Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
May 11, 2021
The following matters are of particular significance to U.S.-Israel relations.
Jim Zanotti
Violence and unrest over Gaza and Jerusalem. Violence and unrest has flared in May 2021
Specialist in Middle
around Gaza and Jerusalem, largely in connection with a controversial case about the possible
Eastern Affairs
eviction of several Palestinians from their East Jerusalem homes. It is unclear to what extent

violence might escalate as the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization) and other militants fire rockets into Israel, and Israel retaliates inside Gaza.

Domestic issues: An end to or continuation of Netanyahu’s rule? After the collapse of its power-sharing government in
December 2020, Israel held another round of elections—an unprecedented fourth in two years—for its Knesset (parliament)
in March 2021. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of the Likud party—the largest in the Knesset—has been unable to form
a new government in the face of significant opposition to his continued rule, while he faces an ongoing criminal corruption
trial. Yair Lapid of the Yesh Atid party has until early June to forge a coalition supported by disparate parties from across the
political spectrum. If Lapid is successful, Naftali Bennett—a former defense minister whose Yamina party supports Israeli
settlements and partial West Bank annexation—might precede Lapid in an initial 27-month rotation as prime minister. If no
one can form a government, another round of elections would probably take place in the fall of 2021, and Netanyahu would
remain as caretaker prime minister (as he did from December 2018 to May 2020) until November 17, when the power-
sharing arrangement Netanyahu entered into last year would lead to Defense and Justice Minister Benny Gantz of the Kahol
Lavan party taking over in the caretaker role.
Palestinians and Arab state normalization. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among
Israelis and Palestinians, the Biden Administration has stated its intention to reengage with Palestinian leaders and people,
after the Trump Administration took several actions that generally favored Israeli positions and appeared to alienate
Palestinian leadership. In April, the Biden Administration announced the resumption of some types of aid to the Palestinians.
Amid some debate on issues that could affect aid to Israel and the Palestinians, the Administration has voiced opposition to
unilateral steps—including annexation, settlement activity, or incitement to violence—by either side. Additionally, the
Administration has expressed support for continuing the Arab-Israeli normalization efforts that began in 2020 under the
Trump Administration, as reflected in agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and
Morocco. In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex part of the West
Bank, though announcements related to settlement activity have accelerated since then.
Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and rivalry among key actors in
the Middle East. Arab-Israeli common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate in countering Iran and perhaps even
Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for Sunni Islamist movements. The January 2021 shift of Israel
from the purview of U.S. European Command to U.S. Central Command may increase Arab-Israeli military interoperability.
Other factors affecting regional cooperation and rivalry might include U.S. arms sales (including a proposed sale of the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter and MQ-9 drone aircraft to the UAE), mutual economic benefits, and Arab public opinion. Some of these
factors could determine whether Saudi Arabia drops preconditions related to Palestinian national demands on normalizing its
relations with Israel.
Iran and other regional issues. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Netanyahu strongly supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the
2015 international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Facing intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its
compliance with the 2015 agreement. Netanyahu has made statements opposing the Biden Administration’s possible reentry
into the agreement. In light of recent incidents targeting Iran’s nuclear program that may have been Israeli covert actions,
observers have speculated about future Israeli actions to influence or disrupt nuclear diplomacy. Israel also has reportedly
conducted a number of military operations in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon against Iran and its allies due to concerns about Iran’s
efforts to establish a permanent presence in these areas and improve the accuracy of Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal.
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. concerns. U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over Chinese
investments in Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure that could increase China’s ability to gather intelligence
and acquire security-related technologies. While Chinese state-owned companies remain engaged in some specific
infrastructure projects, including at seaports in Haifa and Ashdod, in May 2020 Israel turned down the bid of a Chinese-
affiliated company to construct a major desalination plant.
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Introduction: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (see Figure 1) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas;
issues with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations include the following.
 Violence and unrest in May 2021 over the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem.
 Israeli domestic political issues, including questions about whether March 2021
election results wil lead to a new government or more elections, while Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s criminal trial continues.
 Israel’s security cooperation with the United States.
 Israeli-Palestinian issues and Israel’s normalization of relations with various
Arab states.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah.
 Chinese investment in Israeli companies and infrastructure, and U.S. concerns
about implications for U.S. national security.
For background information and analysis on these and other topics, including aid, arms sales, and
missile defense cooperation, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations,
by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.

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Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intel igence Agency GeoNames
Database (2015); DeLorme (2014). Fact information from CIA, The World Factbook; and Economist Intel igence
Unit. Al numbers are forecasts for 2021 unless otherwise specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additional y, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
Violence and Unrest over Gaza and Jerusalem
Various factors have combined to fuel an escalation of unrest and violence in and around the Gaza
Strip and Jerusalem in May 2021. To date, the Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated
terrorist organization) and other militants based in the Gaza Strip have fired hundreds of rockets
into Israel—reportedly causing at least three deaths and several injuries, including with a major
barrage in the Tel Aviv area. Hamas has cast itself as a defender of Jerusalem amid unrest there,
including at the Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) holy sites—a place of frequent
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Jewish-Muslim contention.1 Hamas’s rocket attacks have contributed to a risk of full-blown
conflict as Israel’s military has retaliated, reportedly kil ing at least 28 people in Gaza, and has
increased troop deployments near Gaza’s borders.
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian
conditions.2 Palestinian militants in Gaza periodical y clash with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with
Israel, with militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilian areas in southern Israel and Gaza,
respectively. These incidents periodical y escalate toward larger conflict—with major hostilities taking place in
2008-2009, 2012, and 2014. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to help manage the flow
of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent conflict escalation.
The tension in Jerusalem has mounted throughout the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which
ends on or around May 12. Some provocations—reportedly fueled by social media—have been
tied to Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement and worship in and around the Mount/Haram
and Old City, isolated attacks by Palestinians, and demonstrations by Jewish nationalist groups.3
Unrest has intensified in response to controversy that surrounds the possible eviction of several
Palestinian families from their longtime residences in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood of East
Jerusalem, and stems from Israeli legal assertions that Jewish groups acquired the property years
ago.4 Israel’s Supreme Court temporarily delayed a hearing on the case amid the unrest.
Palestinian leaders and some activists and international actors claim that the case is part of a
systematic Israeli disregard for Palestinian rights in East Jerusalem since the area’s capture and
effective annexation as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.5 Critics of Israeli actions connect
this situation with concerns about Jewish settlement activity and other al egations that Israel
violates international law and Palestinian human rights.6
In response to the violence and unrest, U.S. officials have expressed concern about the possible
Sheikh Jarrah evictions and have cal ed for general de-escalation, while also supporting Israel’s
right to self-defense.7 See “The Biden Administration and 117th Congress” section below for
more on U.S. policy on Israeli-Palestinian issues.
It is unclear to what extent the situation might escalate further among Israelis and Palestinians.
Reports have emerged from Israeli cities such as Lod and Haifa of widespread unrest involving
Arab citizens of Israel. Since the last major conflict between Israel and Hamas in 2014,
subsequent flare-ups have subsided short of that level. Factors affecting escalation or de-
escalation could include:

1 For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Jim Zanotti.
2 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
3 “From T ikTok to T emple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem ,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021.
4 Nir Hasson, “ Jerusalem Clashes: How Palestinians Rallied Behind Sheikh Jarrah,” haaretz.com, May 8, 2021. Some
Israeli human rights organizations estimate that more than 1,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem across a number of
cases are at risk of being evicted from their current residences. Joseph Krauss, “ Palestinians fear loss of family homes
as evictions loom,” Associated Press, May 10, 2021.
5 Patrick Kingsley, “ Israel's Supreme Court Delays Expulsion of Palestinian Families in East Jerusalem ,” New York
Tim es, May 10, 2021.
6 Al-Haq, Action Alert: International Community Must T ake Immediate and Concrete Measures to Halt Israel’s
Aggression against Palestinian Jerusalemites, May 10, 2021.
7 State Department Press Briefing – May 10, 2021.
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 whether Hamas assesses that an extended period of conflict—despite expected casualties
and damage in Gaza—could boost its domestic popularity, further fuel unrest around in
Jerusalem and elsewhere, and increase pressure on Israel’s leaders;
 the extent to which Israeli measures (including its Iron Dome anti-rocket system) prevent,
deter, or provoke additional violence, and protect or harm Israeli and Palestinian
civilians;8
 disruptions or perceived disruptions to the “status quo” arrangement governing worship
at Jerusalem’s holy sites, especial y the Mount/Haram;9
 unsettled questions of leadership and succession within both Israel and the Palestinian
Authority;10
 how international actors respond, including U.S. officials and lawmakers, and Arab states
who have recently improved or sought to improve their relations with Israel; and
 diplomacy addressing various parties’ grievances and concerns.
After March 2021 Elections: Will Netanyahu’s Rule
End or Continue?
On March 23, 2021, Israel held its fourth election in the past two years (previous elections took
place in April and September 2019 and March 2020). The Likud party, led by Prime Minister
Netanyahu, won the most Knesset seats in the March 23 election (see Appendix), despite
criminal indictments against Netanyahu for corruption (see Figure 2).

8 For more on Iron Dome, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
9 “From T ikTok to T emple Mount Clashes: 28 Days of Violence in Jerusalem ,” haaretz.com, May 10, 2021. Under the
“status quo” arrangement (largely based on past practices dating from the 16th century that Israel pledges to uphold),
Muslims can access the Mount/Haram and worship there, while Jews and other non -Muslims are permitted limited
access but not permitted to worship. Jewish worship is permitted at the Western Wall at the base of the Mount/Haram.
10 Neri Zilber, “ Violent Jerusalem Clashes Just the Start of Bloody Days to Come,” Daily Beast, May 10, 2021.
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Figure 2. Indictments Against Netanyahu and Steps of the Legal Process
Indictments
Case 1000: Netanyahu received favors from Hol ywood mogul Arnon Milchan and Australian
bil ionaire James Packer, in return for taking actions in Milchan’s favor.
The charge: Fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: There is no legal problem in receiving gifts from friends; did not
know that his family members requested gifts.
Case 2000: Netanyahu and Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Arnon Mozes struck a deal: Favorable
coverage for Netanyahu in return for limiting the circulation of the Sheldon Adelson-owned newspaper
Israel Hayom.
The charge: Fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: He had no intention of implementing the deal, and relations
between politicians and the media should not be criminalized.
Case 4000: As communication minister, Netanyahu took steps that benefited Shaul Elovitch who
control ed telecom company Bezeq—in return for favorable coverage in Bezeq’s Wal a News site
The charge: Bribery, fraud and breach of trust
Netanyahu’s defense: There is no evidence that he was aware of making regulations
contingent on favorable coverage.
Selected Steps in the Legal Process, and
the Time Between Them

Sources: For “Indictments,” the content comes from Ha’aretz graphics adapted by CRS. For “Selected Steps in
the Legal Process, and the Time Between Them,” CRS prepared the graphics and made slight content
adjustments to underlying source material from Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre. The
interval listed between Steps 4-5 is an estimate.
The bloc of parties that openly support Netanyahu is short of majority backing in the Knesset.
Some politicians on the right of the political spectrum—ideological y close to Netanyahu—have
adopted critiques of Netanyahu previously made by many from the left and center, claiming that
he prioritizes his individual power and survival over Israeli national interests, institutions, and
rule of law. Nevertheless, it is not clear that parties who oppose Netanyahu’s continued rule can
garner a Knesset majority. The possible stalemate could result in another election taking place
later in 2021. A March Wall Street Journal article analyzed some effects of the ongoing political
dysfunction:
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Israel has been without a permanent budget for 13 months now, the longest period in its
history. Infrastructure spending and other government programs are stalled, including plans
for a high-speed rail link between Tel Aviv and Eilat, a port and resort on the Red Sea. The
beginning of the school term earlier this year was delayed when the parliament neglected
to pass a special budget for schools to open. The lack of a long -term budget also has
affected the Israeli military's midterm procurement plans.11
In April, Netanyahu received the initial task from Israeli President Reuven Rivlin to try to form a
government, but could not do so within the al otted four weeks. Netanyahu might expect a
government he leads to end or mitigate the ongoing criminal proceedings against him, while
agreeing to support priorities of coalition partners who may seek West Bank annexation, less
independence for Israel’s judiciary, and continued preferential treatment for ultra-Orthodox
citizens. Some Israeli and international observers have expressed concern about the possibility of
far-right figures under the new Religious Zionism list gaining influence in a Netanyahu-led
government.12
On May 5, Rivlin gave four weeks to the Yesh Atid party’s Yair Lapid to form a government.
Lapid, in seeking to oust Netanyahu, has proposed a unity government supported by parties on
the right (Yamina, New Hope, Yisrael Beitenu), center (Kahol Lavan), and left (Labor, Meretz) of
the political spectrum, as wel as the Arab-led Joint List and possibly the United Arab List
(Ra’am) as wel (see Appendix).13 To secure the support of right-leaning parties, Lapid has
proposed that Yamina leader Naftali Bennett serve as prime minister for the first 27 months of the
government’s term, with Lapid rotating into the prime minister’s office after that. However,
forging and maintaining a coalition from such disparate elements may be difficult, as the Joint
List has expressed opposition to Bennett—a staunch advocate of Israeli West Bank settlements
and partial West Bank annexation—serving as prime minister.14 Having such a government
address domestical y controversial issues beyond basic administration and budgeting could
present serious chal enges. If Lapid cannot form a government by June 2, and no one else from
the Knesset can do so in the subsequent two weeks, a new election would be scheduled for a few
months later.
Developments on the following issues could impact the government formation process and
political outcomes:
 Violence and unrest over Gaza and Jerusalem, and the international response.
 Israeli foreign policy issues involving the Biden Administration, Iran, Arab
states, the Palestinians, and other key actors.
 Israel’s efforts to manage the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic,
vaccinations, and associated socioeconomic issues.
Netanyahu and other members of the power-sharing government that formed in May 2020—or
their successors, if any of them leave office—are to serve in an interim capacity until someone
establishes a majority-backed coalition. By its terms, the power-sharing agreement would make
Defense and Justice Minister Benny Gantz prime minister in November 17, 2021 in the absence
of a new coalition agreement.

11 Felicia Schwartz, “ Israel's Election Impasse T hreatens Covid Recovery,” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2021.
12 Joseph Krauss, “ Far-right party set to gain new influence after Israeli vote,” Associated Press, March 23, 2021.
13 Guillaume Lavallee, “ Israel's Lapid Faces Daunting Path T o Anti-Netanyahu Govt,” Agence France Presse, May 6,
2021.
14 In Israel’s history, no Arab-led party has joined a government, but there is a precedent for outside Arab support for a
coalition led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in the 1990s.
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U.S. Security Cooperation15
While Israel maintains robust military and homeland security capabilities, it also cooperates
closely with the United States on national security matters. U.S. law requires the executive branch
to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge,” or QME, and expedites aid
and arms sales to Israel in various ways. Additional y, a 10-year bilateral military aid
memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States to provide
Israel $3.3 bil ion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 mil ion annual y on joint
missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations.
Israel was the first foreign country to purchase and operate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Congress
also has authorized and encouraged bilateral cooperation in a number of specific security-related
areas, including anti-tunnel defense and countering drone aircraft. In January 2021, one source
reported that Israel has provided the United States with two batteries of its Iron Dome missile
defense system for deployment at U.S. military bases in the region or elsewhere, with additional
batteries planned for U.S. use or possible export via U.S.-Israel coproduction.16
Key Foreign Policy Issues
The Palestinians and Arab State Normalization17
Trump Administration
During President Trump’s time in office, his Administration took a number of actions on the
decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict that favored Israeli positions vis-à-vis the Palestinians, as
set forth below.
Selected Trump Administration Actions Impacting Israeli-Palestinian Issues
December 2017
President Trump recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, prompting the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) to cut off high-level
diplomatic relations with the United States.
May 2018
The U.S. embassy opens in Jerusalem.
August 2018
The Administration suspends U.S. contributions to the U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
September 2018
The Administration reprograms FY2017 economic aid for the West Bank and
Gaza to other locations, and announces the closure of the PLO office in
Washington, DC.
January 2019
As a result of the Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-253), the
Administration ends al bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians.
March 2019
The U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem—previously an independent diplomatic
mission to the Palestinians—is subsumed under the authority of the U.S. embassy
to Israel. President Trump recognizes Israeli sovereignty claims in the Golan
Heights.

15 For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
16 Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel allows U.S. to deploy Iron Dome missile defense in the Gulf,” haaretz.com, January 24,
2021.
17 For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF11237, Israel and the Palestinians: Chronology of a Two-State
Solution, by Jim Zanotti.
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November 2019
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says that the Administration disagrees with a
1978 State Department legal opinion stating that Israeli settlements in the West
Bank are inconsistent with international law.
January 2020
President Trump releases Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal that largely favors
Israeli positions and contemplates possible U.S. recognition of Israeli annexation of
some West Bank areas.
August 2020
Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announce the first of four cases in
which the Trump Administration facilitates some normalization of Israel’s relations
with Arab states (Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco fol ow later in the year). Israel
suspends consideration of West Bank annexation in connection with the UAE
deal.
October 2020
The United States and Israel sign agreements removing restrictions on three
binational foundations from funding projects in areas administered by Israel after
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The foundations are the Binational Industrial Research
and Development Foundation (BIRD), the Binational Science Foundation (BSF),
and the Binational Agricultural Research and Development Foundation (BARD) .
November 2020
Secretary Pompeo announces a change in U.S. product labeling regulations,
requiring products from Israeli settlements in the West Bank to be identified as
coming from Israel.
As mentioned above, in the second half of 2020 the Trump Administration’s diplomatic focus
pivoted from its January 2020 Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal to helping Israel reach
agreements on normalization with some Arab countries, as follows:
 United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. In September 2020, Israel signed
the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain at the White House. Under the
Accords, the UAE and Bahrain have established full diplomatic relations with
Israel, and seek to boost cooperation in a number of other areas, including trade,
investment, and tourism.
 Sudan. Sudan signed onto the Abraham Accords in January 2021 after an
October 2020 joint statement with Israel announcing their plans to normalize
relations, and after Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism
list.18 The Sudanese transitional leadership has said that normalization remains
contingent on ratification by a yet-to-be-formed legislative council.
 Morocco. Morocco agreed to sign onto the Abraham Accords in December 2020
at the same time President Trump announced U.S. recognition of Moroccan
sovereignty claims over the disputed territory of Western Sahara.19 While
Morocco’s initial plan—perhaps pending the opening of a U.S. consulate in
Western Sahara20—is to restore the diplomatic liaison offices it maintained with
Israel from 1994 to 2000, the countries’ agreement could lead to full diplomatic
relations along with increased economic and tourism links.

18 CRS Insight IN11531, Sudan’s Removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard. T he
United States also agreed to provide around $1 billion in bridge financing to clear Sudan’s arrears with the World Bank
and allow it to receive future funding. Sami Magdy, “ Sudan says it signs pact on normalizing ties with Israel,”
Associated Press, January 6, 2021.
19 CRS Insight IN11555, Morocco-Israel Normalization and U.S. Policy Change on Western Sahara , by Alexis Arieff,
Jim Zanotti, and Brock R. Williams. T he signing took place later that month.
20 Mohammed Ayesh, “ Arabic press review: Morocco-Israel deal frozen until Biden’s Western Sahara stance clear,”
Middle East Eye, January 22, 2021.
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In connection with its deal with the UAE, Israel agreed in August 2020 to suspend plans to annex
part of the West Bank, with one source stating that the UAE received a commitment from U.S.
officials that they would not approve Israeli annexation until at least January 2024.21
Before Israel’s late 2020 dealings with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, Egypt and Jordan
had been the only Arab states with formal diplomatic relations with Israel.22 In 1981, Saudi
Arabia’s then-Crown Prince Fahd bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud proposed a formula—later enshrined
in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API)—under which Israel would make certain concessions,
including on Palestinian statehood, before Arab states would normalize their relations with it.23
After Israel started negotiating directly with the Palestinians in the 1990s, it established limited
diplomatic relations with Morocco, and informal ties with a number of other Arab states,
including the UAE and Bahrain.24 These countries downgraded their ties with Israel after the
onset of the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) in 2000. However, in the past decade
discreet Israeli links with Arab states on issues including intel igence, security, and trade have
become closer and more public. Israel has worked with these countries to counter common
concerns, such as Iran’s regional influence and military capabilities (see “Iran and the Region”
below) and Sunni Islamist populist movements (including various Muslim Brotherhood branches
and affiliates).25
Strategic Assessment
Assessing Arab-Israeli normalization to date involves considering its implications both for Israeli-
Palestinian issues and the future of regional cooperation and rivalry.
Israeli-Palestinian Issues
Israel’s deals with Arab states could be interpreted as vindicating Prime Minister Netanyahu’s
long-standing claim that he could normalize Israel’s relations with Arab countries before reaching
a peace agreement with the Palestinians. They also signal some change to Arab states’ previous
insistence—in the 2002 API—that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a
precondition for improved ties.26 However, official statements from Saudi Arabian officials
continue to condition Saudi normalization with Israel on the API’s provisions.27 In late 2020,

21 Jacob Magid, “ US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 at earliest, T oI told,” Times of Israel,
September 13, 2020. For information on the annexation issue, see CRS Report R46433, Israel’s Possible Annexation of
West Bank Areas: Frequently Asked Questions, by Jim Zanotti.
22 Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan and Israel did the same in 1994.
23 T he Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the
territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and
provide for the “ [a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General
Assembly Resolution 194.” T he initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia and adopted by the 22-member League of
Arab States in 2002, and later accepted by the then-56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the 57 -
member Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. T he text of the initiative is a vailable at
http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.
24 Miriam Berger, “ Israel’s relations in the Middle East, explained,” washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2020; Adam
Entous, “Donald T rump’s New World Order,” New Yorker, June 11, 2018; CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest,
Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
25 Steve Hendrix, “ Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,”
washingtonpost.com, August 14, 2020; CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Unrest, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth
Katzman.
26 Annelle Sheline, “ T rump’s Win Is a Loss for the Middle East,” Politico Magazine, August 14, 2020.
27 HRH Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, First Plenary Session, International Institute for Strategic Studies Manama
Dialogue, December 5, 2020.
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Saudi Arabia granted Israel flyover rights within its airspace to facilitate direct Israeli airline
travel to the UAE and Bahrain.28
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) officials denounced Arab
states’ normalization of relations with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause.
They expressed particular concern over the UAE deal, perhaps partly because the UAE has
provided sanctuary and political support for Mohammad Dahlan, a former top PA figure
vehemently opposed by PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas. Dahlan may have
aspirations to succeed Abbas.29
PLO/PA officials claimed that the UAE legitimized Israel’s annexation threats by bargaining over
them, and thus acquiesced to a West Bank status quo that some observers label “de facto
annexation.”30 UAE officials countered that by significantly delaying Israeli declarations of
sovereignty over West Bank areas, they preserved prospects for future negotiations toward a
Palestinian state.31 Since announcing the suspension of annexation plans, Prime Minister
Netanyahu has appealed to domestic pro-settler constituencies with a number of announcements
related to settlement construction and expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Questions surround the impact that Arab states with open relations with Israel might have on
Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. Wil these states influence Israeli positions regarding the
Palestinians, due to their closer access to Israeli leaders and Israeli interests in maintaining and
improving ties with these countries? Or wil these states have less leverage with Israel and
possibly even support efforts to have Palestinians compromise their traditional demands?
Future of Regional Cooperation and Rivalry
Israeli normalization with Arab states could raise questions about the future of cooperation and
rivalry among key actors in the Middle East. Depending on global and regional geopolitical
trends, common cause could intensify, dwindle, or fluctuate between Israel and some Arab states
to counter Iran and perhaps even Turkey and Qatar, two countries that provide some support for
Sunni Islamist movements. In January 2021, President Trump ordered U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, to add
Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.32 Israel had previously been under the
purview of U.S. European Command. While closer cooperation may result between Israel and
some Arab governments, some others that have not normalized relations with Israel might
encounter political chal enges in joining CENTCOM deliberations involving Israel.
Other factors influencing regional cooperation and rivalry might include the following:
 Arms sales. Shortly after the UAE’s normalization deal with Israel, the Trump
Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale to the UAE of F-35 Joint

28 Yoel Guzansky, “ Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, Insight No.
1396, October 29, 2020.
29 See, for example, Neri Zilber, “T he T alented Mr. Dahlan,” Newlines Magazine, November 11, 2020.
30 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “ Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
14, 2020.
31 “UAE minister: We bought lot of time on annexation; Palestinians should negotiate,” Times of Israel, August 14,
2020.
32 Jared Szuba, “T rump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,
2021.
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Strike Fighters, armed MQ-9 Reaper drones, and munitions.33 While noting the
U.S. legal requirement to maintain Israel’s QME, Israeli officials stated that they
would not oppose the sale. The United States and UAE reportedly signed a letter
of offer and acceptance for the sale in the final hours of the Trump
Administration.34 Implementing the deal and delivering the items is expected to
take years. The outcome of this transaction and others that might follow to Arab
states in connection with normalization could depend on issues including QME
considerations, human rights concerns (such as those involved in Yemen’s
ongoing conflict), and prospects for regional arms races involving suppliers such
as Russia and China.35
 Mutual economic benefits. Wider access to markets, technology sharing, and
road or rail infrastructure linking the Gulf with the Mediterranean are some of the
potential economic benefits of expanded Israel-Arab relations.36 Gulf states may
feel urgency to attract investment that could help them diversify their fossil-fuel
export-centered economies, and many regional countries may anticipate the need
to boost their appeal as trade and investment partners in light of new
opportunities amid increased global competition (including between the United
States and China) for markets, resources, and infrastructure projects.
Additional y, UAE sovereign wealth fund Mubadala signed a memorandum of
understanding in April 2021 to purchase a stake in Israel’s Tamar offshore natural
gas field. Section 1279 of the U.S.-Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act
of 2020 (Title XII, Subtitle H of the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act,
P.L. 116-283) authorized the establishment of a program to support Arab-Israeli
cooperation on innovation and advanced technologies.
 Arab public opinion. Arab state leaders considering entering into or maintaining
normalization with Israel might gauge whether expected benefits from
normalization would outweigh concerns about popular criticism or unrest they
might face for possibly undermining the Palestinian cause.37 Public opinion polls
from the past decade suggest relatively unchanging and widespread Arab
opposition to diplomatic recognition of Israel.38 Normalization efforts to date
have not triggered significant unrest, but outside insight is limited into public
opinion, its drivers, and how popular reactions are shaped by the nature of

33 Defense Security Cooperation Agency T ransmittals 21-01, 21-03, and 21-05, November 10, 2020.
34 Valerie Insinna, “ Just hours before Biden’s inauguration, the UAE and US come to a deal on F-35 sales,” Defense
News, January 20, 2021.
35 CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates,
coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
36 T he Israel-UAE treaty signed in September 2020 says, “ Recognizing also their shared goal to advance regional
economic development and the flow of goods and services, the Parties shall endeavor to promote collaborations on
strategic regional infrastructure projects and shall explore the establishment of a mult ilateral working group for the
‘T racks for Regional Peace’ project.” T he Israeli foreign ministry released a proposal for this project, a rail line from
Israel to Saudi Arabia and the UAE via the West Bank and Jordan, in August 2019. A major pa rt of its appeal would be
allowing the participant countries to bypass the two major chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz (Persian Gulf) and Bab
al-Mandab (Red Sea). See Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, T racks for regional peace - regional land bridge and hub
initiative, August 5, 2019.
37 See, for example, Jared Malsin and Amira al-Fekki, “Egypt’s ‘Cold Peace’ a Harbinger for Region,” Wall Street
Journal, December 17, 2020.
38 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, The 2019-2020 Arab Opinion Index: Main Results in Brief, Figure 88,
available at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/Lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Arab-Opinion-Index-2019-2020-
Inbreef-English-Version.pdf.
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authoritarian Arab regimes. It is unclear whether Gulf populations with no direct
history of armed conflict with Israel might be more wil ing to accept pragmatic
cooperation with Israel than those in Egypt, Jordan, and other countries who have
fought Israel in the past.
The above factors could influence future Saudi decisions on normalization with Israel. Some key
Saudi figures—possibly including Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman—may be wil ing to
drop or ease preconditions for Saudi-Israel normalization that relate to the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. Specific incentives to do so could include heightened regional cooperation on Iran,
U.S. offers of advanced arms, prospects to boost Saudi economic diversification, and greater
Saudi influence over Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem.39
The Biden Administration and 117th Congress
The Biden Administration has said that it seeks to help Israel normalize its relations with Arab
states in ways that preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In the 117th Congress, companion bil s encouraging Israel-Arab state
normalization have been introduced in the Senate in March 2021 (S. 1061) and House in April
(H.R. 2748). While the Administration briefly paused the UAE arms sales described above, it
announced in April that the sales would proceed.40 In the same month, the Administration
announced a resumption of economic, humanitarian, and non-lethal security assistance to the
Palestinians at a level somewhat lower than previously provided, perhaps partly owing to some
legal constraints on U.S. economic aid that are linked to PLO/PA welfare payments that arguably
incentivize acts of terror.41 As part of the FY2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act enacted in
December 2020, the Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act of 2020 (Title VIII of
P.L. 116-260) authorized the future establishment of a fund to support Israeli-Palestinian dialogue
and reconciliation programs, and an initiative to promote Israeli-Palestinian economic
cooperation.
It is uncertain how the Biden Administration’s resumption of U.S. aid for Palestinians and its
other policies might affect Israeli-Palestinian issues broadly. Reports suggest that the
Administration may not urgently press Israelis and Palestinians to resume direct negotiations.42 It
is also unclear whether the Administration wil reverse Trump-era actions affecting U.S.-
Palestinian diplomacy and the status of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
International public debate has taken place over al eged Israeli human rights violations against
Palestinians. International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced in March that
she was opening an investigation into possible crimes in the West Bank and Gaza.43 Additional y,
in April a bil was introduced in the House (H.R. 2590) that would not reduce or condition the
amount of U.S. aid provided to Israel, but could place limits on its use in relation to some of those
human rights al egations.44 Later in April, 330 Representatives wrote a letter to the Chair and

39 Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel.”
40 Jacob Magid, “ Biden aide on UAE F-35 sale: Only Israel was meant to have those jets in region,” Times of Israel,
November 1, 2020. For background on various issues at play, see CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military
Edge and Possible U.S. Arm s Sales to the United Arab Em irates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.
41 CRS In Focus IF10644, The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy, by Jim Zanotti.
42 Jacob Magid, “ Biden hopes to deprioritize Israel-Palestinian conflict but might not be able to,” Times of Israel,
December 11, 2020.
43 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
44 “Human Rights Watch accuses Israel of apartheid over treatment of Palestinians,” Associated Press, April 27, 2021
(underlying Human Rights Watch report available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-
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Ranking Member of the House Appropriations Committee arguing against reducing funding or
adding conditions on security assistance to Israel,45 citing a similar argument that President Biden
made during the 2020 presidential race.46
Iran and the Region
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (especial y in
Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon),47 and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Israeli observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war
similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the
smal -scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their al ies as
the “the campaign between wars.”48
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Prime Minister Netanyahu has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement
on Iran’s nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). He
opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration, and welcomed
President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and
accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Facing the
intensified U.S. sanctions, Iran has reduced its compliance with the 2015 agreement.
U.S.-Iran tensions since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have led to greater regional
uncertainty, with implications for Israel.49 Some Israelis have voiced worries about how Iran’s
demonstrated ability in 2019 to penetrate Saudi air defenses and target Saudi oil facilities could
transfer to efforts in targeting Israel.50 In January 2021, one source claimed there was evidence
that Iran has transferred advanced drones (loitering munitions) capable of targeting Israel or Arab
Gulf states to the Iran-supported Houthi movement in Yemen.51 Additional y, reported low-level
Israel-Iran conflict in various settings—cyberspace, international waters, and the territory of other
regional countries—has further exacerbated regional tensions.52
As the Biden Administration engages in international diplomacy to consider possibly reentering
the JCPOA, Israel—with Prime Minister Netanyahu and other key figures opposing such a U.S.

authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution, with the State Department’s 2020 Country Report on Human Rights
Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-
rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/).
45 T ext of letter available at
https://teddeutch.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2021.04.21_mou_letter_delauro_granger_signed.pdf .
46 Omri Nahmias, “ Biden: Israeli threats of annexation choke off hope of peace,” jpost.com, May 20, 2020.
47 For information on this topic, see CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman.
48 See, for example, Efraim Inbar, “Iran and Israel: T he Inevitable War?” Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security,
January 6, 2021.
49 See, for example, CRS Report R45795, U.S.-Iran Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman,
Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton T homas.
50 Uzi Even, “Iran Attack on Saudi Arabia Shows Why Israel Must Shut Down Its Nuclear Reactor,” haaretz.com,
October 6, 2019.
51 T om O’Connor, “Exclusive: Iran Positions ‘Suicide Drones’ in Yemen as Red Sea T ensions Rise,” Newsweek,
January 13, 2021.
52 “Fighting in the Shadows: Israel and Iran,” Soufan Center, March 30, 2021; Dalia Dassa Kaye, “ Has Israel been
sabotaging Iran? Here’s what we know,” washingtonpost.com, July 15, 2020.
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reentry—is one of several regional U.S. partners voicing interest in having its views taken into
account.53 Some observers speculate that Israeli covert or military operations might influence or
disrupt diplomacy on the nuclear issue.54 An April 2021 explosion and power outage—widely
attributed to Israel—that reportedly disabled thousands of centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium
enrichment facility led Iran to begin enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, closer to weapons-
grade levels.55
Hezbollah
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful non-state al y in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadical y clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.56 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its regional
implications.57 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly
Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its
projectiles—and its al eged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.58
Ongoing tension between Israel and Iran raises questions about the potential for Israel-Hezbollah
conflict. Various sources have referenced possible Iran-backed Hezbollah attempts to build
precision-weapons factories in Lebanon.59 Some reports assess that Hezbollah does not want
escalation, partly due to significant political and economic problems in Lebanon, but do not rule
out the potential for heightened conflict owing to miscalculation between Hezbollah and Israel.60
China: Investments in Israel and U.S. Concerns61
U.S. officials have raised some concerns with Israel over burgeoning Chinese investments in
Israeli high-tech companies and civilian infrastructure.62 Israel-China investment ties have grown

53 See also Yaniv Kubovich and Judy Maltz, “Israel’s Chief of Staff: Return to Iran Deal Is ‘Wrong,’ Military Action
‘Should Be on the T able,’” haaretz.com, January 27, 2021.
54 Daniel C. Kurtzer, Aaron David Miller, and Steven N. Simon, “ Israel and Iran Are Pulling the United States T oward
Conflict,” foreignaffairs.com, April 26, 2021; Efraim Inbar and Eran Lerman, “ T he ramifications of a US return to the
2015 Iran deal - opinion,” jpost.com, April 28, 2021.
55 “Iran Begins 60 Percent Uranium Enrichment After Natanz Attack, Top Negotiator Says,” haaretz.com (with content
from Associated Press and Reuters), April 13, 2021.
56 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E.
Humud.
57 For possible conflict scenarios, see Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion, Counting the cost: Avoiding another war
between Israel and Hezbollah, Atlantic Council, May 13, 2020; Hanin Ghaddar, “ How Will Hezbollah Respond to
Israel’s Drone Attack?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch 3171, August 28, 2019.
58 See, for example, “ Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28,
2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “ Who Warns Hezbollah T hat Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York
Tim es, April 23, 2020.
59 “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press; Ben Caspit, “ Hezbollah, Israel
losing red lines,” Al-Monitor, September 4, 2019.
60 See, for example, Amos Harel, “ For Hezbollah, Beirut Devastation Makes Provoking Israel Even Riskier,”
haaretz.com, August 6, 2020.
61 For background on past U.S. concerns regarding Israeli defense transactions with China, see CRS Report RL33476,
Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti; CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy
M. Sharp.
62 Shira Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and
the United States, RAND Corporation, 2020; Shira Efron, et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, RAND
Corporation, 2019; Jewish Institut e for National Security of America, Countering Chinese Engagem ent with Israel: A
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since China announced its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,63 with Israel as an attractive hub of
innovation for Chinese partners, and China as a huge potential export market and source of
investment for Israeli businesses.
Closer Israel-China economic relations have led to official U.S. expressions of concern,64
apparently focused on the possibility that China might gather intel igence or acquire technologies
with the potential to threaten U.S. national security in such fields as cybersecurity, artificial
intel igence, satel ite communications, and robotics. Previously, China-Israel defense industry
cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s contributed to tension in the U.S.-Israel defense relationship
and to an apparent de facto U.S. veto over Israeli arms sales to China.65 Partly due to U.S.
concerns regarding China’s involvement in Israel’s economy, Israel created an advisory panel on
foreign investment in Israel in late 2019.66 However, this panel reportedly does not have the
authority to review investments in sectors such as high-tech that accounted for most of China’s
investments in Israel in the previous decade.67 Apparently, debate continues within Israel’s
government about how to balance economic interests with national security concerns.68
In the past two years, U.S. officials have made notable efforts to discourage Chinese involvement
in specific Israeli infrastructure projects. President Trump reportedly warned Prime Minister
Netanyahu in March 2019 that U.S. security assistance for and cooperation with Israel could be
limited if Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE establish a 5G communications network in Israel,
in line with similar warnings that the Administration communicated to other U.S. al ies and
partners.69 Two Israeli analysts wrote in March 2020 that Israeli officials reportedly blocked
Chinese companies from working on Israeli communications infrastructure.70 In May 2020,
shortly after then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited Israel and voiced concern that
Chinese access to Israeli infrastructure could complicate U.S.-Israel cooperation, Israel’s finance
ministry chose a domestic contractor to construct a $1.5 bil ion desalination plant, turning down
the bid from a subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison Group.71
Additional y, the U.S. Navy reportedly reconsidered its practice of periodical y docking at the
Israeli naval base in Haifa, because a state-owned Chinese company (the Shanghai International
Port Group) secured the contract to operate a new terminal at Haifa’s seaport for 25 years
(beginning in 2021).72 In the conference report (H.Rept. 116-333) accompanying the FY2020
National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92), Congress recommended that the U.S.

Com prehensive and Cooperative U.S.-Israeli Strategy, February 2021.
63 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations, coordinated by
Susan V. Lawrence.
64 Ron Kampeas, “ Breaking China: A rupture looms between Israel and the United States,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency,
June 2, 2020.
65 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, pp. 15-20.
66 Arie Egozi, “ Israelis Create Foreign Investment Overseer; China T argeted,” Breaking Defense, November 13, 2019.
67 Efron et al., Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology, 2020, pp. 24-25.
68 James M. Dorsey, “ Israel-China Relations: Staring into the Abyss of US-Chinese Decoupling,” The Globalist, June
9, 2020; Mercy A. Kuo, “ US-China-Israel Relations: Pompeo’s Visit ,” The Diplomat, May 27, 2020.
69 Hiddai Segev, Doron Ella, and Assaf Orion, “ My Way or the Huawei? T he United States-China Race for 5G
Dominance,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1193, July 15, 2019.
70 Hiddai Segev and Assaf Orion, “ T he Great Power Competition over 5G Communications: Limited Success for the
American Campaign against Huawei,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 1268, March 3, 2020.
71 “Amid US pressure, Israel taps local firm over China for $1.5b desalination plant ,” Times of Israel, May 26, 2020.
72 Roie Yellinek, “ T he Israel-China-U.S. T riangle and the Haifa Port Project,” Middle East Institute, November 27,
2018. Reportedly, the Israeli government plans to limit sensitive roles at the port to Israelis with security clearances.
Jack Detsch, “Pentagon repeats warning to Israel on Chinese port deal,” Al-Monitor, August 7, 2019.
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government “convey to the Government of Israel the serious security concerns with respect to the
leasing arrangements of the Port of Haifa, and urge consideration of the security implications of
such foreign investment in Israel.” Other state-owned Chinese companies are developing a new
port in Ashdod (which also hosts an Israeli naval base), and taking part in construction for Tel
Aviv’s light rail system and road tunnels in Haifa.73

73 Efron et al., The Evolving Israel-China Relationship, 2019, p. 38.
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Appendix. Israeli Political Parties in the Knesset
and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – 30 Knesset seats
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Binyamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu has served as prime minister since 2009 and also was prime
minister from 1996 to 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret
Matkal), and received his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and
diplomacy, he has been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of
land for peace with the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program
and regional influence. He is general y regarded as both a consummate political
dealmaker and a security-minded nationalist. However, he has negotiated with the
Palestinians, and many observers discern cautiousness in Netanyahu’s decisions
regarding the nature and scale of military operations. His rhetorical support for more
assertive populist and nationalistic measures (including diminishing judicial powers and
annexing West Bank territory) has increased after criminal al egations surfaced
against him for corruption.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – 7 seats
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman served as Israel’s defense minister until his resignation in
November 2018. He served as Israel’s foreign minister for most of the period from
2009 to May 2015 and is general y viewed as an ardent nationalist and canny political
actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the Soviet Union (in
what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked under Netanyahu
from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to consider concessions
to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a platform for former
Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption al egations in a 2013 case.
Yamina (Right) – 7 seats
Right-of-center merger of three parties: New Right, Jewish Home, and National
Union; base of support among religious Zionists (mostly Ashkenazi Orthodox Jews);
includes core constituencies supporting West Bank settlements and annexation.
Leader: Naftali Bennett
Born in 1972, Bennett served previously as defense, education, and economy
minister. He served in various special forces units (including as a reservist during the
2006 Hezbol ah conflict in Lebanon). Bennett was a successful software entrepreneur
and has lived in America. He served as Netanyahu’s chief of staff from 2006 to 2008
while Netanyahu was opposition leader. He led the Yesha Council (the umbrel a
organization for Israeli West Bank settlers) from 2010 to 2012.

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New Hope (Tikva Hadasha) – 6 seats
New Hope is a party formed in 2020 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu
and Likud for mainstream right-wing voters.
Leader: Gideon Sa’ar
Born in 1966, Sa’ar served as cabinet secretary in the 1990s (for Prime Minister
Netanyahu) and early 2000s (for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon). He became an
influential and popular member of Likud, first elected to the Knesset in 2003. He
served as education minister from 2009 to 2013 and interior minister from 2013 to
2014. After leaving the Knesset in 2014, he returned in 2019 but left Likud to form
New Hope a year later.
Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – 6 seats
Grouping of right-of-center parties including Religious Zionism/National Union-
Tkuma, Otzma Yehudit, and Noam that formed for the March 2021elections.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism
since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish
nationalist and religiously conservative causes.

LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – 7 seats
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the

Knesset in 2013. Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an
organization that supports victims of sexual assault, and was a regular national media
presence and university lecturer.
Meretz (Vigor) – 6 seats
Meretz is a pro-secular Zionist party that supports initiatives for social justice and
peace with the Palestinians.
Leader: Nitzan Horowitz
Born in 1965, Horowitz became Meretz’s leader in 2019 and was first elected to the
Knesset in 2009. He had a long career as a prominent journalist before entering
politics.

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CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – 17 seats
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid is the leader of the opposition in the Knesset. He came to
politics after a career as a journalist, television presenter, and author. He founded the
Yesh Atid party in 2012, and from 2013 to 2014 he served as finance minister.
Kahol Lavan (Blue and White) – 8 seats
Centrist party formed in 2018 as an alternative to Prime Minister Netanyahu,
ostensibly seeking to preserve long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary,
articulate a vision of Israeli nationalism that is more inclusive of Druze and Arab
citizens, and have greater sensitivity to international opinion on Israeli-Palestinian
issues.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz is Israel’s defense minister, justice minister, and alternate prime
minister, and could become prime minister by November 2021 under a power-
sharing agreement with Netanyahu. He served as Chief of General Staff of the Israel
Defense Forces from 2011 to 2015.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – 9 seats
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri is Israel’s interior minister and minister for Negev and Galilee
development. He led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. In April 2021, he al owed a party col eague
to take his Knesset seat.

United Torah Judaism – 7 seats
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel Ha’torah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; general y seeks greater application of Jewish
law.
Leader: Yaakov Litzman
Born in 1948, Litzman is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He was born in
Germany and raised in the United States before immigrating to Israel in 1965.
Educated in yeshivas (traditional Jewish schools), he later served as principal of a
Hasidic girls’ school in Jerusalem. In April 2021, he alowed a party coleague to take
his Knesset seat.

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ARAB
Joint List – 6 seats
Electoral slate featuring three Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality), Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal), Balad (National Democratic Assembly).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, and of the
Joint List. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before becoming Hadash’s
national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – 4 seats
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist.

Sources: Various open sources.
Note: Knesset seat numbers based on results from the March 23, 2021, election.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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