attractive hub of~~
~~innovation for Chinese partners, and China as a huge potential export market and source of~~
~~investment for Israeli businesses.~~
~~Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U.S. expressions of concern,60~~
~~apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather intelligence or acquire technologies~~
~~with the potential to threaten U.S. national security in such fields as cybersecurity, artificial~~
~~intelligence, satellite communications, and robotics. Previously, China-Israel defense industry~~
~~cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U.S.-Israel defense relationship~~
~~and to an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China.61 Partly due to U.S.~~
~~concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on~~
~~foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.62 However, this panel reportedly does not have the~~
~~authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s~~
~~investments in Israel in the previous decade.63 Apparently, debate continues within Israel’s~~
~~government about how to balance economic interests with national security concerns.64~~
~~In the past two years, U.S. officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement~~
~~in specific Israeli infrastructure projects. President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister~~
~~Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be~~
~~limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel,~~
~~in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U.S. allies and~~
~~partners.65 Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials reportedly blocked~~
~~Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure.66 In May 2020,~~

~~56 Nati Yefet and Judah Ari Gross, “Bennett: US agreed to counter Iran in Iraq while Israel fights it in Syria,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, February 10, 2020.~~
~~57 For background on past U.S. concerns regarding Israeli defense transactions with China, see CRS Report RL33476,~~
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy
~~M. Sharp.~~
~~58 Shira Efron et al.,~~ ~~Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and~~
~~the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020; and Shira Efron, et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, RAND~~
~~Corporation, 2019.~~
~~59 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations, coordinated by~~
~~Susan V. Lawrence.~~
~~60 Ron Kampeas, “Breaking China: A rupture looms between Israel and the United States,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency,~~
~~June 2, 2020.~~
~~61 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, pp. 15-20.~~
~~62 Arie Egozi, “Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China Targeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019.~~
~~63 Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology, 2020, pp. 24-25.~~
~~64 James M. Dorsey, “Israel-China Relations: Staring into the Abyss of US-Chinese Decoupling,” The Globalist, June~~
~~9, 2020; Mercy A. Kuo, “US-China-Israel Relations: Pompeo’s Visit,” The Diplomat, May 27, 2020.~~
~~65 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “My Way or the Huawei? The United States-China Race for 5G~~
~~Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019.~~
~~66 Hiddai Segev and Assaf Orion, “The Great Power Competition over 5G Communications: Limited Success for the~~
~~American Campaign against Huawei,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1268, March 3, 2020.~~
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~~shortly after then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that~~
~~Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U.S.-Israel cooperation, Israel’s finance~~
~~ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1.5 billion desalination plant, turning down~~
~~the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group.67~~
~~Additionally, the U.S. Navy reportedly reconsidered its practice of periodically docking at the~~
~~Israeli naval base in Haifa, because a state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International~~
~~Port Group) secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years~~
~~(beginning in 2021).68 In the conference report (H.Rept. 116-333) accompanying the FY2020~~
~~National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92), Congress recommended that the U.S.~~
~~government “convey to the Government of Israel the serious security concerns with respect to the~~
~~leasing arrangements of the Port of Haifa, and urge consideration of the security implications of~~
~~such foreign investment in Israel.” Other state-owned Chinese companies are developing a new~~
~~port in Ashdod (which also hosts an Israeli naval base), and taking part in construction for Tel~~
~~Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa.69~~

~~67 “Amid US pressure, Israel taps local firm over China for $1.5b desalination plant,” Times of Israel, May 26, 2020.~~
~~68 Roie Yellinek, “The Israel-China-U.S. Triangle and the Haifa Port Project,” Middle East Institute, November 27,~~
~~2018. Reportedly, the Israeli government plans to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances.~~
~~Jack Detsch, “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2019.~~
~~69 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, p. 38.~~
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~~Appendix. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset~~
~~and Their Leaders~~
~~RIGHT~~
Likud (Consolidation) – 36 Knesset seats
~~Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of~~
~~territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.~~
~~Leader: Binyamin Netanyahu~~
~~Born in 1949, Netanyahu has served as prime minister since 2009 and also was prime~~
~~minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret~~
~~Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and~~
~~diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of~~
~~land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program~~
~~and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political~~
~~dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. However, he has negotiated with the~~
~~Palestinians, and many observers discern cautiousness in Netanyahu’s decisions~~
~~regarding the nature and scale of military operations. His rhetorical support for more~~
~~assertive populist and nationalistic measures (including diminishing judicial powers and~~
~~annexing West Bank territory) has increased after criminal allegations surfaced~~
~~against him for corruption, and after President Trump took office.~~
~~Yisrael Beitenu~~ ~~(Israel Our Home) – 7 seats~~
~~Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian~~
~~speakers from the former Soviet Union.~~
~~Leader: Avigdor Lieberman~~
~~Born in 1958, Lieberman served as Israel’s defense minister until his resignation in~~
~~November 2018. He served as Israel’s foreign minister for most of the period from~~
~~2009 to May 2015 and is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and canny political~~
~~actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the Soviet Union (in~~
~~what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked under Netanyahu~~
~~from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to consider concessions~~
~~to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a platform for former~~
~~Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in a 2013 case.~~
~~Yamina~~ ~~(Right) – 5 seats~~
~~Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National~~
~~Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews);~~
~~includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation.~~
~~Leader: Naftali Bennett~~
~~Born in 1972, Bennett served previously as defense, education, and economy~~
~~minister. He served in various special forces units (including as a reservist during the~~
~~2006 Hezbol ah conflict in Lebanon). Bennett was a successful software entrepreneur~~
~~and has lived in America. He served as Netanyahu’s chief of staff from 2006 to 2008~~
~~while Netanyahu was opposition leader. He led the Yesha Council (the umbrella~~
~~organization for Israeli West Bank settlers) from 2010 to 2012.~~

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~~LEFT~~
Labor (Avoda) – 3 seats
~~Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular~~
~~Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians~~
~~in the West Bank and Gaza.~~
~~Leader: Amir Peretz~~
~~Born in 1952, Peretz is Israel’s economy minister. He became Labor’s leader for the~~
~~second time in July 2019, after serving as party leader from 2005 to 2007. He was~~

~~first elected to the Knesset in 1988 and has served as defense minister (during the~~
~~2006 Hezbol ah conflict) and environment minister. Peretz was a farmer in southern~~
~~Israel and served as mayor of Sderot before joining the Knesset.~~

Meretz (Vigor) – 3 seats
~~Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and~~
~~peace with the Palestinians, and former Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s Israel~~
~~Democratic Party.~~
~~Leader: Nitzan Horowitz~~
~~Born in 1965, Horowitz became Meretz’s leader in June 2019 and was first elected to~~
~~the Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent journalist before entering~~
~~politics.~~
~~CENTER~~
Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 15 seats
~~Centrist party largely formed as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu,~~
~~ostensibly seeking to preserve long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary,~~
~~articulate a vision of Israeli nationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab~~
~~citizens, and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian~~
~~issues.~~

~~Leader: Benny Gantz~~
~~Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister, justice minister, and alternate prime~~
~~minister, and is scheduled to become prime minister by November 2021 under the~~
~~unity agreement with Netanyahu. He served as Chief of General Staff of the Israel~~
~~Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015. He established Hosen L’Yisrael (Israel Resilience~~
~~Party) in December 2018. Hosen L’Yisrael merged with the Yesh Atid and Telem~~
~~parties for the April 2019, September 2019, and March 2020 elections under the~~
~~Kahol Lavan name. When the party split in March 2020 after Gantz agreed to pursue~~
~~a unity government with Netanyahu, Hosen L’Yisrael kept the Kahol Lavan name. He~~
~~has sought to draw contrasts with Netanyahu less through policy specifics than by~~
~~presenting himself as a figure who is less polarizing and less populist.~~
Yesh Atid-Telem – 16 seats
~~Yesh Atid (There Is a Future)~~ is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has
championed championed ~~socioeconomic~~ socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular
~~stance. Telem (Hebrew acronym for National Statesman-like Movement) formed in~~
~~January 2019 by former Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon as a center-right, pro-~~
~~nationalist alternative to Netanyahu. The parties merged with Hosen L’Yisrael in early~~
~~2019, then split from it in March 2020.~~
stance. Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid is the leader of the opposition in the Knesset.Born in 1963, Lapid is the leader of the opposition in the Knesset. He He came to came to
politics after a career as a journalist,politics after a career as a journalist, ~~television~~ television presenter,presenter, and author. He founded the and author. He founded the
Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from 2013 to 2014 he served as finance minister. Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from 2013 to 2014 he served as finance minister.

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Derech Eretz (Way of the Land) – 2 seats
~~Center-right faction formed from the split of Kahol Lavan in March 2020.~~
~~Leaders: Zvi Hauser and Yoaz Hendel~~
~~Born in 1968, Hauser was Netanyahu’s cabinet secretary from 2009 to 2013 and later~~
~~led a coalition promoting recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights.~~
~~Born in 1975, Hendel is Israel’s communications minister. He has been an academic,~~
~~journalist, and author covering national security issues. Both men joined Telem in~~
~~early 2019 but formed Derech Eretz when Telem refused to join a unity government~~
~~in March 2020.~~
Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 8 seats Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu, ostensibly seeking to preserve long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary, articulate a vision of Israeli nationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab citizens, and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian issues. Leader: Benny Gantz Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister, justice minister, and alternate prime minister, and could become prime minister by November 2021 under a power-sharing agreement with Netanyahu. He served as Chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats
Mizrahi HarediMizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare(“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle;support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromiseopposes compromise with Palestinians on control over with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, DeriBorn in 1959, Deri is Israel’sis Israel’s ~~interior minister~~ interior minister and ministerand minister for Negev and Galilee for Negev and Galilee
development.development. He led Shas fromHe led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interiorfraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013.He returned as the party’s leader in 2013.

~~United~~ In April 2021, he al owed a party col eague to take his Knesset seat. United Torah Judaism – 7 seats – 7 seats
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat YisraelAshkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degeland Degel Ha’torah); favors welfareHa’torah); favors welfare and and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle;education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorialopposes territorial ~~compromise~~ compromise with with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; ~~generally seeks~~ general y seeks greater application of Jewish greater application of Jewish
law. law.
Leader: Yaakov Litzman
Born in 1948, Litzman is Israel’sBorn in 1948, Litzman is Israel’s construction and housing minister.construction and housing minister. He was born in He was born in
Germany and raised in the United States before immigratingGermany and raised in the United States before immigrating to Israel in 1965. to Israel in 1965.
Educated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he later servedEducated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he later served as principal of a as principal of a
Hasidic girls’ Hasidic girls’ school in Jerusalem. In April 2021, he alowed a party coleague to take his Knesset seat. Congressional Research Service 19 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief ARAB Joint List – 6~~school in Jerusalem. He was first elected to the Knesset in 1999 and has~~
~~previously served as a member of the Knesset’s finance committee.~~
~~ARAB~~
~~Joint List~~ ~~– 15~~ seats seats
Electoral slate featuring Electoral slate featuring ~~four~~three Arab parties that combine socialist Arab parties that combine socialist~~, Islamist,~~ and Arab and Arab
nationalist political strains:nationalist political strains: HadashHadash (Democratic(Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al
(Arab Movement for Renewal), (Arab Movement for Renewal), ~~Ra’am~~ ~~(United Arab List),~~ BaladBalad (National Democratic(National Democratic
Assembly). Assembly).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialistBorn in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the party, and of the
Joint List.Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s
~~national leader in 2006. He supports a more democratic, egalitarian, and peace-~~
~~seeking society, and has sought protection for unrecognized Bedouin vil ages and~~
~~advocated for drafting young Arab Israelis for military or civilian national service.~~

national leader in 2006. United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – 4 seats Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. Leader: Mansour Abbas Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
Note: Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March ~~2, 2020, election. The Gesher (Bridge) and~~
~~Habayit Hayehudi (The Jewish Home) parties each have a single member of the Knesset.~~

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23, 2021, election.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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