Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Israel: May 2021 Violence, Other Background,
May 20, 2021
and U.S. Relations New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations June 15, 2021 in Brief
Jim Zanotti
The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations. The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations.
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Violence over Gaza and Jerusalem, and congressional responses to it. Violence and unrest

has flared in May 2021 around Gaza and Jerusalem, and has sparked Arab-Jewish rioting in some
Israeli cities—partly in connection with a controversial case about the possible eviction of several

Palestinians from their East Jerusalem homes. As a result, prospects of an Israeli government
forming imminently to replace Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu appear to have collapsed . Israel-Gaza violence has
escalated to a level not seen since 2014 as the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) and
other militants fire rockets into civilian areas of Israel, and Israel seeks to strike militant targets within Gaza. Depending on
how the tensions escalate or de-escalate, they could have implications for a number of U.S. policy considerations, including
aid for Israel and the Pales tinians, and how the Biden Administration and Members of Congress might focus on Israeli-
Palestinian and related regional issues. Some Members of Congress are urging the President to seek an immediate cease-fire,
while others express support for Israeli strikes. Joint resolutions of disapproval have been introduced in both the Senate and
the House to block a proposed $735 million sale of precision-guided munitions to Israel that the Biden Administration
notified to Congress on May 5, 2021.
Domestic issues: An end to or continuation of Netanyahu’s rule? After the collapse of its power-sharing government in
December 2020, Israel held another round of elections—an unprecedented fourth in two years—for its Knesset (parliament)
in March 2021. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of the Likud party—the largest in the Knesset—was initially unable to
form a new government in the face of significant opposition to his continued rule, while facing an ongoing criminal
corruption trial. Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party has until early June to forge a coalition supported by disparate parties from
across the political spectrum. As Arab-Jewish tensions escalated amid the May violence, Naftali Bennett—whose right-of-
center Yamina party was critical to Lapid’s efforts—announced that he would not join such a coalition. If no one can form a
government, another round of elections would probably take place in the fall of 2021, and Netanyahu would remain as
caretaker prime minister (as he did from December 2018 to May 2020) until November 17, when the power-sharing
arrangement Netanyahu entered into last year would lead to Defense and Justice Minister Benny Gantz of the Kahol Lavan
party taking over in the caretaker role.
Palestinians and Arab state normalization. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among
Israelis and Palestinians, the Biden Administration has stated its intention to reengage with Palestinian leaders and people,
after the Trump Administration took several actions that generally favored Israeli positions and appeared to alienate
Palestinian leadership. In April, the Biden Administration announced the resumption of some types of aid to the Palestinians.
Amid some debate on issues that could affect aid to Israel and the Palestinians, the Administration has voiced opposition to
unilateral steps—including annexation, settlement activity, or incitement to violence—by either side.New prime minister and an end to Netanyahu’s rule. A group of disparate parties from across the political spectrum agreed in June 2021 to form a power-sharing government to replace long-serving Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who is being tried in an Israeli court on corruption charges. On June 13, the Knesset (Israel’s unicameral parliament) approved the new government, headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett of the Yamina party. Despite holding more right-of-center and nationalistic positions than Netanyahu on Palestinian issues and settlements, Bennett may be constrained by left-of-center and Arab-led parties in the coalition from taking action in line with those positions. The government is generally expected to focus on pragmatic management of Israel’s security and economy rather than controversial political initiatives, but Netanyahu and others in opposition may challenge its cohesion. If the government survives, Yair Lapid of the centrist Yesh Atid party—the current foreign minister—will rotate into the prime minister’s office in August 2023, under the terms of the power-sharing agreement. The Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List is seeking to use its status as part of the coalition to have the government address socioeconomic inequalities among the Arab citizens who make up around 20% of Israel’s population. It is unclear to what extent the new government might change Israel’s approach to relations with the United States, including on important regional matters involving the Palestinians and Iran. Israeli-Palestinian disputes, including the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict and its aftermath. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. In May 2021, an 11-day conflict took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza. It was the fourth major conflict of its kind, with previous ones occurring in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014. Intercommunal protests and violence also took place among Arabs and Jews within Israel and Jerusalem. Hamas apparently sought to capitalize on Arab-Jewish tensions over Jerusalem to increase its domestic popularity vis-à-vis rival faction Fatah. In April, Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas—the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority (PA) president—had postponed plans for 2021 PA elections that many Palestinians had eagerly anticipated. In the conflict’s aftermath, the Biden Administration appears focused on restoring regional calm and improving humanitarian conditions. It is unclear that the conflict decisively changed dynamics between the key parties affected—Israel, Hamas, and the PA. President Biden has pledged to replenish Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system, and legislative proposals may be forthcoming on supplemental U.S. military aid for Israel. With Gaza still under Hamas control, the obstacles to post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as in the past. Beyond providing short-term humanitarian assistance, the United States and other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with longer-term reconstruction without bolstering Hamas. Palestinians and Arab state normalization. To date, the Biden To date, the Biden
Administration has not reversed steps taken by the Trump Administration in apparent connection with 2020 normalization Administration has not reversed steps taken by the Trump Administration in apparent connection with 2020 normalization
agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Moroccoagreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, and the Biden
Administration has stated its support for Arab-Israeli normalization efforts that preserve a two-state solution’s viability. In
. In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank, though connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank, though
announcements related to settlement activity announcements related to settlement activity have accelerated since then.
accelerated after the agreement. Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and rivalry among key actors in Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and rivalry among key actors in
the Middle East. Arab-Israeli common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate in countering Iran and perhaps even the Middle East. Arab-Israeli common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate in countering Iran and perhaps even
Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for Sunni Islamist movements.Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for Sunni Islamist movements. The January 2021 shift of Israel
from the purview of U.S. European Command to U.S. Central Command may increase Arab-Israeli military interoperability.
Other factors affecting regional cooperation and rivalry might include U.S. arms sales (including a proposed sale of the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter and MQ-9 drone aircraft to the UAE), mutual economic benefits, and Arab public opinion. Some of these
factors could determine whether Saudi Arabia drops preconditions related to Palestinian national demands on normalizing its
relations with Israel.
Iran and other regional issues. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Netanyahu stronglyIsrael supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the
2015 international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Facing intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its 2015 international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Facing intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its
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Israel: May 2021 Violence, Other Background, and U.S. Relations in Brief

compliance with the 2015 agreement. compliance with the 2015 agreement. Netanyahu hasIsraeli officials have made statements opposing the Biden Administration’s possible reentry made statements opposing the Biden Administration’s possible reentry
into the agreement. In light of recent incidents targeting Iran’s nuclear program that may have been Israeli covert actions, into the agreement. In light of recent incidents targeting Iran’s nuclear program that may have been Israeli covert actions,
observers have speculated about future Israeli actions to influence or disrupt nuclear diplomacy. Israel also has reportedly observers have speculated about future Israeli actions to influence or disrupt nuclear diplomacy. Israel also has reportedly
conducted a number of military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to concerns about Iran’s conducted a number of military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to concerns about Iran’s
efforts to establish a permanent presence in these areas and improve the accuracy of Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenalefforts to establish a permanent presence in these areas and improve the accuracy of Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal.
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. concerns. U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over Chinese
investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability to gather intelligence
and acquire security-related technologies. While Chinese state-owned companies remain engaged in some specific
infrastructure projects, including at seaports in Haifa and Ashdod, in May 2020 Israel turned down the bid of a Chinese-
affiliated company to construct a major desalination plant.
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Contents
Introduction: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations ....................................................................... 1 New Prime Minister and End of Netanyahu’s Rule ... 1
Violence and Unrest over Gaza and Jerusalem ..................................................................... 2
Overview1 The Power-Sharing Government and Arab Participation .......................................................... 1 Looking Ahead and Issues for U.S. Policy .................................................................. 2
U.S. Policy Considerations and Proposed Arms Sale.............. 3 U.S. Aid and Security Cooperation with Israel ....................................................... 4
After March 2021 Elections: Will Netanyahu’s Rule End or Continue? ........................ 4 Israeli-Palestinian Disputes ........................ 7
U.S. Security Cooperation ................................................................................................ 9
Key Foreign Policy Issues 4 May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict ............................................................................................... 10
The Palestinians and Arab State Normalization .. 4 The Conflict’s Aftermath ..................................................................................................... 10
Trump Administration ..... 7 Assessment ................................................................................................ 10
Strategic Assessment.......................... 7 Military Aid for Israel ......................................................................................................... 12
Israeli-Palestinian Issues 8 Post-Conflict Recovery in Gaza .......................................................................................... 12
Future of Regional Cooperation and Rivalry .......8 Human Rights Considerations: ICC Investigation and U.S. Aid .............................................. 13
The Biden Administration and 117th Congress9 Arab State Normalization with Israel ................................................................ 15
Iran and the Region........................ 9 Iran and the Region ............................................................................................................. 16.......... 12
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions .......................................................... 16
Hezbollah ............... 12 Hezbollah ................................................................................................................ 17
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns................. 13 Tables Table 1. Israeli Power-Sharing Government: Key Positions ........................................................... 18

Figures
Figure 12 Appendixes Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts ................................................................................. 2

Tables
Table 1. Indictments Against Netanyahu and Steps of the Legal Process .................................. 8

Appendixes
Appendix.......... 15 Appendix B. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset and Their Leaders ...................................... 20.. 16

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 18 23


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Introduction: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (Israel (see Figure 1)see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas; has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas;
issues with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations include issues with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations include the following.  The June 2021 formation of a new Israeli power-sharing government, headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, after 12 years with Binyamin Netanyahu serving as prime minister.  Israel’s security cooperation with the United States.  Issues relevant to Israeli-Palestinian disputes, including the aftermath of May 2021 Israel-Gaza Strip violence, human rights considerations,the following.
 Violence and unrest in May 2021 in and around the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, and
various Israeli cities.
 Israeli domestic political issues, including questions about whether March 2021
election results wil lead to a new government or more elections, while Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s criminal trial continues.
 Israel’s security cooperation with the United States.
 Israeli-Palestinian issues and Israel’s normalization of relations with various and Israel’s normalization of relations with various
Arab states. Arab states.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah. Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
 Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure, and U.S. concerns
about implications for U.S. national security.
For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and
missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
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Israel: May 2021 Violence, Other Background, and U.S. Relations in Brief

Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fisch er using
Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intel igence Agency GeoNames
Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from CIA, The World Factbook; and Economist Intel igence
Unit. Al numbers are forecasts for 2021 unless otherwise specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additional y, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occu pied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
Violence and Unrest over Gaza and Jerusalem
Overview
Various factors have combined to fuel an escalation of unrest and violence in and around the Gaza
Strip and Jerusalem in May 2021. Since May 10, the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization) and other militants based in the Gaza Strip have fired hundreds
of rockets into Israel—reportedly causing at least 12 deaths and many more injuries, including
from major barrages against population centers in the Tel Aviv area. Hamas’s rocket attacks have
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contributed to a major escalation as Israel’s military has retaliated with regular airstrikes and
some artil ery fire, reportedly kil ing at least 230 people (including militants and civilians) and
injuring hundreds more in Gaza.
Hamas has cast itself as a defender of Jerusalem amid unrest that mounted there during the
Muslim holy month of Ramadan, including at the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif
(“Mount/Haram”) holy sites—a place of frequent Jewish-Muslim contention.1 Jerusalem also has
been a focus of disil usionment among Palestinians since April because Palestinian Authority
(PA) President Mahmoud Abbas had cited Israel’s unwil ingness to al ow East Jerusalem
Palestinians to vote in PA elections (scheduled for May) as grounds for their postponement.2
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.3
Palestinian militants in Gaza periodical y clash with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilian areas in southern Israel and Gaza,
respectively. These incidents periodical y escalate toward larger conflict—with major hostilities taking place in
2008-2009, 2012, and 2014. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow
of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation.
Mounting tension in Jerusalem was fueled by provocations—reportedly aided by social media—
tied to Israeli measures restricting Palestinian movement and worship in and around the
Mount/Haram and Old City, isolated attacks by Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish
nationalist groups.4 Unrest intensified in response to controversy over the possible eviction of
several Palestinian families from their longtime residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of
East Jerusalem, stemming from an Israeli law that al ows for Jewish recovery of property
abandoned in connection with the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.5 Israel’s Supreme Court temporarily
delayed a hearing on the case amid the unrest. Palestinian leaders and some activists and
international actors claim that the case is part of a systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian
rights in East Jerusalem since the area’s capture and effective annexation as a result of the 1967
Arab-Israeli war.6 Critics of Israeli actions connect this situation with concerns about Jewish
settlement activity and other al egations that Israel violates international law and Palestinian
human rights.7
The ongoing violence between Israel and Gaza-based militants has escalated to a level not seen
since 2014.8 As during the three previous major conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014, as the

1 For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Jim Zanotti.
2 Daoud Kuttab, “ Palestinian president decides —on his own— to postpone elections,” Al-Monitor, April 30, 2021.
3 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
4 “From T ikTok to T emple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem ,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021.
5 Nir Hasson, “ Jerusalem Clashes: How Palestinians Rallied Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some
Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of
cases are at risk of being evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss, “ Palestinians fear loss of family homes
as evictions loom,” Associated Press, May 10, 2021.
6 Patrick Kingsley, “ Israel’s Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem ,” New York
Tim es, May 10, 2021.
7 Al-Haq, Action Alert: International Community Must T ake Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s
Aggression against Palestinian Jerusalemites, May 10, 2021.
8 See Sam Sokol, “ Israel-Gaza Conflict: How T his Escalation Compares with Previous Rounds,” haaretz.com, May 12,
2021.
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rockets from Gaza mostly target Israeli civilians, Palestinian civilians are also vulnerable. Israeli
strikes against militants in Gaza largely focus on targets in densely populated areas that can lead
to collateral damage,9 even if the Israel Defense Forces’ claims about taking measures to warn
civilians of impending strikes are accurate.10 As thousands of civilians in Gaza seek to shelter
away from targeted areas, the people’s plight is exacerbated by deficient infrastructure and health
care facilities, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic, and chal enges to delivering needed
utilities and resources.11 In connection with the fighting in Gaza, damage sustained to health care
facilities, water and sewage infrastructure, and schools has further worsened the humanitarian
situation.12
As the Israel-Gaza conflict intensified, protests and/or rioting broke out in several Israeli cities—
including Lod, Bat Yam, Acre, Haifa, and Jaffa—involving Arab citizens of Israel and Jewish
nationalists.13 Israel mobilized reserve security forces,14 and Jewish and Arab political leaders
have spoken out in an effort to quel this unrest15—with some reports of abatement during the
week of May 17.16 While protests and some incidents of violence have occurred in the West
Bank, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders there have
to this point refrained from the types of organized actions that triggered general Palestinian
intifadas (uprisings) in 1987 and 2000.
U.S. Policy Considerations and Proposed Arms Sale
Key U.S. policy considerations include how developments related to the outbreak of violence and
Arab-Jewish unrest in Israel may affect U.S. aid—and its use—to Israel and the Palestinians;
impact civilians and humanitarian needs in Gaza and elsewhere; and influence how the Biden
Administration and Members of Congress focus on Israeli-Palestinian disputes, Iran’s support for
Hamas and other Palestinian militants, and other regional issues.17
U.S. diplomatic engagement might have some influence on developments. Before the May 10
escalation of Israel-Gaza violence, U.S. officials expressed concerns about the possible evictions
in Sheikh Jarrah and unrest in Jerusalem.18 The week after that, they condemned Palestinian
rocket attacks, supported Israel’s right to self-defense from them, bemoaned civilian casualties,
and stated that Israelis and Palestinians are both entitled to safety and security.19 Deputy Assistant

9 Aaron Boxerman, “ ‘Screams under the rubble’: 42 said killed in Israeli airstrike in Gaza City,” Times of Israel, May
16, 2021.
10 Felicia Schwartz and Jared Malsin, “ Israel Says Strikes to Go On As Gaza Death T oll Mounts,” Wall Street Journal,
May 17, 2021.
11 Raja Abdulrahim, “ T housands of Civilians Flee Airstrikes in Gaza,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2021.
12 Iyad Abuheweila, et al., “ Gaza Reels From Strikes T hat Underscore Scope Of Deep-Rooted Misery,” New York
Tim es, May 19, 2021.
13 Jack Khoury, “ T he Six Factors Stoking the Upheaval in Arab Israeli Society,” haaretz.com, May 12, 2021.
14 Afif Abu Much, “ Police unable to stem violence in mixed Israeli cities,” Al-Monitor, May 18, 2021.
15 Sam Sokol, “ Violence Between Arabs and Jews Inside Israel Further Inflame Gaza Conflict ,” haaretz.com, May 12,
2021; “Gantz orders callup of Border Patrol reserves as Arab-Jewish violence spirals,” Times of Israel, May 13, 2021.
16 Neri Zilber, “ Israeli Officials Dispute Death T oll in Gaza Amid Onslaught ,” Daily Beast, May 18, 2021.
17 See, for example, the text of a May 12 letter to President Biden from 44 Senators at https://www.rubio.senate.gov/
public/_cache/files/ea5fb1cf-a6fa-4abc-983b-2945a4fc2667/93C0C6B98A3A9E07C0C725387D88E76A.05.12.21 -
letter-to-biden-re-israel-attacks.pdf; and the text of a May 12 letter from 25 Representatives to Secretary of State
Antony Blinken at https://twitter.com/repmarkpocan/status/1392606239406923779/photo/1 and https://twitter.com/
repmarkpocan/status/1392606247061442563/photo/1.
18 “U.S. expresses ‘serious concerns’ about violent clashes in Jerusalem,” Reuters, May 10, 2021.
19 White House, Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,
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Secretary of State for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Hady Amr is in the region to pursue de-
escalation. On May 16, Secretary of State Antony Blinken cal ed for an immediate end to
violence, while U.S. officials reportedly continued to block the U.N. Security Council from
issuing a statement cal ing for a cease-fire, perhaps partly due to its wording.20 Israeli leaders
have continued strikes in an apparent effort to impose a cost on Palestinian militants that might
deter them from initiating future violence. In a May 19 phone cal with Prime Minister
Netanyahu, President Biden conveyed that he expected a significant de-escalation that day on the
way to a cease-fire.21 On May 20, an Israeli media source reported that U.S. officials have
expressed opposition to a proposed U.N. Security Council Resolution in the form it was drafted.22
Some Members of Congress have cal ed for a cease-fire.23 Some others have argued that such
cal s should not constrain Israeli actions.24 On May 19, 138 Representatives sent a letter to
President Biden urging him to take decisive action to end the violence.25 The same day, 31
Senators introduced a non-binding resolution to affirm an “unwavering commitment” to Israel
and “its right to defend itself and its civilians against terror.”26
Additional y, some Members have opposed or sought further consultation from the Biden
Administration about a proposed $735 mil ion commercial y licensed sale of precision-guided
munitions to Israel. The Administration notified the proposed sale to Congress on May 5—five
days before the major escalation of violence on May 10.27 According to Representative Gregory
Meeks, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the weapons would likely be
delivered “a year from now.”28 On May 19, nine House Members introduced a joint resolution of
disapproval—referencing license document Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) 20-
084—to block the export, and Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a counterpart joint resolution in
the Senate on May 20.29

May 12, 2021; State Department Press Briefings—May 10, 2021, and May 11, 2021.
20 “UN General Assembly to meet on Gaza as US blocks 3rd Security Council resolution,” Times of Israel, May 17,
2021.
21 White House, Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,
May 19, 2021
22 Jacob Magid, “ US hints it will oppose French Security Council resolution calling for ceasefire,” Times of Israel, May
20, 2021.
23 Ben Samuels, “ Dozens of Democrats Urge Immediate Israeli-Palestinian Cease-fire to Prevent Further Loss of Life,”
haaretz.com, May 17, 2021.
24 Jacob Magid, “ T op Democrat looking to delay $735 million sale of precision missiles to Israel,” Times of Israel, May
17, 2021.
25 T ext of letter available at
https://price.house.gov/sites/price.house.gov/files/5.19.2021%20Israel%20and%20Gaza%20Ceasefire%20Letter%20 -
%20FINAL%20FORMAT T ED.pdf.
26 Senator Rick Scott, VIDEO RELEASE Sen. Bernie Sanders Blocks Sen. Rick Scott Resolution to Support Israel,
Condemn Hamas, May 19, 2021.
27 State Department notification to congressional committees of jurisdiction; Jacqueline Alemany et al., “ Biden
administration’s $735 million weapons sale to Israel faces scrutiny ,” Washington Post, May 18, 2021. T his source also
cited concerns raised by Secretary Blinken and some Members of Congress about Israel’s claims that its military was
targeting Hamas in a strike that destroyed a building in Gaza housing key international media outlets. For information
on U.S. provision of precision-guided weapons to Israel, see CRS New Prime Minister and End of Netanyahu’s Rule A new power-sharing government headed by Prime Minister Naftali Bennett (see the textbox below for a brief biography) took office on June 13, 2021, putting an end to a 12-year-run as prime minister by Binyamin Netanyahu.1 The government was approved by a slim margin (60-59, with one abstention) in Israel’s Knesset (its unicameral parliament). Since Netanyahu’s criminal indictment on corruption charges in February 2019, Israel has held four separate elections—the most recent in March 2021—and experienced considerable political turmoil. Netanyahu had stayed in power during that time for various reasons, including lack of Israeli consensus on replacing him during the crisis over the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic, and his prominence on national security issues. With his efforts to block the new government unsuccessful, Netanyahu and his Likud party will lead the Knesset’s opposition, as was the case from 2006 to 2009. Questions surround Netanyahu’s prospects for continuing as Likud’s leader and his overall future. The Power-Sharing Government and Arab Participation Bennett—a right-of-center figure who leads the Yamina party—and the centrist Yesh Atid party leader Yair Lapid reached agreement across Israel’s political spectrum to oust Netanyahu. The new government draws its support from a disparate coalition of parties on the right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu), center (Yesh Atid and Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the political spectrum, as well as from the Arab-led, Islamist United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) (see Table 1 and Appendix B). 1 Netanyahu also served an earlier 1996-1999 term as prime minister. Congressional Research Service 1 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief Table 1. Israeli Power-Sharing Government: Key Positions Position Name Party Prime Minister Naftali Bennett Yamina Foreign Minister and Yair Lapid Yesh Atid Alternate Prime Minister Defense Minister Benny Gantz Kahol Lavan Finance Minister Avigdor Lieberman Yisrael Beitenu Justice Minister Gideon Sa’ar New Hope Interior Minister Ayelet Shaked Yamina Transportation Minister Merav Michaeli Labor Public Security Minister Omer Bar Lev Labor Health Minister Nitzan Horowitz Meretz Prime Minister Naftali Bennett: Biography Bennett, born in 1972, is a leading figure of the Israeli national religious, pro-settler right. He hails from a modern Orthodox Jewish background. Having parents who emigrated from the United States, Bennett lived in America at various points as a youth and adult. He served in various Israeli special forces units (and remains a reservist) before starting what became a very successful career as a software entrepreneur. Entering politics in 2006, Bennett served as chief of staff for Binyamin Netanyahu until 2008, while Netanyahu was serving as opposition leader in the Knesset. Reportedly, the Netanyahu family harbors some personal animosity toward Bennett dating from his time on Netanyahu’s staff.2 Later, Bennett served as director-general of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization for Israeli West Bank settlers) from 2010 to 2012. He then became the party leader for HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) and led the party into the Knesset in 2013. In 2018 he left The Jewish Home, seeking various right-of-center electoral alliances before finally becoming head of Yamina in 2020. Bennett has participated in several coalition governments led by Netanyahu, serving as economy minister (2013-2015), education minister (2015-2019), and defense minister (2019-2020). In May 2020, he led Yamina into the opposition when Netanyahu and Likud formed a power-sharing government with Benny Gantz and Kahol Lavan. Bennett openly opposes the creation of a Palestinian state, though he approves of greater Palestinian autonomy in West Bank urban areas. He supports continued expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the annexation of Jewish-settled areas. However, he has agreed not to pursue annexation as prime minister in the current power-sharing government. On domestic issues, Bennett generally supports free-market policies, a modest government safety net, and a focus on equality of opportunity and education for economically challenged Israelis. He and his close political col eague Ayelet Shaked, who served as justice minister from 2015 to 2019, support limiting the power of the judiciary to constrain what appears to be increasingly nationalistic voter sentiment among Jewish Israelis. The participation of UAL in the coalition is the first instance of an independent Arab party joining an Israeli government.3 Generally, Arab parties have not joined ruling coalitions, partly because 2 Laurie Kellman, “Bennett, Netanyahu’s former protege, poised to succeed him,” Associated Press, June 3, 2021. 3 According to one Israeli media source, “Only twice have Arab Israeli parties backed an Israeli government. In the 1950s, a small faction composed of one Arab parliamentarian entered the coalition. The faction was far from independent, essentially operating as an Arab franchise of Israel’s ruling socialist party, Mapai. In the 1990s, when the government of left-wing Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin was in danger of collapsing, the Arab parties stepped in to prevent a vote of no confidence.” Aaron Boxerman, “History made as Arab Israeli Ra’am party joins Bennett-Lapid coalition,” Times of Israel, June 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 2 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief of historical and cultural Arab-Jewish tensions in Israel, as well as Arab desires to avoid direct involvement in Israel’s actions in the West Bank and Gaza. During this year’s election and government formation cycle, UAL leader Mansour Abbas expressed his willingness to support a government of any nature if doing so could elicit specific government promises to benefit Arab Israelis. With the outbreak of Arab-Jewish unrest and violence in some Israeli cities during the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict, Abbas temporarily withdrew from coalition negotiations, but he publicly called for an end to violence, and returned to talks with Jewish parties after tensions largely subsided. The power-sharing agreement reportedly includes promises to provide more than $16 billion in targeted funding to assist with economic development, infrastructure, and other needs in Arab-populated areas of Israel, and contemplates relaxing some government restrictions on the expansion of Arab communities.4 Looking Ahead and Issues for U.S. Policy Various questions beset the new government. According to its power-sharing agreement, Bennett is scheduled to serve as prime minister until August 27, 2023, at which point Lapid would become prime minister. Given the fractious nature of the coalition, a New York Times article anticipated that the new government may not address “contentious issues such as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or judicial reform. Instead it will likely focus on more straight-ahead policies, such as creating a new state budget, restoring the post-pandemic economy and improving infrastructure.”5 With ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) parties absent from the coalition, some observers speculate about the prospects for a new government to reduce religious influence over Israeli society on matters such as marriage, gay rights, and public services on the Sabbath.6 Significant disagreements within or defections from the government could lead to its collapse and new elections—perhaps leaving open the possibility of a return by Netanyahu to power. Netanyahu and other right-of-center figures have criticized members from Yamina and New Hope for abandoning their natural ideological partners, in an apparent effort to weaken the coalition’s cohesion. However, if Bennett and Lapid can convince others to join the coalition, the government’s lasting power could increase. Netanyahu’s departure from office and the new government’s formation have the potential to affect U.S.-Israel relations. Three former U.S. officials wrote that the Biden Administration might expect “a few months of calm on the Palestinian issue and the Iran nuclear deal—thanks as much to gridlock in the Knesset as to Jerusalem’s desire to smooth relations with Washington.”7 However, Prime Minister Bennett’s positions on Palestinian issues are more nationalistic than Netanyahu’s, even if Bennett’s left-leaning and Arab coalition partners are likely to constrain his actions. Some specific policy questions of importance include:  U.S. relations. What changes in approach, if any, will the new government make to relations with the Biden Administration and Members of Congress from both parties? 4 Boxerman. 5 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel on Edge as Politicians Wrangle Over Coalition to Oust Netanyahu,” New York Times, June 3, 2021. 6 Isabel Kershner, “Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox Jews Face a Loss of Power,” New York Times, June 7, 2021. 7 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “Netanyahu’s On the Way Out. Here’s What Biden Can Expect Next,” Politico, June 2, 2021. Congressional Research Service 3 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief  Iran. What public line will the government take on a possible U.S. return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program, and what means will it use to influence international diplomacy on the issue?  Palestinian issues. How will the government approach sensitive Arab-Jewish intercommunal issues in Israel and Jerusalem, settlement expansion in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and efforts to maintain calm with Gaza and allow post-conflict recovery?  Regional challenges. How will Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza seek to test the government’s resolve, and how will the government respond? U.S. Aid and Security Cooperation with Israel8 Israel maintains robust military and homeland security capabilities, partly owing to its close cooperation with the United States on national security matters. U.S. law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additionally, a 10-year bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Congress also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a number of specific security-related areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countering drone aircraft. Israeli-Palestinian Disputes Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions—such as during the May 2021 Israel-Gaza conflict mentioned below, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. They also have played down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and have respected agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the future establishment of a fund to support Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation. May 2021 Israel-Gaza Conflict In May 2021, an 11-day conflict (see textbox below) took place between Israel and Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), which maintains de facto control within Gaza.9 Amid unrest in the West Bank during the conflict (May 10-21), one source estimates that 27 8 For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by , by
Jeremy M. Sharp.
28 As cited in Bryant Harris, “ Democratic leaders seek to quell pro-Palestinian uprising in US Congress,” The National
(UAE), May 20, 2021.
29 Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ocasio-Cortez, Pocan & T laib Lead Joint Resolution to Block Weapon
Sales to Netanyahu, May 19, 2021. Senator Bernie Sanders, NEWS: Sanders Moves to Block Weapons Sale to Israel,
May 20, 2021. In 1978 during the 95 th Congress, some resolutions of disapproval (including H.Con.Res. 585,
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Arms Export Notification Period and Congressional Options30
In general, commercial y licensed arms sales must be formal y notified to Congress 30 calendar days before the
export license is issued if they involve the sale of major defense equipment valued at $14 mil ion or more, or
defense articles or services valued at $50 mil ion or more (Section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act, or
AECA). In the case of such sales to NATO member states, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Israel, or New Zealand,
Congress must be formal y notified 15 calendar days before the Administration may issue the relevant export
license. Congress moved Israel from the 30-day notification category to the 15-day category in Section 301 of P.L.
111-266. The AECA sets forth provisions that, in specified circumstances, permit expedited consideration for
legislation to block proposed exports. Congress also could block or regulate exports through the regular
legislative process, without expedited procedures.
For more on recent congressional views and action related to U.S. aid and arms sales to Israel, see
“The Biden Administration and 117th Congress” section below.
Some reports emerged on May 20 of a proposed cease-fire possibly going into effect on May 21.
Factors affecting escalation or de-escalation of the violence could include
 whether Hamas assesses that continued conflict—despite more casualties and
damage in Gaza—could boost its domestic popularity at PA President Abbas’s
expense, further fuel Arab-Jewish unrest, and increase pressure on Israel’s
leaders;31
 the extent to which Israeli measures (including its Iron Dome anti-rocket system
and operations targeting Palestinian militants) prevent, deter, or provoke
additional violence, and protect or harm Israeli and Palestinian civilians;32
 disruptions or perceived disruptions to the “status quo” arrangement governing
worship at Jerusalem’s holy sites, especial y the Mount/Haram;33
 unsettled questions of leadership and succession within both Israel and the
Palestinian Authority;34
 how international actors respond, including U.S. officials and lawmakers, and
Arab states who have recently improved or sought to improve their relations with
Israel; and

H.Con.Res. 586, H.Con.Res. 594, and H.Con.Res. 595) were introduced to block various proposed arms sales to Israel
that were part of a package of proposed sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. For more information , see CRS Report
R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arm s Sales to the United Arab Em irates, coordinated by
Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. In 1979 during the 96th Congress, Representative Paul Findley introduced five
resolutions of disapproval to block other arms sales to Israel ( H.Con.Res. 174, H.Con.Res. 175, H.Con.Res. 176,
H.Con.Res. 177, and H.Con.Res. 178). None of the 1978 or 1979 proposed resolutions came to a vote.
30 For detailed information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
31 Neri Zilber, “T he War T hat Shouldn’t Have Been,” Newlines Magazine, May 13, 2021.
32 Joel Gehrke, “ Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system is facing a severe test ,” Washington Examiner, May 12,
2021. For more on Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
33 “From T ikTok to T emple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem ,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. Under the
“status quo” arrangement (largely based on past practices dating from the 16th century that Israel pledges to uphold),
Muslims can access the Mount/Haram and worship there, while Jews and other non -Muslims are permitted limited
access but not permitted to worship. Jewish worship is permitted at the Western Wall at the base of the Mount/Haram.
34 Neri Zilber, “ Violent Jerusalem Clashes Just the Start of Bloody Days to Come,” Daily Beast, May 10, 2021; Ghaith
al-Omari, “ T o Vote or Not to Vote: Implications of Postponing Palestinian Elections,” Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, PolicyWatch 3477, April 28, 2021.
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 diplomacy addressing various parties’ grievances and concerns, with Egyptian
officials playing a key mediating role between Israel and Hamas.35
As discussed below, the spike in Arab-Jewish tensions since May 10 appears to have ended the
previously imminent prospect of a government replacing Prime Minister Netanyahu with support
from right-of-center and Arab-led parties.36
After March 2021 Elections: Will Netanyahu’s Rule
End or Continue?
On March 23, 2021, Israel held its fourth election in the past two years (previous elections took
place in April and September 2019 and March 2020). The Likud party, led by Prime Minister
Netanyahu, won the most Knesset seats in the March 23 election (see Appendix), despite
criminal indictments against Netanyahu for corruption (see Table 1).

35 Felicia Schwartz and Jared Malsin, “ Israel Says Strikes to Go On As Gaza Death T oll Mounts,” Wall Street Journal,
May 17, 2021.
36 Barak Ravid, “Israel’s ‘change bloc’ collapses, leaving Netanyahu in charge,” Axios, May 13, 2021.
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Table 1. Indictments Against Netanyahu and Steps of the Legal Process
Indictments
Case 1000: Netanyahu received favors from Hol ywood mogul Arnon Milchan and Australian
bil ionaire James Packer, in return for taking actions in Milchan’s favor.
The charge: Fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: There is no legal problem in receiving gifts from friends; did not
know that his family members requested gifts.
Case 2000: Netanyahu and Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Arnon Mozes struck a deal: Favorable
coverage for Netanyahu in return for limiting the circulation of the Sheldon Adelson-owned newspaper
Israel Hayom.
The charge: Fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: He had no intention of implementing the deal, and relations
between politicians and the media should not be criminalized.
Case 4000: As communication minister, Netanyahu took steps that benefited Shaul Elovitch who
control ed telecom company Bezeq—in return for favorable coverage in Bezeq’s Wal a News site.
The charge: Bribery, fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: There is no evidence that he was aware of making regulations
contingent on favorable coverage.
Selected Steps in the Legal Process, and
the Time Between Them


Sources: For “Indictments,” the content comes from Ha’aretz graphics adapted by CRS. For “Selected Steps in
the Legal Process, and the Time Between Them,” CRS prepared the graphics and made slight content
adjustments to underlying source material from Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre. The
interval listed between Steps 4-5 is an estimate.
The bloc of parties that openly support Netanyahu appears to be short of majority backing in the
Knesset. Some politicians on the right of the political spectrum—ideological y close to
Netanyahu—have adopted critiques of Netanyahu previously made by many from the left and
center, claiming that he prioritizes his individual power and survival over Israeli national
interests, institutions, and rule of law. Also, as discussed below, prospects for a Knesset majority
forming to support a coalition opposed to Netanyahu’s continued role have appeared to evaporate
amid Arab-Jewish tensions after the May 10 escalation of violence. The possible stalemate could
result in another election taking place later in 2021. A March Wall Street Journal article analyzed
some effects of the ongoing political dysfunction:
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Israel has been without a permanent budget for 13 months now, the longest period in its
history. Infrastructure spending and other government programs are stalled, includin g plans
for a high-speed rail link between Tel Aviv and Eilat, a port and resort on the Red Sea. The
beginning of the school term earlier this year was delayed when the parliament neglected
to pass a special budget for schools to open. The lack of a long -term budget also has
affected the Israeli military's midterm procurement plans.37
In April, Netanyahu received the initial task from Israeli President Reuven Rivlin to try to form a
government, but could not do so within the al otted four weeks. Netanyahu might expect a
government he leads to end or mitigate the ongoing criminal proceedings against him, while
agreeing to support priorities of coalition partners who may seek West Bank annexation, less
independence for Israel’s judiciary, and continued preferential treatment for ultra-Orthodox
citizens. Some Israeli and international observers have expressed concern about the possibility of
far-right figures under the new Religious Zionism list gaining influence in a Netanyahu-led
government.38
On May 5, Rivlin gave four weeks to the Yesh Atid party’s Yair Lapid to form a government.
Lapid, in seeking to oust Netanyahu, proposed a unity government supported by parties on the
right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu), center (Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of the
political spectrum, as wel as the Arab-led United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) and/or Joint List
(see Appendix).39 To secure the support of right-leaning parties, Lapid sought to have Yamina
leader Naftali Bennett—a staunch advocate of Israeli West Bank settlements and partial West
Bank annexation—serve as prime minister for the first 27 months of the government’s term, with
Lapid rotating into the prime minister’s office after that.
While prospects for such a coalition were initial y favorable, they appear to have collapsed
following the escalation of violence in and around Israel and Gaza. On May 13, Bennett
announced that he would not support this coalition, and instead would pursue discussions about a
coalition with Prime Minister Netanyahu and various centrist and right-of-center figures.40 If
Lapid cannot form a government by June 2, and no one else from the Knesset can do so in the
subsequent two weeks, a new election would be scheduled for a few months later.
Netanyahu and other members of the power-sharing government that formed in May 2020—or
their successors, if any of them leave office—are to serve in an interim capacity until someone
establishes a majority-backed coalition. By its terms, the power-sharing agreement would make
Defense and Justice Minister Benny Gantz prime minister in November 17, 2021 in the absence
of a new coalition agreement. Prime Minister Netanyahu has proposed an initiative to have direct
elections for prime minister that, if enacted by the Knesset, could boost his chances to remain in
power longer.41
U.S. Security Cooperation42
While Israel maintains robust military and homeland security capabilities, it also cooperates
closely with the United States on national security matters. U.S. law requires the executive branch
to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” or QME, and expedites aid

37 Felicia Schwartz, “ Israel’s Election Impasse T hreatens Covid Recovery,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2021.
38 Joseph Krauss, “ Far-right party set to gain new influence after Israeli vote,” Associated Press, March 23, 2021.
39 Guillaume Lavallee, “ Israel’s Lapid Faces Daunting Path to Anti-Netanyahu Govt,” Agence France Presse, May 6,
2021.
40 Gil Hoffman, “ Bennett backs down from anti-Netanyahu gov't as Arab-Jewish riots grow,” jpost.com, May 13, 2021.
41 “Netanyahu wrongly claims directly elected PM will ‘automatically’ form coalition ,” Times of Israel, April 22, 2021.
42 For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
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and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additional y, a 10-year bilateral military aid
memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide
Israel $3.3 bil ion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 mil ion annual y on joint
missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations.
Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Congress
also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a number of specific security-related
areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countering drone aircraft. In January 2021, one source
reported that Israel has provided the United States with two batteries of its Iron Dome missile
defense system for deployment at U.S. military bases in the region or elsewhere, with additional
batteries planned for U.S. use or possible export via U.S.-Israel coproduction.43
Key Foreign Policy Issues
The Palestinians and Arab State Normalization44
Trump Administration
During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions on the
decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict that favored Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, as
set forth below.
Selected Trump Administration Actions Impacting Israeli-Palestinian Issues
December 2017
President Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, prompting the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) to cut off high-level
diplomatic relations with the United States.
May 2018
The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem.
August 2018
The Administration suspends U.S. contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
September 2018
The Administration reprograms FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and
Gaza to other locations, and announces the closure of the PLO office in
Washington, DC.
January 2019
As a result of the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the
Administration ends al bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians.
March 2019
The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously an independent diplomatic
mission to the Palestinians—is subsumed under the authority of the U.S. embassy
to Israel. President Trump recognizes Israeli sovereignty claims in the Golan
Heights.
November 2019
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration disagrees with a
1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli settlements in the West
Bank are inconsistent with international law.
January 2020
President Trump releases Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal that largely favors
Israeli positions and contemplates possible U.S. recognition of Israeli annexation of
some West Bank areas.
August 2020
Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announce the first of four cases in
which the Trump Administration facilitates some normalization of Israel’s relations

43 Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel allows U.S. to deploy Iron Dome missile defense in the Gulf,” haaretz.com, January 24,
2021.
44 For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF11237, Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State
Solution, by Jim Zanotti.
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with Arab states (Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco fol ow later in the year). Israel
suspends consideration of West Bank annexation in connection with the UAE
deal.
October 2020
The United States and Israel sign agreements removing restrictions on three
binational foundations from funding projects in areas administered by Israel after
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The foundations are the Binational Industrial Research
and Development Foundation (BIRD), the Binational Science Foundation (BSF),
and the Binational Agricultural Research and Development Foundation (BARD) .
November 2020
Secretary Pompeo announces a change in U.S. product labeling regulations,
requiring products from Israeli settlements in the West Bank to be identified as
coming from Israel.
As mentioned above, in the second half of 2020 the Trump Administration’s diplomatic focus
pivoted from its January 2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal to helping Israel reach
agreements on normalization with some Arab countries, as follows:
 United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. In September 2020, Israel signed
the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain at the White House. Under the
Accords, the UAE and Bahrain have established full diplomatic relations with
Israel, and seek to boost cooperation in a number of other areas, including trade,
investment, and tourism.
 Sudan. Sudan signed onto the Abraham Accords in January 2021 after an
October 2020 joint statement with Israel announcing their plans to normalize
relations, and after Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism
list.45 The Sudanese transitional leadership has said that normalization remains
contingent on ratification by a yet-to-be-formed legislative council.
 Morocco. Morocco agreed to sign onto the Abraham Accords in December 2020
at the same time President Trump announced U.S. recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara.46 While
Morocco’s initial plan—perhaps pending the opening of a U.S. consulate in
Western Sahara47—is to restore the diplomatic liaison offices it maintained with
Israel from 1994 to 2000, the countries’ agreement could lead to full diplomatic
relations along with increased economic and tourism links.
In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex
part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitment from U.S.
officials that they would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024.48
Before Israel’s late 2020 dealings with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, Egypt and Jordan
had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations with Israel.49 In 1981, Saudi

45 CRS Insight IN11531, Sudan’s Removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard. T he
United States also agreed to provide around $1 billion in bridge financing to clear Sudan’s arrears with the World Bank
and allow it to receive future funding. Sami Magdy, “ Sudan says it signs pact on normalizing t ies with Israel,”
Associated Press, January 6, 2021.
46 CRS Insight IN11555, Morocco-Israel Normalization and U.S. Policy Change on Western Sahara , by Alexis Arieff,
Jim Zanotti, and Brock R. Williams. T he signing took place later that month.
47 Mohammed Ayesh, “ Arabic press review: Morocco-Israel deal frozen until Biden’s Western Sahara stance clear,”
Middle East Eye, January 22, 2021.
48 Jacob Magid, “ US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, T oI told,” Times of Israel,
September 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, see CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of
West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti.
49 Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel did the same in 1994.
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Jeremy M. Sharp. 9 Another U.S.-designated terrorist organization, Palestine Islamic Jihad, also took part from Gaza. Congressional Research Service 4 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces.10 Intercommunal protests and violence also took place within Israel and Jerusalem—involving some Arab citizens of Israel, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Jewish nationalists, and Israeli authorities. In the aftermath, the Biden Administration appears focused on restoring regional calm and improving humanitarian conditions. Major Israel-Hamas Conflicts Since 2008 December 2008-January 2009: Israeli codename “Operation Cast Lead”  Three-week duration, first meaningful display of Palestinians’ Iranian-origin rockets, Israeli air strikes and ground offensive  Political context: Impending leadership transitions in Israel and United States, struggling Israeli-Palestinian peace talks (Annapolis process)  Fatalities: More than 1,100 (possibly more than 1,400) Palestinians, 13 Israelis (three civilians) November 2012: “Operation Pillar of Defense (or Cloud)”  Eight-day duration, Palestinian projectiles of greater range and variety, Israeli air strikes, prominent role for Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system (became operational in 2011)  Political context: Widespread Arab political change, including rise of Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt; three months before Israeli elections  Fatalities: More than 100 Palestinians, six Israelis (four civilians) July-August 2014: “Operation Protective Edge/Mighty Cliff”  About 50-day duration, Palestinian projectiles of greater range and variety, Israeli air strikes and ground offensive, extensive Palestinian use of and Israeli countermeasures against tunnels within Gaza, prominent role for Iron Dome  Political context: Shortly after an unsuccessful round of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and the prominent kil ings of Israeli and Palestinian youth in the West Bank and Jerusalem  Fatalities: More than 2,100 Palestinians, 71 Israelis (five civilians), and one foreign worker May 2021: “Operation Guardian of the Walls”  11-day duration, unprecedented Palestinian rocket barrages into central Israel, Israeli air and artil ery strikes, prominent role for Iron Dome, major Arab-Jewish unrest within Israel for much of the conflict  Political context: Tensions over Jerusalem during Ramadan, new U.S. Administration, significant domestic political uncertainty for both Israelis and Palestinians (including recent postponement of PA elections).  Fatalities: More than 240 Palestinians, 12 in Israel (including two Thai nationals) During the conflict, Palestinian militants fired rockets at Israeli populated areas, leading to major disruptions to daily life and other challenges for millions of Israelis. Israeli strikes targeting militants largely focused on targets in the densely populated urban areas of Gaza. While the Israel Defense Forces claimed, as in previous conflicts, that they took measures to warn civilians of impending strikes,11 some strikes killed or injured civilians and damaged residential areas.12 Various factors contribute to civilians’ humanitarian plight in Gaza, including deficient infrastructure and health care facilities, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic, and challenges 10 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territory, “West Bank: Escalation of Violence 13 April - 21 May 2021,” June 6, 2021. 11 Felicia Schwartz and Jared Malsin, “Israel Says Strikes to Go On As Gaza Death Toll Mounts,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2021. 12 Aaron Boxerman, “‘Screams under the rubble’: 42 said killed in Israeli airstrike in Gaza City,” Times of Israel, May 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief to delivering needed utilities and resources.13 In connection with the fighting, this plight worsened from damage sustained to health care facilities, water and sewage infrastructure, and schools.14 Gaza and Its Challenges The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas, but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.15 Palestinian militants in Gaza periodically clash with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilian areas in southern Israel and Gaza, respectively. These incidents periodically escalate toward larger conflict (see textbox above). Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. By engaging in conflict with Israel, Hamas apparently sought to capitalize on Arab-Jewish tensions over Jerusalem to increase its domestic popularity vis-à-vis rival faction Fatah.16 In April, Fatah’s leader Mahmoud Abbas—the West Bank-based PA president—had postponed plans for 2021 PA elections that many Palestinians had eagerly anticipated.17 Abbas cited Israel’s unwillingness to allow East Jerusalem Palestinians to vote in PA elections (which were scheduled for May) as grounds for their postponement.18 Mounting tension in Jerusalem was fueled by provocations—reportedly aided by social media—tied to Israeli measures restricting Palestinian movement and worship in and around the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) holy sites in the Old City,19 isolated attacks by Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish nationalist groups.20 Unrest intensified in response to controversy over the possible eviction of several Palestinian families from their longtime residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem, stemming from an Israeli law that allows for Jewish recovery of property abandoned in connection with the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.21 Israel’s Supreme Court temporarily delayed a hearing on the case amid the unrest, but the case may be decided in mid-2021.22 Palestinian leaders and some activists and international actors claim that the case is part of a systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem since the area’s capture and effective annexation as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.23 Critics 13 Raja Abdulrahim, “Thousands of Civilians Flee Airstrikes in Gaza,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2021. 14 Iyad Abuheweila, et al., “Gaza Reels From Strikes That Underscore Scope Of Deep-Rooted Misery,” New York Times, May 19, 2021. 15 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 16 Amos Harel, “Israel Wants to Win in Gaza, but Erasing Hamas’ Accomplishments Won’t Come Easy,” Haaretz, May 13, 2021. 17 Patrick Kingsley, “Palestinian Vote Postponed, Prolonging Tensions,” New York Times, April 30, 2021. 18 Daoud Kuttab, “Palestinian president decides —on his own— to postpone elections,” Al-Monitor, April 30, 2021. 19 For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 20 “From TikTok to Temple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. 21 Nir Hasson, “Jerusalem Clashes: How Palestinians Rallied Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of cases are at risk of being evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss, “Palestinians fear loss of family homes as evictions loom,” Associated Press, May 10, 2021. 22 Netael Bandel, “Israel Won’t Intervene in Sheikh Jarrah Case, Making Eviction of Palestinian Families More Likely,” haaretz.com, June 7, 2021. 23 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem,” New York Times, May 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief of Israeli actions connect this situation with concerns about Jewish settlement activity and other allegations that Israel violates international law and Palestinian human rights.24 The Conflict’s Aftermath Assessment It is unclear that the conflict decisively changed the positions of the key parties affected—Israel, Hamas, and the PA—vis-à-vis one another. Factors that may influence developments going forward include:  whether Hamas assesses that renewed conflict could boost its domestic popularity, and further fuel Arab-Jewish unrest in Israel and the West Bank;  the extent to which Israeli measures (including its Iron Dome anti-rocket system and operations targeting Palestinian militants) prevent, deter, or provoke additional violence;25  disruptions or perceived disruptions to the “status quo” arrangement governing worship at Jerusalem’s holy sites, especially the Mount/Haram;26  open questions regarding leadership stability within both Israel and the PA;  diplomacy and post-conflict aid involving international actors, including the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Arab states who have recently improved or sought to improve their relations with Israel. Observers have shared varying views about how the relatively greater volume and intensity of Palestinian militants’ rocket fire in this conflict might affect future military calculations. Two analysts asserted that the saturation tactic employed by Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad achieved only limited success, “since improvements to Iron Dome largely negated the heavier barrages.”27 Another analyst wrote that the barrages stretched Israel’s air defenses in a way that suggested “they may one day not be enough to hinder volumes of rockets,” whether against threats from Gaza or from other Iran-backed actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon.28 24 Al-Haq, “Action Alert: International Community Must Take Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s Aggression against Palestinian Jerusalemites,” May 10, 2021. For additional information, see CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti. 25 Sebastien Roblin, “How Hamas’ Arsenal Shaped the Gaza War of May 2021,” forbes.com, May 25, 2021. For more on Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 26 “From TikTok to Temple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. Under the “status quo” arrangement (largely based on past practices dating from the 16th century that Israel pledges to uphold), Muslims can access the Mount/Haram and worship there, while Jews and other non-Muslims are permitted limited access but not permitted to worship. Jewish worship is permitted at the Western Wall at the base of the Mount/Haram. 27 Grant Rumley and Neri Zilber, “A Military Assessment of the Israel-Hamas Conflict,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3489, May 25, 2021: “4,300 rockets were launched (of which over 600 fell in Gaza). Over eleven days of conflict, this averages out to around 390 launches daily, compared to approximately 650 total rockets fired over twenty-two days in 2008-2009 (29 per day), 1,500 over eight days in 2012 (187 per day), and more than 4,500 spread out over fifty days in 2014 (90 per day).” 28 Seth Frantzman, “Israel’s Iron Dome Won’t Last Forever,” foreignpolicy.com, June 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief Military Aid for Israel As the cease-fire was about to come into effect, President Biden reiterated U.S. support for Israel’s right to defend itself and pledged to replenish Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system.29 During the conflict, some Members of Congress objected to Israeli airstrikes that resulted in civilian casualties and displacement, and sought to restrict a recent proposed $735 million commercial sale of U.S. precision-guided munitions to Israel.30 On June 2, 56 Representatives sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin urgently requesting a report on Israel’s military needs in the conflict’s wake.31 Some statements suggest that legislative proposals may be forthcoming on supplemental U.S. military aid to Israel. In early June, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz traveled to Washington, DC, for meetings with top Biden Administration officials, and Senator Lindsey Graham spoke of a potential Israeli request for up to $1 billion in aid.32 In August 2014, near the end of the last major Israel-Gaza conflict, Congress enacted an emergency supplemental appropriations resolution (P.L. 113-145) to provide $225 million in Department of Defense funding for Iron Dome. Post-Conflict Recovery in Gaza In anticipation of the cease fire, President Biden said: The United States is committed to working with the United Nations, and we remain committed to working with the United Nations and other international stakeholders to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and to marshal international support for the people of Gaza and the Gaza reconstruction efforts. We will do this in full partnership with the Palestinian Authority—not Hamas, the Authority—in a manner that does not permit Hamas to simply restock its military arsenal. I believe the Palestinians and Israelis equally deserve to live safely and securely and to enjoy equal measures of freedom, prosperity, and democracy. During a visit to the region, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced some economic and humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians in partial connection with post-conflict recovery.33 Blinken also spoke out against steps taken by either side that he said could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—including settlement activity, demolitions, evictions, incitement to violence, and payment to terrorists.34 With Gaza still under Hamas control, the obstacles to post-conflict recovery remain largely the same as after the 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 conflicts.35 Beyond providing short-term humanitarian assistance, the United States and other international actors face significant 29 White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East,” May 20, 2021. 30 Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, “Ocasio-Cortez, Pocan & Tlaib Lead Joint Resolution to Block Weapon Sales to Netanyahu,” May 19, 2021. Senator Bernie Sanders, “NEWS: Sanders Moves to Block Weapons Sale to Israel,” May 20, 2021. 31 See text of letter at https://gottheimer.house.gov/uploadedfiles/letter_to_sec_def_re_iron_dome_replenishment.pdf. 32 Jacob Magid, “Gantz urges softer tone with US on Iran, seems to knock Netanyahu’s ‘provoking,’” Times of Israel, June 4, 2021. 33 For information on U.S. aid announced for Palestinians in 2021, see CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview, 2021 Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues, by Jim Zanotti. 34 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at a Press Availability,” Jerusalem, May 25, 2021. 35 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. Congressional Research Service 8 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief challenges in seeking to help with longer-term reconstruction. Because of the PA’s inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwilling to manage international pledges toward reconstruction. Without the PA’s involvement, international organizations and governments generally have less confidence that they can prevent Hamas from diverting assistance for its own purposes.36 Some Arab Gulf states may seek to establish independent committees inside Gaza to distribute funds, modeled after one that Qatar maintains.37 Human Rights Considerations: ICC Investigation and U.S. Aid International public debate has taken place over alleged Israeli human rights violations against Palestinians. The International Criminal Court prosecutor announced the opening of an investigation in March into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.38 The investigation might draw from the findings of an ongoing commission of inquiry established by the U.N. Human Rights Council in May in the wake of the recent Israel-Gaza conflict.39 The U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva issued a statement saying that the “open-ended” commission of inquiry would “not help bring about lasting solutions to the challenges in the region, nor provide greater dignity, freedom, or prosperity for either Palestinians or Israelis.”40 The Biden Administration, like its predecessors, has criticized the Human Rights Council for what it characterizes as a disproportionate focus on Israel.41 In April a bill was introduced in the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the amount of U.S. aid provided to Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some of those human rights allegations.42 Later in April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the chair and ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or adding conditions on security assistance to Israel,43 citing a similar argument that President Biden made during the 2020 presidential race.44 Arab State Normalization with Israel To date, the Biden Administration has not reversed steps that the Trump Administration took in apparent connection with Israel’s recent agreements to normalize or improve relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco (known as the “Abraham Accords”).45 Biden Administration 36 Ibid. 37 Adnan Abu Amer, “Gaza reconstruction deepens PA-Hamas dispute,” May 28, 2021. 38 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 39 U.N. document, A/HRC/S-30/L.1, as orally revised, May 27, 2021. 40 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Press Statement: UN Human Rights Council Session on the Israeli-Palestinian Situation,” May 27, 2021. 41 U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Geneva, “Secretary Blinken: Remarks to the 46th Session of the Human Rights Council,” February 24, 2021. 42 “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel of apartheid over treatment of Palestinians,” Associated Press, April 27, 2021 (underlying Human Rights Watch report available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution, with the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/). 43 Text of letter available at https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf. 44 Omri Nahmias, “Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020. 45 These steps include a proposed U.S. sale to the UAE of F-35s, drone aircraft, and munitions; Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list; and U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty claims over the disputed Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 15 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief officials have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israel’s normalization efforts with Arab states would seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders denounced the Abraham Accords as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties.46 The Pathway to the Abraham Accords, and Its Implications for Palestinians Before the Abraham Accords, Egypt and Jordan had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations with Israel.47 In 1981, Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later enshrined Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later enshrined
in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions, in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions,
including including on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it.on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it.50
48 After Israel started negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited After Israel started negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited
diplomatic relations with Morocco, and informal ties with a number of other Arab states, diplomatic relations with Morocco, and informal ties with a number of other Arab states,
including the UAE and Bahrain.including the UAE and Bahrain.5149 These countries downgraded their ties with Israel after the These countries downgraded their ties with Israel after the
onset of the second Palestinian onset of the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past decade (or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past decade
discreet Israeli links with Arab states on issues including discreet Israeli links with Arab states on issues including intel igenceintelligence, security, and trade have , security, and trade have
become closer and more public. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common become closer and more public. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common
concerns, such as Iran’s regional influence and military capabilities (seeconcerns, such as Iran’s regional influence and military capabilities (see “Iran and the Region”
belowbelow) and Sunni Islamist populist movements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches ) and Sunni Islamist populist movements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches
and affiliates).52
Strategic Assessment
Assessing Arab-Israeli normalization to date involves considering its implications both for Israeli-
Palestinian issues and the future of regional cooperation and rivalry.
Israeli-Palestinian Issues
Israel’s deals with Arab states could be interpreted as vindicating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s
long-standing claim that he could normalize Israel’s relations with Arab countries before reaching
a peace agreement with the Palestinians. They also signal some change to Arab states’ previous
insistence—in the 2002 API—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a
precondition for improved ties.53 However, officialand affiliates).50 To cement its normalization of relations with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitment from U.S. officials that they would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024. Palestinian leaders claimed that the UAE legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto annexation.”51 UAE officials countered that by significantly delaying Israeli declarations of sovereignty over West Bank areas, they preserved prospects for future negotiations toward a Palestinian state.52 Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Israeli officials have appealed to domestic pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements related to settlement construction and expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Official statements from Saudi Arabian officials statements from Saudi Arabian officials
continue to condition Saudi normalization with Israel on the API’s continue to condition Saudi normalization with Israel on the API’s provisions.53 Some key Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be wil ing to drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specific territory of Western Sahara. 46 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August 14, 2020. 47 Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel did the same in 1994. 48 Theprovisions.54 In late 2020,
Saudi Arabia granted Israel flyover rights within its airspace to facilitate direct Israeli airline
travel to the UAE and Bahrain.55
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) officials denounced Arab
states’ normalization of relations with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause.
They expressed particular concern over the UAE deal, perhaps partly because the UAE has
provided sanctuary and political support for Mohammad Dahlan, a former top PA figure

50 T he Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdrawto withdraw fully from the fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem,territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and and
provide for the “provide for the “ [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
AssemblyAssembly Resolution 194.” Resolution 194.” T heThe initiative was proposed by Saudi initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57 --
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. T heThe text of the initiative is available at text of the initiative is available at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html. http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
51 49 Miriam Berger, Miriam Berger, “ “Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam
Entous, “Donald Entous, “Donald T rumpTrump’s New World Order,” ’s New World Order,” New Yorker, June 11, 2018; CRS June 11, 2018; CRS Report 95-1013, Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
5250 Steve Hendrix, “ Steve Hendrix, “ Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,” Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,”
washingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRSwashingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRS Report 95-1013, Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth , by Kenneth
Katzman. Katzman.
53 Annelle Sheline, “ T rump’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle East ,” Politico Magazine, August 14, 2020.
54 HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama
Dialogue, December 5, 2020.
55 Yoel Guzansky, “ Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No.
1396, October 29, 2020.
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vehemently opposed by PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Dahlan may have
aspirations to succeed Abbas.56
PLO/PA officials claimed that the UAE legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over
them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto
annexation.”57 UAE officials countered that by significantly delaying Israeli declarations of
sovereignty over West Bank areas, they preserved prospects for future negotiations toward a
Palestinian state.58 Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Prime Minister
Netanyahu has appealed to domestic pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements
related to settlement construction and expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Questions surround the impact that Arab states with open relations with Israel might have on
Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. Wil these states influence Israeli positions regarding the
Palestinians, due to their closer access to Israeli leaders and Israeli interests in maintaining and
improving ties with these countries? Or wil these states have less leverage with Israel and
possibly even support efforts to have Palestinians compromise their traditional demands?
Future of Regional Cooperation and Rivalry 51 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August 14, 2020. 52 “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” Times of Israel, August 14, 2020. 53 HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama Dialogue, December 5, 2020. Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief incentives to do so could include heightened regional cooperation on Iran, U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects to boost Saudi economic diversification, and greater Saudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.54
Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and
rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical
trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states
to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for
Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add
Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.5955 Israel had previously been under the Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and
some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might
encounter political encounter political chal engeschallenges in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel. in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel.
Other factors influencing regional cooperation and rivalry might include the following: Other factors influencing regional cooperation and rivalry might include the following:
  Arms sales. Shortly after the UAE’s normalization deal with Israel, the Trump Shortly after the UAE’s normalization deal with Israel, the Trump
Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale to the UAE Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale to the UAE of F-35 Joint of F-35 Joint
Strike Fighters, armed MQ-9 Reaper drones, and munitions.Strike Fighters, armed MQ-9 Reaper drones, and munitions.6056 While noting the While noting the
U.S. legal requirement to maintain Israel’s QME, Israeli officials stated that they U.S. legal requirement to maintain Israel’s QME, Israeli officials stated that they
would not oppose the sale. The United States and UAEwould not oppose the sale. The United States and UAE reportedly signed a letter reportedly signed a letter
of offer and acceptance for the sale in the final hours of the Trump of offer and acceptance for the sale in the final hours of the Trump
Administration.Administration.6157 Implementing the deal and delivering the items is expected to Implementing the deal and delivering the items is expected to
take years. The outcome of this transaction and others that might follow to Arab take years. The outcome of this transaction and others that might follow to Arab

56 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “T he T alented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020.
57 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “ Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
14, 2020.
58 “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” Times of Israel, August 14,
2020.
59 Jared Szuba, “T rump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,
2021.
60 Defense Security Cooperation Agency T ransmittals 21-01, 21-03, and 21-05, November 10, 2020.
61 Valerie Insinna, “ Just hours before Biden’s inauguration, the UAE and US come to a deal on F-35 sales,” Defense
News, January 20, 2021.
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states in connection with normalization could depend on issues including QME states in connection with normalization could depend on issues including QME
considerations, human rights concerns (such as those involved in Yemen’s considerations, human rights concerns (such as those involved in Yemen’s
ongoing conflict), and prospects for regional arms races involving suppliers such ongoing conflict), and prospects for regional arms races involving suppliers such
as Russia and China.as Russia and China.6258
  Mutual economic benefits. Wider access to markets, technology sharing, and Wider access to markets, technology sharing, and
road or rail infrastructure linking the Gulf with the Mediterranean are some of the road or rail infrastructure linking the Gulf with the Mediterranean are some of the
potential economic benefits of expanded Israel-Arab relations.potential economic benefits of expanded Israel-Arab relations.6359 Gulf states may Gulf states may
feel urgency to attract investment that could help them diversify their fossil-fuel feel urgency to attract investment that could help them diversify their fossil-fuel
export-centered economies, and many regional countries may anticipate the need export-centered economies, and many regional countries may anticipate the need
to boost their appeal as trade and investment partners in light of new
opportunities amid increased global competition (including between the United
States and China) for markets, resources, and infrastructure projects.
Additional y, UAE sovereign wealth fund Mubadala signed a memorandum of
understanding in April 2021 to purchase a stake in Israel’s Tamar offshore natural
gas field. Section 1279 of the U.S.-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act
of 2020 (Title XII, Subtitle H of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act,
P.L. 116-283) authorized the establishment of a program to support Arab-Israeli
cooperation on innovation and advanced technologies.
 Arab public opinion. Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining
normalization with Israel might gauge whether expected benefits from
normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism or unrest they
might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.64 Public opinion polls
from the past decade suggest relatively unchanging and widespread Arab
opposition to diplomatic recognition of Israel.65 Normalization efforts to date
have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public
opinion, its drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of
authoritarian Arab regimes. It is unclear whether Gulf populations with no direct
history of armed conflict with Israel might be more wil ing to accept pragmatic
cooperation with Israel than those in Egypt, Jordan, and other countries who have
fought Israel in the past.
The above factors could influence future Saudi decisions on normalization with Israel. Some key
Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be wil ing to
drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. Specific incentives to do so could include heightened regional cooperation on Iran,

62 CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military 54 Yoel Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No. 1396, October 29, 2020. 55 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, 2021. 56 Defense Security Cooperation Agency Transmittals 21-01, 21-03, and 21-05, November 10, 2020. 57 Valerie Insinna, “Just hours before Biden’s inauguration, the UAE and US come to a deal on F-35 sales,” Defense News, January 20, 2021. 58 CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, ,
coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti. coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
63 T he59 The Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “ Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “ Recognizing also their shared goalRecognizing also their shared goal to advance regional to advance regional
economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promo tepromote collaborations on collaborations on
strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a mult ilateralmultilateral working group for the working group for the
‘‘T racksTracks for Regional Peace’ project.” for Regional Peace’ project.” T heThe Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from
Israel to SaudiIsrael to Saudi Arabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in AugustArabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in August 2019. A major part of its appeal would2019. A major part of its appeal would be be
allowingallowing the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab
al-Mandabal-Mandab (Red Sea).(Red Sea). See See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, T racks“Tracks for regional peace—regional land for regional peace—regional land bridge bridge and hub and hub
initiative,initiative,” August 5, 2019. Congressional Research Service 11 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief to boost their appeal as trade and investment partners in light of new opportunities amid increased global competition (including between the United States and China) for markets, resources, and infrastructure projects. Additionally, UAE sovereign wealth fund Mubadala signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2021 to purchase a stake in Israel’s Tamar offshore natural gas field. Section 1279 of the U.S.-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020 (Title XII, Subtitle H of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 116-283) authorized the establishment of a program to support Arab-Israeli cooperation on innovation and advanced technologies.  Arab public opinion. Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining normalization with Israel might gauge whether expected benefits from normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism or unrest they might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.60 Public opinion polls from the past decade suggest relatively unchanging and widespread Arab opposition to diplomatic recognition of Israel.61 Normalization efforts to date have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public opinion, its drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of authoritarian Arab regimes. It is unclear whether Gulf populations with no direct history of armed conflict with Israel might be more willing to accept pragmatic cooperation with Israel than those in Egypt, Jordan, and other countries who have fought Israel in the past. Iran and the Region Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (especially in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),62 and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as the “the campaign between wars.”63 Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions Israel August 5, 2019.
64 See, for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” Wall Street
Journal, December 17, 2020.
65 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief, Figure 88,
available at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab-Opinion-Index-2019-2020-
Inbreef-English-Version.pdf.
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U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects to boost Saudi economic diversification, and greater
Saudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.66
The Biden Administration and 117th Congress
The Biden Administration has said that it seeks to help Israel normalize its relations with Arab
states in ways that preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and it has not reversed steps that the Trump Administration took in apparent
connection with Israel’s 2020 agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. In the
117th Congress, companion bil s encouraging Israel-Arab state normalization have been
introduced in the Senate in March 2021 (S. 1061) and House in April (H.R. 2748). While the
Administration briefly paused the UAE arms sales described above, it announced in April that the
sales would proceed.67 In the same month, the Administration announced a resumption of
economic, humanitarian, and non-lethal security assistance to the Palestinians at a level somewhat
lower than previously provided, perhaps partly owing to some legal constraints on U.S. economic
aid that are linked to PLO/PA welfare payments that arguably incentivize acts of terror.68 As part
of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey
Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (Title VIII of P.L. 116-260) authorized the future
establishment of a fund to support Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and reconciliation programs, and
an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation.
It is uncertain how the Biden Administration’s resumption of U.S. aid for Palestinians and its
other policies might affect Israeli-Palestinian issues broadly. Reports suggest that the
Administration may not urgently press Israelis and Palestinians to resume direct negotiations.69 It
is also unclear whether the Administration wil reverse Trump-era actions affecting U.S.-
Palestinian diplomacy and the status of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
International public debate has taken place over al eged Israeli human rights violations against
Palestinians. International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced in March that
she was opening an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.70 Additional y,
in April a bil was introduced in the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the
amount of U.S. aid provided to Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some of those
human rights al egations.71 Later in April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the chair and
ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or

66 Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel.”
67 Jacob Magid, “ Biden aide on UAE F-35 sale: Only Israel was meant to have those jets in region,” Times of Israel,
November 1, 2020. For background on various issues at play, see CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military
Edge and Possible U.S. Arm s Sales to the United Arab Em irates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
68 CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti.
69 Jacob Magid, “ Biden hopes to deprioritize Israel-Palestinian conflict but might not be able to,” Times of Israel,
December 11, 2020.
70 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
71 “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel of apartheid over treatment of Palestinians,” Associated Press, April 27, 2021
(underlying Human Rights Watch report available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-
authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution, with the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights
Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-
rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/).
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adding conditions on security assistance to Israel,72 citing a similar argument that President Biden
made during the 2020 presidential race.73
As discussed above (see “U.S. Policy Considerations and Proposed Arms Sale”), amid May 2021
Israel-Gaza violence some Members have opposed or sought further consultation from the Biden
Administration about a proposed $735 mil ion commercial y licensed sale of precision-guided
munitions to Israel.74 On May 19, nine House Members introduced a joint resolution of
disapproval to block the export, and Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a counterpart joint
resolution in the Senate on May 20.75
Iran and the Region
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (especial y in
Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),76 and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war
similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the
smal -scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their al ies as
the “the campaign between wars.”77
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement
on Iran’s nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). on Iran’s nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). He
Then-Prime Minister Netanyahu opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration, and welcomed opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration, and welcomed
President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and
accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the
intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement.
U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional
uncertainty, with implications for Israel.78 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s
demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could
transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.79 In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence
that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab
Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.80 Additional y, reported low-level

72 T ext of letter available at https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf.
73 Omri Nahmias, “ Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020.
74 State Department notification to congressional committees of jurisdiction; Jacqueline Alemany et al., “ Biden
administration’s $735 million weapons sale to Israel faces scrutin y,” Washington Post, May 18, 2021; Bryant Harris,
“Democratic leaders seek to quell pro-Palestinian uprising in US Congress,” The National (UAE), May 20, 2021.
75 See footnote 29.
76 For information on this topic, see CRS intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement. 60 See, for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2020. 61 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief, Figure 88, available at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab-Opinion-Index-2019-2020-Inbreef-English-Version.pdf. 62 For information on this topic, see CRS Report R44017, Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman. , by Kenneth Katzman.
7763 See, See, for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: T he Inevit ableThe Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security,
January 6, 2021. January 6, 2021.
78 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman,
Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton T homas.
79 Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reactor,” haaretz.com,
October 6, 2019.
80 T om O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as Red Sea T ensions Rise,” Newsweek,
January 13, 2021.
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Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional uncertainty, with implications for Israel.64 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.65 In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.66 Additionally, reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—cyberspace, international waters, and the territory of other Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—cyberspace, international waters, and the territory of other
regional countries—has further exacerbated regional tensions.regional countries—has further exacerbated regional tensions.8167
As the Biden Administration As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy to consider possibly reentering engages in international diplomacy to consider possibly reentering
the JCPOA, Israel—the JCPOA, Israel—with Prime Minister Netanyahu and other key figures opposing such awhose officials are generally skeptical of U.S. U.S.
reentry—is one of several regional U.S. partners voicing interest in having its views taken into reentry—is one of several regional U.S. partners voicing interest in having its views taken into
account.82 Some observers speculateaccount.68 Just before his installation as prime minister, Naftali Bennett said to the Knesset, “Resuming a nuclear deal with Iran is a mistake that will legitimize one of the world's most violent regimes.”69 Some observers have speculated that Israeli covert or military operations might influence or that Israeli covert or military operations might influence or
disrupt diplomacy on the nuclear issue.disrupt diplomacy on the nuclear issue.8370 It is unclear whether the June government transition may affect this dynamic. An April 2021 explosion and power outage—widely An April 2021 explosion and power outage—widely
attributed to Israel—that reportedly disabled thousands of centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium attributed to Israel—that reportedly disabled thousands of centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium
enrichment facility led Iran to begin enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, closer to weapons-enrichment facility led Iran to begin enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, closer to weapons-
grade levels.grade levels.8471
Hezbollah
Lebanese HezbollahLebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state al yally in the region. Hezbollah’s in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have forces and Israel’s military have sporadical ysporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.conflict.8572 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional
implications.implications.8673 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly
Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its
projectiles—and its al eged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.87
Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah
conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build
precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.88 Some reports assess that Hezbollah does not want
escalation, partly due to significant political and economic problems in Lebanon, but do not rule
out the potential for heightened conflict owing to miscalculation between Hezbollah and Israel.89

81 “Fighting in the Shadows: Israel and Iran,” Soufan Center, March 30, 2021; Dalia Dassa Kaye, “ Has Israel been
sabotaging Iran? Here’s what we know,” washingtonpost.com, July 15, 2020.
82 See also Yaniv Kubovich and Judy 64 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas. 65 Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reactor,” haaretz.com, October 6, 2019. 66 Tom O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as Red Sea Tensions Rise,” Newsweek, January 13, 2021. 67 “Fighting in the Shadows: Israel and Iran,” Soufan Center, March 30, 2021; Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Has Israel been sabotaging Iran? Here’s what we know,” washingtonpost.com, July 15, 2020. 68 See also Yaniv Kubovich and Judy Maltz, “Israel’s Chief of Staff: Return to Iran Deal Is ‘Wrong,’ Military Action Maltz, “Israel’s Chief of Staff: Return to Iran Deal Is ‘Wrong,’ Military Action
‘Should‘Should Be Be on the on the T ableTable,’” haaretz.com, January 27, 2021. ,’” haaretz.com, January 27, 2021.
8369 Noa Shpigel, “Incoming PM Bennett Says Resuming Iran Nuclear Deal Would Be Mistake in Knesset Address,” haaretz.com, June 13, 2021. 70 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “ Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “ Israel and Iran Are PullingIsrael and Iran Are Pulling the United States the United States T owardToward
ConflictConflict ,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “ T heThe ramifications of a US return to the ramifications of a US return to the
2015 Iran deal—opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021. 2015 Iran deal—opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021.
8471 “Iran Begins 60 Percent Uranium Enrichment After Natanz Attack, Top Negotiator Says,” haaretz.com (with content “Iran Begins 60 Percent Uranium Enrichment After Natanz Attack, Top Negotiator Says,” haaretz.com (with content
from from Associated Press and and Reuters), April 13, 2021. ), April 13, 2021.
85 72 CRS CRS Report R44759, Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud;, by Carla E. Humud; CRS CRS In FocusIn Focus IF10703, IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. , by Carla E.
Humud. Humud.
8673 For possible For possible conflict scenarios, see Nicholas Blanford and Assafconflict scenarios, see Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion, Orion, Counting the cost: Avoiding another war
between Israel and Hezbollah, , Atlantic Council, May 13, 2020; Hanin Ghaddar,, May 13, 2020; Hanin Ghaddar, “ “How Will Hezbollah Respond to How Will Hezbollah Respond to
Israel’s Drone Attack?” Israel’s Drone Attack?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch 3171, August 28, 2019. , Policywatch 3171, August 28, 2019.
87 See, for example, “ Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28,
2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “ Who Warns Hezbollah T hat Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York
Tim es, April 23, 2020.
88 “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press; Ben Caspit, “ Hezbollah, Israel
losing red lines,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2019.
89 See, for example, Amos Harel, “ For Hezbollah, Beirut Devastation Makes Provoking Israel Even Riskier,”
haaretz.com, August 6, 2020.
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Israel: May 2021 Violence, Other Background, Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.74 Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.75 Some reports assess that Hezbollah does not want escalation, partly due to significant political and economic problems in Lebanon, but do not rule out the potential for heightened conflict owing to miscalculation between Hezbollah and Israel.76 74 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times, April 23, 2020. 75 “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press; Ben Caspit, “Hezbollah, Israel losing red lines,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2019. 76 See, for example, Amos Harel, “For Hezbollah, Beirut Devastation Makes Provoking Israel Even Riskier,” haaretz.com, August 6, 2020. Congressional Research Service 14 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from CIA, The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are forecasts for 2021 unless otherwise specified. Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. Congressional Research Service 15 Israel: New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief Appendix Band U.S. Relations in Brief

China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns90
U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in
Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure.91 Israel-China investment ties have grown
since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,92 with Israel as an attractive hub of
innovation for Chinese partners, and China as a huge potential export market and source of
investment for Israeli businesses.
Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U.S. expressions of concern,93
apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather intel igence or acquire technologies
with the potential to threaten U.S. national security in such fields as cybersecurity, artificial
intel igence, satel ite communications, and robotics. Previously, China-Israel defense industry
cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U.S.-Israel defense relationship
and to an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China.94 Partly due to U.S.
concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on
foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.95 However, this panel reportedly does not have the
authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s
investments in Israel in the previous decade.96 Apparently, debate continues within Israel’s
government about how to balance economic interests with national security concerns.97
In the past two years, U.S. officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement
in specific Israeli infrastructure projects. President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister
Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be
limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel,
in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U.S. al ies and
partners.98 Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials reportedly blocked
Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure.99 In May 2020,
shortly after then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that
Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U.S.-Israel cooperation, Israel’s finance

90 For background on past U.S. concerns regarding Israeli defense transactions with China, see CRS Report RL33476,
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy
M. Sharp.
91 Shira Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and
the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020; Shira Efron, et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, RAND
Corporation, 2019; Jewish Institute for National Securit y of America, Countering Chinese Engagem ent with Israel: A
Com prehensive and Cooperative U.S.-Israeli Strategy, February 2021.
92 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations, coordinated by
Susan V. Lawrence.
93 Ron Kampeas, “ Breaking China: A rupture looms between Israel and the United States,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency,
June 2, 2020.
94 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, pp. 15-20.
95 Arie Egozi, “ Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China T argeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019.
96 Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology, 2020, pp. 24-25.
97 James M. Dorsey, “ Israel-China Relations: Staring into the Abyss of US-Chinese Decoupling,” The Globalist, June
9, 2020; Mercy A. Kuo, “ US-China-Israel Relations: Pompeo’s Visit ,” The Diplomat, May 27, 2020.
98 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “ My Way or the Huawei? T he United States-China Race for 5G
Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019.
99 Hiddai Segev and Assaf Orion, “ T he Great Power Competition over 5G Communications: Limited Success for the
American Campaign against Huawei,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1268, March 3, 2020.
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ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1.5 bil ion desalination plant, turning down
the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group.100
Additional y, the U.S. Navy reportedly reconsidered its practice of periodical y docking at the
Israeli naval base in Haifa, because a state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International
Port Group) secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years
(beginning in 2021).101 In the conference report (H.Rept. 116-333) accompanying the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92), Congress recommended that the U.S.
government “convey to the Government of Israel the serious security concerns with respect to the
leasing arrangements of the Port of Haifa, and urge consideration of the security implications of
such foreign investment in Israel.” Other state-owned Chinese companies are developing a new
port in Ashdod (which also hosts an Israeli naval base), and taking part in construction for Tel
Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa.102

100 “Amid US pressure, Israel taps local firm over China for $1.5b desalination plant ,” Times of Israel, May 26, 2020.
101 Roie Yellinek, “ T he Israel-China-U.S. T riangle and the Haifa Port Project,” Middle East Institute, November 27,
2018. Reportedly, the Israeli government plans to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances.
Jack Detsch, “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2019.
102 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, p. 38.
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Appendix. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset
and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats
Israel’s historical repository . Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset and Their Leaders RIGHT Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats (Opposition) Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorialterritorial compromise;compromise; has also championed free-markethas also championed free-market policies.policies.
Leader: Binyamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu Born in 1949, Netanyahu has served as prime minister since 2009served as prime minister from 2009 to June 2021, and also was prime and also was prime
minister from minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret forces unit (Sayeret
Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a careerMatkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politicsin politics and and
diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticismdiplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of regarding the exchange of
land for peace with the Palestinians and his desireland for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s to counter Iran’s nuclear program nuclear program
and regionaland regional influence. He is influence. He is general y generally regarded as both a regarded as both a consummate political consummate political
dealmaker dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats (Coalition) Pro-secular, and a security-minded nationalist. However, he has negotiated with the
Palestinians, and many observers discern cautiousness in Netanyahu’s decisions
regarding the nature and scale of military operations. His rhetorical support for more
assertive populist and nationalistic measures (including diminishing judicial powers and
annexing West Bank territory) has increased after criminal al egations surfaced
against him for corruption.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakersspeakers from the formerfrom the former Soviet Union. Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, LiebermanBorn in 1958, Lieberman served as Israel’s defense minister until his resignation in
November 2018. He served as Israel’s foreign minister for most of the period from
2009 to May 2015 and is general y is Israel’s finance minister, and has previously served as defense minister and foreign minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and canny political viewed as an ardent nationalist and canny political
actor with primeactor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the Soviet Union (in was born in the Soviet Union (in
what is now Moldova) and immigratedwhat is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He to Israel in 1978. He worked worked under Netanyahu under Netanyahu
from 1988 to 1997. Disil usionedfrom 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s by Netanyahu’s wil ingnesswil ingness to considerto consider concessions concessions
to the Palestinians, Liebermanto the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael founded Yisrael Beitenu as a platform for former Beitenu as a platform for former
Soviet immigrants.Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption He was acquitted of corruption al egationsallegations in a 2013 case. in a 2013 case.
Yamina (Right) – 7 seats (Right) – 7 seats
(Coalition) Right-of-center mergerRight-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home,of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National and National
Union; base of support among religiousUnion; base of support among religious Zionists Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews); (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews);
includes core constituencies supporting Westincludes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlementsBank settlements and annexation. Leader: Prime Minister Naftali Bennett (biography in textbox in the main body of the report) New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats (Coalition) New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters. Leader: Gideon Sa’ar Born in 1966, Sa’ar serves as justice minister. He served as cabinet secretary in the 1990s (for Prime Minister Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel and annexation.
Leader: Naftali Bennett
Born in 1972, Bennett served previously as defense, education, and economy
minister. He served in various special forces units (including as a reservist during the
2006 Hezbol ah conflict in Lebanon). Bennett was a successful software entrepreneur
and has lived in America. He served as Netanyahu’s chief of staff from 2006 to 2008
while Netanyahu was opposition leader. He led the Yesha Council (the umbrel a
organization for Israeli West Bank settlers) from 2010 to 2012.
New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats
New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu
and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters.
Leader: Gideon Sa’ar
Born in 1966, Sa’ar served as cabinet secretary in the 1990s (for Prime Minister
Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon). He became an Sharon). He became an
influential and popular memberinfluential and popular member of Likud,of Likud, first elected to the first elected to the Knesset in 2003. He Knesset in 2003. He
served as education ministerserved as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior from 2009 to 2013 and interior minister minister from 2013 to from 2013 to
2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019 2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019 but left Likud to form but left Likud to form
New Hope a year later. New Hope a year later.
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Israel: May 2021 Violence, Other Background, New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief

Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats
(Opposition) Grouping of right-of-center parties including ReligiousGrouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/NationalZionism/National Union-Union-
Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections. Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism
since 2019. A trained lawyer,since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promotehe has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish Jewish
nationalist and religiouslynationalist and religiously conservative conservative causes. causes.

LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – 7 seats (Avoda) – 7 seats (Coalition)
Labor is Israel’sLabor is Israel’s historical repositoryhistorical repository of social democratic,of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’sZionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility responsibility for Palestinians for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza. in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli Born in 1966, Michaeli is transportation minister. She became Labor’sbecame Labor’s leader in 2020 leader in 2020 and was first elected to the and was first elected to the

Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics,Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she she founded and headed an founded and headed an
organization that supports victimsorganization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a of sexual assault, and was a regular regular national media national media
presence and university lecturer.presence and university lecturer.
Meretz (Vigor) – 6 seats (Vigor) – 6 seats
(Coalition) Meretz is a pro-secular ZionistMeretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiativesparty that supports initiatives for social justice and for social justice and
peace with the Palestinians. peace with the Palestinians.
Leader: Nitzan Horowitz
Born in 1965, Horowitz Born in 1965, Horowitz is health minister. He became Meretz’sbecame Meretz’s leader in 2019 and was first elected to the leader in 2019 and was first elected to the
Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent journalist journalist before entering before entering
politics. politics.

CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future)(There Is a Future) – 17 seats – 17 seats
(Coalition) Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomicsocioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid Born in 1963, Lapid is foreign minister and alternate prime minister. Under the government’s power-sharing agreement, he is set to become prime minister in August 2023. He Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid came to politicscame to politics after a career as a journalist, television after a career as a journalist, television
presenter,presenter, and author. He founded the Yesh Atid party in 2012, and fromand author. He founded the Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from 2013 to 2013 to
2014 he served as finance minister. 2014 he served as finance minister.
Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 8 seats (Blue and White) – 8 seats
(Coalition) Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime MinisterCentrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu, Netanyahu,
ostensibly seekingostensibly seeking to preserveto preserve long-standing Israelilong-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary, institutions such as the judiciary,
articulate a visionarticulate a vision of Israeliof Israeli nationalism that is morenationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab inclusive of Druze and Arab
citizens, and have greatercitizens, and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian
issues.issues.
Leader: Benny Gantz

Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister, justice minister, and alternate prime
minister, and could become prime minister by November 2021 under a power-
sharing agreement with Netanyahu. He served Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister. He served as Chief of Generalas Chief of General Staff of the Israel Staff of the Israel
Defense ForcesDefense Forces from 2011 to 2015.from 2011 to 2015.
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ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats
(Opposition) Mizrahi HarediMizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare(“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle;support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromiseopposes compromise with Palestinians on control over with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, DeriBorn in 1959, Deri is Israel’s interior minister and minister for Negev and Galilee
development. He led Shas from led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interiorfraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In AprilHe returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In April 2021, he 2021, he al owedallowed a party col eague a party col eague
to take his Knesset seat. to take his Knesset seat.

United Torah Judaism – 7 seats – 7 seats
(Opposition) Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat YisraelAshkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degeland Degel Ha’torah); favors welfareHa’torah); favors welfare and and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle;education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorialopposes territorial compromise compromise with with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; general y seeks generally seeks greater application of Jewish greater application of Jewish
law. law.
Leader: Yaakov Litzman
Born in 1948, Litzman Born in 1948, Litzman is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He was born in was born in
Germany and raised in the United States before Germany and raised in the United States before immigrating immigrating to Israel in 1965. to Israel in 1965.
Educated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he later servedEducated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he later served as principal of a as principal of a
Hasidic girls’Hasidic girls’ school in Jerusalem.school in Jerusalem. In AprilIn April 2021, he 2021, he alowed a party coleague allowed a party col eague to take to take
his Knesset seat. his Knesset seat.
ARAB
Joint List – 6 seats – 6 seats
(Opposition) Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialistElectoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist and Arab nationalist
political strains:political strains: HadashHadash (Democratic(Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal), Movement for Renewal), and BaladBalad (National Democratic(National Democratic Assembly). Assembly).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialistBorn in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the party, and of the
Joint List.Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s
national leader in 2006. national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am)(UAL or Ra’am) – 4 seats – 4 seats
(Coalition) IslamistIslamist Arab party that embodiesArab party that embodies conservative socialconservative social values while seekingvalues while seeking state state
support to improvesupport to improve Arabs’ socioeconomicArabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist.

Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
Note: Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election. Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election.

Author Information Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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Israel: May 2021 Violence, Other Background, New Prime Minister and U.S. Relations in Brief


Author Information

Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs



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