Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief
February 9, 2023
Israel has forged close bilateral cooperation with the United States in many areas. A 10-year
bilateral military aid memorandum of understanding commits the United States to provide Israel
Jim Zanotti
$3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and to spend $500 million annually on joint missile
Specialist in Middle
defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional appropriations. Some
Eastern Affairs
Members of Congress have increased their scrutiny over Israel’s use of U.S. security assistance,

contributing to debate on the subject. This report also discusses the following matters:

Netanyahu’s December 2022 return to power and new coalition partners. In December 2022,
Likud party leader Benjamin Netanyahu became prime minister of a new government, replacing a 2021-2022 coalition that
had formed in opposition to Netanyahu. He previously served as prime minister from 1996 to 1999 and 2009 to 2021. The
November 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process began in December 2018 addressing corruption
allegations against Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the
new Israeli government has triggered debate about the consequences for Israel’s democracy, its ability to manage tensions
with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its relations with the United States and other countries. The government has
proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s judicial system, triggering a highly charged national debate over checks and balances
in Israel with potential international implications. Netanyahu has reportedly said that any final legislation will reflect wide
agreement and be softened from the version introduced.
Israeli-Palestinian issues. In hopes of preserving the viability of a negotiated two-state solution among Israelis and
Palestinians, Biden Administration officials have sought to help manage tensions, bolster Israel’s defensive capabilities, and
strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump Administration. Administration officials have regularly spoken
out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians that could risk sparking violence and undermining the vision of two states—
including settlement expansion, legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions to the historic status quo of
the holy sites, and incitement and acquiescence to violence. Since 2022, Israeli-Palestinian violence has triggered heightened
counterterrorism measures and controversy, with another spike in January 2023 leading the Palestinian Authority to announce
the suspension of security coordination with Israel; U.S. officials seek to facilitate coordination. As the Gaza Strip remains
under the control of the Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the United States and
other international actors face significant challenges in seeking to help with reconstruction without bolstering the group.
The Abraham Accords and Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority states. The Biden Administration has followed
agreements reached during the Trump Administration that normalized or improved relations between Israel and four Arab or
Muslim-majority states—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. Biden Administration officials
have said that any further U.S. efforts to assist Israeli normalization with Muslim-majority countries would seek to preserve
the viability of a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian leaders have denounced
normalization as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab states’ previous insistence that Israel address
Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition for improved ties. Ongoing efforts to deepen security and economic ties
between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco could drive broader regional cooperation—including on air and missile
defense—that inclines other Arab and Muslim-majority countries toward future normalization with Israel. Congress has
passed legislation encouraging more normalization and greater regional security cooperation involving Israel.
Countering Iran and other regional dynamics. Israeli officials seek to counter Iranian regional influence and prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel supported President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the 2015
international agreement that constrained Iran’s nuclear activities. Amid seemingly diminished prospects for a possible U.S.
return to the agreement, Israeli leaders seek greater international pressure on Iran. Observers have speculated about Israeli
covert or military actions to influence nuclear diplomacy and Iran’s program. Israel also has reportedly conducted a number
of military operations against Iran and its allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq due to its concerns about Iran’s presence in these
areas and Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile arsenal. Via U.S. mediation, Israel and Lebanon—which do not have formal
relations—reached agreement in October 2022 on maritime boundaries to allow both countries to extract offshore natural gas.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Israel has sought to provide political
support for Ukraine and humanitarian relief for Ukrainians without alienating Russia. To date, Israel has not directly
provided lethal assistance to Ukraine—citing the need to deconflict its military operations over Syria with Russia. However,
Israel is reportedly providing or planning to provide basic intelligence and assistance with early warning systems to counter
Iran-made drones and missiles used by Russia.
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Overview: Major Issues for U.S.-Israel Relations
Israel (see Appendix A for a map and basic facts) has forged close bilateral cooperation with the
United States in many areas. For more background, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to
Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
U.S.-Israel security cooperation—a critical part of the bilateral relationship—is multifaceted. U.S.
law requires the executive branch to take certain actions to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military
edge,” or QME, and expedites aid and arms sales to Israel in various ways. A 10-year bilateral
military aid memorandum of understanding (MOU)—signed in 2016—commits the United States
to provide Israel $3.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and to spend $500 million
annually on joint missile defense programs from FY2019 to FY2028, subject to congressional
appropriations. The MOU anticipates possible supplemental aid in emergency situations such as
conflict. In March 2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in supplemental funding through
FY2024 for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system as a response to the system’s heavy use during a
May 2021 conflict between Israel and Gaza Strip-based groups such as Hamas and Palestine
Islamic Jihad (both of which are U.S.-designated terrorist organizations). Some lawmakers seek
oversight measures and legislation to distinguish certain Israeli actions in the West Bank and
Gaza from general U.S. support for Israeli security.1
Additional issues to be discussed below with significant implications for U.S.-Israel relations
include the following:
 The December 2022 return of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister at
the head of a coalition government. Ministers from ultra-nationalist parties could
affect Israeli policies on Palestinian and some domestic matters in ways that
complicate U.S.-Israel relations.
 Israeli-Palestinian violence and other problems, and their implications for U.S.
policy.
 Israel’s relations with various Arab states since the Abraham Accords.
 Concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence, including with
Lebanon-based Hezbollah and in Syria.
 Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Netanyahu’s Return to Power and New Coalition
Partners
On December 29, 2022, Israel’s Knesset voted to reinstall Likud party leader Benjamin
Netanyahu for a third stint as prime minister (his previous terms were 1996-1999 and 2009-
2021). He heads a coalition government that includes ultra-nationalist and ultra-Orthodox parties
(see Figure 1 and Appendix B).

1 For example, the Two-State Solution Act (H.R. 5344 from the 117th Congress) would have expressly prohibited U.S.
assistance (including defense articles or services) to further, aid, or support unilateral efforts to annex or exercise
permanent control over any part of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) or Gaza.
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Figure 1. November 2022 Knesset Election Results

Source: Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, with graphic adapted by CRS. The Religious
Zionism slate consists of three separate parties: Religious Zionism (7 seats), Jewish Power (6), and Noam (1).
The 2022 election was the fifth held in Israel since a legal process regarding corruption
allegations against Netanyahu began in December 2018; his criminal trial is ongoing and could
last for months or years.2 Two of the previous four elections did not result in the formation of a
government, and the other two resulted in short-lived coalition governments—a 2020-2021
government with Netanyahu as prime minister, and a 2021-2022 government without him.
Coalition partners who support legal measures to help Netanyahu avoid criminal punishment may
have leverage to pursue their policy preferences.3
In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice (HCJ, also known as the Supreme Court) required
Netanyahu to dismiss Aryeh Deri—leader of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party—as interior and
health minister because of a January 2022 tax fraud conviction. Perhaps partly to maintain Shas
support for the coalition, Netanyahu pledged to find any legal way whereby Deri might “continue
to contribute to the State of Israel.”4
Key Government Figures and Decisionmaking
Netanyahu’s inclusion of ultra-nationalists Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir within the new
Israeli government (see Table 1) has triggered debate about the implications for Israel’s
democracy, its ability to manage tensions with its Arab citizens and with Palestinians, and its
relations with the United States and other countries.5 Coalition agreements state that the Jewish
people have an “exclusive right” to the land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River,6
appearing to conflict with Palestinian statehood aspirations. Smotrich has devoted his career to
expanding Jewish control in the West Bank and advocating for the application of Jewish religious
law in Israeli society.7 Ben Gvir expresses many similar views and has been a fixture at

2 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Where the Benjamin Netanyahu trials stand – and where they are going – analysis,” Jerusalem
Post, August 16, 2022.
3 Ron Kampeas, “Why Netanyahu’s new government could alienate Israel’s conservative American allies,” Jewish
Telegraphic Agency, December 30, 2022.
4 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu fires Deri ‘with a heavy heart’ after High Court nixes convicted minister,” Times of
Israel, January 22, 2023.
5 Josef Federman, “As Israel’s Netanyahu returns to office, troubles lie ahead,” Associated Press, December 29, 2022.
6 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022.
7 “Bezalel Smotrich: The controversial and feared Netanyahu ally,” Ynetnews/i24News, December 30, 2022.
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contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.8 An Israeli court convicted him in 2007
for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism.9
Upon the government’s formation, President Joe Biden stated that his Administration would work
with the government to jointly address many issues in the region and “will continue to support the
two state solution and oppose policies that endanger its viability or contradict our mutual interests
and values.”10 Earlier, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the Administration will “gauge
the government by the policies it pursues rather than individual personalities.”11
Table 1. Israeli Government: Key Positions
Position
Name
Party
Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu
Likud
Defense Minister
Yoav Galant
Likud
Foreign Minister
Eli Cohen
Likud
Finance Minister and Minister within Defense Ministry
Bezalel Smotrich
Religious Zionism
Justice Minister
Yariv Levin
Likud
National Security Minister
Itamar Ben Gvir
Jewish Power
Transportation Minister
Miri Regev
Likud
Strategic Affairs Minister
Ron Dermer
No formal affiliation
Energy Minister
Israel Katz
Likud
Agriculture and Rural Development Minister
Avi Dichter
Likud
Smotrich and Ben Gvir are each in the process of assuming some security responsibilities. Under
the coalition agreements, Smotrich has a defense ministry position with formal responsibility over
civil affairs units administering West Bank and Gaza Strip issues, including the planning
commission that oversees West Bank settlement construction and home demolitions.12 Ben Gvir
heads a national security ministry with general authority over Israel’s police—including
personnel that patrol Jerusalem and its disputed holy sites.13 He also expects to oversee the border
police, including units that have operated in the West Bank under Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
authority.14 Ben Gvir supports easing open-fire conditions for security forces and increasing their
legal immunity.15

8 Gregoire Sauvage, “Itamar Ben Gvir, the ultra-nationalist accused of stirring up violence in Jerusalem,” May 15,
2021.
9 Etgar Lefkovits, “Ben-Gvir convicted of inciting to racism,” Jerusalem Post, June 25, 2007.
10 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on the New Government of the State of Israel,” December 29,
2022.
11 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken at the J Street National Conference,” December 4, 2022.
12 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Smotrich given authority over key West Bank appointments in deal with Likud,” Times of
Israel, December 5, 2022.
13 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law,’ cementing minister’s expanded powers over police,” Times of
Israel, December 28, 2022. For background on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
14 “Likud agrees to split entire Border Police from police force, hand Ben Gvir control,” Times of Israel, December 29,
2022.
15 Keller-Lynn, “Knesset passes ‘Ben Gvir law.’”
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Defense Minister Yoav Galant apparently seeks to prevent changes to the defense ministry and
border police from disrupting the chain of command.16 Based on media accounts of deliberations
between Netanyahu, Galant, and then IDF chief of staff Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi,
Kochavi reportedly said that the IDF would not be answerable to Smotrich or Ben Gvir.17
Netanyahu and Galant reportedly assured Kochavi that decisions on whether to practically
implement any changes in command structure would occur only after the military could apprise
the government of the potential consequences.18 Media reports suggest that Netanyahu supports
the specified transfers of authority to Smotrich despite continued opposition from Galant and
senior IDF commanders.19 However, a former legal adviser to the defense ministry has said that
any changes bypassing the defense minister would not be legally valid unless the government
amends two of Israel’s basic laws. The adviser also has warned, “If civilian issues [in the West
Bank] are not managed by the defense minister, there is serious potential for security harm, and
that needs to be stopped.”20
Netanyahu has asserted that he will personally retain ultimate responsibility for policy.21 One
Israeli journalist has argued that Netanyahu’s efforts to act as a buffer between his coalition
partners and Western countries concerned about their influence will eventually lead to him losing
the support of one or the other.22 Two former U.S. officials have written that if a new Israeli
government with Smotrich and Ben Gvir features open hostility to Arabs and illiberal measures to
change Israel’s democracy, opponents of strong U.S.-Israel relations will exploit the situation “to
try to undo aspects of the relationship, and certainly to challenge Israeli military requests.”23
The coalition agreements are not legally binding.24 The degree of their implementation could have
significant consequences for issues like West Bank annexation or legalization of outposts, the
rights of minorities (including Arabs, women, and LGBTQ people), and diaspora immigration to
Israel.25 The part of the coalition agreement referring to the possible annexation of West Bank
areas explicitly defers to Netanyahu’s preferred timing and consideration of Israeli interests.26

16 Herb Keinon, “Israel’s new defense minister faces new challenges from within – analysis,” Jerusalem Post, January
2, 2023.
17 “Kohavi said to tell Netanyahu IDF won’t answer in any way to Smotrich and Ben Gvir,” Times of Israel, January 5,
2023.
18 Ibid.
19 “Netanyahu said to back Smotrich over Gallant in dispute over West Bank authority,” Times of Israel, January 25,
2023.
20 Emanuel Fabian, “Former defense legal adviser warns against planned government moves in West Bank,” Times of
Israel, January 23, 2023.
21 Steve Inskeep and Daniel Estrin, “‘They are joining me. I’m not joining them’: Netanyahu defends far-right allies,”
NPR, December 15, 2022.
22 Ben Caspit, “Crisis imminent as Netanyahu’s far-right partners set to govern West Bank,” Al-Monitor, December 9,
2022.
23 Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, “A narrow government with Ben Gvir and Smotrich threatens US-Israel ties,”
Times of Israel, November 2, 2022.
24 Barak Ravid, “Israel swears in most right-wing government in its history,” Axios, December 29, 2022.
25 Tovah Lazaroff, “Netanyahu coalition pledges to advance West Bank annexation policies,” Jerusalem Post,
December 22, 2022; Rina Bassist, “With discrimination protections at risk, protests planned across Israel,” Al-Monitor,
December 28, 2022; Zvika Klein, “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Jerusalem
Post, December 22, 2022.
26 “Netanyahu agrees to amend Law of Return in coalition deal with UTJ,” Associated Press, December 28, 2022.
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Proposed Judicial System Changes
Justice Minister Yariv Levin has proposed legislation to overhaul Israel’s judicial system in the
following ways:27
 Require larger HCJ majorities to invalidate laws or government decisions.
 Allow the Knesset to override HCJ decisions, unless the full 15-judge panel
decides unanimously.
 Give the government greater control of the panel that selects judges.
 Prevent the HCJ from applying a “reasonableness” test to legislation and
government action.
 Allow cabinet ministers to appoint legal advisers from outside the Justice
Ministry’s aegis.
Reducing the judiciary’s power to curb Knesset majority-backed government action could allow
this coalition to enact laws that have encountered or would likely encounter HCJ resistance. Such
laws could include legalizing Jewish West Bank outposts on private Palestinian land, exempting
ultra-Orthodox Jews from military conscription, or changing minority rights and the religious-
secular balance in Israel.28 It is unclear whether Prime Minister Netanyahu can participate in the
legislative process for the judicial reform proposal because of an existing conflict of interest
agreement barring him from matters that could affect his criminal case.29
The proposal has triggered a highly charged national debate over checks and balances in Israel.
Since its announcement, tens of thousands of Israelis have joined protests in conjunction with
opposition politicians,30 and many former HCJ justices and attorneys general signed a letter
strongly criticizing the proposal and calling on the government to withdraw it to prevent “serious
damage” to the rule of law.31 Additionally, a number of leading figures in Israel’s financial and
economic sector—including the head of Israel’s central bank and several executives in the
country’s high-tech industry—have reportedly indicated some concern about the proposed
judicial reforms’ potential impact on Israel’s economy and its global appeal.32 Netanyahu has
defended the need for reform—including by arguing that the HCJ exercises broad powers of
judicial review despite Israel’s lack of a written constitution as a clear reference point—while
calling for substantive dialogue during the legislative process to ensure that the changes can be
made responsibly.33 More than 170 North American law professors with varying views on
whether the HCJ should face more checks have signed a statement expressing worry that the

27 Jeremy Sharon, “Justice minister unveils plan to shackle the High Court, overhaul Israel’s judiciary,” Times of Israel,
January 4, 2023.
28 Dov Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions,” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 2023; “Israel unveils
controversial plans to overhaul judicial system,” Associated Press, January 4, 2023.
29 “Israel’s attorney-general tells Netanyahu to stay out of push for judicial changes,” Reuters, February 2, 2023; Chen
Maanit, “Netanyahu Says No Conflict of Interest in His Judicial Reforms,” Ha’aretz, January 26, 2023.
30 Lieber, “Israel’s Court Plan Deepens Divisions.”
31 Tamar Uriel-Beeri, “Former Israel A-Gs on reforms: ‘They threaten to destroy judicial system,’” Jerusalem Post,
January 12, 2023.
32 Neri Zilber, “Will Less Democracy Kill Israel’s Tech Sector?” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2023.
33 “PM defends judicial overhaul: Amendments will be made responsibly, everyone calm down,” Times of Israel,
January 13, 2022; Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence, CNN, January 31, 2023.
For some additional arguments supporting judicial reform in Israel, see Richard A. Epstein and Max Raskin, “Israel’s
Proposed Judicial Reforms Aren’t ‘Extreme,’” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023; and Peter Berkowitz, “Israel’s
Constitutional Counterrevolution,” Real Clear Politics, February 5, 2023.
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speed and scale of the proposed reforms would “seriously weaken the independence of the
judiciary, the separation of powers and the rule of law.”34 HCJ President Esther Hayut has said
that the HCJ intends to examine any legislation enacted, raising the possibility of a constitutional
crisis if the HCJ rules that the legislation is invalid.35
Some observers warn about international implications of efforts to weaken Israel’s judiciary. For
example, two Members of Congress have expressed concerns that such moves might strain U.S.-
Israel relations.36 Additionally, a former legal adviser for Israel’s defense ministry has said that
international or foreign courts have to date largely trusted Israel’s justice system to deal with
politicians or soldiers accused of illegal actions. He then speculated, “But if we get rid of that
[current levels of domestic legal accountability] and give carte blanche to [soldiers to] do what
they want and give them immunity from prosecution, it would open up all sorts of measures.”37
During Secretary of State Blinken’s January 2023 visit to Israel, he said (in remarks alongside
Netanyahu) that both America and Israel support “core democratic principles and institutions,
including respect for human rights, the equal administration of justice for all, the equal rights of
minority groups, the rule of law, free press, a robust civil society.” He further said that “building
consensus for new proposals is the most effective way to ensure they’re embraced and that they
endure.”38 A few days before Blinken’s visit, Netanyahu reportedly told visiting National Security
Advisor Jake Sullivan that any final legislation will reflect wide agreement and be softened from
the version Justice Minister Levin introduced.39
Israeli-Palestinian Issues40
Overview
Biden Administration officials have said that they seek to preserve the viability of a negotiated
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while playing down near-term prospects for
direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.41 In doing so, they seek to help manage tensions, bolster
Israel’s defensive capabilities, and strengthen U.S.-Palestinian ties that frayed during the Trump
Administration.42 These officials regularly speak out against steps taken by Israelis or Palestinians
that could fuel violence and risk undermining the vision of two states.43 In January 2023 remarks

34 Text of statement available at https://uslawprofstatementisrael.com/.
35 David Horovitz, “Constitutional crisis looms, as Supreme Court president shows she won’t go quietly,” Times of
Israel, January 12, 2023.
36 Representative Jerrold Nadler, “As the Most Senior Jewish Member of Congress, I Now Fear Deeply for the U.S.-
Israel Relationship,” Ha’aretz, January 25, 2023; Representative Brad Sherman, interviewed in Ben Samuels, “Top
pro-Israel Democrat Warns Netanyahu Government ‘Mistakes’ Could Erode U.S. Support,” Ha’aretz, January 23,
2023.
37 Fabian, “Former defense legal adviser warns against planned government moves in West Bank.”
38 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu After Their
Meeting,” January 30, 2023.
39 “Netanyahu said to tell US nat’l security adviser judicial reform plan to be softened,” Times of Israel, January 22,
2023.
40 See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
41 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press
Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank,” July 15, 2022.
42 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
43 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council
Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” September 28, 2022.
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made alongside Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas during a visit to the West
Bank, Secretary Blinken said:
Meanwhile, we oppose any action by either side that makes that goal [a two-state solution]
more difficult to achieve, more distant. And we’ve been clear that this includes things like
settlement expansion, the legalization of outposts, demolitions and evictions, disruptions
to the historic status quo of the holy sites, and of course incitement and acquiescence to
violence. We look to both sides to unequivocally condemn any acts of violence regardless
of the victim or the perpetrator.44
U.S. Policy on Jerusalem
The Trump Administration made U.S. policy changes affecting bilateral relations when it recognized Jerusalem as
Israel’s capital in 2017 and moved the location of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018.
These actions could affect future outcomes regarding Jerusalem’s status—given Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem
as their future national capital—though the Trump Administration did not take a position on the boundaries of
Israeli sovereignty in the city. The Biden Administration has said that the embassy wil remain in Jerusalem.45
Israel’s previous government took some steps to improve Palestinians’ economic and living
circumstances, including through loans and work permits.46 However, some critics charged that
the measures mirrored past Israeli efforts to manage the conflict’s effects unilaterally rather than
address its causes through negotiation with Palestinians.47 During President Biden’s July 2022
visit to Israel and the West Bank, the White House released a statement saying that Israel had
committed to expanding the number of Palestinian work permits, 24-hour accessibility to the
Allenby border crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, and efforts to upgrade the West Bank
and Gaza to 4G communications infrastructure.48
Israeli-Palestinian tensions have heightened in 2023. In response to a Palestinian-backed U.N.
General Assembly resolution in December 2022 requesting an International Court of Justice
advisory opinion on Israeli actions in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, the
Netanyahu government has taken a number of retaliatory actions. These include withholding tax
revenue due the PA (partly authorized by existing Israeli law) and rerouting some of it to Israeli
families victimized by terrorism, freezing construction plans for Palestinians in parts of the West
Bank, and rescinding expedited travel privileges at checkpoints for PA officials.49 Some countries
(including France, Germany, and Japan) signed a statement expressing deep concern regarding
these Israeli steps, calling them “punitive measures against the Palestinian people, leadership, and
civil society.”50

44 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting,” January 31, 2023.
45 Niels Lesniewski, “White House confirms Biden will keep embassy in Jerusalem,” Roll Call, February 9, 2021.
46 Thomas Grove and Fatima AbdulKarim, “Israel Offers Economic Help to Palestinians in Bid to Stem Influence of
Hamas,” Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2022; Aaron Boxerman, “Israel set to raise work permit quotas for Gazans to
20,000,” Times of Israel, March 26, 2022.
47 Neri Zilber, “Israel’s new plan is to ‘shrink,’ not solve, the Palestinian conflict,” CNN, September 16, 2021.
48 White House, “FACT SHEET: The United States-Palestinian Relationship,” July 14, 2022. The Allenby crossing is
scheduled to operate on a nearly continuous basis starting in April 2023. Jacob Magid, “After US pressure, Allenby
crossing to Jordan set to open at all hours on weekdays,” Times of Israel, November 24, 2022.
49 “Israel to withhold PA tax revenue, impose other sanctions after Abbas’s UN success,” Times of Israel, January 6,
2023; Tovah Lazaroff, “Smotrich doubles penalties for pay-for-slay, withholds NIS 100m,” Jerusalem Post, February
2, 2023.
50 Luke Tress, “Over 90 countries urge Israel to lift sanctions put on Palestinians after UN vote,” Times of Israel,
January 17, 2023.
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In early January 2023, National Security Minister Ben Gvir visited Jerusalem’s Temple
Mount/Haram al Sharif (“Mount/Haram”) a few days after taking office, triggering statements of
condemnation or concern from Palestinians and several governments both within the region and
globally.51 Netanyahu has pledged to maintain the historic “status quo” that allows only Muslims
to worship at the holy site, and has downplayed Ben Gvir’s visit by referring to previous
ministerial visits to the site.52 Expressing deep concern about the potentially provocative nature of
Ben Gvir’s visit, the State Department spokesperson called on Netanyahu to keep his
commitment on the status quo.53 During Netanyahu’s late January visit to King Abdullah II of
Jordan, which has a custodial role over the Mount/Haram, the king reportedly told Netanyahu that
Israel should respect the “historic and legal status quo in the Holy Aqsa mosque and not violate
it.”54
Gaza and Its Challenges
The Gaza Strip—control ed by Hamas but significantly affected by general Israeli and Egyptian access and
import/export restrictions—faces difficult and complicated political, economic, and humanitarian conditions.55
Palestinian militants in Gaza clash at times with Israel’s military as it patrols Gaza’s frontiers with Israel, with
militant actions and Israeli responses sometimes endangering civilians in both places. These incidents occasionally
escalate toward larger conflict, as in May 2021. Hamas and Israel reportedly work through Egypt and Qatar to
help manage the flow of necessary resources into Gaza and prevent or manage conflict escalation. Since 2018,
Egypt and Hamas (perhaps with implied Israeli approval) have permitted some commercial trade via the informal
Salah al Din crossing that bypasses the formal PA controls and taxes at other Gaza crossings.56
With Gaza under Hamas control, the obstacles to internationally supported recovery from the May 2021 conflict
remain largely the same as after previous Israel-Gaza conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014.57 Because of the PA’s
inability to control security in Gaza, it has been unwil ing to manage donor pledges toward reconstruction, leading
to concerns about Hamas diverting international assistance for its own purposes.58 Before the 2021 conflict, Qatar
had provided cash assistance for Gaza, but due to Israeli concerns about the potential for its diversion, Qatar
began an arrangement in September 2021 to provide money transfers to needy families through the United
Nations.59 In November 2021, Qatar and Egypt agreed on a new mechanism—with Israel’s tacit approval—to
restart assistance toward Gaza civil servants’ salaries that had been on hold since the May 2021 outbreak of
conflict.60

51 Barak Ravid, “Israeli ultranationalist minister visits sensitive Jerusalem holy site, raising tensions,” Axios, January 3,
2023; U.N. Security Council, “Leaders on All Sides of Palestinian Question Must Help Alleviate Tensions, Maintain
Status Quo at Jerusalem’s Holy Sites, Senior Peace Official Tells Security Council,” January 5, 2023.
52 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence. For background, see CRS Report
RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
53 State Department Press Briefing, January 3, 2023.
54 “King Abdullah meets Israeli PM Netanyahu in surprise Jordan visit, royal court says,” Reuters, January 24, 2023.
For background, see CRS Report RL33546, Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
55 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
56 Ahmad Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas provides boost for Gaza economy,” Al-Monitor,
November 23, 2021; Neri Zilber, “New Gaza Crossing Raises Questions About Blockade Policies,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2019.
57 David Makovsky, “Why Blinken Will Have a Tough Sell,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 25, 2021.
58 Ibid.
59 Aaron Boxerman, “UN to begin dispensing Qatari cash to needy Gazan families Monday under new deal,” Times of
Israel, September 12, 2021.
60 Yaniv Kubovich, “Egypt, Qatar Reach Breakthrough on Hamas Civil Servants Salaries,” haaretz.com, November 29,
2021; Abu Amer, “Egypt, Qatar agreement with Israel, Hamas.”
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Israel-West Bank Violence
After an upsurge in Israeli-Palestinian violence during 2022 that resulted in the deaths of 30
Israelis or foreigners in Israel and at least 170 Palestinians in the West Bank (see text box below
on the death of U.S. citizen Shireen Abu Akleh),61 violence spiked again during the last weekend
in January 2023. After an Israeli raid killed 10 Palestinians in a refugee camp in the West Bank
city of Jenin, a Palestinian gunman killed seven people the following night outside a Jerusalem
synagogue.62 Additional attacks ensued in Jerusalem and the West Bank over the next two days,
with a teenage Palestinian gunman wounding two Israelis and one report alleging 144 attacks by
Israeli settlers on Palestinian civilians or their properties in the West Bank.63
Since at least the second half of 2022, Israeli counterterrorism efforts have concentrated on
northern West Bank cities like Nablus and Jenin in connection with efforts to arrest terrorism
suspects, halt illicit weapons smuggling and production, and establish order.64 As the increase in
Israeli-Palestinian violence has attracted greater U.S. policy attention,65 Israeli and PA forces have
approached West Bank militants in different ways, leading to some tensions and the possibility of
future escalation.66 The PA reportedly seeks time and flexibility to address militancy independent
of Israeli dictates, with efforts to reach compromises that avoid major armed confrontations or
arrests. Some PA personnel reportedly have directly targeted Israeli forces or settlers, raising
questions about the PA’s ability to control individuals’ actions.67
Following the late January spike in violence, Israel’s government approved measures that
Netanyahu said were aimed at curbing terrorism, but might further fuel tensions, including steps
reducing benefits for families of accused terrorists, expediting home demolitions and West Bank
settlement building, reinforcing Israeli military and police units, and expediting gun licenses for
Israelis.68 In defending Israel’s steps as “targeted action on the terrorists and their immediate
circle,” Netanyahu said that he continues to allow 150,000 Palestinians to work in Israel, has
reduced security checkpoints, and encourages investment by Israelis and “our new peace partners
in the Gulf” in Palestinian areas of the West Bank.69

61 Patrick Kingsley, “As Violence Rages, New Israeli Alliance Risks Fueling Even More of It,” New York Times,
January 29, 2023.
62 Dov Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2023.
63 Raja Abdulrahim, “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement in West Bank as Violence Rages,” New York
Times, January 30, 2023.
64 Isabel Kershner, “Palestinian Assailant Kills Three Israelis in the West Bank,” New York Times, November 16, 2022.
65 State Department Press Briefings, October 25, 2022, and September 28, 2022; “Remarks by Ambassador Linda
Thomas-Greenfield,” September 28, 2022. See also CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
66 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Military Targets New Palestinian Militia,” New York Times, October 26, 2022; Yaniv
Kubovich and Jack Khoury, “Nablus’ ‘Lion’s Den’ Has Become a Major Headache for Israel and the Palestinian
Authority,” Haaretz, October 12, 2022.
67 Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian security forces become more involved in resistance in West Bank,” Al-Monitor,
October 12, 2022.
68 Lieber et al., “Israeli-Palestinian Violence Grows”; Abdulrahim, “Palestinian Is Shot Dead Outside Israeli Settlement
in West Bank.”
69 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
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After the raid in Jenin, the PA announced a suspension of security coordination with Israel,70 but
its practical meaning is unclear.71 Previously, the PA publicly suspended security coordination
with Israel for a few months in 2020 when Israel was contemplating annexation of West Bank
areas.72 In early February, President Abbas reportedly told Central Intelligence Agency Director
Bill Burns that Israel-PA intelligence sharing has continued, and that he would fully resume
coordination once calm is restored.73 Burns later remarked that the ongoing tensions have an
“unhappy resemblance to some of the realities” of the 2000-2005 period of Israeli-Palestinian
violence known as the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising).74 An Israeli observer has argued
that PA leadership under Abbas is unlikely to coordinate efforts against Israelis in the way
Palestinian leaders supposedly did during the intifada.75
While in the West Bank, Secretary Blinken said that “it’s important to take steps to de-escalate, to
stop the violence, to reduce tensions, and to try as well to create the foundation for more positive
actions going forward.”76 He also said that he discussed with President Abbas “the importance of
the Palestinian Authority itself continuing to improve its governance and accountability,
strengthening the institutions of the PA.”77 According to one media report, Blinken encouraged
Abbas privately to implement a security plan presented to Israel and the PA weeks earlier by the
U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), Lieutenant General
Michael Fenzel.78 The plan supposedly lays out steps for PA security forces to regain control in
Jenin and Nablus, including the training of a special PA force. Reportedly, PA officials have
reservations about the plan, partly because it may not explicitly call for Israel to reduce incursions
into West Bank cities or include other provisions calculated to attract Palestinian public support.79
Shireen Abu Akleh Killing and Controversy
In May 2022, prominent Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh (a U.S. citizen) was kil ed by a gunshot in an area
of Jenin where Israeli security forces were trading fire with Palestinians. Abu Akleh was an East Jerusalem resident
of Palestinian background. Her death triggered a major international outcry, as did images of Israeli police
disrupting her funeral in East Jerusalem. In condemning Abu Akleh’s kil ing and an injury suffered by one of her
col eagues, the State Department spokesperson called for an immediate and thorough investigation and ful
accountability, and said that Israel has “the wherewithal and the capabilities to conduct a thorough, comprehensive
investigation.”80 Evidence suggests that the shot may have come from Israeli forces,81 with the PA asserting that its

70 “In light of the massacre in Jenin, Palestinian leadership declares end to security coordination with Israel,” WAFA
News Agency, January 26, 2023.
71 Yoni Ben Menachem, “By Ending Security Coordination with Israel, the Palestinian Authority Is Shooting Itself in
the Foot,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 30, 2023.
72 “Palestinian Authority resuming cooperation with Israel, Palestinian official says,” Reuters, November 17, 2020.
73 Jacob Magid, “CIA director: Current Israeli-Palestinian tensions resemble Second Intifada,” Times of Israel,
February 7, 2023.
74 Ibid.
75 Micah Halpern, “Terror wave in Israel not an intifada, but still very dangerous – opinion,” Jerusalem Post,
November 28, 2022.
76 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas After Their
Meeting.”
77 Ibid.
78 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Blinken pressed Abbas to accept U.S. security plan for Jenin,” Axios, February 1, 2023. For
background on the USSC, whose office oversees a multilateral mission based in Jerusalem, see CRS Report RL34074,
The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
79 Ibid.
80 State Department Press Briefing, May 11, 2022.
81 Josef Federman, “Bellingcat probe suggests Israeli fire most likely killed journalist; but not 100%,” Associated
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investigation proves Israeli forces deliberately targeted Abu Akleh, but Israel denying any such intent.82 In April
2022, some advocacy groups and lawyers filed a complaint with the ICC alleging that Israel has systematically
targeted Palestinian journalists for years.83
After some Members of the House and Senate sent letters to the executive branch requesting that the State
Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conduct an independent investigation into Abu Akleh’s
death,84 the State Department issued a statement in July. The statement said that the U.S. Security Coordinator
(USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority oversaw an independent process, and in summarizing Israeli and PA
investigations concluded that Israeli gunfire likely kil ed Abu Akleh, but “found no reason to believe that this was
intentional.”85 PA officials and members of Abu Akleh’s family have publicly criticized the part of the USSC’s finding
regarding intent.86 A June 2022 public opinion pol indicated that 92% of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza
believe that Abu Akleh was deliberately targeted.87
After conducting an internal investigation, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said in September 2022 that there was a
“high possibility” that Abu Akleh was accidentally hit by IDF gunfire88—eliciting additional public criticism from PA
officials and Abu Akleh family members who assert that the shooting was not accidental.89 In response, the State
Department welcomed the IDF review,90 later adding that U.S. officials would continue to press Israel to “closely
review its policies and practices on rules of engagement and consider additional steps to mitigate the risk of
civilian harm, protect journalists, and prevent similar tragedies in the future.”91 Then-Prime Minister Yair Lapid and
then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz defended Israel’s rules of engagement and said that no outside party could
dictate them.92
In November 2022, media reports said that the FBI has opened an investigation into Abu Akleh’s death.93 In
response, then-Defense Minister Gantz said that the alleged U.S. decision was a mistake and that Israel, after
having conducted an “independent and professional investigation,” would not cooperate with an external
investigation.94
The Abraham Accords
In late 2020 and early 2021, Israel reached agreements to normalize or improve its relations with
four members of the Arab League: the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The Trump
Administration facilitated each of these agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, and (as

Press, May 16, 2022.
82 “Palestinian officials: Israel killed Al Jazeera reporter,” Associated Press, May 26, 2022.
83 International Federation of Journalists, “Palestine: ICC case filed over systematic targeting of Palestinian
journalists,” April 26, 2022.
84 Text of letters available at https://carson.house.gov/sites/carson.house.gov/files/
Carson%20Shireen%20Abu%20Abkleh%20signed.pdf and https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Final%20Abu%20Akleh%20Letter%20(PDF).pdf.
85 State Department press statement, “On the Killing of Shireen Abu Akleh,” July 4, 2022.
86 “US: Israeli fire likely killed reporter; no final conclusion,” Associated Press, July 4, 2022.
87 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 84, June 22-25, 2022.
88 Hiba Yazbek and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Says Reporter Was Probably Shot By One of Its Forces,” New York
Times, September 6, 2022.
89 Khaled Abu Toameh, “Palestinians reject IDF probe into Shireen Abu Akleh killing, vow to bring case to ICC,”
Jerusalem Post, September 5, 2022.
90 State Department, “IDF Releases Shireen Abu Akleh Report,” September 5, 2022.
91 State Department Press Briefing, September 6, 2022.
92 Emanuel Fabian and Jacob Magid, “Rebuffing US, Lapid and Gantz say ‘no one will dictate’ IDF’s open-fire
regulations,” Times of Israel, September 7, 2022.
93 Barak Ravid, “FBI opens investigation into killing of Palestinian American Shireen Abu Akleh,” Axios, November
14, 2022.
94 Laura Kelly, “Israel calls US probe into journalist’s death ‘grave mistake,’ says it ‘will not cooperate,’” The Hill,
November 14, 2022.
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mentioned above) provided U.S. security, diplomatic, or economic incentives for most of the
countries in question.95 In 2021, Israel opened embassies in the UAE and Bahrain, and both
countries reciprocated. Israel and Morocco also reopened the liaison offices that each country had
operated in the other from the mid-1990s to 2000. Saudi Arabia reportedly supported the UAE
and Bahrain in their decisions to join the Abraham Accords.96 The Sudanese military’s seizure of
power in October 2021 froze the Israel-Sudan normalization process.97 In January 2023, the
Sudanese military leadership said that Sudan would sign a normalization deal with Israel after it
transitions to a civilian government, but some Sudanese civilian groups reportedly remain unsure
about this step.98
Trade, tourism, and investment ties among the other Accords countries have deepened,
particularly between Israel and the UAE. Some notable developments include a May 2022 Israel-
UAE free-trade agreement (pending Israeli ratification) and a major Israel-UAE-Jordan initiative
focused on desalinated water and solar energy.99 As a sign of mutual high-level commitment to
the Accords, Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid and the
foreign ministers of the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt at a March 2022 summit in Israel’s
southern Negev desert to inaugurate a regional cooperation framework featuring periodic Negev
Forum meetings, as well as working groups engaging regularly on clean energy, education and
coexistence, food and water security, health, regional security, and tourism.100 Participants expect
a 2023 foreign ministerial meeting to take place in Morocco.
Despite closer government-to-government ties and broader Israel-UAE economic cooperation,
public opinion polling in Arab states indicates that long-standing popular opposition to regional
governments recognizing Israel remains strong.101 According to one poll, support in the UAE and
Bahrain for the Accords dropped from 47% and 45%, respectively, in 2020 to 25% and 20% in
2022.102 However, the same poll shows incremental increases in support since 2020 within the
UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia to permit private business and sports ties with Israelis.103
U.S. and Israeli officials seek to expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab and Muslim-
majority countries. Secretary Blinken has said that “we’re committed to continue building on the
efforts of the last administration to expand the circle of countries with normalized relations with
Israel in the years ahead.”104 However, the Biden Administration’s willingness to offer major U.S.

95 These incentives included possible U.S. arms sales to the UAE and Morocco, possible U.S. and international
economic assistance or investment financing for Morocco and Sudan, and U.S. recognition of Morocco’s claim of
sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Some reports suggest that the Trump Administration linked
Sudan’s removal from the U.S. state sponsors of terrorism list to its agreement to recognize Israel.
96 Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Jake Sullivan discussed Saudi-Israel normalization with MBS,” Axios, October 20, 2021.
97 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, “Sudan’s Imperiled Transition: U.S.
Policy in the Wake of the October 25th Coup,” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing, February 1, 2022.
98 “Israel, Sudan announce deal to normalise relations,” Reuters, February 3, 2023.
99 “Israel-UAE economic relations grow further with free trade agreement,” Al-Monitor, May 31, 2022; “Israel, Jordan
sign huge UAE-brokered deal to swap solar energy and water,” Times of Israel, November 22, 2021.
100 State Department, “The Negev Forum Working Groups and Regional Cooperation Framework,” January 10, 2023;
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Meeting of the Negev Forum steering committee and working groups opens in
Abu Dhabi,” January 9, 2023.
101 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2022 Arab Opinion Index, January 3, 2023.
102 Dion Nissenbaum, “Israeli Official Visits Bahrain to Lift Ties,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2022; Dylan
Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, July 15, 2022.
103 Kassin and Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords.”
104 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Alternate Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair
Lapid and United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan at a Joint Press
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policy inducements to countries in connection with normalization efforts remains unclear.105 The
Biden Administration also has sought to avoid portraying Israeli normalization with Arab and
Muslim-majority states as a substitute for efforts toward a negotiated two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.106 Palestinian leaders denounced the initial announcement of UAE
normalization with Israel as an abandonment of the Palestinian national cause, given Arab League
states’ previous insistence that Israel address Palestinian negotiating demands as a precondition
for improved ties.107 In January 2023, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al
Saud expressed general support for normalization with Israel but stated that “true normalization
and true stability will only come through giving the Palestinians hope, through giving the
Palestinians dignity. That requires giving the Palestinians a state, and that’s the priority.”108
Security cooperation. In January 2021, President Trump determined that U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM), which commands U.S. military forces in most countries in the Middle East, would
add Israel to its area of responsibility, partly to encourage military interoperability as a means of
reinforcing closer ties between Israel and many Arab states.109 Israel had previously been under
the purview of U.S. European Command. CENTCOM formalized Israel’s move in September
2021,110 and in October an Israeli Defense Forces liaison was stationed at CENTCOM
headquarters.111 Since then, Israel has joined military exercises with the United States and the
other Abraham Accords states, as well as other CENTCOM partners such as Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.112
Following a string of missile and drone attacks against the UAE in early 2022, apparently by
Iran-allied forces in Yemen (known as the Houthis), the UAE government has reportedly
expressed interest in closer security cooperation with Israel.113 Earlier, both Morocco (November
2021) and Bahrain (February 2022) signed MOUs with Israel on security cooperation.114 These
MOUs appear to anticipate more intelligence sharing, joint exercises and training, and arms sales.
Reports indicate that Israel has agreed to sell air defense systems to all three countries and may be

Availability,” October 13, 2021.
105 Michael Koplow et al., “Biden has an opportunity to put his own stamp on Arab-Israeli relations,” The Hill, October
14, 2021.
106 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Joint Press Statements at the Conclusion of the Negev Summit,”
March 28, 2022.
107 Walid Mahmoud and Muhammad Shehada, “Palestinians unanimously reject UAE-Israel deal,” Al Jazeera, August
14, 2020.
108 Marita Kassis, “Saudi FM says no normalizing ties with Israel before Palestinian issue resolved,” Al-Monitor,
January 20, 2023.
109 Jared Szuba, “Trump orders US Central Command to include Israel amid strategic shift,” Al-Monitor, January 15,
2021.
110 U.S. Central Command, “U.S. Central Command Statement on the Realignment of the State of Israel,” September 1,
2021.
111 Judah Ari Gross, “IDF liaison sets up shop in US CENTCOM offices in Florida, solidifying move,” The Times of
Israel, October 29, 2021.
112 “UAE, Bahrain, Israel and U.S. forces in first joint naval drill,” Reuters, November 11, 2021. Participant list for
2022 International Maritime Exercise available at https://www.dvidshub.net/graphic/18822/imx-ce-22-participant-list.
113 Arie Egozi, “Amid attacks, UAE quietly asks Israel about defense systems: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 25,
2022.
114 Ben Caspit, “Gantz says Israel, Morocco ‘leap together’ in historic agreement,” Al-Monitor, November 26, 2021;
Rina Bassist, “Israel signs security cooperation agreement with Bahrain,” Al-Monitor, February 3, 2022. During the
same visit in which Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz signed the MOU with Bahrain, he and Bahrain’s defense
minister made a public visit to the U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet base there to emphasize the level of collaboration among all
parties involved.
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contemplating more defense and defense technology sales.115 In late 2022, Israel’s defense
ministry estimated that its deals with the three countries were worth $3 billion.116
At the March 2022 Negev summit, Israeli leaders and their Arab counterparts reportedly
discussed a range of possible cooperative measures, such as real-time intelligence sharing on
inbound drone and missile threats and acquisition of Israeli air defense systems.117 Speculation
about specific measures has continued since then.118 In January 2023, the Department of
Homeland Security publicized its efforts to help expand U.S.-Israel-UAE cooperation on
cybersecurity to Bahrain and Morocco.119
Reports suggest that while some air defense coordination may be taking place between Israel,
certain Arab states, and the United States, “Arab participants are reluctant to confirm their
involvement, let alone advertise their participation in a fully fledged military alliance.”120 One
obstacle could be the apparent reluctance of countries in the region to share the real-time
intelligence data that underlies basic threat information that they might be more willing to
share.121 Unless and until a regional framework is formalized, CENTCOM apparently plans to
help coordinate air defense and response with various U.S. regional partners using the X-band
radar stationed in Israel, ship-borne Aegis combat systems, and existing air defense systems and
fighter jets.122
Selected congressional actions. In January 2022, some Members of the Senate and House
formed bipartisan caucuses to promote the Abraham Accords.123 In March, Congress enacted the
Israel Relations Normalization Act of 2022 (IRNA, Division Z of P.L. 117-103). Among other
things, the IRNA required the Secretary of State to submit an annual strategy for strengthening
and expanding normalization agreements with Israel, and an annual report on the status of
measures within Arab League states that legally or practically restrict or discourage normalization
efforts with Israel or domestic support for such efforts.
The FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-263) enacted in December 2022
included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Secretary of
State) to submit to foreign affairs and intelligence committees:

115 Arie Egozi, “First Israeli Barak air defense system deploys to UAE, bigger deals expected: Sources,” Breaking
Defense, October 19, 2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry,” Wall Street Journal,
October 10, 2022.
116 Nissenbaum, “Accords Benefit Israel’s Defense Industry.”
117 “Israel reportedly working on air defense pact with regional allies,” Times of Israel, March 29, 2022.
118 Arie Egozi, “Gulf States Willing to Host Israeli Sensors for Air-Defense Network: Sources,” Breaking Defense,
June 29, 2022; “Israel to ask Biden for okay to provide air defense laser to Saudi Arabia – report,” Times of Israel, June
28, 2022; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, “Israel Grows Military Role with Alliance Against Iran,” New York
Times, June 21, 2022.
119 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Expands Abraham Accords to Cybersecurity,” February 2, 2023; Tim
Starks and Ellen Nakashima, “The Abraham Accords expand with cybersecurity collaboration,” Washington Post,
January 31, 2023.
120 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “Israel Destroys Iranian Drones as Arabs Assist,” New York Times, July 14,
2022. See also Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “U.S. Presses for Stronger Israeli-Arab Security Ties,” Wall Street
Journal, July 13, 2022.
121 Lara Seligman and Alexander Ward, “Biden wants a Middle East air defense ‘alliance.’ But it’s a long way off,”
Politico, July 12, 2022.
122 Anshel Pfeffer, “How Israel and Saudi Arabia Plan to Down Iranian Drones Together,” Haaretz, July 13, 2022.
123 For more information, see https://www.rosen.senate.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/
Senate%20Abraham%20Accords%20Caucus%20Mission%20Statement.pdf.
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a strategy on cooperation with allies and partners in the area of responsibility of the United
States Central Command to implement a multinational integrated air and missile defense
architecture to protect the people, infrastructure, and territory of such countries from cruise
and ballistic missiles, manned and unmanned aerial systems, and rocket attacks from Iran
and groups linked to Iran.
Countering Iran
Israeli officials cite Iran as one of their primary concerns, largely because of (1) antipathy toward
Israel expressed by Iran’s revolutionary regime, (2) Iran’s broad regional influence (including in
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen), and (3) Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and advanced
conventional weapons capabilities. Iran-backed groups’ demonstrated abilities since 2019 to
penetrate the air defenses of countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through
coordinated drone and missile attacks have implications for Israeli security calculations.124 Israeli
observers who anticipate the possibility of a future war similar or greater in magnitude to Israel’s
2006 war against Lebanese Hezbollah refer to the small-scale military skirmishes or covert
actions since then involving Israel, Iran, or their allies as “the campaign between the wars.”125
Iranian Nuclear Issue and Regional Tensions
Israel has sought to influence U.S. decisions on the international agreement on Iran’s nuclear
program (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA). Prime Minister
Netanyahu strenuously opposed the JCPOA in 2015 when it was negotiated by the Obama
Administration, and welcomed President Trump’s May 2018 withdrawal of the United States
from the JCPOA and accompanying reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s core economic
sectors. Since this time, Iran has increased its enrichment of uranium to levels that could
significantly shorten the time it requires to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.126
Reported low-level Israel-Iran conflict has persisted in various settings—including cyberspace,
international waters, and the territory of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—with implications for regional
tensions.127 In June 2022, then-Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett characterized some
operations inside Iran as targeting the “head of the octopus” to counter a range of Iranian military
capabilities.128
As the Biden Administration has engaged in international diplomacy and considered the
possibility of reentering or revising the JCPOA, Israeli leaders have sought to influence
diplomatic outcomes. During their stints as prime minister, Bennett (2021-2022) and Yair Lapid
(2022) opposed the deal but largely abstained from involvement in U.S. debates on the issue.129

124 Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Drone Strike on Iranian Military Facility Is Deemed an Attack,” New York
Times, May 28, 2022; Anna Ahronheim, “How serious is the drone threat against Israel?” Jerusalem Post, March 11,
2022.
125 See, for example, Seth J. Frantzman, “Iran and Hezbollah analyze Israel’s ‘war between the wars,’” Jerusalem Post,
November 14, 2021.
126 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Iran Nears an Atomic Milestone,” New York Times, September 13, 2021.
127 Ben Caspit, “IRGC colonel’s assassination highlights Israel’s shift in tactics against Iran,” Al-Monitor, May 24,
2022; Dion Nissenbaum, “Israel Steps Up Campaign Against Iran,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2022; Arie Egozi,
“With missile attack and alleged espionage, Israel-Iran ‘shadow war’ slips into the open,” Breaking Defense, March 16,
2022.
128 Dion Nissenbaum et al., “Israel Widens Covert Actions to Rein in Iran,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2022.
129 “Bennett says he won’t pick public fight with US over Iran nuclear deal,” Times of Israel, March 21, 2022; Israeli
Prime Minister’s Office, “PM Lapid’s Remarks at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” July 17, 2022.
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Given various developments starting in 2022, including unrest and government crackdowns in
Iran and Iranian material support for Russian military operations in Ukraine, near-term prospects
for a renewed or revised JCPOA appear to have diminished.130
During President Biden’s trip to Israel in July, he and then-Prime Minister Lapid signed the
Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration, which included a U.S. commitment
“never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon,” and a statement that the United States “is
prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome.”131 Additionally, Biden
said that he would be willing to use force against Iran as a “last resort” to prevent it from
acquiring nuclear weapons.132 Lapid said that Israel wants a credible military threat to be the basis
for international negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, and that the United States “didn’t
necessarily agree on this” during President Biden’s visit.133
Various sources document reported Israeli covert or military operations targeting Iran’s nuclear
program,134 and some U.S. officials have reportedly differed with Israeli counterparts on the
overall effectiveness of such operations.135 Even with reported upgrades to Israeli military
capabilities,136 questions apparently remain about military readiness for a major operation against
Iran’s nuclear program.137
In a January 2023 CNN interview, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel has conducted
attacks on Iran aimed at thwarting its nuclear program and targeting “certain weapons
development.” He also said, “I think the only way that you can stop a rogue state from getting
nuclear weapons is a combination of crippling economic sanctions, but the most important thing
is a credible military threat. And I would say this, if deterrence fails, you have no choice but to
take action.”138
Hezbollah and Syria
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s closest and most powerful nonstate ally in the region. Hezbollah’s
forces and Israel’s military have sporadically clashed near the Lebanese border for decades—with
the antagonism at times contained in the border area, and at times escalating into broader
conflict.139 Speculation persists about the potential for wider conflict and its implications,
including from incursions into Israeli airspace by Hezbollah drones.140
Israeli officials have sought to draw attention to Hezbollah’s buildup of mostly Iran-supplied
weapons—including reported upgrades to the range, precision, and power of its projectiles—and

130 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The dimming prospects of returning to a nuclear agreement with Iran,
November 2022.
131 White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022.
132 “Biden delivers tough talk on Iran as he opens Mideast visit,” Associated Press, July 15, 2022.
133 “Lapid: Israel, US don’t ‘necessarily agree’ on need for military threat against Iran,” Times of Israel, July 17, 2022.
134 “Iran foils Israel-linked ‘sabotage’ plot at nuclear plant,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2022.
135 David E. Sanger et al., “Israeli Attacks Spur Upgrade of Iran Sites,” New York Times, November 22, 2021.
136 “Israel makes dramatic upgrades to military plans to attack Iran,” Jerusalem Post (citing Walla!), June 8, 2022.
137 Yossi Melman, “Israel Has No Realistic Military Option on Iran,” Haaretz, September 1, 2022.
138 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence.
139 CRS Report R44759, Lebanon, by Carla E. Humud; CRS In Focus IF10703, Lebanese Hezbollah, by Carla E.
Humud.
140 Neville Teller, “Hezbollah is as big a threat to Israel as Iran’s nuclear program – opinion,” Jerusalem Post,
December 28, 2022; Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer, “Hezbollah’s Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The
Israeli Card,” Institute for National Security Studies, March 9, 2022.
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its alleged use of Lebanese civilian areas as strongholds.141 In early 2022, Hezbollah’s leadership
and Israel’s defense ministry both publicly cited Iran-backed efforts by Hezbollah to manufacture
precision-guided missiles in Lebanon.142 In late 2022, Israeli officials reportedly warned Lebanon
that Israel could strike the Beirut airport if it serves as a destination for weapons smuggling,
based on reports that Iran has begun or planned flights that could carry equipment directly to
Hezbollah in Lebanon.143
Given Syria’s greater reliance on Iran due to its long civil war, Iran has sought to bolster
Hezbollah by sending advanced weapons to Lebanon through Syria or by establishing other
military sites on Syrian territory. In response, Israel has conducted thousands of airstrikes on Iran-
backed targets that could present threats to its security.144
Russia has reportedly shown some capacity to thwart Israeli airstrikes against Iranian or Syrian
targets,145 but has generally refrained via a deconfliction mechanism with Israel.146 This
deconfliction has apparently continued to date even with Russia’s war on Ukraine, but Russia has
criticized some Israeli strikes.147
In October 2022, Israel, Lebanon, and the United States resolved a long-standing maritime
boundary dispute, with potential implications for Israel-Hezbollah conflict (see Appendix C).
Public debate in Israel has centered on whether the economic benefits from the deal are worth the
concessions and the possible emboldening of Hezbollah.148 While Prime Minister Netanyahu
made a statement before taking office again about “neutralizing” (rather than canceling) the
maritime boundary agreement,149 his government has not taken action to date.150
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Israel has publicly condemned Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine through statements and votes in
international fora. Meanwhile, it has sought to provide political support for Ukraine and
humanitarian relief for Ukrainians—including allowing around 46,000 Jewish and non-Jewish
refugees to enter Israel—without alienating Russia.151 As mentioned above regarding Syria, Israel

141 See, for example, “Hezbollah says it has doubled its arsenal of guided missiles,” Associated Press, December 28,
2020; Ben Hubbard and Ronen Bergman, “Who Warns Hezbollah That Israeli Strikes Are Coming? Israel,” New York
Times, April 23, 2020.
142 “Hezbollah claims it’s making drones and missiles in Lebanon; chief offers export opportunity,” Associated Press,
February 16, 2022; Israeli Government Press Office, “DM Gantz Signs Seizure Order Against Lebanese Companies
Supplying Hezbollah Project,” February 6, 2022.
143 Ben Caspit, “Israel could strike in Lebanon if Iran renews weapons smuggling,” Al-Monitor, December 16, 2022.
144 Anna Ahronheim, “Thousands of airstrikes carried out by Israel in past five years,” jpost.com, March 29, 2022.
145 Arie Egozi, “Israel Shifts to Standoff Weapons in Syria as Russian Threats Increase,” Breaking Defense, July 27,
2021.
146 Jacob Magid, “Russia says military coordination with Israel in Syria will continue as usual,” Times of Israel,
February 27, 2022.
147 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel to increase military, civilian aid to Ukraine – report,” jpost.com, May 4, 2022; Emanuel
Fabian, “Shuttering Damascus airport, Israel ramps up its efforts to foil Iran arms transfers,” Times of Israel, June 12,
2022.
148 Isabel Kershner, “Israel and Lebanon Sign Deal on Maritime Border,” New York Times, October 28, 2022.
149 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Netanyahu says Ben Gvir could be police minister, vows to ‘neutralize’ Lebanon deal,” Times
of Israel, October 31, 2022.
150 Seth J. Frantzman, “Qatar swoops into Lebanon gas deal in wake of Jerusalem-Beirut agreement,” Jerusalem Post,
January 31, 2023.
151 Bret Stephens, “Naftali Bennett’s Exit Interview,” New York Times, June 21, 2022; Bar Peleg, “Israel to Bar
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has counted on airspace deconfliction with Russia to target Iranian personnel and equipment,
especially those related to the transport of munitions or precision-weapons technology to
Hezbollah in Lebanon.152
Despite reported entreaties from U.S. and Ukrainian officials, Israel has refrained to date from
directly providing lethal assistance to Ukraine.153 Starting in May 2022, Israel has sent some
protective gear to Ukrainian rescue forces and civilian organizations.154
Once Russia began using Iran-made drones in Ukraine, Israel offered to help Ukraine develop an
early-warning system for its civilians, and also began sharing basic intelligence with Ukraine
aimed at helping its forces counter drone attacks.155 In November 2022, one news outlet reported
that Israel had begun supplying “strategic materials” to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) member for use in Ukraine.156
In 2022 and 2023, the United States reportedly withdrew 300,000 155-millimeter artillery shells
from War Reserves Stock Allies stockpiles in Israel to send to Ukraine.157 According to multiple
reports, Israeli officials acceded to the Pentagon’s request in order to avoid confrontation with the
United States and because, according to one Israeli official, “it’s their ammunition and they don’t
really need our permission to take it.”158
In July 2022, Russia’s Justice Ministry signaled to Israel that it was seeking to close the Russian
branch of the Jewish Agency for Israel, an entity that has branches around the world to facilitate
emigration to Israel and run cultural and language education program in coordination with Israel.
Russia claimed that the agency violated privacy laws by storing personal information about
emigration applicants, but many Israelis suspected that Russian concerns about Israeli policy on
Ukraine and possibly Syria and Jerusalem may have motivated the pending legal action.159

Ukrainians Arriving Since October From Working,” Ha’aretz, December 28, 2022. About 14,000 Ukrainians who
entered Israel after the invasion remained as of December 2022. Additionally, about 26,000 Russian Jews had entered
Israel in 2022 as of October. Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘It’s driven by fear’: Ukrainians and
Russians with Jewish roots flee to Israel,” Guardian, October 16, 2022.
152 Transcript: One-On-One with Israel’s Netanyahu amid Surging Violence; Zev Chafets, “Why Israel Won’t Supply
the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” Bloomberg, March 11, 2022.
153 Arie Egozi, “As Iranian munitions kill in Ukraine, pressure builds for Israel to reassess its Russian balancing act,”
Breaking Defense, October 18, 2022.
154 “Zelensky ‘shocked’ by lack of Israeli defense support: ‘They gave us nothing,’ Times of Israel, September 23,
2022; “In first, Israel sends 2,000 helmets, 500 flak jackets to Ukraine,” Times of Israel, May 18, 2022.
155 “Israel offers help with air-attack alerts, but Ukraine wants interceptors,” Reuters, October 19, 2022; “Israel giving
intel on Russia’s Iranian drones to Ukraine – report,” Jerusalem Post, October 24, 2022.
156 Yossi Melman, “Under U.S. Pressure, Israel Funded ‘Strategic Materials’ for Ukraine,” Ha’aretz, November 17,
2022.
157 Eric Schmitt, Adam Entous, Ronen Bergman, John Ismay, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Sends U.S. Arms
Stored in Israel to Ukraine,” New York Times, January 17, 2023.
158 Barak Ravid, “U.S. sends weapons stored in Israel to Ukraine,” Axios, January 18, 2023.
159 Anton Troianovski and Isabel Kershner, “Russia Moves to Shut Down Agency Handling Emigration to Israel,” New
York Times, July 22, 2022.
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Appendix A. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Sources: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated using Department of State
Boundaries (2017); Esri (2013); the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency GeoNames Database (2015);
DeLorme (2014). Fact information from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; CIA,
The World Factbook; and Economist Intelligence Unit. All numbers are estimates for 2022 unless otherwise
specified.
Notes: According to the U.S. executive branch: (1) The West Bank is Israeli occupied with current status
subject to the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement; permanent status to be determined through further
negotiation. (2) The status of the Gaza Strip is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations. (3) The
United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017 without taking a position on the specific boundaries
of Israeli sovereignty. (4) Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Additionally, the United States
recognized the Golan Heights as part of Israel in 2019; however, U.N. Security Council Resolution 497, adopted
on December 17, 1981, held that the area of the Golan Heights control ed by Israel’s military is occupied
territory belonging to Syria. The current U.S. executive branch map of Israel is available at https://www.cia.gov/
the-world-factbook/countries/israel/map.
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Appendix B. Main Israeli Parties and Their Leaders
RIGHT
Likud (Consolidation) – Coalition (32 Knesset seats)
Israel’s historical repository of right-of-center nationalist ideology; skeptical of
territorial compromise; has also championed free-market policies.
Leader: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
Born in 1949, Netanyahu returned as Israel’s prime minister in December 2022.
Previously, he served as prime minister from 2009 to 2021, and also from 1996 to
1999. Netanyahu served in an elite special forces unit (Sayeret Matkal), and received
his higher education at MIT. Throughout a career in politics and diplomacy, he has
been renowned both for his skepticism regarding the exchange of land for peace with
the Palestinians and his desire to counter Iran’s nuclear program and regional
influence. He is generally regarded as both a consummate political dealmaker and a
security-minded nationalist.
National Unity (HaMachane HaMamlachti) – Opposition (12 seats)
Merger of centrist Blue and White (led by Benny Gantz) and right-of-center New
Hope (led by Gideon Sa’ar) parties. Seeks to draw contrasts with Netanyahu-led
Likud by claiming support for long-standing Israeli institutions such as the judiciary
and for an inclusive vision of Israeli nationalism for Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.
Varying views on Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Leader: Benny Gantz
Born in 1959, Gantz served as chief of general staff of the Israel Defense Forces from
2011 to 2015. He then served as defense minister from 2020 to 2022.
Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) – Coalition (7 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on expanding settlements, supporting annexation of
West Bank areas, and aligning Israeli societal practices with traditional Jewish religious
law. Elected on a common slate with Jewish Power and Noam.
Leader: Bezalel Smotrich
Born in 1980, Smotrich is Israel’s finance minister, as well as a minister with some
nominal responsibilities over West Bank administration. He has headed the
underlying party that leads Religious Zionism since 2019. A trained lawyer, he has
engaged in regular activism to promote Jewish nationalist and religiously conservative
causes.
Jewish Power (Otzma Yehudit) – Coalition (6 seats)
Ultra-nationalist party with similar positions to Religious Zionism. Elected on a
common slate with Religious Zionism and Noam.
Leader: Itamar Ben Gvir
Born in 1976, Ben Gvir is Israel’s national security minister. He once belonged to
Kach, a movement based on the racist ideology of former Knesset member Meir
Kahane (1932-1990) that was final y banned from elections in the 1990s. Ben Gvir
was convicted in 2007 for incitement to racism and supporting terrorism but says
that he has moderated his positions and does not generalize about Arabs. He is a
lawyer and has regularly represented Jewish nationalist activists. Ben Gvir has been a
regular fixture at contentious gatherings of Jews and Arabs in Jerusalem.
Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home) – Opposition (6 seats)
Pro-secular, right-of-center nationalist party with base of support among Russian
speakers from the former Soviet Union.
Leader: Avigdor Lieberman
Born in 1958, Lieberman has previously served as Israel’s defense minister, foreign
minister, and finance minister. He is generally viewed as an ardent nationalist and
canny political actor with prime ministerial aspirations. Lieberman was born in the
Soviet Union (in what is now Moldova) and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He worked
under Netanyahu from 1988 to 1997. Disil usioned by Netanyahu’s wil ingness to
consider concessions to the Palestinians, Lieberman founded Yisrael Beitenu as a
platform for former Soviet immigrants. He was acquitted of corruption allegations in
a 2013 case.
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Noam (Pleasantness) – Coalition (1 seat)
Ultra-nationalist party with focus on traditional Jewish religious values on family issues
(including opposition to LGBTQ rights), Sabbath day observance, and the
conversation process. Elected on a common slate with Religious Zionism and Jewish
Power.
Leader: Avi Maoz
Born in 1956, Maoz is a former civil servant who later turned to politics. He has
headed Noam since its establishment in 2019. He nominally heads an office in the
prime minister’s office devoted to Jewish identity that includes responsibilities to
integrate immigrants from post-Soviet states and regulate educational content in
public schools.
LEFT
Labor (Avoda) – Opposition (4 seats)
Labor is Israel’s historical repository of social democratic, left-of-center, pro-secular
Zionist ideology; associated with efforts to end Israel’s responsibility for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza.
Leader: Merav Michaeli
Born in 1966, Michaeli became Labor’s leader in 2020 and was first elected to the
Knesset in 2013. She served as transportation minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
Before entering national politics, she founded and headed an organization that
supports victims of sexual assault and was a regular national media presence and
university lecturer.
CENTER
Yesh Atid (There Is a Future) – Opposition (24 seats)
Yesh Atid is a centrist party in existence since 2012 that has championed
socioeconomic issues such as cost of living and has taken a pro-secular stance.
Leader: Yair Lapid
Born in 1963, Lapid transitioned from a successful media career to politics in 2013,
when he founded Yesh Atid. In the 2013 election, Yesh Atid had a surprising second-
place finish and Lapid served as finance minister in the Netanyahu-led government
from 2013 to 2015. Subsequently, Lapid has avoided allying with Netanyahu, and Yesh
Atid appears to have displaced the Labor party as the leading political option for
Israelis who do not support right-of-center parties. Lapid has stated support for a
two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He served as foreign minister and
then prime minister in the 2021-2022 coalition.
ULTRA-ORTHODOX
Shas (Sephardic Torah Guardians) – Coalition (11 seats)
Mizrahi Haredi (“ultra-Orthodox”) party; favors welfare and education funds in
support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes compromise with Palestinians on control over
Jerusalem.
Leader: Aryeh Deri
Born in 1959, Deri led Shas from 1983 to 1999 before being convicted for bribery,
fraud, and breach of trust in 1999 for actions taken while serving as interior minister.
He returned as the party’s leader in 2013. As part of a plea deal for tax fraud in
January 2022, Deri agreed to resign from the Knesset, but returned in the November
2022 election. In January 2023, Israel’s High Court of Justice ruled that he could no
longer serve as interior and health minister because he had indicated in the 2022 plea
deal that he would permanently leave politics.
United Torah Judaism – Coalition (7 seats)
Ashkenazi Haredi coalition (Agudat Yisrael and Degel HaTorah); favors welfare and
education funds in support of Haredi lifestyle; opposes territorial compromise with
Palestinians and conscription of Haredim; generally seeks greater application of its
interpretation of traditional Jewish law.
Leader: Yitzhak Goldknopf
Born in 1951, Goldknopf is Israel’s construction and housing minister. He has been

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prominent in the ultra-Orthodox community as an operator of kindergartens and day
care centers, and as an advocate for legal measures to enforce Sabbath observance.
ARAB
Hadash-Ta’al – Opposition (5 seats)
Electoral slate featuring two Arab parties that combine socialist and Arab nationalist
political strains: Hadash (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) and Ta’al (Arab
Movement for Renewal).
Leader: Ayman Odeh
Born in 1975, Odeh is the leader of Hadash, an Arab Israeli socialist party, along with
the overall Hadash-Ta’al slate. An attorney, he served on the Haifa city council before
becoming Hadash’s national leader in 2006.

United Arab List (UAL or Ra’am) – Opposition (5 seats)
Islamist Arab party that embodies conservative social values while seeking state
support to improve Arabs’ socioeconomic position within Israel.
Leader: Mansour Abbas
Born in 1974, Abbas has led the UAL since 2007 and is a qualified dentist. He led the
UAL into the previous 2021-2022 coalition after receiving promises that the
government would focus more resources and attention on socioeconomic help for
Arab Israelis.

Sources: Various open sources.
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Appendix C. Israel-Lebanon Maritime Agreement
Despite the lack of formal Israel-Lebanon relations, on October 11, 2022, Israel, Lebanon and the
United States announced that they had reached an agreement to settle a long-standing Israel-
Lebanon maritime boundary dispute. The agreement paves the way for both countries to
eventually increase offshore gas production. The deal also recognizes an existing 5 km buoy line
extending into the Mediterranean as the status quo pending a formal future Israel-Lebanon
agreement (see Figure C-1). According to a senior Biden Administration official
This is not a direct bilateral agreement. It is through the United States. But it is marking a
boundary that will allow both countries to pursue their economic interests without
conflict.160
On October 27, the parties signed documents to begin implementation of the deal.161 Reportedly,
President Biden drafted a letter to Israel guaranteeing Israel’s security and economic rights in the
agreement and pledging to prevent Hezbollah from receiving any income from Lebanese natural
gas drilling.162

160 White House, “Background Press Call by Senior Administration Officials on the Israel-Lebanon Maritime
Agreement,” October 11, 2022.
161 Lazar Berman, “Biden drafts letter guaranteeing Israel’s rights in Lebanon maritime deal,” Times of Israel, October
29, 2022.
162 Jonathan Lis, “Lebanon Maritime Deal: U.S. Offers Guarantees if Hezbollah ‘Challenges the Agreement,’” Haaretz,
October 11, 2022; Lahav Harkov, “What is in the Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement?” Jerusalem Post,
October 11, 2022.
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Figure C-1. Map: Israel-Lebanon Maritime Boundary Agreement

Source: Haaretz.
Note: All boundaries are approximate.
Under the agreement, Lebanon has full rights to the Qana gas field—with the caveat that a future
side agreement between Israel and Lebanon’s Block 9 operator (the French company Total) will
settle any revenues granted to Israel in the case of gas production in the section of the Qana field
that falls into Israel’s Block 72. It is only after this side agreement that initial exploration can
begin at Qana, with regular extraction likely beginning several years after that.163
The terms of the deal leave the Karish gas field—from which Israel started extracting gas shortly
before the deal’s signing—completely within Israel’s exclusive economic zone. Hezbollah had
threatened attacks against Israel if extraction at Karish began before resolving the dispute.

163 Lazar Berman, “Israeli official: Development of disputed Qana gas field will take four stages,” Times of Israel,
October 12, 2022.
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Author Information

Jim Zanotti

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Disclaimer
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