Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from June 21, 2023 to July 31, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations
~~June 21~~July 31, 2023 , 2023
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel
Jim Zanotti
$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance, Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance,

contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters: contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters:

Netanyahu government and ~~judicial reform debate~~controversy over judicial system changes. In December 2022, Likud party leader In December 2022, Likud party leader
Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new coalition government, despite facing an ongoing criminal trial for corruption. government, despite facing an ongoing criminal trial for corruption.
Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new Israeli government has Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new Israeli government has
triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions with Palestinians, and its triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions with Palestinians, and its
relations with the United States. The government has proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s relations with the United States. The government has proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s judicial system. Despite major domestic controversy over whether changes—or responses to them—might impact checks and balances, cohesion, and military readiness, and efforts by~~judicial system, triggering a~~
~~highly charged national debate over checks and balances in Israel with potential international implications. With~~ President President
~~Biden and some Members of Congress encouraging a compromise solution, and broad domestic disagreement over the issue,~~
~~Netanyahu’s government temporarily postponed the legislation in March 2023. As compromise efforts stalled in June, the~~
~~government began moving forward on one element of the proposal.~~
Biden to encourage compromise, the coalition passed a law in July 2023 to prevent Israeli courts from using a “reasonableness” standard to invalidate government actions. Israel’s High Court of Justice plans to hear arguments challenging the legislation in September, raising the possibility of a constitutional crisis. The government may consider additional legislation that could modify how judges are selected, though Netanyahu has stated openness to dialogue with the opposition into November. Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken
out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of
~~the~~Jerusalem’s holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered heightened holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered heightened
~~West Bank counterterrorism measures, with another spike in early 2023 leading the Palestinian Authority to announce the~~
~~suspension of security coordination with Israel. The United States, Jordan, and Egypt have convened periodic talks aimed at~~
~~bolstering Israel-PA coordination, de-escalating tensions, and minimizing unilateral measures~~West Bank counterterrorism measures. As the Gaza Strip remains . As the Gaza Strip remains
under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and
other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group. other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and possible Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia. The Biden Administration has followed The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ongoing efforts to deepen security and the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ongoing efforts to deepen security and
economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on
various types of defense. After China helped broker diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the various types of defense. After China helped broker diplomatic normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the
Administration has declared that Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia is a U.S. priority. Any negotiations toward that end Administration has declared that Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia is a U.S. priority. Any negotiations toward that end
would likely consider Saudi security and civilian nuclear demands, as well as a pathway toward a two-state solution. would likely consider Saudi security and civilian nuclear demands, as well as a pathway toward a two-state solution.
Congress has passed Congress has passed and proposed legislation encouraging legislation encouraging ~~more normalization and greater regional security~~ expanded and deepened regional cooperation involving Israel. cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran and other regional dynamics. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015
international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran
amid questions about the tenor of U.S.-Israel cooperation on Iran-related issues. Israel also has reportedly conducted a amid questions about the tenor of U.S.-Israel cooperation on Iran-related issues. Israel also has reportedly conducted a
number of covert or military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq for various purposes, including number of covert or military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq for various purposes, including
to prevent Lebanese Hezbollah from bolstering its weapons arsenal and capabilities. Some reports suggest the future to prevent Lebanese Hezbollah from bolstering its weapons arsenal and capabilities. Some reports suggest the future
possibility of an informal, unwritten U.S.-Iran understanding by which Iran might limit some uranium enrichment and possibility of an informal, unwritten U.S.-Iran understanding by which Iran might limit some uranium enrichment and
receive some financial relief for humanitarian purposes, raising questions about how Israel might respond to such a deal. receive some financial relief for humanitarian purposes, raising questions about how Israel might respond to such a deal.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. Israel has shown reluctance to provide support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. Israel has shown reluctance to provide
lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However, Israel is lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However, Israel is
reportedly providing or planning to provide reportedly providing or planning to provide Ukraine with basic intelligence, assistance with early warning systems, and anti-drone basic intelligence, assistance with early warning systems, and anti-drone
jamming systems to counter Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.jamming systems to counter Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page link to page ~~29 link to page 5 link to page~~ 30 30 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (seeIsrael (see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, , by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (Islamic Jihad (PIJ) (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers seek both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers seek
oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1 Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
In July 2023, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 57,2 expressing the sense of Congress that: 1. the State of Israel is not a racist or apartheid state; 2. Congress rejects all forms of antisemitism and xenophobia; and 3. the United States will always be a staunch partner and supporter of Israel. Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include the following: include the following:
• Domestic Israeli issues, including • Domestic Israeli issues, including ~~a judicial reform proposal from~~action by the ~~the~~
government of Prime Minister government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Benjamin Netanyahu to reduce the power of Israel’s judiciary that has triggered a highly that has triggered a highly
charged national debate. charged national debate.
• Israeli-Palestinian violence and • Israeli-Palestinian violence and ~~other problems~~ongoing disputes. .
• Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords• Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords, including speculation about potential Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization. .
• Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with • Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria. Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria.
• Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. • Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
~~Domestic Issues~~
~~Netanyahu’s Return to Power and New Coalition Partners~~
~~On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) voted to reinstall Likud party leader~~
~~Benjamin Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and~~
~~2009-2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox~~
~~parties (see Figure 1 and Appendix B).~~

1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S. 1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S.
assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise
permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza. permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
2 The House passed the resolution on July 18 by a vote of 412-9, with one voting present. The Senate passed it by unanimous consent on July 25. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1 1

link to page link to page 5 link to page 31 link to page 6 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Domestic Issues Netanyahu’s Return to Power and New Coalition Partners On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) voted to reinstall Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and 2009-2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox parties (see Figure 1 and Appendix B). 6

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

Figure 1. November 2022 Knesset Election Results

Source: Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious
Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1). Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1).
The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption
allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could
last for months or years.last for months or years.23 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a
government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021 government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021
government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him. government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him.
Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may
have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.34
Key Government Figures and Decisionmaking
Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new
Israeli government (seIsraeli government (see Table 1) has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s
democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its
relations with the United States and other countries.relations with the United States and other countries.45 Coalition agreements state that the Jewish Coalition agreements state that the Jewish
people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,56
appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to
expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious
law in Israeli society.law in Israeli society.67 Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at
~~contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.7 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007~~
~~for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.8~~
~~Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work~~
~~with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the~~
~~two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests~~

2 3 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand – and where they are going – analysis,” Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand – and where they are going – analysis,” Jerusalem
Post, August 16, 2022. , August 16, 2022.
34 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, December 30, 2022. , December 30, 2022.
45 Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” Associated Press, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
56 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
67 “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” Ynetnews/i24News, December 30, 2022. , December 30, 2022.
~~7 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” May 15,~~
~~2021.~~
~~8 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~and values.”9~~ Congressional Research Service 2 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.8 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.9 Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests and values.”10 Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge
the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”1011 In July 2023, President Biden said in a CNN interview that some of the members of Israel’s cabinet are among the most extreme he has seen.12
Table 1. Israeli Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu Benjamin Netanyahu
Likud Likud
Defense Minister Defense Minister
Yoav Gallant Yoav Gallant
Likud Likud
Foreign Minister Foreign Minister
Eli Cohen Eli Cohen
Likud Likud
Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry
Bezalel Smotrich Bezalel Smotrich
Religious Zionism Religious Zionism
Justice Minister Justice Minister
Yariv Levin Yariv Levin
Likud Likud
National Security Minister National Security Minister
Itamar Ben Gvir Itamar Ben Gvir
Jewish Power Jewish Power
Transportation Minister Transportation Minister
Miri Regev Miri Regev
Likud Likud
Strategic Affairs Minister Strategic Affairs Minister
Ron Dermer Ron Dermer
No formal affiliation No formal affiliation
Energy Minister Energy Minister
Israel Katz Israel Katz
Likud Likud
Agriculture and Rural Development Minister Agriculture and Rural Development Minister
Avi Dichter Avi Dichter
Likud Likud
Smotrich and Ben Gvir have each assumed some security responsibilities. Under the coalition Smotrich and Ben Gvir have each assumed some security responsibilities. Under the coalition
agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over civil affairs agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over civil affairs
units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning commission that units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning commission that
oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.1113 Ben Gvir heads a national Ben Gvir heads a national
security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including personnel that patrol security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including personnel that patrol
Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.1214 He also expects to oversee the border police, including He also expects to oversee the border police, including
units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) authority.units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) authority.1315 Ben Gvir Ben Gvir
supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their legal immunity.supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their legal immunity.14
~~Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and top IDF leaders have apparently sought to prevent changes to~~
~~the defense ministry and border police from disrupting the chain of command.15 In February~~
~~2023, Smotrich received general responsibilities to direct settlement planning and enforcement~~
~~over illegal construction in the West Bank, while Gallant maintained formal powers to intervene~~
~~in Smotrich’s decisions with cause.16 It is unclear how the arrangement will work in practice,~~

916 8 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” France24, May 15, 2021. 9 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007. 10 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29, White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29,
2022. 2022.
1011 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022.
1112 Transcript: Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden, CNN, July 9, 2023. 13 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” Times of
Israel, December 5, 2022. , December 5, 2022.
1214 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” Times of
Israel, December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, , December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations~~, by Jim Zanotti.~~
13. 15 “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” Times of Israel, December 29, , December 29,
2022. 2022.
1416 Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’” Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’”
~~15 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, January~~
~~2, 2023; Ash Obel, “Smotrich refuses to attend meeting with IDF chief on transfer of West Bank powers,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, January 25, 2023.~~
~~16 Jeremy Sharon, “Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, February 23, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~especially if Gallant and Smotrich disagree on an issue that arguably has both civilian and~~
~~national security implications.~~
Congressional Research Service 3 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and top IDF leaders have apparently sought to prevent changes to the defense ministry and border police from disrupting the chain of command.17 In February 2023, Smotrich received general responsibilities to direct settlement planning and enforcement over illegal construction in the West Bank, while Gallant maintained formal powers to intervene in Smotrich’s decisions with cause.18 In June, the Israeli government eased and expedited the process for settlement construction In June, the Israeli government eased and expedited the process for settlement construction
approval. While the process reportedly remains subject to final authorization by the prime approval. While the process reportedly remains subject to final authorization by the prime
minister, this move makes it harder for the defense minister or prime minister to slow the efforts minister, this move makes it harder for the defense minister or prime minister to slow the efforts
of Smotrich or any successor in his position.of Smotrich or any successor in his position.1719 U.S. and Palestinian Authority (PA) officials have U.S. and Palestinian Authority (PA) officials have
criticized the Israeli action.criticized the Israeli action.18
~~Netanyahu has asserted that he will~~ 20 In anticipation of the government’s formation in late 2022, Netanyahu asserted that he would personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.1921 One One
Israeli journalist Israeli journalist ~~has~~ argued that Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition argued that Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition
partners and Western countries concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing partners and Western countries concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing
the support of one or the other.the support of one or the other.2022 Two former U.S. officials Two former U.S. officials ~~have written~~wrote that if a government with that if a government with
Smotrich and Ben Gvir Smotrich and Ben Gvir ~~features~~featured open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to change Israel’s open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to change Israel’s
democracy, opponents of strong U.S.-Israel relations democracy, opponents of strong U.S.-Israel relations ~~will~~would exploit the situation “to try to undo exploit the situation “to try to undo
aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”2123
The coalition agreements are not legally binding. The coalition agreements are not legally binding.2224 The degree of their implementation could have The degree of their implementation could have
significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the
rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to
Israel.Israel.2325 The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank
areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.24
~~Proposed~~26 Controversy over Judicial System Changes and ~~Controversy~~
~~Overview~~
~~The government’s proposed legislation on judicial reform has triggered a highly charged national~~
~~debate over checks and balances in Israel. In January 2023, Justice Minister Yariv Levin~~
~~introduced a plan to overhaul Israel’s judicial system in the following ways:25~~
~~• Require larger HCJ majorities to invalidate laws or government decisions.~~
~~• Allow the Knesset to override HCJ decisions, unless the full 15-judge panel~~
~~decides unanimously.~~
~~• Give the government effective control of the panel that appoints judges.~~

17Proposals Shortly after Netanyahu’s government took office, it advanced proposals in January 2023 aimed at reducing the power of the judiciary—particularly Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ)—to check actions approved by Israel’s government.27 The proposals have triggered several months of 17 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2023; Ash Obel, “Smotrich refuses to attend meeting with IDF chief on transfer of West Bank powers,” Times of Israel, January 25, 2023. 18 Jeremy Sharon, “Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning,” Times of Israel, February 23, 2023. 19 Isabel Kershner, “Israel Eases Rules for Settlements in West Bank,” Isabel Kershner, “Israel Eases Rules for Settlements in West Bank,” New York Times, June 19, 2023. , June 19, 2023.
1820 Ibid.; State Department, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18, Ibid.; State Department, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18,
2023. 2023.
1921 Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,” Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,”
NPR, December 15, 2022. , December 15, 2022.
2022 Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” Al-Monitor, December 9, , December 9,
2022. 2022.
2123 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,” Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,”
Times of Israel, November 2, 2022. , November 2, 2022.
2224 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
2325 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” Jerusalem Post, ,
December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” Al-Monitor, ,
December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Jerusalem
Post, December 22, 2022. , December 22, 2022.
~~24 “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ~~26 “Netanyahu government: West Bank settlements top priority,” ,” Associated Press, December 28, 2022. , December 28, 2022.
2527 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” Times of Israel, ,
January 4, 2023. January 4, 2023.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

4 4

link to page 31 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations highly charged national debate. In March, Netanyahu dropped or delayed plans on various proposals to give the government control over Israel’s Judicial Appointments Committee (JAC) and allow the Knesset to override most HCJ decisions, in the face of pressure from various sectors of society and President Biden. In June, a dialogue aimed at achieving national consensus between government and opposition leaders broke down. Despite appeals from President Biden for Netanyahu to pursue compromise, the coalition proceeded in July to advance legislation that would prevent Israeli courts from using a “reasonableness” standard to invalidate government actions.28 Netanyahu defended his action by saying that after trying to compromise for three months without success, he “decided to proceed with this minor correction.”29 “Reasonableness” Law, Next Political Steps, and Popular Sentiment The new law, which the Knesset passed on July 24, amends Israel’s Basic Law on the judiciary. The amendment prohibits courts from evaluating the reasonableness of administrative decisions made by the cabinet or its ministers (see text box below).30 The opposition, which vehemently contested the bill, boycotted the vote. The Role of Israel’s Reasonableness Clause One of the government’s January 2023 proposals for changing the judiciary’s role was to prevent courts from invalidating government actions on the grounds that they are “unreasonable in the extreme.” The reasonableness test does not apply to laws, but only to administrative decisions such as executive orders, cabinet actions, matters that require ministerial sign-off, and municipal planning and zoning rulings.31 As the courts have developed the reasonableness framework over time, they have applied it in various cases where they determine that an action might be arbitrary, reckless, or unethical, even if it does not contradict a specific provision of law.32 Among other things, the HCJ has used this clause as a basis for some decisions to vacate cabinet appointments, including the current Netanyahu government’s December 2022 designation of Shas party leader Aryeh Deri (see Appendix B) as interior and health minister.33 The HCJ found Deri’s appointment to be unreasonable because of his past criminal convictions for corruption and his promise in a plea bargain not to return to public life.34 Debate was vigorous over the July 2023 bil to end courts’ use of the reasonableness standard. The coalition and its supporters argued that because the clause is not clearly defined in law, its potentially broad application infringes unfairly on the government’s popular mandate and chil s executive action.35 Some opponents of the bil maintained that the HCJ has shown restraint in rejecting most petitions challenging reasonableness, but that courts should have flexibility to employ the reasonableness standard to protect uncodified rights and prevent public corruption and malfeasance.36 Despite the new limitation on using the reasonableness clause, courts can stil resort to other common law standards that could protect against certain government decisions. These grounds include 28 Barak Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats,” Axios, July 23, 2023. 29 Morgan Winsor, “Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks out on divisive judicial overhaul: ‘It's a minor correction,’” ABC News, July 27, 2023. 30 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset begins final votes on reasonableness law, curbing court review of decisions,” Times of Israel, July 23, 2023. Under the bill, courts can still use reasonableness to examine the actions of lower-level civil servants or municipal officials. 31 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “What the ‘reasonableness’ law does—and doesn’t—mean for judicial overhaul,” Times of Israel, July 27, 2023. 32 Amichai Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness,” Israel Democracy Institute, June 22, 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “The reason for reasonableness: A doctrine at the heart of the overhaul explained,” Times of Israel, July 8, 2023. 33 Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness.” 34 Jeremy Sharon, “Deri v. High Court: What did he actually pledge in his 2022 plea bargain?” Times of Israel, January 24, 2023. 35 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Is Torn by Debate over How Much Power to Allow Supreme Court,” July 22, 2023. 36 Ibid.; Cohen, “Doing Away with the Standard of Extreme Unreasonableness.” Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations proportionality, anti-discrimination, conflict of interest, and lack of good faith.37 Israeli President Isaac Herzog and the opposition had sought a compromise with Netanyahu that would have preserved some use of reasonableness to review government action, suspended additional legislation on judicial changes for a period of time, and stipulated that the government could not fire the attorney general,38 but these efforts fell short. When the Knesset reconvenes in October, it may consider additional legislation affecting the JAC and perhaps other issues related to the judiciary. Netanyahu has said that the coalition is willing to return to dialogue with the opposition until sometime in November in an effort to “reach a comprehensive agreement,”39 but opposition leader Yair Lapid has said that he will not join talks that are an “empty show.”40 Some prominent members of Netanyahu’s Likud party have made public statements that appear to advise caution on future steps.41 Polls have suggested that a majority of Israelis may support some form of judicial reform, but generally favors efforts toward compromise. The specific measures introduced by the government seem to attract only minority support.42 One July 2023 poll had 43% of Israelis opposing the Knesset’s reasonableness legislation, 31% supporting it, and the rest undecided. Moreover, polls also indicate a downturn in general support for Netanyahu and other coalition members.43 A poll taken after the passage of the reasonableness law said that a majority of Israelis worry that civil conflict is possible, while 22% support the government advancing legislation unilaterally.44 The reaction within Israeli society—including from protests and potential military service and workforce disruptions—appears likely to affect how the legislative process continues. The proposed judicial changes have galvanized and polarized substantial portions of the Jewish Israeli populace, with some broad divisions manifest between: • Opponents, many of whom are members of the largely secular and Ashkenazi (Jews of European origin) communities that have traditionally occupied leading roles in government, the military, and the burgeoning high-tech sector; and • Supporters, including several who may identify with certain demographically ascendant groups like West Bank settlers, Jewish nationalists, and the ultra-Orthodox (some of whom hail from a Mizrahi, or Middle Eastern Jewish background).45 Since January, hundreds of thousands of opponents have joined in regular non-violent protests against the proposed changes in conjunction with opposition politicians,46 and several former HCJ 37 Sharon, “The reason for reasonableness: A doctrine at the heart of the overhaul explained.” 38 Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats.” 39 “Netanyahu vows to continue dialogue to reach judicial reform compromise,” i24News, July 24, 2023. 40 Dov Lieber, “Israelis Vow to Intensify Protests Against New Judicial Legislation,” Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2023. 41 “Israeli air chief warns of security threat from judicial reform crisis,” Reuters, July 28, 2023. 42 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Only a Minority of Israelis Support the Proposed Judicial Overhaul,” Israel Democracy Institute, February 21, 2023, and “Overhauling the Judicial System – What Do Israelis Think?” Israel Democracy Institute, February 3, 2023; “Direct Polls: 3/4 of Israelis support judicial reform,” Israel National News, March 7, 2023. 43 “43% of Israelis opposed to judicial reform Reasonableness Clause – poll,” Jerusalem Post, July 9, 2023. 44 Moshe Cohen, “58% of Israelis fear a civil war amid judicial reform crisis,” Jerusalem Post/Maariv, July 28, 2023. 45 Dov Lieber and Shandi Raice, “Protests Break Out in Israel After Judicial Revamp Passes,” Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2023; Patrick Kingsley, “Parliament Set to Vote in Israel on Judicial Bill,” New York Times, July 24, 2023. 46 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2023; “Anti-overhaul protesters call to turn up heat as over 300,000 estimated at rallies,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2023. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations justices and attorneys general have strongly criticized the proposals.47 At some times, the protests have disrupted traffic and operations at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport. Widespread opposition also has come from Israel’s financial and economic sector.48 Thousands of supporters of the proposed changes have engaged in several non-violent counter-protests. Israeli authorities’ approach to protestors also has become a hotly contested subject. In July, Tel Aviv’s police commander announced his resignation, alleging blatant political interference in the exercise of his duties—a probable reference to National Security Minister Ben Gvir’s call for more assertive efforts to counter disorderly protests.49 Following the commander’s resignation, crowd control measures escalated in force and arrests increased.50 Potential Court Review HCJ President Esther Hayut said in January that the HCJ intends to examine any legislation enacted under the government’s proposed changes to the judiciary, raising the possibility of a constitutional crisis if the HCJ rules that the legislation is invalid.51 The HCJ is planning to hold a hearing on petitions challenging the law on September 12.52 The HCJ could strike down the reasonableness law, uphold it, or narrowly interpret it to curb its impact. To date, the HCJ has not invalidated any provision of Israel’s Basic Laws, which in the absence of a written constitution lay down the rules of government and enumerate fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the HCJ has indicated that it could reverse a Basic Law if it fundamentally changes the nature of democracy in Israel or abuses the constitutional process.53 One Israeli legal expert has speculated that the HCJ could refrain from deciding on the July law’s validity in the abstract, but opt to engage on the issue when presented with a concrete case if the government tries to replace the attorney general or change the composition of the JAC—both of which could represent red lines for the court on the issue of judicial independence.54 General Assessment The following implications of the judicial system changes and proposals may have relevance for U.S. policy. Israel’s security and economy. Many within Israel’s military reserves and its private sector have suspended their activity or threatened to do so, raising questions about the country’s defense readiness and economic strength.55 According to a media report citing an unnamed U.S. official, 47 Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Jerusalem Post, January 12, 2023. 48 Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2023. 49 “Tel Aviv police chief quits, citing government meddling against protesters,” Reuters, July 6, 2023; “Tel Aviv police chief skips Ben Gvir ceremony removing him from his post,” Times of Israel, July 4, 2023. 50 Marissa Newman and Lisa Fleischer, “Protests in Israel Turn Violent After Firing of Police Chief,” Bloomberg, July 6, 2023. 51 Neri Zilber, “Will Israel’s Supreme Court Fight Back?” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2023. David Horovitz, “Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,” Times of Israel, January 12, 2023. 52 Michael Starr, “High Court to Discuss Israel’s Reasonableness Law on September 12,” Jerusalem Post, July 31, 2023. 53 Lieber and Raice; Emily Bazelon, “How Israel’s Supreme Court Might React to the Challenge to Its Power,” New York Times, July 25, 2023. 54 Bazelon. 55 David S. Cloud and Dov Lieber, “Israel Faces New Security Threats if Protesting Military Reservists Refuse to (continued...) Congressional Research Service 7 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations the Pentagon “is concerned that the crisis facing the Israeli military could have negative implications for Israel’s deterrence strategy and encourage Iran or Hezbollah to conduct military provocations that could escalate the situation in the region.”56 In late July, Israel’s air force commander said, “It is possible that at a time like this they (Israel's enemies) will try to test the frontiers, our cohesion and our alertness.”57 Additionally, disputes continue about whether reservists and other military personnel—many of whom fulfill key roles—are justified in linking their service to legislative outcomes.58 One news source has reported that the main problem for the military would be decreased cohesion and readiness over the long term rather than an immediate breakdown in performance. This source cites analysis arguing that highly-skilled reservists (fighter pilots, special operations troops, and intelligence analysts) who stop volunteering would probably return in the event of a crisis, and the IDF would retain the capacity to handle most short-term threats.59 Another source postulates that the IDF’s recruitment of mandatory conscripts to combat duty might face challenges.60 Democracy, governance, and Israel’s international standing. Much of the national debate focuses on the potential long-term implications for Israeli democracy and governance that might stem from changes to the judiciary’s power. The discourse highlights the challenge Israel faces in respecting the actions of an elected government while protecting minority rights at a time when the prime minister’s personal stake in judicial outcomes—owing to his criminal trial—may complicate efforts to build trust with the opposition. Weakening judicial review could allow the government to take actions that the HCJ might have previously resisted. Such actions could include expanding Israel’s West Bank control at Palestinians’ expense, increasing economic preferences and military service exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews, or changing minority rights and the religious-secular balance in Israel.61 Some debate whether Israel might face heightened condemnation and legal prosecution in international fora if its reputation for having a strong, independent judiciary erodes.62 Many of those supporting the proposed changes assert that the HCJ needs corrective balance because Israel lacks a constitution providing explicit boundaries to judicial review. 63 Some also Serve,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2023; “Israeli doctors walk off the job and more strikes are threatened after law weakening courts passes,” Associated Press, July 25, 2023; Dov Lieber, “Economic, Political Tumult Roil Israel,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2023. 56 Ravid, “Exclusive: Biden says Bibi shouldn’t rush ‘divisive’ judicial overhaul bill amid threats.” 57 “Israeli air chief warns of security threat from judicial reform crisis,” Reuters. 58 “Here’s how reservists are playing a crucial role in opposing Israel’s judicial reforms,” Associated Press, July 25, 2023. 59 Cloud and Lieber. 60 Lilach Shoval, “Israel’s army readiness, Air Force cohesion at risk over judicial overhaul rift,” Al-Monitor, July 30, 2023. 61 Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions”; “Israel unveils controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,” Associated Press, January 4, 2023. 62 Michael Starr, “Judicial reform reasonableness bill advances to final Knesset votes,” Jerusalem Post, July 20, 2023; Eugene Kontorovich and Avraham Russel Shalev, “Arguments about judicial reform, ICC are legally baseless – opinion,” Jerusalem Post, July 21, 2023. 63 “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” Times of Israel, January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, CNN, January 31, 2023. For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Real Clear Politics, February 5, 2023. For some historical context, see Patrick Kingsley, “Social Rifts, Spread over Decades, at the Root of Israel’s Judicial Crisis,” New York Times, March 11, 2023. Congressional Research Service 8 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations allege that elites from Israeli society who oppose the coalition’s proposals are at least partly focused on maintaining their power and position.64 Netanyahu’s legal future. Changes to the judicial system also might affect the status of Netanyahu’s ongoing criminal trial. He and Israel’s attorney general have publicly disagreed on her insistence that a conflict-of-interest agreement bars him from participating in debates surrounding the proposed changes.65 Following the passage of the July law, the attorney general requested that the HCJ invalidate an earlier Basic Law provision (passed in March) that prevents the judiciary from ordering a prime minister to step down. U.S. role. President Biden’s repeated efforts to steer Netanyahu toward compromise may have helped delay some measures, but did not stop the enactment of the July reasonableness law. Biden’s attempts also have generated debate about U.S. input into Israel’s domestic politics.66 U.S. Ambassador to Israel Tom Nides—who plans to leave his post in the summer of 2023—has said that most Israelis want the United States to be involved in Israel’s business, and that the Administration is trying to stop Israel from “going off the rails.”67 Members of Congress have articulated varying opinions about U.S. engagement in the discourse over Israel’s judicial system.68 Biden reportedly agreed in July to meet with Netanyahu in the United States at some point later in the year,69 after saying in March that they would not meet at the White House “in the near term.”70 Israeli-Palestinian Issues71 Overview (Including Jerusalem, Gaza, and Visa Waiver Program) Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.72 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration.73 These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians 64 Moshe Koppel, “This reform will end limitless power for unelected elites,” Times of Israel (blog), February 5, 2023. 65 “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” Reuters, February 2, 2023; Chen Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Haaretz, January 26, 2023. 66 See, for example, Robert Satloff, “President Biden can show his support for Israel by staying silent,” The Hill, July 29, 2023. 67 Dov Lieber and Michael Amon, “U.S. Ambassador Warned Israel Against ‘Going off the Rails’ with Judicial Overhaul,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2023. 68 Peter Baker and Lisa Lerer, “U.S. Navigates Turbulent Ties to a Close Ally,” New York Times, July 24, 2023; Marc Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform,” Jewish Insider, February 16, 2023. Full text of three letters available at https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/final-3.8.23-delauro-schakowsky-mcgovern-letter-to-biden-administration-on-two-state-solution-compressed.pdf, https://nadler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.9.23_letter_to_israeli_government_final.pdf, and https://eshoo.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/eshoo.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/open-letter-to-israeli-pro-democracy-protesters-5.24.23.pdf. 69 Kevin Liptak, “White House says Biden and Netanyahu will ‘probably’ meet this year,” CNN, July 17, 2023. 70 Josef Federman, “Israeli PM, Biden exchange frosty words over legal overhaul,” Associated Press, March 29, 2023. 71 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 72 State Department Press Briefing, February 23, 2023; White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. 73 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service 9 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations that could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.74 In January 2023 remarks made alongside PA President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West Bank, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution] more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless of the victim or the perpetrator.75 U.S. Policy on Jerusalem The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.76 Israel’s previous government initiated some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances, including through loans and work permits,77 and some of these measures have continued under its current government. Some critics have charged that the measures mirror past ~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~• Prevent the HCJ from applying a “reasonableness” test to legislation and~~
~~government action.~~
~~• Allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisers from outside the Justice~~
~~Ministry’s aegis.~~
~~Reducing the judiciary’s power to curb Knesset majority-backed government action could allow~~
~~this coalition to enact laws that have encountered or would likely encounter HCJ resistance. Such~~
~~laws could include legalizing Jewish West Bank outposts on private Palestinian land, exempting~~
~~ultra-Orthodox Jews from military conscription, or changing minority rights and the religious-~~
~~secular balance in Israel.26 It is unclear whether Prime Minister Netanyahu’s participation in the~~
~~legislative process for the judicial reform proposal is legal because of an existing conflict of~~
~~interest agreement barring him from matters that could affect his criminal case.27 Netanyahu has~~
~~participated in the ongoing debates despite the insistence of Israel’s attorney general that he is~~
~~prohibited from doing so. In March, the Knesset passed a law that—if not overturned by the~~
~~HCJ—would limit the circumstances under which a prime minister could be removed from~~
~~office.28~~
~~Since the government announced its proposed legislation in January, hundreds of thousands of~~
~~Israelis have joined in regular protests in conjunction with opposition politicians,29 and many~~
~~former HCJ justices and attorneys general have strongly criticized the proposal and called on the~~
~~government to withdraw it to prevent “serious damage” to the rule of law.30 Widespread~~
~~opposition has encompassed other sectors of society. A number of leading figures in Israel’s~~
~~financial and economic sector—including the head of Israel’s central bank and several executives~~
~~in the country’s high-tech industry—have expressed concern about the proposed judicial reforms’~~
~~potential impact on Israel’s economy and its global appeal.31 Additionally, many military and~~
~~security personnel—including several reservists who play critical roles in the Israel Air Force—~~
~~have joined protests and/or threatened to suspend their service if the proposals pass without~~
~~significant change. In March, IDF chief of staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that the IDF~~
~~could not operate without “the volunteering spirit of the reservists ... which depends on the~~
~~preservation of the IDF as the ‘people’s army’ in a Jewish and democratic country.”32~~
~~Netanyahu has defended the need for reform. He has argued that the HCJ has exercised broad~~
~~powers of judicial review since the 1990s despite Israel’s lack of a written constitution as a clear~~
~~reference point, while calling for substantive dialogue during the legislative process to ensure that~~
~~the changes can be made responsibly.33 HCJ President Esther Hayut has said that the HCJ intends~~

~~26 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2023; “Israel unveils~~
~~controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,” Associated Press, January 4, 2023.~~
~~27 “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” Reuters, February 2, 2023; Chen~~
~~Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Haaretz, January 26, 2023.~~
~~28 Henriette Chacar, “Israel’s attorney general accuses Netanyahu of breaking the law,” Reuters, March 24, 2023.~~
~~29 Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions”; “Anti-overhaul protesters call to turn up heat as over 300,000~~
~~estimated at rallies,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2023.~~
~~30 Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~January 12, 2023.~~
~~31 Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2023.~~
~~32 Neri Zilber, “Netanyahu Holds the Key to De-escalating Israel’s Crisis,” Newlines Magazine, March 16, 2023.~~
~~33 “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” Times of Israel,~~
~~January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, CNN, January 31, 2023.~~
~~For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s~~
~~Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s~~
~~Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Real Clear Politics, February 5, 2023. For some historical context, see Patrick~~
~~Kingsley, “Social Rifts, Spread over Decades, at the Root of Israel’s Judicial Crisis,” New York Times, March 11, 2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

5

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~to examine any legislation enacted, raising the possibility of a constitutional crisis if the HCJ~~
~~rules that the legislation is invalid.34~~
~~Some observers warn about international implications of efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary. For~~
~~example, a former legal adviser for Israel’s defense ministry has said that international or foreign~~
~~courts have to date largely trusted Israel’s justice system to deal with politicians or soldiers~~
~~accused of illegal actions. He then speculated, “But if we get rid of that [current levels of~~
~~domestic legal accountability] and give carte blanche to [soldiers to] do what they want and give~~
~~them immunity from prosecution, it would open up all sorts of measures.”35~~
~~Some Members of Congress have shared varying views on the reform proposal. For example, two~~
~~Members of Congress expressed concerns in January that it might strain U.S.-Israel relations.36 In~~
~~February and March, a number of other Members voiced opinions. Some joined letters to~~
~~President Biden or Israeli leaders—or made separate statements—expressing support for the~~
~~principles of judicial review and minority rights.37 Others stated confidence in Israelis to make~~
~~their own democratic decisions.38~~
~~In mid-March, Israeli President Isaac Herzog introduced a framework that he promoted as~~
~~facilitating a compromise to preserve Israeli democracy and unity. It would aim to strengthen~~
~~civil rights and limit the potential for a government backed by a narrow Knesset majority to make~~
~~swift and major changes to the judiciary, absent broader support from national institutions.39~~
~~Netanyahu rejected Herzog’s specific proposal while indicating that he remained open to~~
~~compromise in principle.40~~
~~In late March, the controversy over the proposed judicial reform legislation came to a head, as~~
~~described in the timeline below.~~
~~Key Developments in Judicial Reform Debate: March 19-27~~
~~March 19~~
~~President Biden calls Prime Minister Netanyahu in support of a compromise~~
~~consistent with democratic values such as “genuine checks and balances” and “the~~
~~broadest possible base of popular support.”41~~

~~34 David Horovitz, “Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, January 12, 2023.~~
~~35 Emanuel Fabian, “Former defense legal adviser warns against planned government moves in West Bank,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, January 23, 2023.~~
~~36 Representative Jerrold Nadler, “As the Most Senior Jewish Member of Congress, I Now Fear Deeply for the U.S.-~~
~~Israel Relationship,” Haaretz, January 25, 2023; Representative Brad Sherman, interviewed in Ben Samuels, “Top pro-~~
~~Israel Democrat Warns Netanyahu Government ‘Mistakes’ Could Erode U.S. Support,” Haaretz, January 23, 2023.~~
~~37 Full text of two letters available at https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/files/evo-media-~~
~~document/final-3.8.23-delauro-schakowsky-mcgovern-letter-to-biden-administration-on-two-state-solution-~~
~~compressed.pdf and https://nadler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.9.23_letter_to_israeli_government_final.pdf. See also~~
~~Laura Kelly, “Netanyahu’s judicial reforms have US lawmakers worried about Israeli democracy,” The Hill, March 9,~~
~~2023; Marc Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform,”~~
Jewish Insider, February 16, 2023.
~~38 Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform.”~~
~~39 “Warning of civil war, Herzog unveils framework for judicial reform; PM rejects it,” Times of Israel, March 15,~~
~~2023.~~
~~40 Patrick Kingsley, “An Effort to Resolve Israel’s Impasse Stalls on How to Pick Judges,” New York Times, March 17,~~
~~2023; Elliott Abrams, “Israel and the Debate over the Role of the Judiciary in Democratic Government,” Council on~~
~~Foreign Relations, March 16, 2023.~~
~~41 White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,” March 19,~~
~~2023.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~March 19-20~~
~~Israeli government announces postponement of most of the judicial reform~~
~~legislation, but continues to press forward with plans to pass a bil that would give~~
~~it major—though not total—control over judicial appointments42~~
~~March 25~~
~~Defense Minister Gallant departs from Netanyahu’s position by calling for a pause~~
~~to the legislation, based on stated concerns that domestic contention is affecting~~
~~Israel’s military and security forces.~~
~~March 26~~
~~Netanyahu announces a decision to fire Gallant (as discussed below, Netanyahu~~
~~reverses this decision in April).~~
~~U.S. National Security Council spokesperson says developments “further~~
~~underscore the urgent need for compromise.”43~~
~~March 27~~
~~After protests against the legislation expand—along with counter-demonstrations~~
~~in support of the legislation—and a general strike closes down much of Israel,~~
~~Netanyahu announces that all judicial reform legislation wil be postponed to~~
~~prevent a rift among Israelis.~~
~~Netanyahu proclaims readiness to engage in dialogue with the opposition to~~
~~“bring a reform that wil restore the balance between the different branches of~~
~~government while strengthening civil liberties.”44~~
~~Assessment~~
~~It is unclear how the March 2023 postponement will affect legislative outcomes on judicial~~
~~reform. In a March interview, Netanyahu said that the Knesset should be limited in its power to~~
~~nullify HCJ decisions. That issue is separate from the judicial appointments clause that appears to~~
~~be more central to the controversy—with the ruling coalition seeking an automatic majority on~~
~~the judicial appointments committee, and the opposition arguing to maintain a political-~~
~~professional balance on the committee that prevents a clear majority (see text box below).45 In the~~
~~same interview, Netanyahu reiterated his view that the HCJ needs checking to strengthen Israeli~~
~~democracy.46~~
~~In April, Netanyahu said that there was no deadline to enact judicial reform legislation, and that~~
~~his priority is to achieve broad national consensus.47 One journalist speculated that Netanyahu~~
~~was looking for ways to distance himself from his ultra-nationalist coalition partners in light of~~
~~concerns about possible declines in his approval rating, domestic political and economic stability,~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian tensions, and relations with the United States.48 Reportedly, National Security~~
~~Minister Ben Gvir acquiesced to giving the government until late July to pass consensus-based~~
~~judicial reform, after receiving Netanyahu’s agreement that if the government and opposition~~
~~cannot reach agreement, the legislation will pass unilaterally.49 On April 14, Moody’s Investors~~
~~Service kept Israel’s credit ratings constant, but downgraded the outlook on those ratings from~~

~~42 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Biden tells Bibi he’s never seen such anxiety over Israel’s political situation,” Axios, March~~
~~20, 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “Ostensibly softened, Rothman bill gives coalition broad control over choice of judges,”~~
Times of Israel, March 21, 2023.
~~43 White House, “Statement from NSC Spokesperson Adrienne Watson on Developments in Israel,” March 26, 2023.~~
~~44 Barak Ravid, “Bibi suspends judicial overhaul after mass protests across Israel,” Axios, March 27, 2023.~~
~~45 Dov Lieber, “Netanyahu Vows Compromise on Judiciary,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2023.~~
~~46 “Netanyahu in weekend interview: Overhaul necessary as Supreme Court ‘too powerful,’” Times of Israel, March 27,~~
~~2023.~~
~~47 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Netanyahu falls in polls, could abandon judicial overhaul,” Al-Monitor, April 14, 2023.~~
~~48 Ibid.~~
~~49 Ibid.~~
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~~“positive” to “stable,” reflecting “a deterioration of Israel’s governance, as illustrated by the~~
~~recent events around the government’s proposal for overhauling the country's judiciary.”50~~
~~Polls have suggested that a majority of Israelis may support some form of judicial reform, but the~~
~~specific reforms introduced by the government in January seem to attract only minority support.~~
~~Majorities appear to favor compromises that would preserve at least some judicial review powers~~
~~and a role for justices alongside politicians in making judicial appointments.51~~
~~After the March postponement, President Biden expressed hope that Netanyahu would walk away~~
~~from the judicial reform proposals and reiterated his earlier call for compromise. He also~~
~~dismissed the idea of Netanyahu visiting the White House “in the near term.”52 Netanyahu has~~
~~said that Israel will not make decisions based on outside pressure,53 but referred to U.S.-Israel ties~~
~~as “unshakeable” while virtually addressing the State Department’s 2023 Summit for~~
~~Democracy.54 During a visit to Israel in May, Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy said, “I think~~
~~the pause, the idea of bringing both sides together to find common ground would be a good place.~~
~~But I do think that there are elements, when I read the law, where you would want to look for~~
~~reforms.”55~~
~~Judicial Appointments Committee and Controversy~~
~~The Israeli Judicial Appointments Committee (JAC) is made up of nine members: two Knesset members (MKs),~~
~~two government ministers, two representatives of the Israel Bar Association, and three HCJ judges. A simple~~
~~majority of five JAC members can appoint most judges; HCJ picks need the approval of seven JAC members.56~~
~~Under the government’s initial proposal for judicial reform, it would have obtained a sufficient majority to~~
~~effectively control all appointments. During the March crisis on the issue, the government floated a “compromise”~~
~~plan that would permit each Israeli government to obtain and use majority control on the JSC to appoint up to~~
~~two HCJ judges as vacancies arise, and then require broader agreement to fil any additional HCJ vacancies.57~~
~~With Israel’s opposition stil protesting the government’s proposals as of June, the Knesset held its regularly~~
~~scheduled vote to select the two MKs for the JAC. Amid threats from some coalition figures to select two~~
~~coalition MKs if negotiations toward an overall judicial reform compromise had not progressed, the Knesset~~
~~selected an MK from the opposition, but Netanyahu had it delay the selection of a coalition MK for up to a month,~~
~~thereby preventing the JAC from convening during that time. In response, the opposition said it would pause~~
~~compromise negotiations until the selection process is complete.58~~
~~Following the suspension of coalition-opposition negotiations in June, officials from the~~
~~government said that they would try to enact legislation before the Knesset’s summer recess~~
~~begins in late July seeking to prevent judicial review of the “reasonableness” of government~~
~~decisions. Finance Minister Smotrich said that this effort would be “slower, with more moderate~~

~~50 Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s changes outlook on Israel to stable from positive, affirms A1 ratings,” April~~
~~14, 2023.~~
~~51 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Only a Minority of Israelis Support the Proposed Judicial Overhaul,” Israel~~
~~Democracy Institute, February 21, 2023, and “Overhauling the Judicial System – What Do Israelis Think?” Israel~~
~~Democracy Institute, February 3, 2023; “Direct Polls: 3/4 of Israelis support judicial reform,” Israel National News,~~
~~March 7, 2023.~~
~~52 Josef Federman, “Israeli PM, Biden exchange frosty words over legal overhaul,” Associated Press, March 29, 2023.~~
~~53 Ibid.~~
~~54 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Netanyahu Addresses the US State Dept. Summit for Democracy 2023,” March~~
~~29, 2023.~~
~~55 Omer Lachmanovitch and Ariel Kahana, “‘This administration should get further behind the Abraham Accords,’”~~
Israel Hayom, May 1, 2023.
~~56 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Vote on identity of MKs on judge selection panel seen as test for overhaul talks,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, June 14, 2023.~~
~~57 Sharon, “Ostensibly softened, Rothman bill gives coalition broad control over choice of judges.”~~
~~58 Patrick Kingsley, “Israel’s Judicial Crisis Resurfaces as Talks Abruptly Halt,” New York Times, June 15, 2023.~~
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~~steps” than the legislative push earlier in the year. Reportedly, the government may introduce a~~
~~new bill on judicial appointments during the Knesset’s winter session, which begins in October.59~~
~~Amid continuing public debate, Netanyahu has roundly criticized military reservists threatening~~
~~not to serve. He also has sought to convince military leadership to do more to counter this~~
~~behavior.60 Some Israeli analysts have suggested that reservists’ actions played a major role in~~
~~pressuring Netanyahu to pause the judicial reform legislation.61 As various media sources~~
~~speculated in early 2023 on the effect future controversies might have on reservists as well as~~
~~full-time personnel, some surveys indicated that reservists’ military service had not decreased~~
~~drastically.62~~
~~Facing negative public polling from his decision—never fully finalized—to fire Defense Minister~~
~~Gallant, Netanyahu reversed the decision in early April.63 Pressure on Netanyahu to clearly~~
~~reinstate Gallant came at a time when Israel’s military has faced heightened challenges or threats~~
~~from violence in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Lebanon.64~~
~~Gallant’s reinstatement came shortly after Israeli media reported that the IDF’s Military~~
~~Intelligence directorate had warned Israel’s top national security decisionmakers that Israel’s~~
~~strategic situation and deterrence had eroded for various reasons, particularly domestic division~~
~~over judicial reform legislation. According to Israel Hayom:~~
~~This view of Israel is shared by all members of the anti-Israeli axis led by Iran, and it has~~
~~been clearly manifested in the series of meetings held by Hezbollah Secretary-General~~
~~Hassan Nasrallah with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad officials aimed at coordinating~~
~~their positions.... The Palestinian Authority has also been encouraged by the US-Israel~~
~~friction and it hopes to seize on it, particularly in international forums – from UN~~
~~committees to The Hague.65~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian Issues66~~
~~Overview~~
~~Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated~~
~~two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for~~
~~direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.67 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster~~
~~Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump~~

~~59 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Coalition moves to restart overhaul, sets plan to limit High Court’s judicial review,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, June 19, 2023.~~
~~60 Amos Harel, “Netanyahu Tries to Regain Control of His Generals, but May Lose Another Battle,” Haaretz, April 7,~~
~~2023.~~
~~61 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Soldiers Forced Netanyahu’s Hand,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2023.~~
~~62 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Is volunteering for IDF reserve duty cratering or stable? – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, March 27,~~
~~2023.~~
~~63 Barak Ravid, “In reversal, Netanyahu says he’s keeping Gallant as Israel’s defense minister,” Axios, April 10, 2023.~~
~~64 Ben Caspit, “Israel, Lebanon’s Hezbollah agree to avoid confrontation, but for how long?” Al-Monitor, April 7,~~
~~2023.~~
~~65 Yoav Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence,” Israel Hayom, April~~
~~4, 2023.~~
~~66 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~67 State Department Press Briefing, February 23, 2023; White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President~~
~~Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.~~
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~~Administration.68 These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians~~
~~that could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.69 In January 2023 remarks~~
~~made alongside PA President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West Bank, Secretary of State~~
~~Antony Blinken said:~~
~~Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution]~~
~~more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like~~
~~settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions~~
~~to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to~~
~~violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless~~
~~of the victim or the perpetrator.70~~
~~U.S. Policy on Jerusalem~~
~~The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as~~
~~Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018.~~
~~These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem~~
~~as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of~~
~~Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.71~~
~~Israel’s previous government took some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living~~
~~circumstances, including through loans and work permits.72 However, some critics charged that~~
~~the measures mirrored past~~ Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than
address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.7378 During President Biden’s July 2022 During President Biden’s July 2022
visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had
committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the
Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank
and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.7479 As of April 2023, Israeli personnel began 24- As of April 2023, Israeli personnel began 24-
hour operations at the Allenby hour operations at the Allenby crossing five days a week.80 In July 2023, the United States and Israel announced that Israel would begin allowing Palestinian Americans to travel to Israel and the West Bank from Israeli airports, as part of Israel’s effort to qualify for entry into the U.S. Visa Waiver Program—under the program’s reciprocity requirement—by the end of September. Past Israeli practice had been to generally require Palestinian Americans to enter the West Bank via the Allenby crossing with Jordan.81 74~~crossing five days a week.75~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian tensions have heightened in 2023. In response to a Palestinian-backed U.N.~~
~~General Assembly resolution in December 2022 requesting an International Court of Justice~~
~~advisory opinion on Israeli actions in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, the~~
~~Netanyahu government has taken a number of retaliatory actions. These include withholding tax~~
~~revenue due the PA (partly authorized by existing Israeli law) and rerouting some of it to Israeli~~
~~families victimized by terrorism, freezing construction plans for Palestinians in parts of the West~~
~~Bank, and rescinding expedited travel privileges at checkpoints for PA officials.76 Some countries~~

~~68 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
69 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022. Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022.
7075 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting,” January 31, 2023. Meeting,” January 31, 2023.
7176 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. , February 9, 2021.
7277 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of
Hamas,” Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to , February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to
20,000,” 20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022. , March 26, 2022.
7378 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021. , September 16, 2021.
7479 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing is White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing is
scheduled to operate on a nearly continuous basis starting in April 2023. Jacob Magid, “After US pressure, Allenby scheduled to operate on a nearly continuous basis starting in April 2023. Jacob Magid, “After US pressure, Allenby
crossing to Jordan set to open at all hours on weekdays,” crossing to Jordan set to open at all hours on weekdays,” Times of Israel, November 24, 2022. , November 24, 2022.
7580 Rina Bassist, “Israel expands border crossing hours for Palestinians going to Jordan,” Rina Bassist, “Israel expands border crossing hours for Palestinians going to Jordan,” Al-Monitor, April 3, 2023. , April 3, 2023.
~~76 “Israel to withhold PA tax revenue, impose other sanctions after Abbas’s UN success,” Times of Israel, January 6,~~
~~2023; Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich doubles penalties for pay-for-slay, withholds NIS 100m,” Jerusalem Post, February~~
~~2, 2023.~~
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~~(including France, Germany, and Japan) signed a statement expressing deep concern regarding~~
~~these Israeli steps, calling them “punitive measures against the Palestinian people, leadership, and~~
~~civil society.”77~~81 Barak Ravid, “U.S. and Israel agree on conditions that could see Israelis join visa waiver program,” Axios, July 19, 2023; Rina Bassist, “Israel signs deal with US to join visa waiver program,” Al-Monitor, July 19, 2023. An unofficial version of the draft U.S.-Israel MOU on the issue is available at https://ammannet.net/english/text-us-israel-visa-waiver-mou. For more information on the Visa Waiver Program, see CRS Report R46300, Adding Countries to the Visa Waiver Program: Effects on National Security and Tourism, by Abigail F. Kolker and Michaela D. Platzer. Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations
In January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/Haram In January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/Haram
al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of condemnation al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of condemnation
or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and globally.or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and globally.7882
Netanyahu pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims to worship at Netanyahu pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims to worship at
the holy site, and downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous ministerial visits to the the holy site, and downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous ministerial visits to the
site.site.7983 Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of Ben Gvir’s visit, the Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of Ben Gvir’s visit, the
State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his commitment on the status quo.State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his commitment on the status quo.8084
During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of Jordan, which has a custodial role During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of Jordan, which has a custodial role
over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel should respect the “historic over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel should respect the “historic
and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate it.”and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate it.”~~81 The State Department~~
~~reiterated its concern about provocations and the status quo after another visit by Ben Gvir in~~
~~May.82~~

~~77 Luke Tress, “Over 90 countries urge Israel to lift sanctions put on Palestinians after UN vote,” Times of Israel,~~
~~January 17, 2023.~~
~~78 Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Axios, January 3,~~
~~2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain~~
~~Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023.~~
~~79 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report~~
~~RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~80 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.~~
~~81 “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” Reuters, January 24, 2023.~~
~~For background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
~~82 “US flogs Ben Gvir for ‘provocative, inflammatory’ tour on tense Temple Mount,” Times of Israel, May 22, 2023.~~
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85 Ben Gvir made additional visits to the Mount/Haram in May and July.
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.83
86 Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.8487
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.8588 Because of the PA’s Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.8689 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.Nations.8790 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.conflict.88
~~Israel-West Bank Violence, Settlements, and Other Tensions~~
~~Overview of violence and some countermeasures.~~ ~~After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian~~
~~violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30 Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least~~
~~170 Palestinians in the West Bank,89 violence has spiked in the first half of 2023. For this year as~~
~~of June, at least 20 Israelis and 120 West Bank Palestinians have died from attacks by militants~~
~~and/or extremists on both sides against civilians and/or their property, or clashes involving Israeli~~
~~security forces and Palestinian militants.90~~
~~Since at least the second half of 2022, Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on~~
~~northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism~~
~~suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.91 As the increase in~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,92 Israeli and PA forces have~~
~~approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of~~

~~83 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
8491 82 Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Axios, January 3, 2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023. 83 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations. 84 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. 85 “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” Reuters, January 24, 2023. For background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 86 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations. 87 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor, ,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
8588 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
8689 Ibid. Ibid.
8790 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021. , September 12, 2021.
8891 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” Haaretz, November 29, , November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” 2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
~~89 Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” New York Times,~~
~~January 29, 2023.~~
~~90 Dov Lieber, “Israel Fires at Palestinians from Air,” Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2023.~~
~~91 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” New York Times, November 16, 2022.~~
~~92 State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022, and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda~~
~~Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074,~~ ~~The Palestinians: Background and U.S.~~
~~Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
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~~future escalation.93 The PA~~ Congressional Research Service 11 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Israel-West Bank Violence and Settlement Tensions Overview of violence and some countermeasures. After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30 Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least 170 Palestinians in the West Bank,92 violence has spiked in 2023. For this year as of July, at least 29 Israelis and 155 West Bank Palestinians have died from attacks by militants and/or extremists on both sides against civilians and/or their property, or clashes involving Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants.93 Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.94 As the increase in Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,95 Israeli and PA forces have approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of future escalation.96 The PA reportedly has sought time and flexibility to address militancy reportedly has sought time and flexibility to address militancy
independent of Israeli dictates, as part of an effort to reach compromises that avoid major armed independent of Israeli dictates, as part of an effort to reach compromises that avoid major armed
confrontations or arrests. confrontations or arrests. ~~Some~~In 2022, some PA personnel reportedly PA personnel reportedly ~~have~~ directly targeted Israeli forces or directly targeted Israeli forces or
settlers, raising questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.settlers, raising questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.9497
Israel’s government approved measures in January that Prime Minister Netanyahu said were Israel’s government approved measures in January that Prime Minister Netanyahu said were
aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps reducing benefits for aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps reducing benefits for
families of accused terrorists, accelerating home demolitions and West Bank settlement building, families of accused terrorists, accelerating home demolitions and West Bank settlement building,
reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for Israelis.reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for Israelis.9598 In In
defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate circle,” defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate circle,”
Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has reduced Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has reduced
security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners in the security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners in the
Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.9699
After a deadly January Israeli raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security After a deadly January Israeli raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security
coordination with Israel,coordination with Israel,97100 but its practical meaning is unclear. but its practical meaning is unclear.98101 Previously, the PA publicly Previously, the PA publicly
suspended security coordination with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was suspended security coordination with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was
~~contemplating annexation of West Bank areas.99 In February, President Abbas reportedly told~~
~~Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns that Israel-PA intelligence sharing has continued,~~
~~and that he would fully resume coordination once calm is restored.100 Burns later remarked that~~
~~the ongoing tensions have an “unhappy resemblance to some of the realities” of the 2000-2005~~
~~period of Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising).101 An~~
~~Israeli observer has argued that PA leadership under Abbas is unlikely to coordinate efforts~~
~~against Israelis in the way Palestinian leaders supposedly did during the intifada.102~~
Efforts to deescalate amid continuing challenges. During Secretary Blinken’s January visit to
~~the West Bank, he said that “it’s important to take steps to de-escalate, to stop the violence, to~~
~~reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the foundation for more positive actions going~~
~~forward.”103 He also said that he discussed with President Abbas “the importance of the~~
~~Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its governance and accountability,~~

93 92 Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” New York Times, January 29, 2023. 93 Raja Abdulrahim, “West Bank Teenagers Are Writing Out Their Last Words,” New York Times, July 5, 2023. 94 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” New York Times, November 16, 2022. 95 State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022 and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations. 96 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” New York Times, October 26, 2022; Yaniv , October 26, 2022; Yaniv
Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian
Authority,” Authority,” Haaretz, October 12, 2022. , October 12, 2022.
9497 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Al-Monitor, ,
October 12, 2022. October 12, 2022.
9598 Dov Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows,” Dov Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2023; Raja Abdulrahim, , January 30, 2023; Raja Abdulrahim,
“Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement in West Bank as Violence Rages,” “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement in West Bank as Violence Rages,” New York Times, January 30, , January 30,
2023. 2023.
9699 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
97100 “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” WAFA
News Agency, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
98101 Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in
the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023. the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023.
~~99 “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” Reuters, November 17, 2020~~.
~~100 Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Times of Israel,~~
~~February 7, 2023.~~
~~101 Ibid.~~
~~102 Micah Halpern, “Terror wave in Israel not an intifada, but still very dangerous – opinion,” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~November 28, 2022.~~
~~103 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their~~
~~Meeting.”~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

13

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~strengthening the institutions of the PA.”104~~Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations contemplating annexation of West Bank areas.102 In February, Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns remarked that the tensions resembled “some of the realities” of the 2000-2005 period of Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising).103 An Israeli observer has argued that PA leadership under President Abbas is unlikely to coordinate efforts against Israelis in the way Palestinian leaders supposedly did during the intifada.104 Challenges related to de-escalation efforts and settlements. During Secretary Blinken’s January visit to the West Bank, he said that “it’s important to take steps to de-escalate, to stop the violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the foundation for more positive actions going forward.”105 He also said that he discussed with President Abbas “the importance of the Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its governance and accountability, strengthening the institutions of the PA.”106 According to one media report, Blinken encouraged According to one media report, Blinken encouraged
Abbas privately to implement a security plan presented to Israel and the PA weeks earlier by the Abbas privately to implement a security plan presented to Israel and the PA weeks earlier by the
U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), Lieutenant General U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), Lieutenant General
Michael Fenzel.Michael Fenzel.~~105~~107 The plan supposedly lays out steps for PA security forces to regain control in The plan supposedly lays out steps for PA security forces to regain control in
Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA force. Reportedly, PA officials expressed Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA force. Reportedly, PA officials expressed
reservations about the plan, partly because reservations about the plan, partly because ~~it may not explicitly call for Israel to reduce~~of concerns that it might not reduce Israeli incursions incursions
into West Bank cities or include other provisions calculated to attract Palestinian public into West Bank cities or include other provisions calculated to attract Palestinian public
support.support.~~106~~108
In February, the Israeli government decided to advance West Bank plans to construct nearly In February, the Israeli government decided to advance West Bank plans to construct nearly
10,000 additional settlement units and begin a process to retroactively legalize nine outposts that 10,000 additional settlement units and begin a process to retroactively legalize nine outposts that
had previously been illegal under Israeli law—triggering a statement of strong opposition from had previously been illegal under Israeli law—triggering a statement of strong opposition from
Secretary Blinken.Secretary Blinken.~~107 Over the next week, U.S.-brokered diplomacy reportedly averted a~~
~~Palestinian-supported U.N. Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution condemning the Israeli~~
~~action.108 Instead, the UNSC issued a presidential statement that expressed deep concern and~~
~~dismay about the Israeli decision, strongly opposed “all unilateral measures that impede peace,”~~
~~and called for “upholding unchanged the historic status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem in word~~
~~and in practice” and Jordan’s custodial role.109~~
109 A few days later, the United States, Israel, the PA, Jordan, and Egypt issued a communique from A few days later, the United States, Israel, the PA, Jordan, and Egypt issued a communique from
Aqaba, Jordan aimed at de-escalating tensions and violence by committing Israel and the PA to Aqaba, Jordan aimed at de-escalating tensions and violence by committing Israel and the PA to
suspend unilateral measures for a few months.110 In March, suspend unilateral measures for a few months.110 In March, ~~with incidents of violence recurring,~~
the five parties reconvened as scheduled in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, and restated the the five parties reconvened as scheduled in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, and restated the
commitments from Aqaba. They also specified plans to work toward empowering PA security commitments from Aqaba. They also specified plans to work toward empowering PA security
forces, develop a mechanism to curb violence, and establish a separate mechanism to improve forces, develop a mechanism to curb violence, and establish a separate mechanism to improve
Palestinian economic conditions.111 Reportedly, the PA had agreed in February to start Palestinian economic conditions.111 Reportedly, the PA had agreed in February to start
implementing the USSC security plan,112 which one source has said would involve “the implementing the USSC security plan,112 which one source has said would involve “the
recruitment and training of thousands of Palestinian security personnel to be deployed in the recruitment and training of thousands of Palestinian security personnel to be deployed in the
~~northern West Bank.”113 Later in March, the foreign ministers of all six Gulf Cooperation Council~~
~~countries (the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman) sent a letter to Secretary~~
~~Blinken urging the Biden Administration “to play its role in reaching a just, comprehensive and~~
~~lasting solution to the conflict based on the principles of international law.”114~~
~~Also in March, the Knesset passed legislation to overturn parts of a 2005 law that had made~~
~~Jewish settlements in certain areas of the northern West Bank illegal. In that year, then-Israeli~~
~~Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had affirmed in writing to then-President George W. Bush that Israel~~

~~104 Ibid.~~
~~105~~northern West Bank.”113 The status of the 102 “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” Reuters, November 17, 2020. 103 Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Times of Israel, February 7, 2023. 104 Micah Halpern, “Terror wave in Israel not an intifada, but still very dangerous – opinion,” Jerusalem Post, November 28, 2022. 105 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their Meeting.” 106 Ibid. 107 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Axios, February 1, 2023. For , February 1, 2023. For
background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074, background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074,
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations~~, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~106~~. 108 Ibid. Ibid.
~~107~~109 State Department, “Israeli Settlement and Outpost Legalization Announcement,” February 13, 2023. State Department, “Israeli Settlement and Outpost Legalization Announcement,” February 13, 2023.
~~108 Michelle Nichols, “No U.N. vote Monday on Israel settlements, diplomats say,” Reuters, February 19, 2023; Barak~~
~~Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023.~~
~~109 U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2023/1), February 20, 2023.~~
110 State Department, “Aqaba Joint Communique,” February 26, 2023. 110 State Department, “Aqaba Joint Communique,” February 26, 2023.
111 State Department, “Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh,” March 19, 2023. 111 State Department, “Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh,” March 19, 2023.
112 Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” 112 Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023. , February 19, 2023.
113 Yoni Ben Menachem, “American-Israeli Military Coordination and the Possibility of Regional Escalation,” 113 Yoni Ben Menachem, “American-Israeli Military Coordination and the Possibility of Regional Escalation,”
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 9, 2023. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 9, 2023.
~~114 “GCC foreign ministers condemn Israeli minister in letter to Blinken,” The National (UAE), March 26, 2023.~~
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1413 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations USSC plan is unclear given subsequent escalation in Jenin and heightened Israeli operations (as discussed below) at a time when PA security forces appear to be less engaged.114 Also in March, the Knesset passed legislation to overturn parts of a 2005 law that had made Jewish settlements in certain areas of the northern West Bank illegal. In that year, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had affirmed in writing to then-President George W. Bush that Israel

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

committed to evacuate settlements and outposts in that region. A State Department spokesperson committed to evacuate settlements and outposts in that region. A State Department spokesperson
said that the United States is extremely troubled about the legislation, and that it clearly said that the United States is extremely troubled about the legislation, and that it clearly
contradicts Israel’s longtime undertaking to the United States, as well commitments it made contradicts Israel’s longtime undertaking to the United States, as well commitments it made
earlier in March to de-escalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions.115 earlier in March to de-escalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions.115 ~~After Deputy Secretary of State~~
~~Wendy Sherman met with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Herzog to convey~~
~~U.S. concern about the legislation,116~~ Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying that Israel’s Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying that Israel’s
government has “no intention of establishing new communities” in the West Bank areas in government has “no intention of establishing new communities” in the West Bank areas in
question.question.~~117~~116 The relocation of a yeshiva (Jewish religious school) within one of these areas in May The relocation of a yeshiva (Jewish religious school) within one of these areas in May
triggered additional criticism from the State Department,triggered additional criticism from the State Department,~~118~~117 as did additional settlement-related as did additional settlement-related
announcements from Israel in June.announcements from Israel in June.~~119~~
~~Widening of conflict?~~118 Reportedly, when President Biden raised concerns about settlement expansion in a July call with Netanyahu, Netanyahu said that no additional settlement plans would be approved in 2023.119 Policy Change on U.S.-Israel Science/Technology Cooperation in Settlements In June 2023, the State Department announced that the Biden Administration would return to pre-Trump Administration U.S. policies that limit U.S.-Israel scientific and technological cooperation to areas administered by Israel before the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.120 In 2020, the Trump Administration signed agreements with Israel removing geographic restrictions on three U.S.-Israel binational foundations.121 In July, 14 Senators sent a letter to President Biden and Secretary Blinken denouncing the June 2023 policy change as an “antisemitic boycott of Israel” that undermines bilateral cooperation. The Senators threatened to block the Biden Administration’s nominees if it does not reverse course.122 June-July escalation. In June, clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants In June, clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants
intensified in the northern West Bankintensified in the northern West Bank~~, with reports indicating~~. Reports indicate that Hamas and that Hamas and ~~Palestine Islamic~~
~~Jihad~~PIJ may have increased their direct involvement, perhaps helping West Bank militants employ tactics similar in sophistication to those used by Iran-supported groups in Lebanon and Gaza, such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).123 One Palestinian shooting attack killed four Israeli settlers, and then a group of Israeli settlers stormed a Palestinian town, setting fire to multiple homes and cars in a scene reminiscent of a similar reprisal attack by settlers in February.124 114 Ben Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?” Al-Monitor, July 4, 2023 115 State Department Press Briefing, March 21, 2023. 116 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on the Knesset Decision to Repeal Parts of the Disengagement Law,” March 22, 2023. 117 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Netanyahu further provokes Biden with relocation of outpost yeshiva,” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2023. 118 State Department, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement,” June 18, 2023. 119 Barak Ravid, “Inside Biden’s call with Israel’s Netanyahu,” July 18, 2023. 120 State Department Press Briefing, June 26, 2023. 121 For more information on these foundations, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 122 Text of letter available at https://www.cruz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/cruz_bds_final.pdf. 123 Isabel Kershner, “Five Palestinians, Including 15-Year-Old Boy, Are Killed in Israeli Raid in the West Bank,” New York Times, June 20, 2023; Ben Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas,” Al-Monitor, June 20, 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “After roadside bomb during Jenin raid, Gallant says ‘all options on the table,’” Times of Israel, June 20, 2023. 124 “Hundreds of Israeli settlers torch Palestinian homes and cars after deadly shooting at settlement,” Euronews with (continued...) Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 17 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations After reported consultations within Israel’s security and political leadership weighing the benefits and drawbacks of larger-scale counterterrorism operations,125 in early July the IDF launched a major two-day raid into Jenin featuring around 1,000 ground troops, aerial cover, and armored vehicles to counter IEDs. During the raid, which Israeli apparently carried out in hopes of reducing militants’ ability to use Jenin’s refugee camp as a haven for stockpiling weapons and planning attacks against Israelis, 12 Palestinians and one Israeli died. Israel reportedly arrested some 300 suspects while confiscating weapons caches and destroying weapons production facilities in and around several civilian areas (including a mosque). Around 3,000 residents of the camp (which houses approximately between 14,000 and 18,000 people) fled during the fighting.126 In a possible response to the Jenin raid, a Palestinian wounded eight people at a Tel Aviv bus stop in a car-ramming and stabbing attack before he was shot and killed.127 Israel’s operation in Jenin was its largest since Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 during the second intifada. According to one Israeli officer, the scale of the challenge in 2023 is smaller than in 2002, when general Palestinian involvement in violence was more widespread.128 Some IDF officials reportedly worry ~~may have increased their direct involvement.120 Israeli officials appear to be debating the~~
~~merits of widening the scale of counterterrorism operations. The Israel Security Agency (Shin~~
~~Bet) has reportedly expressed concerns about the potential for Iran-backed West Bank militants to~~
~~increasingly obstruct Israelis’ freedom of maneuver by using tactics similar to those of Iran-~~
~~supported groups in Gaza or Lebanon—including more sophisticated use of improvised explosive~~
~~devices.121 However, some IDF officials reportedly worry about possible disadvantages,~~
~~particularly~~ that a more overt war footing in the West Bank could harden negative Palestinian that a more overt war footing in the West Bank could harden negative Palestinian
popular attitudes toward Israel.popular attitudes toward Israel.~~122 The State Department continues to urge de-escalation.123~~
129 The Abraham Accords
General overview. In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or
improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), improve its relations with four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements,
known as the Abraham Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives known as the Abraham Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives
for most of the countries in question.for most of the countries in question.~~124~~130 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and
Bahrain, and both countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices Bahrain, and both countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices
that each country had operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. that each country had operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. ~~While Saudi Arabia has~~

~~115 State Department Press Briefing, March 21, 2023.~~
~~116 State Department, “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Herzog,”~~
~~March 21, 2023.~~
~~117 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on the Knesset Decision to Repeal Parts of the~~
~~Disengagement Law,” March 22, 2023.~~
~~118 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Netanyahu further provokes Biden with relocation of outpost yeshiva,” Al-Monitor, May 30,~~
~~2023.~~
~~119 State Department, “The United States is Deeply Troubled with Israeli Settlement Announcement.”~~
~~120 Isabel Kershner, “Five Palestinians, Including 15-Year-Old Boy, Are Killed in Israeli Raid in the West Bank,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, June 20, 2023; Ben Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas,” Al-Monitor, June~~
~~20, 2023.~~
~~121 Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas”; Emanuel Fabian, “After roadside bomb during~~
~~Jenin raid, Gallant says ‘all options on the table,’” Times of Israel, June 20, 2023.~~
~~122 Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas.”~~
~~123 Fabian, “After roadside bomb during Jenin raid, Gallant says ‘all options on the table.’”~~
~~124~~Israel’s July 2023 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in the disputed territory of Western Sahara could lead to full Israel-Morocco diplomatic relations via the mutual opening of embassies. The Sudanese military’s seizure of power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.131 In January 2023, the Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal with Israel after it transitions to a civilian government,132 but the outbreak of Sudanese civil conflict in April may delay any major developments on that front for the foreseeable future. Associated Press, June 21, 2023; Emanuel Fabian, “Palestinian killed as settlers rampage in Huwara after deadly terror attack,” Times of Israel, February 26, 2023. 125 See footnote 123. 126 Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?”; “Israel ends large-scale West Bank raid that left 13 dead,” Agence France Presse, July 2, 2023; “Israeli troops withdraw in West Bank, Gaza rockets fired,” Reuters, July 5, 2023. 127 “Eight injured in Tel Aviv car ramming and stabbing attack, Israeli officials say,” CNN, July 4, 2023. 128 Caspit, “Can Israel’s operation in Jenin restore IDF deterrence in West Bank?” 129 Caspit, “Israel increasingly fears West Bank chaos, rise of Hamas.” 130 See https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/. These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and See https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/. These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and
Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and
U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports
suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its
agreement to recognize Israel. agreement to recognize Israel.
131 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022. 132 “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” Reuters, February 3, 2023. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

15 15

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

While Saudi Arabia has not normalized its relations with Israel, it reportedly supported the UAE and Bahrain in their not normalized its relations with Israel, it reportedly supported the UAE and Bahrain in their
decisions to join the Abraham Accords.decisions to join the Abraham Accords.~~125~~133 Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Oman have opened Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Oman have opened
their airspace to Israeli civilian airlines, significantly reducing their travel time to Asian their airspace to Israeli civilian airlines, significantly reducing their travel time to Asian
~~destinations. The Sudanese military’s seizure of power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan~~
~~normalization process.126 In January 2023, the Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan~~
~~would sign a normalization deal with Israel after it transitions to a civilian government,127 but an~~
~~outbreak of new civil conflict in Sudan in April may delay any major developments on that front~~
~~for the foreseeable future.~~
destinations. Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened, Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened,
particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include an Israel-UAE free particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include an Israel-UAE free
trade agreement that went into effect in March 2023, and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative trade agreement that went into effect in March 2023, and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative
focused on desalinated water and solar energy. As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the focused on desalinated water and solar energy. As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the
Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met the foreign ministers of Israel, the UAE, Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met the foreign ministers of Israel, the UAE,
Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern Negev desert to Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern Negev desert to
inaugurate a regional cooperation framework. The framework features periodic Negev Forum inaugurate a regional cooperation framework. The framework features periodic Negev Forum
meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education and meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education and
coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.~~128~~134 Participants have Participants have
expected that a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting would take place in Morocco, but U.S. officials expected that a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting would take place in Morocco, but U.S. officials
reportedly told Israel that plans for holding the meeting in July would be postponed due to an reportedly told Israel that plans for holding the meeting in July would be postponed due to an
Israeli settlement construction announcement in June.Israeli settlement construction announcement in June.~~129~~135 Developments since the new Israeli Developments since the new Israeli
government took office have reportedly fueled some concerns among Arab governments about government took office have reportedly fueled some concerns among Arab governments about
closer ties with Israel, including the new government’s actions against Palestinians, Israeli closer ties with Israel, including the new government’s actions against Palestinians, Israeli
domestic discord, and some apparent U.S.-Israel differences.domestic discord, and some apparent U.S.-Israel differences.~~130~~136
Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation, Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation,
public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional
governments recognizing Israel remains strong.governments recognizing Israel remains strong.~~131~~137 According to one poll, support in the UAE and According to one poll, support in the UAE and
Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in
2022.2022.~~132~~138 However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the
UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.~~133~~139
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim- U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the
efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with

~~125 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021.~~
~~126 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.~~
~~Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.~~
~~127 “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” Reuters, February 3, 2023.~~
~~128~~Israel in the years ahead.”140 In June 2023, Blinken announced the appointment of Daniel Shapiro (formerly U.S. ambassador to Israel) as senior adviser on regional integration, a new position focused on deepening and broadening the Accords. Reportedly, Shapiro will be less engaged in 133 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021. 134 State Department, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023; State Department, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023;
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in
Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023. Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023.
~~129~~135 Itamar Eichner, “US responds to new settlement construction: postpones Negev Forum in Morocco,” Itamar Eichner, “US responds to new settlement construction: postpones Negev Forum in Morocco,” Ynetnews, June , June
18, 2023. 18, 2023.
~~130~~136 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel’s Ties with Arabs Falter,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel’s Ties with Arabs Falter,” Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2023; , April 10, 2023; Yoav Limor, “Exclusive: Limor, “Exclusive:
Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrenceIntelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence.”
~~131~~,” Israel Hayom, April 4, 2023. 137 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2022 Arab Opinion Index, January 3, 2023. , January 3, 2023.
~~132~~138 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2022; Dylan , December 5, 2022; Dylan
Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022. Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022.
~~133~~139 Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.” Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.”
~~Congressional Research Service~~

16

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~Israel in the years ahead.”134 In June 2023, Blinken said that the Administration would soon create~~
~~a new position to further U.S. diplomacy and engagement toward deepening and broadening the~~
~~Accords.135 However, the~~140 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press Availability,” October 13, 2021. Congressional Research Service 16 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations diplomacy aimed at Israel-Saudi normalization (discussed below) than in boosting other aspects of the Abraham Accords.141 The Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S. policy Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S. policy
inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.~~136 The Biden~~
~~Administration also~~142 It has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and Muslim- has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and Muslim-
majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.Palestinian conflict.~~137~~143 Negev Forum members acknowledge that part of their mandate is to Negev Forum members acknowledge that part of their mandate is to
“create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian relations.”“create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian relations.”~~138~~144 However, the PA has opted not to join the However, the PA has opted not to join the
forum. Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE normalization with Israel forum. Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE normalization with Israel
as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League states’ previous as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League states’ previous
insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved
ties.ties.~~139~~145 Jordan also has remained on the sidelines of the Negev Forum, conditioning its Jordan also has remained on the sidelines of the Negev Forum, conditioning its
involvement on PA participation.involvement on PA participation.~~140~~146
Normalization efforts with Saudi Arabia. In May 2023, an unnamed senior Israeli diplomatic In May 2023, an unnamed senior Israeli diplomatic
source was cited as saying that “the Saudi [normalization] issue is now more important than source was cited as saying that “the Saudi [normalization] issue is now more important than
anything else” for Netanyahu’s foreign policy. “He knows that Israel cannot stop Iran on its anything else” for Netanyahu’s foreign policy. “He knows that Israel cannot stop Iran on its
own.”own.”~~141~~147 Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has expressed general support Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud has expressed general support
for normalization with Israel but stated in January 2023 that “true normalization and true stability for normalization with Israel but stated in January 2023 that “true normalization and true stability
will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the Palestinians dignity. That will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the Palestinians dignity. That
requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”~~142~~148 Various factors could Various factors could
complicate an Israel-Saudi normalization process, including the March 2023 Saudi-Iran complicate an Israel-Saudi normalization process, including the March 2023 Saudi-Iran
normalization deal brokered by China, Saudi desires for stronger U.S. support for Saudi security normalization deal brokered by China, Saudi desires for stronger U.S. support for Saudi security
and civilian nuclear priorities (which might require congressional approval), and Arab concerns and civilian nuclear priorities (which might require congressional approval), and Arab concerns
regarding increased Israeli-Palestinian tensions and violence.regarding increased Israeli-Palestinian tensions and violence.~~143~~149 One media report has suggested One media report has suggested
that while Arab states like Saudi Arabia “may see Iran as a menace, they see little gain in isolating that while Arab states like Saudi Arabia “may see Iran as a menace, they see little gain in isolating
and opposing Tehran to the extent that Israel does.”and opposing Tehran to the extent that Israel does.”~~144~~150 A 2023 public opinion poll suggests that 141 Jacob Magid, “Ex-US ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro tapped as Biden’s first Abraham Accords envoy,” Times of Israel, June 29, 2023. 142 ~~A 2023 public opinion poll suggests that~~

~~134 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair~~
~~Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press~~
~~Availability,” October 13, 2021.~~
~~135 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the 2023 American Israel Public Affairs Committee Policy~~
~~Summit,” June 5, 2023.~~
~~136~~ Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October , October
14, 2021. 14, 2021.
~~137~~143 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Their State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Their
Meeting,” January 30, 2023. Meeting,” January 30, 2023.
~~138~~144 The Negev Forum Regional Cooperation Framework Adopted by the Steering Committee on November 10th, 2022, The Negev Forum Regional Cooperation Framework Adopted by the Steering Committee on November 10th, 2022,
hyperlink to document available at https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-hyperlink to document available at https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-
framework/. framework/.
~~139~~145 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
~~140~~146 Jacob Magid, “US laments Jordan’s absence from Negev Forum, aims to keep Palestinians in loop,” Jacob Magid, “US laments Jordan’s absence from Negev Forum, aims to keep Palestinians in loop,” Times of Israel, ,
January 8, 2023. January 8, 2023.
~~141~~147 Ben Caspit, “For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia not impossible,” Ben Caspit, “For Israel, normalization with Saudi Arabia not impossible,” Al-Monitor, May 16, 2023. , May 16, 2023.
~~142~~148 Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Al-Monitor, ,
January 20, 2023. January 20, 2023.
~~143~~149 Mark Mazzetti et al., “U.S., in Long Shot, Seeks Saudi Deal with Netanyahu,” Mark Mazzetti et al., “U.S., in Long Shot, Seeks Saudi Deal with Netanyahu,” New York Times, June 19, 2023; , June 19, 2023;
Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Israeli-Saudi normalization still elusive despite US push,” Elizabeth Hagedorn, “Israeli-Saudi normalization still elusive despite US push,” Al-Monitor, May 25, 2023; Barak , May 25, 2023; Barak
Ravid, “Biden admin pushing for Saudi-Israeli peace deal by end of year, officials say,” Ravid, “Biden admin pushing for Saudi-Israeli peace deal by end of year, officials say,” Axios, May 17, 2023. , May 17, 2023.
~~144~~See also CRS In Focus IF10799, Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Paul K. Kerr. 150 Patrick Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran,” Patrick Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran,” New York Times, ,
March 11, 2023. March 11, 2023.
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large majorities of Saudis oppose normalization with both Israel and Iran, and that about 18% large majorities of Saudis oppose normalization with both Israel and Iran, and that about 18%
support cooperation with Israel against Iran.support cooperation with Israel against Iran.~~145~~151
During Secretary Blinken’s June 2023 visit to Saudi Arabia, he said that helping normalize During Secretary Blinken’s June 2023 visit to Saudi Arabia, he said that helping normalize
Israeli-Saudi ties is a U.S. priority, saying, “We discussed it here, and we will continue to work at Israeli-Saudi ties is a U.S. priority, saying, “We discussed it here, and we will continue to work at
it, to advance it in the days, weeks, and months ahead.”it, to advance it in the days, weeks, and months ahead.”~~146~~152 In the same briefing, Saudi Foreign In the same briefing, Saudi Foreign
Minister Al Saud said: Minister Al Saud said:
I have said before and it’s quite clear that we believe that normalization is in the interest of I have said before and it’s quite clear that we believe that normalization is in the interest of
the region, that it would bring significant benefits to all. But without finding a pathway to the region, that it would bring significant benefits to all. But without finding a pathway to
peace for the Palestinian people, without addressing that challenge, any normalization will peace for the Palestinian people, without addressing that challenge, any normalization will
have limited benefits. And therefore, I think we should continue to focus on finding a have limited benefits. And therefore, I think we should continue to focus on finding a
pathway towards a two-state solution, on finding a pathway towards giving the Palestinians pathway towards a two-state solution, on finding a pathway towards giving the Palestinians
dignity and justice.dignity and justice.~~147~~153 In a July CNN interview, President Biden said that “We’re a long way” from an Israel-Saudi normalization deal that could partly depend on what Saudi Arabia might ask of the United States.154 According to one media report, Biden has authorized Administration officials to “probe with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia to see if some kind of deal is possible and at what price.”155 Security cooperation and Israel in CENTCOM
~~Security cooperation~~. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would
add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR), partly to encourage military interoperability as a add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR), partly to encourage military interoperability as a
means of reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.means of reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.~~148~~156 Israel had previously Israel had previously
been under the purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in been under the purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in
September 2021,September 2021,~~149~~157 and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM
headquarters.headquarters.~~150~~158 Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the
other Abraham Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, other Abraham Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.~~151~~159
Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by
Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government reportedly expressed Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government reportedly expressed
interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.~~152~~160 Earlier, both Morocco (November 2021) and Earlier, both Morocco (November 2021) and
Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.~~153~~161 These MOUs 151 ~~These MOUs~~
~~appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.~~
~~Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be~~

~~145~~ David Pollock, “New Saudi Opinion Poll Shows 40 Percent Still Back Some Ties with Israel,” Washington Institute David Pollock, “New Saudi Opinion Poll Shows 40 Percent Still Back Some Ties with Israel,” Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (Fikra Forum), May 15, 2023. for Near East Policy (Fikra Forum), May 15, 2023.
~~146~~152 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at a State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud at a
Joint Press Availability,” June 8, 2023. Joint Press Availability,” June 8, 2023.
~~147~~153 Ibid. Ibid.
~~148~~154 Transcript: Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden. 155 Thomas L. Friedman, “Biden Is Weighing a Big Middle East Deal,” New York Times, July 27, 2023. 156 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, , January 15,
2021. 2021.
~~149~~157 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1, U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021. 2021.
~~150~~158 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of
Israel, October 29, 2021. , October 29, 2021.
~~151~~159 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for , November 11, 2021. Participant list for
2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list. 2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
~~152~~160 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25, , January 25,
2022. 2022.
~~153~~161 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021; , November 26, 2021;
Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. , February 3, 2022.
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appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales. Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.~~154~~162 In late 2022, Israel’s defense In late 2022, Israel’s defense
ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.~~155~~163
At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly
discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on
inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.~~156~~164 Speculation Speculation
about specific measures has continued since then.about specific measures has continued since then.~~157~~165 In January 2023, the Department of In January 2023, the Department of
Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on
cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.~~158~~166
Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel, Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel,
certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their
involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”~~159~~167 Actions Actions
by this Israeli government may be fueling any such reluctance to some degree.by this Israeli government may be fueling any such reluctance to some degree.~~160~~168 Regional Regional
countries might be hesitate to share the real-time intelligence data that underlies less sensitive countries might be hesitate to share the real-time intelligence data that underlies less sensitive
basic threat information.basic threat information.~~161~~169 Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM
apparently plans to help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners apparently plans to help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners
using the X-band radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air using the X-band radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air
defense systems and fighter jets.defense systems and fighter jets.~~162~~170 Additionally, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Additionally, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
(NAVCENT) is reportedly working with Israel and some Arab states to develop a network of (NAVCENT) is reportedly working with Israel and some Arab states to develop a network of
unmanned maritime drones to monitor Iranian naval activity and narcotics smuggling in unmanned maritime drones to monitor Iranian naval activity and narcotics smuggling in
NAVCENT’s area of responsibility.NAVCENT’s area of responsibility.~~163~~171
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.~~164~~172 In March, Congress enacted the In March, Congress enacted the
Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other
things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening
and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of

~~154~~162 Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Breaking
Defense, October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” , October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” Wall Street Journal, ,
October 10, 2022. October 10, 2022.
~~155~~163 Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.” Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.”
~~156~~164 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022. , March 29, 2022.
~~157~~165 Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Breaking Defense, ,
June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” Times of Israel, June , June
28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” 28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York
Times, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~158~~166 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim
Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Washington Post, ,
January 31, 2023. January 31, 2023.
~~159~~167 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” New York Times, July 14, , July 14,
2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” 2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” Wall Street
Journal, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
~~160~~168 “UAE, Jordan consider reducing diplomacy with Israel – report,” “UAE, Jordan consider reducing diplomacy with Israel – report,” Jerusalem Post, March 22, 2023. , March 22, 2023.
~~161~~169 Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,” Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,”
Politico, July 12, 2022. , July 12, 2022.
~~162~~170 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Haaretz, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
~~163~~171 Dion Nissenbaum, “Inside a U.S. Navy Maritime Drone Operation Aimed at Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Inside a U.S. Navy Maritime Drone Operation Aimed at Iran,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, , August 31,
2022. 2022.
~~164~~172 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/ For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/
Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf. Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.
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measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization
efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts. efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.
The FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263) The FY2023 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263), enacted in enacted in
December 2022December 2022, included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the
Secretary of State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees, within 180 days of Secretary of State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees, within 180 days of
enactment: enactment:
a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United
States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense
architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise
and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran
and groups linked to Iran. and groups linked to Iran.
Some Members have introduced legislation in the 118th Congress aimed at strengthening the Some Members have introduced legislation in the 118th Congress aimed at strengthening the
Abraham Accords, including: Abraham Accords, including:
• H.R. 3099, which seeks to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of • H.R. 3099, which seeks to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 to establish 1956 to establish ~~the~~a Senate-confirmed position of “Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords.” The position of “Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords.” The
~~House passed the bill in June 2023.~~
•House passed the bill in June 2023. • S. 2413, which among other things would authorize the creation of a Regional Integration Office within the State Department, to be headed by a Senate-confirmed position of “Special Presidential Envoy for the Abraham Accords, Negev Forum, and Related Normalization Agreements.” It also would establish a $105 million Regional Integration Opportunity Fund for FY2024-FY2030, authorize additional cooperative Arab-Israeli funding, and expand the reach of U.S.-Israel foundations to include Abraham Accords and Negev Forum countries. • H.R. 2973/S. 1334, which seeks to require the Administration to submit a H.R. 2973/S. 1334, which seeks to require the Administration to submit a
strategy to some congressional committees for greater regional maritime and strategy to some congressional committees for greater regional maritime and
interdiction cooperation to counter Iranian and Iran-related naval capabilities and interdiction cooperation to counter Iranian and Iran-related naval capabilities and
threats to lawful commerce. threats to lawful commerce.
• H.R. 3792, which, among other things, encourages U.S. officials to use three • H.R. 3792, which, among other things, encourages U.S. officials to use three
existing regional or global programs—the Middle East Partnership Initiative, existing regional or global programs—the Middle East Partnership Initiative,
Middle East Research Cooperation, and the International Visitor Leadership Middle East Research Cooperation, and the International Visitor Leadership
Program—to fund activities to expand and deepen the Accords.Program—to fund activities to expand and deepen the Accords.~~165~~
Countering ~~Iran166~~Iran173
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE through coordinated drone penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE through coordinated drone
and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.~~167~~174 Israeli observers who Israeli observers who
anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war
~~against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since~~
~~then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”168~~
~~As mentioned above, the IDF’s Military Intelligence directorate reportedly warned Israeli~~
~~officials in early 2023 that the “anti-Israeli axis led by Iran”—including Hezbollah and Hamas—~~
~~appears to be emboldened by Israeli domestic discord and some purported U.S.-Israel~~

~~165 U.S. Congressman Joe Wilson, “Wilson, Phillips, McCaul, Meeks, Baird, Allred Introduce Bipartisan Bill to~~
~~Expand Abraham Accords,” June 2, 2023.~~
~~166~~ 173 See also CRS Report R47321, See also CRS Report R47321, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, by , by ~~Carla E. Humud and~~ Clayton Thomas. Clayton Thomas.
~~167~~174 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York
Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” , May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” Jerusalem Post, March 11, , March 11,
2022. 2022.
~~168 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~November 14, 2021.~~
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~~differences.169~~Congressional Research Service 20 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”175 The IDF’s Military Intelligence directorate reportedly warned Israeli officials in early 2023 that the “anti-Israeli axis led by Iran”—including Hezbollah and Hamas—appears to be emboldened by Israeli domestic discord and some purported U.S.-Israel differences.176 According to one media report’s profile of the intelligence warning, Iran doubts According to one media report’s profile of the intelligence warning, Iran doubts
that Israel can “carry out an offensive against it or strike its nuclear program with US support.”that Israel can “carry out an offensive against it or strike its nuclear program with US support.”~~170~~
177 Another media report said that Iran and its allies are not “necessarily interested in a direct, all-out Another media report said that Iran and its allies are not “necessarily interested in a direct, all-out
clash,” but are “willing to risk more daring offensive operations,” while arguing that closer U.S.-clash,” but are “willing to risk more daring offensive operations,” while arguing that closer U.S.-
Israel security coordination may at least partly reflect a pragmatic U.S. desire to prevent being Israel security coordination may at least partly reflect a pragmatic U.S. desire to prevent being
dragged into a confrontation with Iran.dragged into a confrontation with Iran.~~171~~178 This same report surmised that Iran may calculate it has This same report surmised that Iran may calculate it has
bolstered its position vis-á-vis Israel and the United States because Iran and the Syrian regime bolstered its position vis-á-vis Israel and the United States because Iran and the Syrian regime
have improved their relations with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab governments, Iran is have improved their relations with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab governments, Iran is
approaching “nuclear threshold state” status, and Iran has a growing partnership with Russia. approaching “nuclear threshold state” status, and Iran has a growing partnership with Russia.
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister
Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.~~172~~179
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace, Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional
tensions.tensions.~~173~~180 In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some
operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military
capabilities.capabilities.~~174~~181
As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the
possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence
diplomatic outcomes.diplomatic outcomes.~~175~~182 Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and 175 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post, November 14, 2021. 176 ~~Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and~~
~~government crackdowns in Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in~~
~~Ukraine, near-term prospects for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.176~~
~~During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July 2022, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the~~
~~Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment~~
~~“never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is~~
~~prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”177 Additionally, Biden~~
~~said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from~~

~~169~~ Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence.” Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence.”
~~170~~177 Ibid. Ibid.
~~171~~178 Amos Harel, “Washington’s Mideast Pullout Sets Israel and Iran on a Collision Course,” Amos Harel, “Washington’s Mideast Pullout Sets Israel and Iran on a Collision Course,” Haaretz, April 11, 2023. , April 11, 2023.
~~172~~See also Jared Szuba, “US, Israel war games underscore warnings to Iran on nuclear enrichment,” Al-Monitor, July 11, 2023. 179 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “UN report: Uranium particles enriched to 83.7% found in Iran,” Stephanie Liechtenstein, “UN report: Uranium particles enriched to 83.7% found in Iran,” Associated Press, ,
February 28, 2023. February 28, 2023.
~~173~~180 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24, , May 24,
2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, , April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi,
“With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” “With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16, , March 16,
2022. 2022.
~~174~~181 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~175~~182 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022; Israeli , March 21, 2022; Israeli
Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022. Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022.
~~176 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran,~~
~~November 2022.~~
~~177 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022.~~
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~~acquiring nuclear weapons.178 In February 2023, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Thomas~~ Congressional Research Service 21 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations government crackdowns in Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in Ukraine, near-term prospects for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.183 During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July 2022, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment “never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”184 Additionally, Biden said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.185 In February 2023, Ambassador Nides said Nides said
that the United States that the United States ~~will~~would not engage in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program while Iran not engage in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program while Iran
provides drones for Russia in its war in Ukraine. He also said that U.S.-Israel cooperation vis-à-provides drones for Russia in its war in Ukraine. He also said that U.S.-Israel cooperation vis-à-
vis Iran was “lockstep”: vis Iran was “lockstep”:
As President Biden has said, we will not stand by and watch Iran get a nuclear weapon, As President Biden has said, we will not stand by and watch Iran get a nuclear weapon,
number one. Number two, he said, all options are on the table. Number three, Israel can number one. Number two, he said, all options are on the table. Number three, Israel can
and should do whatever they need to deal with and we’ve got their back.and should do whatever they need to deal with and we’ve got their back.~~179~~186
In January 2023, the United States and Israel held their largest-ever bilateral military exercise, In January 2023, the United States and Israel held their largest-ever bilateral military exercise,
named Juniper Oak. According to CENTCOM, the exercise “enhanced interoperability and the named Juniper Oak. According to CENTCOM, the exercise “enhanced interoperability and the
ability of CENTCOM forces to rapidly move combat power into the region,” and provides ability of CENTCOM forces to rapidly move combat power into the region,” and provides
opportunities to incorporate lessons learned with all U.S. partners in the CENTCOM AOR.opportunities to incorporate lessons learned with all U.S. partners in the CENTCOM AOR.~~180~~187 The two militaries held another stage of Juniper Oak in July.188
Various sources have documented reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s Various sources have documented reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s
nuclear program,nuclear program,~~181~~189 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on
the overall effectiveness of such operations.the overall effectiveness of such operations.~~182~~190 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military
capabilities,capabilities,~~183~~191 questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against
Iran’s nuclear program.Iran’s nuclear program.~~184~~192
In a January 2023 In a January 2023 ~~CNN~~CNN interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted
attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons
development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting
nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing
is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to
take action.”take action.”~~185~~193 Amid some international concerns about advanced levels of Iranian uranium Amid some international concerns about advanced levels of Iranian uranium
~~enrichment, Defense Minister Gallant stated in February that Israel would not allow Iran to enrich~~
~~uranium to 90%.186~~
~~While an imminent return to the JCPOA may be unlikely, media reports emerged in June 2023 of~~
~~indirect U.S.-Iran discussions aimed at a possible informal, unwritten understanding,187 despite~~
~~public statements by U.S. officials denying that a deal is in the offing. The reports say that such a~~
~~U.S.-Iran arrangement might feature various elements, including:~~

~~178~~ 183 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran, November 2022. 184 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022. 185 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” Associated Press, July 15, 2022. , July 15, 2022.
~~179~~186 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve got their back,’” Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve got their back,’”
Times of Israel, February 19, 2023. , February 19, 2023.
~~180~~187 U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26, 2023. See also Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26, 2023. See also Michael Eisenstadt,
“The Juniper Oak Military Exercise: Implications for Innovation, Experimentation, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” “The Juniper Oak Military Exercise: Implications for Innovation, Experimentation, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2023. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2023.
~~181~~188 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command and the Israel Defense Forces Begin Military Exercise,” July 10, 2023. 189 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022. , March 15, 2022.
~~182~~190 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021. , November 22, 2021.
~~183~~191 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel’s ‘Top Gun’: The US-Israeli aircraft that can take down Iran,” Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel’s ‘Top Gun’: The US-Israeli aircraft that can take down Iran,” Jerusalem Post, February , February
25, 2023. 25, 2023.
~~184~~192 Ethan Bronner and Henry Meyer, “Will Israel Attack Iran? What to Know About Netanyahu’s Military Posturing,” Ethan Bronner and Henry Meyer, “Will Israel Attack Iran? What to Know About Netanyahu’s Military Posturing,”
Bloomberg, June 13, 2023; Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” , June 13, 2023; Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Haaretz, September 1, , September 1,
2022. 2022.
~~185~~193 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
~~186 “Netanyahu said to huddle repeatedly with military brass over possible attack on Iran,” Times of Israel, February 22,~~
~~2023.~~
~~187 Michael Crowley et al., “U.S. and Iran Quietly Discussing a Deal to Ease Nuclear Tensions,” New York Times, June~~
~~15, 2023; Laurence Norman and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Begins Quiet Push to Reduce Tensions with Iran,”~~ ~~Wall Street~~
~~Journal, June 15, 2023.~~
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Congressional Research Service 22 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations enrichment, Defense Minister Gallant stated in February that Israel would not allow Iran to enrich uranium to 90%.194 While an imminent return to the JCPOA may be unlikely, media reports emerged in June 2023 of indirect U.S.-Iran discussions aimed at a possible informal, unwritten understanding,195 despite public statements by U.S. officials denying that a deal is in the offing. The reports say that such a U.S.-Iran arrangement might feature various elements, including: • Iranian agreement not to enrich uranium beyond 60%, and to release three • Iranian agreement not to enrich uranium beyond 60%, and to release three ~~Iranian-~~
Iranian-American prisoners; and American prisoners; and
• U.S. agreement not to tighten sanctions, and to unfreeze billions of dollars in • U.S. agreement not to tighten sanctions, and to unfreeze billions of dollars in ~~Iranian~~
Iranian funds held abroad for Iran to use for humanitarian purposes.funds held abroad for Iran to use for humanitarian purposes.~~188~~196
Netanyahu has reportedly indicated to members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Netanyahu has reportedly indicated to members of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee that Israel “could live with” such a U.S.-Iran understanding,Committee that Israel “could live with” such a U.S.-Iran understanding,~~189~~197 though on June 13 he though on June 13 he
said: said:
Our position is clear: No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue Our position is clear: No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue
to do everything to defend itself. Our opposition to a return to the original agreement, I to do everything to defend itself. Our opposition to a return to the original agreement, I
think it is working, but there are still differences of outlook and we do not hide them, also think it is working, but there are still differences of outlook and we do not hide them, also
about smaller agreements.about smaller agreements.~~190~~198 Additionally, Netanyahu is apparently wary of U.S. efforts aimed at persuading Israel to promise not to surprise the United States with military action against Iran.199
Some unnamed Israeli senior officials have been cited as speculating that the Biden Some unnamed Israeli senior officials have been cited as speculating that the Biden
Administration may seek a more informal understanding with Iran because of concerns about Administration may seek a more informal understanding with Iran because of concerns about
potential congressional opposition to a formal agreement, though a source close to the potential congressional opposition to a formal agreement, though a source close to the
Administration has expressed that President Biden is more “a creature of Congress” than most Administration has expressed that President Biden is more “a creature of Congress” than most
presidents.presidents.~~191~~200
Hezbollah and Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflictconflict~~.192 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications,~~
~~including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.193~~
~~Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied~~
~~weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and~~
~~its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.194 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership~~
~~and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture~~
~~precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.195 In late 2022, Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon~~
~~that Israel could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling,~~

~~188 Ibid.~~
~~189~~—most notably in a 2006 war.201 194 “Netanyahu said to huddle repeatedly with military brass over possible attack on Iran,” Times of Israel, February 22, 2023. 195 Michael Crowley et al., “U.S. and Iran Quietly Discussing a Deal to Ease Nuclear Tensions,” New York Times, June 15, 2023; Laurence Norman and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Begins Quiet Push to Reduce Tensions with Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2023. 196 Ibid. 197 “Report: Netanyahu says US and Iran in talks for a ‘mini-deal’ Israel can live with,” “Report: Netanyahu says US and Iran in talks for a ‘mini-deal’ Israel can live with,” Times of Israel, June 13, 2023. , June 13, 2023.
~~190~~198 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense
Committee: ‘No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue to do everything to defend itself,’” Committee: ‘No agreement with Iran will be binding on Israel, which will continue to do everything to defend itself,’”
June 13, 2023. June 13, 2023.
~~191~~199 Lahav Harkov, “Herzog to fly to Washington for White House visit, Congress speech,” Jerusalem Post, July 16, 2023. 200 Amir Tibon and Ben Samuels, “Israeli Officials Believe U.S. Will Avoid Calling New Iran Understandings an Amir Tibon and Ben Samuels, “Israeli Officials Believe U.S. Will Avoid Calling New Iran Understandings an
‘Agreement,’” ‘Agreement,’” Haaretz, June 13, 2023. , June 13, 2023.
~~192~~201 CRS Report R44759, CRS Report R44759, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah. Congressional Research Service 23 link to page 34 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Some developments in 2022 and 2023, such as greater Hezbollah activity in disputed border areas, and occasional cross-border drone incursions and projectile fire, have fueled speculation about a possible outbreak of hostilities.202 One July 2023 report citing Israeli security sources assessed that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah does not appear to want all-out confrontation with Israel, but “no longer has deep-seated concern about a possible escalation into a day or a few days of limited fighting,” which might increase the risk of 2006-style intensified conflict.203 Nasrallah’s possible interest in probing for limits to Israeli deterrence may be due in part to domestic upheavals in Israel. In response to Israeli protests over the July Basic Law provision affecting the judiciary, Nasrallah said that Israel “is on the path to collapse, fragmentation, and disappearance, God willing.”204 Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.205 In 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.206 Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon that Israel could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling, based on reports that Iran has planned flights that could carry equipment directly to Hezbollah in Lebanon.207~~; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah.~~
~~193 Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program – opinion,” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~December 28, 2022; Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The~~
~~Israeli Card,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022.~~
~~194 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28,~~
~~2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, April 23, 2020.~~
~~195 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press,~~
~~February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies~~
~~Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.~~
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~~link to page 33~~ ~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~based on reports that Iran has planned flights that could carry equipment directly to Hezbollah in~~
~~Lebanon.196~~
~~Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster~~
~~Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other~~
~~military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-~~
~~backed targets that could present threats to its security.197~~
~~Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian~~
~~targets,198 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.199 This~~
~~deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has~~
~~criticized some Israeli strikes.200~~
In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime
boundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (seeboundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (see Appendix C). .
Public debate in Israel centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal were worth the Public debate in Israel centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal were worth the
concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.~~201~~208 While Prime Minister Netanyahu While Prime Minister Netanyahu
made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the
maritime boundary agreement,maritime boundary agreement,~~202~~209 his government has not taken action to date. his government has not taken action to date.~~203~~210 Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-backed targets that could present threats to its security.211 202 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Hezbollah deterrence is eroding as Lebanon border heats up,” Al-Monitor, July 14, 2023; “Lebanon’s militant Hezbollah group says it shot down an Israeli drone near the southern border,” Associated Press, June 26, 2023; Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program – opinion,” Jerusalem Post, December 28, 2022. 203 Caspit, “Israel’s Hezbollah deterrence is eroding as Lebanon border heats up,” 204 “Hezbollah chief gloats: Israel had its ‘worst day,’ is on ‘path to disappearance,’” Times of Israel, July 25, 2023. 205 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times, April 23, 2020. 206 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press, February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022. 207 Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2022. 208 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022. 209
~~Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine~~
~~Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in~~
~~international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and~~
~~humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish~~
~~refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.204 As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel~~
~~has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment,~~
~~especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to~~
~~Hezbollah in Lebanon.205~~

~~196 Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2022.~~
~~197 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” Jerusalem Post, March 29,~~
~~2022.~~
~~198 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27,~~
~~2021.~~
~~199 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel,~~
~~February 27, 2022.~~
~~200 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” Jerusalem Post, May 4, 2022;~~
~~Emanuel Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel,~~
~~June 12, 2022.~~
~~201 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022.~~
~~202~~ Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Times
of Israel, October 31, 2022. , October 31, 2022.
~~203~~210 Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Jerusalem Post, ,
January 31, 2023. January 31, 2023.
~~204 Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar~~
~~Ukrainians Arriving Since October from Working,” Haaretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who~~
~~entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered~~
~~Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and~~
~~Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022.~~
~~205 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply~~
~~the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022.~~
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211 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” Jerusalem Post, March 29, 2022. Congressional Research Service 24 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian targets,212 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.213 This deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has criticized some Israeli strikes.214 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.215 As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.216 Despite entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal Despite entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal
assistance to Ukraine.assistance to Ukraine.~~206~~217 Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian
rescue forces and civilian organizations.rescue forces and civilian organizations.~~207~~218
Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an
early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine
aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.~~208~~219 In November 2022, one news outlet reported In November 2022, one news outlet reported
that Israel had funded the purchase of “strategic materials” by a North Atlantic Treaty that Israel had funded the purchase of “strategic materials” by a North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) member, which then transferred the materials to Ukraine for its use.Organization (NATO) member, which then transferred the materials to Ukraine for its use.~~209~~220
In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells
from War Reserve Stocks for Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.from War Reserve Stocks for Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.~~210~~221 According to multiple reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation 212 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27, 2021. 213 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel, February 27, 2022. 214 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” Jerusalem Post, May 4, 2022; Emanuel Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12, 2022. 215 Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar Ukrainians Arriving Since October from Working,” Haaretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022. 216 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022. 217 ~~According to~~
~~multiple reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation~~
~~with the United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and~~
~~they don’t really need our permission to take it.”211~~
~~In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for the possible sale of anti-drone~~
~~jamming systems that could help Ukraine down drones. Israeli officials have claimed that this~~
~~step does not change Israel’s policy against providing lethal assistance because the systems are~~
~~defensive in nature and do not target Russian soldiers. While Ukrainian officials appear interested~~
~~in the systems, they view them as less critical than air defense systems that can counter ballistic~~
~~missiles.212~~
~~In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian~~
~~branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate~~
~~emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel.~~
~~Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about~~
~~emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on~~
~~Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.213 As of~~
~~early 2023, the agency had reportedly frozen most activities related to promoting Jewish~~
~~emigration to Israel from former Soviet Union countries (except Ukraine).214~~

~~206~~ Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,” Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,”
Breaking Defense, October 18, 2022. , October 18, 2022.
~~207~~218 “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ Times of Israel, September 23, , September 23,
2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” 2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022. , May 18, 2022.
~~208~~219 “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” Reuters, October 19, 2022; “Israel giving , October 19, 2022; “Israel giving
intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022. , October 24, 2022.
~~209~~220 Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Haaretz, November 17, , November 17,
2022. 2022.
~~210~~221 Eric Schmitt, et al., “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Eric Schmitt, et al., “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023. , January 17, 2023.
~~211 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023.~~
~~212 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel approves export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine,” Axios, March 15, 2023.~~
~~213 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, July 22, 2022.~~
~~214~~ Congressional Research Service 25 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations with the United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and they don’t really need our permission to take it.”222 In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for the possible sale of anti-drone jamming systems that could help Ukraine down drones. Israeli officials have claimed that this step does not change Israel’s policy against providing lethal assistance because the systems are defensive in nature and do not target Russian soldiers. While Ukrainian officials appear interested in the systems, they view them as less critical than air defense systems that can counter ballistic missiles.223 In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel. Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.224 As of early 2023, the agency had reportedly frozen most activities related to promoting Jewish emigration to Israel from former Soviet Union countries, except Ukraine.225 222 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023. 223 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel approves export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine,” Axios, March 15, 2023. 224 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” New York Times, July 22, 2022. 225 Zvika Klein, “Jewish Agency lowers profile in Russia, less activity in FSU countries – exclusive,” Zvika Klein, “Jewish Agency lowers profile in Russia, less activity in FSU countries – exclusive,” Jerusalem Post, ,
February 21, 2023. February 21, 2023.
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Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA, DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are projections for 2023 unless otherwise ; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are projections for 2023 unless otherwise
specified. specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
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Appendix B. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats) (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022. Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022.
Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to
1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received
his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has
been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with
the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional
influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a
security-minded nationalist. security-minded nationalist.
National Unity (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats) (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats)
Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New
Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led
Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary
and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.
Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from
2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.
Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats) (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of
West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious
law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam. law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister within the Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister within the
defense ministry with some responsibilities over West Bank administration. He has defense ministry with some responsibilities over West Bank administration. He has
headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained
lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and
religiously conservative causes. religiously conservative causes.
Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats) (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a
common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam. common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam.
Leader: Itamar Ben Gvir
Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to
Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir
Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir
was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says
that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a
lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a
regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats) (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union. speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign
minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and
canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the
Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked
under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to
consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a
platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in
a 2013 case. a 2013 case.
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Noam (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat) (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues
(including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the conversion (including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the conversion
process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish Power. process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish Power.
Leader: Avi Maoz
Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has
headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. In the current government, he headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. In the current government, he
nominally headed an office in the prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity, nominally headed an office in the prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity,
but resigned from that post in February 2023 based on concerns that he was not but resigned from that post in February 2023 based on concerns that he was not
given the authority to change policy as he desired. given the authority to change policy as he desired.
LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats) (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza. in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the
Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition. Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that
supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and
university lecturer. university lecturer.
CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats) (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013,
when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-
place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government
from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh
Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for
Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and
then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition. then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats) (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in
January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November
2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could not 2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could not
serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had
indicated in the 2022 plea deal that he would permanently leave politics. indicated in the 2022 plea deal that he would permanently leave politics.
United Torah Judaism – Coalition (7 seats) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its
interpretation of traditional Jewish law. interpretation of traditional Jewish law.
Leader: Yitzhak Goldknopf
Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been
prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day
care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance. care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance.
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ARAB
Hadash-Ta’al – Opposition (5 seats) – Opposition (5 seats)
Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadashpolitical strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal). Movement for Renewal).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with
the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before
becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006. becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats) (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the
UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the
government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for
Arab Israelis.Arab Israelis.

Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
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Appendix C. Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement
Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the
United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-
Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to
eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line
extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon
agreement (seagreement (see Figure C-1). According to a senior Biden Administration official . According to a senior Biden Administration official
This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a
boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without
conflict.conflict.~~215~~226
On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal. On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal.~~216~~227 Reportedly, Reportedly,
President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the
agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural
gas drilling.gas drilling.~~217~~228

~~215~~226 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime
Agreement,” October 11, 2022. Agreement,” October 11, 2022.
~~216~~227 Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Times of Israel, October , October
29, 2022. 29, 2022.
~~217~~228 Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Haaretz, ,
October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” Jerusalem Post, ,
October 11, 2022. October 11, 2022.
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Figure C-1. Map: Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Agreement

Source: Haaretz. Haaretz.
Note: All boundaries are approximate. All boundaries are approximate.
Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future
side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will
settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field
that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can
begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.~~218~~229
The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly
before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had
threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute. threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute.

~~218~~229 Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Times of Israel, ,
October 12, 2022. October 12, 2022.
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Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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