Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from July 25, 2022 to August 9, 2022

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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
~~July 25~~August 9, 2022 , 2022
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding—signed in 2016—commits the United
Jim Zanotti
States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
appropriations. Some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of appropriations. Some Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of

U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the U.S. security assistance, contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the
following matters: following matters:

Political instability and fall 2022 election. Israel has experienced a period of unprecedented political instability since April Israel has experienced a period of unprecedented political instability since April
2019. During this time, the country has held four elections with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing criminal 2019. During this time, the country has held four elections with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing criminal
prosecution on political corruption charges. After the coalition government that replaced Netanyahu in June 2021 broke down prosecution on political corruption charges. After the coalition government that replaced Netanyahu in June 2021 broke down
in June 2022, another election—the fifth round in four years—is scheduled to take place on November 1, 2022. With the in June 2022, another election—the fifth round in four years—is scheduled to take place on November 1, 2022. With the
collapse of the coalition, Israel’s prime minister changed from Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party (who had held the office collapse of the coalition, Israel’s prime minister changed from Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party (who had held the office
since June 2021) to Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party. Lapid is to serve in a caretaker capacity along with Israel’s other since June 2021) to Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party. Lapid is to serve in a caretaker capacity along with Israel’s other
cabinet ministers until a new Knesset installs a new government. The elections and the subsequent government formation cabinet ministers until a new Knesset installs a new government. The elections and the subsequent government formation
process are likely to be a showdown between Netanyahu’s Likud party and the parties inclined to support him, and Prime process are likely to be a showdown between Netanyahu’s Likud party and the parties inclined to support him, and Prime
Minister Lapid and others across the political spectrum who oppose Netanyahu leading another government. Minister Lapid and others across the political spectrum who oppose Netanyahu leading another government.
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials regularly speak out strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials regularly speak out
against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for including settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for
individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. Violence in 2022 has triggered heightened counterterrorism measures and some individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism. Violence in 2022 has triggered heightened counterterrorism measures and some
controversy, including in relation to the killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. With the Gaza Strip controversy, including in relation to the killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. With the Gaza Strip
still under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States still under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States
and other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group. and other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority states. The Biden Administration has followed The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced
normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address
Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties. Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.
Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader
regional cooperation—including on air and missile defense—that inclines Saudi Arabia and other Muslim-majority countries regional cooperation—including on air and missile defense—that inclines Saudi Arabia and other Muslim-majority countries
toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging more normalization and toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging more normalization and
greater regional security cooperation involving Israel. greater regional security cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran in the region. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 international agreement
that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israel’s leaders have varying views about a possible U.S. return to the agreement. that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israel’s leaders have varying views about a possible U.S. return to the agreement.
Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Observers have speculated about future Israeli covert or military actions to influence nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program.
Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq due Israel also has reportedly conducted a number of military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq due
to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal. to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. To date, Israel has not provided lethal support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. To date, Israel has not provided lethal
assistance to Ukraine, but has provided protective equipment to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian groups. Since 2015, assistance to Ukraine, but has provided protective equipment to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian groups. Since 2015,
Russia’s air defense capabilities in Syria have compelled Israel to deconflict its airstrikes there with Russia. Russia has Russia’s air defense capabilities in Syria have compelled Israel to deconflict its airstrikes there with Russia. Russia has
started action to close the Russian branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, a move that could strain bilateral ties.started action to close the Russian branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, a move that could strain bilateral ties.
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Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (seeIsrael (see Figure 1 for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, , by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). A few lawmakers Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). A few lawmakers
seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and seek oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1 Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it
recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding
Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—
though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty
in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy will remain in Jerusalem.2 in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy will remain in Jerusalem.2
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include include
 Israel’s ongoing political instability and the upcoming fall 2022 election.  Israel’s ongoing political instability and the upcoming fall 2022 election.
 Israeli-Palestinian problems and their implications for U.S. policy, including  Israeli-Palestinian problems and their implications for U.S. policy, including
violence and controversy in 2022, Gaza and its challenges, and human rights violence and controversy in 2022, Gaza and its challenges, and human rights
considerations. considerations.
 Developments regarding Israel’s normalization or improvement of relations with  Developments regarding Israel’s normalization or improvement of relations with
various Arab and Muslim-majority states since the Abraham Accords. various Arab and Muslim-majority states since the Abraham Accords.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah. Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
 Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.  Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

1 Rebecca Kheel, “Progressives ramp up scrutiny of US funding for Israel,” 1 Rebecca Kheel, “Progressives ramp up scrutiny of US funding for Israel,” The Hill, May 23, 2021. One bill, the Two-, May 23, 2021. One bill, the Two-
State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), would expressly prohibit U.S. assistance (including defense articles or services) to State Solution Act (H.R. 5344), would expressly prohibit U.S. assistance (including defense articles or services) to
further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise permanent control over any part of the West Bank further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise permanent control over any part of the West Bank
(including East Jerusalem) or Gaza. (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
2 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” 2 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. , February 9, 2021.
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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA, DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2022 unless otherwise ; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2022 unless otherwise
specified. specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
Israeli Political Instability and Fall 2022 Election
Israel has experienced a period of unprecedented political instability since April 2019. During this Israel has experienced a period of unprecedented political instability since April 2019. During this
time, the country has held four elections with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing time, the country has held four elections with then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing
criminal prosecution on political corruption charges. After the coalition government that replaced criminal prosecution on political corruption charges. After the coalition government that replaced
Netanyahu in June 2021 broke down in June 2022 (as discussed below), another election—the Netanyahu in June 2021 broke down in June 2022 (as discussed below), another election—the
fifth round in four years—is scheduled to take place on November 1, 2022. With the collapse of fifth round in four years—is scheduled to take place on November 1, 2022. With the collapse of
the coalition, Israel’s prime minister changed from Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party (who had the coalition, Israel’s prime minister changed from Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party (who had
held the office since June 2021) to Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party. Lapid is to serve in a held the office since June 2021) to Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party. Lapid is to serve in a
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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

caretaker capacity along with Israel’s other cabinet ministers (see caretaker capacity along with Israel’s other cabinet ministers (see Table 1) until a new Knesset until a new Knesset
installs a new government. Bennett, as alternate prime minister, is to maintain significant installs a new government. Bennett, as alternate prime minister, is to maintain significant
responsibility for Iran-related issues, but he has announced that he will not run in the fall election. responsibility for Iran-related issues, but he has announced that he will not run in the fall election.
Table 1. Israeli Caretaker Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Yair Lapid Yair Lapid
Yesh Atid Yesh Atid
Alternate Prime Minister Alternate Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett Naftali Bennett
Yamina Yamina
Defense Minister Defense Minister
Benny Gantz Benny Gantz
Kahol Lavan Kahol Lavan
Finance Minister Finance Minister
Avigdor Lieberman Avigdor Lieberman
Yisrael Beitenu Yisrael Beitenu
Justice Minister Justice Minister
Gideon Sa’ar Gideon Sa’ar
New Hope New Hope
Interior Minister Interior Minister
Ayelet Shaked Ayelet Shaked
Yamina Yamina
Transportation Minister Transportation Minister
Merav Michaeli Merav Michaeli
Labor Labor
Public Security Minister Public Security Minister
Omer Bar Lev Omer Bar Lev
Labor Labor
Health Minister Health Minister
Nitzan Horowitz Nitzan Horowitz
Meretz Meretz
Over nearly four years, Israel’s efforts at establishing political leadership have unfolded as Over nearly four years, Israel’s efforts at establishing political leadership have unfolded as
follows. Netanyahu was selected by Israel’s president as the Knesset member best situated to follows. Netanyahu was selected by Israel’s president as the Knesset member best situated to
form a government after both the April 2019 and September 2019 elections, but was unable to do form a government after both the April 2019 and September 2019 elections, but was unable to do
so in either case—the first time such a stalemate had occurred in Israel. After the March 2020 so in either case—the first time such a stalemate had occurred in Israel. After the March 2020
election, Netanyahu formed a power-sharing government in May 2020 with Benny Gantz’s Kahol election, Netanyahu formed a power-sharing government in May 2020 with Benny Gantz’s Kahol
Lavan party, but the government collapsed later that year over a failure to pass a national budget. Lavan party, but the government collapsed later that year over a failure to pass a national budget.
The resulting election in March 2021 led to the replacement of Netanyahu’s government by a The resulting election in March 2021 led to the replacement of Netanyahu’s government by a
wide-ranging but fractious coalition of parties in June 2021 (wide-ranging but fractious coalition of parties in June 2021 (see Appendix A). While Bennett—a . While Bennett—a
right-of-center figure—served as prime minister of this power-sharing government, the centrist right-of-center figure—served as prime minister of this power-sharing government, the centrist
Lapid played a leading role in arranging the coalition. Lapid played a leading role in arranging the coalition.
In June 2022, the Netanyahu-led opposition in the Knesset withheld its support for a bill to renew In June 2022, the Netanyahu-led opposition in the Knesset withheld its support for a bill to renew
the application of certain aspects of civilian law to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and the bill the application of certain aspects of civilian law to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, and the bill
failed to pass after two members of Bennett’s Yamina party left the coalition in hopes of bringing failed to pass after two members of Bennett’s Yamina party left the coalition in hopes of bringing
a more right-leaning government to power. To trigger an automatic renewal of the civilian laws’ a more right-leaning government to power. To trigger an automatic renewal of the civilian laws’
application to West Bank settlers, Bennett and Lapid got the Knesset to dissolve the coalition and application to West Bank settlers, Bennett and Lapid got the Knesset to dissolve the coalition and
vote for the election now scheduled for the fall. Under the government’s power-sharing vote for the election now scheduled for the fall. Under the government’s power-sharing
agreement, once the Knesset voted for a new election, Lapid (see text box below for a brief agreement, once the Knesset voted for a new election, Lapid (see text box below for a brief
biography) became Israel’s caretaker prime minister because members of Bennett’s party were biography) became Israel’s caretaker prime minister because members of Bennett’s party were
responsible for the coalition’s demise. responsible for the coalition’s demise.
Prime Minister Yair Lapid: Biography
Lapid, born in 1963, transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, when he Lapid, born in 1963, transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, when he
founded the centrist, pro-secular Yesh Atid (There is a Future) party. His father Tommy was founded the centrist, pro-secular Yesh Atid (There is a Future) party. His father Tommy was
also a media personality-turned-politician who led the Shinui (Change) party in the Knesset also a media personality-turned-politician who led the Shinui (Change) party in the Knesset
from 1999-2006 and served briefly as justice minister. from 1999-2006 and served briefly as justice minister.
In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-place finish and Lapid served as finance In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-place finish and Lapid served as finance
minister in the Netanyahu-led government from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided minister in the Netanyahu-led government from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided
allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading
political option for Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. political option for Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties.
Lapid and Yesh Atid joined a combined list with Benny Gantz’s Kahol Lavan to oppose Netanyahu for three Lapid and Yesh Atid joined a combined list with Benny Gantz’s Kahol Lavan to oppose Netanyahu for three
straight elections beginning in April 2019, but split from Kahol Lavan when Gantz formed a power-sharing straight elections beginning in April 2019, but split from Kahol Lavan when Gantz formed a power-sharing
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government with Netanyahu in May 2020. After Yesh Atid’s second-place finish in the March 2021 election, then- government with Netanyahu in May 2020. After Yesh Atid’s second-place finish in the March 2021 election, then-
Israeli President Reuven Rivlin chose Lapid as the Knesset member best positioned to form a government. He Israeli President Reuven Rivlin chose Lapid as the Knesset member best positioned to form a government. He
established a power-sharing government in June 2021 featuring eight parties across Israel’s political spectrum, established a power-sharing government in June 2021 featuring eight parties across Israel’s political spectrum,
serving as foreign minister and alternate prime minister as part of a rotation agreement with Prime Minister serving as foreign minister and alternate prime minister as part of a rotation agreement with Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party. Under the power-sharing agreement, Lapid became caretaker prime minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party. Under the power-sharing agreement, Lapid became caretaker prime minister
in July 2022 after members of Yamina caused the government’s dissolution. In conducting Israel’s foreign policy in July 2022 after members of Yamina caused the government’s dissolution. In conducting Israel’s foreign policy
since June 2021, Lapid, Bennett, and Gantz have avoided major military conflict to date while supporting efforts to since June 2021, Lapid, Bennett, and Gantz have avoided major military conflict to date while supporting efforts to
counter Iran, including in coordination with the United States and various Arab countries. counter Iran, including in coordination with the United States and various Arab countries.
While he is constrained from major political initiatives while serving in a caretaker capacity, Lapid favors a two-While he is constrained from major political initiatives while serving in a caretaker capacity, Lapid favors a two-
state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,3 and has expressed opposition to West Bank settlement state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,3 and has expressed opposition to West Bank settlement
construction that could impede such a solution—particularly in isolated areas away from settlement blocs closer construction that could impede such a solution—particularly in isolated areas away from settlement blocs closer
to Israel.4 In past public statements, Lapid has said that he would not accept dividing Jerusalem with the to Israel.4 In past public statements, Lapid has said that he would not accept dividing Jerusalem with the
Palestinians.5 Palestinians.5
The elections and the subsequent government formation process are likely to be a showdown The elections and the subsequent government formation process are likely to be a showdown
between Netanyahu’s Likud party and the parties inclined to support him, and Prime Minister between Netanyahu’s Likud party and the parties inclined to support him, and Prime Minister
Lapid’s Yesh Atid party and others across the political spectrum who oppose Netanyahu leading Lapid’s Yesh Atid party and others across the political spectrum who oppose Netanyahu leading
another government. The previous coalition achieved little consensus on controversial subjects—another government. The previous coalition achieved little consensus on controversial subjects—
the Palestinians, how to balance judicial review and majority rule, and religion’s role in the state. the Palestinians, how to balance judicial review and majority rule, and religion’s role in the state.
Nevertheless, Lapid and Bennett maintain that this coalition competently addressed important Nevertheless, Lapid and Bennett maintain that this coalition competently addressed important
issues such as Iran, the budget, and the COVID-19 crisis.6 issues such as Iran, the budget, and the COVID-19 crisis.6
Netanyahu’s trial is ongoing and may continue for years without legally preventing him from Netanyahu’s trial is ongoing and may continue for years without legally preventing him from
leading a government. Some observers speculate that he might be open to political compromises leading a government. Some observers speculate that he might be open to political compromises
with other parties in return for measures to end or disrupt his prosecution, even though Netanyahu with other parties in return for measures to end or disrupt his prosecution, even though Netanyahu
denies this.7 Such compromises could include efforts to increase formal Israeli control over parts denies this.7 Such compromises could include efforts to increase formal Israeli control over parts
of the West Bank and reduce the judiciary’s power over legislation or government action. of the West Bank and reduce the judiciary’s power over legislation or government action.
Itamar Ben Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party are possible Likud coalition Itamar Ben Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party are possible Likud coalition
partners—perhaps as part of a broader Religious Zionism electoral list—and have links with a partners—perhaps as part of a broader Religious Zionism electoral list—and have links with a
Jewish ultra-nationalist movement based on the ideology of Meir Kahane (1932-1990).8 Kahane Jewish ultra-nationalist movement based on the ideology of Meir Kahane (1932-1990).8 Kahane
served in the Knesset from 1984 until 1988, when his party was banned from elections after Israel served in the Knesset from 1984 until 1988, when his party was banned from elections after Israel
passed legislation disqualifying those who incite racism. The U.S. government has designated a passed legislation disqualifying those who incite racism. The U.S. government has designated a
Kahanist group (Kahane Chai) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, even though the Kahanist group (Kahane Chai) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity, even though the
government de-listed the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2022 due to its inactivity.9 government de-listed the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2022 due to its inactivity.9
The following could be significant factors regarding the elections and government formation The following could be significant factors regarding the elections and government formation
process: process:

3 Josef Federman, “Lapid, set to be Israel’s next premier, faces critical test,” 3 Josef Federman, “Lapid, set to be Israel’s next premier, faces critical test,” Associated Press, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
4 Tovah Lazaroff, “Lapid, Gantz now control the fate of settlers in Israel’s West Bank,” jpost.com, June 20, 2022. 4 Tovah Lazaroff, “Lapid, Gantz now control the fate of settlers in Israel’s West Bank,” jpost.com, June 20, 2022.
5 Noa Landau, “Yair Lapid Says Jerusalem Is Non-negotiable Even if It Means No Peace,” haaretz.com, December 25, 5 Noa Landau, “Yair Lapid Says Jerusalem Is Non-negotiable Even if It Means No Peace,” haaretz.com, December 25,
2017. 2017.
6 Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview”; “Lapid says Bennett has shown responsibility, thanks him for 6 Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview”; “Lapid says Bennett has shown responsibility, thanks him for
friendship: ‘I love you very much,’” friendship: ‘I love you very much,’” Times of Israel, June 20, 2022. , June 20, 2022.
7 Patrick Kingsley and Isabel Kershner, “As Government Collapses, Netanyahu Makes Case to Lead Israel Again,” 7 Patrick Kingsley and Isabel Kershner, “As Government Collapses, Netanyahu Makes Case to Lead Israel Again,”
New York Times, June 22, 2022. , June 22, 2022.
8 David B. Green, “Israel Election Results: Who Was Meir Kahane, and Why Is His Racist Legacy Relevant Again,” 8 David B. Green, “Israel Election Results: Who Was Meir Kahane, and Why Is His Racist Legacy Relevant Again,”
haaretz.com, March 26, 2021. haaretz.com, March 26, 2021.
9 State Department, “Revocation of Five Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designations and the Delisting of Six 9 State Department, “Revocation of Five Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designations and the Delisting of Six
Deceased Individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” May 20, 2022. Deceased Individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” May 20, 2022.
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  Another stalemate? Initial polling suggests that Likud will probably win more Initial polling suggests that Likud will probably win more
votes than any other party, but pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs may both have votes than any other party, but pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs may both have
difficulty achieving Knesset support to form a government.10 In such an event, difficulty achieving Knesset support to form a government.10 In such an event,
Lapid and other caretaker officials might continue in their positions through Lapid and other caretaker officials might continue in their positions through
multiple election rounds, as Netanyahu did when serving in a caretaker capacity multiple election rounds, as Netanyahu did when serving in a caretaker capacity
from December 2018 until May 2020. from December 2018 until May 2020.
  Potential game changers. The electoral math could change if some parties near The electoral math could change if some parties near
the electoral threshold fall beneath it, or, alternatively, run with one or more other the electoral threshold fall beneath it, or, alternatively, run with one or more other
parties as a combined list. Other changes could come from key political figures parties as a combined list. Other changes could come from key political figures
entering or departing the political scene, or making new alignments. One such entering or departing the political scene, or making new alignments. One such
figure is Gadi Eizenkot, a prominent retired general and former Israel Defense figure is Gadi Eizenkot, a prominent retired general and former Israel Defense
Forces chief of staff. Additionally, the political future of the Yamina party Forces chief of staff. Additionally, the political future of the Yamina party
without Bennett is in question.11 Leaders of the Kahol Lavan, New Hope, and without Bennett is in question.11 Leaders of the Kahol Lavan, New Hope, and
Yisrael Beitenu parties all currently oppose sitting in government with Yisrael Beitenu parties all currently oppose sitting in government with
Netanyahu, but also have a history of working with him. In July 2022, Kahol Netanyahu, but also have a history of working with him. In July 2022, Kahol
Lavan and New Hope agreed to run on a combined list in November’s election, Lavan and New Hope agreed to run on a combined list in November’s election,
perhaps boosting Defense Minister Gantz’s prime ministerial chances. perhaps boosting Defense Minister Gantz’s prime ministerial chances.
  Arab-led parties. As in the previous government, Arab-led parties could be As in the previous government, Arab-led parties could be
decisive in determining future political outcomes. The Islamist United Arab List decisive in determining future political outcomes. The Islamist United Arab List
(UAL or Ra’am) was the first independent Arab party to join an Israeli (UAL or Ra’am) was the first independent Arab party to join an Israeli
government when it joined the Lapid-Bennett coalition in June 2021.12 The Joint government when it joined the Lapid-Bennett coalition in June 2021.12 The Joint
List (made up of three smaller parties with socialist or nationalist leanings) has List (made up of three smaller parties with socialist or nationalist leanings) has
stayed aloof from the pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs to date. Voter turnout among stayed aloof from the pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs to date. Voter turnout among
Arab citizens of Israel has fluctuated between 45% and 65% in the past four Arab citizens of Israel has fluctuated between 45% and 65% in the past four
elections,13 and could determine whether UAL reaches the electoral threshold, elections,13 and could determine whether UAL reaches the electoral threshold,
while also generally affecting Arab-led parties’ ability to influence government while also generally affecting Arab-led parties’ ability to influence government
formation or critical legislation.14 formation or critical legislation.14
~~Israeli-Palestinian Issues15~~
~~Overview~~
~~Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated~~
~~two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for~~
~~direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.16 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster~~
~~Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump~~

10 Michael Horovitz, “Polls point to return of dreaded deadlock in next elections, unless alliances shift,” 10 Michael Horovitz, “Polls point to return of dreaded deadlock in next elections, unless alliances shift,” Times of
Israel, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
11 Yossi Verter, “Israel’s Government of Change Nears End Along With Bennet’s Political Career,” haaretz.com, June 11 Yossi Verter, “Israel’s Government of Change Nears End Along With Bennet’s Political Career,” haaretz.com, June
21, 2022. 21, 2022.
12 Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” 12 Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3, , June 3,
2021. 2021.
13 Arik Rudnitzky, “The Arab Vote in the Elections for the 24th Knesset (March 2021),” Israel Democracy Institute, 13 Arik Rudnitzky, “The Arab Vote in the Elections for the 24th Knesset (March 2021),” Israel Democracy Institute,
April 27, 2021. April 27, 2021.
14 “Israel’s electoral threshold: Will it change and who will be affected?” jpost.com, June 26, 2022. 14 “Israel’s electoral threshold: Will it change and who will be affected?” jpost.com, June 26, 2022.
~~15 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~16 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press~~
~~Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Israeli-Palestinian Issues15 Overview Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.16 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians Administration. These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians
that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for expansion and settler violence, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payments for
individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.17 individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.17
Some Israeli settlement construction plans for East Jerusalem and the West Bank have Some Israeli settlement construction plans for East Jerusalem and the West Bank have
advanced,18 but Israel has reportedly delayed a few plans flagged as especially damaging to the advanced,18 but Israel has reportedly delayed a few plans flagged as especially damaging to the
two-state vision by the Biden Administration or some Members of Congress.19 In May 2022, two-state vision by the Biden Administration or some Members of Congress.19 In May 2022,
Israel advanced plans for nearly 4,500 additional housing units for West Bank settlements,20 Israel advanced plans for nearly 4,500 additional housing units for West Bank settlements,20
drawing statements of strong opposition from the Administration.21 drawing statements of strong opposition from the Administration.21
Biden Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based Palestinian Biden Administration officials have renewed diplomatic ties with West Bank-based Palestinian
Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and resumed various forms of U.S. aid for
Palestinians.22 Additionally, as part of FY2021 appropriations legislation, the Nita M. Lowey Palestinians.22 Additionally, as part of FY2021 appropriations legislation, the Nita M. Lowey
Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (MEPPA, Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized
the establishment of two funds to support development in the West Bank and Gaza, along with the establishment of two funds to support development in the West Bank and Gaza, along with
various types of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation.23 For allocation between the two various types of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and cooperation.23 For allocation between the two
MEPPA funds, Congress appropriated $50 million for FY2021 and the same amount for FY2022, MEPPA funds, Congress appropriated $50 million for FY2021 and the same amount for FY2022,
with additional $50 million tranches authorized for FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025. with additional $50 million tranches authorized for FY2023, FY2024, and FY2025.
Reopening of U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem?
Biden Administration officials have said that they plan to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that had Biden Administration officials have said that they plan to reopen the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem that had
previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians, without previously functioned as an independent diplomatic mission in handling relations with the Palestinians, without
specifying when the consulate might reopen.24 The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S. specifying when the consulate might reopen.24 The Trump Administration merged the consulate into the U.S.
Embassy in Israel in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU) Embassy in Israel in March 2019, with the consulate’s functions taken over by a Palestinian Affairs Unit (PAU)
within the embassy. Competing Israeli and Palestinian national narratives influence this issue, with both sides within the embassy. Competing Israeli and Palestinian national narratives influence this issue, with both sides
appealing to U.S. officials about its importance of Jerusalem and its holy sites to their domestic constituencies.25 appealing to U.S. officials about its importance of Jerusalem and its holy sites to their domestic constituencies.25
A December 2021 media report claimed that controversy on the issue led the Biden Administration to effectively A December 2021 media report claimed that controversy on the issue led the Biden Administration to effectively
shelve plans to reopen the consulate. It also said that the PAU was communicating directly with State Department shelve plans to reopen the consulate. It also said that the PAU was communicating directly with State Department
officials in Washington, rather than working through other embassy channels.26 In June 2022, the PAU was re-officials in Washington, rather than working through other embassy channels.26 In June 2022, the PAU was re-
branded as the Office of Palestinian Affairs (OPA), with the OPA operating under the auspices of the embassy branded as the Office of Palestinian Affairs (OPA), with the OPA operating under the auspices of the embassy
while reporting directly to Washington.27 This type of direct communication was a core aspect of the previous while reporting directly to Washington.27 This type of direct communication was a core aspect of the previous
consulate general’s independent status. Nevertheless, PA President Abbas continues to press for the reopening of consulate general’s independent status. Nevertheless, PA President Abbas continues to press for the reopening of
the consulate.28 the consulate.28

~~17 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett After Their Meeting,”~~
~~Jerusalem, March 27, 2022.~~
~~18 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances Thousands of Settlement Homes Despite Harsh U.S. Rebuke,” haaretz.com, October~~
~~27, 2021.~~
~~19 “Israel stops plan for contentious east Jerusalem settlement,” Associated Press, December 6, 2021; Jacob Magid,~~
~~“Meeting on E1 settlement plans delayed for month after US pressure,” Times of Israel, July 4, 2022.~~
~~20 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances over 4,000 West Bank Housing Units for Jews,” haaretz.com, May 12, 2022.~~
~~21 State Department Press Briefing, May 6, 2022.~~
~~22 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~24 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021.~~
~~25 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel to form team to solve consulate dispute,” Axios, October 20, 2021; Jack Khoury and~~
~~Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves~~
~~Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021.~~
~~26 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel,” Times of Israel,~~
~~December 15, 2021.~~
~~27 Barak Ravid, “State Department separates Palestinian office from U.S. Embassy to Israel,” Axios, June 9, 2022.~~
~~28 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press~~
~~Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

7

~~link to page 13~~ ~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances,~~
~~including through loans and work permits.29 However, some critics charge that the measures~~
~~mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its~~
~~causes through negotiation with Palestinians.30 During President Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel~~
~~and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had committed to~~
~~expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the Allenby border~~
~~crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank and Gaza to~~
~~4G communications infrastructure.31~~
~~Some international bodies have subjected alleged Israeli human rights violations against~~
~~Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny. In March 2021, the International Criminal~~
~~Court (ICC) prosecutor began an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.32~~
~~Members of Congress have taken varying positions on human rights-related concerns.~~
15 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 24 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021. 25 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel to form team to solve consulate dispute,” Axios, October 20, 2021; Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021. 26 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel,” Times of Israel, December 15, 2021. 27 Barak Ravid, “State Department separates Palestinian office from U.S. Embassy to Israel,” Axios, June 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Israel has taken some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances, including through loans and work permits.29 However, some critics charge that the measures mirror past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.30 During President Biden’s July 2022 visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.31 Some international bodies have subjected alleged Israeli human rights violations against Palestinians to further legal and political scrutiny. In March 2021, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor began an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.32 Members of Congress have taken varying positions on human rights-related concerns. Possible Downgrade of U.S. Security Coordinator Some Members of Congress have opposed the Pentagon’s stated plan to change the rank requirement for the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the PA (USSC) from three-star general (or equivalent flag officer rank) to colonel (or equivalent).33 The change is anticipated by the end of 2022 because of a legal requirement to reduce the number of active duty flag officers by 110 across the military, per Section 501 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-328), with several other posts around the world also affected. In June, 30 Senators sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, urging him to maintain the position’s three-star rank requirement because of concerns a downgrade could undermine Israel-Palestinian 20 Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Advances over 4,000 West Bank Housing Units for Jews,” haaretz.com, May 12, 2022. 21 State Department Press Briefing, May 6, 2022. 22 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 23 For information on the Partnership for Peace Fund (PPF), see https://www.usaid.gov/west-bank-and-gaza/meppa. For information on the Joint Investment for Peace Initiative (JIPI), see https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-announces-joint-investment-peace-initiative-promote-middle-east-peace. According to USAID FY2022 Congressional Notification #43, January 20, 2022, the Administration plans to allocate $46.5 million of FY2021 funding for MEPPA toward the PPF, and $3.5 million toward the JIPI. 24 State Department Press Briefing, November 3, 2021. 25 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel to form team to solve consulate dispute,” Axios, October 20, 2021; Jack Khoury and Jonathan Lis, “Palestinian Officials Say U.S. Seeks to Reopen Consulate Serving East Jerusalem After Israel Approves Budget,” haaretz.com, October 3, 2021. 26 Jacob Magid, “US holding off on reopening Jerusalem consulate amid strong pushback from Israel,” Times of Israel, December 15, 2021. 27 Barak Ravid, “State Department separates Palestinian office from U.S. Embassy to Israel,” Axios, June 9, 2022. 28 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. 29 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to 20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022. 30 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021. 31 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” 32 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 33 Jacob Magid, “Despite bipartisan opposition, US still plans to downgrade Jerusalem security post,” Times of Israel, August 2, 2022. For background on the USSC and its functions, see CRS Report R46274, The Palestinians and Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act: U.S. Aid and Personal Jurisdiction, by Jim Zanotti and Jennifer K. Elsea. Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 13 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief communication and U.S. leadership within the USSC’s multilateral framework.34 A few days later, 57 Representatives sent a similar letter.35 One source has reported that the State Department, Israel, and the PA have reservations about the proposed change.36 Observers have debated the issue. Some former U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian officials assert that having a flag officer is essential to maintaining U.S. credibility and influence regarding Israeli-Palestinian security coordination, especially at a time when security conditions may be deteriorating (as discussed below).37 From another perspective, a retired Israeli general has said that the USSC position became less important during the Obama and Trump Administrations in providing material assistance for the PA and shaping the U.S. regional role.38 Violence and Controversy in 2022
A number of complicated factors may contribute to heightened tensions and episodic violence A number of complicated factors may contribute to heightened tensions and episodic violence
between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel. With prospects dim for between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel. With prospects dim for
diplomatic resolution of final-status issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem’s status, militants diplomatic resolution of final-status issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem’s status, militants
and activists on both sides may seek to shape outcomes or express protest. Arab states’ greater and activists on both sides may seek to shape outcomes or express protest. Arab states’ greater
willingness—despite Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic stalemate—to cooperate openly with Israel willingness—despite Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic stalemate—to cooperate openly with Israel
could feed increased tensions (see could feed increased tensions (see “The Abraham Accords” below). below).
Since March 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has resulted to date in the deaths of 19 Israelis or Since March 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has resulted to date in the deaths of 19 Israelis or
foreigners in Israel and more than 40 Palestinians,foreigners in Israel and more than 40 Palestinians,3339 amid the following: amid the following:
 Protests and violent altercations around Jerusalem holy sites, including during  Protests and violent altercations around Jerusalem holy sites, including during
religious holidays and other sensitive times commemorating historical events. religious holidays and other sensitive times commemorating historical events.3440
 Heightened Israeli and PA security measures to counter alleged Palestinian  Heightened Israeli and PA security measures to counter alleged Palestinian
lawlessness and militancy in West Bank cities such as Jenin. lawlessness and militancy in West Bank cities such as Jenin.3541
In May 2022, prominent In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a Palestinian Christian from journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a Palestinian Christian from
East Jerusalem who was a U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli East Jerusalem who was a U.S. citizen) was killed by a gunshot in an area of Jenin where Israeli
security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered a major international security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Her death triggered a major international
outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning outcry, as did images of Israeli police disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning
Abu Akleh’s killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department Abu Akleh’s killing and an injury suffered by one of her colleagues, the State Department
spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and full accountability, and said spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and full accountability, and said
that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive

~~28 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press~~
~~Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.~~
~~29 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of~~
~~Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to~~
~~20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022.~~
~~30 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021.~~
~~31 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,”~~
~~32 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
33investigation.”42 Some evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces,43 with the PA claiming that its investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but 34 Text of letter available at https://www.ossoff.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Ossoff-Graham-USSC-Letter.pdf. 35 Text available at https://jewishinsider.nyc3.digitaloceanspaces.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/23210039/Letter-to-Sec.-Austin-With-Watermark.pdf. 36 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Pentagon weighs downgrading rank of U.S. Palestinian security post,” Axios, June 1, 2022. 37 Shira Efron and Ghaith al-Omari, “How Pentagon Bureaucracy Could Undermine West Bank Security,” Israel Policy Forum, June 16, 2022; Amos Gilead and Jonathan Lord, cited in Aaron Mehta and Arie Egozi, “US-Israel-Palestine security role facing downgrade; can a colonel do a general’s job?” Breaking Defense, August 5, 2022. 38 Eitan Dangot, cited in Aaron Mehta and Arie Egozi, “US-Israel-Palestine security role facing downgrade.” 39 David S. Cloud and Anas Baba, “Israeli Work Permits Ease Gaza Tensions,” David S. Cloud and Anas Baba, “Israeli Work Permits Ease Gaza Tensions,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2022. , May 28, 2022.
3440 CRS Report RL33476, CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
3541 Ahmad Melhem, “Israeli forces find tough resistance in Jenin camp,” Ahmad Melhem, “Israeli forces find tough resistance in Jenin camp,” Al-Monitor, May 25, 2022. , May 25, 2022.
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~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~investigation.”36 Some evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces,37 with~~
~~the PA claiming that its investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but~~
~~Israel denying any such intent.38~~42 State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022. 43 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” May 16, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Israel denying any such intent.44 In April 2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers had filed a In April 2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers had filed a
complaint with the ICC alleging that Israel has systematically targeted Palestinian journalists for complaint with the ICC alleging that Israel has systematically targeted Palestinian journalists for
years.years.3945
After some Members of the House and Senate sent letters to the executive branch requesting that After some Members of the House and Senate sent letters to the executive branch requesting that
the State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct an independent investigation the State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation conduct an independent investigation
into Abu Akleh’s death,into Abu Akleh’s death,4046 the State Department issued a statement in July. The statement said that the State Department issued a statement in July. The statement said that
the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority oversaw an the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority oversaw an
independent process, and in summarizing Israeli and PA investigations concluded that Israeli independent process, and in summarizing Israeli and PA investigations concluded that Israeli
gunfire likely killed Abu Akleh, but “found no reason to believe that this was intentional.”gunfire likely killed Abu Akleh, but “found no reason to believe that this was intentional.”4147 PA PA
officials and members of Abu Akleh’s family have publicly criticized the part of the USSC’s officials and members of Abu Akleh’s family have publicly criticized the part of the USSC’s
finding regarding intent.finding regarding intent.4248 While visiting Bethlehem in July, President Biden said that the United While visiting Bethlehem in July, President Biden said that the United
States “will continue to insist on a full transparent accounting of her death.”States “will continue to insist on a full transparent accounting of her death.”4349

~~36 State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022.~~
~~37 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” May 16, 2022.~~
3844 “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” Associated Press, May 26, 2022. , May 26, 2022.
3945 International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian
journalists,” April 26, 2022. journalists,” April 26, 2022.
4046 Text of letters available at https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/ Text of letters available at https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/
Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf and Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf and
https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Final%20Abu%20Akleh%20Letter%20(PDF).pdf. https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Final%20Abu%20Akleh%20Letter%20(PDF).pdf.
4147 State Department press statement, “On the Killing of Shireen Abu Akleh,” July 4, 2022. State Department press statement, “On the Killing of Shireen Abu Akleh,” July 4, 2022.
4248 “US: Israeli fire likely killed reporter; no final conclusion,” “US: Israeli fire likely killed reporter; no final conclusion,” Associated Press, July 4, 2022. , July 4, 2022.
4349 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas.” White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas.”
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.4450
Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.4551
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.4652 Because of the PA’s Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.4753 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.Nations.4854 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.conflict.49
~~The Abraham Accords~~
~~In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with~~
~~four members of the Arab League: the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump~~
~~Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and (as~~
~~mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the~~
~~countries in question.50 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both~~
~~countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had~~
~~operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported the UAE~~
~~and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords, even allowing the use of Saudi~~
~~airspace for direct commercial airline flights between those countries and Israel.51~~
~~Trade, tourism, and investment ties have generally deepened since the signing of the Accords—~~
~~including a May 2022 Israel-UAE free-trade agreement (pending Israeli ratification) and a major~~
~~Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative focused on desalinated water and solar energy.52 One exception is~~

~~44 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
4555 For three days in early August 2022, Israel and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militants in Gaza exchanged fire. Hamas stayed out of the violence. A few days before that, Israel had arrested a PIJ leader in the West Bank, and PIJ threats of retaliation led to lockdowns in much of southern Israel. Israel conducted its military operation with the stated aim of thwarting any possible retaliation, and Israeli officials claimed to have kil ed the top echelon of PIJ militants in Gaza. More than 40 Palestinians died and hundreds more were injured, with some of these casualties possibly resulting from errant Palestinian rockets; several Israelis were injured, but no Israeli deaths were reported.56 The Iron Dome anti-rocket system intercepted several PIJ projectiles.57 After a cease-fire took hold on August 7, President Biden thanked Egyptian and Qatari officials for helping broker an end to hostilities while expressing support for Israel’s right to defend itself and lamenting civilian casualties.58 A similar round of violence between Israel and PIJ (with Hamas abstaining) took place in November 2019. The Abraham Accords In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and (as mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the countries in question.59 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both 50 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 51 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor, ,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
4652 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
4753 Ibid. Ibid.
4854 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021. , September 12, 2021.
4955 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29, Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” 2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
~~50 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international~~
~~economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of~~
~~sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked~~
~~Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel.~~
~~51 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021.~~
~~52 “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan~~
~~sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021.~~
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10

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

56 Dov Lieber and Aaron Boxerman, “Palestinian Militants, Israel Set Cease-Fire,” Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2022. 57 Ibid. 58 White House, “Statement by President Biden on the Ceasefire in Gaza,” August 7, 2022. 59 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported the UAE and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords, even allowing the use of Saudi airspace for direct commercial airline flights between those countries and Israel.60 Trade, tourism, and investment ties have generally deepened since the signing of the Accords—including a May 2022 Israel-UAE free-trade agreement (pending Israeli ratification) and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative focused on desalinated water and solar energy.61 One exception is that implementing Israel-Sudan normalization appears to be on hold following the Sudanese that implementing Israel-Sudan normalization appears to be on hold following the Sudanese
military’s seizure of power in October 2021.military’s seizure of power in October 2021.5362 As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the
Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the foreign Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the foreign
ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern
Negev desert. Negev desert.
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim- U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Israel-UAE-Bahrain majority countries. Commemorating the one-year anniversary of the Israel-UAE-Bahrain
agreements in October 2021, Secretary Blinken said that “we’re committed to continue building agreements in October 2021, Secretary Blinken said that “we’re committed to continue building
on the efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations on the efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations
with Israel in the years ahead.”with Israel in the years ahead.”5463 However, the Biden Administration appetite for offering major However, the Biden Administration appetite for offering major
U.S. policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.U.S. policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.5564
The Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and The Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and
Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Israeli-Palestinian conflict.5665 Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE
normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League
states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition
for improved ties.for improved ties.5766
Prospects for Saudi normalization. As Israel has drawn closer to some Arab states, the As Israel has drawn closer to some Arab states, the
likelihood of a future normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia may be increasing. Given likelihood of a future normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia may be increasing. Given
Saudi Arabia’s importance as an economic and military power in the region, the kingdom’s Saudi Arabia’s importance as an economic and military power in the region, the kingdom’s
history of firm opposition to such normalization, and its status as the custodian of Islam’s most history of firm opposition to such normalization, and its status as the custodian of Islam’s most
holy and foundational sites, such a development could boost any precedent that the Abraham holy and foundational sites, such a development could boost any precedent that the Abraham
Accords may set for other Muslim-majority countries considering cooperation with Israel.Accords may set for other Muslim-majority countries considering cooperation with Israel.5867 In In
June 2022, Secretary Blinken said that Saudi Arabia is a “critical partner” of the United States in June 2022, Secretary Blinken said that Saudi Arabia is a “critical partner” of the United States in
~~dealing with regional challenges from extremism and Iran and in “continuing the process of~~
~~building relationships between Israel and its neighbors both near and further away through the~~
~~continuation, the expansion of the Abraham Accords.”59~~
~~While senior Saudi officials say that full Israel-Saudi normalization still remains contingent on~~
~~progress with Palestinian issues,60 the two countries are reportedly engaging in serious talks in the~~
~~meantime to build business ties and coordinate on regional security matters. During President~~
~~Biden’s trip to the region in July 2022, he announced certain steps that could point toward~~
~~eventual normalization. These steps included the opening of Saudi airspace to Israeli civilian~~

53 sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel. 60 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021. 61 “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021. 62 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
5463 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
Availability,” October 13, 2021. Availability,” October 13, 2021.
5564 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October , October
14, 2021. 14, 2021.
5665 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,” State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,”
March 28, 2022. March 28, 2022.
5766 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
5867 Dion Nissenbaum, “Saudis Expand Talks with Israel,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Saudis Expand Talks with Israel,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2022. , June 7, 2022.
~~59 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Foreign Affairs Magazine Centennial Celebration,” June 1,~~
~~2022.~~
~~60 Jacob Magid, “Saudi minister: Peace with Israel ‘strategic option’ but not before 2-state solution,” Times of Israel,~~
~~July 16, 2022.~~
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~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

Congressional Research Service 11 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief dealing with regional challenges from extremism and Iran and in “continuing the process of building relationships between Israel and its neighbors both near and further away through the continuation, the expansion of the Abraham Accords.”68 While senior Saudi officials say that full Israel-Saudi normalization still remains contingent on progress with Palestinian issues,69 the two countries are reportedly engaging in serious talks in the meantime to build business ties and coordinate on regional security matters. During President Biden’s trip to the region in July 2022, he announced certain steps that could point toward eventual normalization. These steps included the opening of Saudi airspace to Israeli civilian overflights, and an arrangement that is to allow Saudi Arabia to take full control of the Red Sea overflights, and an arrangement that is to allow Saudi Arabia to take full control of the Red Sea
islands Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt while guaranteeing Israel’s freedom of navigation, despite islands Tiran and Sanafir from Egypt while guaranteeing Israel’s freedom of navigation, despite
the planned withdrawal of a Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping contingent that the planned withdrawal of a Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping contingent that
includes U.S. troops.includes U.S. troops.6170
Security cooperation. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would
add Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of add Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.6271 Israel had previously been under the Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September 2021,6372
and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM headquarters.6473
Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the other Abraham Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the other Abraham
Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt, Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Egypt,
and Pakistan.and Pakistan.6574
Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by
Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly
expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.6675 Earlier, both Morocco (November Earlier, both Morocco (November
2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.6776 These These
MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales. MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.
In his February 8, 2022, confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, In his February 8, 2022, confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
soon-to-be CENTCOM Commander and General Michael Kurilla testified that Israel and other soon-to-be CENTCOM Commander and General Michael Kurilla testified that Israel and other
~~regional countries were cooperating on integrated air and missile defense and in other security~~
~~areas. At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly~~
~~discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on~~
~~inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.68 Speculation~~
~~about specific measures has continued since then,69 and Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz~~
~~said in June 2022 that a “Middle East Air Defense Alliance” is already working together with the~~
~~United States.70 Reports in July suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking~~

61 68 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the Foreign Affairs Magazine Centennial Celebration,” June 1, 2022. 69 Jacob Magid, “Saudi minister: Peace with Israel ‘strategic option’ but not before 2-state solution,” Times of Israel, July 16, 2022. 70 White House, “FACT SHEET: Results of Bilateral Meeting Between the United States and the Kingdom of White House, “FACT SHEET: Results of Bilateral Meeting Between the United States and the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia,” July 15, 2022. Saudi Arabia,” July 15, 2022.
6271 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, , January 15,
2021. 2021.
6372 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1, U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021. 2021.
6473 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of
Israel, October 29, 2021. , October 29, 2021.
6574 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for 2022 , November 11, 2021. Participant list for 2022
International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list. International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
6675 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25, , January 25,
2022. 2022.
6776 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021; , November 26, 2021;
Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. During the , February 3, 2022. During the
same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense
minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all
parties involved. parties involved.
~~68 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022.~~
~~69 “Israeli radars to be used in UAE to detect Iran missiles, drones – report,” jpost.com, June 28, 2022; “Israel to ask~~
~~Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” Times of Israel, June 28, 2022.~~
~~70 Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York Times,~~
~~June 21, 2022.~~
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12

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief regional countries were cooperating on integrated air and missile defense and in other security areas. At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.77 Speculation about specific measures has continued since then,78 and Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz said in June 2022 that a “Middle East Air Defense Alliance” is already working together with the United States.79 Reports in July suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel, certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to place between Israel, certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to
confirm their involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military confirm their involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military
alliance.”alliance.”7180 One obstacle could be the apparent reluctance of regional countries to share the real- One obstacle could be the apparent reluctance of regional countries to share the real-
time intelligence data that underlies basic threat information they might be more willing to time intelligence data that underlies basic threat information they might be more willing to
share.share.7281
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.7382 In March, Congress enacted the In March, Congress enacted the
Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other
things, the IRNA requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening things, the IRNA requires the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening
and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of
measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization
efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts. efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.
In June 2022, several Members in the Senate and House introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces In June 2022, several Members in the Senate and House introduced the Deterring Enemy Forces
and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act of 2022 (S. 4366 and H.R. 7987). The bill has and Enabling National Defenses (DEFEND) Act of 2022 (S. 4366 and H.R. 7987). The bill has
provisions that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a strategy and feasibility study provisions that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a strategy and feasibility study
on cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt for an on cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council states, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt for an
integrated air and missile defense capability to counter Iran-related threats. Large portions of the integrated air and missile defense capability to counter Iran-related threats. Large portions of the
bill have been incorporated as amendments to the House Armed Services Committee version bill have been incorporated as amendments to the House Armed Services Committee version
(H.R. 7900) and Senate Armed Services Committee version (S. 4543) of the National Defense (H.R. 7900) and Senate Armed Services Committee version (S. 4543) of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023. Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023.
Countering Iran
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through
~~coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.74 Israeli~~
~~observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s~~
~~2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert~~
~~actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”75~~
~~Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions~~
~~Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear~~
~~program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister~~

71 77 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022. 78 “Israeli radars to be used in UAE to detect Iran missiles, drones – report,” jpost.com, June 28, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” Times of Israel, June 28, 2022. 79 Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York Times, June 21, 2022. 80 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” New York Times, July 14, , July 14,
2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” 2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” Wall Street
Journal, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
7281 Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,” Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,”
Politico, July 12, 2022. , July 12, 2022.
7382 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022- For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
01/Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf. 01/Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.
~~74 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” jpost.com, March 11, 2022.~~
~~75 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” jpost.com,~~
~~November 14, 2021.~~
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~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.83 Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”84 Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Then-Prime Minister Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.7685
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace, Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional
tensions.tensions.7786 In June 2022, then-Prime Minister Bennett characterized some operations inside Iran In June 2022, then-Prime Minister Bennett characterized some operations inside Iran
in the past year as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military in the past year as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military
capabilities.capabilities.7887
As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy and considers the possibility of As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy and considers the possibility of
reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israel is reportedly still seeking to influence diplomatic reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israel is reportedly still seeking to influence diplomatic
outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international negotiations with Iran, then-outcomes. Prior to the November 2021 resumption of international negotiations with Iran, then-
Prime Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return to the JCPOA.Prime Minister Bennett stated that Israel would not be bound by a return to the JCPOA.7988 A A
January 2022 report suggested that some leading Israeli security officials might prefer an January 2022 report suggested that some leading Israeli security officials might prefer an
international deal to no deal because an agreement could provide “increased certainty about the international deal to no deal because an agreement could provide “increased certainty about the
limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, and it would buy more time for Israel to prepare for
escalation scenarios.”escalation scenarios.”8089 During his time as prime minister, Bennett opposed the deal, During his time as prime minister, Bennett opposed the deal,8190 but largely but largely
abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.8291 Prime Minister Yair Lapid replaced Prime Minister Yair Lapid replaced
Bennett in July 2022 and has maintained a consistent stance on the issue.Bennett in July 2022 and has maintained a consistent stance on the issue.8392
As international discussions around the JCPOA continued in March 2022, Bennett and then- As international discussions around the JCPOA continued in March 2022, Bennett and then-
Foreign Minister Lapid issued a joint statement arguing against reports that the United States Foreign Minister Lapid issued a joint statement arguing against reports that the United States
~~might remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from its Foreign Terrorist~~
~~Organizations (FTO) list in exchange for a promise not to harm Americans.84 In an April 26,~~
~~2022, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Blinken said that he could only~~
~~envision the IRGC’s de-listing if Iran takes steps necessary to justify it.85 On May 4, 62 Senators~~
~~voted in favor of a motion that any Iran nuclear deal must address Iran’s ballistic missile~~
~~program, support for terrorism, and oil trade with China, and not lift sanctions on or de-list the~~
~~IRGC.86 Later in May, Bennett claimed that President Biden told him in April that he would not~~

76 83 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” jpost.com, March 11, 2022. 84 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” jpost.com, November 14, 2021. 85 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” New York Times, September 13, 2021. , September 13, 2021.
7786 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel's shift in tactics against Iran,” Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel's shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24, 2022; , May 24, 2022;
Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, “With , April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, “With
missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16, 2022. , March 16, 2022.
7887 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
7988 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Bennett’s Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Bennett’s Remarks at the Security and Policy Conference of the Institute for
Policy and Strategy Conference, Reichman University,” November 23, 2021. Policy and Strategy Conference, Reichman University,” November 23, 2021.
8089 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel’s military intel chief says Iran deal better than no deal,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel’s military intel chief says Iran deal better than no deal,” Axios, January 5, 2022. See also , January 5, 2022. See also
Ronen Bergman, “Israel’s Military Leans in Favor of Iran Nuclear Deal. Its Spy Agency Won't Budge,” Ronen Bergman, “Israel’s Military Leans in Favor of Iran Nuclear Deal. Its Spy Agency Won't Budge,” New York
Times, July 15, 2022. , July 15, 2022.
8190 Jonathan Lis, “Bennett Announces Laser-based Missile Defense System ‘Within a Year,’” haaretz.com, February 1, Jonathan Lis, “Bennett Announces Laser-based Missile Defense System ‘Within a Year,’” haaretz.com, February 1,
2022. 2022.
8291 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022. , March 21, 2022.
8392 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022. Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022.
~~84 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Joint Announcement from PM Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid,” March~~
~~18, 2022.~~
~~85 Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6518577?11.~~
~~86 H.R. 4521, Roll Call Vote #155: Motion Agreed to 62-33, R 46-1, D 15-31, I 1-1, May 4, 2022;~~ ~~Congressional~~
~~Record, S.2321, May 4, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

14

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~de-list the IRGC.87~~ Congressional Research Service 14 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief might remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from its Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list in exchange for a promise not to harm Americans.93 In an April 26, 2022, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Secretary Blinken said that he could only envision the IRGC’s de-listing if Iran takes steps necessary to justify it.94 On May 4, 62 Senators voted in favor of a motion that any Iran nuclear deal must address Iran’s ballistic missile program, support for terrorism, and oil trade with China, and not lift sanctions on or de-list the IRGC.95 Later in May, Bennett claimed that President Biden told him in April that he would not de-list the IRGC.96 During his July 2022 trip to Israel, President Biden confirmed that he would During his July 2022 trip to Israel, President Biden confirmed that he would
not remove the IRGC from the FTO list.not remove the IRGC from the FTO list.8897
During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and Prime Minister Lapid signed the Jerusalem During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and Prime Minister Lapid signed the Jerusalem
U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment “never to U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment “never to
allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is prepared to use allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is prepared to use
all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”8998 Reportedly, Lapid said to Biden that Reportedly, Lapid said to Biden that
talks regarding the JCPOA must have a deadline. Biden has not specified a deadline and said that talks regarding the JCPOA must have a deadline. Biden has not specified a deadline and said that
diplomacy was his preferred method to resolve the issue, but also said that “we’re not going to diplomacy was his preferred method to resolve the issue, but also said that “we’re not going to
wait forever.”wait forever.”9099 Additionally, Biden said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a Additionally, Biden said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a
“last resort” to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.“last resort” to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.91100 Lapid said that Israel wants a Lapid said that Israel wants a
credible military threat to be the basis for international negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, credible military threat to be the basis for international negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue,
and that the United States “didn’t necessarily agree on this” during President Biden’s visit.and that the United States “didn’t necessarily agree on this” during President Biden’s visit.92101
One source reported in May 2022 that divisions persist among Israeli officials over which One source reported in May 2022 that divisions persist among Israeli officials over which
approach or combination of approaches—among options including international diplomacy, U.S.-approach or combination of approaches—among options including international diplomacy, U.S.-
led sanctions, and Israeli military and intelligence operations—may be likelier to prevent or slow led sanctions, and Israeli military and intelligence operations—may be likelier to prevent or slow
Iranian nuclear advances.Iranian nuclear advances.93102 Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military
operations targeting Iran’s nuclear program,operations targeting Iran’s nuclear program,94103 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed
with Israeli counterparts on the overall effectiveness of such operations.with Israeli counterparts on the overall effectiveness of such operations.95104 Even with reported Even with reported
upgrades to Israeli military capabilities,upgrades to Israeli military capabilities,96105 questions apparently remain about military readiness questions apparently remain about military readiness
for a major operation against Iran’s nuclear program.for a major operation against Iran’s nuclear program.97
~~Hezbollah and Syria~~
~~Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s~~
~~forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with~~
~~the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader~~
~~conflict.98 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications,~~
~~including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.99~~
~~Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied~~
~~weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and~~

87106 93 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Joint Announcement from PM Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid,” March 18, 2022. 94 Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-6518577?11. 95 H.R. 4521, Roll Call Vote #155: Motion Agreed to 62-33, R 46-1, D 15-31, I 1-1, May 4, 2022; Congressional Record, S.2321, May 4, 2022. 96 Jacob Magid, “Bennett: Biden notified me last month of decision to keep Iran Guards on terror list,” Jacob Magid, “Bennett: Biden notified me last month of decision to keep Iran Guards on terror list,” Times of Israel, ,
May 25, 2022. May 25, 2022.
8897 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” Associated Press, July 15, 2022. , July 15, 2022.
8998 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022. White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022.
9099 Lahav Harkov, “Biden says US won’t wait forever for Iran deal, doesn’t set deadline,” jpost.com, July 14, 2022. Lahav Harkov, “Biden says US won’t wait forever for Iran deal, doesn’t set deadline,” jpost.com, July 14, 2022.
91100 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit.” “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit.”
92101 “Lapid: Israel, US don’t ‘necessarily agree’ on need for military threat against Iran,” “Lapid: Israel, US don’t ‘necessarily agree’ on need for military threat against Iran,” Times of Israel, July 17, 2022. , July 17, 2022.
93102 Ben Caspit, “Israeli leadership divided on Iran deal,” Ben Caspit, “Israeli leadership divided on Iran deal,” Al-Monitor, May 27, 2022. , May 27, 2022.
94103 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022. , March 15, 2022.
95104 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
96105 “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” jpost.com (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022. “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” jpost.com (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022.
97106 Amos Harel, “Israel’s Saber-rattling on Iran Lacks One Critical Element,” haaretz.com, May 20, 2022. Amos Harel, “Israel’s Saber-rattling on Iran Lacks One Critical Element,” haaretz.com, May 20, 2022.
~~98 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E.~~
~~Humud.~~
~~99 Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The Israeli Card,”~~
~~Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022.~~
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15

~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.100~~ Congressional Research Service 15 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief Hezbollah and Syria Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader conflict.107 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications, including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.108 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.109 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership
and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture
precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.~~101~~110
Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster
Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other
military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-
backed targets that could present threats to its security.backed targets that could present threats to its security.~~102~~111
Russia’s advanced air defense systems in Syria could affect Israeli operations there. Russia’s advanced air defense systems in Syria could affect Israeli operations there.~~103~~112 Russia has Russia has
reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian targets,reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian targets,~~104~~113 but but
has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.~~105~~114 This deconfliction has This deconfliction has
apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has criticized some apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has criticized some
Israeli strikes.Israeli strikes.~~106~~115 In May 2022, a Russian-origin S-300 air defense system in Syria reportedly fired In May 2022, a Russian-origin S-300 air defense system in Syria reportedly fired
on Israeli jets for the first time, raising questions about the status of Israel-Russia deconfliction.on Israeli jets for the first time, raising questions about the status of Israel-Russia deconfliction.~~107~~116
In June and July 2022, Israel’s military has intercepted Hezbollah drones heading either for the In June and July 2022, Israel’s military has intercepted Hezbollah drones heading either for the
Israel-Lebanon border or Israeli infrastructure at the Karish offshore gas field that is the subject of Israel-Lebanon border or Israeli infrastructure at the Karish offshore gas field that is the subject of
an Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has threatened an Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has threatened
additional action and said that Hezbollah is prepared to go to war over the gas field dispute,additional action and said that Hezbollah is prepared to go to war over the gas field dispute,~~108~~
~~prompting responses from Prime Minister Lapid and Defense Minister Gantz warning against~~
~~escalation and stating Israel’s readiness to act against any threat and its interest in Lebanon’s~~
~~stability and prosperity.109~~
~~Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine~~
~~Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in~~
~~international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and~~
~~humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 35,000 Jewish and non-Jewish~~

~~100~~117 107 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. Humud. 108 Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The Israeli Card,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022. 109 See, e.g., “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” See, e.g., “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben , December 28, 2020; Ben
Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times, ,
April 23, 2020. April 23, 2020.
~~101~~110 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press, ,
February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies
Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022. Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.
~~102~~111 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022. Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022.
~~103~~112 Paul Iddon, “Is Russia Helping Syria Intercept Israeli Missile Strikes?” forbes.com, July 30, 2021. Paul Iddon, “Is Russia Helping Syria Intercept Israeli Missile Strikes?” forbes.com, July 30, 2021.
~~104~~113 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27, , July 27,
2021. 2021.
~~105~~114 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel, ,
February 27, 2022. February 27, 2022.
~~106~~115 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel
Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12, , June 12,
2022. 2022.
~~107~~116 Dan Parsons and Tyler Rogoway, “S-300 Surface-To-Air Missile Fired at Israeli Jets over Syria for First Time: Dan Parsons and Tyler Rogoway, “S-300 Surface-To-Air Missile Fired at Israeli Jets over Syria for First Time:
Report,” Report,” The Drive, May 16, 2022. , May 16, 2022.
~~108~~117 Tobias Siegal, “Nasrallah threatens war over Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute,” Tobias Siegal, “Nasrallah threatens war over Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute,” Times of Israel, July 13, , July 13,
~~2022.~~
~~109 Emanuel Fabian, “Lapid, Gantz warn that Hezbollah drones, threats could lead region to ‘escalation,’”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, July 19, 2022.~~
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~~Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief~~

~~refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.110~~ Congressional Research Service 16 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief prompting responses from Prime Minister Lapid and Defense Minister Gantz warning against escalation and stating Israel’s readiness to act against any threat and its interest in Lebanon’s stability and prosperity.118 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 35,000 Jewish and non-Jewish refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.119 As mentioned above, Israel has counted on As mentioned above, Israel has counted on
airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those
related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.~~111~~120
Despite entreaties from Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from providing lethal Despite entreaties from Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from providing lethal
assistance to Ukraine or approving third-party transfers of weapons with proprietary Israeli assistance to Ukraine or approving third-party transfers of weapons with proprietary Israeli
technology.technology.~~112~~121 Under some Western pressure, Israel has contemplated providing defensive Under some Western pressure, Israel has contemplated providing defensive
equipment, personal combat gear, and/or warning systems to Ukraine’s military, partly to project equipment, personal combat gear, and/or warning systems to Ukraine’s military, partly to project
to existing arms export clients that it would be a reliable supplier in crisis situations.to existing arms export clients that it would be a reliable supplier in crisis situations.~~113~~122 Starting in Starting in
May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian
organizations.organizations.~~114~~123
While Israel has not directly joined Western economic sanctions against Russia, Foreign Minister While Israel has not directly joined Western economic sanctions against Russia, Foreign Minister
Lapid has said that Israel is determined to prevent Russians from using Israel to bypass Lapid has said that Israel is determined to prevent Russians from using Israel to bypass
sanctions.sanctions.~~115~~124 Observers debate the influence of prominent Russian or Russian-speaking Israelis Observers debate the influence of prominent Russian or Russian-speaking Israelis
within Israel.within Israel.~~116~~125 In a March 2022 interview on Israeli television, U.S. Under Secretary of State for In a March 2022 interview on Israeli television, U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said, “You don’t want to become the last haven for dirty money Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said, “You don’t want to become the last haven for dirty money
that’s fueling Putin’s wars.”that’s fueling Putin’s wars.”~~117~~126
In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it is seeking to close the Russian In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it is seeking to close the Russian
branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate
emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel. emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel.
Russia is claiming that the agency has violated privacy laws by storing personal information Russia is claiming that the agency has violated privacy laws by storing personal information
about emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspect that Russian concerns about Israeli policy about emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspect that Russian concerns about Israeli policy
~~on Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may be motivating the pending legal action.118~~
~~Prime Minister Lapid has warned Russia that closing the agency’s Russian branch would be a~~
~~“grave event” with consequences for Israel-Russia relations.119~~

~~110~~ 2022. 118 Emanuel Fabian, “Lapid, Gantz warn that Hezbollah drones, threats could lead region to ‘escalation,’” Times of Israel, July 19, 2022. 119 Isabel Kershner, “Israelis Debate How Many, and What Kind of, Refugees to Accept,” Isabel Kershner, “Israelis Debate How Many, and What Kind of, Refugees to Accept,” New York Times, March 24, , March 24,
2022; Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” 2022; Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~111~~120 Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022. , March 11, 2022.
~~112~~121 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel rejects U.S. request to approve missile transfer to Ukraine,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel rejects U.S. request to approve missile transfer to Ukraine,” Axios, May 25, 2022. , May 25, 2022.
~~113~~122 Yaniv Kubovich and Jonathan Lis, “Israeli Officials Inclined to Increase Ukraine Aid in Face of Russian Yaniv Kubovich and Jonathan Lis, “Israeli Officials Inclined to Increase Ukraine Aid in Face of Russian
Atrocities,” haaretz.com, May 3, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” Atrocities,” haaretz.com, May 3, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,”
jpost.com, May 4, 2022. jpost.com, May 4, 2022.
~~114~~123 Emanuel Fabian, “Israel to send new batch of defensive equipment to Ukraine,” Emanuel Fabian, “Israel to send new batch of defensive equipment to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, July 12, 2022; “In , July 12, 2022; “In
first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022. , May 18, 2022.
~~115~~124 Rina Bassist, “Israel vows country won’t become safe haven for sanctioned Russian oligarchs,” Rina Bassist, “Israel vows country won’t become safe haven for sanctioned Russian oligarchs,” Al-Monitor, March , March
14, 2022. 14, 2022.
~~116~~125 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Cautious Tone on Ukraine Puts Focus on Israeli Oligarchs,” Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Cautious Tone on Ukraine Puts Focus on Israeli Oligarchs,” New York Times, April 11, , April 11,
2022. 2022.
~~117~~126 “US official warns Israel: ‘Don’t be last haven for dirty money fueling Putin’s war,’” “US official warns Israel: ‘Don’t be last haven for dirty money fueling Putin’s war,’” Times of Israel, March 11, , March 11,
2022. 2022.
~~118~~Congressional Research Service 17 Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief on Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may be motivating the pending legal action.127 Prime Minister Lapid has warned Russia that closing the agency’s Russian branch would be a “grave event” with consequences for Israel-Russia relations.128 127 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” New
York Times, July 22, 2022. , July 22, 2022.
~~119~~128 Judah Ari Gross, “Lapid warns Russia: Jewish Agency closure would be ‘grave event’ with impact on ties,” Judah Ari Gross, “Lapid warns Russia: Jewish Agency closure would be ‘grave event’ with impact on ties,” Times
of Israel, July 24, 2022. , July 24, 2022.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

Appendix A. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Benjamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also Born in 1949, Netanyahu served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also
was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces was prime minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces
unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career
in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the in politics and diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the
exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s exchange of land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s
nuclear program and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a nuclear program and regional influence. He is generally regarded as both a
consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. consummate political dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. speakers from the former Soviet Union. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as Born in 1958, Lieberman is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as
defense minister and foreign minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist defense minister and foreign minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist
and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in and canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in
the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He the Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He
worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s worked under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s
wil ingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael wil ingness to consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael
Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption Beitenu as a platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption
allegations in a 2013 case. allegations in a 2013 case.
Yamina (Right) – 6 seats (Right) – 6 seats
Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National
Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews); Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews);
includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation. A includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation. A
majority of its members were part of the 2021-2022 coalition. majority of its members were part of the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Ayelet Shaked
Born in 1976, Shaked had a brief career as a software engineer before entering Born in 1976, Shaked had a brief career as a software engineer before entering
politics and working under Netanyahu from 2006 to 2010. She was first elected to politics and working under Netanyahu from 2006 to 2010. She was first elected to
the Knesset in 2013 and has been a close political col eague of former Prime Minister the Knesset in 2013 and has been a close political col eague of former Prime Minister
Naftali Bennett, serving previously as justice minister and now as interior minister. Naftali Bennett, serving previously as justice minister and now as interior minister.
She resigned her Knesset seat shortly after becoming interior minister in June 2021. She resigned her Knesset seat shortly after becoming interior minister in June 2021.
She favors the eventual annexation of most West Bank settlements and autonomy She favors the eventual annexation of most West Bank settlements and autonomy
short of statehood for the Palestinians. She also supports a greater role for Jewish short of statehood for the Palestinians. She also supports a greater role for Jewish
nationalism in law and society and a reduced role for the judiciary. nationalism in law and society and a reduced role for the judiciary.
New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats
New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu
and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Gideon Sa’ar
Born in 1966, Sa’ar serves as justice minister. He served as cabinet secretary in the Born in 1966, Sa’ar serves as justice minister. He served as cabinet secretary in the
1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel 1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon). He became an influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the Sharon). He became an influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the
Knesset in 2003. He served as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior Knesset in 2003. He served as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior
minister from 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019 minister from 2013 to 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019
but left Likud to form New Hope a year later. but left Likud to form New Hope a year later.
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Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats
Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-
Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections. Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism
since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish
nationalist and religiously conservative causes. nationalist and religiously conservative causes.

LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – 7 seats (Avoda) – 7 seats
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. in the West Bank and Gaza. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leader in 2020 Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’s leader in 2020
and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she and was first elected to the Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she
founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a founded and headed an organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a
regular national media presence and university lecturer. regular national media presence and university lecturer.
Meretz (Vigor) – 6 seats (Vigor) – 6 seats
Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and
peace with the Palestinians. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition. peace with the Palestinians. Part of the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Nitzan Horowitz
Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister. He became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister. He became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and
was first elected to the Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent was first elected to the Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent
journalist before entering politics. He announced in July 2022 that he would not lead journalist before entering politics. He announced in July 2022 that he would not lead
the party in the November 2022 election. the party in the November 2022 election.
CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future)(There Is a Future) – 17 seats – 17 seats
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. Part of socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. Part of
the 2021-2022 coalition. the 2021-2022 coalition.
Leader: Prime Minister Yair Lapid (biography in text box in the main body of the report)

Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 8 seats (Blue and White) – 8 seats
Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Likud that claimed itself more Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Likud that claimed itself more
committed to preserving long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary, committed to preserving long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary,
articulating a vision of Israeli nationalism more inclusive of Druze and Arab citizens, articulating a vision of Israeli nationalism more inclusive of Druze and Arab citizens,
and having greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian issues. Part and having greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian issues. Part
of the 2021-2022 coalition. of the 2021-2022 coalition.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of General Staff
of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.of the Israel Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.
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ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In January 2022, he resigned his Knesset He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In January 2022, he resigned his Knesset
seat in connection with a criminal plea deal involving tax-related offenses, but seat in connection with a criminal plea deal involving tax-related offenses, but
maintained his leadership of the party. maintained his leadership of the party.

United Torah Judaism – 7 seats – 7 seats
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel Ha’torah); favors welfare and Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel Ha’torah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its
interpretation of traditional Jewish law. interpretation of traditional Jewish law.
Leader: Moshe Gafni
Born in 1952, Gafni was educated in a yeshiva (traditional Jewish school) and headed Born in 1952, Gafni was educated in a yeshiva (traditional Jewish school) and headed
a kollel (institute for advanced rabbinic study). He was first elected to the Knesset in a kollel (institute for advanced rabbinic study). He was first elected to the Knesset in
1988. 1988.
ARAB
Joint List – 6 seats – 6 seats
Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadashpolitical strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal), and BaladMovement for Renewal), and Balad (National Democratic Assembly). (National Democratic Assembly).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the
Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s
national leader in 2006. national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am)(UAL or Ra’am) – 4 seats – 4 seats
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. Part of the 2021-support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. Part of the 2021-
2022 coalition. 2022 coalition.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the
UAL into the previous coalition in June 2021 after receiving promises that the UAL into the previous coalition in June 2021 after receiving promises that the
government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for
Arab Israelis. Arab Israelis.
Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
Notes: Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election. Yamina expelled Knesset Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election. Yamina expelled Knesset
member Amichai Chikli in April 2022. member Amichai Chikli in April 2022.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief

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