Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Changes from March 27, 2023 to April 17, 2023

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations
~~March 27~~April 17, 2023 , 2023
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel
Jim Zanotti
$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile
Specialist in Middle Specialist in Middle
defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some
Eastern Affairs Eastern Affairs
Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance, Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance,

contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters: contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters:

Netanyahu’s return to power and judicial reform debate. In December 2022, Likud party In December 2022, Likud party
leader Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new government, replacing a 2021-2022 coalition that had formed in leader Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new government, replacing a 2021-2022 coalition that had formed in
opposition to Netanyahu. He previously served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999 and 2009 to 2021. The November 2022 opposition to Netanyahu. He previously served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999 and 2009 to 2021. The November 2022
election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process began in December 2018 addressing corruption allegations against election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process began in December 2018 addressing corruption allegations against
Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new Israeli Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new Israeli
government has triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab government has triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab
citizens and with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States and other countries. The government has proposed citizens and with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States and other countries. The government has proposed
legislation to overhaul Israel’s judicial system, triggering a highly charged national debate over checks and balances in Israel legislation to overhaul Israel’s judicial system, triggering a highly charged national debate over checks and balances in Israel
with potential international implications. With President Biden and some Members of Congress encouraging a compromise with potential international implications. With President Biden and some Members of Congress encouraging a compromise
solution, and broad domestic disagreement over the issue, Netanyahu’s government temporarily postponed the legislation in solution, and broad domestic disagreement over the issue, Netanyahu’s government temporarily postponed the legislation in
March 2023 to allow time to work toward national consensus. March 2023 to allow time to work toward national consensus.
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken
out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of
the holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered heightened the holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered heightened
West Bank counterterrorism measures, with another spike in early 2023 leading the Palestinian Authority to announce the West Bank counterterrorism measures, with another spike in early 2023 leading the Palestinian Authority to announce the
suspension of security coordination with Israel. The United States, Jordan, and Egypt have convened periodic talks aimed at suspension of security coordination with Israel. The United States, Jordan, and Egypt have convened periodic talks aimed at
bolstering Israel-PA coordination, de-escalating tensions, and minimizing unilateral measures. As the Gaza Strip remains bolstering Israel-PA coordination, de-escalating tensions, and minimizing unilateral measures. As the Gaza Strip remains
under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and
other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group. other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority states. The Biden Administration has followed The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ongoing efforts to deepen security and the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ongoing efforts to deepen security and
economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on economic ties between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on
various types of defense—that inclines other Arab and Muslim-majority countries toward future normalization with Israel. various types of defense—that inclines other Arab and Muslim-majority countries toward future normalization with Israel.
Congress has passed legislation encouraging more normalization and greater regional security cooperation involving Israel. Congress has passed legislation encouraging more normalization and greater regional security cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran and other regional dynamics. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015 from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015
international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Amid seemingly diminished prospects for a possible U.S. international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Amid seemingly diminished prospects for a possible U.S.
return to the agreement, Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iranreturn to the agreement, Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran~~. Observers have speculated about Israeli~~
~~covert or military actions to influence nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program~~ amid questions about the tenor of U.S.-Israel cooperation on Iran-related issues. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number . Israel also has reportedly conducted a number
of of covert or military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq ~~due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these~~
~~areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal~~for various purposes, including to prevent Lebanese Hezbollah from bolstering its weapons arsenal and capabilities. Via U.S. mediation, Israel and Lebanon—which do not have formal . Via U.S. mediation, Israel and Lebanon—which do not have formal
relations—reached agreement in October 2022 on maritime boundaries to allow both countries to extract offshore natural gas. relations—reached agreement in October 2022 on maritime boundaries to allow both countries to extract offshore natural gas.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. Israel has shown reluctance to provide support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. Israel has shown reluctance to provide
lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However, Israel is lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However, Israel is
reportedly providing or planning to provide basic intelligence, assistance with early warning systems, and anti-drone reportedly providing or planning to provide basic intelligence, assistance with early warning systems, and anti-drone
jamming systems to counter Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.jamming systems to counter Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.
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Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (seeIsrael (see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, , by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. , by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S. U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers seek Islamic Jihad (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers seek
oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1 Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include the following: include the following:
 The December 2022 return of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister at  The December 2022 return of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister at
the head of a coalition government that includes ministers from ultra-nationalist the head of a coalition government that includes ministers from ultra-nationalist
parties. The new government’s judicial reform proposal has triggered a highly parties. The new government’s judicial reform proposal has triggered a highly
charged national debate in Israel charged national debate in Israel ~~that has prompted public statements of support~~
~~by President Biden and some Members of Congress for compromise measures.~~
~~ Israeli-Palestinian violence and other problems, and their implications for U.S.~~
~~policy.~~
and prompted statements from U.S. officials and lawmakers.  Israeli-Palestinian violence and other problems.  Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords.  Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the 2020-2021 Abraham Accords.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with  Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria. Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria.
 Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.  Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Netanyahu’s Return to Power and New Coalition
Partners
On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) voted to reinstall Likud party leader On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset (parliament) voted to reinstall Likud party leader
Benjamin Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and Benjamin Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and
2009-2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox 2009-2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox
parties (separties (see Figure 1 and Appendix B).

1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S. 1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S.
assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise
permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza. permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
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Figure 1. November 2022 Knesset Election Results

Source: Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious
Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1). Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1).
The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption
allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could
last for months or years.2 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a last for months or years.2 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a
government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021 government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021
government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him. government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him.
Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may
have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.3 have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.3
Key Government Figures and Decisionmaking
Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new
Israeli government (seIsraeli government (see Table 1) has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s
democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its
relations with the United States and other countries.4 Coalition agreements state that the Jewish relations with the United States and other countries.4 Coalition agreements state that the Jewish
people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,5 people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,5
appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to
expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious
law in Israeli society.6 Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at law in Israeli society.6 Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at
contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.7 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007 contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.7 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007
for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.8 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.8
Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work
with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the
two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests

2 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand – and where they are going – analysis,” 2 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand – and where they are going – analysis,” Jerusalem
Post, August 16, 2022. , August 16, 2022.
3 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” 3 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, December 30, 2022. , December 30, 2022.
4 Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” 4 Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” Associated Press, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
5 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” 5 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
6 “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” 6 “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” Ynetnews/i24News, December 30, 2022. , December 30, 2022.
7 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” May 15, 7 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” May 15,
2021. 2021.
8 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” 8 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007. , June 25, 2007.
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and values.”9 Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge and values.”9 Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge
the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”10 the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”10
Table 1. Israeli Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu Benjamin Netanyahu
Likud Likud
Defense Minister Defense Minister
Yoav Yoav ~~Galant (subject to possible~~
~~Likud~~
~~March 2023 dismissal)~~Gallant Likud
Foreign Minister Foreign Minister
Eli Cohen Eli Cohen
Likud Likud
Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry
Bezalel Smotrich Bezalel Smotrich
Religious Zionism Religious Zionism
Justice Minister Justice Minister
Yariv Levin Yariv Levin
Likud Likud
National Security Minister National Security Minister
Itamar Ben Gvir Itamar Ben Gvir
Jewish Power Jewish Power
Transportation Minister Transportation Minister
Miri Regev Miri Regev
Likud Likud
Strategic Affairs Minister Strategic Affairs Minister
Ron Dermer Ron Dermer
No formal affiliation No formal affiliation
Energy Minister Energy Minister
Israel Katz Israel Katz
Likud Likud
Agriculture and Rural Development Minister Agriculture and Rural Development Minister
Avi Dichter Avi Dichter
Likud Likud
Smotrich and Ben Gvir Smotrich and Ben Gvir ~~are each in the process of assuming~~have each assumed some security responsibilities. Under some security responsibilities. Under
the coalition agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over the coalition agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over
civil affairs units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning civil affairs units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning
commission that oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.11 Ben Gvir commission that oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.11 Ben Gvir
heads a national security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including heads a national security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including
personnel that patrol Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.12 He also expects to oversee the border personnel that patrol Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.12 He also expects to oversee the border
police, including units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF) police, including units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
authority.13 Ben Gvir supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their authority.13 Ben Gvir supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their
legal immunity.14 legal immunity.14
Defense Minister Yoav Defense Minister Yoav ~~Galant~~Gallant and top IDF leaders have apparently sought to prevent changes to and top IDF leaders have apparently sought to prevent changes to
the defense ministry and border police from disrupting the chain of command.15 In February the defense ministry and border police from disrupting the chain of command.15 In February
2023, Smotrich received general responsibilities to direct settlement planning and enforcement 2023, Smotrich received general responsibilities to direct settlement planning and enforcement
over illegal construction in the West Bank, while over illegal construction in the West Bank, while ~~Galant~~Gallant maintained formal powers to intervene in maintained formal powers to intervene in
Smotrich’s decisions with cause.16 It is unclear how the arrangement will work in practice, Smotrich’s decisions with cause.16 It is unclear how the arrangement will work in practice,

9 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29, 9 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29,
2022. 2022.
10 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022. 10 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022.
11 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” 11 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” Times of
Israel, December 5, 2022. , December 5, 2022.
12 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” 12 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” Times of
Israel, December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, , December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
13 “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” 13 “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” Times of Israel, December 29, , December 29,
2022. 2022.
14 Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’” 14 Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’”
15 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within – analysis,” 15 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, January , January
2, 2023; Ash Obel, “Smotrich refuses to attend meeting with IDF chief on transfer of West Bank powers,” 2, 2023; Ash Obel, “Smotrich refuses to attend meeting with IDF chief on transfer of West Bank powers,” Times of
Israel, January 25, 2023. , January 25, 2023.
16 Jeremy Sharon, “Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning,” 16 Jeremy Sharon, “Smotrich handed sweeping powers over West Bank, control over settlement planning,” Times of
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especially if especially if ~~Galant~~Gallant and Smotrich disagree on an issue that arguably has both civilian and national and Smotrich disagree on an issue that arguably has both civilian and national
security implications. security implications.
Netanyahu has asserted that he will personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.17 One Netanyahu has asserted that he will personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.17 One
Israeli journalist has argued that Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition Israeli journalist has argued that Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition
partners and Western countries concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing partners and Western countries concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing
the support of one or the other.18 Two former U.S. officials have written that if a new Israeli the support of one or the other.18 Two former U.S. officials have written that if a new Israeli
government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir features open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir features open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to
change Israel’s democracy, opponents of strong U.S.-Israel relations will exploit the situation “to change Israel’s democracy, opponents of strong U.S.-Israel relations will exploit the situation “to
try to undo aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”19 try to undo aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”19
The coalition agreements are not legally binding.20 The degree of their implementation could have The coalition agreements are not legally binding.20 The degree of their implementation could have
significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the
rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to
Israel.21 The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank Israel.21 The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank
areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.22 areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.22
Proposed Judicial System Changes and Controversy
Overview Justice Minister Yariv Levin proposed legislation in January 2023 to overhaul Israel’s judicial Justice Minister Yariv Levin proposed legislation in January 2023 to overhaul Israel’s judicial
system in the following ways:23 system in the following ways:23
 Require larger HCJ majorities to invalidate laws or government decisions.  Require larger HCJ majorities to invalidate laws or government decisions.
 Allow the Knesset to override HCJ decisions, unless the full 15-judge panel  Allow the Knesset to override HCJ decisions, unless the full 15-judge panel
decides unanimously. decides unanimously.
 Give the government  Give the government ~~greater~~effective control of the panel that control of the panel that ~~selects~~appoints judges. judges.
 Prevent the HCJ from applying a “reasonableness” test to legislation and  Prevent the HCJ from applying a “reasonableness” test to legislation and
government action. government action.
 Allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisers from outside the Justice  Allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisers from outside the Justice
Ministry’s aegis. Ministry’s aegis.
Reducing the judiciary’s power to curb Knesset majority-backed government action could allow Reducing the judiciary’s power to curb Knesset majority-backed government action could allow
this coalition to enact laws that have encountered or would likely encounter HCJ resistance. Such this coalition to enact laws that have encountered or would likely encounter HCJ resistance. Such
laws could include legalizing Jewish West Bank outposts on private Palestinian land, exempting laws could include legalizing Jewish West Bank outposts on private Palestinian land, exempting
~~ultra-Orthodox Jews from military conscription, or changing minority rights and the religious-~~

Israel, February 23, 2023.
17 Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,” 17 Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,”
NPR, December 15, 2022. , December 15, 2022.
18 Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” 18 Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” Al-Monitor, December 9, , December 9,
2022. 2022.
19 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,” 19 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,”
Times of Israel, November 2, 2022. , November 2, 2022.
20 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” 20 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022. , December 29, 2022.
21 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” 21 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” Jerusalem Post, ,
December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” Al-Monitor, ,
December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Jerusalem
Post, December 22, 2022. , December 22, 2022.
22 “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” 22 “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Associated Press, December 28, 2022. , December 28, 2022.
23 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” 23 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” Times of Israel, ,
January 4, 2023. January 4, 2023.
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ultra-Orthodox Jews from military conscription, or changing minority rights and the religious-secular balance in Israel.24 It is unclear whether Prime Minister Netanyahusecular balance in Israel.24 It is unclear whether Prime Minister Netanyahu ~~can participate~~’s participation in the in the
legislative process for the judicial reform proposallegislative process for the judicial reform proposal is legal because of an existing conflict of interest because of an existing conflict of interest
agreement barring him from matters that could affect his criminal case.25 Netanyahu has agreement barring him from matters that could affect his criminal case.25 Netanyahu has
participated in the ongoing participated in the ongoing ~~judicial reform~~ debates despite the insistence of Israel’s attorney debates despite the insistence of Israel’s attorney
general that he is prohibited from doing so. In March, the Knesset passed a law that—if not general that he is prohibited from doing so. In March, the Knesset passed a law that—if not
overturned by the HCJ—would limit the circumstances under which a prime minister could be overturned by the HCJ—would limit the circumstances under which a prime minister could be
removed from office.26 removed from office.26
The The ~~justice minister’s proposal~~government’s proposed legislation on judicial reform has triggered a highly charged national debate over checks and has triggered a highly charged national debate over checks and
balances in Israel. Since its announcement, hundreds of thousands of Israelis have joined protests balances in Israel. Since its announcement, hundreds of thousands of Israelis have joined protests
in conjunction with opposition politicians,27 and many former HCJ justices and attorneys general in conjunction with opposition politicians,27 and many former HCJ justices and attorneys general
have strongly criticized the proposal and called on the government to withdraw it to prevent have strongly criticized the proposal and called on the government to withdraw it to prevent
“serious damage” to the rule of law.28 “serious damage” to the rule of law.28 ~~As widespread opposition to the proposal has continued for~~
~~more than two months, it has~~ Widespread opposition has encompassed other sectors of society. A number of leading figures encompassed other sectors of society. A number of leading figures
in Israel’s financial and economic sector—including the head of Israel’s central bank and several in Israel’s financial and economic sector—including the head of Israel’s central bank and several
executives in the country’s high-tech industry—have expressed concern about the proposed executives in the country’s high-tech industry—have expressed concern about the proposed
judicial reforms’ potential impact on Israel’s economy and its global appeal.29 Additionally, many judicial reforms’ potential impact on Israel’s economy and its global appeal.29 Additionally, many
military and security personnel—including several reservists who play critical roles in the Israel military and security personnel—including several reservists who play critical roles in the Israel
Air Force—have joined protests and/or threatened to suspend their service if the proposals pass Air Force—have joined protests and/or threatened to suspend their service if the proposals pass
without significant change. In March, IDF chief of staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that without significant change. In March, IDF chief of staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that
the IDF could not operate without “the volunteering spirit of the reservists ... which depends on the IDF could not operate without “the volunteering spirit of the reservists ... which depends on
the preservation of the IDF as the ‘people’s army’ in a Jewish and democratic country.”30 the preservation of the IDF as the ‘people’s army’ in a Jewish and democratic country.”30
Netanyahu has defended the need for reform Netanyahu has defended the need for reform~~—including by arguing~~. He has argued that the HCJ has exercised that the HCJ has exercised
broad powers of judicial review since the 1990s despite Israel’s lack of a written constitution as a broad powers of judicial review since the 1990s despite Israel’s lack of a written constitution as a
clear reference pointclear reference point—, while calling for substantive dialogue during the legislative process to while calling for substantive dialogue during the legislative process to
ensure that ensure that the changes can be made responsibly.31 HCJ President Esther Hayut has said that the HCJ intends to examine any legislation enacted, raising the possibility of a constitutional crisis if the HCJ rules that the legislation is invalid.32~~the changes can be made responsibly.31 More than 150 North American law professors~~
~~with varying views on whether the HCJ should face more checks have signed a statement~~
~~expressing worry that the speed and scale of the proposed reforms could weaken the~~
~~independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers and the rule of law.32 HCJ President~~

24 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” 24 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2023; “Israel unveils , January 24, 2023; “Israel unveils
controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,” controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,” Associated Press, January 4, 2023. , January 4, 2023.
25 “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” 25 “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” Reuters, February 2, 2023; Chen , February 2, 2023; Chen
Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Ha’aretz, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
26 Henriette Chacar, “Israel's attorney general accuses Netanyahu of breaking the law,” 26 Henriette Chacar, “Israel's attorney general accuses Netanyahu of breaking the law,” Reuters, March 24, 2023. , March 24, 2023.
27 Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions”; “Anti-overhaul protesters call to turn up heat as over 300,000 27 Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions”; “Anti-overhaul protesters call to turn up heat as over 300,000
estimated at rallies,” estimated at rallies,” Times of Israel, March 11, 2023. , March 11, 2023.
28 Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” 28 Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Jerusalem Post, ,
January 12, 2023. January 12, 2023.
29 Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” 29 Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
30 Neri Zilber, “Netanyahu Holds the Key to De-escalating Israel’s Crisis,” 30 Neri Zilber, “Netanyahu Holds the Key to De-escalating Israel’s Crisis,” Newlines Magazine, March 16, 2023. , March 16, 2023.
31 “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” 31 “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” Times of Israel, ,
January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, CNN, January 31, 2023. , January 31, 2023.
For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s
Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s , January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s
Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Real Clear Politics, February 5, 2023. For some historical context, see Patrick , February 5, 2023. For some historical context, see Patrick
Kingsley, “Social Rifts, Spread over Decades, at the Root of Israel’s Judicial Crisis,” Kingsley, “Social Rifts, Spread over Decades, at the Root of Israel’s Judicial Crisis,” New York Times, March 11, 2023. , March 11, 2023.
32 David Horovitz, “Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,” Times of Israel, January 12, ~~32 Michael Starr, “Over 150 US law professors sign statement opposing judicial reform,” Jerusalem Post, February 2,~~
2023. 2023.
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~~Esther Hayut has said that the HCJ intends to examine any legislation enacted, raising the~~
~~possibility of a constitutional crisis if the HCJ rules that the legislation is invalid.33~~
Some observers warn about international implications of efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary. For Some observers warn about international implications of efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary. For
example, a former legal adviser for Israel’s defense ministry has said that international or foreign example, a former legal adviser for Israel’s defense ministry has said that international or foreign
courts have to date largely trusted Israel’s justice system to deal with politicians or soldiers courts have to date largely trusted Israel’s justice system to deal with politicians or soldiers
accused of illegal actions. He then speculated, “But if we get rid of that [current levels of accused of illegal actions. He then speculated, “But if we get rid of that [current levels of
domestic legal accountability] and give carte blanche to [soldiers to] do what they want and give domestic legal accountability] and give carte blanche to [soldiers to] do what they want and give
them immunity from prosecution, it would open up all sorts of measures.”them immunity from prosecution, it would open up all sorts of measures.”34
~~Polls suggest that a majority of Israelis may support some form of judicial reform, but the specific~~
~~reforms introduced by the government seem to attract only minority support. Majorities appear to~~
~~favor compromises that would preserve at least some judicial review powers and a role for~~
~~justices alongside politicians in making judicial appointments.35~~33 Some Members of Congress have shared varying views on the reform proposal. For example, two Members of Congress expressed concerns in January that it might strain U.S.-Israel relations.34 In February and March, a number of other Members voiced opinions. Some joined letters to President Biden or Israeli leaders—or made separate statements—expressing support for the principles of judicial review and minority rights.35 Others stated confidence in Israelis to make their own democratic decisions.36
In mid-March, Israeli President Isaac Herzog introduced a framework that he promoted as In mid-March, Israeli President Isaac Herzog introduced a framework that he promoted as
facilitating a compromise to preserve Israeli democracy and unity. It would aim to strengthen facilitating a compromise to preserve Israeli democracy and unity. It would aim to strengthen
civil rights and limit the potential for a government backed by a narrow Knesset majority to make civil rights and limit the potential for a government backed by a narrow Knesset majority to make
swift and major changes to the judiciary, absent broader support from national institutions.swift and major changes to the judiciary, absent broader support from national institutions.3637
Netanyahu Netanyahu ~~has rejected Herzog’s proposal, with the issue of judicial appointments reportedly a~~
~~sticking point, but Netanyahu and some other figures that generally support the government’s~~
~~initial proposal have hinted that they remain willing to consider a deal.37~~
~~During Secretary of State Blinken’s January 2023 visit to Israel, he said (in remarks alongside~~
~~Netanyahu) that both America and Israel support “core democratic principles and institutions,~~
~~including respect for human rights, the equal administration of justice for all, the equal rights of~~
~~minority groups, the rule of law, free press, a robust civil society.” He further said that “building~~
~~consensus for new proposals is the most effective way to ensure they’re embraced and that they~~
~~endure.”38 A few days before Blinken’s visit, Netanyahu reportedly told visiting National Security~~
~~Advisor Jake Sullivan that any final legislation will reflect wide agreement and be softened from~~
~~the version Justice Minister Levin introduced.39~~
~~As the debate has progressed, some Members of Congress have shared varying views on the~~
~~reform proposal. For example, two Members of Congress expressed concerns in January that it~~
~~might strain U.S.-Israel relations.40 In February and March, a number of other Members voiced~~

~~33 David Horovitz, “Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,”~~ ~~Times of~~
~~Israel, January 12, 2023.~~
~~34 Fabian, “Former defense legal adviser warns against planned government moves in West Bank.”~~
~~35 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Only a Minority of Israelis Support the Proposed Judicial Overhaul,” Israel~~
~~Democracy Institute, February 21, 2023, and “Overhauling the Judicial System – What Do Israelis Think?” Israel~~
~~Democracy Institute, February 3, 2023; “Direct Polls: 3/4 of Israelis support judicial reform,” Israel National News,~~
~~March 7, 2023.~~
~~36 “Warning of civil war, Herzog unveils framework for judicial reform; PM rejects it,” Times of Israel, March 15,~~
~~2023.~~
37rejected Herzog’s specific proposal while indicating that he remained open to compromise in principle.38 Domestic Crisis and Postponement of Legislation On March 19, President Biden called Prime Minister Netanyahu—according to an unnamed senior Administration official—to express concern about the judicial reform issue.39 A White House readout of the call said that the President “offered support for efforts underway to forge a compromise” consistent with democratic values such as “genuine checks and balances” and “the broadest possible base of popular support.”40 After the Biden-Netanyahu call, the Israeli government announced that most of the judicial reform legislation would be postponed until the Knesset returns from a spring recess in late April, potentially allowing for dialogue among differing viewpoints on those issues. 33 Fabian, “Former defense legal adviser warns against planned government moves in West Bank.” 34 Representative Jerrold Nadler, “As the Most Senior Jewish Member of Congress, I Now Fear Deeply for the U.S.-Israel Relationship,” Ha’aretz, January 25, 2023; Representative Brad Sherman, interviewed in Ben Samuels, “Top pro-Israel Democrat Warns Netanyahu Government ‘Mistakes’ Could Erode U.S. Support,” Ha’aretz, January 23, 2023. 35 Full text of two letters available at https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/final-3.8.23-delauro-schakowsky-mcgovern-letter-to-biden-administration-on-two-state-solution-compressed.pdf and https://nadler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.9.23_letter_to_israeli_government_final.pdf. See also Laura Kelly, “Netanyahu’s judicial reforms have US lawmakers worried about Israeli democracy,” The Hill, March 9, 2023; Marc Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform,” Jewish Insider, February 16, 2023. 36 Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform.” 37 “Warning of civil war, Herzog unveils framework for judicial reform; PM rejects it,” Times of Israel, March 15, 2023. 38 Patrick Kingsley, “An Effort to Resolve Israel’s Impasse Stalls on How to Pick Judges,” Patrick Kingsley, “An Effort to Resolve Israel’s Impasse Stalls on How to Pick Judges,” New York Times, March 17, , March 17,
2023; Elliott Abrams, “Israel and the Debate over the Role of the Judiciary in Democratic Government,” Council on 2023; Elliott Abrams, “Israel and the Debate over the Role of the Judiciary in Democratic Government,” Council on
Foreign Relations, March 16, 2023. Foreign Relations, March 16, 2023.
~~38 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu After Their~~
~~Meeting,” January 30, 2023.~~
~~39 “Netanyahu said to tell US nat’l security adviser judicial reform plan to be softened,” Times of Israel, January 22,~~
~~2023.~~
~~40 Representative Jerrold Nadler, “As the Most Senior Jewish Member of Congress, I Now Fear Deeply for the U.S.-~~
~~Israel Relationship,” Ha’aretz, January 25, 2023; Representative Brad Sherman, interviewed in Ben Samuels, “Top~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

6

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~~opinions. Some joined letters to President Biden or Israeli leaders—or made separate~~
~~statements—expressing support for the principles of judicial review and minority rights.41 Others~~
~~stated confidence in Israelis to make their own democratic decisions.42~~
~~On March 19, President Biden called Prime Minister Netanyahu—according to an unnamed~~
~~senior Administration official—to express concern about the judicial reform issue.43 A White~~
~~House readout of the call said that the President “offered support for efforts underway to forge a~~
~~compromise” consistent with democratic values such as “genuine checks and balances” and “the~~
~~broadest possible base of popular support.”44 After the Biden-Netanyahu call, the Israeli~~
~~government announced that most of the judicial reform legislation would be postponed until the~~
~~Knesset returns from a spring recess in late April, potentially allowing for dialogue among~~
~~differing viewpoints on those issues.~~
39 “Biden calls Israel’s Netanyahu to express judicial plan ‘concern,’” Associated Press, March 19, 2023. 40 White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,” March 19, 2023. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations However, the government continued to press forward with plans to pass a bill before April 2 that However, the government continued to press forward with plans to pass a bill before April 2 that
would have given it a large amount of—though not total—control over judicial appointments.would have given it a large amount of—though not total—control over judicial appointments.4541
Over the next week, domestic opposition to the bill intensified, and on March 25, Defense Over the next week, domestic opposition to the bill intensified, and on March 25, Defense
Minister Minister ~~Yoav Galant~~Gallant departed from Netanyahu’s position by calling for a pause to the legislation departed from Netanyahu’s position by calling for a pause to the legislation
until after the spring recess, based on stated concerns that contention over the proposals was until after the spring recess, based on stated concerns that contention over the proposals was
affecting Israel’s military and security forces. On March 26, Netanyahu announced his decision to affecting Israel’s military and security forces. On March 26, Netanyahu announced his decision to
fire fire ~~Galant~~Gallant. Later that day, a National Security Council spokesperson said, “We are deeply . Later that day, a National Security Council spokesperson said, “We are deeply
concerned by today’s developments out of Israel, which further underscore the urgent need for concerned by today’s developments out of Israel, which further underscore the urgent need for
compromise.”compromise.”~~46 Also on March 26, the Israeli Consul General in New York, Asaf Zamir,~~
~~announced his resignation over the judicial reform issue.47~~
42 After protests opposing the legislation—as well as counter-demonstrations supporting it— After protests opposing the legislation—as well as counter-demonstrations supporting it—
expanded, and a general strike closed down much of the country on March 27, Netanyahu expanded, and a general strike closed down much of the country on March 27, Netanyahu
announced that day that announced that day that ~~the~~all judicial reform legislation would be postponed to prevent a rift among Israelis. He legislation would be postponed to prevent a rift among Israelis. He
proclaimed his readiness to start an immediate dialogue with the opposition to “bring a reform proclaimed his readiness to start an immediate dialogue with the opposition to “bring a reform
that will restore the balance between the different branches of government while strengthening that will restore the balance between the different branches of government while strengthening
civil liberties.”civil liberties.”4843 Reportedly, National Security Minister Ben Gvir Reportedly, National Security Minister Ben Gvir ~~has~~ acquiesced to giving the acquiesced to giving the
government until late July to pass consensus-based judicial reform, after receiving Netanyahu’s government until late July to pass consensus-based judicial reform, after receiving Netanyahu’s
agreement that if the government and opposition cannot reach agreement, the agreement that if the government and opposition cannot reach agreement, the legislation will pass unilaterally.44 A New National Guard? As part of the apparent deal with Ben Gvir, Netanyahu also reportedly agreed to place a new National Guard security unit derived from Israel’s Border Police under Ben Gvir’s direct authority.45 In early April, Israel’s cabinet authorized establishing the National Guard, which would apparently focus on addressing crime and unrest in mixed Arab-Jewish areas of Israel. Instead of placing the new unit under Ben Gvir’s authority, the cabinet designated a 90-day period to receive recommendations from government agencies regarding its role and command structure. Some key figures, including Israel’s attorney general, chief of police, and opposition leader, have raised questions about the new unit’s mandate or whether it might increase rather than decrease sectarian tensions.46 As of mid-April, Netanyahu appears to favor placing the National Guard under the aegis of Israel’s police rather than directly under Ben Gvir’s authority.47 Assessment It is unclear how the postponement will affect legislative outcomes on judicial reform. In a late March interview, Netanyahu said that the Knesset should be limited in its power to nullify HCJ decisions. That issue is separate from the judicial appointments clause at the center of the late March crisis. In the same interview, Netanyahu reiterated his view that the HCJ needs checking to strengthen Israeli democracy.48 As of mid-April, negotiations between the coalition and 41~~legislation will pass~~

~~pro-Israel Democrat Warns Netanyahu Government ‘Mistakes’ Could Erode U.S. Support,” Ha’aretz, January 23,~~
~~2023.~~
~~41 Full text of two letters available at https://delauro.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/delauro.house.gov/files/evo-media-~~
~~document/final-3.8.23-delauro-schakowsky-mcgovern-letter-to-biden-administration-on-two-state-solution-~~
~~compressed.pdf and https://nadler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/3.9.23_letter_to_israeli_government_final.pdf. See also~~
~~Laura Kelly, “Netanyahu’s judicial reforms have US lawmakers worried about Israeli democracy,” The Hill, March 9,~~
~~2023; Marc Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform,”~~
Jewish Insider, February 16, 2023.
~~42 Rod, “While some sound alarm, pro-Israel members call for measured approach on judicial reform.”~~
~~43 “Biden calls Israel’s Netanyahu to express judicial plan ‘concern,’” Associated Press, March 19, 2023.~~
~~44 White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,” March 19,~~
~~2023.~~
45 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Biden tells Bibi he’s never seen such anxiety over Israel’s political situation,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Biden tells Bibi he’s never seen such anxiety over Israel’s political situation,” Axios, March , March
20, 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “Ostensibly softened, Rothman bill gives coalition broad control over choice of judges,” 20, 2023; Jeremy Sharon, “Ostensibly softened, Rothman bill gives coalition broad control over choice of judges,”
Times of Israel, March 21, 2023. , March 21, 2023.
4642 White House, “Statement from NSC Spokesperson Adrienne Watson on Developments in Israel,” March 26, 2023. White House, “Statement from NSC Spokesperson Adrienne Watson on Developments in Israel,” March 26, 2023.
~~47 Twitter, Asaf Zamir, March 26, 2023 – 4:11 PM, at~~
~~https://twitter.com/AmbAsafZamir/status/1640084005855936518.~~
48 Barak Ravid, “Bibi suspends judicial overhaul after mass protests across Israel,” Axios43 Barak Ravid, “Bibi suspends judicial overhaul after mass protests across Israel,” Axios, March 27, 2023. 44 Ibid. 45 Eliav Breuer, “Ben-Gvir gets National Guard in exchange for support of judicial reform delay,” Jerusalem Post, March 27, 2023. 46 Dan Williams, “Israel OKs Ben-Gvir's ‘national guard’ but hedges on his powers,” Reuters, 47 Ben Caspit, “Israel’s Netanyahu falls in polls, could abandon judicial overhaul,” Al-Monitor, April 14, 2023. 48 “Netanyahu in weekend interview: Overhaul necessary as Supreme Court ‘too powerful,’” Times of Israel, March 27, 2023. , March 27, 2023.
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~~unilaterally.49 As part of the apparent deal with Ben Gvir, Netanyahu also has reportedly agreed to~~
~~place a unit of Israel’s Border Police known as the National Guard under Ben Gvir’s direct~~
~~authority. In criticizing this reported security decision, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel~~
~~said, “This is a police unit intended first and foremost to act in mixed cities, first and foremost~~
~~against the Arab population. Such power in Ben-Gvir’s hands = certain violation of Arabs’ rights.~~
~~Advancing such a proposal will also enable him to use these forces against the protests and~~
~~demonstrators.”50~~
~~Israeli-Palestinian Issues51~~
~~Overview~~
~~Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated~~
~~two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for~~
~~direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.52 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster~~
~~Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump~~
~~Administration.53 These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians~~
~~that could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.54 In January 2023 remarks~~
~~made alongside Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West~~
~~Bank, Secretary~~ opposition parties reportedly have focused on reaching agreement on all the disputed issues, and also codifying fundamental civil rights.49 On April 13, Netanyahu said that there was no deadline to enact judicial reform legislation, and that his priority is to achieve broad national consensus.50 One journalist has speculated that Netanyahu may be looking for ways to distance himself from his ultra-nationalist coalition partners in light of concerns about possible declines in his approval rating, domestic political and economic stability, Israeli-Palestinian tensions, and relations with the United States.51 On April 14, Moody’s Investors Service kept Israel’s credit ratings constant, but downgraded the outlook on those ratings from “positive” to “stable,” reflecting “a deterioration of Israel’s governance, as illustrated by the recent events around the government’s proposal for overhauling the country's judiciary.”52 Polls suggest that a majority of Israelis may support some form of judicial reform, but the specific reforms introduced by the government seem to attract only minority support. Majorities appear to favor compromises that would preserve at least some judicial review powers and a role for justices alongside politicians in making judicial appointments.53 As public debate continues, Netanyahu has roundly criticized military reservists threatening not to serve. He also has sought to convince military leadership to do more to counter this behavior.54 Some Israeli analysts have suggested that reservists’ actions played a major role in pressuring Netanyahu to pause the judicial reform legislation.55 As various media sources speculate on the effect future controversies might have on reservists as well as full-time personnel, some surveys indicate that reservists’ military service has not decreased drastically to date.56 After the postponement of the government’s judicial reform proposals, President Biden expressed hope that Netanyahu will walk away from them and reiterated his earlier call for compromise. He also dismissed the idea of Netanyahu visiting the White House “in the near term.”57 Netanyahu has said that Israel will not make decisions based on outside pressure,58 but referred to U.S.-Israel ties as “unshakeable” while virtually addressing the State Department’s 2023 Summit for Democracy.59 49 Jeremy Sharon, “Judicial overhaul negotiation teams hold talks on anchoring fundamental rights in law,” Times of Israel, April 11, 2023. 50 Caspit, “Israel’s Netanyahu falls in polls, could abandon judicial overhaul.” 51 Ibid. 52 Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s changes outlook on Israel to stable from positive, affirms A1 ratings,” April 14, 2023. 53 Tamar Hermann and Or Anabi, “Only a Minority of Israelis Support the Proposed Judicial Overhaul,” Israel Democracy Institute, February 21, 2023, and “Overhauling the Judicial System – What Do Israelis Think?” Israel Democracy Institute, February 3, 2023; “Direct Polls: 3/4 of Israelis support judicial reform,” Israel National News, March 7, 2023. 54 Amos Harel, “Netanyahu Tries to Regain Control of His Generals, but May Lose Another Battle,” Ha’aretz, April 7, 2023. 55 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Soldiers Forced Netanyahu’s Hand,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2023. 56 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Is volunteering for IDF reserve duty cratering or stable? – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, March 27, 2023. 57 Josef Federman, “Israeli PM, Biden exchange frosty words over legal overhaul,” Associated Press, March 29, 2023. 58 Ibid. 59 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Netanyahu Addresses the US State Dept. Summit for Democracy 2023,” March 29, 2023. Congressional Research Service 8 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Facing negative public polling from his decision—never fully finalized—to fire Defense Minister Gallant, Netanyahu reversed the decision in early April.60 Pressure on Netanyahu to clearly reinstate Gallant came at a time when Israel’s military has faced heightened challenges or threats from violence in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Lebanon.61 Gallant’s reinstatement came shortly after Israeli media reported that the IDF’s Military Intelligence directorate had warned Israel’s top national security decision-makers that Israel’s strategic situation and deterrence has eroded over the past several months for various reasons, particularly domestic division over judicial reform legislation. According to Israel Hayom: This view of Israel is shared by all members of the anti-Israeli axis led by Iran, and it has been clearly manifested in the series of meetings held by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad officials aimed at coordinating their positions.... The Palestinian Authority has also been encouraged by the US-Israel friction and it hopes to seize on it, particularly in international forums – from UN committees to The Hague.62 Israeli-Palestinian Issues63 Overview Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.64 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration.65 These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.66 In January 2023 remarks made alongside Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West Bank, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: Blinken said:
Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution] Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution]
more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like
settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions
to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to
violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless
of the victim or the perpetrator.of the victim or the perpetrator.55
~~U.S. Policy on Jerusalem~~
~~The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as~~
~~Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018.~~
~~These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem~~
~~as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of~~
~~Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.56~~
~~Israel’s previous government took some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living~~
~~circumstances, including through loans and work permits.57 However, some critics charged that~~

~~49 Ibid.~~
~~50 Eliav Breuer, “Ben-Gvir gets National Guard in exchange for support of judicial reform delay,” Jerusalem Post,~~
~~March 27, 2023.~~
5167 60 Barak Ravid, “In reversal, Netanyahu says he’s keeping Gallant as Israel’s defense minister,” Axios, April 10, 2023. 61 Ben Caspit, “Israel, Lebanon’s Hezbollah agree to avoid confrontation, but for how long?” Al-Monitor, April 7, 2023. 62 Yoav Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence,” Israel Hayom, April 4, 2023. 63 See also CRS Report RL34074, See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
5264 State Department Press Briefing, February 23, 2023; White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President State Department Press Briefing, February 23, 2023; White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President
Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022. Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.
5365 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
5466 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022. Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022.
5567 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting,” January 31, 2023. Meeting,” January 31, 2023.
~~56 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021.~~
~~57 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of~~
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Congressional Research Service 9 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations U.S. Policy on Jerusalem The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.68 Israel’s previous government took some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living circumstances, including through loans and work permits.69 However, some critics charged that the measures mirrored past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than the measures mirrored past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than
address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.5870 During President Biden’s July 2022 During President Biden’s July 2022
visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had
committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the
Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank
and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.5971 As of April 2023, Israeli personnel began 24-hour operations at the Allenby crossing five days a week.72
Israeli-Palestinian tensions have heightened in 2023. In response to a Palestinian-backed U.N. Israeli-Palestinian tensions have heightened in 2023. In response to a Palestinian-backed U.N.
General Assembly resolution in December 2022 requesting an International Court of Justice General Assembly resolution in December 2022 requesting an International Court of Justice
advisory opinion on Israeli actions in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, the advisory opinion on Israeli actions in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, the
Netanyahu government has taken a number of retaliatory actions. These include withholding tax Netanyahu government has taken a number of retaliatory actions. These include withholding tax
revenue due the PA (partly authorized by existing Israeli law) and rerouting some of it to Israeli revenue due the PA (partly authorized by existing Israeli law) and rerouting some of it to Israeli
families victimized by terrorism, freezing construction plans for Palestinians in parts of the West families victimized by terrorism, freezing construction plans for Palestinians in parts of the West
Bank, and rescinding expedited travel privileges at checkpoints for PA officials.Bank, and rescinding expedited travel privileges at checkpoints for PA officials.6073 Some countries Some countries
(including France, Germany, and Japan) signed a statement expressing deep concern regarding (including France, Germany, and Japan) signed a statement expressing deep concern regarding
these Israeli steps, calling them “punitive measures against the Palestinian people, leadership, and these Israeli steps, calling them “punitive measures against the Palestinian people, leadership, and
civil society.”civil society.”6174
In In ~~early~~ January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple
Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of
condemnation or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and condemnation or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and
globally.globally.62 75 Netanyahu has pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims Netanyahu has pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims
to worship at the holy site, and has downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous to worship at the holy site, and has downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous
~~ministerial visits to the site.63 Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of~~
~~Ben Gvir’s visit, the State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his~~
~~commitment on the status quo.64 During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of~~
~~Jordan, which has a custodial role over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that~~
~~Israel should respect the “historic and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate~~
~~it.”65~~

ministerial visits to 68 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021. 69 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of Hamas,” Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to , February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to
20,000,” 20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022. , March 26, 2022.
5870 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021. , September 16, 2021.
5971 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing is White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing is
scheduled to operate on a nearly continuous basis starting in April 2023. Jacob Magid, “After US pressure, Allenby scheduled to operate on a nearly continuous basis starting in April 2023. Jacob Magid, “After US pressure, Allenby
crossing to Jordan set to open at all hours on weekdays,” crossing to Jordan set to open at all hours on weekdays,” Times of Israel, November 24, 2022. , November 24, 2022.
6072 Rina Bassist, “Israel expands border crossing hours for Palestinians going to Jordan,” Al-Monitor, April 3, 2023. 73 “Israel to withhold PA tax revenue, impose other sanctions after Abbas’s UN success,” “Israel to withhold PA tax revenue, impose other sanctions after Abbas’s UN success,” Times of Israel, January 6, , January 6,
2023; Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich doubles penalties for pay-for-slay, withholds NIS 100m,” 2023; Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich doubles penalties for pay-for-slay, withholds NIS 100m,” Jerusalem Post, February , February
2, 2023. 2, 2023.
6174 Luke Tress, “Over 90 countries urge Israel to lift sanctions put on Palestinians after UN vote,” Luke Tress, “Over 90 countries urge Israel to lift sanctions put on Palestinians after UN vote,” Times of Israel, ,
January 17, 2023. January 17, 2023.
6275 Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Axios, January 3, , January 3,
2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain 2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain
Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023. Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023.
~~63 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report~~
~~RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.~~
~~64 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.~~
~~65 “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” Reuters, January 24, 2023.~~
~~For background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.~~
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Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations the site.76 Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of Ben Gvir’s visit, the State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his commitment on the status quo.77 During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of Jordan, which has a custodial role over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that Israel should respect the “historic and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate it.”78 Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.66
79 Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018, help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.6780
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to ~~internationally~~international y supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.6881 Because of the PA’s Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.6982 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.Nations.7083 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.conflict.7184
Israel-West Bank Violence
After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30 After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30
Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least 170 Palestinians in the West Bank,Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least 170 Palestinians in the West Bank,7285 violence has violence has
spiked in early 2023. For this year as of mid-spiked in early 2023. For this year as of mid-~~March, at least~~April, more than 15 Israelis and 15 Israelis and 8790 Palestinians have Palestinians have
died from attacks by militants and/or extremists on both sides against civilians and/or their died from attacks by militants and/or extremists on both sides against civilians and/or their
property, or clashes involving Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants.property, or clashes involving Israeli security forces and Palestinian militants.7386 In late February, In late February,
Palestinian gunmen shot and killed two Israeli settlers passing through the village of Huwara, Palestinian gunmen shot and killed two Israeli settlers passing through the village of Huwara,
~~triggering retaliatory attacks by dozens of settlers that killed one Palestinian and injured more~~
~~than 300, and burned around 30 homes and 100 cars in the village.74 Amid negative U.S. and~~
~~international reactions to the retaliatory attacks, Netanyahu and several other officials criticized~~
~~them. Finance Minister Smotrich appealed to settlers to leave the response to Palestinian violence~~
~~to the government, and then called for the government to “wipe out” Huwara. After receiving~~
~~heavy U.S. and international condemnation for the statement, he expressed regret and insisted it~~
~~was not intended literally.75 In March, Smotrich said, “There is no such thing as a Palestinian~~

66 76 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 77 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023. 78 “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” Reuters, January 24, 2023. For background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 79 CRS Report RL34074, CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
6780 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor, ,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019. Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
6881 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021. David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
6982 Ibid. Ibid.
7083 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021. , September 12, 2021.
7184 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29, Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.” 2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
7285 Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” New York Times, ,
January 29, 2023. January 29, 2023.
~~73 Aaron Boxerman and Dov Lieber, “Israel Reverses Settlement Policy,” Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2023; Aaron~~
~~Boxerman, “Violence Flares in West Bank as Summit Seeks Calm,” Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2023.~~
~~74 “‘They burned everything’: Israeli settlers torch Palestinian homes, cars after West Bank attack,”~~ ~~Agence France~~
~~Presse, February 27, 2023.~~
~~75 State Department Press Briefing, March 1, 2023; Omri Nahmias and Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich walks back Huwara~~
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86 Aaron Boxerman, “Tense Calm Follows Violence in, Around Gaza,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2023. Congressional Research Service 11 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations triggering retaliatory attacks by dozens of settlers that killed one Palestinian and injured more than 300, and burned around 30 homes and 100 cars in the village.87 Amid negative U.S. and international reactions to the retaliatory attacks, Netanyahu and several other officials criticized them. Finance Minister Smotrich appealed to settlers to leave the response to Palestinian violence to the government, and then called for the government to “wipe out” Huwara. After receiving heavy U.S. and international condemnation for the statement, he expressed regret and insisted it was not intended literally.88 In March, Smotrich said, “There is no such thing as a Palestinian people,” drawing objections from the National Security Council spokesperson for any language people,” drawing objections from the National Security Council spokesperson for any language
that can “become an obstacle to a viable two-state solution.”that can “become an obstacle to a viable two-state solution.”7689
Since at least the second half of 2022, Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on Since at least the second half of 2022, Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on
northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism
suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.7790 As the increase in As the increase in
Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,7891 Israeli and PA forces have Israeli and PA forces have
approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of
future escalation.future escalation.7992 The PA reportedly has sought time and flexibility to address militancy The PA reportedly has sought time and flexibility to address militancy
independent of Israeli dictates, as part of an effort to reach compromises that avoid major armed independent of Israeli dictates, as part of an effort to reach compromises that avoid major armed
confrontations or arrests. Some PA personnel reportedly have directly targeted Israeli forces or confrontations or arrests. Some PA personnel reportedly have directly targeted Israeli forces or
settlers, raising questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.settlers, raising questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.8093
Israel’s government approved measures in January that Prime Minister Netanyahu said were Israel’s government approved measures in January that Prime Minister Netanyahu said were
aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps reducing benefits for aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps reducing benefits for
families of accused terrorists, accelerating home demolitions and West Bank settlement building, families of accused terrorists, accelerating home demolitions and West Bank settlement building,
reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for Israelis.reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for Israelis.8194 In In
defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate circle,” defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate circle,”
Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has reduced Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has reduced
security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners in the security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners in the
Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.8295
After a deadly January Israeli raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security After a deadly January Israeli raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security
coordination with Israel,coordination with Israel,8396 but its practical meaning is unclear. but its practical meaning is unclear.8497 Previously, the PA publicly 87 “‘They burned everything’: Israeli settlers torch Palestinian homes, cars after West Bank attack,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2023. 88 State Department Press Briefing, March 1, 2023; Omri Nahmias and Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich walks back Huwara comments during US visit,” March 13, 2023. 89 ~~Previously, the PA publicly~~
~~suspended security coordination with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was~~
~~contemplating annexation of West Bank areas.85 In early February, President Abbas reportedly~~
~~told Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns that Israel-PA intelligence sharing has~~
~~continued, and that he would fully resume coordination once calm is restored.86 Burns later~~
~~remarked that the ongoing tensions have an “unhappy resemblance to some of the realities” of the~~
~~2000-2005 period of Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the second Palestinian intifada (or~~

~~comments during US visit,” March 13, 2023.~~
76 “Israeli minister says there’s ‘no such thing as a Palestinian people,’ inviting US rebuke,” “Israeli minister says there’s ‘no such thing as a Palestinian people,’ inviting US rebuke,” CNN, March 21, 2023. , March 21, 2023.
7790 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” New York Times, November 16, 2022. , November 16, 2022.
7891 State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022, and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022, and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda
Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
7992 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” New York Times, October 26, 2022; Yaniv , October 26, 2022; Yaniv
Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian
Authority,” Authority,” Haaretz, October 12, 2022. , October 12, 2022.
8093 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Al-Monitor, ,
October 12, 2022. October 12, 2022.
8194 Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows”; Abdulrahim, “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows”; Abdulrahim, “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement
in West Bank.” in West Bank.”
8295 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
8396 “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” WAFA
News Agency, January 26, 2023. , January 26, 2023.
8497 Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in
~~the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023.~~
~~85 “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” Reuters, November 17, 2020~~.
~~86 Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Times of Israel,~~
~~February 7, 2023.~~
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~~uprising).87~~ Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations suspended security coordination with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was contemplating annexation of West Bank areas.98 In February, President Abbas reportedly told Central Intelligence Agency Director Bill Burns that Israel-PA intelligence sharing has continued, and that he would fully resume coordination once calm is restored.99 Burns later remarked that the ongoing tensions have an “unhappy resemblance to some of the realities” of the 2000-2005 period of Israeli-Palestinian violence known as the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising).100 An Israeli observer has argued that PA leadership under Abbas is unlikely to An Israeli observer has argued that PA leadership under Abbas is unlikely to
coordinate efforts against Israelis in the way Palestinian leaders supposedly did during the coordinate efforts against Israelis in the way Palestinian leaders supposedly did during the
intifada.intifada.88101
During Secretary Blinken’s January visit to the West Bank, he said that “it’s important to take During Secretary Blinken’s January visit to the West Bank, he said that “it’s important to take
steps to de-escalate, to stop the violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the steps to de-escalate, to stop the violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the
foundation for more positive actions going forward.”foundation for more positive actions going forward.”89102 He also said that he discussed with He also said that he discussed with
President Abbas “the importance of the Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its President Abbas “the importance of the Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its
governance and accountability, strengthening the institutions of the PA.”governance and accountability, strengthening the institutions of the PA.”90103 According to one According to one
media report, Blinken encouraged Abbas privately to implement a security plan presented to media report, Blinken encouraged Abbas privately to implement a security plan presented to
Israel and the PA weeks earlier by the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Israel and the PA weeks earlier by the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian
Authority (USSC), Lieutenant General Michael Fenzel.Authority (USSC), Lieutenant General Michael Fenzel.91104 The plan supposedly lays out steps for The plan supposedly lays out steps for
PA security forces to regain control in Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA PA security forces to regain control in Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA
force. Reportedly, PA officials expressed reservations about the plan, partly because it may not force. Reportedly, PA officials expressed reservations about the plan, partly because it may not
explicitly call for Israel to reduce incursions into West Bank cities or include other provisions explicitly call for Israel to reduce incursions into West Bank cities or include other provisions
calculated to attract Palestinian public support.calculated to attract Palestinian public support.92105
In February, the Israeli government decided to advance West Bank plans to construct nearly In February, the Israeli government decided to advance West Bank plans to construct nearly
10,000 additional settlement units and begin a process to retroactively legalize nine outposts that 10,000 additional settlement units and begin a process to retroactively legalize nine outposts that
had previously been illegal under Israeli law—triggering a statement of strong opposition from had previously been illegal under Israeli law—triggering a statement of strong opposition from
Secretary Blinken.Secretary Blinken.93106 Over the next week, U.S.-brokered diplomacy reportedly averted a Over the next week, U.S.-brokered diplomacy reportedly averted a
Palestinian-supported U.N. Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution condemning the Israeli Palestinian-supported U.N. Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution condemning the Israeli
action.action.94107 Instead, the UNSC issued a presidential statement that expressed deep concern and Instead, the UNSC issued a presidential statement that expressed deep concern and
dismay about the Israeli decision, strongly opposed “all unilateral measures that impede peace,” dismay about the Israeli decision, strongly opposed “all unilateral measures that impede peace,”
and called for “upholding unchanged the historic status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem in word and called for “upholding unchanged the historic status quo at the holy sites in Jerusalem in word
and in practice” and Jordan’s custodial role.and in practice” and Jordan’s custodial role.95
~~A few days later, the United States, Israel, the PA, Jordan, and Egypt issued a communique from~~
~~Aqaba, Jordan aimed at de-escalating tensions and violence by committing Israel and the PA to~~
~~suspend unilateral measures for a few months.96 In March, with incidents of violence recurring,~~
~~the five parties reconvened as scheduled in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, and restated the~~
~~commitments from Aqaba. They also specified plans to work toward empowering PA security~~
~~forces, develop a mechanism to curb violence, establish a separate mechanism to improve~~
~~Palestinian economic conditions, and resume talks in April.97 Reportedly, the PA agreed in~~

~~87 Ibid.~~
88108 the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023. 98 “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” Reuters, November 17, 2020. 99 Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Times of Israel, February 7, 2023. 100 Ibid. 101 Micah Halpern, “Terror wave in Israel not an intifada, but still very dangerous – opinion,” Micah Halpern, “Terror wave in Israel not an intifada, but still very dangerous – opinion,” Jerusalem Post, ,
November 28, 2022. November 28, 2022.
89102 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting.” Meeting.”
90103 Ibid. Ibid.
91104 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Axios, February 1, 2023. For , February 1, 2023. For
background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074, background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074,
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. , by Jim Zanotti.
92105 Ibid. Ibid.
93106 State Department, “Israeli Settlement and Outpost Legalization Announcement,” State Department, “Israeli Settlement and Outpost Legalization Announcement,”
94107 Michelle Nichols, “No U.N. vote Monday on Israel settlements, diplomats say,” Reuters, February 19, 2023; Barak Michelle Nichols, “No U.N. vote Monday on Israel settlements, diplomats say,” Reuters, February 19, 2023; Barak
Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023. , February 19, 2023.
95108 U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2023/1), February 20, 2023. U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2023/1), February 20, 2023.
~~96 State Department, “Aqaba Joint Communique,” February 26, 2023.~~
~~97 State Department, “Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh,” March 19, 2023.~~
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~~February to start implementing the USSC security plan,98~~ Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations A few days later, the United States, Israel, the PA, Jordan, and Egypt issued a communique from Aqaba, Jordan aimed at de-escalating tensions and violence by committing Israel and the PA to suspend unilateral measures for a few months.109 In March, with incidents of violence recurring, the five parties reconvened as scheduled in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, and restated the commitments from Aqaba. They also specified plans to work toward empowering PA security forces, develop a mechanism to curb violence, establish a separate mechanism to improve Palestinian economic conditions, and resume talks in April.110 Reportedly, the PA agreed in February to start implementing the USSC security plan,111 which one source has said would which one source has said would
involve “the recruitment and training of thousands of Palestinian security personnel to be involve “the recruitment and training of thousands of Palestinian security personnel to be
deployed in the northern West Bank.”deployed in the northern West Bank.”99112 Later in March, the foreign ministers of all six Gulf Later in March, the foreign ministers of all six Gulf
Cooperation Council countries (the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman) sent Cooperation Council countries (the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman) sent
a letter to Secretary Blinken urging the Biden Administration “to play its role in reaching a just, a letter to Secretary Blinken urging the Biden Administration “to play its role in reaching a just,
comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict based on the principles of international law,”comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict based on the principles of international law,”~~100~~
~~and criticizing the statements mentioned above about Palestinians by Israeli Finance Minister~~
~~Smotrich.~~ and criticizing the statements mentioned above about Palestinians by Israeli Finance Minister Smotrich.113 Tensions During Religious Holidays During the March and April 2023 observances of Ramadan, Passover, and Easter, Israel-Palestinian tensions have intensified. In early April, Israeli police entered Al Aqsa Mosque (normally the exclusive province of Muslims) on Jerusalem’s Mount/Haram to eject Palestinians who had barricaded themselves inside overnight—some reportedly with rocks, fireworks, and improvised explosives.114 A combination of factors—including some Jewish “fringe groups” calling for Passover ritual animal sacrifice on the Mount/Haram (no such sacrifice has taken place),115 and reported encouragement of overnight Muslim worship by officials with the Jordanian-control ed Islamic trust (or waqf) that administers the Mount/Haram—may have factored into Palestinians’ decisions to stay in Al Aqsa overnight, even though they are typically only permitted to do so during the final 10 days of Ramadan.116 The force used by the police against Palestinian worshippers and the arrests of hundreds prompted strong negative reactions or statements of concern from several regional and international actors.117 In the aftermath, various militant groups fired rockets toward Israel from Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. Israel’s military made retaliatory strikes in Gaza and against Hamas targets in Lebanon based on Israeli intelligence assessments that Hamas—not Hezbol ah—was responsible for the rocket fire,118 though there may be some evidence of growing cooperation between the two groups.119 No casualties have been reported from the rocket fire or retaliatory strikes. Israeli-Palestinian contention has spiked each of the last three years amid religious holidays that either overlap or occur close together. In 2021, major Israel-Gaza violence began at the end of Ramadan. Clashes did not escalate 109 State Department, “Aqaba Joint Communique,” February 26, 2023. 110 State Department, “Joint Communique from the March 19 meeting in Sharm El Sheikh,” March 19, 2023. 111 Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023. 112 Yoni Ben Menachem, “American-Israeli Military Coordination and the Possibility of Regional Escalation,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 9, 2023. 113 “GCC foreign ministers condemn Israeli minister in letter to Blinken,” The National (UAE), March 26, 2023. 114 “Officials acknowledge ‘terrible’ impact of images of cops beating Muslims at Al-Aqsa,” Times of Israel, April 9, 2023; Barak Ravid, “Israeli police raid Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa Mosque compound,” Axios, April 5, 2023. 115 Ash Obel, “Police minister: Jews must go to Temple Mount on Passover — but no animal sacrifice,” Times of Israel, April 3, 2023. 116 “Israeli Police Storm Al-Aqsa Mosque Again, Sparking Fears of Continued Violence,” Associated Press, April 6, 2023; Haley Ott, “Israeli forces storm Jerusalem’s Al-Aqsa mosque, arresting hundreds of Palestinian worshipers,” CBS News, April 5, 2023. 117 “Global condemnation after Israeli riot police attack worshippers at Al-Aqsa mosque,” Agence France Presse, April 6, 2023. 118 Barak Ravid, “Inside Israel’s decision not to target Hezbollah in striking Lebanon,” Axios, April 7, 2023. 119 Beatrice Farhat, “Lebanon’s Hezbollah hosts Hamas chief as rockets fly over Israel border,” Al-Monitor, April 6, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations to the same level in 2022 under the previous Israeli government led by then-Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, but police did enter Al Aqsa Mosque on one occasion, removing or arresting hundreds of Palestinians.
On March 20, the Knesset passed legislation to overturn parts of a 2005 law that had made Jewish On March 20, the Knesset passed legislation to overturn parts of a 2005 law that had made Jewish
settlements in certain areas of the northern West Bank illegal. In that year, then-Israeli Prime settlements in certain areas of the northern West Bank illegal. In that year, then-Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon had affirmed in writing to then-President George W. Bush that Israel Minister Ariel Sharon had affirmed in writing to then-President George W. Bush that Israel
committed to evacuate settlements and outposts in that region. A State Department spokesperson committed to evacuate settlements and outposts in that region. A State Department spokesperson
said that the United States is extremely troubled about the legislation, and that it clearly said that the United States is extremely troubled about the legislation, and that it clearly
contradicts Israel’s longtime undertaking to the United States, as wellcontradicts Israel’s longtime undertaking to the United States, as well ~~the~~ commitments it made commitments it made
earlier in earlier in ~~the month~~March to de-escalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions. to de-escalate Israeli-Palestinian tensions.~~101~~120 After Deputy Secretary of State After Deputy Secretary of State
Wendy Sherman met with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Herzog to convey Wendy Sherman met with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Michael Herzog to convey
U.S. concern about the legislation,U.S. concern about the legislation,~~102~~121 Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying that Israel’s Netanyahu’s office issued a statement saying that Israel’s
government has “no intention of establishing new communities” in the West Bank areas in government has “no intention of establishing new communities” in the West Bank areas in
question.question.~~103~~122
The Abraham Accords
In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with
four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and four members of the Arab League: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and
Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Sudan. The Trump Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham
Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the countries Accords, and provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the countries
in question.in question.~~104~~123 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both countries In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both countries
reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had operated reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had operated
in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. While Saudi Arabia has not normalized its relations with in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. While Saudi Arabia has not normalized its relations with
Israel, it reportedly supported the UAE and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Israel, it reportedly supported the UAE and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham
Accords.Accords.~~105~~124 Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Oman have opened their airspace to Israeli civilian Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Oman have opened their airspace to Israeli civilian
airlines, significantly reducing their travel time to Asian destinations. The Sudanese military’s airlines, significantly reducing their travel time to Asian destinations. The Sudanese military’s
seizure of power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.seizure of power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.~~106 In January~~

~~98 Barak Ravid, “Israeli-Palestinian showdown at UN averted after U.S. mediation,” Axios, February 19, 2023.~~
~~99 Yoni Ben Menachem, “American-Israeli Military Coordination and the Possibility of Regional Escalation,”~~
~~Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, March 9, 2023.~~
~~100 “GCC foreign ministers condemn Israeli minister in letter to Blinken,” The National (UAE), March 26, 2023.~~
~~101 State Department Press Briefing, March 21, 2023.~~
~~102~~125 In January 2023, the Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal with Israel after it transitions to a civilian government, but some Sudanese civilian groups reportedly remain unsure about this step.126 Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened, particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include an Israel-UAE free trade agreement that went into effect in March 2023, and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative 120 State Department Press Briefing, March 21, 2023. 121 State Department, “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Herzog,” State Department, “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Meeting with Israeli Ambassador to the United States Herzog,”
March 21, 2023. March 21, 2023.
~~103~~122 Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on the Knesset Decision to Repeal Parts of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on the Knesset Decision to Repeal Parts of the
Disengagement Law,” March 22, 2023. Disengagement Law,” March 22, 2023.
~~104~~123 See https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/. These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and See https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/. These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and
Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and Morocco, possible U.S. and international economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and
U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports
suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its suggest that the Trump Administration linked Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its
agreement to recognize Israel. agreement to recognize Israel.
~~105~~124 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021. , October 20, 2021.
~~106~~125 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S. Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
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~~2023, the Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal with~~
~~Israel after it transitions to a civilian government, but some Sudanese civilian groups reportedly~~
~~remain unsure about this step.107~~
~~Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened,~~
~~particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include an Israel-UAE free~~
~~trade agreement that went into effect in March 2023, and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative~~
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022. 126 “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” Reuters, February 3, 2023. Congressional Research Service 15 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations focused on desalinated water and solar energy. As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the focused on desalinated water and solar energy. As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to the
Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken metAccords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met ~~Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and~~ the foreign the foreign
ministers of ministers of Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s southern
Negev desert to inaugurate a regional cooperation framework. The framework features periodic Negev desert to inaugurate a regional cooperation framework. The framework features periodic
Negev Forum meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education Negev Forum meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education
and coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.and coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.~~108~~127 Participants Participants
expect a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting to take place in Morocco. expect a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting to take place in Morocco.
Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation, Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation,
public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional
governments recognizing Israel remains strong.governments recognizing Israel remains strong.~~109~~128 According to one poll, support in the UAE and According to one poll, support in the UAE and
Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in
2022.2022.~~110~~129 However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the
UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.~~111~~
130 In this context, developments since the new Israeli government took office have reportedly fueled some concerns among Arab governments, including the new government’s actions against Palestinians, Israeli domestic discord, and some apparent U.S.-Israel differences.131 According to various media accounts, UAE officials have expressed hesitancy to Israeli counterparts about further advancing bilateral relations without clearer signs that Netanyahu can control his coalition.132 U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim- U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the
efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with
Israel in the years ahead.”Israel in the years ahead.”~~112~~133 However, the Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S. However, the Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S.
policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.~~113~~134 The The
Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and
Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.Israeli-Palestinian conflict.~~114~~135 Negev Forum members acknowledge that part of their mandate is to Negev Forum members acknowledge that part of their mandate is to
“create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian relations.”“create momentum in Israeli-Palestinian relations.”~~115~~136 However, the PA has opted not to join the However, the PA has opted not to join the

~~Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.~~
~~107 “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” Reuters, February 3, 2023.~~
~~108~~127 State Department, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023; State Department, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023;
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in
Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023. Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023.
~~109~~128 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2022 Arab Opinion Index, January 3, 2023. , January 3, 2023.
~~110~~129 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2022; Dylan , December 5, 2022; Dylan
Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022. Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022.
~~111~~130 Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.” Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.”
~~112~~131 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel’s Ties with Arabs Falter,” Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2023; Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence.” 132 Nissenbaum, “Israel’s Ties with Arabs Falter”; “UAE, Jordan consider reducing diplomacy with Israel – report,” Jerusalem Post, March 22, 2023. 133 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
Availability,” October 13, 2021. Availability,” October 13, 2021.
~~113~~134 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October , October
14, 2021. 14, 2021.
~~114~~135 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Their State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Their
Meeting,” January 30, 2023. Meeting,” January 30, 2023.
~~115~~136 The Negev Forum Regional Cooperation Framework Adopted by the Steering Committee on November 10th, 2022, The Negev Forum Regional Cooperation Framework Adopted by the Steering Committee on November 10th, 2022,
hyperlink to document available at https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-hyperlink to document available at https://www.state.gov/the-negev-forum-working-groups-and-regional-cooperation-
~~framework/.~~
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forum. Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE normalization with Israel forum. Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE normalization with Israel
as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League states’ previous as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League states’ previous
insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved
ties.ties.~~116~~137 Jordan also has remained on the sidelines of the Negev Forum, conditioning its Jordan also has remained on the sidelines of the Negev Forum, conditioning its
involvement on PA participation.involvement on PA participation.~~117~~138
In January 2023, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud expressed In January 2023, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud expressed
general support for normalization with Israel but stated that “true normalization and true stability general support for normalization with Israel but stated that “true normalization and true stability
will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the Palestinians dignity. That will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the Palestinians dignity. That
requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”~~118~~139 Various factors could Various factors could
complicate an Israel-Saudi normalization process, including the March 2023 Saudi-Iran complicate an Israel-Saudi normalization process, including the March 2023 Saudi-Iran
normalization deal brokered by China, Saudi desires for stronger U.S. support for Saudi security normalization deal brokered by China, Saudi desires for stronger U.S. support for Saudi security
and civilian nuclear priorities, and Arab concerns regarding increased Israeli-Palestinian tensions and civilian nuclear priorities, and Arab concerns regarding increased Israeli-Palestinian tensions
and violence.and violence.~~119~~140 One media report has suggested that while Arab states like Saudi Arabia “may One media report has suggested that while Arab states like Saudi Arabia “may
see Iran as a menace, they see little gain in isolating and opposing Tehran to the extent that Israel see Iran as a menace, they see little gain in isolating and opposing Tehran to the extent that Israel
does.”does.”~~120~~141 Another cited Israeli and Gulf officials as saying, “Saudi interest in openly embracing Israel has cooled as violence between Palestinians and Israelis has intensified and Mr. Netanyahu's right-wing coalition has pushed to build more Jewish homes on West Bank land.”142
Security cooperation. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would (CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would
add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR), partly to encourage military interoperability as a add Israel to its area of responsibility (AOR), partly to encourage military interoperability as a
means of reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.means of reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.~~121~~143 Israel had previously Israel had previously
been under the purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in been under the purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in
September 2021,September 2021,~~122~~144 and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM
headquarters.headquarters.~~123~~145 Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the
other Abraham Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, other Abraham Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.~~124~~
~~Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by~~
~~Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government reportedly expressed~~
~~interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.125 Earlier, both Morocco (November 2021) and~~

~~116~~146 framework/. 137 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August , August
14, 2020. 14, 2020.
~~117~~138 Jacob Magid, “US laments Jordan’s absence from Negev Forum, aims to keep Palestinians in loop,” Jacob Magid, “US laments Jordan’s absence from Negev Forum, aims to keep Palestinians in loop,” Times of Israel, ,
January 8, 2023. January 8, 2023.
~~118~~139 Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Al-Monitor, ,
January 20, 2023. January 20, 2023.
~~119~~140 Patrick Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran,” Patrick Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran,” New York Times, ,
March 11, 2023; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Saudis Seek Edge in Israel Talks,” March 11, 2023; Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Saudis Seek Edge in Israel Talks,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2023; , March 10, 2023;
David Makovsky, “Netanyahu’s Potential Friction Points with Biden (Part 2): Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and David Makovsky, “Netanyahu’s Potential Friction Points with Biden (Part 2): Iran, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, and
Domestic Issues,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 10, 2023. Domestic Issues,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 10, 2023.
~~120~~141 Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran.” Kingsley, “For Israel, Saudi Deal with Iran Undermines Its Hopes of Isolating Tehran.”
~~121~~142 Nissenbaum, “Israel’s Ties with Arabs Falter.” 143 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15, , January 15,
2021. 2021.
~~122~~144 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1, U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021. 2021.
~~123~~145 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of
Israel, October 29, 2021. , October 29, 2021.
~~124~~146 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for , November 11, 2021. Participant list for
2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list. 2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
~~125 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25,~~
~~2022.~~
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Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government reportedly expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.147 Earlier, both Morocco (November 2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.~~126~~148 These MOUs These MOUs
appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales. appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.
Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be
contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.~~127~~149 In late 2022, Israel’s defense In late 2022, Israel’s defense
ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.~~128~~150
At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly
discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on
inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.~~129~~151 Speculation Speculation
about specific measures has continued since then.about specific measures has continued since then.~~130~~152 In January 2023, the Department of In January 2023, the Department of
Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on
cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.~~131~~153
Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel, Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel,
certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their
involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”~~132 One~~
~~obstacle could be the apparent reluctance of countries in the region~~154 Actions by this Israeli government may be fueling any such reluctance to some degree.155 Regional countries might be hesitate to share the real-time to share the real-time
intelligence data that underlies intelligence data that underlies ~~basic threat information that they might be more willing to~~
~~share.133~~less sensitive basic threat information.156 Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM apparently plans to Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM apparently plans to
help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners using the X-band help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners using the X-band
radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air defense systems and radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air defense systems and
fighter jets.fighter jets.~~134~~157 Additionally, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) is reportedly Additionally, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) is reportedly
working with Israel and some Arab states to develop a network of working with Israel and some Arab states to develop a network of ~~unmanned maritime drones to~~
~~monitor Iranian naval activity and narcotics smuggling in NAVCENT’s area of responsibility.135~~
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
~~formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.136 In March, Congress enacted the~~

~~126~~ 147 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25, 2022. 148 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021; , November 26, 2021;
Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022., February 3, 2022. ~~During the~~
~~same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense~~
~~minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all~~
~~parties involved.~~
~~127~~ 149 Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Breaking
Defense, October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” , October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” Wall Street Journal, ,
October 10, 2022. October 10, 2022.
~~128~~150 Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.” Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.”
~~129~~151 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022. , March 29, 2022.
~~130~~152 Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Breaking Defense, ,
June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” Times of Israel, June , June
28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” 28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York
Times, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~131~~153 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim
Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Washington Post, ,
January 31, 2023. January 31, 2023.
~~132~~154 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” New York Times, July 14, , July 14,
2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” 2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” Wall Street
Journal, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
~~133~~155 “UAE, Jordan consider reducing diplomacy with Israel – report.” 156 Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,” Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,”
Politico, July 12, 2022. , July 12, 2022.
~~134~~157 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Haaretz, July 13, 2022. , July 13, 2022.
~~135 Dion Nissenbaum, “Inside a U.S. Navy Maritime Drone Operation Aimed at Iran,” Wall Street Journal, August 31,~~
~~2022.~~
~~136 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/~~
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16

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

Congressional Research Service 18 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations unmanned maritime drones to monitor Iranian naval activity and narcotics smuggling in NAVCENT’s area of responsibility.158 Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.159 In March, Congress enacted the Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other
things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening
and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of
measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization
efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts. efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.
The FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263) enacted in December 2022 The FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263) enacted in December 2022
included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Secretary of included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Secretary of
State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees: State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees:
a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United
States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense
architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise
and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran
and groups linked to Iran. and groups linked to Iran.
In the 118th Congress, H.R. 1268 seeks to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of In the 118th Congress, H.R. 1268 seeks to amend the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 to establish the position of “Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords.” 1956 to establish the position of “Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords.”
Countering Iran
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE through coordinated drone penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE through coordinated drone
and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.~~137~~160 Israeli observers who Israeli observers who
anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s 2006 war
against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert actions since
then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”~~138~~161 As mentioned above, the IDF’s Military Intelligence directorate reportedly warned Israeli officials in early 2023 that the “anti-Israeli axis led by Iran”—including Hezbollah and Hamas—appears to be emboldened by Israeli domestic discord and some purported U.S.-Israel differences.162 According to one media report’s profile of the intelligence warning, Iran doubts that Israel can “carry out an offensive against it or strike its nuclear program with US support.”163 158 Dion Nissenbaum, “Inside a U.S. Navy Maritime Drone Operation Aimed at Iran,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2022. 159 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf. 160
~~Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions~~
~~Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear~~
~~program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister~~
~~Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama~~
~~Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States~~
~~from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic~~
~~sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could~~
~~significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.139~~
~~Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,~~
~~international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional~~

~~Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.~~
~~137~~ Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York
Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” , May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” Jerusalem Post, March 11, , March 11,
2022. 2022.
~~138~~161 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post, ,
November 14, 2021. November 14, 2021.
~~139 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “UN report: Uranium particles enriched to 83.7% found in Iran,” Associated Press,~~
~~February 28, 2023~~162 Limor, “Exclusive: Intelligence Directorate sounds alarm over eroding Israeli deterrence.” 163 Ibid. .
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1719 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Another media report said that Iran and its allies are not “necessarily interested in a direct, all-out clash,” but are “willing to risk more daring offensive operations,” while arguing that closer U.S.-Israel security coordination may at least partly reflect a pragmatic U.S. desire to prevent being dragged into a confrontation with Iran.164 This same report surmised that Iran may calculate it has bolstered its position vis-á-vis Israel and the United States because Iran and the Syrian regime have improved their relations with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab governments, Iran is approaching “nuclear threshold state” status, and Iran has a growing partnership with Russia. Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.165 Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace, international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional tensions.166

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~tensions.140~~ In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some
operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military
capabilities.capabilities.~~141~~167
As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the
possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence
diplomatic outcomes.diplomatic outcomes.168 ~~During their stints as prime minister, Bennett (2021-2022) and Yair Lapid~~
~~(2022) opposed the deal but largely abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.142~~
Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and government crackdowns in Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and government crackdowns in
Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in Ukraine, near-term prospects Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in Ukraine, near-term prospects
for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.~~143~~169
During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the
Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment
“never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is “never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is
prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”~~144~~170 Additionally, Biden Additionally, Biden
said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from
acquiring nuclear weapons.acquiring nuclear weapons.~~145~~171 In February 2023, U.S. Ambassador to Israel In February 2023, U.S. Ambassador to Israel ~~Tom~~Thomas Nides said that Nides said that
~~the United States will not engage in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program while Iran provides~~
~~drones for Russia in its war in Ukraine. He also said that U.S.-Israel cooperation vis-à-vis Iran~~
~~was “lockstep”:~~
~~As President Biden has said, we will not stand by and watch Iran get a nuclear weapon,~~
~~number one. Number two, he said, all options are on the table. Number three, Israel can~~
~~and should do whatever they need to deal with and we’ve got their back.146~~
~~In January, the United States and Israel held their largest-ever bilateral military exercise, named~~
~~Juniper Oak. According to CENTCOM, the exercise “enhanced interoperability and the ability of~~
~~CENTCOM forces to rapidly move combat power into the region,” and provides opportunities to~~
~~incorporate lessons learned with all U.S. partners in the CENTCOM AOR.147~~
~~Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear~~
~~program,148 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the~~
~~overall effectiveness of such operations.149 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military~~

~~140~~the United States will not engage in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program while Iran 164 Amos Harel, “Washington’s Mideast Pullout Sets Israel and Iran on a Collision Course,” Ha’aretz, April 11, 2023. 165 Stephanie Liechtenstein, “UN report: Uranium particles enriched to 83.7% found in Iran,” Associated Press, February 28, 2023. 166 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24, , May 24,
2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi, , April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi,
“With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” “With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16, , March 16,
2022. 2022.
~~141~~167 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022. , June 21, 2022.
~~142~~168 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022; Israeli , March 21, 2022; Israeli
Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022. Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022.
~~143~~169 International Institute for Strategic Studies, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran, ,
November 2022. November 2022.
~~144~~170 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022. White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022.
~~145~~171 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” Associated Press, July 15, 2022. , July 15, 2022.
~~146 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve got their back,’”~~
Times of Israel, February 19, 2023.
~~147 U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26, 2023. See also Michael Eisenstadt,~~
~~“The Juniper Oak Military Exercise: Implications for Innovation, Experimentation, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran,”~~
~~Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2023.~~
~~148 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022.~~
~~149 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021.~~
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18

~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

~~capabilities,150 questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against~~
~~Iran’s nuclear program.151~~ Congressional Research Service 20 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations provides drones for Russia in its war in Ukraine. He also said that U.S.-Israel cooperation vis-à-vis Iran was “lockstep”: As President Biden has said, we will not stand by and watch Iran get a nuclear weapon, number one. Number two, he said, all options are on the table. Number three, Israel can and should do whatever they need to deal with and we’ve got their back.172 In January, the United States and Israel held their largest-ever bilateral military exercise, named Juniper Oak. According to CENTCOM, the exercise “enhanced interoperability and the ability of CENTCOM forces to rapidly move combat power into the region,” and provides opportunities to incorporate lessons learned with all U.S. partners in the CENTCOM AOR.173 Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear program,174 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the overall effectiveness of such operations.175 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military capabilities,176 questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against Iran’s nuclear program.177
In a January 2023 In a January 2023 CNN interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted
attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons
development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting
nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing
is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to
take action.”take action.”~~152~~178 Amid some international concerns about advanced levels of Iranian uranium Amid some international concerns about advanced levels of Iranian uranium
enrichment, Defense Minister enrichment, Defense Minister ~~Galant~~Gallant stated in February that Israel would not allow Iran to enrich stated in February that Israel would not allow Iran to enrich
uranium to 90%.uranium to 90%.~~153~~179
Hezbollah and Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.conflict.~~154~~180 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications, Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications,
including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.~~155~~
~~Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied~~
~~weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and~~
~~its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.156 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership~~
~~and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture~~
~~precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.157 In late 2022, Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon~~
~~that Israel could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling,~~
~~based on reports that Iran has begun or planned flights that could carry equipment directly to~~
~~Hezbollah in Lebanon.158~~
~~Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster~~
~~Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other~~

~~150~~181 172 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “US envoy Nides: Israel ‘can do whatever they need’ on Iran, ‘and we’ve got their back,’” Times of Israel, February 19, 2023. 173 U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26, 2023. See also Michael Eisenstadt, “The Juniper Oak Military Exercise: Implications for Innovation, Experimentation, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 1, 2023. 174 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022. 175 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021. 176 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel’s ‘Top Gun’: The US-Israeli aircraft that can take down Iran,” Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israel’s ‘Top Gun’: The US-Israeli aircraft that can take down Iran,” Jerusalem Post, February , February
25, 2023. 25, 2023.
~~151~~177 Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Haaretz, September 1, 2022. , September 1, 2022.
~~152~~178 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
~~153~~179 “Netanyahu said to huddle repeatedly with military brass over possible attack on Iran,” “Netanyahu said to huddle repeatedly with military brass over possible attack on Iran,” Times of Israel, February 22, , February 22,
2023. 2023.
~~154~~180 CRS Report R44759, CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, , by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E. , by Carla E.
Humud. Humud.
~~155~~181 Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program – opinion,” Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program – opinion,” Jerusalem Post, ,
December 28, 2022; Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The December 28, 2022; Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The
~~Israeli Card,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022.~~
~~156 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28,~~
~~2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,”~~ ~~New York~~
~~Times, April 23, 2020.~~
~~157 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press,~~
~~February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies~~
~~Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.~~
~~158 Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2022.~~
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19

~~link to page 29~~ ~~Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations~~

Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 32 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.182 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.183 In late 2022, Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon that Israel could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling, based on reports that Iran has begun or planned flights that could carry equipment directly to Hezbollah in Lebanon.184 Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-
backed targets that could present threats to its security.backed targets that could present threats to its security.~~159~~185
Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian
targets,targets,~~160~~186 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel. but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.~~161~~187 This This
deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has
criticized some Israeli strikes.criticized some Israeli strikes.~~162~~188
In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime
boundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (seeboundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (see Appendix C). .
Public debate in Israel has centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal are worth the Public debate in Israel has centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal are worth the
concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.~~163~~189 While Prime Minister Netanyahu While Prime Minister Netanyahu
made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the
maritime boundary agreement,maritime boundary agreement,~~164~~190 his government has not taken action to date. his government has not taken action to date.~~165~~
191 Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in
international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and
~~humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish~~
~~refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.166 As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel~~
~~has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment,~~
~~especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to~~
~~Hezbollah in Lebanon.167~~
~~Despite entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal~~
~~assistance to Ukraine.168 Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian~~
~~rescue forces and civilian organizations.169~~

~~159~~ Israeli Card,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022. 182 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28, 2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York Times, April 23, 2020. 183 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press, February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022. 184 Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2022. 185 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022. Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022.
~~160~~186 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27, , July 27,
2021. 2021.
~~161~~187 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel, ,
February 27, 2022. February 27, 2022.
~~162~~188 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel
Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12, , June 12,
2022. 2022.
~~163~~189 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022. , October 28, 2022.
~~164~~190 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Times
of Israel, October 31, 2022. , October 31, 2022.
~~165~~191 Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Jerusalem Post, ,
January 31, 2023. January 31, 2023.
~~166 Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar~~
~~Ukrainians Arriving Since October From Working,” Ha’aretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who~~
~~entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered~~
~~Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and~~
~~Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022.~~
~~167 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply~~
~~the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022.~~
~~168 Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,”~~
Breaking Defense, October 18, 2022.
~~169 “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ Times of Israel, September 23,~~
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20

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Congressional Research Service 22 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.192 As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment, especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to Hezbollah in Lebanon.193 Despite entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has shown reluctance to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine.194 Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some protective gear to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations.195 Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an
early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine
aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.~~170~~196 In November 2022, one news outlet reported In November 2022, one news outlet reported
that Israel had begun supplying “strategic materials” to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization that Israel had begun supplying “strategic materials” to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) member for use in Ukraine.(NATO) member for use in Ukraine.~~171~~197
In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells
from War Reserves Stock Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.from War Reserves Stock Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.~~172~~198 According to multiple According to multiple
reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation with the reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation with the
United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and they don’t United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and they don’t
really need our permission to take it.”really need our permission to take it.”~~173~~199
In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for the possible sale of anti-drone In early 2023, Israel reportedly approved export licenses for the possible sale of anti-drone
jamming systems that could help Ukraine down drones. Israeli officials have claimed that this jamming systems that could help Ukraine down drones. Israeli officials have claimed that this
step does not change Israel’s policy against providing lethal assistance because the systems are step does not change Israel’s policy against providing lethal assistance because the systems are
defensive in nature and do not target Russian soldiers. While Ukrainian officials appear interested defensive in nature and do not target Russian soldiers. While Ukrainian officials appear interested
in the systems, they view them as less critical than air defense systems that can counter ballistic in the systems, they view them as less critical than air defense systems that can counter ballistic
missiles.missiles.~~174~~200
In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian
branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate
emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel. emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel.
Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about
emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on
~~Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.175~~

192 Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar Ukrainians Arriving Since October From Working,” Ha’aretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022. 193 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022. 194 Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,” Breaking Defense, October 18, 2022. 195 “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ Times of Israel, September 23, 2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” 2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022. , May 18, 2022.
~~170~~196 “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” Reuters, October 19, 2022; “Israel giving “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” Reuters, October 19, 2022; “Israel giving
intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022. , October 24, 2022.
~~171~~197 Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Ha’aretz, November 17, , November 17,
2022. 2022.
~~172~~198 Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms
Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023. , January 17, 2023.
~~173~~199 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023. , January 18, 2023.
~~174~~200 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel approves export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine,” Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Israel approves export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine,” Axios, March 15, 2023. , March 15, 2023.
~~175 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,”~~ ~~New~~
~~York Times, July 22, 2022.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

21 Congressional Research Service 23 Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.201 As of early 2023, the agency has reportedly frozen most activities related to promoting Jewish emigration to Israel from former Soviet Union countries (except Ukraine).202 201 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” New York Times, July 22, 2022. 202 Zvika Klein, “Jewish Agency lowers profile in Russia, less activity in FSU countries – exclusive,” Jerusalem Post, February 21, 2023. Congressional Research Service 24

Israel: Major Issues and U.S. Relations

Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015); Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA, DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are projections for 2023 unless otherwise ; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are projections for 2023 unless otherwise
specified. specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map. the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
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Appendix B. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats) (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies. territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022. Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022.
Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to
1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received 1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received
his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has
been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with
the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional
influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a
security-minded nationalist. security-minded nationalist.
National Unity (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats) (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats)
Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New
Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led
Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary
and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.
Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from
2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.
Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats) (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of
West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious
law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam. law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister within the Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister within the
defense ministry with some nominal responsibilities over West Bank administration. defense ministry with some nominal responsibilities over West Bank administration.
He has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A He has headed the underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A
trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and trained lawyer, he has engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and
religiously conservative causes. religiously conservative causes.
Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats) (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a
common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam. common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam.
Leader: Itamar Ben Gvir
Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to
Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir
Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir
was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says
that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a
lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a
regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats) (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union. speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign
minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and
canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the
Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked
under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to
consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a
platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in
a 2013 case. a 2013 case.
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Noam (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat) (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues
(including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the conversion (including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the conversion
process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish Power. process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish Power.
Leader: Avi Maoz
Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has
headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. In the current government, he headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. In the current government, he
nominally headed an office in the prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity, nominally headed an office in the prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity,
but resigned from that post in February 2023 based on concerns that he was not but resigned from that post in February 2023 based on concerns that he was not
given the authority to change policy as he desired. given the authority to change policy as he desired.
LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats) (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza. in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the
Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition. Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that
supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and
university lecturer. university lecturer.
CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats) (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance. socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013, Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013,
when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-
place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government
from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh
Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for
Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and
then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition. then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats) (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem. Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery, Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister. fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in
January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November
2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could not 2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could not
serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had serve as interior and health minister in the current government because he had
indicated in the 2022 plea deal that he would permanently leave politics. indicated in the 2022 plea deal that he would permanently leave politics.
United Torah Judaism – Coalition (7 seats) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its
interpretation of traditional Jewish law. interpretation of traditional Jewish law.
Leader: Yitzhak Goldknopf
Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been
prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day
care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance. care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance.
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ARAB
Hadash-Ta’al – Opposition (5 seats) – Opposition (5 seats)
Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadashpolitical strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal). Movement for Renewal).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with
the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before
becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006. becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats) (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel. support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the
UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the
government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for
Arab Israelis.Arab Israelis.

Sources: Various open sources. Various open sources.
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Appendix C. Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement
Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon and the Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon and the
United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-
Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to
eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line
extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon
agreement (seagreement (see Figure C-1). According to a senior Biden Administration official . According to a senior Biden Administration official
This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a
boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without
conflict.conflict.~~176~~203
On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal. On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal.~~177~~204 Reportedly, Reportedly,
President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the
agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural
gas drilling.gas drilling.~~178~~205

~~176~~203 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime
Agreement,” October 11, 2022. Agreement,” October 11, 2022.
~~177~~204 Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Times of Israel, October , October
29, 2022. 29, 2022.
~~178~~205 Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Haaretz, ,
October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” Jerusalem Post, ,
October 11, 2022. October 11, 2022.
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Figure C-1. Map: Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Agreement

Source: Haaretz. Haaretz.
Note: All boundaries are approximate. All boundaries are approximate.
Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future
side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will
settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field
that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can
begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.~~179~~206
The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly
before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had
threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute. threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute.

~~179~~206 Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Times of Israel, ,
October 12, 2022. October 12, 2022.
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Author Information

Jim Zanotti Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

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