Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress




Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and
AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background
and Issues for Congress

February 16, 2024
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32418




Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal

Summary
Issues for Congress regarding the Navy’s Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN) program include the FY2024 procurement funding request for the program and
the proposal for selling three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia and transferring U.S.
submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology to Australia under a U.S.-UK-Australia
security agreement called AUKUS.
Virginia-class FY2024 procurement funding. The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774)
class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) since FY1998, and a total of 38 have been
procured through FY2023. Since FY2011, Virginia-class boats have been procured at a rate of
two per year. Most Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years are to be built
with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section
equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional
Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. When procured at a rate of two boats per year, VPM-
equipped Virginia-class SSNs have an estimated procurement cost of about $4.3 billion per boat.
The Navy’s current ship force-level goal, which was released in December 2016, calls for
achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 manned ships, including 66 SSNs. The Navy currently
has about 50 SSNs. Under the Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan,
which includes three alternatives, the SSN force would decline to a low point of 46 boats in
FY2030 and grow to 60, 69, or 63 boats by FY2053.
The Navy’s proposed budget requests the procurement of the 39th and 40th Virginia-class boats.
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission states that one of the two boats is to be built to a special
configuration referred to as the “Modified VIRGINIA Class Subsea and Seabed Warfare (Mod VA
SSW)” configuration. The two boats have an estimated combined procurement cost of $9,427.6
million (i.e., about $9.4 billion), and have received a combined total of $2,297.7 million in prior-
year advance procurement (AP) funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the
remaining $7,130.0 million needed to complete their estimated combined procurement cost, as
well as $1,855.5 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal
years, $1,360.0 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding, which is an additional kind
of AP funding that can occur under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract, and $168.2 million
in cost-to-complete (CTC) funding to cover cost growth on Virginia-class boats procured in prior
years. In addition to these requested funds, on October 20, 2023, the Administration submitted a
request for FY2024 emergency supplemental funding that includes, among other things, a total of
$3,393.2 million in funding for the submarine industrial base to support construction of new
submarines and maintenance of existing submarines.
AUKUS submarine proposal. In September 2021, the U.S., UK, and Australian governments
announced a significant new security partnership, called AUKUS. The proposed first major
initiative under AUKUS, referred to as Pillar 1, would be a project to rotationally deploy up to
five U.S. and UK SSNs out of a port in Western Australia, and more significantly, for Australia,
with U.S. and UK assistance, to acquire, operate, and maintain its own force of eight
conventionally armed SSNs, including three to five Virginia-class SSNs that would be sold to
Australia. Key issues for Congress regarding the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include the following:
Should Congress decide in 2023 whether approve, reject, or modify the legislation requested to
implement Pillar 1, as the Administration is requesting, or defer a decision until 2024 or later?
How do the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway compare to those
of a potential alternative of a U.S.-Australia division of labor on SSNs?
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

U.S. Navy Submarines .............................................................................................................. 1
U.S. SSN Force Levels .............................................................................................................. 2
Force-Level Goal ................................................................................................................ 2
Past and Current Force Levels ............................................................................................ 3
Projected Procurement Rates and Force Levels .................................................................. 3

Submarine Construction Industrial Base ................................................................................... 4
SSN Maintenance Backlog ....................................................................................................... 4
U.S. SSN Classes ...................................................................................................................... 6
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class ............................................................................................. 6
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class ..................................................................................................... 6
Virginia (SSN-774) Class.................................................................................................... 7
Virginia-Class Program ............................................................................................................. 9
Program Elements ............................................................................................................... 9
FY2024 Funding Request ................................................................................................. 13
AUKUS Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway for Selling Virginia-Class SSNs and Transferring
U.S. Submarine and Propulsion Technology to Australia .................................................... 14
Proposal Is Referred to as Pillar 1 of AUKUS .................................................................. 14
Key Elements of Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway .................................................................... 15
Previous Countries That Requested but Did Not Receive U.S. Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Technology .................................................................................................. 16
Impact of Selling Virginia-Class Boats to Australia on Size of U.S. SSN Force .............. 18
May 2023 DOD Legislative Package with Requested Enabling Legislation.................... 21
Supplemental Funding for Submarine Industrial Base Requested on October 20,

2023 ............................................................................................................................... 21
October 25, 2023, Hearing on Submarine Industrial Base and AUKUS .......................... 21
Potential Alternative of a U.S.-Australia Division of Labor ............................................. 21

Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 23
AUKUS Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway for Selling Virginia-Class SSNs and Transferring
U.S. Submarine and Propulsion Technology to Australia .................................................... 23
Deciding on Requested Enabling Legislation in 2023 or at a Later Point ........................ 23
Merits of Proposed Pillar 1 Compared to U.S.-Australia Division of Labor .................... 28
Summary of Some Key Factors ........................................................................................ 46
Projected SSN Force Levels vs. SSN Force-Level Goal......................................................... 47
Industrial-Base Capacity for Building Both Virginia- and Columbia-Class Boats ................. 48
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 48
Press Report ...................................................................................................................... 50
Strategic Outsourcing........................................................................................................ 52
Potential Oversight Questions for Congress ..................................................................... 53
Virginia-Class Delivery Delays and Cost Growth .................................................................. 54
June 2023 GAO Report ..................................................................................................... 54
Press Reports ..................................................................................................................... 55
Additional Virginia-Class Issues ............................................................................................. 57
Maintenance Requirements and Operational Availability ................................................. 57
Shortage of Spare Parts for Boats Undergoing Maintenance ............................................ 59
Substandard Steel .............................................................................................................. 60
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Problem with Hull Coating ............................................................................................... 60
Defective Parts .................................................................................................................. 61
Legislative Activity Regarding FY2024 Funding Request ............................................................ 61
Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request ............................................................... 61
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226) ........................................ 63
House ................................................................................................................................ 63
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 64
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 64

FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587) ......................................................... 65
House ................................................................................................................................ 65
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 65

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations ............................................................................... 66
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 66
House ................................................................................................................................ 66

Legislative Activity Regarding Proposed Sale of Virginia-Class Boats Under AUKUS
Agreement .................................................................................................................................. 66
May 2023 DOD Legislative Package Relating to AUKUS Agreement .................................. 66
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226) ........................................ 69
House ................................................................................................................................ 69
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 69
Conference ........................................................................................................................ 70
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587) ......................................................... 72
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 72
AUKUS Undersea Defense Act (H.R. 3939) .......................................................................... 73
AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act (H.R. 4619) ................................................. 73
Bilateral Resilience in Industry Trade Security Act (BRITS Act) (H.R. 4715) ...................... 73
Keeping our Allies Leading in Advancement Act (KOALA Act) (H.R. 4716) ....................... 73
AUKUS Oversight and Accountability Act (H.R. 4725) ........................................................ 73
Truncating Onerous Regulations for Partners and Enhancing Deterrence Operations
(TORPEDO) Act of 2023 (S. 1471) ..................................................................................... 74

Figures
Figure 1. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine ..................................................................................... 7
Figure 2. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine ..................................................................................... 8
Figure 3. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine ..................................................................................... 8

Tables
Table 1. Numbers of SSNs in Maintenance or Awaiting Maintenance............................................ 5
Table 2. Actual and Projected Virginia-Class Procurement Quantities ........................................... 9
Table 3. Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway and Potential Division of Labor Alternative ......................... 23
Table 4. Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request........................................................ 63

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Appendixes
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals .................................................................................... 75
Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs ....................................................................................... 77
Appendix C. SSN Maintenance Backlog ...................................................................................... 79
Appendix D. December 2021 Determinations Pursuant to Defense Production Act (DPA) ......... 91
Appendix E. 1987-1988 Letters and Statements from Members Regarding Canadian SSN
Project ........................................................................................................................................ 94
Appendix F. October 25, 2023, Navy Testimony on Increasing Capacity of Submarine
Industrial Base .......................................................................................................................... 102

Contacts
Author Information ...................................................................................................................... 105

Congressional Research Service

Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on
• the Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN)
procurement program, and
• a proposal for selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs and transferring U.S.
submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology to Australia under a U.S.-
UK-Australia security agreement called AUKUS.
The Navy has been procuring Virginia-class SSNs since FY1998, and a total of 38 have been
procured through FY2023. Since FY2011, Virginia-class boats have been procured at a rate of
two per year. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the procurement of the 39th and 40th
Virginia-class boats.
Issues for Congress include those relating to the proposed procurement of Virginia-class boats in
FY2024 and subsequent years, and those relating to the proposal under the AUKUS agreement
for selling three to five Virginia-class boats and transferring U.S. submarine and naval nuclear
propulsion technology to Australia under AUKUS. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues
could substantially affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, Australian military
capabilities, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
The Navy’s SSN(X) next-generation attack submarine program, which is to be the eventual
successor to the Virginia-class SSN program, is discussed in another CRS product: CRS In Focus
IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X]) Program: Background and Issues
for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in
another CRS report: CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
U.S. Navy Submarines1
The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs),2 nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces (SOF) submarines
(SSGNs),3 and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The SSNs are general-purpose

1 In U.S. Navy submarine designations, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered, B stands for ballistic
missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile). Submarines can be powered by either nuclear
reactors or nonnuclear power sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-
powered. A submarine’s use of nuclear or nonnuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is
armed with nuclear weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a nonnuclear-powered
submarine can be armed with nuclear weapons.
2 The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United States. The Navy’s SSBNs are discussed in CRS
Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for
Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure
, by Amy F. Woolf.
3 The Navy’s four SSGNs are former Trident SSBNs that have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk
cruise missiles and SOF rather than SLBMs. Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission
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Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal

submarines that can (when appropriately equipped and armed) perform a variety of peacetime and
wartime missions, including the following:
• covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for
national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
• covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than possible with the
SSGNs);
• covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles (again on a
smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
• covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
• anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
• anti-surface warfare, or ASuW (i.e., attacking surface ships).
The technical (including acoustic) superiority of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered submarines is
generally considered a foundation of U.S. superiority in undersea warfare, which in turn
underpins a U.S. ability to leverage the world’s oceans as a medium of operations and maneuver,
deny that to others, and thereby generate a huge asymmetric strategic advantage for the United
States. During the Cold War, ASW against Soviet submarines was the primary stated mission of
U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery operations were reportedly
important on a day-to-day basis as well.4 In the post-Cold War era, although ASW remained a
mission, the SSN force focused more on performing the first three other missions listed above.
With the shift from the post-Cold War era to a situation of renewed great power competition,5
ASW and ASuW against Russian and Chinese submarines and surface ships has become a more
prominent mission. DOD officials and other observers view SSNs as particularly useful for
implementing certain elements of the national defense strategy because of their ability to evade
China’s improving anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces.6
U.S. SSN Force Levels
Force-Level Goal
Goal Current Force-Level Goal of 66 Boats within 355-Ship Plan
The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016, is to achieve and maintain a
fleet of 355 manned ships, including 66 SSNs.7

orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs are
more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other submarine missions and are sometimes included in
counts of the projected total number of Navy attack submarines. The Navy’s SSGNs are discussed in CRS Report
RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
4 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection operations during the Cold War, see
Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs,
1998).
5 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for
Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
6 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 For more on the 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Emerging Successor Force-Level Goal
The Navy and Department of Defense (DOD) since 2019 have been working to develop a new
force-level goal to replace the 355-ship force-level goal. Studies of this emerging force-level goal
that have been released by the Navy in summary form suggest that the new force-level goal could
call for achieving and maintaining a force of 66 to 72 SSNs.8 For a review of SSN force-level
goals since the Reagan Administration, see Appendix A.
Past and Current Force Levels
During most of the 1980s, when plans called for achieving a 600-ship Navy including 100 SSNs,
the SSN force included more than 90 boats, peaking at 98 boats at the end of FY1987. The
number of SSNs declined after that in a manner that roughly paralleled the decline in the total
size of the Navy over the same time period. The 50 SSNs in service at the end of FY2022
included the following:
• 26 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
• 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
• 21 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.
The three classes of SSNs listed above are discussed further later in this report. In addition to the
50 SSNs shown above, the Navy operates four Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSGNs. Compared to the
Navy’s SSNs, the SSGNs have a much larger capacity for carrying cruise missiles and SOF, but
they are nevertheless general-purpose submarines that can perform missions performed by SSNs.
Projected Procurement Rates and Force Levels
The Navy’s FY2024 five-year (FY2024-FY2028) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 10
Virginia-class boats, to be procured at a rate of two per year. The Navy’s FY2024 30-year
(FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan includes three alternative 30-year shipbuilding profiles for
the period FY2029-FY2053. Under these profiles, the SSN force would reach a minimum of 46
boats in FY2030 and grow to 60, 69, or 63 boats by FY2053. Under the alternative where the
force grows to 69 boats by FY2053, the force would reach 66 boats in FY2049.
The number of boats in the SSN force is projected to experience a valley or trough from the mid-
2020s through the early 2030s. This valley is a projected consequence of having procured a
relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era.
The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS
reports and testimony every year since then. As noted above, the FY2024 30-year shipbuilding
plan projects that the SSN force would reach a minimum of 46 boats in FY2030, return to 50
boats in FY2032, and then grow to more than 50 boats starting in FY2036.
Some observers are concerned that this projected valley in SSN force levels could lead to a period
of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened
conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China.9 To help fill in part of the

8 For the effort to develop a successor to the 355-ship goal of 2016, including the studies that the Navy has released in
summary form, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for
Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9 China took note of the projected valley. The November 2014 edition of a Chinese military journal, for example,
included an article with a passage that translates as follows:
... in 2028, the [U.S. Navy] force of nuclear attack submarines will fall from the current number of
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projected valley, the Navy plans to refuel and extend the service lives of up to seven Los Angeles-
class SSNs, while also pursuing “updated service life estimates for the remaining 688s based on
current hull by hull utilization.”10
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
U.S. Navy submarines are built by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of
Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News
Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. These are the only two shipyards in the country
capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while HII/NNS also
builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships.
In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes 16,000
suppliers in all 50 states,11 as well as laboratories and research facilities in numerous states. Much
of the total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from
sole-source suppliers. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of
stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program.12 Much of
the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base is resident at
GD/EB; additional portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the component makers.
SSN Maintenance Backlog
As shown in Table 1, the number of SSNs either in depot maintenance or idle (i.e., awaiting
depot maintenance) has increased from 11 boats (about 21% of the SSN force) in FY2012 to 18
boats (about 37% of the SSN force) as of May 2023. In advance policy questions submitted for a
September 14, 2023, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider her
nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, stated that the fraction of the SSN force either in depot maintenance or idle had been
reduced since May 2023 to 33%.13

55 down to 41 boats. Some are concerned about whether this force level can meet the requirements
of the Asia-Pacific rebalance.”
(Lyle Goldstein, “Evolution of Chinese Power Projection Capabilities,” presentation to Center for a
New American Security (CNAS) roundtable discussion, September 29, 2016, slide 7 of 41.)
10 Source: Navy information paper on FY2022 Fiscal Planning Framework and SSN-688 class service live extension
program questions, February 5, 2021, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) and CRS on February 5, 2021. See also Richard R. Burgess, “Vice Adm. Houston: Sub Force Approaching
Inflection Point of 50 SSNs,” Seapower, November 17, 2021; Justin Katz, “Navy Assessing LA Sub Fleet for Possible
Life Extensions,” Breaking Defense, November 18, 2021. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Assessing Los Angeles Subs For
Life Extension,” Defense Daily, November 19, 2021; David Axe, “To Keep Up Its Undersea Strength, The U.S. Navy
Aims To Keep Old Submarines Longer,” Forbes, November 22, 2021; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Avoided a 2022
‘Trough’ in Submarine Fleet Size, but Industry Challenges Threaten Future Growth,” Defense News, January 3, 2022.
11 Source: CQ transcript of spoken testimony of Erik Raven, Under Secretary of the Navy, at an October 25, 2023,
hearing on the submarine industrial base and its ability to support the AUKUS framework before the Seapower and
Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. See also Joint Statement, Honorable Erik K.
Raven, Under Secretary of the Navy, VADM William J. Houston, Commander, Naval Submarine Forces, [and] RDML
Jonathan Rucker, Program Executive Officer, Attack Submarines, before the House Committee on Armed Services
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, October 25, 2023, p. 5.
12 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke. In terms of work provided to these firms, the Navy states
that a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
13 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for
Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 31, 32.
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The Navy has stated that industry best practice would call for about 20% of the SSN force to be
in depot maintenance (and for none to be idle) at any given moment,14 and Admiral Franchetti has
stated that the Navy has adopted the 20% figure as its goal.15 As also shown in Table 1, the
increase since FY2012 in the number of SSNs in depot maintenance or idle has substantially
reduced the number of SSNs operationally ready at any given moment, reducing the SSN force’s
capacity for meeting day-to-day mission demands and potentially putting increased operational
pressure on SSNs that are operationally ready.
Table 1. Numbers of SSNs in Maintenance or Awaiting Maintenance
Average number or percentage of SSNs for each fiscal year
Number
Combined
awaiting
number in
% of force in
Number in
depot
depot
depot
Number
Fiscal
Number
depot
maintenance
maintenance
maintenance operationally
year
in force
maintenance
(aka idle)
or idle
or idle
ready
FY08
51
11
0
11
22%
40
FY09
52
10
1
11
21%
41
FY10
52
10
0
10
19%
42
FY11
52
11
0
11
21%
41
FY12
53
10
1
11
21%
42
FY13
53
12
0
12
23%
41
FY14
53
13
2
15
28%
38
FY15
53
9
1
10
19%
43
FY16
52
12
1
13
25%
39
FY17
50
12
2
14
28%
36
FY18
50
14
2
16
32%
34
FY19
50
13
3
16
32%
34
FY20
50
10
5
15
30%
35
FY21
49
14
4
18
37%
31
FY22
49
11
5
16
33%
33
FY23*
49
14
4
18
37%
31
Source: U.S. Navy information paper dated June 13, 2023, and provided to CRS and Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on June 15, 2023. *Data for FY2023 is as of May 2023. In
advance policy questions submitted for a September 14, 2023, hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee to consider her nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, stated that the fraction of the SSN force either in depot maintenance or idle had been
reduced since May 2023 to 33%. (Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa
M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 31, 32.)

14 Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Hopes New Funding Model Can Cut Sub Maintenance Delays by 2026,” Defense News,
November 17, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Frustration Building over Late Weapons, Ship Deliveries,” Defense
News
, January 11, 2023; Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,” Defense Daily,
January 12, 2023; Justin Katz, “As AUKUS Looms, US Navy Sub Leaders Sound Alarms at Home,” Breaking
Defense
, November 4, 2022.
15 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for
Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 31, 32.
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The increase in the number of SSNs in depot maintenance or idle is due primarily to insufficient
numbers of workers and facility constraints at the four government-operated Naval Shipyards
(NSYs), which are the primary facilities for performing depot-level overhaul and maintenance
work on the Navy’s nuclear-powered ships, including the SSNs. Supply chain issues affecting the
availability of repair parts for SSNs are an additional issue. To address capacity constraints at the
NSYs, the Navy has increased staffing at the NSYs and in 2018 began a 20-year, multibillion-
dollar investment plan, called the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP), to
modernize the NSYs’ facilities.16 The Navy has also shifted a small number of SSN overhauls to
GD/EB and HII/NNS. For additional background information on the SSN maintenance backlog,
which has been a matter of concern and oversight for the congressional defense committees, see
Appendix C.
U.S. SSN Classes17
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class
A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between
FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are 360 feet long, have a
beam (i.e., hull diameter) of 33 feet, and have a submerged displacement of about 6,900 tons.
They are equipped with four 21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of about 26
torpedoes in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class (SSN-719
and higher) were built with an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for
carrying and launching 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The final 23 boats in the class (SSN-751
and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles-class
boats or 688Is. As of the end of FY2022, 36 of the 62 boats in the class had been retired.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class
Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarines are larger and more heavily armed than Los Angeles-class
submarines. They are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of
50 torpedoes or cruise missiles. The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30
boats, but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of the
Cold War and associated changes in military requirements and defense spending levels. The three
Seawolf-class submarines are Seawolf (SSN-21), Connecticut (SSN-22), and Jimmy Carter (SSN-
23).
SSN-21 and SSN-22 were procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and
1998, respectively. They are 353 feet long, have a beam of 40 feet, and have a submerged
displacement of 9,138 tons. SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was
suspended in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It entered service in 2005. SSN-23 was built to
a lengthened configuration compared to the other two ships in the class—it is 453 feet long (i.e.,
100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22), has a beam of 40 feet, and has a submerged

16 For an overview of the SIOP, see U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, “Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program” accessed June 22, 2023, at https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Shipyards/SIOP/. See also Government
Accountability Office, Navy Readiness[:] Actions Needed to Address Cost and Schedule Estimates for Shipyard
Improvement
, GAO-23-106067, June 2023, 49 pp.; Government Accountability Office, Naval Shipyards[:] Ongoing
Challenges Could Jeopardize Navy’s Ability to Improve Shipyards
, Statement of Diana C. Maurer, Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management, Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Readiness and Management Support and
Seapower, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, GAO 22-105993, May 10, 2022, 18 pp.
17 Source for submarine lengths, beams (i.e., hull diameters), and submerged displacements: U.S. Navy, “Attack
Submarines–SSN,” updated March 13, 2023.
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displacement of 12,158 tons. The Navy states that SSN-23 includes “a 100-foot-long, 2,500-ton
hull extension, known as the multi-mission platform, to test new generations of weapons and
support Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land forces) operations.”18
Virginia (SSN-774) Class
The Navy has been procuring Virginia-class SSNs (Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3) since
FY1998; the first entered service in October 2004. The Virginia-class design was developed to be
less expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the Seawolf-class
design. The baseline Virginia-class design is 377 feet long, has a beam of 34 feet, and has a
submerged displacement of about 7,800 tons. Virginia-class boats are equipped with four 21-inch
diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of about 25 torpedoes in their torpedo tubes and
internal magazines. Virginia-class boats are also equipped with vertical launch tubes in their bows
for carrying and launching 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Figure 1. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Dan Ward, “Opinion: How Budget Pressure Prompted
the Success of Virginia-Class Submarine Program,” USNI News, November 3, 2014. The caption credits the
photograph to the U.S. Navy and states that it shows USS Minnesota (SSN-783) under construction in 2012.
Virginia-class boats equipped with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM; see discussion below) are
84 feet longer—they are 461 feet long, have a beam of 34 feet, and have a submerged
displacement of about 10,200 tons. The VPM can be armed with 28 additional Tomahawk cruise
missiles. In addition to the VPM, the Virginia-class design has been updated multiple times in
other ways since FY1998.

18 Andrea Perez, “USS Jimmy Carter Conducts Change of Command,” Defense Visual Information Distribution
Service (DVIDS), December 18, 2020. See also H. I. Sutton, “SSN-23,” Covert Shores, August 27, 2017; John P.
Davis, “USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23), Expanding Future SSN Missions,” GlobalSecurity.org, undated. For a press
report on SSN-23, see, for example, Benjamin Brimelow, “The US Navy’s Only Operational Sub Named After a
President Has Been Doing Top-Secret Missions for 17 Years,” Business Insider, March 10, 2022.
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Figure 2. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Megan Eckstein, “Newport News Has Ful y Staffed
Attack Sub Line, After Years of Delays,” Defense News, February 9, 2023. The caption credits the photograph to
Matt Hildreth/HII and states that it shows USS Montana (SSN-794) under construction at HII/NNS.
Figure 3. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine

Source: Photograph accompanying Megan Eckstein, “The US Navy Is Spending Bil ions to Stabilize Vendors. Wil
It Work?” USNI News, September 8, 2023. The caption credits the photograph to Ashley Cowan/HII and states
that it shows the USS New Jersey (SSN-796) being moved at HII/NNS in April 2022.
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Virginia-Class Program
Program Elements
Unit Procurement Cost
Most Virginia-class boats to be procured in FY2019 and subsequent years are to be built to a
lengthened configuration that includes the Virginia Payload Module (VPM—see discussion
below). When procured at a rate of two boats per year, VPM-equipped Virginia-class SSNs have
an estimated procurement cost in FY2025 of about $4.3 billion per boat.
Annual Procurement Quantities
Table 2 shows annual numbers of Virginia-class boats procured from FY1998 (the lead boat)
through FY2023, and the numbers projected for procurement in FY2024-FY2028 under the
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission. A total of 38 Virginia-class boats have been procured through
FY2023.
Table 2. Actual and Projected Virginia-Class Procurement Quantities
Projected quantities for FY2024-FY2028 as shown in Navy’s FY2024 budget submission
FY98
1
FY06
1
FY14
2
FY22
2
FY99
1
FY07
1
FY15
2
FY23
2
FY00
0
FY08
1
FY16
2
FY24
2
FY01
1
FY09
1
FY17
2
FY25
2
FY02
1
FY10
1
FY18
2
FY26
2
FY03
1
FY11
2
FY19
2
FY27
2
FY04
1
FY12
2
FY20
2
FY28
2
FY05
1
FY13
2
FY21
2


Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
Multiyear Contracting
With the exception of the Virginia-class boat that was procured in FY2003, all Virginia-class
boats procured from FY1998 through FY2023 were procured under multiyear contracting,
meaning either a block buy contract (for the boats procured in FY1998-FY2002) or multiyear
procurement (MYP) contracts (for the boats procured from FY2004 through FY2003).19

19 The first four Virginia-class boats, known as the Block I boats, were procured under an FY1998-FY2002 block buy
contract. This was the first instance of block buy contracting—the mechanism of a block buy contract was essentially
created for procuring the first four Virginia-class boats. The Virginia-class boat procured in FY2003 fell between the
FY1998-FY2002 block buy contract and the subsequent FY2004-FY2008 MYP contract, and was contracted for
separately. The next five Virginia-class boats, known as the Block II boats, were procured under an FY2004-FY2008
MYP contract. The next eight Virginia-class boats, known as the Block III boats, were procured under an FY2009-
FY2013 MYP contract. The next 10 Virginia-class boats, known as the Block IV boats, were procured under an
FY2014-FY2018 MYP contract. The next 10 Virginia-class boats, known as the Block V boats, were procured under an
FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. For more on MYP and block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear
Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress
, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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The Navy wants the next Virginia-class MYP contract to begin not in FY2024, but in FY2025. As
part of its FY2024 budget submission, the Navy has requested authority for a Virginia-class MYP
contract that would begin in FY2025.20 The two boats requested for procurement for FY2024 are
to be added as non-MYP options to the FY2019-FY2023 Virginia MYP contract. The FY2019-
FY2023 MYP contract, in other words, is be used as a contractual vehicle for procuring the two
boats requested for procurement in FY2024, but those two boats would be executed as non-MYP
boats, without the special MYP procurement authorities (and resultant cost reductions) that were
applied to the other boats procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy states
that treating the two boats requested for procurement in FY2024 in this manner would put the
next Virginia-class MYP contract—the one that is to cover boats procured in FY2025-FY2029—
into better schedule alignment with contracts for procuring Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarines, which would maximize efficiency and supplier-firm stability in those years for both
the Virginia- and Columbia-class programs.21
Joint Production Arrangement
Virginia-class boats are built jointly by GD/EB—the program’s prime contractor—and HII/NNS.
The arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats was proposed to Congress by GD/EB,
HII/NNS, and the Navy, and agreed to by Congress in 1997, as part of Congress’s action on the
Navy’s budget for FY1998, the year that the first Virginia-class boat was procured.22 A primary
aim of the arrangement was to minimize the cost of building Virginia-class boats at a relatively
low annual rate in two shipyards (rather than entirely in a single shipyard) while preserving key
submarine-construction skills at both shipyards.
Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat, HII/NNS builds certain other
parts of each boat, and the yards have taken turns building the reactor compartments and
performing final assembly of the boats. The arrangement has resulted in a roughly 50-50 division
of Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves both yards’ ability to build
submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and
perform submarine final-assembly work.23

20 The Navy typically requests authority for an MYP contract for the Virginia-class program one year in advance of the
proposed start of the MYP contract. The Navy states that “if the MYP [proposed to begin in FY2025] is not approved
in FY 2024, the Navy would lose EOQ savings across the procurement and the long-term shipbuilder and vendor base
stability achieved with an MYP authority. If an MYP is not authorized for the next Block of VCS submarines, the Navy
may have to enter a single ship procurement contract for FY 2025 ships forcing industry to assume greater risk and
raise prices.” (Source: “Twelfth Package of Legislative Proposals Sent to Congress for Inclusion in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 – Individual Proposals (Sent to Congress on May 18, 2023),” posted at
https://ogc.osd.mil/OGC-Offices/Office-of-Legislative-Counsel/DoD-Legislative-Proposals-2024/.) See also Nick
Wilson, “Citing Essential Cost Savings, DOD Seeks Multiyear Authority for Block VI Virginia Submarines,” Inside
Defense
, May 19, 2023.
21 Source: Navy briefing on Virginia-class program for CRS and CBO, April 28, 2023.
22 See Section 121 of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997).
23 The joint production arrangement is a departure from prior U.S. submarine construction practices, under which
complete submarines were built in individual yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over
the Virginia-class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that occurred in 1995-1997
(i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB
and HII/NNS involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards capable of
building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a
submarine design that is being procured at a relatively low annual rate. The joint production agreement cannot be
changed without the agreement of both GD/EB and HII/NNS.
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Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP)
Under a plan it calls the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP),24 the Navy plans to build Columbia-
class ballistic missile submarines jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of the work going to
GD/EB. As part of this plan, the Navy plans to adjust the division of work on the Virginia-class
attack submarine program so that HII/NNS would receive a larger share of the final-assembly
work for that program than it has received in the past.25
Virginia Payload Module (VPM)
The Navy plans to build most Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years with
the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped
with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk
missiles or other payloads. The VPM’s vertical launch tubes are to be used to store and fire
additional Tomahawk cruise missiles or other payloads, including payloads with diameters larger
than the 21-inch diameter of a torpedo or Tomahawk missile.26 The four additional launch tubes
in the VPM could carry a total of 28 additional Tomahawk cruise missiles (seven per tube),27

24 The IEP was previously called the Submarine Unified Build Strategy, or SUBS.
25 Key elements of IEP include the following:
• GD/EB is to be the prime contractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
• HII/NNS is to be a subcontractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
• GD/EB is to build certain parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the parts that
GD/EB builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
• HII/NNS is to build certain other parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the
parts that HII/NNS builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
• GD/EB is to perform the final assembly on all 12 Columbia-class boats;
• as a result of the three previous points, the Navy estimates that GD/EB would receive an estimated 77%-78% of the
shipyard work building Columbia-class boats, and HII/NNS would receive 22%-23%;
• GD/EB is to continue as prime contractor for the Virginia-class program, but to help balance out projected
submarine-construction workloads at GD/EB and HII/NNS, the division of work between the two yards for building
Virginia-class boats is to be adjusted so that HII/NNS would perform the final assembly on a greater number of
Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current Virginia-class division of work (in which
final assemblies are divided more or less evenly between the two shipyards); as a consequence, HII/NNS would receive
a greater share of the total work in building Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current
division of work.
See Richard B. Burgess, “Submarine Admirals: ‘Unified Build Strategy’ Seeks Affordability for Future Sub Fleet,”
Seapower, July 8, 2016; Julia Bergman, “Congressmen Visit EB A Day After It Is Named Prime Contractor for Ohio
Reaplcement Program,” The Day (New London), March 29, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Ohio Replacement Plan Is
Good News For Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, March 29, 2016; Robert McCabe, “Newport News Shipbuilding’s
Share of Virginia-Class Submarine Deliveries to Grow,” Virginian-Pilot (Newport News), March 29, 2016; Valerie
Insinna, “GD Electric Boat Chosen To Take Lead Role for Ohio Replacement Sub,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2016:
1-3; Hugh Lessig, “Navy: More Submarine Work Coming to Newport News Shipyard,” Military.com, March 30, 2016.
See also Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration
& Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection
Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2016, p. 12.
26 For an illustration of the VPM, see http://www.gdeb.com/news/advertising/images/VPM_ad/VPM.pdf, which was
accessed by CRS on March 1, 2012.
27 Michael J. Conner, “Investing in the Undersea Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 16-20.
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which would increase the total number of torpedo-sized weapons (such as Tomahawks) carried by
the Virginia-class design from about 37 to about 65—an increase of about 76%.28
Building Virginia-class boats with the VPM is intended to compensate for a sharp loss in
submarine force weapon-carrying capacity that will occur with the retirement in FY2026-FY2028
of the Navy’s four Ohio-class SSGNs. Each SSGN is equipped with 24 large-diameter vertical
launch tubes, of which 22 can be used to carry up to seven Tomahawks each, for a maximum of
154 vertically launched Tomahawks per boat, or 616 vertically launched Tomahawks for the four
boats. Twenty-two Virginia-class boats built with VPMs could carry 616 Tomahawks in their
VPMs.
Acoustic and Other Improvements
The Virginia-class design has been updated multiple times since FY1998. In addition to the VPM,
the Navy is introducing acoustic and other improvements to the Virginia-class design that are
intended to help maintain the design’s superiority over Russian and Chinese submarines.29
Schedule and Cost Performance
The Virginia-class program experienced cost growth in its early years that was due in part to
annual procurement rates that were lower than initially envisaged and challenges in restarting
submarine production at HII/NNS.30 The lead ship in the program, however, was delivered within
four months of the target date that had been established about a decade earlier, and subsequent
boats in the program were delivered largely on cost and ahead of schedule.31 The Virginia (SSN-
774) class program received a David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award from DOD in
2008.
Beginning in 2019, it was reported that GD/EB, HII/NNS, and their supplier firms were
experiencing challenges in meeting scheduled delivery times as the Virginia-class program was
transitioning from production of two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-
equipped boats per year. Delivery delays have continued since then, and cost growth has emerged

28 A Virginia-class SSN can carry about 25 torpedoes in its four horizontal torpedo tubes and associated torpedo room,
and an additional 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles (which are torpedo-sized) in its bow-mounted vertical lunch tubes, for a
total of about 37 torpedo-sized weapons. Another 28 Tomahawks in four mid-body vertical tubes would increase that
total by about 76%.
29 For press reports discussing these improvements, see Kris Osborn, “The Navy Wants to Turn Its Nuclear Attack
Submarines Into ‘Spy’ Ships,” National Interest, May 28, 2018; Kris Osborn, “Navy Launches Most High-Tech &
Stealthy Attack Sub Ever,” Scout Warrior, November 18, 2017; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Considering Mid-Block
Virginia-Class Upgrades, SSGN Construction in Late 2030s,” USNI News, November 2, 2017; Zachary Cohen, “US
Launches ‘Most Advanced’ Stealth Sub Amid Undersea Rivalry,” CNN, October 26, 2017; Franz-Stefan Gady, “US
Navy Christens Most Advanced Attack Sub Ever,” The Diplomat, October 17, 2017; Douglas Ernst, “Navy Christens
Its ‘Most Advanced’ Attack Submarine Ever,” Washington Times, October 16, 2017; Dave Majumdar, “Stealth and
Armed to the Teeth: US Navy’s Big Plan for Submarine Dominance,” National Interest, July 9, 2016; Kris Osborn,
“‘Acoustic Superiority’: US Navy’s Secret Submarine Plan to Dominate the Seas,” National Interest, June 20, 2016;
Dave Majumdar, “This Is How the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Force Dominates the World’s Oceans,” National Interest,
May 17, 2016; Megan Eckstein, “Submarines To Become Stealthier Through Acoustic Superiority Upgrades,
Operational Concepts,” USNI News, March 1, 2016.
30 See Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, before the
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Hearing on Submarine Force
Structure and Acquisition Policy, March 8, 2007, Table 10 on pp. 14-15.
31 For discussions of recent exceptions, see Christopher P. Cavas, “US Navy Submarine Program Loses Some of Its
Shine,” Defense News, March 13, 2017; David B. Larter, “Virginia-Class Attack Sub Delivers late As US Navy Aims
to Get Program Back on Course,” Defense News, June 26, 2018.
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as an additional issue. This issue is discussed in more detail in the “Issues for Congress” section
of this report.
December 2021 Determinations Pursuant to Defense Production Act (DPA)
On December 21, 2021, President Biden signed three determinations permitting the use of the
Defense Production Act (DPA) to strengthen the U.S. submarine industrial base for the purpose of
increasing production of Virginia-class submarines. For more on these determinations, see
Appendix D.
FY2024 Funding Request
Virginia-Class Procurement Funding Requested in FY2024 Budget Submission
The Navy’s proposed budget requests the procurement of the 39th and 40th Virginia-class boats.
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission states that one of the two boats is to be built to a special
configuration referred to as the “Modified VIRGINIA Class Subsea and Seabed Warfare (Mod VA
SSW)” configuration,32 suggesting a configuration that includes a capability for conducting
seabed warfare missions.33
The two boats requested for procurement in FY2024 have an estimated combined procurement
cost of $9,427.6 million (i.e., about $9.4 billion), including $5,356.9 million for the Mod VA
SSW boat and $4,070.7 million for the other boat. The two boats have received a combined total
of $2,297.7 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s proposed
FY2024 budget requests the remaining $7,130.0 million needed to complete their estimated
combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget also requests $1,855.5 million
in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years; $1,360.0 million in
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding, which is an additional kind of AP funding that can
occur under an MYP contract; and $168.2 million in cost-to-complete (CTC) funding to cover
cost growth on Virginia-class boats procured in prior years, bringing the total amount of
procurement, AP, EOQ, and CTC funding requested for FY2024 to $10,513.7 million (i.e., about
$10.5 billion).
Supplemental Funding for Submarine Industrial Base Requested on October 20,
2023

In addition to the above requested funds, on October 20, 2023, the Administration submitted a
request for FY2024 emergency supplemental funding for national security priorities that includes,
among other things, a total of $3,393.2 million (i.e., about $3.4 billion) in funding for the

32 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 1 of 1,
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
, March 2023, p. 113.
33 In a transcript published on September 27, 2022, of a podcast on subsea and seabed warfare recorded September 26,
2022, a GD/EB official states “Subsea and Seabed warfare (SSW) is a new capability targeted for a single, late-block-V
Virginia-class submarine. While we can’t get into the details, we can say it is a complex, fast-moving program with
strong Navy and congressional support. We’re now well into the arrangement phase of the design, which is a critical
phase of the program when we lock down major decisions on systems and components and the configuration of
spaces.” Another EB official states that “prior Virginia insertions [i.e. insertions of new elements into the Virginia-class
design], like the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) compared to SSW, had about half as many arrangements and more
time to sell them all.” (Sydney Davies, “K. Graney Team Spotlight Podcast: Subsea and Seabed Warfare,” EB Landing,
September 27, 2022.)
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submarine industrial base to support construction of new submarines and maintenance of existing
submarines, as follows:
• $557.758 million in the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) appropriation
account for improvements at the four government-operated naval shipyards
(NSYs) that maintain the Navy’s nuclear-powered ships, including the Navy’s
submarines;
• $2,055.0 million in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
account (i.e., the Navy’s shipbuilding account) to increase production rates and
submarine availability through initiatives in supplier development, shipbuilder
and supplier infrastructure, workforce development, technology advancements,
and strategic sourcing;
• $393.57 million in the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) appropriation account to
increase production rates and submarine availability through initiatives in
supplier development, shipbuilder and supplier infrastructure, workforce
development, technology advancements, and strategic sourcing;
• $7.0 million in the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy (RDTEN)
appropriation account to increase production rates and submarine availability
through initiatives in supplier development, shipbuilder and supplier
infrastructure, workforce development, technology advancements, and strategic
sourcing;
• $281.914 million in the Military Construction, Navy and Marine Corps
appropriation account to support infrastructure work at the NSYs to improve the
ability to maintain the readiness of the fleet; and
• $98.0 million in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the
Department of Energy (DOE) for Naval Reactors (i.e., the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program) to support hiring and infrastructure expansion at the
Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites in
order to meet growing mission demands to provide the trilateral security
partnership between Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (i.e.,
AUKUS) with nuclear propulsion plants.34
AUKUS Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway for Selling Virginia-Class SSNs
and Transferring U.S. Submarine and Propulsion Technology to
Australia

Proposal Is Referred to as Pillar 1 of AUKUS
In September 2021, the U.S., UK, and Australian governments announced a significant new
security partnership called AUKUS (pronounced AW-kus, rhyming with caucus), with the
acronym referring to Australia, the UK, and the United States.35 The proposed first major

34 Source: Attachment 4: Submarine Industrial Base (pages 58-63) to letter dated October 20, 2023, from Shalanda D.
Young, Office of Management and Budget, to The Honorable Patrick McHenry, Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of
Representatives, accessed October 23, 2023, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Letter-
regarding-critical-national-security-funding-needs-for-FY-2024.pdf.
35 For more on the AUKUS agreement, see CRS In Focus IF12113, AUKUS and Indo-Pacific Security, by Derek E.
Mix and Bruce Vaughn; CRS Report R47599, AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress, by Patrick
(continued...)
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initiative under AUKUS, referred to as Pillar 1, would be a project to rotationally deploy up to
five U.S. and UK SSNs out of a port in Western Australia, and more significantly, for Australia,
with U.S. and UK assistance, to acquire, operate, and maintain its own force of eight
conventionally armed SSNs, including three to five Virginia-class SSNs that would be sold to
Australia. Today only six countries—the United States, the UK, France, Russia, China, and
India—operate nuclear-powered submarines. The United States since 1958 has provided
assistance to the UK’s nuclear-powered submarine program.36 Under the AUKUS Pillar 1
initiative, Australia would become the second country to receive U.S. assistance in this area.
Key Elements of Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway
Key elements of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include the following:37
Embedding of Australian personnel. Beginning in 2023, Australian military
and civilian personnel would embed with the U.S. and UK navies, and in the U.S.
and UK submarine industrial bases, to accelerate the training of Australian
personnel. The United States would increase SSN port visits to Australia
beginning in 2023, with Australian sailors joining U.S. crews for training and
development; the UK would increase visits to Australia beginning in 2026.
Rotational deployments of U.S. and UK SSNs from Australia. As early as
2027, the United States and UK would begin forward rotations of SSNs out of
HMAS Stirling, an Australian naval base near Perth, in Western Australia, to
accelerate the development of Australian naval personnel, workforce,
infrastructure and regulatory system. Eventually, one UK SSN and up to four
Virginia-class SSNs would be rotationally deployed out of HMAS Stirling under
the arrangement, which would be called Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-
West).
Sale of three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia. The United States would
sell Australia three Virginia-class submarines, with the potential to sell up to two
more if needed. The first two boats, which would be sold in FY2032 and
FY2035, would be existing boats with 18 to 27 years each of remaining expected
service life. The third boat, which would be sold in FY2038, would be a new boat
taken directly from the U.S. production line, and thus have a full 33-year
expected service life. In combination, the sale of these three boats would transfer

Parrish and Luke A. Nicastro; CRS In Focus IF11999, AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth
D. Nikitin; and CRS In Focus IF12483, U.S. Arms Transfer Restrictions and AUKUS Cooperation, by Paul K. Kerr and
Ilana Krill.
36 For additional discussion of U.S. assistance to the UK’s nuclear-powered submarine program, see CRS Report
R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for
Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
37 Sources: White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” March 13, 2023; Commonwealth of Australia, The
AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway, A Partnership for the Future
, undated, released ca. March 13, 2023, 57
pp.; U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024
, March 2023, p. 4, 15 (table note 3); Megan Eckstein, “Here’s When the US Navy Plans to Sell Subs to Australia
under AUKUS,” Defense News, November 16, 2023; Rich Abott, “Sub Boss Outlines Schedule Of Virginia-Sub Sales
To Australia Under AUKUS,” Defense Daily, November 9, 2023; Mallory Shelbourne, “Australia Will Announce
AUKUS Nuclear Attack Boat Build Partner Next Year,” USNI News, November 9, 2023; Justin Katz, “US Navy Sub
Boss Reveals New Details on AUKUS Virginia Class Sub Sales to Australia,” Breaking Defense, November 8, 2023;
John Hunter Farrell, “Australia To Get One New Build Virginia Class Submarine, Two From U.S. Navy,” The Drive,
June 8, 2023, which reports remarks made by Australian government officials in testimony at a May 2023 Australian
parliamentary hearing.
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more than 70 boat-years of SSN capability from the U.S. Navy to Australia’s
navy. The U.S. Navy anticipates building additional Virginia-class SSNs in the
2030s as replacements for submarines sold to Australia.
UK and Australia construction of AUKUS SSNs incorporating U.S.
technology. The UK and Australia would design and build a new class of
AUKUS SSNs for use in the UK and Australian navies that would incorporate
U.S. submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology. The boats would be
built in the UK and Australia, with the first boat delivered to the UK navy in the
late 2030s and the first boat built in Australia delivered to the Australian navy in
the early 2040s. If the Australian construction effort encounters delays, a fourth
and perhaps fifth Virginia-class boat would be sold to permit Australia to
continue the buildup of its SSN force. Australia by the mid-2050s would operate
a force of eight SSNs, including three to five Virginia-class boats and five to
three AUKUS SSNs.
Australian investments in U.S. and UK submarine industrial bases. Australia
would invest at least $3 billion in its industrial base to establish its own capacity
for building and maintaining SSNs. In addition to that $3 billion, and for the
purpose of supporting implementation of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway, Australia
has allocated in its budget model another $3 billion for an Australian contribution
to the U.S. submarine industrial base, as well as third sum of money (not yet
determined as of October 2023) for an Australian contribution to the UK
submarine industrial base.38 Although Australia’s budget model includes a figure
of $3 billion for Australia’s contribution the U.S. submarine industrial base, the
precise size and timing of Australia’s contribution to the U.S. submarine
industrial base is subject to U.S.-Australian consultations.
Previous Countries That Requested but Did Not Receive U.S. Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Technology

Overview
U.S. submarine technology and naval nuclear propulsion technology, reflecting decades of
cumulative U.S. Navy research, development, design, construction, and operational experience,
are generally considered crown jewels of U.S. military technology and consequently are highly
protected. As noted earlier, the technical (including acoustic) superiority of U.S. Navy nuclear-
powered submarines is generally considered a foundation of U.S. superiority in undersea warfare,
which in turn underpins a U.S. ability to leverage the world’s oceans as a medium of operations
and maneuver, deny that to others, and thereby generate a huge asymmetric strategic advantage
for the United States.
Given both its high degree of importance to overall U.S. national security strategy and U.S.
technical superiority in the field, U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology to date has been
shared with only one other country—the UK, through an arrangement begun in 1958 reflecting
the U.S.-UK special relationship and U.S.-UK cooperation on nuclear-related matters dating back
to the Manhattan project in World War II.

38 Parliament of Australia, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Trade Legislation Committee, October 25, 2023, transcript of
committee meeting, accessed December 13, 2023, at
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/estimate/27450/&sid=000
0.
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As detailed below, during the Cold War, when the United States and its allies were engaged in an
extended, high-stakes, and costly strategic competition against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact
allies, the United States reportedly turned down requests from four U.S. treaty allies other than
the UK—France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan—to share U.S. naval nuclear propulsion
technology. A fifth U.S. treaty ally—Canada—also requested but did not receive this technology.
Canada canceled its SSN project before the United States acted fully on Canada’s request. A sixth
country, Pakistan, also requested but did not receive the technology.
Detailed Discussion
In a November 18, 1987, presentation at a conference in Ottawa, Canada, U.S. Navy Captain
Robert F. Hofford, the U.S. naval attaché in Ottawa—who stated that he was expressing his own
views, which did not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government—stated that
Canada is not the only country that has requested this particular advantage from the U.S.
As a matter of fact, Canada stands at the end of a line of about six different nations [other
than the UK] that have requested exactly the same support from the U.S. for [a] nuclear
submarine program. In fact we have turned them all down up to this point, so Canada is in
a unique position of being the first country other than the British to be allowed or to even
start a technology information flow that will allow the country to pursue its lines toward a
nuclear program.39
Regarding France, Italy, and the Netherlands, a November 5, 1987, letter from Representative
Melvin Price to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger and Secretary of Energy John S.
Herrington, the full text of which is reprinted in Appendix E, states in part
It is important to appreciate that there is nothing new about an ally wanting our naval
nuclear propulsion technology—or about the consistently strong U.S. policy against its
releases. Over the years, we have turned down requests from a number of countries,
including France, Italy, and the Netherlands.
Regarding France, a 1989 journal article on assistance that the United States provided to France
on the design of French nuclear warheads stated
One area in which the French requested but did not receive help was in antisubmarine-
warfare (ASW) technology and, in particular, in silencing their own ballistic missile
submarines to make them less easily tracked by Soviet hunter-killers. The U.S. Navy
adamantly opposed any such assistance. Behind the navy’s position was the extreme
sensitivity of its own counter-ASW regime. “The security of our Poseidon-Trident force
was so important that we were not going to share with anybody else the methods we used
to preserve it,” a senior civilian told me. Another said, “This is a jewel the navy will give
to no one.”40
Regarding Japan, Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, then-Director of the U.S. Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program (aka Naval Reactors), testified in March 1988:
Frankly, I think Japan is smart enough, if they really want to, to develop a phase-to-phase
[sic: phased-array] radar.41 They have also asked us for help in nuclear submarines. We

39 Transcript of presentation.
40 Richard H. Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1989 (No. 75): 16-17, accessed at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148862.
41 Admiral McKee’s testimony at this point is referring to a proposal at the time, which he was asked to comment on, to
sell to Japan the U.S. Navy’s surface ship Aegis weapon system, which included the SPY-1 phased-array radar. The
system was eventually sold to Japan and is now used on eight Japanese destroyers. The system was also sold to South
Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway for use on ships in the navies of those countries. For more on the Aegis system,
(continued...)
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say[,] “If you want to get into the nuclear submarine business, go ahead and do it. You
don’t need our help.”42
Regarding Pakistan, Admiral McKee testified in March 1988: “We have a letter from the
Pakistanis who want one [i.e., a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine] because the Soviets gave [sic:
leased] one [i.e., a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine] to India.43
Admiral McKee’s testimony about Japan and Pakistan was given in connection with a project that
Canada initiated in 1987 to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK- or French-made SSNs. A choice by
Canada to select the UK SSN design (the Trafalgar-class design) would have involved the transfer
to Canada of naval nuclear propulsion technology in the Trafalgar-class design that was derived
from the naval nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK
beginning in 1958, which would have raised a question of U.S. approval for a potential sale of
UK-made SSNs to Canada. The issue was discussed in a 1988 CRS report.44 Canada canceled its
SSN project in 1989, mooting the potential question of whether to share with Canada naval
nuclear propulsion technology in the Trafalgar-class design that was derived from the naval
nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in 1958. For
1987-1988 letters and statements from Members of Congress regarding the Canadian SSN
project, see Appendix E.
Impact of Selling Virginia-Class Boats to Australia on Size of U.S. SSN Force
Overview of CBO and CRS Estimates
Selling three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia would reduce the size of the U.S. Navy’s
SSN force from FY2032 (when the first boat would be sold) until (as estimated by CRS and
CBO) sometime between 2040 and 2049. As discussed further in the detailed discussion below
• Based on Navy testimony and potential construction times for SSNs, CRS
notionally estimates that if the Navy were able to increase SSN production rates
along the lines that the Navy has described, then the third replacement boat might

see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
42 U.S. Congress. House. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—1989, Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1989—H.R. 4264, and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, Department of Energy National
Security Programs, before the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives
, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 3, 1988, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988, H.A.S.C. No.
100-75, p. 3. (Included in CRS/FDT bound volume collection as House Armed Services Committee, Hearings. [Vol.] 9,
100th Congress, 2d Sess.
, 1988, CRS-F.)
43 Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1989, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988, p. 1327.
India leased a nuclear-powered submarine with the hull number K-43 from the Soviet Union in September 1987. The
boat served in India’s navy from 1988 to 1991, and the lease is viewed as helping India with its effort to design and
build its own nuclear-powered submarines. (See for example “Soviet submarine K-43,” Wikipedia, updated March 19,
2023, accessed October 30, 2023.) India leased a second nuclear-powered submarine from Russia in 2012 (the boat
served in India’s Navy from 2012 to 2021), and in 2019 signed a lease with Russia for a third nuclear-powered
submarine that reportedly is to join India’s navy by 2025. (See, for example, Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India Signs $3
Billion Contract with Russia for Lease of a Nuclear Submarine,” Defense News, March 8, 2019; “List of submarines of
the Indian Navy,” Wikipedia, updated October 21, 2023, accessed October 30, 2023.)
44 For a discussion of this issue, see CRS Issue Brief IB88083, Canadian Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine
Program: Issues for Congress
, updated April 24, 1989 (archived), by Ronald O’Rourke. This report is available to
congressional clients directly from the author.
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enter service around 2043, and the fourth and fifth replacement boats, if needed,
might enter service around 2046 and 2049, respectively.
• The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), based on a detailed SSN procurement
projection CBO developed, estimates that if the Navy were able to increase SSN
production rates along the lines that the Navy has described, then the third
replacement boat would enter service in 2040 and the fourth and fifth
replacement boats, if needed, would enter service in 2042 and 2049, respectively.
• In other words, CRS and CBO estimate that if three Virginia-class boats are sold
to Australia, the reduction in the size of the U.S. SSN force would last until 2040
(CBO) or 2043 (CRS), that if four Virginia-class boats are sold to Australia, the
reduction would last until 2042 (CBO) or 2046 (CRS), and that if five Virginia-
class boats are sold to Australia, the reduction would last until 2049 (both CBO
and CRS).
• These estimated dates are dependent on the ability of the Navy and the U.S.
submarine construction industrial base to increase the Virginia-class production
rate to 2.0 boats per year by 2028 and to 2.33 boat per year sometime after that. If
the Virginia-class production rate falls short of these goals, then the reduction in
the size of the SSN force could last longer than the dates cited above.
Detailed Discussion
The Navy states in its FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan, “the Navy anticipates building
additional Virginia class SSNs in the 2030s as replacements for submarines sold to Australia.”
Strictly construed, building additional SSNs as replacements for three to five Virginia-class boats
sold to Australia would involve building three to five SSNs that would be in addition to those that
were already envisaged as being built under the Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan that preceded the
announcement of the AUKUS agreement in September 2021. The Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan
with 30-year ship procurement profiles that preceded the announcement of the AUKUS
agreement in September 2021 is the Navy FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan,
which was submitted in March 2019. This 30-year plan includes the procurement of SSNs at a
steady rate of two boats per year from FY2021 through FY2049.45
On this basis, it might be argued that building replacement SSNs for three to five Virginia-class
boats sold to Australia would involve building SSNs at a rate of something more than two boats
per year. At an October 25, 2023, hearing on the submarine industrial base and its ability to
support the AUKUS framework before the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee, the Navy testified that supporting both U.S. Navy and
AUKUS needs would require the increasing the Virginia-class construction rate from 2.0 boats
per year to 2.33 boats per year.46 Compared to a previously planned procurement rate of 2.0 boats
per year, a procurement rate of 2.33 boats per year would equate to one additional boat every
three years.
If the first replacement boat were procured in FY2030 and an additional replacement boat were
procured every three years thereafter (i.e., in FY2033, FY2036, and so on if needed), and if each
boat were to take seven years to build (which is a construction time that might be reasonable

45 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2020
, March 2019, Table A2-1 on page 13.
46 Joint Statement, Honorable Erik K. Raven, Under Secretary of the Navy, VADM William J. Houston, Commander,
Naval Submarine Forces, [and] RDML Jonathan Rucker, Program Executive Officer, Attack Submarines, before the
House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, October 25, 2023, p. 5.
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under projected construction conditions), then CRS notionally estimates that the third
replacement boat might enter service around 2043, and the fourth and fifth replacement boats, if
needed, might enter service around 2046 and 2049, respectively.
CBO, based on a detailed SSN procurement projection CBO developed under which the first four
replacement boats are procured at one- and two-year intervals rather than three-year intervals,
estimates that the third replacement boat would enter service in 2040, and the fourth and fifth
replacement boats, if needed, would enter service in 2042 and 2049, respectively.47
Whether the U.S. submarine construction industrial base would be able to achieve an SSN
construction rate of 2.33 boats per year, particularly as it also is building new Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarines, is a question that may be considered. As discussed later in this
report, although Virginia-class submarines are currently being procured at a rate of two boats per
year, the submarine construction industrial base is currently able to build them at a rate of about
1.2 to 1.3 boats per year, resulting in a growing backlog of SSN construction work, and the Navy
does not anticipate the Virginia-class construction rate reaching 2.0 boats per year until 2028.
As noted earlier, the supplemental funding for the submarine industrial base requested on October
20, 2023, is intended to help increase the capacity of the submarine industrial base to support both
pre-AUKUS U.S. Navy needs and additional submarine-construction needs that would be
required for implementing the AUKUS agreement. If the Navy is not able to achieve an SSN
construction rate of 2.33 boats per year, then replacement boats for those sold to Australia could
enter service with the U.S. Navy later than indicated in the above CRS and CBO estimates, or
perhaps not be built at all.
Under the Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, the Navy’s SSN force—
without the sale of any Virginia-class boats to Australia—is projected to include 50 SSNs in
FY2035 and either 55, 57, or 60 SSNs in FY2045. The FY2035 figure of 50 SSNs represents a
shortfall of about 24% relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal of 66 boats, while the FY2045
figures of 55, 57, and 60 boats represent shortfalls of about 17%, 14%, and 9%, respectively,
relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal of 66 boats.
Selling three Virginia-class boats to Australia by FY2035, and not replacing them through the
construction of additional Virginia-class boats by FY2035, would reduce the projected number of
SSNs in FY2035 to 47 boats, which would increase the percentage shortfall in the number of
Navy SSNs relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal in FY2035 from the above-mentioned
figure of about 24% to about 29%.
Selling three Virginia-class boats to Australia by FY2045, and not replacing them through the
construction of additional Virginia-class boats by FY2045, would reduce the projected number of
SSNs in FY2045 to 52, 54, or 57 boats, which would increase the percentage shortfalls in the
number of Navy SSNs relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal in FY2045 from the above-
mentioned figures of about 17%, 14%, and 9%, respectively, to about 21%, 18%, and 14%,
respectively.
Selling five Virginia-class boats to Australia by FY2045, and not replacing them through the
construction of additional Virginia-class boats by FY2045, would reduce the projected number of
SSNs in FY2045 to 50, 52, or 55 boats, which would increase the percentage shortfalls in the
number of Navy SSNs relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal in FY2045 from the above-

47 Source CBO email to CRS, October 30, 2023. See also Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s
Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan
, October 2023, Box 1 on pp 28-29.
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mentioned figures of about 17%, 14%, and 9%, respectively, to about 24%, 21%, and 17%,
respectively.
May 2023 DOD Legislative Package with Requested Enabling Legislation
On May 2, 2023, DOD sent to Congress its eighth package of legislative proposals requested for
inclusion in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The package included
requested measures that would
• provide DOD with the authority to accept payments from the government of
Australia for the purpose of improving the U.S. submarine industrial base;
• authorize the transfer of up to two Virginia-class SSNs to the government of
Australia in the form of a sale, with the costs of the transfer covered by the
government of Australia; and
• provide for the training of the Australian private-sector personnel to support the
development of the Australian submarine industrial base under the foreign
military sales program pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).
For the text of the legislative package, see the “Legislative Activity ” section of this report.
Supplemental Funding for Submarine Industrial Base Requested on
October 20, 2023

As noted earlier, on October 20, 2023, the Administration submitted a request for FY2024
emergency supplemental funding for national security priorities that includes, among other
things, a total of $3,393.2 million (i.e., about $3.4 billion) in funding for the submarine industrial
base to support construction of new submarines and maintenance of existing submarines. This
funding is intended to help increase the capacity of the submarine industrial base to support both
pre-AUKUS U.S. Navy needs and additional submarine-construction needs that would be
required for implementing the AUKUS agreement.
October 25, 2023, Hearing on Submarine Industrial Base and AUKUS
On October 25, 2023, the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee held a hearing on the submarine industrial base and its ability to support the
AUKUS framework. The witnesses—all from DOD and the Navy, and who testified in support of
the proposed Pillar 1 pathway and the supplemental funding for the submarine industrial base that
was requested on October 20, 2023—were Dr. Mara Karlin, performing the duties of Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Erik Raven, Under Secretary of the Navy; Vice Admiral
William Houston, Commander, Naval Submarine Forces; and Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker,
Program Executive Officer, Attack Submarines.48
Potential Alternative of a U.S.-Australia Division of Labor
A potential alternative to the proposed Pillar 1 pathway would be a U.S.-Australia military
division of labor under which U.S. SSNs would perform both U.S. and Australian SSN missions

48 The prepared statements of the witnesses are available at
https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=116514. The CQ transcript of the hearing is
available (subscription required) at https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7864570?3. A video of the hearing
is available at https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings/spf-hearing-submarine-industrial-base-and-its-ability-support-
aukus-framework.
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while Australia invested in military capabilities for performing non-SSN missions for both
Australia and the United States. Such a U.S.-Australia military division of labor might be broadly
similar to military divisions of labor that exist between the United States and some or all of its
NATO or other allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft carriers, SSNs, large surface
combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non-naval capabilities such as (to name only some
examples) nuclear weapons, space assets, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities.
Under a U.S.-Australia military division of labor involving SSNs
• the proposed forward rotations of U.S. and UK SSNs to Australia would still be
implemented;
• the size of the U.S. SSN force would be expanded by at least three to five boats,
and possibly eight boats, above previous plans so as to provide additional U.S.
SSNs for performing Australian SSN missions; and
• Australia, instead of using funds to purchase, operate, and maintain its own
SSNs, would instead invest those funds in other military capabilities (such as, for
example, producing long-range anti-ship missiles and/or purchasing of U.S.-
made B-21 long-range bombers),49 so as to create an Australian capacity for
performing non-SSN military missions for both Australia and the United States.
Variations of this potential alternative include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
• Under one variation of this potential alternative, the proposed sharing of U.S.
naval nuclear propulsion technology and U.S. submarine technology, the
proposed Australian investments in Australian and U.S. submarine-construction
capability, and the other proposed actions for supporting eventual Australian
construction of AUKUS SSNs would continue, and Australia would eventually
build its own AUKUS SSNs, reducing at that point the need for U.S. SSNs to
perform Australian SSN missions.
• Under another variation of this potential alternative, the performance of
Australian SSN missions by U.S. SSNs would continue indefinitely, and instead
of implementing the technology sharing, making Australian investments in
submarine-construction capability, and taking the other actions that would be
needed to eventually build AUKUS SSNs, Australia would continue investing in
other military capabilities for supporting a continuing U.S.-Australia division of
labor. Under this variation, the size of the U.S. SSN force would eventually be
expanded above previously planned levels by eight boats (i.e., the planned
eventual number of SSNs that Australia had planned to acquire).
Under both variations of this potential alternative, some or all of the U.S. Navy SSNs that would
perform Australian SSN missions could be operated out of a port in Australia, in an arrangement
perhaps similar to the earlier-described Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) concept
that forms another part of AUKUS Pillar 1, or to the arrangement under which U.S. Navy
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) from 1961 to 1991 underwent inter-
deployment refits at a forward-located facility in Holy Loch, Scotland.50

49 For more on the B-21 program, see CRS Report R44463, Air Force B-21 Raider Long-Range Strike Bomber,
coordinated by John R. Hoehn.
50 For a short history of the Holy Loch arrangement, see, Ronald D. Gumbert, “History of Submarine Squadron
(continued...)
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Table 3 summarizes certain features of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway and the two above-
described variations of the potential alternative of a U.S.-Australia division of labor.
Table 3. Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway and Potential Division of Labor Alternative
Potential alternative of U.S.-Australia
division of labor

Proposed AUKUS pathway
One variation
Another variation
Australian SSN missions to
Australian Navy SSNs, consisting
U.S. Navy SSNs, until
be performed in 2030s and
initially of Virginia-class boats sold
replaced by
U.S. Navy SSNs
beyond by…
to Australia, later augmented by
Australian-made
Australian-made AUKUS SSNs
AUKUS SSNs
Forward rotations of U.S.
Yes
Yes
Yes
and UK SSNs to Australia
3 to 5 Virginia-class SSNs
Yes
No
No
sold to Australia
AUKUS SSNs built in
Yes
Yes
No
Australia for Australian use
Source: Table prepared by CRS.
Issues for Congress
AUKUS Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway for Selling Virginia-Class SSNs
and Transferring U.S. Submarine and Propulsion Technology to
Australia
Key questions for Congress in assessing whether to approve, reject, or modify the proposed Pillar
1 pathway include the following:
• Should Congress decide in 2023 whether to approve, reject, or modify the
legislation requested to implement the proposed Pillar 1 pathway, as the
Administration is requesting, or defer a decision until 2024 or later?
• How do the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway
compare to those of the potential alternative of a U.S.-Australia division of labor?
Each of these two questions is discussed below.
Deciding on Requested Enabling Legislation in 2023 or at a Later Point
Administration Is Requesting Congressional Action in 2023
The Administration is asking Congress to approve the legislation requested to implement the
proposed Pillar 1 pathway in 2023 rather than at a later point on the grounds that approving the
requested legislation quickly would send a strong signal of U.S. resolve and commitment, and
because deferring approval of the legislation to 2024 or beyond would delay the timeline for

Fourteen,” Submarine Review, January 1992: 72-77, accessed November 6, 2023, at
https://archive.navalsubleague.org/1992/history-of-submarine-squadron-fourteen.
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implementing the pathway. At an October 25, 2023, hearing on the submarine industrial base and
its ability to support the AUKUS framework before the Seapower and Projection Forces
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the Navy testified
To maintain momentum and programmatic schedules, there are four critical legislative
proposals that must be passed as part of the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA)….
Passage demonstrates the US commitment, sends the right signal to Australia to make
proportional contribution into the US SIB, and keeps Pillar One on track…. Passing this
legislation now will also allow for the appropriate amount of time to complete what will
be an extremely complicated Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case. The FMS case allows
Australian personnel to take part in the planning and execution of the major maintenance
availability occurring prior to the first planned SSN transfer. Including AU in these efforts
allows future AU [Australian] crews better access and understanding of the SSN operation
and integrates the maintenance team for observation of the planning and execution of a
large maintenance period. Planning for this availability starts within the next two years.
Therefore, to support Australian personnel integration into the planning, execution, and re-
delivery process, the FMS case requires Congressional authorization this year.
This legislative proposal also amends Section 8680 of Title 10 to allow for the maintenance
of US submarines in Australia and the UK and to be carried out by personnel from all
AUKUS nations. Modifying Title 10 is critical to establishing Submarine Rotational Force-
West (SRF-W) by late 2027 and ultimately Australia’s ability to safely and effectively
operate SSNs. Not passing this legislation will require the US to alter maintenance work
associated with planned SSN port visits in 2025, impacting Australia’s ability to build the
knowledge, skills and stewardship required to operate SSNs and will likely delay the
establishment of SRF-W.
Acceptance of contributions is required this year to authorize the US Department of
Defense to receive Australia’s proportional contribution for the US SIB starting in 2025….
The training proposal is required to fully develop the Australian submarine industrial base
and allow for personnel to be embedded in early calendar year 2024. Without this
provision, the number of Australian personnel eligible for training in the US would be well
below projected requirements and will negatively impact the establishment of SRF-W.51
Information Available to Congress in 2023
In assessing whether to whether approve, reject, or modify the legislation requested to implement
the proposed Pillar 1 pathway in 2023, as the Administration is requesting, or defer a decision
until 2024 or later, Congress may consider, among other things, whether it has adequate
information to support a decision in 2023. Items of information that could be helpful to Congress
in assessing the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include but are not necessarily limited to the
following:
Specific boats that would be sold. Which Virginia-class boats, specifically,
would be sold to Australia? If a total of four or five boats are sold, how many
would be existing boats with less than 33 years of remaining expected service
life, and how many would be newly built boats?
Prices of boats that would be sold. How much would Australia pay for each
boat that it would purchase? Adjusted for their remaining expected service lives,

51 Joint Statement, Honorable Erik K. Raven, Under Secretary of the Navy, VADM William J. Houston, Commander,
Naval Submarine Forces, [and] RDML Jonathan Rucker, Program Executive Officer, Attack Submarines, before the
House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, October 25, 2023, pp. 8-9.
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how would those sale prices compare to the $4.3-billion procurement cost of a
new VPM-equipped Virginia-class boat?
The precise amount and timing of Australia’s investment in U.S. submarine
industrial base. How much additional funding, exactly, would Australia provide
for the U.S. submarine construction industrial base? When would this funding be
provided? Would it be provided in a single payment or a series of payments?
Dates for procuring replacement boats. When would each of the three to five
replacement boats for the U.S. Navy be procured, and when would they each
enter service?
U.S. industrial base capability for building replacement boats. How able
would the U.S. submarine construction base be in the 2030s to build, as
replacements for sold Virginia-class boats, three to five new SSNs for the U.S.
Navy that would be in addition to the SSNs already envisaged for procurement
for U.S. Navy use prior to the announcement of the AUKUS agreement?
Operational impact of reduction in U.S. SSN force. What would be the impact
of a three- to five-boat reduction in the size of the U.S. SSN force on the ability
of the U.S. SSN force to perform day-to-day and wartime SSN missions of
interest to the United States?
At the October 25, 2023, hearing on the submarine industrial base and its ability to support the
AUKUS framework before the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
REPRESENATIVE MIKE GALLAGHER: Thank you. First, a sort of a clerical issue, my
understanding is the Submarine Industrial Base 2025 study is done. I think some of our
staff may have been briefed on it, but do we have access to the report or rather can we have
access to the report?
DR. MARA KARLIN, PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY: Indeed, I believe that some briefings have
occurred and some additional briefings will occur to—to you and your staff. I think folks
are just scheduling those right now.
GALLAGHER: Could we get the actual report though itself?
KARLIN: I believe that they will be briefing you on the—on the actual study and I think
they have—their plan is to brief you on the cost estimates from the study and to walk
through the substance of it.
GALLAGHER: Um, Wait so—But presumably the study's like instantiated in like a
physical document, right? Like could we just get the physical document at some point to
read it? And if we’re assessing the health of the submarine industrial base, I think that
would be like very helpful.
KARLIN: Yeah, I believe—I believe the plan is to sit down with you and your staff and
walk through materials related to it and I would note that that did—did inform the numbers
that were in—in the [FY2024] supplemental [funding request for the submarine industrial
base].
GALLAGHER: Ok, I guess in addition to being walked through the material, could I just
have the material to read the material?
KARLIN: I can take that back. I think as of now the plan was to brief you all using materials
to be clear.
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REPRESNTATIVE TRENT KELLY, CHAIRMAN: If you could—if you could take back
that we would like the actual report, I think that’s very helpful.52
An October 12, 2023, letter to President Biden from Senators Roger F. Wicker, Jeanne Shaheen,
Dan Sullivan, Richard Blumenthal, Kevin Cramer, and Tim Kaine states
We write to express our strong support for advancing the Australia-United Kingdom-
United States (AUKUS) partnership. The collaboration across the U.S. government over
the last several months has enabled significant progress in the development of the legal
authorities necessary for AUKUS implementation, and we are eager to see those authorities
be signed into law this year.
To realize the full potential of AUKUS, the American defense industrial base will require
significant resources to improve submarine construction and maintenance rates. The
volume of submarine tonnage the industrial base must produce to meet the Navy’s own
requirements and fully implement the AUKUS agreement will require historic and
sustained investments in the submarine workforce and supplier network. To achieve such
capacity, Congress must have a comprehensive understanding of the current status of the
submarine industrial base as well as the future resource investments necessary to meet our
nation’s requirements.
We understand that a Submarine Industrial Base 2025 (SIB-25) study from the U.S. Navy
and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation is complete, but that the
administration does not plan to share its findings with Congress until the President’s
Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2025 is released, sometime early next year. However,
understanding the scope of the generational investment required for the SIB’s viability is
critical for development of AUKUS-authorizing legislation this year and for robust
Congressional oversight as the United States charts the future course of AUKUS.
Therefore, we ask the administration to provide the cost estimates contained within the
SIB-25 study to Congress no later than October 31, 2023, to inform Congressional
consideration of any AUKUS-associated legislation.
It is critical that the administration articulate a detailed plan for instituting necessary
enhancements to the submarine industrial base. This is a crucial first step in posturing the
United States to effectively address existing security challenges in the Indo-Pacific, and
essential for fully realizing the potential of the AUKUS agreement.53
An October 17, 2023, report from the Defence Committee of the House of Commons of the UK
Parliament on UK defense and the Indo-Pacific region stated the following regarding the UK’s
role in AUKUS (emphasis as in the original)
Witnesses also pointed to the challenges involved in implementing the partnership. For
example, Dr [Marcus] Hellyer [Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
(ASPI)] and Professor [Rory] Medcalf [Head of National Security College, Australian
National University] thought it essential that the Government remains realistic and alert to
the magnitude of the challenge posed by the timeframes, cost, infrastructure and regulation
required to deliver this ambitious programme. Such challenges are likely to be heightened
by the lack of clarity over key details of the programme: for example, Baroness Goldie was
unable to tell us how many SSN-AUKUS submarines will be built for the UK or with
which weapons systems the submarines will be equipped….

52 CQ transcript of hearing.
53 Letter dated October 12, 2023, to President Joe Biden from Senators Roger F. Wicker, Jeanne Shaheen, Dan
Sullivan, Richard Blumenthal, Kevin Cramer, and Tim Kaine, accessed October 23, 2023, at
https://www.wicker.senate.gov/services/files/17397F99-D39B-4D53-BF10-6A7A6BF6C074. See also Bryant Harris,
“Senators Push Biden to Release Submarine Costs for AUKUS,” Defense News, October 17, 2023.
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We welcome the announcement of the SSN-AUKUS class submarine, including the
increased port visits and the Rotational Force, in maintaining a coherent regional
presence. The UK must, however, be realistic and cognisant of the significant hurdles
for all AUKUS partners in constructing nuclear-powered submarines. A fundamental
challenge is the continuing lack of clarity about how many submarines will ultimately
be built, the cost, and the availability of a skilled workforce. We call on the
Government to set out in its response to this Report the anticipated timescale for
producing a detailed plan on: how much it expects SSN-AUKUS to cost, how it will
address the skills shortage, and how many SSN-AUKUS class it will produce. It should
also set out any existing plans so far as they exist.
54
Potential questions for Congress to consider include the following:
• Does Congress have sufficient information in 2023 regarding the specific
elements of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway (including elements addressed in the
bullet points listed above) to adequately assess the merits of Pillar 1?
• Is the executive branch being adequately forthcoming in providing Congress with
such information?
• What might be the potential implications if Congress were to make a decision in
2023 about the proposed Pillar 1 pathway without sufficient information on its
specific elements?
Supporters of making a decision in 2023 on whether to approve, reject, or modify the legislation
requested to implement the proposed Pillar 1 pathway could argue, as the Navy did in the above-
quoted portion of the Navy’s testimony at the October 25, 2023, hearing, that approving the
requested legislation in 2023 would send a strong signal of U.S. resolve and commitment, and
that deferring a decision to 2024 or a later year would send a weaker signal and set back the
timeline for implementing the pathway. They could argue that in light of the urgency that some
observers view for countering China’s improving naval and other military capabilities,55 including
concerns about the possibility that China might take military action against Taiwan or other
countries sometime within the next few years,56 any delay in implementing the proposed Pillar 1
pathway could have a significant impact on deterring or responding to potential nearer-term
Chinese aggression against Taiwan or other countries.
Supporters of deferring a decision until 2024 or later could argue that if Congress in 2023 does
not have adequate information from the executive branch for making a decision (including
information on the elements addressed in the bullet points listed earlier), then making a decision
in 2023 could be premature, inconsistent with maintaining Congress as a co-equal branch of
government, or inconsistent with carrying out Congress’s responsibility for conducting effective
oversight of executive branch proposals, particularly on matters as important as those involved in
the proposed Pillar 1 pathway. Making a decision in 2023 without adequate information, they
could argue, could create downstream risks in execution that themselves could set back the

54 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Defence Committee, UK Defence and the Indo-Pacific, Eleventh Report of
Session 2022–23, Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report, Ordered by the House of Commons to be
printed 17 October 2023, pp. 25-26. The second paragraph in the block quote appears again on pages 39-40 as part of
the report’s conclusions and recommendations section.
55 For more on China’s naval modernization effort and its overall military capabilities, see CRS Report RL33153,
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke, and CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell.
56 For more on this concern, which is sometimes referred with the terms such as the Davidson window (meaning the
period 2021 to 2027) or decade of concern (meaning the decade from 2020 to 2030), see CRS Report RL33153, China
Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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implementation timeline. They could argue that in some past instances where the Navy urged
Congress to act quickly to approve a new effort, and Congress complied, such as (to cite one
example) the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, downstream execution challenges led
to multiple program challenges and the eventual truncation of the program.57
Merits of Proposed Pillar 1 Compared to U.S.-Australia Division of Labor
In assessing the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway compared to
those of the potential alternative of a U.S.-Australia division of labor, Congress may consider
various issues, including but not limited to the following:
• the analytical basis and business case for the proposed Pillar 1 pathway;
• the potential impact on deterrence and warfighting capability;
• the potential impact on the risk of China, Russia, or some other country gaining
access to U.S. submarine or naval nuclear propulsion technology; and
• the risk of an accident involving an Australian-owned SSN that might call into
question for third-party observers the safety of all U.S. Navy nuclear-powered
ships and thereby affect U.S. public support for operating U.S. Navy nuclear-
powered ships and/or the ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships to make
port calls around the world.
Each of these issues is discussed below.
Analytical Basis and Business Case
In terms of the time, funding, personnel, technology, and industrial work that would be involved,
implementing the proposed Pillar 1 pathway would be an effort comparable in scale and
complexity to a major DOD acquisition program. Major DOD acquisition programs are generally
not initiated without first demonstrating that there is a rigorous analytical basis for the program—
something that is typically done by conducting a formal study, often called an analysis of
alternatives (AOA) or analysis of multiple concepts (AMC), that rigorously compares various
potential courses of action so as to identify the one that the analysis shows to be the most cost
effective. Performing an AOA, AMC, or equivalent rigorous analysis prior to initiating a program
can test the validity of beliefs or presumptions about the cost effectiveness of an envisioned
course of action, and sometimes produce unexpected or counter-intuitive results.
Establishing a firm analytical basis for an acquisition program by conducting an AOA, AMC, or
equivalent rigorous analysis can help form part of what the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) refers to as a sound business case for proceeding with an acquisition program. GAO since
at least 2006 has reported and testified multiple times on the risks associated with initiating
acquisition programs without a sound business case.58

57 For further discussion, see pages 20-27 of the May 12, 2017, version of CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke. Similar discussions can be found in
earlier versions of this report.
58 A 2006 GAO report, for example, states:
We have frequently reported on the importance of using a solid, executable business case before
committing resources to a new product development effort. In the case of DOD, a business case
should be based on DOD acquisition policy and lessons learned from leading commercial firms and
successful DOD programs. The business case in its simplest form is demonstrated evidence that (1)
the warfighter’s needs are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen concept, and (2) the
(continued...)
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chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources—that is, proven
technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when
it is needed. A program should not go forward into product development unless a sound business
case can be made.
(Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Improved Business Case Is Needed
for Future Combat System’s Successful Outcome
, GAO-06-367, March 2006, p. 8.
A 2015 GAO report states:
A business case provides demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter need exists and that it can
best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the concept can be developed and produced within
existing resources—including proven technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and
adequate time to deliver the product when needed. Establishing a business case calls for a realistic
assessment of risks and costs; doing otherwise undermines the intent of the business case and
invites failure.
(Government Accountability Office, Acquisition Reform[:] DOD Should Streamline Its Decision-
Making Process for Weapon Systems to Reduce Inefficiencies
, GAO-15-192, footnote 11 on page 9.
A similar statement is found in Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Joint
Action Needed by DOD and Congress to Improve Outcomes
, Testimony Before Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Managing Director,
Acquisition and Sourcing Management, GAO-16-187T, October 27, 2015, highlights page.)
A 2020 GAO report states:
GAO’s previous work has shown that weapon systems without a sound business case are
at greater risk for schedule delays, cost growth, and integration issues….
We have previously reported on the importance of establishing a solid, executable business case
before committing resources to a new development effort. A business case demonstrates that (1) the
warfighter’s needs are valid and that they can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the
chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources. In addition to an
acquisition strategy, other basic elements of a sound acquisition business case include firm
requirements, a plan for attaining mature technologies, and a reliable cost estimate and affordability
analysis….
(Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Action Is Needed to Provide Clarity
and Mitigate Risks of the Air Force's Planned Advanced Battle Management System
, GAO-20-389,
April 2020, highlights page and p. 7.)
In 2021 testimony on DOD acquisition, GAO states:
GAO annually assesses selected DOD weapon programs and their likely outcomes by analyzing:
(1) the soundness of a program’s business case—which provides evidence that the warfighter’s
needs are valid and the concept can be produced within existing resources—at program start, and
(2) the knowledge a program attains at other key points in the acquisition process. For example, the
Navy’s Ford-class aircraft carrier program began with a weak business case, including an
unrealistic cost estimate based on unproven technologies, resulting in over $2 billion in cost growth
and years of delays to date for the lead ship….
For years, we have reported on the importance of using a solid, executable business case—a
justification for a proposed project or undertaking—before committing resources to a new product
development effort. An executable business case uses realistic cost and schedule targets to meet the
warfighter’s performance and quality expectations by balancing inherent uncertainties in
acquisition programs….
While cost and schedule metrics provide decision makers with performance information in
hindsight, we have found that assessing a program’s business case at the start of development and
attainment of certain product knowledge at key points in the acquisition process can help predict a
program’s performance.
(Government Accountability Office, DOD Acquisition Reform[:] Increased Focus on Knowledge
Needed to Achieve Intended Performance and Innovation Outcomes
, Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S.
Senate, Statement of Shelby S. Oakley, Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions,
GAO-21-511T, April 28, 2021, highlights page and pp. 1-2, 6.)
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In the earlier-cited example of the LCS program, the Navy, prior to announcing the start of that
program in November 2001, did not perform a rigorous AOA, AMC, or equivalent analysis to
show that a ship like the LCS was not simply one way, but rather the best or most promising way,
to perform the missions that the Navy was seeking a capability to perform. The Navy in April
2003 testimony acknowledged that it did not conduct such a study until after it had selected the
LCS as its preferred solution, raising a question as to whether that study was tainted by the
knowledge that the Navy had already selected the LCS as its preferred solution. The absence of a
rigorous AOA, AMC, or equivalent analysis performed prior to the announcement of the LCS
program could be viewed as a factor that contributed to the program’s subsequent controversy and
ultimate truncation.59
Potential oversight questions for Congress concerning include the following:
• Prior to announcing the proposed Pillar 1 pathway in September 2021, did the
United States, either by itself or in conjunction with the UK and Australia,
conduct an AOA, AMC, or equivalent rigorous analysis showing that the
proposed Pillar 1 pathway was not simply one possible course of action, but
rather the most cost-effective course of action (along with the proposed Pillar 2
of AUKUS)60 for generating improved deterrence and warfighting capability?
• If such an analysis was not conducted prior to announcing the proposed Pillar 1
pathway in September 2021
• Why not?
• What was the basis for selecting the proposed Pillar 1 pathway as the
preferred course of action? To what degree did the selection of the proposed
Pillar 1 pathway reflect plausible but untested beliefs or presumptions about
its cost effectiveness relative to other potential courses of action?
• How strong is the business case for the proposed Pillar 1 pathway? If the
business case is not strong, what implications might that have for the
implementation of the pathway over the next 20 or more years?
• If an AOA, AMC, or equivalent analysis was conducted prior to announcing the
proposed Pillar 1 pathway in September 2021
• Has the analysis been provided to Congress? If not, why not?
• What alternative courses of action (such as a U.S.-Australia division of labor
on SSNs, or courses of action that do not involve SSNs) did the analysis
examine?
• What were the findings regarding the comparative cost effectiveness of the
proposed Pillar 1 pathway and the alternative courses of action?
A November 15, 2023, opinion piece stated
In a different world, where [Australia’s Department of] Defence was meeting its core
obligations to provide cogent, well-founded advice to support government decision
making, we would expect that there had been a proper analysis of alternative ways of

59 For further discussion, see pages 20-27 of the May 12, 2017, version of CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke. Similar discussions can be found in
earlier versions of this report.
60 The proposed Pillar 2 of AUKUS would involve U.S.-UK-Australian cooperation in developing and deploying
certain advanced military technologies. For more on Pillar 2, see CRS Report R47599, AUKUS Pillar 2: Background
and Issues for Congress
, by Patrick Parrish and Luke A. Nicastro.
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increasing Australia’s deterrent capabilities and long-range strike against the backdrop of
a dangerous region centred on an aggressive China.
But it is almost certain that this did not happen in the lead-up to the AUKUS announcement.
Instead, the same key defence leadership that has self-proclaimed its failures in an
analogous chain of advice and decision making [for Australia’s Hunter-class frigate
program] was a part of a tiny coterie of people around the then prime minister who were
solely focused on “How can Australia acquire nuclear submarines?”
Looking at deterrence and strike through a straw that only lets the answer be a submarine
is an oddly blinkered position to take on something that is about an essential element in our
national defence.
It also doesn’t let you think clearly about the huge opportunity costs involved in the
financial and human capital tied up in the AUKUS subs plan and the consequences these
have for the rest of our military power.61
Deterrence and Warfighting Capability
Regarding the potential impact on deterrence and warfighting capability, potential arguments that
might be made by supporters of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include but are not necessarily
limited to the following:
• Selling Virginia-class boats to Australia would substantially enhance deterrence
of potential Chinese aggression by sending a strong signal to China of the
collective determination of the United States and Australia, along with the UK, to
counter China’s military modernization effort. The fact that the United States has
never before sold a complete SSN to another country—not even the UK62—
would underscore the depth of this determination, and thus the strength of the
deterrent signal it would send.
• The deterrent value of selling Virginia-class boats to Australia would be greater
than the deterrent value of keeping those SSNs in U.S. Navy service. Compared
with the option of keeping the SSNs in U.S. Navy service and waiting for
Australia to build its own AUKUS SSNs, selling Virginia-class boats to Australia
would substantially accelerate the creation of an Australian force of SSNs and
thereby present China much sooner with a second allied decisionmaking center
(along with the United States) for SSN operations in the Indo-Pacific. This would
enhance deterrence of potential Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific by
complicating Chinese military planning. In this regard, selling Virginia-class
boats to Australia would be broadly comparable to
• the help that the United States provided to the UK’s nuclear-powered
submarine program starting in 1958, which accelerated the creation of the
UK’s SSN force, thereby presenting the Soviet Union much sooner with a
second allied decisionmaking center (along with the United States) for SSN
operations in the European theater, which enhanced deterrence of potential
Soviet aggression in Europe by complicating Soviet military planning; and

61 Michael Shoebridge, “An AUKUS Remix Delivering Greater Military Power Faster: the B-21 Raider,” Defence
Connect
, November 15, 2023. Also posted as Michael Shoebridge, “AUKUS Plan B: Delivering Greater Military
Power Faster—The B-21 Raider,” Real Clear Defense, November 16, 2023.
62 To help the UK build its first SSN, the United States transferred to the UK a U.S. SSN propulsion plant (i.e., the
“back half” of a U.S. SSN), but the UK designed and built the forward part (the “front half”) of the boat and married it
to the U.S.-supplied propulsion plant.
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• the help that the United States, secretly at the time, reportedly provided to
France during the Cold War on the design of France’s nuclear warheads, so
as to speed up the development and fielding of France’s strategic nuclear
deterrent force and thereby present the Soviet Union much sooner with three
decisionmaking centers—the United States, the UK, and France—that were
armed with effective strategic nuclear deterrent forces.63
• A division of labor arrangement in which U.S. SSNs perform SSN missions for
Australia would not generate this multiple-decisionmaking-center form of
deterrence.
• Australia’s promised investment in the U.S. submarine industrial base would help
accelerate the date by which replacement SSNs, strictly construed, could be built
for the U.S. Navy, and thereby minimize the time during which the size of the
U.S. SSN force is reduced due to the sale of Virginia-class boats to Australia.
Investments that Australia would make in the U.S. and Australian submarine
construction industrial bases would increase the capacity of the combined U.S.-
Australia submarine construction industrial base at a time when limits on the
capacity of the U.S. submarine construction industrial base have become a matter
of concern for U.S. policymakers.
• Australia intends to increase its defense budget as needed to be able to finance
the purchase, operation, and maintenance of its Virginia-class boats without
having to reduce funding for other Australian military capabilities that are needed
for deterring or countering potential Chinese aggression. Increases to Australia’s
military budget would be sufficient to ensure that selling Virginia-class boats to
Australia would have a net positive impact on Australia’s overall military
capabilities for deterring potential Chinese aggression.
Potential arguments that might be made by skeptics of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include but
are not necessarily limited to the following:
• The potential benefits, costs, and risks of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway are
uncertain in the absence of specific information on items such as the remaining
service lives of the Virginia-class boats that would be sold to Australia, the prices
of the boats that would be sold, the precise amount and timing of Australia’s
investment in the U.S. submarine industrial base,64 the dates when each of the
three to five replacement boats for the U.S. Navy would be procured, the dates
when they would each enter service, the details of the Navy’s plan for increasing
the SSN production rate to 2.33 SSNs per year while also building Columbia-
class ballistic missile submarines, and the operational impact of a three- to five-
boat reduction in the size of the U.S. SSN force on the ability of the U.S. SSN

63 See Richard H. Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1989 (No. 75): 3-33, accessed at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148862; “The French Bomb, with Secret U.S. Help, Documents from Nixon and Ford
Administrations Show U.S. Assistance for French Nuclear Forces Earlier Than Previously Reported,” National Security
Archive, George Washington University, May 26, 2011, accessed at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb346/;
William Burr, “U.S. Secret Assistance to the French Nuclear Program, 1969-1975: From ‘Fourth Country’ to Strategic
Partner,” Wilson Center, undated, accessed at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-secret-assistance-to-the-
french-nuclear-program-1969-1975-fourth-country-to-strategic.
64 As noted earlier, although some press reports have stated that Australia’s investment in the U.S. (or U.S. and UK)
submarine construction industrial base would total $3 billion, the Australian government as of August 2023 had not yet
definitized the size or timing of its proposed investment in the U.S. industrial base.
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force to perform day-to-day and wartime SSN missions of interest to the United
States.
• Selling Virginia-class boats to Australia could weaken deterrence of potential
Chinese aggression if China were to find reason to believe, correctly or not, that
Australia might use its Virginia-class boats less effectively than the U.S. Navy
would use them if the boats were retained in U.S. Navy service, or that Australia
might not involve its military, including its Virginia-class boats, in U.S.-China
crises or conflicts that Australia viewed as not engaging important Australian
interests. Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles in March 2023 reportedly
confirmed that in exchange for the Virginia-class boats, Australia’s government
made no promises to the United States that Australia would support the United
States in a future conflict over Taiwan.65 Virginia-class boats are less certain to be
used in a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, or less certain to be used in such a
conflict in the way that the United States might prefer, if they are sold to
Australia rather than retained in U.S. Navy service. This would be a consequence
of Australia having sovereign control over its Virginia-class boats—it is, in
effect, the flip side of the earlier argument made by supporters of the proposed
Pillar 1 pathway about having Australia become a second allied decisionmaking
center (along with the United States) for SSN operations in the Indo-Pacific. An
October 2023 CBO report states: “Would China be less deterred if the United
States reduced the number of its attack submarines to help Australia develop its
submarine force? Because the United States and Australia have a strong alliance,
improving the Australian Navy’s [SSN] capability could help offset the U.S.
Navy’s potential loss of [SSN] capability. That loss might even be more than
offset because the Australian submarines would be based in the Western Pacific
region and therefore could respond more quickly to any conflict with China
involving Taiwan or other issues in the South China Sea. However, Australia
would control its own submarines, and their participation in any particular
conflict would not be guaranteed. In fact, in March 2020, the Australian defense
minister stated that his country did not promise to support the United States in the
event of a conflict involving Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.”66
• Given the challenges that the U.S. submarine industrial base is experiencing in
achieving a construction rate of 2.0 Virginia-class boats per year to meet U.S.
Navy needs, the ability of the submarine industrial base to achieve the higher
target rate of 2.33 boat per year, so as to build in a timely manner replacement
SSNs, strictly construed, for Virginia-class boats sold to Australia is uncertain.
The duration of the impact of selling Virginia-class boats to Australia on the size
of the U.S. SSN force is thus uncertain and could be longer than anticipated.
• The costs for Australia of acquiring, operating, and maintaining Virginia-class
boats could reduce, perhaps significantly, funding within Australia’s military
budget for other Australian military capabilities, particularly if Virginia SSN-
related costs turn out to be higher than expected. If this were to occur, there could

65 Rod McGuirk, “Australia Won’t Promise to Side with US in Taiwan Conflict,” Associated Press, March 20, 2023;
Daniel Hurst, “Australia Has ‘Absolutely Not’ Committed to Join US in Event of War over Taiwan, Marles Says,”
Guardian, March 18, 2023; Georgia Hitch, “No Promise Given to US to Assist in Potential Taiwan Conflict in
Exchange for Submarines, Says Defence Minister Richard Marles,” abc.net.au, March 18, 2023.
66 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2023, p. 29.
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be a net negative impact on Australia’s overall military capabilities for deterring
potential Chinese aggression.
• A November 29, 2023, article stated “Buying those subs will be the most
expensive—an estimated $365 billion [in acquisition and life-cycle operation
and support costs]—and technologically complex enterprise Australia has
ever engaged in, so budget and creating an entirely new industrial base will
be key. Which is why a May [2023] publication from the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute [ASPI], stating the country will actually spend $1.5 billion
less on defense over the next two years, caused ripples of concern in the
Lucky Country [i.e., Australia]. Asked specifically about the report,
[Australian Minister for Defence Industry Pat] Conroy essentially stated that
he did not agree with the premise of the question. Conroy also accused ASPI
‘of picking and choosing between what parts (of the budget) they counted
and what parts they didn’t count.’ In fact, he argued, ‘the defence budget
goes up every year over the forward estimates. And as importantly, if you
compare those years to what the last government projected in their last
budget, which is March 2022, in every year of Labor’s budget they are higher
than what the Opposition committed to when they were in government. So
every year the defence budget goes up, and we’ll reach 2.3 per cent of GDP
at the end of the decade, so over the 10 years, moving from just slightly over
2 per cent now. So I know people are frustrated,’ Conroy said, ‘but the
defence budget is increasing. Money is flowing to defence industry to deliver
capable projects, critical capabilities.’ That statement was not felt by the
more than half dozen industry sources who told Breaking Defense and other
reporters during the recent Indo-Pac maritime conference that they are
concerned about getting money for future investments. The ‘flow’ of money
was largely restricted to existing programs, maintenance and supply, they
said, with little to no new money available since the Labor government of
Anthony Albanese took power.”67
• A November 28, 2023, opinion piece stated “Despite receiving extra money
to grow the [Australian] defence force since 2016, it has shrunk by about
1000 [people] a year. In questions, [Pat] Conroy was forced to say what the
[Australian] Government will do over the next ten years. He said the
Government was bringing forward long range strike and missile production.
Australians would be aghast at just how puny these efforts are. A tiny number
of missiles will be bought for the three Air Warfare Destroyers which are our
only modern warships. No Tomahawks for the [Australian navy’s existing]
Collins [class conventionally powered submarines]. And a few upgraded
missiles for our 100 fast jets. So far, that’s it. We’ve bought or ordered zero
long range ground launched missiles. The so-called missile production effort
doesn’t get going for another couple of years and will produce only land
artillery rockets, with a range of 70 to 90 kilometres and which can only
strike targets on land, with no maritime application. For the Government, the
AUKUS subs are a magic pudding, so far away you don’t have to spend any
real money on them, and so impressive sounding they convince people
you’re doing something on defence when you’re doing nothing. And if a few

67 Colin Clark, “Aussie Procurement Minister Offers New AUKUS Industrial Details, Pushes Back on Budget
Critique,” Breaking Defense, November 29, 2023.
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lefties complain, all the better. But it still produces no defence capability for
Australia over the next ten years, and quite possibly nothing after that
either.”68
• It would be more cost-effective to pursue a U.S.-Australia division of labor under
which U.S. SSNs would perform both U.S. and Australian SSN missions while
Australia invests in other types of military forces.69
• Such a division of labor would follow the general model of military divisions
of labor that exist between the United States and some or all of its NATO and
other allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft carriers, SSNs, large surface
combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non-naval capabilities such as (to
name only some examples) nuclear weapons, space assets, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
• It would be inconsistent to argue that the U.S.-Australia relationship is close
enough to contemplate the transfer of U.S. naval nuclear propulsion
technology but not close enough to permit a division of labor on SSNs.
• The proposed SSN AUKUS pathway would result in parallel SSN-related
investments in the United States and Australia comparable to parallel
investments in certain military capabilities among NATO countries that have
been criticized by some observers for their collective inefficiencies.70
• The potential alternative of a U.S.-Australia division of labor could include
having Australia spend additional resources on producing long-range anti-
ship missiles and/or purchasing U.S.-made long-range bombers.

68 Greg Sheridan, “Pantomime World of the Albanese Government’s Defence Policy,” The Australian, November 28,
2023.
69 In connection with a project that Canada initiated in 1987 (and canceled in 1989) to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK-
or French-made SSNs, Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, then-Director of the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (aka
Naval Reactors), testified in March 1988 that the project “puts at risk resources that ought to be used for other
purposes” and that Canada “could make a better contribution to NATO in other areas with the same amount of money.”
(U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989—H.R. 4264, and
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Title 1
, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hearings held March 1, 3,
8, 9, 10, and 17, 1988, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988, H.A.S.C. No. 100-70, p. 345. The hearing in question, on
submarine programs, was held on March 9, 1988. [Included in CRS/FDT bound volume collection as House Armed
Services Committee, Hearings. (Vol.) 5, 100th Congress, 2d Sess.
, 1988, CRS-F.].)
70 For examples of reports and articles discussing such inefficiencies among NATO countries and potential steps to
mitigate these inefficiencies, see “EU Incentivizing Common Procurement Between Members,” Aviation Week,
October 10, 2023; Stephen Flanagan and Anna M. Dowd, “Alliance Assignments: Defense Priorities for Key NATO
States,” War on the Rocks, October 4, 2023; David A. Ochmanek, et al., Inflection Point, How to Reverse the Erosion
of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence
, RAND, 2023, 217 pp.; Nicole Koenig et al., Defense Sitters,
Transforming European Militaries in Times of War
, Special Edition of the Munich Security Report on European
Defense, Munich Security Conference (MSC), June 2023, 95 pp.; Max Bergmann and Otto Svendsen, Transforming
European Defense, A New Focus on Integration
, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 2023, 64
pp.; Sean Monaghan, “Solving Europe’s Defense Dilemma: Overcoming the Challenges to European Defense
Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 1, 2023; Luigi Scazzieri, “Is European
Defence Missing Its Moment?” Centre for European Reform, January 16, 2023; “EU Defence Review Calls for Greater
European Cooperation to Match Defence Spending Increases,” European Defence Agency, November 15, 2022;
Bastian Giegerich and Ester Sabatino, “The (Sorry) State of EU Defense Cooperation,” Carnegie Europe, October 6,
2022; Paul Taylor, “How to Spend Europe’s Defense Bonanza Intelligently, EU Countries Must Coordinate
Procurement and Pool Resources to Avoid Wasting Money,” Politico, September 2, 2022; Max Bergmann, Colin Wall,
Sean Monaghan, and Pierre Morcos, “Transforming European Defense,” Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), August 18, 2022.
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• The long-range anti-ship missiles could enter service with Australian and
U.S. forces within the next several years, which could be of particular
value for responding to concerns about the possibility that China might
take military action against Taiwan or other countries sometime within
the next several years.71 These missiles would be in addition to those that
Australia might already be planning to build for its own needs or for
meeting joint Australian-UK-U.S. needs. By comparison, additional
SSNs that would enter service in the 2030s and 2040s under the proposed
Pillar 1 pathway would be of uncertain value in connection with
deterring or countering potential Chinese aggression between now and
2030.72
• Regarding a purchase of B-21 bombers, a November 15, 2023, opinion
piece states that “B-21s will be in service with the US Air Force from the
mid-2020s. If Australia joined the [B-21] program as we have with the F-
35 [strike fighter] and EF/A-18 Growler electronic attack aircraft
[programs], we could have early [B-21] aircraft around 2030 and at least
the first 12 in service before 2035. This is not hypothetical—it is based
on Northrop’s current production system and relies on Northrop keeping
to the normal production maturity cycle used successfully in multiple
other aircraft programs—low-rate initial production followed by full
production. There would be no Adelaide assembly factory. Politically and
practically, the B-21 requires no nuclear waste repository, has no IAEA
[international nuclear regulatory] entanglements, provokes no nuclear
proliferation concerns around reuse of highly enriched uranium, and
doesn’t require nuclear reactors to be based permanently near Australian
population centres. Australia could proceed with the forward basing of
UK and US submarines without having our own nuclear submarines.
And we could also maintain our investment in the US and UK industrial
bases to increase overall allied submarine numbers, but without the high
costs of purchasing and operating our own. Australia becoming a partner
in the B-21 [program] creates a larger pool of these key deterrent and
strike weapons in the Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the AUKUS submarine
deal requires rationing of scarce submarines for decades before numbers
eventually lift. The US Department of Defense is likely to welcome
Australia becoming a partner as we have in the Growler and F-35,
instead of an Australian government having to continue to charm future
presidents to release submarines the US Navy desperately needs itself.
Even if Australia were to acquire a large fleet of 36 B-21s, making it one
of the most powerful air forces on the planet, we would still have $200

71 For a study that recommends increased procurement of long-range anti-ship missiles as a high-priority for improving
U.S. and allied capabilities for countering Chinese aggression in a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, see Mark F.
Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham, The First Battle of the Next War, Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of
Taiwan
, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 2023, 158 pp., which states on page 4 (emphasis
as in original)
Recommendation: Increase the arsenal of long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Bombers
capable of launching standoff, anti-ship ordnance offer the fastest way to defeat the invasion with
the least amount of U.S. losses. Procuring such missiles and upgrading existing missiles with this
anti-ship capability needs to be the top procurement priority.
72 For an example of an opinion piece on this point, see Nishank Motwani, “AUKUS’s Three Pillars of Uncertainty:
Sovereignty, Strategy and Costs,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), October 23, 2023.
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billion in national treasure to spend on other things—defence and
otherwise—in comparison with the current AUKUS Pillar 1 plan. Even if
$50 billion of this were reinvested in the fast-moving digital part of
AUKUS—Pillar 2—to get it moving, AUKUS would no longer be
sucking the oxygen out of the rest of the [Australian] Defence Force
because of its scale and cost and demands for scarce, skilled people.”73
Technology Security
Another factor that may be considered concerns the potential impact, if any, of sharing U.S.
submarine and naval nuclear propulsion with another country on the risk of that technology being
stolen by China, Russia, or some other country. Regarding Canada’s project to acquire a force of
10 to 12 UK- or French-made SSNs, Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, then-Director of the U.S.
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (aka Naval Reactors), testified in March 1988 (i.e., years
before the rise of the internet and internet-based cyber espionage):
We have a number of very sensitive arrangements with a lot of our allies on a government-
to-government, navy-to-navy, military-to-military basis that deal with certain things we do.
But once the Canadians talk about launching into a 12 nuclear submarine building program,
we are talking about a proliferation of technology across a very broad industrial base. The
Canadians intend to do 65 percent of the work [for building those submarines] in Canada.
That is proliferating the technology over a wide range of industrial activities that have
never had any involvement in this kind of business.
So there is, I think, a clear and present concern that dissemination would not be in our
national interests. That is how we get into it.74
Later in March 1988, before a different committee, Admiral McKee similarly testified
The concern about the security of the technology is a little complicated. The Canadians are
good neighbors. We have shared alliance commitments with them. That is true; we have
shared a lot of sophisticated, sensitive information, sophisticated tactical information,
working exercises together, but that is between our Navies and our governments.
Taking this very sophisticated technology and disseminating it through a broad range of
Canadian industry is a whole different story. They have only built ten submarines to date—
during World War I. Part of the commitment is that these will be 65 percent Canadian built.
That requires us to proliferate a broad range of technology in Canadian industry that is not
used to dealing with this degree of sophistication, but more important, the sensitivity of the
technology….

73 Michael Shoebridge, “An AUKUS Remix Delivering Greater Military Power Faster: the B-21 Raider,” Defence
Connect
, November 15, 2023. Also posted as Michael Shoebridge, “AUKUS Plan B: Delivering Greater Military
Power Faster—The B-21 Raider,” Real Clear Defense, November 16, 2023. For further discussion of the option of
Australia purchasing B-21s, see Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Nicholls, ‘Impactful Projection’: Long-Range Strike
Options for Australia
, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), December 2022, 53 pp.
74 U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989—H.R. 4264, and
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee
, Title 1, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hearings Held March 1,
3, 8, 9, 10, and 17, 1988, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988. H.A.S.C. No. 100-70, p. 351. The hearing in question, on
submarine programs, was held on March 9, 1988. [Included in CRS/FDT bound volume collection as, House Armed
Services Committee, Hearings. (Vol.) 5, 100th Congress, 2d Sess.
, 1988, CRS-F.]
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I would rather see them go to the French than take the risk associated with transfer of [U.S.-
derived] Trafalgar technology.75
Potential arguments that might be made by supporters of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include
but are not necessarily limited to the following:
• Australia is fully capable of, and fully committed to, protecting U.S. submarine
and naval nuclear propulsion technology. The Australian government has stated
“Building on the decades of experience that the UK and the US have in
protecting sensitive and classified nuclear material, naval nuclear propulsion
technology and SSN capabilities, Australia has committed to a strong security
posture to deliver an uncompromised SSN program, as a responsible steward of
nuclear technology.”76
• A May 23, 2023, press report stated “ASIO [Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation] officers are being embedded within the Defence Department to
help prevent foreign spies from stealing the highly prized nuclear-powered
submarine secrets Australia plans to acquire under the AUKUS pact with the
United States and United Kingdom…. [ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess]
described AUKUS as a ‘great shiny example of something that foreign
intelligence services would like to get insights on’, raising the importance of
ensuring the Australian Defence Force has the best possible security protections
as the nuclear-powered submarine plan advances. ‘It’s a new target that has
received new attention from foreign intelligence services,’ Burgess said. ‘I have
people embedded in the AUKUS team in Defence that actually help Defence with
their security posture ... I’m confident Defence understand the threats to security
and the job they have to do to manage that risk effectively.’ Attempts to access
sensitive Defence information is a ‘constant’ and ‘very persistent’ threat, he
added.”77
• An October 19, 2023, press report stated “Mr. Burgess, who spoke on the
sidelines of the Five Eyes intelligence summit in Palo Alto, [California,] said he
also had separate concerns about adversaries trying to infiltrate Australia’s
sensitive AUKUS pact information, but that ASIO was capable of handling that.
‘Some nations have said AUKUS is interesting. They’ll already be trying to tap
into that through the UK and the US. Australia is now part of that,’ he said.
‘They’re probably looking for how can they get inside [AUKUS] once it is set
up. That’s traditional espionage. We’re capable of handling that with our defence
and defence industry partners.’ ‘Of course, given the significance of AUKUS,

75 U.S. Congress. House. Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1989, Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
, 100th
Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1328. The hearing in question, on atomic energy defense activities, was held on March 23, 1988.
Following the ellipse in the above-quoted passage, the subcommittee Chairman, Representative Tom Bevill, stated:
“Then maybe you ought to let them get their submarine from the French.” Admiral McKee replied: “That is what I
have said. The French thing raises all kinds of ghosts in the British mind, as you can well imagine. The French
alternative has been used as a hammer—the Canadians emphasize that we have to help them or they will go to the
French. I would rather see them go to the French than take the risk associated with transfer of Trafalgar technology.”
76 Commonwealth of Australia, The AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway, A Partnership for the Future,
undated, released ca. March 13, 2023, p. 38.
77 Matthew Knott, “ASIO Agents Embedded in Defence to Protect AUKUS Secrets from Foreign Spies,” Sydney
Morning Herald
, May 23, 2023.
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we’re in conversations with what security or additional security capabilities is
needed by defence, [and by the] defence industry.’”78
• At an October 25, 2023, hearing on the submarine industrial base and its ability
to support the AUKUS framework before the Seapower and Projection Forces
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, Under Secretary of the
Navy Erik Raven stated “We’re working very closely with Australia and the UK
to make sure that there’s a common set of security principles that governs all the
AUKUS security work we’re deeply engaged with. Also, NCIS [Naval Criminal
Investigative Service] is establishing a presence in Australia to manage a lot of
the—the counterintelligence and other concerns, but certainly part of AUKUS
again is going towards an integrated industrial base so that when we talk security,
we’re speaking the same language.”79
• A November 15, 2023, press report stated “Australia’s cooperation with the
United States and Britain to develop an Australian fleet of submarines powered
by U.S. nuclear technology is a likely target of state-sponsored cyberespionage,
the nation’s digital spy agency said on Wednesday [November 15]. The
Australian Signals Directorate reported a 23% increase in cybercrimes in the
country and a 14% increase in the average cost of each crime in its latest annual
online threat assessment for the fiscal year that ended on June 30…. “The
AUKUS partnership, with its focus on nuclear submarines and other advanced
military capabilities, is likely a target for state actors looking to steal intellectual
property for their own military programs,” the report said. “Cyber operations are
increasingly the preferred vector for state actors to conduct espionage and foreign
interference,” it added. Defense Minister Richard Marles said state online actors’
increased interest in Australian infrastructure, including the submarine program,
demonstrated the need for greater investment in the nation’s cyberdefense
capabilities. Marles said the government would double the Australian Signals
Directorate’s online capacity, investing 10 billion Australian dollars ($6.5 billion)
over a decade.”80
Potential arguments that might be made by skeptics of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include but
are not necessarily limited to the following:
• Chinese cyber and other espionage in the past reportedly has been successful on
multiple occasions in acquiring U.S. military information and technology,81

78 Matthew Cranston, “ASIO on High Alert as Middle East Explodes,” Australian Financial Review, October 19, 2023.
79 Source: CQ transcript of heating. Under Secretary Raven’s statement was made in reply to a question from
Representative Donald Norcross, who asked: “If you could just touch base on a bit of a twist, that when we step up to
the nuclear facilities classification and being able to clear a workforce, which Australia has a certain level, but certainly
nowhere close to where it has to be. The challenges that they're going to face from a domestic workforce and then their
challenge like us, they’re bringing in many others from around the world to be part of that workforce. How are they
going to address that challenge?”
80 Rod McGuirk, “State-Sponsored Online Spies Likely to Target Australian Submarine Program, Spy Agency Says,”
Associated Press, November 15, 2023.
81 See, for example, “Survey of Chinese Espionage in the United States Since 2000,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), undated, accessed November 12, 2023, at https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-
technologies-program/archives/survey-chinese-espionage-united-states-2000; Xiaoshan Xue, “US Experts Urge More
Efforts to Thwart China’s Acquisition of US Military Technology,” VOA, March 17, 2023; Nicholas Yong, “Industrial
Espionage: How China Sneaks Out America’s Technology Secrets,” BBC, January 16, 2023; Jeffrey B. Jones,
Confronting China’s Efforts to Steal Defense Information, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
(continued...)
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including information relating to undersea warfare. A June 8, 2021, press report
about China’s acquisition of undersea warfare technology states that “China
fields increasingly advanced and ‘smart’ technologies, including torpedoes,
mines, and UUVs [unmanned underwater vehicles]. As highlighted by the case of
Qin Shuren, at least some of these advances are being made with the help of U.S.
technology. Sometimes the technology is purchased on the open market and other
times it is gained through illicit means that range from cyber theft to old-
fashioned espionage and smuggling.”82 In 2018, Chinese hackers reportedly stole
a large amount of unclassified but sensitive information relating to undersea
warfare from a U.S. contractor working for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center
in Newport, RI.83 Some observers have expressed concern about the
cybersecurity readiness of defense contractors.84
• Notwithstanding Australia’s capability for, and commitment to, protecting U.S.
submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology, sharing this technology with
another country, particularly in an era of advanced and persistent computer
hacking threats, would increase the attack surface, meaning the number of
potential digital and physical entry points that China, Russia, or some other
country could attempt to penetrate to gain access to that technology.85 In this
instance, the addition to the attack surface could include not only Australian
government organizations, but Australian contractors and subcontractors
involved in proposed Pillar 1 pathway efforts.
• Hackers linked to China reportedly are highly active in attempting to penetrate
Australian government and contractor computers.86 A March 1, 2023, press report

Kennedy School, May 2020, 34 pp.; Ellen Ioanes, “China Steals US Designs for New Weapons, and It’s Getting Away
with ‘the Greatest Intellectual Property Theft in Human History,’” Business Insider, September 24, 2019.
82 Ma Xiu and Peter W. Singer, “How China Steals US Tech to Catch Up in Underwater Warfare,” Defense One, June
8, 2021.
83 Ellen Nakashima and Paul Sonne, “China Hacked a Navy Contractor and Secured a Trove of Highly Sensitive Data
on Submarine Warfare,” Washington Post, June 8, 2018; Helene Cooper, “Chinese Hackers Steal Unclassified Data
From Navy Contractor,” New York Times, June 8, 2023.
84 See, for example, Eric Noonan, “The US Just Got Serious about Cybersecurity. Contractors Aren’t Ready,” Federal
Times
, November 3, 2023.
85 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines attack surface as “the set of points on the
boundary of a system, a system element, or an environment where an attacker can try to enter, cause an effect on, or
extract data from, that system, system element, or environment.” (National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Computer Security Resource Center, “Attack Surface,” accessed October 23, 2023, at
https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/attack_surface.) IBM similarly defines it as “the sum of vulnerabilities, pathways or
methods—sometimes called attack vectors—that hackers can use to gain unauthorized access to the network or
sensitive data, or to carry out a cyberattack.” (IBM, “What Is an Attack Surface?” accessed October 23, 2023, at
https://www.ibm.com/topics/attack-surface.) The cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike similarly defines it as “the total
number of all possible entry points for unauthorized access into any system. It includes all vulnerabilities and endpoints
that can be exploited to carry out a security attack. The attack surface is also the entire area of an organization or
system that is susceptible to hacking.” (CrowdStrike, “What Is an Attack Surface?” accessed October 23, 2023, at
https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/attack-surface/.)
86 See, for example, Max Mason, “Chinese Hackers Use G7 Ruse to Target Australian Government Officials,”
Australian Financial Review, June 19, 2023; News.com.au, “Chinese Cyber Attack on Australia Exposed,”
News.com.au, August 30, 2022; Bill Toulas, “Chinese Hackers Target Australian Govt with ScanBox Malware,”
Bleeping Computer, August 30, 2022; Jamie Tarabay, “How Hackers Hammered Australia After China Ties Turned
Sour,” Bloomberg, August 30, 2021; Jacob Greber, “US accuses Chinese nationals of hacking Australian defence
contractor,” Australian Financial Review, July 22, 2020; Daniel Hurst, “Hackers Linked to China Allegedly Stole Data
from Australian Defence Contractor,” Guardian, July 22, 2020; Lauren Ferri and Charlie Coë, “Top Chinese Hackers
(continued...)
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stated that “Chinese hackers ‘significantly increased’ attacks on Australian
government, industry and education after the AUKUS nuclear submarine pact
came under the crosshairs of the world’s most prolific espionage operation,
according to cyber security experts.” The article quoted a senior employee of the
cybersecurity company CrowdStrike as stating that the AUKUS agreement “has
been in the crosshairs of Australia’s cybersecurity adversaries since it was
announced.”87
Risk of Accident That Could Impact Views on Safety of U.S. Ships
Another factor that may be considered is the risk of an accident involving an Australian-owned
SSN—either a Virginia-class SSN or an AUKUS SSN incorporating U.S. naval nuclear
propulsion technology—on U.S. public support for operating U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships
and/or the ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships to make port calls around the world. Such
port calls can be made for purposes of sending deterrent signals of alliance resolve and solidarity
to potential adversaries; conducting diplomacy and engagement activities with the countries being
visited; resupplying U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships with food and other provisions; and
providing rest and recreation for the crews of those ships.
A 2020 publication from the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (aka Naval Reactors) states
Naval Reactors maintains an outstanding record of over 166 million miles safely steamed
on nuclear power. The Program currently operates 98 reactors and has accumulated over
7,100 reactor-years of operation…. Because of the Program’s demonstrated reliability,
U.S. nuclear-powered warships are welcomed in more than 150 ports of call in over 50
foreign countries and dependencies….
From the beginning, the [U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion] Program recognized that the
environmental safety of operating U.S. nuclear-powered ships would be key to their
acceptance at home and abroad. The Program maintains the same rigorous attitude toward
the control of radioactivity and protection of the environment as it does toward reactor
design, testing, operation, and servicing. As a result, the Program has a well-documented
record showing the absence of any adverse environmental effect from the operation of U.S.
nuclear-powered warships. Because of this record, these ships are welcome in over 150
ports in over 50 countries and dependencies….
Throughout the Program’s entire history—over 7,100 reactor years of operation and more
than 166 million miles steamed on nuclear power—there has never been a reactor accident,
nor any release of radioactivity that has had an adverse effect on human health or the quality
of the environment.88

Stole a Treasure Trove of Information from an Australian Defence Contractor Including Top-Secret Weapon and
Military Data,” Daily Mail, July 21, 2020.
87 Justin Vallejo, “Extent of Hacks against Australia after AUKUS Deal Revealed,” Herald Sun, March 1, 2023.
88 Department of Energy and Department of the Navy, The United States Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 2020,
Over 166 Million Miles Safely Steamed on Nuclear Power
, pp. 1, 31, 32. The Department of Energy similarly states
From the beginning, the [Naval Nuclear Propulsion] Program recognized that the environmental
safety of operating U.S. nuclear-powered ships would be key to their acceptance at home and
abroad.
The Program maintains the same rigorous attitude toward the control of radioactivity and protection
of the environment as it does toward reactor design, testing, operation, and servicing. As a result,
the Program has a well-documented record showing the absence of any adverse environmental
effect from the operation of U.S. nuclear-powered warships. Because of this record, these ships are
(continued...)
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At an April 6, 1987, hearing before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials
subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Navy’s Seawolf (SSN-21)
submarine program, Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, then-Director of the U.S. Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program (aka Naval Reactors), listed the attributes that the Navy wanted the SSN-21
design to have, including the following:
Finally, safety. Don’t forget, if there is even the perception of a reactor accident, the
fundamental security posture of the United States could change overnight. Imagine a
Chernobly-type [sic: Chernobyl-type] accident in Norfolk on the [Navy’s nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier] U.S.S. Nimitz. So we have to take safety factors into account.89
In 1987-1988, when Canada was pursuing its project to acquire a force of UK- or French-made
SSNs, some observers argued that an accident with a Canadian-owned, British-designed SSN
whose propulsion plant employed technology derived from the U.S. nuclear propulsion
technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in 1958 could affect U.S. public
support for operating U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships and/or the ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-
powered ships to make port calls around the world. A 1990 National War College report stated
that
the strongest opposition to the U.K.-Canadian SSN deal within DOE [the Department of
Energy] came from Naval Reactors, which wanted no part of any nuclear propulsion
transfer deal. For DOE the issues were simple. For Canada to build SSN’s, large amounts
of sensitive classified nuclear propulsion technology would have to be transferred to the
Canadian government and industry. The question was would it be protected? Second,
Canada did not have the critically important technology infrastructure which Naval
Reactors knew was necessary for the safe application of naval nuclear propulsion. Their
greatest concern, one shared by all in DOE and DOD, was that a reactor accident aboard a
Canadian SSN using U.S.-design nuclear technology could severely damage public
confidence in the safety of all nuclear vessels, severely curtailing the operational freedom
and port access of the U.S. Navy, 40% of whose vessels were nuclear[-powered].90
A November 23, 1987, press report on remarks made to reporters by U.S. Navy Captain Robert F.
Hofford, the U.S. naval attaché in Ottawa, following the end of his earlier-noted November 18,
1987, presentation at a conference in Ottawa, Canada, stated that
some in the Pentagon fear that a Canadian submarine accident could derail the United
States’ plan to procure its own new class of attack submarine, the SSN-21. An accident in
Canada would galvanize anti-nuclear and pacifist groups against the U.S. submarine
program.
If an accident should happen, “We can’t wipe our hands of the Canadian program. I think
that realization is coming out here,” he [Hofford] told reporters.
“We would like the Canadian submarine program to be autonomous,” he said. Assuming
Canada awards the contract [for its then-planned SSN acquisition program] to the British,
any nuclear accident “would reflect on the United States and could very easily put our

welcome in over 150 ports in more than 50 countries and dependencies, as well as in U.S. ports.
(Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Powering the Navy”
expandable section entitled “Concern for the Environment,” accessed October 11, 2023 at
https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/powering-navy.)
89 U.S. Congress. House. SSN-21, Hearing before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of
the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearing Held April 6, 1987,
H.A.S.C. No. 100-49, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988, p. 19.
90 Gerald L. Brubaker, Taking a Dive for a Friend—The Decision to Transfer Nuclear Submarine Technology to
Canada
, National War College, December 10, 1990, pp. 6-7.
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programs into jeopardy. We don’t want that to happen because we realize the strategic
value of the [American] submarine and the submarine program.”91
A November 27, 1987, press report stated that
the degree of potential American opposition [to the Canadian SSN project] was
underscored last week by remarks made at a defense contractors’ conference in Ottawa by
the United States naval attaché here, Capt. Robert F. Hofford.
Captain Hofford said that concerns about the Canadian submarines, which would be built
in Canadian shipyards, could cause Congress to delay granting permits for the use of
American reactor technology beyond the March 1988 deadline set by the [Canadian]
Government for a choice between contending [UK and French] designs….
In part, safety concerns have been prompted by the fact that Canadian shipyards have built
no submarines since World War I, and no nuclear-powered vessels of any kind….
Canadian officials say the United States has continued to argue that Canada should abandon
the submarine program and spend the money on upgrading its conventional defenses,
which have withered badly over the last 20 years.92
A November 5, 1987, letter from Representative Melvin Price93 to Secretary of Defense Caspar
W. Weinberger and Secretary of Energy John S. Herrington stated that “a mishap involving a
Canadian nuclear submarine could undermine the public confidence necessary for the successful
operation of our own nuclear [-powered] Navy, [which accounts for] over 40 percent of our
ships.”94
At a March 21, 1988, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider the
nomination of William Ball III to be Secretary of the Navy, Senator J. James Exon, the chairman
of the Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, discussed the Canadian SSN project. A March 22, 1988, press report about the
hearing stated “After the hearing, Exon and fellow committee member Sen. John Warner (R-Va.)
said in an interview that the project is a dangerous technological and political gamble for Canada
and the United States…. ‘Any minor accident with the nuclear power plant could result in our
own nuclear-powered vessels being barred from 80 percent of the world’s ports,’ Exon said.”95
In a floor statement printed in the Congressional Record for March 25, 1988, Senator Exon stated
My specific concern, however, has to do with whether Canada fully recognizes and can
afford the extensive infrastructure of training and support facilities to ensure that our
transferred technology will be operated safely. Mr. President, more and more ports of the
world are being closed to the U.S. Navy for reasons of antinuclear sentiment around the
world. From New Zealand to the Philippines to Northern Europe, we are faced with a
serious challenge to the continued operation of and support for the necessary presence of

91 David Silverberg, “U.S. Navy Fears May Snag Canadian Nuclear Sub Buy,” Defense News, November 23, 1987: 1,
35.
92 John F. Burns, “Canada May Lose Nuclear Sub Plan,” New York Times, November 27, 1987: 4.
93 Melvin Price was a Member of Congress from January 3, 1945 until his death on April 22, 1988. He was Chairman
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the 93rd Congress (1973-1974) and Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee in the 94th through 98th Congresses (1975-1984). (Source: https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/
bio/P000522.)
94 The full text of Representative Price’s letter is reprinted in Appendix E.
95 George C Wilson, “Transfer of U.S. Nuclear Sub technology Considered,” Washington Post, March 22, 1988, p. 4.
The article was published in other editions of the paper with the headline “U.S. Considers Transfer of Secret Sub
Technology.”
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the U.S. Navy. In short, in this era of nuclear phobia, we must maintain and enhance our
safe standards of shipboard nuclear propulsion.
Our Navy has had over 34 years experience with nuclear-powered ships and we have had
no accidents. This is the result of a very careful training program, very stringent operating
procedures, and shipyards and workers highly skilled in nuclear technology.
For Canada, nuclear-powered ships will be a new experience. Although the Canadians
considered acquiring nuclear subs in the early 1960’s and began an exchange program with
the United States and Royal Navies on the matter, the proposed submarines would be
Canada's first nuclear-powered ships. To be fair, the Canadians do operate nuclear
powerplants and their safety record is good. But submarines are different.
Canada’s Navy is indeed impressive in its professionalism and technology. Its record is
long and admirable. In fact, the Royal Canadian Navy was the third largest navy in the
world at the end of World War II. We have worked long and closely with the Canadians in
the area of nuclear weapons and defense. That is a sound relationship which could be
expanded if it proves prudent to do so.
But Mr. President, I want to be absolutely sure that the Canadians understand the
tremendous responsibility they assume when they acquire nuclear submarines.
If they should ever experience a nuclear accident or incident, the blame, rightly or wrongly,
could be transferred by the United States. Rightly or wrongly, our Nation as well as Canada,
could and probably would bear the consequences. We could see more ports around the
world closed to our nuclear powered or nuclear armed ships. This is the heart of my
concern. With 40 percent of our naval forces nuclear, any nuclear-powered accident,
however minimal, would be blown all out of proportion and we would very likely find a
"Not Welcome" sign posted more prominently in more ports where it is vital for our ships
to port if they are to perform their critical mission.
So before we either transfer nuclear power technology or allow the British to transfer the
technology we initially provided to them, I will pursue this matter very carefully in the
hearings in the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear
Deterrence.96
Immediately following the statement from Senator Exon quoted above, the Congressional Record
for March 25, 1988, includes a floor statement from Senator John Warner, the ranking member of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, in which Senator Warner stated
The U.S. Congress knows from decades of experience that the costs associated with ocean-
going nuclear vessels are enormous, encompassing not just development and acquisition,
but also constant training and elaborate supporting shore establishment and overhaul
facilities. Let there be no misunderstanding: This is an enormously complex and costly
matter, and no nation should enter into such an undertaking without an exhaustively
thorough appreciation for those complexities and costs. Congress will carry certain
responsibilities as assigned by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, should the Canadians desire
the British submarine design. With the benefit of knowledge derived from our own
experience, Congress must conscientiously and fairly examine the Canadian proposal, in
our own national security interests. We need to know how Canada proposes to institute this
program; and how Canada proposes to insure, as my distinguished chairman mentioned,
that the standard of nuclear safety of such a fleet will be at least as high as that of the United
States and the British in the operation of their fleets.97

96 Congressional Record, March 25, 1988, pp. 5293-5294. The full text of Senator Exon’s floor statement is reprinted
in Appendix E.
97 Congressional Record, March 25, 1988, pp. 5294-5295. The full text of Senator Warner’s floor statement is reprinted
in Appendix E.
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Supporters of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway could argue that the Australian Navy is a fully
professional force that would operate and maintain its Virginia-class boats in a manner fully
adhering to the U.S. Navy’s strict and exacting safety, quality-control, and accountability
standards for submarines and nuclear-powered ships98 so as to minimize, to the same extent as in
the U.S. Navy, the risk of an accident that might call into question for third-party observers the
safety of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships. They could argue that Australia fully understands that
avoiding accidents can be important to maintaining access for U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships
to ports around the world, because Australia itself in 1971 suspended visits by U.S. Navy and
other nuclear-powered ships to Australian ports pending a review of the safety implications of
such visits.99 Under the proposed Pillar 1 pathway, they could argue, Australian personnel would
be trained in the same philosophy and procedures used by the U.S. Navy to minimize the risk of
such an accident. They could argue that the limited scale of Australia’s existing nuclear-reactor
infrastructure—Australia currently operates only one nuclear reactor, a research reactor that uses
low-enriched uranium (LEU)100— would mean that U.S. Navy personnel who train Australian
personnel would not face a significant task in overcoming preexisting, ingrained Australian
practices that might be inconsistent with U.S. Navy philosophy and procedures. They could also
argue that in November 2023, the Australian government introduced into Australia’s parliament
the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023, which is a bill to
establish a new, independent regulator to ensure Australia applies the highest standards of
nuclear safety across its nuclear-powered submarine enterprise and can continue to
implement AUKUS without delay.
… The new Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator will draw on the experience
of the US and the UK to deliver international best practice in nuclear safety, as the
Government delivers Australia’s conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine
capability.
The Regulator will be an independent, statutory agency within the Defence portfolio and
operate within Australia’s existing system of regulation.
The legislation will also establish a fit-for-purpose regulatory framework that imposes
strict nuclear safety duties and licensing requirements for activities related to nuclear-
powered submarines.
It will also impose new offences for breaches of nuclear safety duties, including serious
criminal and civil penalties.101

98 For further discussion on these standards, see, for example, John W. Crawford and Steven L. Krahn, “The Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program: A Brief Case Study in Institutional Constancy,” Public Administration Review, vol. 58,
no. 2, March/April 1998: 159-166.
99 See Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Australian Navy, Port Visits to Australia by Nuclear-Powered Vessels: A
Historical Context
, 2023, PDF pages 7 to 10 of 26, accessed November 8, 2023, at https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/
default/files/documents/Port%20Visits%20to%20Australia%20by%20Nuclear-Powered%20Vessels%20-
%20A%20Historical%20Context.pdf. See also Australian Government, Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear
Safety Agency, “Nuclear-Powered Vessel Visit Planning,” accessed October 11, 2023, at https://www.arpansa.gov.au/
research/radiation-emergency-preparedness-and-response/visits-by-nuclear-powered-warships.
100 For more on this reactor, see Australia’s Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), “OPAL Multi-
Purpose Reactor,” accessed December 13, 2023, at https://www.ansto.gov.au/facilities/opal-multi-purpose-reactor.
101 Australian Government, Defence, “New Legislation to Ensure Naval Nuclear Power Safety,” media release dated
November 16, 2023. See also Australian Government, Defence, “Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023,”
undated; Parliament of Australia, “Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023 [and] Australian Naval Nuclear
Power Safety (Transitional Provisions) Bill 2023,” Bills Digest No. 32, 2023–24, November 24, 2023; Parlaiment of
Australia, Bills of the Current Parliament, “Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023,” posted at
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbillhome%2Fr7104%
(continued...)
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Skeptics of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway could argue that while the Australian Navy is a fully
professional force that would operate and maintain its Virginia-class boats in a manner fully
adhering to the U.S. Navy’s strict and exacting safety, quality-control, and accountability
standards for submarines and nuclear-powered ships, selling Virginia-class boats to Australia or
building for Australia AUKUS SSNs that incorporate U.S. nuclear propulsion technology would
unavoidably make another country (Australia) responsible for preventing an accident with an
SSN that might call into question for third-party observers the safety of U.S. Navy nuclear-
powered ships. They could argue that the second variation of a U.S.-Australian division of labor
outlined earlier—the variation under which U.S. SSNs perform Australian SSN missions
indefinitely—would avoid that situation and keep all U.S.-made SSNs under the control of the
U.S. Navy, which has a proven record extending back to 1954102 of safely operating its nuclear-
powered ships.
Summary of Some Key Factors
Drawing from the above discussion, some key factors that Congress may consider in assessing
whether to approve, reject, or modify the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include but are not
necessarily limited to the following:
Sufficiency of information. The sufficiency of information available to
Congress for adequately assessing the merits of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway.
Analytical basis and business case. The analytical basis and business case for
the proposed Pillar 1 pathway, including
• whether an analytical basis was established by conducting a rigorous analysis
of alternatives (AOA), analysis of multiple concepts (AMC), or equivalent
study prior to the announcement of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway in
September 2021, and
• the potential implications of proceeding with the proposed Pillar 1 pathway
without a pre-September 2021 analytical basis or a strong business case.
Deterrence and warfighting capability. The potential net impact on deterrence
on warfighting capability of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway, including
• the deterrent value of Australia being a second allied decisionmaking center
(along with the United States) for SSN operations in the Indo-Pacific;
• how Virginia-class boats sold to Australia would be used for deterrence or in
potential conflict scenarios, compared with how they would be used for those
purposes if they remained in U.S. Navy service, and how China might
(correctly or not) assess this question;
• the impact of selling three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia on the size
of the U.S. SSN force, and the ability of the U.S. submarine construction
industrial base to build, as replacements for sold Virginia-class boats, three to
five new replacement SSNs, and the dates when the replacement SSNs SSNs
would enter service; and

22; Australian Government, Defence, Discussion Paper: The Legal and Regulatory Framework to Support Naval
Nuclear Power Safety
, undated, 18 pp.; Kirsty Needham, “Australia to create navy nuclear safety watchdog for
AUKUS,” Reuters, December 12, 2023.
102 The U.S. Navy’s first nuclear-powered ship, the attack submarine Nautilus (SSN-571), was commissioned into
service on September 30, 1954.
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• the net impact on funding that would be available within Australia’s military
budget for other Australian military capabilities that could contribute to
combined U.S.-UK-Australian deterrence and warfighting capability, and
• the cost-effectiveness of using Australian funding for acquiring and
sustaining an Australian SSN force compared with using Australian funding
for other military capabilities (such as producing long-range anti-ship
missiles and/or purchasing B-21 long-range bombers) that are needed for
deterring or countering potential Chinese aggression.
Technology security. The impact, if any, of transferring U.S. submarine and
naval nuclear propulsion technology to Australia on the risk of China, Russia, or
some other country gaining access to that technology.
Risk of accident. The risk of an accident involving an Australian-owned SSN
that might call into question for third-party observers the safety of all U.S. Navy
nuclear-powered ships and thereby affect U.S. public support for operating U.S.
Navy nuclear-powered ships and/or the ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered
ships to make port calls around the world.
Potential alternative of U.S.-Australia division of labor. How the proposed
Pillar 1 pathway compares on the above factors to the alternative described
earlier of a U.S.-Australia division of labor on SSNs and other military
capabilities.
Projected SSN Force Levels vs. SSN Force-Level Goal
Another issue for Congress concerns projected SSN force-levels compared to the SSN force-level
goal. As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s current force-level goal, which was released in December
2016, calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 manned ships, including 66 SSNs. The
Navy and the Office of the Secretary Defense have been working since 2019 to develop a
successor Navy force-level goal to replace the 355-goal of 2016. Studies of this emerging force-
level goal that have been released by the Navy in summary form suggest that the new force-level
goal could call for achieving and maintaining a force of 66 to 72 SSNs.
The Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan includes three alternative 30-
year shipbuilding profiles for the period FY2029-FY2053. (These profiles do not include the
impact under the AUKUS proposed Pillar 1 pathway of selling three to five Virginia-class boats
to Australia, or of eventually procuring additional SSNs as replacements for the boats that would
be sold to Australia.) Under these profiles, the SSN force would reach a minimum of 46 boats in
FY2030, and grow to 60, 69, or 63 boats by FY2053. Under the alternative where the SSN force
grows to 69 boats by FY2053, the force would reach 66 boats in FY2049. Potential questions for
Congress include the following:
• Should the Navy’s next force-level goal—the successor to the 355-ship goal of
2016—include an SSN force-level goal of 66 boats, 72 boats, or some other
number of boats?
• What are the potential operational implications of the SSN force declining to a
minimum of 46 boats in FY2030, and of remaining below the 66-boat force-level
goal until at least FY2049?
In assessing these questions, Congress may consider several factors, including but not necessarily
limited to the following:
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• U.S. national security strategy and national defense strategy, and the
contributions that SSNs make to fulfilling those strategies;
• the funding that would be needed each year to procure SSNs and operate and
support the SSN force, and the potential impact of SSN-related funding
requirements on funding available for other Navy or DOD programs; and
• the capacity of the submarine construction industrial base.
Regarding the first factor above, DOD officials and other observers view SSNs as particularly
useful for implementing certain elements of the national defense strategy because of their ability
to evade China’s improving anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces.103
Regarding the second factor above, as noted earlier, when procured at a rate of two boats per year,
VPM-equipped Virginia-class SSNs have an estimated procurement cost of about $4.3 billion per
boat. Increasing the size of the SSN force would increase the SSN force’s annual operation and
support costs.
The third factor above—the capacity of the submarine construction industrial base—is discussed
further in the next section.
Industrial-Base Capacity for Building Both Virginia- and
Columbia-Class Boats

Overview
A related issue for Congress—one that existed prior to the September 2021 announcement of the
above-discussed AUKUS proposed Pillar 1 pathway, and would continue to exist in the absence
of the proposed AUKUS Pillar 1 pathway—concerns the ability of the submarine construction
industrial base to execute the work associated with procuring one Columbia-class SSBN plus two
VPM-equipped Virginia-class SSNs per year (a procurement rate referred to in short as 1+2). (In
the “1+2” nomenclature, the 2 refers to being able to produce 2.0 Virginia-class boats per year.)
Policymakers and other observers have expressed concern about the industrial base’s capacity for
executing a 1+2 workload without encountering bottlenecks or other production problems in one
or both of these programs. In a nutshell, the challenge for the industrial base—both shipyards and
supplier firms—is to ramp up production from one “regular” Virginia-class boat’s work per year
(the volume of work prior to FY2011) to the equivalent of about five “regular” Virginia-class
boats’ work per year (the approximate volume of work represented by two VPM-equipped
Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat).104 In other words, the challenge for the
industrial base is to quintuple the pre-2011 volume of annual production by 2028.
Concerns about the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to execute the workload
resulting from a sustained 1+2 procurement rate were heightened starting in 2019 by the earlier-
noted reports about challenges faced by the two submarine-construction shipyards and associated
supplier firms in meeting scheduled delivery times for Virginia-class boats as the Virginia-class

103 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
104 If building a Virginia-class boat is viewed as requiring one unit of work, then building a VPM-equipped Virginia-
class boat can be viewed as requiring about 1.25 units of work, and building a Columbia-class boat can be viewed as
requiring about 2.5 units of work. On this basis, building two VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-
class boat would require about five units of work (1.25 + 1.25 + 2.5 = 5.0).
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program transitions from production of two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-
equipped boats per year.105
Although Virginia-class submarines are being procured at a rate of two boats per year, Navy
officials have noted that deliveries of Virginia-class submarines from GD/EB and HII/NNS have
averaged 1.2 boats per year for the past five years.106 On March 29, 2023, Secretary of the Navy
Carlos Del Toro testified that the Virginia-class production rate was at that point about 1.4 boats
per year.107 At an April 28, 2023, briefing on the Virginia-class program for CRS and CBO, Navy
officials stated that the rate as of that date was about 1.3 boats per year.108 A March 31, 2023,
press report stated that Navy officials estimate that it will take another five years—until 2028—
before the delivery rate will increase to 2.0 boats per year.109 In advance policy questions
submitted for a September 14, 2023, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to
consider her nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy’s goal is to stabilize the Virginia-class construction rate
at 1.4 boats per year by the end of 2023, increase it to at least 1.5 boats per year by the end of
2024, and increase it to 2.0 boats per year by 2028.110
The Navy’s report on its FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan states
Within the overall industrial base, including both shipyards and suppliers, varying levels
of capacity and risk exist. Nuclear powered ship production, a unique capability with little
to no opportunity for commercial or dual use production, is provided by two private
shipyards that are currently facilitized and certified to construct nuclear powered ships and
will be at capacity for the next 15-plus years building Columbia class SSBNs, Virginia
class SSNs, next generation SSNs, and Ford class CVNs. Industrial base funding was
provided in FY2023 to increase infrastructure, reduce production risk, help stabilize the
more than 350 critical suppliers, and help enable recruitment, training and retention of the

105 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Overly Optimistic Cost
Estimate Will Likely Lead to Budget Increases
, GAO-19-497, April 2019, pp. 20-23; David B. Larter, “Late Is the New
Normal for Virginia-Class Attack Boats,” Defense News, March 20, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Lack of Submarine
Parts Slowing Down Maintenance, New Construction,” USNI News, March 26, 2019; David B. Larter, “The US Navy,
Seeking Savings, Shakes Up Its Plans for More Lethal Attack Submarines,” Defense News, April 3, 2019; Anthony
Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Sub Firepower Upgrade Delayed by Welding Flaws,” Bloomberg, August 13, 2019; Paul
McLeary, “Weld Problems Spread To Second Navy Sub Program,” Breaking Defense, August 14, 2019; David B.
Larter, “Questions About US Navy Attack Sub Program Linger as Contract Negotiations Drag,” Defense News, August
16, 2019; Emma Watkins, “Will the U.S. Navy Soon Have a Missile-Tube Problem?” National Interest, August 19,
2019; David B. Larter, “As CNO Richardson Departs, US Submarine Builders Face Pressure,” Defense News, August
22, 2019; David B. Larter, “After a Leadership Shakeup at General Dynamics, a Murky Future for Submarine
Building,” Defense News, October 28, 2019; Rich Abott, “Navy Says Virginia Sub Delays Due To Faster Production
Rate,” Defense Daily, November 6, 2019.
106 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Frustration Building over Late Weapons, Ship Deliveries,” Defense
News
, January 11, 2023; Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,” Defense Daily,
January 12, 2023.
107 Sam LaGrone, “SECNAV Del Toro: Virginia Attack Sub Construction ‘Significantly Behind,’ District of Columbia
Submarine 10% Behind Schedule,” USNI News, March 29 (updated March 30), 2023. See also Rich Abott, “SECNAV:
Columbia Sub 10 Percent Behind, Virginia Subs Improving But Still Behind,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2023.
108 Navy briefing on Virginia-class program for CRS and CBO, April 28, 2023.
109 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Estimates 5 More Years for Virginia Attack Sub Production to Hit 2 Boats a Year,” USNI
News
, March 31, 2023.
110 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for
Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, p. 31.
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skilled production workforce. The PB2024 request includes funding to continue these
efforts.111
As discussed earlier in this report, the Navy has testified that meeting both U.S. Navy needs and
additional needs under the AUKUS proposed Pillar 1 pathway would require increasing the
Virginia-class production rate further, to 2.33 boats per year. Under the nomenclature used here,
such a combined Columbia-plus-Virginia procurement rate would be expressed as 1+2.33.
The Navy and industry are working to build up the capacity of the submarine industrial base to
support a 1+2.33 procurement rate by sometime after 2028. Building up the industrial base’s
capacity to a 1+2.33 capacity will require investing several billion dollars for capital plant
expansion and improvements and workforce development at both the two submarine-construction
shipyards (GD/EB and HII/NNS) and submarine supplier firms. Some of this funding has been
provided in FY2023 and prior years, some of it is requested for FY2024, some of it would be
requested in FY2025 and subsequent years, and some of it would be provided, under the AUKUS
proposed Pillar 1 pathway, by Australia. The funding requested for FY2024 includes both funding
in the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission, and the supplemental funding for the submarine
industrial base that was requested on October 20, 2023.
At an October 25, 2023, hearing on the submarine industrial base and its ability to support the
AUKUS framework before the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, the Navy provided testimony on its plan to increase the industrial
base’s capacity to support the production of 2.33 Virginia-class boats per year and thus a
combined Columbia-plus-Virginia procurement rate of 1+2.33. The Navy’s testimony on its plan
is reprinted in Appendix F.
Some observers have expressed interest in expanding the capacity of the submarine construction
industrial base to support a procurement rate of one Columbia-class boat plus three Virginia-class
boats plus per year (referred to in short as 1+3). Building three VPM-equipped Virginia-class
boats and one Columbia-class boat per year could require the equivalent of about 6.25 “regular”
Virginia-class boats’ work per year, if the Virginia-class boats are built to the VPM-equipped
configuration.112
As noted earlier, on December 21, 2021, President Biden signed three determinations permitting
the use of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to strengthen the U.S. submarine industrial base for
the purpose of increasing production of Virginia-class submarines.
Press Report
A September 8, 2023, press report stated
The U.S. Navy expects the submarine-industrial base to start delivering attack submarines
on time by 2028—more than a decade after vendors and shipbuilders began struggling to
keep up with growing demand, made worse by the pandemic and the seismic disruption it
brought to the labor market.
In fact, the Navy says, industry will have additional capacity by the early 2030s to start
increasing the size of the attack sub fleet, which is currently smaller than its required size

111 See U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal
Year 2024
March 2023, p. 9.
112 If building a Virginia-class boat is viewed as requiring one unit of work, then building a VPM-equipped Virginia-
class boat can be viewed as requiring about 1.25 units of work, and building a Columbia-class boat can be viewed as
requiring about 2.5 units of work. On this basis, building three VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-
class boat would require about 6.25 units of work (1.25 + 1.25 + 1.25 + 2.5 = 6.25).
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and would be more so following the sale of a couple boats to Australia as part of the
AUKUS trilateral pact.
To get there, the sea service anticipates spending $6.3 billion to bolster the submarine-
industrial base—on top of the annual cost of buying and repairing submarines….
The Navy spent $2.3 billion from fiscal 2018 to fiscal 2023 “to build and strengthen the
Submarine Industrial Base’s capacity, capability and resiliency,” Whitney Jones, director
of the Navy’s Submarine Industrial Base initiative, told Defense News in a written
statement.
This money was spent across five main lines of effort.
First is supplier development, after what Jones called the “slow but sustained degradation
of domestic manufacturing over the past 40 years.”
This money would boost the production capacity of existing suppliers, develop new
suppliers in areas where there may be a single vendor building a critical part, and
addressing market sectors where there has been a significant demand increase, such as
electrical and electronics subcomponents….
The second area is shipyard infrastructure, to ensure General Dynamics Electric Boat and
HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding can ramp up their production to a rate that will, in FY26,
hit its highest rate by tonnage since World War II: one Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarine and two Virginia-class attack submarines with the Virginia Payload Module
insert each year, dubbed a 1+2 production rate….
The shipyards are making their own investments. For example, Newport News
Shipbuilding spokesman Todd Corillo told Defense News the yard is in the midst of
making $1.9 billion in capital investments that started in 2016 and will run through 2025,
which include facilities to accelerate submarine production.
The Navy is also pitching in with support for the facilities and equipment needed to keep
up with growing demand.
The third effort, strategic outsourcing, appears to be taking some of this growing work
away from the two shipyards. Jones said the Navy is looking to move at least 5 million
production hours a year in large-scale steel fabrication, outfitting and other heavy
manufacturing work to other locations, allowing the shipyards to focus on outfitting, final
assembly and testing….
The fourth effort is workforce development, as companies in the submarine-industrial base
of all sizes and in all locations struggle to recruit and retain the workers they need.
And the fifth is investing in new manufacturing technologies that can make work processes
more efficient, such as automated welding, robotics and additive manufacturing.
In total, Jones said, the Navy and the submarine-industrial base are executing 79 projects
in the current fiscal year aimed at boosting the capability, capacity and quality of work in
the sub-tier supply chain, in support of the so-called 1+2 production rate of Columbia and
Virginia submarines….
The Navy proposed spending $2.4 billion from FY24 to FY28 to further infuse cash into
the supply chain and churn out parts to support submarine maintenance….
During an Aug. 3 earnings call, HII President Chris Kastner said the company, through the
second quarter of this year, “hired over 3,200 craftsmen and women on a solid pace to meet
our full year plan of approximately 5,000. Although we’re meeting our hiring targets,
attrition remains high and labor is still the greatest risk to meeting our plan.”
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He called labor “the largest obstacle, the largest risk” on the Virginia-class program, and
said the company would have to focus on recruiting, training and retaining skilled workers
for years to come….
Jones, the Navy official, said FY24 money would address those issues. Beyond outlining
previous and upcoming initiatives, she highlighted an effort to use data analytics to identify
the best uses for this submarine-industrial base money.
The Navy team “must quantitatively and qualitatively describe challenges, gaps, and the
impact of efforts/investments,” she said.
As part of that effort, her office has mapped out and performed a risk assessment of the
16,000 suppliers in the submarine-industrial base. It identified the more than 200 million
parts the two shipbuilders will need to buy in the next 10 years, and found 15 critical
chokepoints that could threaten these future purchasing plans.113
Strategic Outsourcing
One option for addressing industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and
Virginia-class SSNs at the same time is to increase the use of shipyards other than GD/EB and
HII/NNS, as well as other manufacturing facilities, in building components of Columbia- and/or
Virginia-class boats—a practice sometimes referred to as strategic outsourcing. An October 21,
2022, press report states
The U.S. Navy is pouring billions of dollars into shoring up the companies that help build
nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.
But these companies, and especially prime contractors General Dynamics Electric Boat
and HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding, cannot hire enough people to keep up with demand.
So they’re outsourcing work that was previously done in-house, two admirals said.
Rear Adm. Jon Rucker, the program executive officer for attack submarines, said the Navy
spent more than $1 billion between fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2022, and that the service is
committed to $2.4 billion from fiscal 2023 to fiscal 2027.
These funds cover supplier development, workforce development, shipbuilder
infrastructure, the development of technologies such as additive manufacturing and
nondestructive testing, government oversight, and strategic outsourcing.
In terms of tonnage of submarine construction, the Navy will see a 5.5 times increase from
FY11 to FY25. But the number of suppliers has dropped to about 5,000, compared to
17,000 companies during the last submarine construction surge in the 1980s, Rucker said
last month at an American Society of Naval Engineers conference.
Rucker said the Navy is trying to target its investments where it can make the most impact:
350 companies are considered “critical suppliers” in the submarine-industrial base, and
55% of those are located in six states. So workforce development dollars are focused on
those states to do the most good for critical suppliers in need of more workers. This effort
could see the establishment of new training sites in Virginia and Pennsylvania.
Outsourcing is becoming more important as some regions realize they aren’t receiving
enough interest for people to join the manufacturing industry, despite federal and state
government efforts to create manufacturing training opportunities.

113 Megan Eckstein, “The US Navy Is Spending Billions to Stabilize Vendors. Will It Work?” USNI News, September
8, 2023.
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“We are saturated in certain areas of the country. The Northeast is one of those. If we
cannot bring the people to the work, we’re going to take the work to the people,” Rucker
said.
Today, he explained, Electric Boat outsources 1.1 million hours’ worth of work a year and
Newport News Shipbuilding outsources 900,000 hours as they build new Virginia- and
Columbia-class submarines.
By 2025, that combined 2 million hours will grow to 5 million, he said—which equates to
half the work to build a Virginia submarine.
Rucker said companies across the U.S. are building structural pieces of submarines,
including some large modules, that were previously built at Electric Boat and Newport
News facilities. Now they’re constructed by companies with available workers and space,
and then shipped to the shipyard for assembly.114
A December 6, 2022, news release from Austal USA of Mobile, AL—a shipyard that builds
conventionally powered surface ships for the Navy—states
Production has commenced at Austal USA’s shipyard in Mobile, Ala., in support of their
strategic partnership with General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB) to support the U.S.
Navy’s recapitalization of the nation’s nuclear submarine fleet. Leveraging Austal USA’s
lean manufacturing techniques and modern steel production line facilities, a focus factory
approach is being used to expand production capacity of the submarine industrial base.
As part of the partnership, Austal USA is constructing and outfitting Command and Control
Systems Modules (CCSM) and Electronic Deck Modules (EDM) for the Virginia- and
Columbia-class programs. GDEB commenced on-the-job training efforts in April 2022 to
provide certification for skilled trades and supervisory positions to ensure consistent work
practices and adherence to quality assurance standards....
Work commenced in late November on two tanks for a Virginia class submarine. The first
CCSM is scheduled to arrive at Austal USA’s Mobile shipyard in late January 2023 for
initial outfitting efforts. The work will support a gradual ramp up to full fabrication and
outfitting of CCSMs and EDMs across both submarine classes beginning in 2026.115
Potential Oversight Questions for Congress
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• What is the total estimated cost of actions needed to increase the capacity of the
submarine-construction industrial base to a 1+2 annual production rate? What
portion of this cost has been funded through FY2023, and what portion remains
to be funded in FY2024 and subsequent years? How much of that remaining cost
has been requested for FY2024 itself? What portions of all these costs are to be
funded by government, and what portions are to be funded by industry?
• Can the estimated date for achieving a construction rate of 2.0 Virginia-class
boats per year be achieved by 2028? Can it be accelerated from 2028 to an earlier
year? If so, what additional actions would be necessary, and what is their
estimated cost?

114 Megan Eckstein, “Defense Firms Outsource Sub, Carrier Construction amid Labor Woes,” Defense News, October
21, 2022.
115 Austal USA, “Austal USA Commences Submarine Work,” December 6, 2022. See also Justin Katz, “Known for
LCS, Alabama-Based Austal USA Starts Submarine Work,” Breaking Defense, January 19, 2023; Rojoef Manuel,
“Austal, General Dynamics Team Up for US Navy Nuclear Submarine Production,” Defense Post, December 8, 2022;
Rich Abott, “Austal Starts Submarine Construction Support Work,” Defense Daily, December 12, 2022.
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• What additional actions would be needed to increase the capacity of the
submarine-construction industrial base to a 1+3 annual production rate? What
would these actions cost, and when would the 1+3 capacity be attained?
• What impact is the December 21, 2021, presidential determinations relating to
the DPA having on the capacity of the submarine construction industrial base to
build both Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines? What actions has the
determinations made possible that were not previously permitted? What actions
are included in the proposed FY2024 budget, and at what cost? What would be
the specific effect of these actions, and how long would they take to implement?
Virginia-Class Delivery Delays and Cost Growth
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the delivery delays and cost growth in the Virginia-
class program.
June 2023 GAO Report
A June 2023 GAO report—the 2023 edition of GAO’s annual report surveying DOD major
acquisition programs—stated the following regarding the Block V version of the Virginia-class
design:
Current Status
Performance on VCS construction continues to degrade. The program now estimates
construction of each Block V submarine will take an average of over 2 years longer than
reported last year. The delays are due to problems meeting original staffing and work
efficiency estimates.
Due to delays, program officials are developing a new, more realistic schedule for Block
V. They said that they expect to complete this process in early 2023. Program officials
stated that the shipbuilders do not have sufficient workforce to complete VCS while also
constructing the Columbia class submarines and overhauling several Los Angeles class
submarines. They noted VCS construction is about 25 percent below staffing needs as of
September 2022.
In an effort to improve VCS construction, shipbuilders are outsourcing certain work that
they would have otherwise completed in their shipyards, noted program officials. The
officials told us that the shipbuilders implemented these changes due to shipbuilders’
workforce constraints and the limited physical capacity of some facilities.
The same factors that delayed the schedule also contributed to cost increases. While the
fixed price incentive contract set target and ceiling prices for each submarine, program
officials reported that the VCS shipbuilders have not met the work efficiency and material
cost estimates that informed the target pricing. Consequently, the Navy plans to request
more funds to complete Block V, as its prior budget requests covered the target prices, but
not up to the ceiling prices.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
According to the program office, it remains challenged to meet a two ship per year
construction rate. It also stated that the Navy is working with shipbuilders and investing in
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the submarine industrial base to address challenges, such as supply chain issues and
workforce skills gaps, and to improve production capacity through strategic outsourcing.116
Press Reports
A May 8, 2023, press report stated
Availability of parts, not people, is the largest barrier right now to catch up with the delays
in constructing Virginia-class nuclear attack boats, company officials at submarine builder
Newport News Shipbuilding told USNI News....
While work stoppages and worker attrition due to the COVID-19 pandemic have been cited
as reasons for the delay in submarine production, availability of parts and materials has
become the primary reason for delays, Newport News president Jennifer Boykin told USNI
News on Friday [May 5].
“COVID had an impact because we had such a large percent of the workforce that wasn’t
here during the six months in 2020. Many of our suppliers, if not most, were struggling
with some of the same issues. Many of our suppliers got off track because they didn’t have
[the] workforce,” she said on Friday, a day ahead of the christening of Massachusetts (SSN-
798).
“Post COVID, not as many people came back … Most of our suppliers are really working,
doing what they can to increase their workforce pipeline.”
While Newport News is doing well with the workforce for the moment, its suppliers are
dealing with their own workforce issues that have increased the time it takes for parts to
get to the yard.
Workforce and supply chain concerns have prompted the Navy, HII and General Dynamics
Electric Boat to retool the schedule for the Block V Virginia-class.
“The intent was to incorporate some of these challenges,” Boykin said.117
A March 29, 2023, press report stated
Production of the Navy’s first-in-class Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine—
District of Columbia (SSBN-826)—is 10 percent behind schedule, Secretary of the Navy
Carlos Del Toro told a House panel on Wednesday [March 29].
Likewise, the production of Virginia-class attack boats is slowly improving but is
“significantly behind” the target of two submarines per year, Del Toro told the House
Appropriations defense subcommittee during a hearing.
Del Toro’s assessment was in response to questions from subcommittee chair Rep. Ken
Calvert (R-Calif.), who cited a January Government Accountability Office study that
warned the Navy did not have a clear understanding of the program’s schedule risks. Del
Toro contested the finding from GAO.
“We do have clear visibility into the schedule challenges that Columbia faces. She’s
currently about 10 percent behind schedule is what she is given the challenges that we’ve
faced with COVID and supply chain, not being able to get the advanced procurements that
are necessary to be able to fulfill those requirements leads to her being 10 percent behind,”
Del Toro told Calvert.

116 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Programs Are Not Consistently
Implementing Practices That Can Help Accelerate Acquisitions
, GAO-23-106059, June 2023, p. 165.
117 Sam LaGrone, “Submarine Supply Chain Largest Barrier to Improving Virginia Attack Sub Schedule, Says
Boykin,” USNI News, May 8, 2023.
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“The shortage of workers in the submarine community and across the nation is obviously
a national challenge that we all have to address collectively. I do believe that increasing
legal immigration in this country will help the blue-collar workforce, including those top
workers that we need actually in the submarine force as well. … We are working very
closely with industry to try to close these gaps.”
Following an earlier version of this post, a Navy official clarified to USNI News the
estimate to which Del Toro was referring was an internal General Dynamics Electric Boat
schedule 74-month schedule that was shorter than the Navy’s contract schedule....
“On the Virginia side of the house … they are significantly behind. They should be at two
boats per year. They’re currently [at] around 1.4. They have made some progress in moving
in [the right] direction. I’m concerned particularly about the construction of the sterns and
bows in Virginia and getting those up to Electric Boat up in Connecticut and integrating
them all,” Del Toro said.
“We are holding industry accountable in every which way that we possibly can and
working with them at the same time to try to close these gaps.”118
A March 6, 2023, press report stated
Electric Boat hired 3,700 shipbuilders last year. It wants to hire more than 5,000 this year
and just as many every year for decades into the future.
Last spring, it hired a fifth of UConn’s engineering grads. At the other end of the education
pipeline, it is promoting shipbuilding careers in elementary schools, setting its sights on
second graders who will join the workforce when EB hopes to hit its peak employment
target in 10 years.
“My first words to you this morning,” President Kevin Graney deadpanned last week to a
roomful of political, government and military officials at a breakfast meeting at the Mystic
Marriott. “EB is hiring.”
The nation’s foremost builder of submarines is, Graney said, in the midst of a “once in
generation expansion,” producing for its principal customer, the U.S. Navy, the ships that
will form the front line in a scramble by the U.S. and its allies to catch up with and contain
Chinese expansionism.
But one of the challenges emerging from a new shipbuilding boom is a shortage of
shipbuilders....
As [submarine] construction gears up, there is concern over whether Electric Boat—and
the thousands of other manufacturers in the supply chain known as the submarine industrial
base—can hire and begin production quickly enough to meet the aggressive construction
and delivery schedule on which the Navy says U.S. security depends....
By scouring the northeast for tradesmen and engineers, Electric Boat says it is meeting and
will continue to meet the Navy’s ambitious delivery schedule of two Virginia and one
Columbia class submarines a year....
Electric Boat said it is meeting the delivery schedule and will continue to do so, although
there was a slippage in the Virginia work after a portion of its tight workforce was shifted
to the Columbia program when the Navy designated that as the nation’s top defense
priority.119

118 Sam LaGrone, “SECNAV Del Toro: Virginia Attack Sub Construction ‘Significantly Behind,’ District of Columbia
Submarine 10% Behind Schedule,” USNI News, March 29 (updated March 30), 2023. See also Rich Abott, “SECNAV:
Columbia Sub 10 Percent Behind, Virginia Subs Improving But Still Behind,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2023.
119 Edmund H. Mahony, “CT’s Electric Boat Looking to Hire 5,000 More Employees Amidst ‘Once in Generation
Expansion,’” Hartford Courant, March 6, 2023.
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A February 9, 2023, press report stated
The Virginia-class submarine production line at Newport News Shipbuilding is now fully
staffed, after taking a back seat to the preeminent Columbia-class submarine program for
years.
A larger workforce is one of several factors that give the company confidence the
remaining Block IV Virginia boats will be delivered on their new schedule. The vessels
were bought at a pace of two a year and were meant to deliver at the same rate. However,
they are only arriving at a rate of about 1.2 boats annually, several U.S. Navy officials
recently said.
In fact, Newport News Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Electric Boat, which co-build
all the submarines, did not deliver a single sub to the Navy from April 2020 to February
2022.
The boats were already behind schedule when the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the
issue. As the two submarine construction yards—Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia
and Electric Boat in Connecticut—ramped up the size of their workforce in anticipation of
a greater workload, they had to ensure the Columbia production line was fully staffed and
remained on schedule.
Any shortfalls, then, fell on the Virginia program.
“We’re fully staffed on Block IV and Columbia, and we’re working very hard on execution
there,” the CEO of HII, Chris Kastner, said Feb. 9 on an earnings call.120
A January 31, 2023, press report stated
The U.S. Navy and its suppliers have thousands of open jobs at government repair yards
and in the private shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base, as hiring and retaining skilled
workers has become “our No. 1 strategic challenge across the enterprise,” according to the
head of Naval Sea Systems Command.
Vice Adm. Bill Galinis said Monday government and industry are competing against each
other for a undersized pool of talent in both trades and white-collar specialties....
Matt Sermon, the executive director for the Program Executive Office for Strategic
Submarines, noted at the same conference a recent analysis showed the submarine
industrial base will need to hire 100,000 people over the next 10 years for submarine
construction alone, at the two main shipyards as well as their 17,000 vendors. This would
cover the workforce needed to build one Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and
two Virginia-class attack submarines each year.121
Additional Virginia-Class Issues
Maintenance Requirements and Operational Availability
Another issue for Congress concerns the maintenance requirements and operational availability of
Virginia-class boats. A September 22, 2022, press report states

120 Megan Eckstein, “Newport News Has Fully Staffed Attack Sub Line, After Years Of Delays,” Defense News,
February 9, 2023.
121 Megan Eckstein, “Workforce Woes Are Top ‘Strategic Challenge’ for Navy, Admiral Says,” Defense News, January
31, 2023. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Official Describes 100,000-Person Submarine Workforce Challenges,” Defense
Daily
, January 31, 2023; Nick Wilson, “Navy Officials Highlight Labor Shortages, Other Key Challenges for
Submarine Production And Maintenance,” Inside Defense, January 31, 2023.
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With its Virginia class of attack submarines suffering from maintenance woes and low
operational availability, the U.S. Navy is working to ensure its next attack submarine is
easier to sustain, according to the program executive officer [PEO] for attack submarines....
[On September 21, at the American Society of Naval Engineers’ annual Fleet Maintenance
and Modernization Symposium, Rear Admiral Jonathan] Rucker said PEO Attack
Submarines is revisiting the maintenance plan for these Virginia SSNs in the hopes of
improving sustainment and that the Navy must take a better approach while designing the
SSN(X) next-generation attack submarine to ensure high operational availability and easier
sustainment throughout the lifecycle.
Coming off of the Cold War-era Seawolf-class submarine, designed to be fast, lethal and
stealthy, the Navy took a different approach with the Virginia class, Rucker said, and opted
to “build a submarine for an affordable cost to ensure we could get the numbers we
needed.”
“I’m not going to say that sustainment came as an afterthought but, to be honest, it was …
a challenge we’ll deal with later,” he added. “Unfortunately, some of that challenge is here
today.”
At the same conference, Rear Adm. Scott Brown, who oversees maintenance at the Navy’s
four public shipyards, said the service didn’t make the required upfront investments when
designing and acquiring the Virginia class, meaning shipyard workers today reach for parts
and components and find they’re not there.
“It’s resulting in a lot of churn, a lot of cannibalization—so we have to take things off other
boats to stick them on the boat we’re trying to get out—and a lot of, frankly, frustration
with the workforce on waiting for stuff that doesn’t exist,” Brown said. “Of course, that
leads to delays.”
Rucker said the Navy must ensure that doesn’t happen with future [submarine] classes.
... Rucker, who previously served as program manager for the Columbia class, said the
Navy designed the ship [i.e., the Columbia class submarine] with maintenance in mind,
even bringing in ship maintainers for their input on potential issues such as access and
rigging points.
Maintenance is also a focus for the SSN(X) [next-generation attack submarine] program,122
he said.
“There are things we’ve already learned on Virginia: of the over a million parts, less than
0.1% of the design is not doing what we thought it would from [a life expectancy
perspective]. It’s 32 items, to be exact,” Rucker said. “We’ve already figured out what
those were, we redesigned them or changed the maintenance cycle.”
Those improved parts could be used on SSN(X).
Rucker said the SSN(X) design phase prioritizes this focus on maintenance. The program’s
initial capabilities document lays out four top-level requirements: speed, stealth, payloads,
and operational availability.123
A September 21, 2022, press report stated
The earliest Virginia-class boats are among the hardest submarines to repair on time.

122 For more on the SSN(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
123 Megan Eckstein, “Next-Generation Attack Subs Will Be Designed with Maintenance in Mind,” Defense News,
September 22, 2022.
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“We’ve seen a significant growth in the amount of man days required in submarine
availabilities, particularly in the Virginia class,” [Vice Admiral William] Galinis [the
commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command] said.
“We’re doing a deep dive to figure out why that is. It’s really a continuous process.”...
The Virginias were designed to operate closer to shore and with components that met
rigorous NAVSEA standards for submarine safety, but were not as durable as some of the
older components on the Los Angeles-class boats.
“When we came off the Sea Wolf-class we had an extremely capable but relevantly more
expensive submarine,” [Rear Admiral Jonathan] Rucker said.
“Where we were in the beginning of the Virginia class, we had a charge early on to build
a design and build a submarine for an affordable cost to make sure we got the numbers we
needed.”
Sustainment of the submarine class wasn’t a major requirement for the program and the
Navy pushed maintenance aside for other cost saving considerations.
“Unfortunately, some of those challenges are here today,” Rucker said.
USS Virginia (SSN-774), commissioned in 2004, is wrapping up a mid-life availability
and lessons from that repair and other early boats in the class are informing a class-wide
maintenance plan to assist with scheduling and securing materials.
That Navy will implement that plan starting in Fiscal Year 2023 and may not see
improvements until FY 2024.
“If you throw a rudder over on the Titanic, it takes a while for the ship to turn,” Rucker
told USNI News.
“It’s going to take a little bit of time, just because there’s a lag and getting the resources or
changing behavior or ensuring that we plan better for what we’re going to do.”
In the long term, the lessons from the Virginia-class sustainment issue have informed how
the Navy planned for repairing and maintaining the Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarines and the next-generation attack submarine SSN(X), Rucker said.124
Shortage of Spare Parts for Boats Undergoing Maintenance
A related issue for Congress concerns a shortage of spare parts for existing Virginia-class boats
undergoing maintenance. A June 21, 2021, press report states
The U.S. Navy has swapped more than 1,600 parts among its new Virginia-class
submarines since 2013 to ease maintenance bottlenecks as components that are supposed
to last 33 years wear out decades sooner.
Parts are being shuttled regularly among the nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines so
that vessels in the $166 billion class built by General Dynamics Corp. and Huntington
Ingalls Industries Inc. can return to operations, according to data from the Naval Sea
Systems Command and the Congressional Budget Office125….
If a part isn’t available for a sub that’s finishing refurbishment, shipyard maintenance
workers may be forced to borrow, or “cannibalize,” one from a submarine entering

124 Sam LaGrone, “NAVSEA: Navy ‘Struggling’ to Get Attack Subs Out of Repairs on Time as Demand Increases,”
USNI News, September 21, 2022. See also Audrey Decker, “Navy Still ‘Really Struggling’ with On-Time Maintenance
for Virginia,” Inside Defense, September 21, 2022.
125 This is a reference to a recent CBO report: Congressional Budget Office, The Capacity of the Navy’s Shipyards to
Maintain Its Submarine
s, March 2021, 21 pp.
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maintenance in order to reduce delays. Most cannibalized parts are for non-propulsion
electronic systems, but the Navy declined to specify which ones are affected, citing
operational security.
The number of swapped parts for the submarines, which began entering service in 2004,
increased from 100 in 2013 to 171 in 2016, 201 in 2018 and 452 in 2019 before declining
to 318 last year. The Navy projects the number will drop to 82 between this year and
next….
The big disadvantage of cannibalizing parts from one submarine to another is the extra
workload involved, according to the Congressional Budget Office, as well as the risk that
a part might be damaged during the extra steps. The Navy doesn’t know how much the
swaps add to workload, saying that at this point “there is limited range and depth of
data.”…
Some parts identified to last 33 years based on engineering analysis and testing,“were
subject to degradation” such as “corrosion caused by complex galvanic interactions,” or
when two dissimilar metals or electrical parts come in contact for an extended period of
time, “that had not been predicted in some operating environments,” the Navy said….
The Navy’s submarine leaders are “not satisfied with any material cannibalization that
limits our submarine fleet’s ability to respond to national tasking and is taking all steps
necessary to avoid these scenarios,” the command said. It said it is ordering parts earlier to
“reduce material work stoppages and maintenance delays awaiting components.”
According to the Navy, 70% of the part swaps were between Block I subs that first entered
service in 2004 and Block II vessels initially delivered in 2008.
Flaws in contractor quality and parts that were out of specification “contribute to a small
percentage” of premature parts wear, the Navy said.126
Substandard Steel
Another issue for Congress concerns substandard steel used for building Navy submarines
between 1985 and 2017, a problem that investigators discovered in 2017 and that was first
reported in 2020.127
Problem with Hull Coating
Another issue for Congress concerns a problem with the hull coating used on Virginia-class boats
that was first reported years ago, and then again 2017128 and 2019.129

126 Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy’s Deadliest New Sub Is Hobbled over Spare Parts,” Bloomberg, June 21, 2021.
127 For press reports on this issue, see, for example, Gene Johnson, “Metallurgist Gets 2.5 Years for Faking Tests on
Sub Parts,” Associated Press, February 14, 2022; Gene Johnson (Associated Press), “Feds Say Company Provided
Subpar Steel for US Navy Subs,” Defense News, June 15, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Has ‘Mitigated’ Risk of Suspect
Steel From Company in Federal Fraud Case,” USNI News, June 19, 2020; Julia Bergman, “Submarine Supplier
Mishaps Lead to Call for Hearing,” New London Day, June 16 (updated June 17), 2020; Gene Johnson, “Metallurgist
Admits Faking Steel-Test Results for Navy Subs,” Associated Press, November 8, 2021; Agence France-Presse, “US
Navy Boosts Monitoring of Subs After Falsified Steel Tests,” France 24, November 10, 2021; Geoff Ziezulewicz,
“Navy Says It Ensured Sub Safety After Fake Strength Tests Surfaced, But Won’t Detail How,” Defense News, Navy
Times
, January 6, 2022.
128 See William Cole, “Navy Subs Still Show Issue with Stealth Coating,” Military.com, March 6, 2017.
129 See James Clark, “Whistleblower Accuses Largest US Military Shipbuilder of Putting ‘American Lives at Risk’ by
Falsifying Tests on Submarine Stealth Coating,” Task & Purpose, October 3, 2019.
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Defective Parts
Another issue for Congress concerns three Virginia-class boats that were reported in 2016 to have
been built with defective parts.130
Legislative Activity Regarding FY2024
Funding Request

Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
Virginia-Class Procurement Funding Requested in FY2024 Budget Submission
The Navy’s proposed budget requests the procurement of the 39th and 40th Virginia-class boats.
The two boats have an estimated combined procurement cost of $9,427.6 million (i.e., about $9.4
billion). The two boats have received a combined total of $2,297.7 million in prior-year advance
procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining
$7,130.0 million needed to complete their estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy’s
proposed FY2024 budget also requests $1,855.5 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to
be procured in future fiscal years, $1,360.0 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding,
which is an additional kind of AP funding that can occur under an MYP contract, and $168.2
million in cost-to-complete (CTC) funding to cover cost growth on Virginia-class boats procured
in prior years, bringing the total amount of procurement, AP, EOQ, and CTC funding requested
for FY2024 to $10,513.7 million (i.e., about $10.5 billion).
As noted earlier, as part of its FY2024 budget submission, the Navy has requested authority for a
Virginia-class MYP contract that would begin in FY2025.131
Supplemental Funding for Submarine Industrial Base Requested on
October 20, 2023

In addition to the above requested funds, on October 20, 2023, the Administration submitted a
request for FY2024 emergency supplemental funding for national security priorities that includes,
among other things, a total of $3,393.2 million (i.e., about $3.4 billion) in funding for the
submarine industrial base to support construction of new submarines and maintenance of existing
submarines, as follows:

130 For press reports on this issue, see, for example, David Larter, “Secret Weld: How Shoddy Parts Disabled A $2.7
Billion Submarine,” Navy Times, March 28, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Welding Problems Fixed For Virginia
Subs; Carter Tours Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2016; and David Larter, “Attack Sub Minnesota Rejoins
Fleet After Parts Fiasco,” Navy Times, June 4, 2016.
131 As noted earlier, the Navy typically requests authority for an MYP contract for the Virginia-class program one year
in advance of the proposed start of the MYP contract. The Navy states that “if the MYP [proposed to begin in FY2025]
is not approved in FY 2024, the Navy would lose EOQ savings across the procurement and the long-term shipbuilder
and vendor base stability achieved with an MYP authority. If an MYP is not authorized for the next Block of VCS
submarines, the Navy may have to enter a single ship procurement contract for FY 2025 ships forcing industry to
assume greater risk and raise prices.” (Source: “Twelfth Package of Legislative Proposals Sent to Congress for
Inclusion in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 – Individual Proposals (Sent to Congress on
May 18, 2023),” posted at https://ogc.osd.mil/OGC-Offices/Office-of-Legislative-Counsel/DoD-Legislative-Proposals-
2024/.) See also Nick Wilson, “Citing Essential Cost Savings, DOD Seeks Multiyear Authority for Block VI Virginia
Submarines,” Inside Defense, May 19, 2023.
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• $557.758 million in the Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) appropriation
account for improvements at the four government-operated naval shipyards
(NSYs) that maintain the Navy’s nuclear-powered ships, including the Navy’s
submarines;
• $2,055.0 million in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation
account (i.e., the Navy’s shipbuilding account) to increase production rates and
submarine availability through initiatives in supplier development, shipbuilder
and supplier infrastructure, workforce development, technology advancements,
and strategic sourcing;
• $393.57 million in the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) appropriation account to
increase production rates and submarine availability through initiatives in
supplier development, shipbuilder and supplier infrastructure, workforce
development, technology advancements, and strategic sourcing;
• $7.0 million in the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy (RDTEN)
appropriation account to increase production rates and submarine availability
through initiatives in supplier development, shipbuilder and supplier
infrastructure, workforce development, technology advancements, and strategic
sourcing;
• $281.914 million in the Military Construction (MilCon), Navy and Marine Corps
appropriation account to support infrastructure work at the NSYs to improve the
ability to maintain the readiness of the fleet; and
• $98.0 million in the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the
Department of Energy (DOE) for Naval Reactors (i.e., the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program) to support hiring and infrastructure expansion at the
Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated Naval Nuclear Laboratory sites in
order to meet growing mission demands to provide the trilateral security
partnership between Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (i.e.,
AUKUS) with nuclear propulsion plants.132
Table 4 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2024 budget funding request for the
procurement of Virginia-class boats in FY2024 and subsequent years.

132 Source: Attachment 4: Submarine Industrial Base (pages 58-63) to letter dated October 20, 2023, from Shalanda D.
Young, Office of Management and Budget, to The Honorable Patrick McHenry, Speaker Pro Tempore of the House of
Representatives, accessed October 23, 2023, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Letter-
regarding-critical-national-security-funding-needs-for-FY-2024.pdf.
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Table 4. Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Final
HAC
SAC
Final
FY2024 Procurement Funding Request for Virginia-Class Program (all in SCN account)
Procurement
7,130.0
7,130.0
7,130.0
7,130.0
7,130.0
7,130.0

Advance procurement (AP)
3,215.5
2,890.4
3,215.5
3,215.5
3,215.5
3,158.8

(Quantity)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)

Cost-to-complete
168.2
168.2
168.2
168.2
168.2
168.2

Total Virginia-class
10,513.7
10,188.6
10,513.7
10,513.7
10,513.7
10,457.0

Emergency Supplemental Funding for Submarine Industrial Base (SIB) Requested on October 20, 2023
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
House
Senate
Final
House
Senate
Final
OMN account
557.8
n/a
n/a


557.8

SCN account
2,055.0
n/a
n/a


2,155.0

OPN account
393.6
n/a
n/a


293.6

RDTEN account
7.0
n/a
n/a


7.0

MilCon account
281.9
n/a
n/a


281.9

Subtotal DOD
3,295.2
n/a
n/a


3,295.2

DOE NNSA for NR
98.0
n/a
n/a


0

Total SIB
3,393.2
n/a
n/a


3,295.2

Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s original FY2024 budget submission, committee and
conference reports, and explanatory statements on FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024
DOD Appropriations Act. Figures may not add due to rounding.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee, SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee, SAC is
Senate Appropriations Committee, HAC is House Appropriations Committee. Advance procurement funding
includes both “regular” AP funding and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding for multiyear procurement
(MYP). SCN is Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy; OMN is Operation and Maintenance, Navy; OPN is Other
Procurement, Navy; RDTEN is Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy; MilCon is Military
Construction, Navy and Marine Corps; DOE NNSA for NR is Department of Energy National Nuclear
Security Administration for Naval Reactors (i.e., the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program). n/a is not applicable—
the House and Senate versions of the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) were reported prior
to the submission of the emergency supplemental funding request on October 20, 2023.
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-125 of June 30, 2023) on H.R.
2670, recommends the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 4. The recommended
reduction of $325.1 million in advance procurement (AP) funding is for “early to need.” (Page
445)
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Section 131 of the bill would provide authority for a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for
not more than 13 Virginia-class submarines.
Section 344 would modify a requirement for a briefing on the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Plan (SIOP) and require a briefing on the implementation status of the SIOP.
Section 1024 would require quarterly briefings on SSN maintenance.
H.Rept. 118-125 states
Public Naval Shipyards
The committee recognizes the importance of the four naval public shipyards and is
encouraged by the ongoing work as part of the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program (SIOP). The committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to ensure SIOP
projects remain on schedule and to identify additional opportunities for enhanced
capabilities for increased throughput at the public shipyards. (Page 124)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S.
2226, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 4. S.Rept. 118-58
states
Virginia Class Material Strategy.—The Committee remains concerned with persistent
delays in submarine repair maintenance activities that reduce operational availabilities of
submarines. The Committee notes that the availability of VIRGINIA Class submarine
[VCS] materials have been a significant driver of maintenance delays. Therefore, the
Committee supports the fiscal year 2024 President’s budget request of $470,000,000 for
the procurement of VCS spares and repair parts in support of the Navy’s revised VCS
material strategy. In order to facilitate appropriate congressional oversight of this novel
approach, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy not later than 90 days after the
enactment of this act, and quarterly thereafter, to brief the congressional defense
committees on the Navy’s VCS materials strategy. The briefing shall include (1) updates
on the implementation of the strategy; (2) plans for the obligation of funding appropriated
for VCS spares and repair parts; (3) an assessment of the health of the defense industrial
base for VCS materials; and (4) an updated analysis of estimated cost savings and
reductions in availability delays resulting from the Navy’s strategy. The Committee
encourages the Secretary of the Navy to use predictive modeling and make adjustments to
the budget development process and procurement lead times of VCS materials to improve
material readiness. (Pages 146-147)
Section 123 of the bill provides authority for a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for 10
Virginia-class submarines.
Conference
The conference report (H.Rept. 118-301 of December 6, 2023) on H.R. 2670 recommended the
funding levels shown in the authorization final column of Table 4.
Section 123 of H.R. 2670 provides authority for an MYP contract for not more than 13 Virginia-
class submarines.
Section 344 modifies a requirement for the Navy to provide briefings on the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP).
Section 350 directs the Navy, in coordination with the SIOP, to develop and implement a strategy
to leverage commercial best practices used in shipyards to improve the efficiency of operations
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and to demonstrate a digital platform that uses artificial intelligence to analyze data on the
maintenance and condition of shipboard assets of the Navy at shipyards, for the purpose of
improving the readiness of the Armed Forces, predicting and diagnosing issues prior to the
occurrence of such issues, and lowering maintenance costs. It also directs the Navy to conduct an
assessment of the costs of maintenance delays on shipboard assets of the Navy and the potential
cost savings of adopting artificial intelligence predictive maintenance technologies to assist in the
determination of the condition of in-service equipment and estimate when maintenance should be
performed prior to failure or end of life of such equipment. It also directs the Navy to provide a
briefing on these matters.
Section 1024 directs the Navy to provide biannual (once every 180 days) briefings on submarine
maintenance and readiness that are to include, among other things, discussions of ongoing SIOP
efforts, lessons learned from other Navy programs, and recommendations for legislative changes
required with respect to policies or resources to ensure efficient and effective maintenance and
operational readiness for the submarine enterprise.
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-121 of June 27, 2023) on H.R.
4365, recommends the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 4.
Section 8010 of the bill would provide authority for a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for
Virginia-class submarines.
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587,
recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 4. The recommended
reduction of $56.757 million in advance procurement (AP) funding is for “Long Lead Time CFE
[contractor-furnished equipment] Two Year AP prior year execution delays.” (Page 135)
Section 8010 of the bill would provide authority for a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for
10 Virginia-class submarines and government-furnished equipment (GFE).
S.Rept. 118-81 states
Submarine Construction Performance.—The Committee continues to be concerned by
VIRGINIA Class Submarine [VCS] construction cost and schedule performance which
impact not only the construction and delivery to the fleet of VCS, but also affect the
COLUMBIA Class Submarine [COL] construction schedule. The Committee notes that the
fiscal year 2024 President’s budget request includes funds for cost overruns of VCSs
procured in fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017, and that cost overruns on additional ongoing
new VCS construction programs are expected to exceed $3,000,000,000 in future years.
The Secretary of the Navy is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees
the most current cost and schedule estimates, by VCS and COL, with the submission of
each annual President’s budget request until delivery of the twelfth and final COLUMBIA
hull. The report shall identify changes from the previous year, and include detailed
explanations for all submarines not fully resourced to the Navy’s cost estimate, as well as
all projected cost-to-complete requirements for previously appropriated submarines. (Page
137)
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Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
Senate
H.R. 815 was introduced in the House on February 2, 2023, and agreed to in the House by voice
vote on March 7, 2023, as the Removing Extraneous Loopholes Insuring Every Veteran
Emergency Act (aka RELIEVE Act).
Under Senate Amendment 1388 to H.R. 815—an amendment in the nature of a substitute that was
proposed in the Senate on February 9, 2024, and agreed to in the Senate on February 12, 2024—
H.R. 815 would become the National Security Act, 2024, of which Division A of H.R. 815 would
be the National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024. Division A of H.R. 815 would
provide the supplemental funding amounts shown in the Appropriations Senate column of the
lower part of Table 4. Compared with the supplemental amounts requested on October 20, 2023,
the amounts that would be provided by Division A of H.R. 815 would in effect transfer $100
million in requested supplemental funding from the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) account to
the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account, and would not provide the $98.0 million
in funding that was requested for the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) for Naval Reactors (NR) in support of AUKUS Pillar 1.
House
Emergency supplemental appropriations acts introduced in the House since January 29, 2024,
include H.R. 7113 (introduced January 29, 2024), H.R. 7217 (introduced February 5, 2024), H.R.
7271 (introduced February 7, 2024), and H.R. 7372 (introduced February 15, 2024).
Compared with the supplemental amounts requested on October 20, 2023, for the submarine
industrial base, H.R. 7113, H.R. 7217, and H.R. 7271 would provide none of the requested
funding, while H.R. 7372 would provide the same amounts as those that would be provided under
Senate Amendment 1388 to H.R. 815 (i.e., the same amounts as shown in the Appropriations
Senate column of the lower part of Table 4), except for the Military Construction (MilCon)
account, for which H.R. 7372 would provide none of the requested funding.
On February 6, 2024, H.R. 7217 failed of passage/was not agreed to in House on a motion to
suspend the rules and pass the bill.
Legislative Activity Regarding Proposed Sale of
Virginia-Class Boats Under AUKUS Agreement133

May 2023 DOD Legislative Package Relating to AUKUS Agreement
On May 2, 2023, DOD sent to Congress its eighth package of legislative proposals requested for
inclusion in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The package included the
following requested measures relating to the SSN part of the AUKUS agreement:

133 Legislation shown in this section includes bills listed in Congress.gov as of August 15, 2023, that contain the term
AUKUS and relate at least in part to Pillar 1 of AUKUS.
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SEC. ___. ACCEPTANCE OF CONTRIBUTIONS IN SUPPORT OF AUSTRALIA,
UNITED KINGDOM,
AND UNITED STATES
SUBMARINE
SECURITY
ACTIVITIES.
Chapter 155 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2608 the
following new section:
Ҥ 2609. Acceptance of contributions for Australia, United Kingdom, and United States
submarine security activities; Submarine Security Activities Account
“(a) ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of Defense may accept from the
Government of Australia contributions of money made by the Government of Australia for
use by the Department of Defense in support of non-nuclear related aspects of submarine
security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (in this
section referred to as ‘AUKUS’).
“(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBMARINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES ACCOUNT.—(1)
There is established in the Treasury of the United States a special account to be known as
the ‘Submarine Security Activities Account’.
“(2) Contributions of money accepted by the Secretary of Defense under subsection (a)
shall be credited to the Submarine Security Activities Account.
“(c) USE OF THE SUBMARINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES ACCOUNT.—(1) The
Secretary of Defense may use funds in the Submarine Security Activities Account—
“(A) for any purpose authorized by law that the Secretary determines would support
AUKUS submarine security activities; or
“(B) to carry out a military construction project that is consistent with the purposes for
which the contributions were made and is not otherwise authorized by law.
“(2) Funds in the Submarine Security Activities Account may be used as described in this
subsection without further specific authorization in law.
“(d TRANSFERS OF FUNDS.—(1) In carrying out subsection (c), the Secretary of
Defense may transfer funds available in the Submarine Security Activities Account to
appropriations available to the Department of Defense.
“(2) In carrying out subsection (c), and in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Secretary of Defense may transfer funds available in the
Submarine Security Activities Account to appropriations or funds of the Department of
Energy available to carry out activities related to AUKUS submarine security activities.
“(3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall be available for obligation for the same
time period and for the same purpose as the appropriation to which transferred.
“(4) Upon a determination by the Secretary that all or part of the funds transferred from the
Submarine Security Activities Account are not necessary for the purposes for which such
funds were transferred, all or such part of such funds shall be transferred back to the
Submarine Security Activities Account.
“(e) INVESTMENT OF MONEY.—(1) Upon request by the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Treasury may invest money in the Submarine Security Activities Account
in securities of the United States or in securities guaranteed as to principal and interest by
the United States.
“(2) Any interest or other income that accrues from investment in securities referred to in
paragraph (1) shall be deposited to the credit of the Submarine Security Activities Account.
“(f) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.—The authority to accept or transfer funds
under this section is in addition to any other authority to accept or transfer funds.”.
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SEC. ___. AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES SUBMARINE
SECURITY ACTIVITIES.
(a) AUTHORIZATION TO TRANSFER SUBMARINES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (6), the President may transfer not more than
two Virginia class submarines from the inventory of the Navy to the Government of
Australia on a sale basis under section 21 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761).
(2) COSTS OF TRANSFER.—Any expense incurred by the United States in connection
with the transfer authorized by this subsection shall be charged to the Government of
Australia.
(3) WAIVER OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The requirement for the Chief
of Naval Operations to make a certification under section 8678 of title 10, United States
Code, shall not apply to a transfer under this subsection.
(4) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of the Navy may use the proceeds of a transfer under
this subsection—
(A) for the acquisition of vessels to replace the vessels transferred to the Government of
Australia; or
(B) to carry out any other authority the use of which the Secretary of the Navy determines
would improve the submarine industrial base.
(5) CREDITING OF RECEIPTS.—Notwithstanding any provision of law pertaining to the
crediting of amounts received from a sale under the terms of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2761), any receipt of the United States as a result of a transfer under this section
shall—
(A) be credited, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy to—
(i) the appropriation, fund, or account used in incurring the original obligation;
(ii) an appropriate appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the purposes for
which the expenditures were made; or
(iii) any other appropriation, fund, or account available for the purpose specified in
paragraph (4)(B); and
(B) remain available for obligation until expended for the same purpose as the
appropriation to which the receipt is credited.
(6) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING LAW TO TRANSFER OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—With respect to any special nuclear material for use in utilization
facilities or any portion of a vessel transferred under this subsection constituting utilization
facilities for military applications under section 91 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C.
2121), transfer of such material or such facilities shall only occur in accordance with such
section 91.
(B) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of Energy may use proceeds from a transfer
described in subparagraph (A) for the acquisition of submarine naval nuclear propulsion
plants and the nuclear fuel to replace the propulsion plants and fuel transferred to the
Government of Australia.
(b) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT OF AUKUS SUBMARINES.—Section 8680 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
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(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
“(c) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT OF CERTAIN SUBMARINES.—
“(1) SHIPYARD.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Secretary of
the Navy shall determine the appropriate shipyard in the United States, Australia, or the
United Kingdom to perform any repair or refurbishment of a United States submarine
involved in submarine security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (in this section referred to as “AUKUS”).
“(2) PERSONNEL.—Repair or refurbishment described in paragraph (1) may be carried
out by personnel of the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia in accordance with
the international arrangements governing AUKUS submarine security activities.”.

SEC. ___. AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES SUBMARINE
SECURITY TRAINING.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may transfer or authorize export of defense services to
the Government of Australia under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)
that may also be directly exported to Australian private-sector personnel to support the
development of the Australian submarine industrial base necessary for submarine security
activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (in this section
referred to as “AUKUS”), including where such private-sector personnel are not officers,
employees, or agents of the Government of Australia.
(b) APPLICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR FURTHER TRANSFER.—Any transfer
of defense services to the Government of Australia pursuant to subsection (a) to persons
other than those directly provided such defense services pursuant to such subsection shall
only be made in accordance with the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).134
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226)
House
In H.R. 2670 as passed by the House, Section 518 would require a report identifying gaps in the
level of staffing necessary to accomplish AUKUS-related efforts in DOD. Section 3132 would
require a report that contains a plan to establish a domestic enrichment capability dedicated to
solely satisfying DOD requirements for highly enriched uranium (HEU), high-assay low enriched
uranium, low enriched uranium, and depleted uranium, with such a report to include, among other
things, a description of any changes in the DOD requirement for HEU due to AUKUS. (U.S. and
British nuclear-powered warships use HEU in their reactors.)
Senate
Section 1353 of S. 2226 would require DOD to designate a senior DOD civilian official to be
responsible for overseeing DOD activities relating to the AUKUS partnership.

134 Source: Office of Legislative Counsel, “DoD Legislative Proposals, Fiscal Year 2024,” under “Eighth Package of
Legislative Proposals Sent to Congress for Inclusion in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024—
Individual Proposals (Sent to Congress on May 2, 2023),” posted at https://ogc.osd.mil/OGC-Offices/Office-of-
Legislative-Counsel/DoD-Legislative-Proposals-2024/. See also Bryant Harris and Megan Eckstein, “Pentagon Seeks
Authority to Transfer Nuclear Submarines to Australia,” Defense News, May 17, 2023; Nick Wilson, “DOD Asks
Congress for AUKUS Provisions in FY-24 Defense Authorization Bill,” Inside Defense, May 17, 2023.
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The Senate Armed Services committee’s report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S. 2226
states
Public shipyard support for AUKUS
The committee strongly supports the trilateral security agreement between the United
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, known as AUKUS, which presents a unique
opportunity to significantly increase security cooperation and enhance collective security
with two of our closest allies. Central to the agreement is the initiative to enable Australia
to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. The committee notes the importance of ensuring
appropriate attention is given to the Australian submarine industrial base, particularly
Australian shipyards, to ensure that it is prepared to meet the demands of maintaining these
advanced systems. As such, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of the Navy to provide a report, no later than January 30, 2024, on the
Department’s efforts and plans to leverage the expertise of the United States public
shipyards, including lessons learned as part of the ongoing Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Plan [SIOP], to support Australian shipyard improvements and worker
training. (Page 268)
Conference
In the conference report (H.Rept. 118-301 of December 6, 2023) on H.R. 2670, Sections 1321-
1354 address various matters relating to the AUKUS partnership, including the proposed Pillar 1
pathway for submarines, which is covered in particular in Sections 1351-1354, which are referred
to collectively as the AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act.
Sections 1321-1354 of H.R. 2670 collectively address (but not necessarily in the same exact
ways) many of the matters addressed by the freestanding bills listed later in this section—the
AUKUS Undersea Defense Act (H.R. 3939), the AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act
(H.R. 4619), the Bilateral Resilience in Industry Trade Security Act (BRITS Act) (H.R. 4715), the
Keeping our Allies Leading in Advancement Act (KOALA Act) (H.R. 4716), the AUKUS
Oversight and Accountability Act (H.R. 4725), and the Truncating Onerous Regulations for
Partners and Enhancing Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO) Act of 2023 (S. 1471).
Section 1351 of H.R. 2670 states that Sections 1351-1354 may be referred to as the AUKUS
Submarine Transfer Authorization Act.
Section 1352:
• Authorizes, effective one year after enactment of H.R. 2670, the transfer of up to
two Virginia-class submarines to Australia on a sale basis, and the transfer of not
more than one additional Virginia-class submarine to Australia on a sale basis,
during a 20-year period beginning on the date of enactment of H.R. 2670.
• States that these transfers will not be subject to the requirements of Section 36 of
the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776) or 10 U.S.C. 8677 (which requires
an authorization by law for the transfer of certain vessels to other countries).
• States that expenses incurred by the United States in connection with the
transfers are to be charged to Australia notwithstanding Section 516(e) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).
• States that at least 270 days prior to each transfer, the president is to submit a
certification that the transfer will not degrade U.S. undersea capabilities, is
consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, and is in
furtherance of the AUKUS partnership; that United States is making sufficient
submarine production and maintenance investments to meet U.S. military
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requirements; and that Australia has provided the appropriate funds and support
for the additional capacity required to meet the requirements.
• States that the requirement for the Chief of Naval Operations to make a
certification under 10 U.S.C. 8678 shall not apply to the transfers. The text of 10
U.S.C. 8678 is as follows:
§8678. Chief of Naval Operations: certification required for disposal of combatant
vessels

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no combatant vessel of the Navy may be
sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of unless the Chief of Naval Operations
certifies that it is not essential to the defense of the United States.
• States that the submarine transfers may not occur unless United States and
Australia have entered into a mutual defense agreement that provides a clear
legal framework for the sole purpose of Australia’s acquisition of conventionally
armed, nuclear-powered submarines, and that meets the highest nonproliferation
standards for the exchange of nuclear materials, technology, equipment, and
information between the United States and Australia.
• States that the transfer of any Virginia-class submarine beyond the three such
submarines authorized above may occur only if such transfer is explicitly
authorized pursuant to a law enacted after the date of enactment of H.R. 2670.
• Sets forth procedures for crediting receipts received from the sales of Virginia-
class boats.
• Requires a notification at least 30 days prior to the first submarine transfer that
Australia has met certain requirements for supporting U.S. and UK submarines
rotationally deployed to Australia under the Submarine Rotational Forces-West
effort, and for operating its own Virginia-class submarines.
• Sets forth the legal framework for any special nuclear materials for use in
utilization facilities or any portion of a transferred submarine.
• Amends 10 U.S.C. 8680 to permit, under certain conditions, a public or private
shipyard in the United States, Australia, or the UK to perform any repair or
refurbishment of a U.S. submarine that is involved in submarine security
activities between the three AUKUS partners.
• Authorizes the transfer or export to Australia and the UK, including private and
public-sector Australian and UK personnel, of defense services necessary or
incidental to support the transfer and operation of a transferred submarine, and
requires (with presidential certification) that any transferred or exported defense
service be subject to appropriate security controls to ensure that sensitive
information is protected from disclosure to persons unauthorized by the United
States to receive it.
• Requires a classified report 180 days after the date of enactment of H.R. 2670,
and annually thereafter for 15 years, on the status of the submarine transfers and
other matters relating to the implementation of submarine security cooperation
between the three AUKUS partners.
Section 1353 authorizes the acceptance of, and sets forth the procedures for holding and using,
contributions of money from Australia relating to nonnuclear related aspects of submarine
security activities between the three AUKUS partners.
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Section 1354 defines the term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees and leadership’’ as used in
these sections as meaning the Speaker of the House; the House Foreign Affairs, Armed Services,
and Appropriations Committees; the Senate majority leader; and the Senate Foreign Relations,
Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees.
In addition to the above provisions that focus on submarine security cooperation between the
three AUKUS partners, the following sections addressing the AUKUS partnership in general
include elements relating to submarine security cooperation, including but not necessarily limited
to the following:
Section 1332 directs the senior DOD official designated as responsible for overseeing DOD
activities relating to the AUKUS partnership to submit, not later than 90 days after enactment of
H.R. 2670, an implementation plan for DOD efforts relating to the AUKUS partnership that
includes, among other things, a consideration of the plan’s implications for the industrial base
with respect to expanding U.S. submarine construction capacity to fulfill U.S., UK, and Australia
requirements; accelerating the restoration of U.S. capabilities for producing highly enriched
uranium to fuel submarine reactors; stabilizing commodity markets and expanding supplies of
high-grade steel, construction materials, and other resources required for improving shipyard
condition and expanding throughput capacity; and coordinating and synchronizing industrial
sourcing opportunities among the three AUKUS partners.
Section 1333 directs the State Department, in coordination with DOD and other appropriate
agencies, to submit a report once every two years, starting one year after enactment of H.R. 2670,
that includes, among other things, an explanation of the total cost to the United States associated
with Pillar One of the AUKUS partnership; a detailed explanation of how enhanced access to
Australia’s industrial base is contributing to strengthening the U.S. strategic position in Asia; a
detailed explanation of the military and strategic benefit provided by improved access to
Australian naval bases; and a detailed assessment of how Australia’s sovereign conventionally
armed nuclear attack submarines contribute to U.S. defense and deterrence objectives in the Indo-
Pacific region. The report is to also include a discussion of progress made on achieving Pillar 1,
including a description of progress made by the three AUKUS partners to conclude an Article 14
arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); a description of the status of
efforts of the three AUKUS partners to build the supporting infrastructure to base conventionally
armed, nuclear-powered attack submarines; updates on efforts by the three AUKUS partners to
train a workforce that can build, sustain, and operate conventionally armed, nuclear-powered
attack submarines; a description of progress in establishing submarine support facilities capable
of hosting rotational forces in western Australia by 2027; and a description of progress made in
improving U.S. submarine production capabilities that will enable the United States to meet its
objectives of providing up to five Virginia-class submarines to Australia by the early to mid-
2030s, as well as U.S. submarine production requirements.
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587
states
Australia-United Kingdom-United States Trilateral Partnership Agreement.—The
Committee supports the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Trilateral Partnership
Agreement, which will strengthen allied presence and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Not
later than 90 days after the enactment of this act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a
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long-term plan to the congressional defense committees on the planned schedule,
milestones, costs, and funding requirements for the transfer of Virginia Class submarines
from the United States and to meet the U.S. Navy’s requirement for attack submarines.
This plan shall include funding requirements and plans for U.S. and partner investments in
the U.S. submarine industrial base. (Page 138)
AUKUS Undersea Defense Act (H.R. 3939)
Section 3 of H.R. 3939 would authorize the transfer not more than two Virginia class submarines
from the Navy to Australia on a sale basis under section 21 of the Arms Export Control Act, with
the cost of the transfer to be borne by Australia. Section 4 would permit DOD to accept from
Australia contributions of money made by Australia for use by DOD in support of nonnuclear
related aspects of submarine security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Section 5 would permit the President to transfer or authorize the export of defense
services to Australia under the Arms Export Control Act that may also be directly exported to
Australian private-sector personnel to support the development of the Australian submarine
industrial base necessary for submarine security activities between Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act (H.R. 4619)
Section 3 of H.R. 4619 would, among other things, authorize the transfer up to two Virginia-class
submarines from the Navy to Australia on a sale basis over a period of 15 years, with the cost of
the transfer to be borne by Australia, subject to the President making certain certifications not less
than 270 days prior to a transfer of a vessel, and providing for a joint resolution of disapproval by
Congress within the 270-day period.
Bilateral Resilience in Industry Trade Security Act (BRITS Act)
(H.R. 4715)
H.R. 4715 would amend the Arms Export Control Act to establish exceptions for the United
Kingdom relating to licensing of defense articles and defense services for export under the act.
Keeping our Allies Leading in Advancement Act (KOALA Act)
(H.R. 4716)
H.R. 4716 would amend the Arms Export Control Act to establish exceptions for Australia
relating to licensing of defense articles and defense services for export under the act.
AUKUS Oversight and Accountability Act (H.R. 4725)
Section 2 of H.R. 4725 would require the Department of State to appoint a senior advisor in the
Department of State to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the AUKUS partnership,
establish a task force on AUKUS governance to be led by the senior advisor, and require the
senior advisor to submit reports to Congress on a quarterly and annual basis. Section 3 would
make modifications to the Arms Export Control Act and other authorities.
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Truncating Onerous Regulations for Partners and Enhancing
Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO) Act of 2023 (S. 1471)
S. 1471 contains provisions that would address various proposed activities to be carried out under
the AUKUS agreement. Sections relating to the SSN AUKUS project (i.e., Pillar 1) include but
are not necessarily limited to Sections 3, 4, 6, and 12-15.

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Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan Administration
(1981-1989).
The Reagan-era (i.e., 1980s-era) plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and
maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally
called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.135 In 1992, however, the SSN goal
was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level requirement study
(updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level
acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.136
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy,
established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs.137 The
Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR supported a requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and
established a tentative SSN force-level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of
peacetime operational requirements.”138 The Clinton Administration later amended the SSN
figure to 55 boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in December 1999. The study
had three main conclusions:
• “that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 62 [SSNs] in
the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the regional military commanders-
in-chief] with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands
without gapping other requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this
force structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to meet the
modeled war fighting requirements”;
• “that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18 Virginia class
SSNs in the 2015 time frame”; and
• “that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame
would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence community’s highest
operational and collection requirements.”139

135 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials, Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral
Raymond G. Jones Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in U.S. Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs,
June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
136 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July 1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub
Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,” Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9;
Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon
Urges Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “ Size of Sub
Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
137 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993,
pp. 55-57.
138 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
139 Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy, February 14, 2000, p. 5.
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The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of required SSN force
levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not translated into official DOD force-level
goals.
The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended
requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs. In revalidating
this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD’s
“transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value
from each element of the force—DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and
reorganize the Armed Forces.”140
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in 2003-2004. One of
the Navy studies—an internal Navy study done in 2004—reportedly recommended reducing the
attack submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly
recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack
submarines.141
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force levels out to
FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035—a 260-ship fleet including 37 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs and 4 SSGNs.142
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack submarine
requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.143
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships, including
48 SSNs.
Although the Navy’s ship force-level goals have changed repeatedly in subsequent years, the
figure of 48 SSNs remained unchanged until December 2016, when the Navy released a force-
level objective for achieving and maintaining a force of 355 ships, including 66 SSNs.

140 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
141 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p. 1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study
Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May 13, 2004.
142 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of
Naval Vessels for FY 2006
. The report was delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees on March 23, 2005.
143 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day (New London, CT), May 27,
2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.
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Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs
This appendix presents information on some alternative profiles for funding the procurement of
SSNs. These alternatives include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
two years of advance procurement (AP) funding followed by full funding
the traditional approach, under which there are two years of AP funding for the
SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
one year of AP funding followed by full funding—one year of AP funding for
the SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
full funding with no AP funding (single-year full funding, aka point-blank
full funding)—full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, with no AP
funding in prior years;
incremental funding—partial funding of the SSN in the year of procurement,
followed by one or more years of additional funding increments needed to
complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
advance appropriations—a form of full funding that can be viewed as a
legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.144
Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the FY2008 budget,
suggested that two years of AP funding are required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and
consequently that additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest.145 This
testimony understated Congress’s options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the
near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of AP funding (which is used
primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion components), Congress can procure an
SSN without prior-year AP funding, or with only one year of AP funding. Consequently, Congress
at that time had the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or FY2010.
Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships
for which no prior-year AP funding had been provided. Specifically, Congress used single-year
full funding in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71, and again in
FY1988 to procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the
Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in FY1990 and
FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial AP payment for CVN-74.
Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to

144 For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement:
Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
145 For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008 Department
of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships the Navy might want to procure in
FY2008, should additional funding be made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter stated in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced procurement, to be
able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we would need to start two years in advance. What
that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08 with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year
to 2010.” (Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same subcommittee on
March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007.
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FY1988, and fully funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships
entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.146
The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor components was
not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and 75 with single-year full
funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more quickly. What made it possible for
Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full funding was Congress’s constitutional authority
to appropriate funding for that purpose.
Procuring an SSN with one year of AP funding or no AP funding would not materially change the
way the SSN would be built—the process would still encompass two or three years of advance
work on long-leadtime components, and an additional five or six years or so of construction work
on the ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction of the
ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal, and the interval between the recorded
year of full funding and the year that the ship enters service would be longer than normal.
Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships would not begin
construction for some time and consequently would take longer to enter service than a ship of that
kind would normally require. When Congress procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
(CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both
cases in the knowledge that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some
time after the first.


146 In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear propulsion components in
inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted the carriers to be built more quickly than would have
otherwise been the case, but it is not what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it
possible was Congress’s authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.
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Appendix C. SSN Maintenance Backlog
This appendix presents additional background information on the SSN maintenance backlog.
A January 12, 2023, press report stated
Top Navy officials this week promoted the idea of adding more public shipyards [i.e.,
government-operated naval shipyards, or NSYs] to improve ship maintenance.
Speaking during the annual Surface Navy Association symposium on Wednesday [January
11], Adm. Daryl Caudle, Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, emphatically said
there is a good argument for the need to add at least a fifth public shipyard.
“Of course. I need six! I need enough capacity in our shipyards to drive the backlog down
to zero…I can today, if I had the backlog chipped down, have a more effective, larger fleet
today.” Caudle said on Wednesday during the Surface Navy Association symposium.147
A November 17, 2022, press report stated (emphasis added)
The U.S. Navy has nearly twice as many submarines sidelined for maintenance than
it should
, and those boats in maintenance ultimately require three times more unplanned
work than they should, the program executive officer for attacks subs has said.
But the service thinks it can turn these and other problematic statistics around by changing
when and how it funds submarine maintenance. In fact, Rear Adm. Jon Rucker said he
thinks the Navy can implement industry best practices starting in fiscal 2026 and, by the
end of that fiscal year, get to almost zero delay days.
Several aspects of submarine maintenance preparation are awry, setting up the boats for
poor outcomes, Rucker said this month at the Naval Submarine League’s annual
conference.
On the planning side, engineers aren’t sticking to milestones that lock the work package at
a certain point; instead, they continue to jam in more work, which throws off assumptions
about the materials to order and the availability of skilled labor.
Because of the addition of extra work once the maintenance availability starts, coupled
with unexpected problems that arise, Rucker said 30% of the total work on submarines is
unplanned, compared to an industry best practice of 10%.
The Navy has set a goal to get to 10% unplanned work by FY26, and much of that
improvement will come from discipline in the planning process.
When it comes to ordering materials, Rucker said, the Navy isn’t funding these at the right
amount or at the right time.
For starters, he explained, the Navy only funds 40% to 50% of materials ahead of the start
of a maintenance availability; the remaining amount is ordered after the availability starts
and workers can get a closer look at the insides of the boat. Much of this material is
considered “contingent”—the Navy will not order it until workers see that the condition of
the submarine requires certain work be done and therefore materials to be ordered.
The problem is that almost every single boat requires all the same contingent work, Rucker
said, meaning it would be better to assume up front the work will be done and the parts are
required. “We’re going to buy the material anyway; we just buy it late” under the current
system, he explained.
By fiscal 2026, he said, the Navy will aim to have 90% to 95% of total material on hand
when an availability starts, rather than today’s 40% to 50% figure. This issue of buying

147 Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,” Defense Daily, January 12, 2023.
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materials earlier is made all the more dire by the increasing delivery times of many
materials.
Rucker told reporters after his speech at the conference that the Navy used to get away with
later material orders for two reasons: The older Los Angeles-class attack boats had a more
plentiful inventory of spare parts on hand due to investments when that submarine class
was in construction, and because parts not already on hand could typically be delivered
within two to 12 months.
Today, the Navy has few spares on hand for the newer Virginia-class boats. And when
items like large pumps and valves are unexpectedly needed, it can take as long as three
years to get them made and delivered.
“We have to phase the money differently. Our model’s broken because it was built on an
assumption of the way things were 20 or 30 years ago, when we had three times the
suppliers [in the industrial base], a very mature class” with plenty of spares on hand, he
said.
“But the model doesn’t support the fact that we have longer leads, fewer suppliers; it takes
more time, and we didn’t buy all the stuff we needed to. We’re going to adjust the way we
buy things,” he added.
He made clear the Navy isn’t asking to buy materials “early,” but rather on a new timeline
that better reflects long delivery times and the imperative to have 90% to 95% of the
material on hand at the start of work.
Rucker said the submarine community decided on these changes too late to modify the
FY23 funding request. He’s working to get them implemented in the FY24 budget request,
which is to be released in the spring. If the Navy can properly phase its spending on
materials for submarine repair work, it will give industry a more predictable workload,
ensure more materials are on hand at the start of a repair project and reduce a major barrier
to submarines coming out of maintenance on schedule.
Overall, Rucker explained in his speech, the Navy has gone from nearly 1,600 delay days
of maintenance for attack submarines in FY19 to 1,100 delay days in FY22, which ended
Sept. 30.
Late materials alone account for more than 100 of those days, Rucker said.
His office projects that figure will come down to about 700 delay days by FY26 based on
changes already implemented—and Rucker said that better planning and earlier materials
purchased will get the community to as close to zero as possible by the end of FY26,
assuming the changes are implemented this next budget cycle.
This drive to zero delay days comes in the context of an undersized attack submarine force
that’s kept busy. Navy and Pentagon leadership repeatedly call the submarine force among
America’s top advantages over adversaries like China and Russia; yet the U.S. has 50
attack submarines and four related “large payload submarines,” compared to a requirement
for a combined 66 to 72 attack and large payload subs.
Of the 50 attack subs, Rucker said 18 are in maintenance or waiting for their turn.
Industry best practice would call for just 20% to be tied up in repairs, or 10 boats
instead of 18.
148
The Navy in 2010 decided to put the submarines through fewer but longer maintenance
availabilities, allowing the boats to have longer operational cycles. But Rucker said this

148 Regarding this point, see also Megan Eckstein, “Navy Frustration Building over Late Weapons, Ship Deliveries,”
Defense News, January 11, 2023; Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,”
Defense Daily, January 12, 2023; Justin Katz, “As AUKUS Looms, US Navy Sub Leaders Sound Alarms at Home,”
Breaking Defense, November 4, 2022.
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new model—when all the delays are taken into account—means a sub going into
maintenance is out of the fleet for an average of 450 to 700 days, depending on the class,
at a time when operational commanders are itching for all the submarine presence they can
get.
To help overcome the backlog of maintenance work faster, construction yards Newport
News Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Electric Boat are helping with some repairs of
Los Angeles-class subs. The former has Columbus, and the latter was awarded a contract
over the summer for repairs on Hartford.
Boise, the poster child for submarine maintenance woes—it returned from its last
deployment in January 2015 and has been waiting to get into maintenance since fiscal 2016,
losing its certification to dive amid the delays—is expected to go into maintenance at
Newport News. But Rucker said a final decision on its funding would be revealed in the
FY24 budget request, and he would not comment further on plans for that boat.149
A November 14, 2022, press report stated
When a U.S. attack submarine arrives for shipyard maintenance, Navy rules say the vast
majority of the necessary parts and materiel must be there waiting. But most jobs actually
begin with half or even fewer of the needed items on hand. That means delays, extra cost,
and usually, stealing items from other projects, which compounds the problems across the
sub force.
That’s a planning and funding problem, according to the program executive officer for
attack submarines, who says he’s working to fix it by 2026.
“On the material side, we are not funding them properly…We do not fund the right amount
and we do not phase it properly,” Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker said Nov. 2 at the annual
Naval Submarine League symposium in Arlington, Virginia....
Currently, just 40 to 50 percent of the required parts and material are on hand when a sub
arrives in the yard, Rucker said.
Part of the problem is that the Navy lacks funds for “contingent material”: parts to fix
problems that are discovered during the work, like valves that are found to need
replacement. But, Rucker said, these kinds of things are actually predictable.
“Every availability—about 90 percent—we use the same stuff. We know that, but we don't
order it until then,” he said.
Because submarine parts are so specialized and the supply chain so constrained, this
generally means the yard has to take the items from some other planned submarine-
maintenance project, Rucker said.
“And with lead times of material on the order of up to two years and some more, no wonder
we don't have the material we have to count on,” he said. “Because we order it after the
avail starts, and we don't get it in time to do it, so we got to take it from somewhere else.”
Rucker said for new construction, the material is bought upfront. He wants to do the same
for sustainment.
“So, we're changing that model so where we're going to phase the funding differently and
order the contingent material in advance and so it’s ready,” he said. “So when we get to
that point, the stuff’s on the shelf. That’s part of the problem of not buying all that stuff
early on. Decisions were made early; we got to get after it.”

149 Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Hopes New Funding Model Can Cut Sub Maintenance Delays by 2026,” Defense News,
November 17, 2022.
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By 2026, each availability will start with the required 90 to 95 percent of the material on
hand, he said.
But missing material is only part of what causes submarine-maintenance delays. Rucker
said that planning and shipyard throughput are also causes for not “executing.”
Currently, the attack submarine force has about 1,100 days of maintenance delay, down
from about 1,500 to 1,600 days in 2019, Rucker said, adding that improvements already in
the works will reduce total annual delay days to 700 by 2026.
Late material adds 100 to 111 days of delay to each availability. These are the delays that
better planning and funding is intended to reduce.
How the Navy could do this phased-funding approach is unclear. Rucker told reporters he
is working to see which budget year to introduce it. When asked about the budgeting
process for implementing something like this, officials with U.S. Naval Sea Systems
Command and the Navy said they could not comment on internal budget deliberations or
future budgets.150
A November 2, 2022, press report stated
Within the next year the US Navy wants to initiate a “scoping study” aimed at determining
if the service needs to establish a fifth public shipyard to support future submarine
maintenance, according to a senior officer involved in the task, a notion that previously
met with some resistance from lawmakers.
Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker, program executive officer for attack submarines, told
reporters here at the Naval Submarine League symposium that industry frequently asks the
Navy about considerations for a new public shipyard. He also stressed that the scoping
study was preliminary and there is no clear consensus in the service yet about whether
another shipyard is even necessary, let alone whether it will be built.
“Right now, we’re in a stage to say: ‘Let’s go scope how capable our shipyards could be?’”
he said. Once the service completes its Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program,
“how efficient will we be?” he continued, referring to the Navy’s 20-year plan to overhaul
the four existing public shipyards....
Breaking Defense in May published an extensive report about one Ohio businessman’s
proposal to the Navy to do just that [see the May 9, 2022, press report excerpted below].
Ed Bartlett, an engineer and former enlisted sailor, called his proposal “the only actionable
plan” to relieve the Navy’s submarine maintenance backlog, and he has numerous former
admirals, shipbuilding industry giants and local politicians backing his ideas. But at the
time, lawmakers on Capitol Hill seemed unconvinced that now’s the time for such a major
investment. [Rep.] Joe Courtney, Conn., a House Democrat known for being hawkish on
Navy spending, called it a “tall order.”
Rucker today said the service had underestimated several issues that are now causing
problems, such as the second- and third-tier ramifications of the coronavirus pandemic.
But he added that another shipyard is a “big path to go down,” if that decision is ever made.
Right now, the Navy’s urgent focus is on improving the capabilities and efficacy of the
current shipyards, he added.151

150 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Only Half the Parts Are Waiting When US Attack Submarines Come in For Repairs,” Defense
One
, November 14, 2022. See also Justin Katz, “As AUKUS looms, US Navy Sub Leaders Sound Alarms at Home,”
Breaking Defense, November 4, 2022.
151 Justin Katz, “Navy ‘Scoping Study’ to Examine Shipyard Capacity, Potential for a New Yard,” Breaking Defense,
November 2, 2022.
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A September 21, 2022, press report stated
The submarine industrial base, already strained by demand for new construction, may need
to accelerate its production of spare parts to alleviate submarine maintenance woes.
The vast majority of submarine maintenance availabilities run late, in part due to poor
planning practices and in part because repair yards rely on a pool of replacement parts “that
just doesn’t exist” after the Navy failed to sufficiently prepare for Virginia-class submarine
sustainment, according to two admirals.
“That upfront investment didn’t happen for Virginia-class, so we’re missing that whole
sustainment tail, or a big portion of that,” Rear Adm. Scott Brown, the deputy commander
of Naval Sea Systems Command for industrial operations (NAVSEA 04), said Sept. 20 at
the American Society of Naval Engineers’ annual Fleet Maintenance and Modernization
Symposium here.
“It’s resulting in a lot of churn, a lot of cannibalization—so we have to take things off other
boats to stick them on the boat we’re trying to get out—and a lot of, frankly, frustration
with the workforce on waiting for stuff that doesn’t exist,” he added. “Of course, that leads
to delays.”
He said the Navy asked the Center for Naval Analyses to study the connection between
material delays and extended maintenance availabilities; the research organization found
the lack of material on hand “is a fairly large contribution to our delays,” according to
Brown.
Vice Adm. Bill Galinis, the commander of NAVSEA, said Sept. 21 at the same conference
that only 20% to 30% of submarine maintenance availabilities over the last decade have
finished on time. The problem is worsening as the Virginia-class submarines account for a
greater percentage of the undersea fleet, he said.
“We’ve seen a significant growth in the amount of man days required to complete a
submarine [maintenance] availability, particularly a Virginia-class one, and [we’re] really
trying to deep-dive and understand why that really is,” Galinis added.
He pointed to a couple potential factors. For parts purchased with annual operations and
maintenance funding, global supply chain issues mean it takes longer for parts to be
delivered. In some cases, it’s taking up to two years, putting current and upcoming
availabilities at risk.
For spare parts managed through the Defense Logistics Agency or the Naval Supply
Systems Command, the Navy has only funded some of these at about 40% or 50% in recent
years. As a result, parts simply aren’t in the inventory when needed by the Navy’s four
public shipyards.
And, Galinis added, the rotable pool of spares is too small due to a lack of investment in
the early years of the Virginia-class acquisition. The rotable pool is made up of parts taken
off a submarine by shipyard workers and later refurbished for use in the future.
He added that the refurbishment process is moving too slowly, meaning parts aren’t
available when needed. Galinis said the Navy may have to contract out some of that
refurbishment work.
Brown told Defense News his office, which oversees the work of all four public shipyards,
wants to increase the inventory of each component in the rotable pool and also add new
types of components that have particularly blocked the service from completing
maintenance availabilities on time.
Brown said he doesn’t expect the problem to cost the Navy more, but the service may need
to spend more quickly on spares and sustainment.
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“That’s going to cause a push of material dollars to the left in the [five-year Future Years
Defense Program] to buy early to make sure we have that stuff. But it’s eventually going
to equalize out, because we’re going to end up buying it anyway,” he said.
Galinis also pointed to a lack of rigor in submarine planning and project management,
which he said is exacerbating the maintenance delays.
A number of pre-availability assessments and tests must take place on all submarines,
aircraft carriers and surface ships to help identify the exact condition of the ship and what
work is needed.
“The submarine force is probably the hardest one for us to get that done, principally
because of their operational schedule and just in some cases the difficulty getting teams
out to a submarine,” Galinis said. But it means some planning documents aren’t completed
until the submarine is back in port, generating additional delays.
Indeed, whereas surface ships only see about 10% so-called unplanned work, aircraft
carriers have been seeing a 22% unplanned work rate and submarines are nearing 30%, the
NAVSEA commander said.152
A July 11, 2022, press report stated that
maintenance issues are hindering the East Coast fleet’s readiness, according to Adm. Daryl
Caudle, who leads U.S. Fleet Forces Command....
[Caudle stated:] “As far as some things I’m seeing where we’re not performing: Let’s go
to the submarine force first. The lack of capacity and the lack of performance at our public
and private yards are driving availabilities—these are depot availabilities now—past our
class maintenance time frames to such an extent that they have consumed all the dry docks.
So if I have an emergent issue, I don’t really have good options to bring in units for those
things that may be emergent dry-docking repairs. They have also forced ships—because
submarines expire, their hulls expire—for them to be tied up alongside waiting on their
availability to start because there’s no place to put them. We call those idle submarines.
“The number of idle submarines has crept up over time. They fluctuate now between five
to, worst case, it got to a point we were at about nine out. So these are submarines just
sitting pierside because the hulls expired, they can’t submerge and they’re not ready to go
into their depot availability. This backlog is causing me to lose fleet size due to this
problem.”153
A May 12, 2022, press report states
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday had blunt words today for two
powerhouse companies that build submarines for the Navy: We need your shipyards, but
not the problems that come with them.
“We know that we don’t have the capacity in our public shipyards to handle all of that
[submarine] maintenance. We need Electric Boat and we need Huntington Ingalls to be
able to do that work,” said Gilday. “They are under performing. They are over cost and
way over schedule.”
Gilday was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the Navy’s fiscal
2023 budget request alongside Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro and Marine Corps
Commandant Gen. David Berger....

152 Megan Eckstein, “Submarine Fleet Needs More Spare Parts to Stem Maintenance Delays,” Defense News,
September 21, 2022. See also Sam LaGrone, “NAVSEA: Navy ‘Struggling’ to Get Attack Subs Out of Repairs on
Time as Demand Increases,” USNI News, September 21, 2022.
153 Megan Eckstein, “Six Questions with the Head of US Fleet Forces Command,” Defense News, July 11, 2022.
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Todd Corillo, a Newport News Shipbuilding spokesman, in a statement to Breaking
Defense, acknowledged the shipbuilder has “experienced challenges” since reconstituting
its submarine repair business “following a 10-year hiatus.”
“In this time, we have built a proficient workforce, matured the supply chain, developed
process improvements and made smart investments in required facilities,” he said.
“Although we experienced challenges with our transition back into this complex business,
we are now keeping pace with current submarine repair needs and also forecasting future
workflow to drive predictable capacity and performance.”154
A May 9, 2022, press report stated
With the Navy working through its long-term plan to relieve the notorious submarine
maintenance backlog and other well-known issues piling up at the service’s four public
shipyards, into the space has stepped Ed Bartlett, an engineer and former enlisted sailor
who has spent the last several years arguing that the solution is obvious: It’s time to build
a fifth shipyard.
Bartlett has now twice pitched the Navy on a proposal to buy and build a fifth public
shipyard and depot facility in Ohio. His company calls the proposal “the only actionable
plan” to relieve the Navy’s submarine maintenance backlog, and his offer has the backing
of former admirals, a shipbuilding industry giant and local politicians.
But what may seem an easy solution on paper has, so far, been met with cold reality. The
Navy rejected Bartlett’s proposal the first time due to cost and policy concerns, and still
sees issues with a revised proposal submitted earlier this year. There’s also a host of
technical and legal hurdles any plan for a new shipyard in the Great Lakes would have to
overcome.
And while lawmakers have been less than impressed with the Navy’s long-term, $21 billion
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP), there doesn’t seem to be much energy
around the idea of a new shipyard—at least outside of the Ohio delegation, who would
benefit from Bartlett’s pitch.
With the Navy’s first admiral directly charged with overseeing SIOP set to testify in front
of Congress this week for the first time, the one thing that all sides seem to agree on is this:
The Navy must move faster to get its ships out of port and underway, and business as usual
will only leave the US critically vulnerable in a future conflict.155
A February 16, 2022, press report stated
The U.S. Navy attack submarine force inventory is at a low, and maintenance backlogs are
making it harder to conduct important development work, the commander of the submarine
force in U.S. Pacific Fleet said this week.
Rear Adm. Jeffrey Jablon said the SSN fleet sits at just 47 today—down from 50 attack
subs in the fall, due in part to submarine decommissionings happening as planned while
new deliveries from industry run behind schedule.
That 47 is further diminished by maintenance challenges, he said while speaking at a Feb.
16 panel at the WEST 2022 conference, cohosted by the U.S. Naval Institute and AFCEA
International.
In fiscal 2016, because of idle time for subs awaiting maintenance—on boats which have
exceeded their operational limits and were no longer allowed to submerge under the water
until they underwent maintenance—the Navy lost about 360 days of operations.

154 Justin Katz, “Navy’s Submarine Builders ‘Over Cost’, ‘Under Performing’: Top Admiral,” Breaking Defense, May
12, 2022.
155 Justin Katz, “Is a New Navy Shipyard Realistic, or Just a ‘Tall Order?’” Breaking Defense, May 9, 2022.
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In FY21, the fleet lost nearly 1,500 days to idle time—the equivalent of taking four
submarines out of the fleet.
Additionally, Jablon said in FY21 the fleet lost the equivalent of 3.5 submarines to repair
periods that ran longer than planned.
“That’s about seven and a half SSNs that I cannot use last year because of awaiting
maintenance or maintenance delay,” he said.
Even with that smaller fleet, he told Defense News, “we meet all our operational
commitments. We’re able to ensure that our ships are combat ready when they deploy. We
meet the requirements of our combatant commanders that are placed upon us.”
But “it results in less ability to do tactical development at sea,” Jablon added, noting it also
cuts into commanding officers’ discretionary time at sea to bolster training in particular
areas.
“We’re still able to prepare the ship to be combat ready when they deploy,” he said, but
“it’s more difficult, it’s more deliberate, it takes more input from the [type commander]
staff to do that.”156
A September 22, 2020, press report stated
It has been five years since the attack submarine Boise returned from its last patrol, and
this whole time she has been waiting on some loving care and attention in the shipyards.
On Monday [September 21], the check cleared for roughly $351.8 million that covers the
initial planning and work as part of her overhaul at Huntington Ingalls Newport News
Shipbuilding where she has been in dry dock since earlier this year. Another contract
covering the full engineering overhaul is in negotiations, according to Naval Sea System
Command spokesperson Colleen O’Rourke,157 work that will include significant
maintenance on the nuclear propulsion system and modernization upgrades.
The running tab on Boise so far is $355 million, with advanced planning money already
awarded, according to the Defense Department contract announcement. The work under
this contract is scheduled to wrap up in May 2023, eight years after the sub left the
operational fleet.
While Boise could be wrapped up by 2023—the overhaul was initially scheduled for 25
months—it’s possible the repairs could take longer, O’Rourke said.
The bill will be paid out of 2020 Operations & Maintenance funding, according to the
contract announcement.
Boise has been something of a cause célèbre among congressional leaders, who have
pointed to the ship’s long wait to enter the shipyard as emblematic of the Navy’s struggle
with maintenance delays. The issue with attack submarines has been complicated, because
while that work would typically be done in the public shipyards, those have been backed
up with aircraft carriers and the Ohio-class ballistic missile subs.
Some of the Navy’s problems will resolve themselves after ballistic missile subs are
refueled, said Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and analyst with the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, in a 2019 interview.
“The big factor here is that attack submarines are last in line when it comes to
maintenance,” Clark explained then. “And that maintenance is done in the public yards,
both the refueling and non-refueling overhauls. So that’s why you see submarines like

156 Megan Eckstein, “Submarine Maintenance Backlogs and Delays Take Toll on Fleet’s Development Work at Sea,”
Defense News, February 16, 2022.
157 Colleen O’Rourke is no relation to Ronald O’Rourke.
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Boise who have been waiting a long time to get in, because carriers had a lot of maintenance
backlog”.
“And working through that backlog pushed SSBN refuelings back, and that in turn pushed
attack subs to the end of the line. Now that they are working through the carrier backlog
and the SSBN refueling is now largely completed, that’s going to mean the attack
submarines can be brought back into the public shipyards. So that’s a structural issue that’s
going to work itself out.”
But other aspects of the Navy’s quest to dig out of the submarine backlog are thornier and
will require the service to make long-term commitments to private shipyards, Clark said.
One of the main issues with assigning attack subs to private shipyards is that they are not
necessarily set up as maintenance shops: They’re more so built and organized as new
construction yards.
Naval Sea Systems Command acknowledged as much in a statement to the Virginian Pilot
as part of a story on the delays of Columbus and Helena, which the command attributed to
“the workforce’s inexperience in conducting submarine maintenance, which differs greatly
from new construction.”…
In an interview with USNI News, former Naval Sea Systems Command head Vice Adm.
Thomas Moore said he thought Boise would go better than previous attempts at
maintaining attack boats in private shipyard.
“I think we are well-positioned on Boise, certainly way better than we were on Helena and
Columbus, when we learned so many lessons the hard way,” Moore said. “They hadn’t
done submarine work in 10 years, and I think we underestimated how they had atrophied
in that skill set. I think they did as well.
“And the other thing is, I think we recognized that we probably put too much on their plate,
with multiple [maintenance] availabilities [i.e., ship maintenance projects] on their plate at
one time.”158
An August 2020 GAO report on maintenance delays on aircraft carriers and submarines stated
The Navy’s four shipyards completed 38 of 51 (75 percent) maintenance periods late for
aircraft carriers and submarines with planned completion dates in fiscal years 2015 through
2019, for a combined total of 7,424 days of maintenance delay. For each maintenance
period completed late, the shipyards averaged 113 days late for aircraft carriers and 225
days late for submarines.

Unplanned work and workforce factors—such as shipyard workforce performance and
capacity (having enough people to perform the work)—were the main factors GAO
identified as causing maintenance delays for aircraft carriers and submarines. The Navy
frequently cited both factors as contributing to the same days of maintenance delay.
Unplanned work—work identified after finalizing maintenance plans—contributed to
more than 4,100 days of maintenance delays. Unplanned work also contributed to the

158 David B. Larter, “The Hapless Attack Sub Boise Could Return to the Fleet in 2023 After 8 Years Sidelined,”
Defense News, September 22, 2020.
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Navy’s 36 percent underestimation of the personnel resources necessary to perform
maintenance. The workforce factor contributed to more than 4,000 days of maintenance
delay on aircraft carriers and submarines during fiscal years 2015 through 2019.
The Navy has taken steps but has not fully addressed the unplanned work and workforce
factors causing the most maintenance delays. First, the Navy updated planning documents
to improve estimates and plans to annually update these data, but knowing whether changes
improve results may take several years. Second, the Navy has consistently relied on high
levels of overtime to carry out planned work. GAO’s analysis found that high overtime
among certain production shops, such as painting or welding, averaged from 25 to 32
percent for fiscal years 2015 through 2019, with peak overtime as high as 45 percent.
Furthermore, shipyard officials told us that production shops at all four shipyards are
working beyond their capacity. Overtime at such rates has been noted as resulting in
diminished productivity. Third, the Navy initiated the Shipyard Performance to Plan
initiative in the fall of 2018 to address the unplanned work and workforce factors, but it
has not yet developed 13 of 25 planned metrics that could improve the Navy’s
understanding of the causes of maintenance delays. In addition, the Shipyard Performance
to Plan initiative does not include goals, milestones, and a monitoring process along with
fully developed metrics to address unplanned work and workforce weaknesses. Without
fully developing metrics and implementing goals, action plans, milestones, and a
monitoring process, the shipyards are not likely to address unplanned work and workforce
weaknesses and the Navy is likely to continue facing maintenance delays and reduced time
for training and operations with its aircraft carriers and submarines.159
A May 26, 2020, press report stated
After years of struggling to conduct attack submarine maintenance—with the four public
naval shipyards prioritizing SSN work last, behind a backlog of ballistic-missile sub and
aircraft carrier work, and private shipyards finding it tough to resume submarine repair
work after years of only doing new construction—the Navy appears back on track for its
SSN maintenance, the head of Naval Sea Systems Command told USNI News.
The move of attack submarine USS Boise (SSN-764) to the dry dock at Newport News
Shipbuilding in Virginia is the most visible sign of things moving in the right direction,
after the sub has been sitting pier side at nearby Norfolk Naval Shipyard for more than four
years waiting for maintenance to begin.
The Navy had previously hoped to get Boise into Newport News as early as 2018, but the
private yard struggled with its first two Los Angeles-class SSN maintenance periods—for
USS Helena (SSN-725) and USS Columbus (SSN-762)—and didn’t have the room for the
sub or the workforce to start working on it. As Boise lingered, it became a focal point in
the discussion about a lack of repair capacity and a backup of work at the four public naval
shipyards.
But, NAVSEA Commander Vice Adm. Tom Moore told USNI News, the Navy is moving
into a new era of on-time submarine maintenance….
Moore told USNI News in an interview last week that “I think we are well-positioned on
Boise, certainly way better than we were on Helena and Columbus, when we learned so
many lessons the hard way: that, one, they hadn’t done submarine work in 10 years, and I
think we underestimated how they had atrophied in that skill set, and I think they did as
well; and the other thing is, I think we recognized that we probably put too much on their
plate, with multiple availabilities on their plate at one time.” …
Moore said that Electric Boat likely won’t be a provider of submarine maintenance for
much longer–aside from an availability for USS Hartford (SSN-768) that starts in

159 Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipyards[:] Actions Needed to Address the Main Factors Causing
Maintenance Delays for Aircraft Carriers and Submarines
, GAO-20-588, August 2020, summary page.
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November 2021, the Connecticut yard will have its hand full with construction of
Columbia-class SSBNs and Block V Virginia-class SSNs. Moore said it’s important to get
the sub repair capability reconstituted at Newport News Shipbuilding so that one private
yard can serve as part of the SSN repair community….
Moore acknowledged that the bulk of the Navy’s problems in recent years was that its four
public shipyards, tasked with maintaining nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
carriers, did not have the capacity to keep up with demand….
If the plan can be executed, Moore said the anticipated work at Norfolk Naval Shipyard
matches the workforce capacity, meaning there should be no more backlog….
Though Boise has remained a “problem child” for longer than anticipated, Moore noted in
the recent interview that SSN maintenance is wrapping up on time more and more as
capacity at the public yards grows….
Moore said he was confident NAVSEA was in a good position on SSN maintenance
because a whole set of improvements had been made in tandem in recent years: not only
was the [naval shipyard] workforce now up to its goal of 36,700 personnel, but an effort to
create better business practices is underway and the first projects in a 20-year Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) program are already hitting the waterfront.160
A March 2019 Navy report to Congress states that in response to the above committee report
language
The Navy submitted an initial [submarine maintenance] plan in December 2018, that
reflected FY 2019 budget information. The Navy has [now] updated this plan to
incorporate data from the President’s FY 2020 budget submitted on March 11, 2019….
… In the post-Cold War and post 9/11 era, there have been decades of decisionmaking
associated with the re-posturing of defense strategies, such as: the reduction in maintenance
capacity and flexibility though Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC), increased
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), evolution of submarine life cycle maintenance plans,
budget reductions, and budget uncertainties that have contributed to the current challenges
facing the submarine fleet.
The root cause of submarine idle time and associated loss of operational availability, as
discussed in the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 19-229, “Actions
Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet” (issued
November 2018), is largely due to public shipyard capacity not keeping pace with growing
maintenance requirements that have been building for a number of years prior to the USS
BOISE (SSN 764) FY 2016 Engineered Overhaul (EOH). The workload to capacity
mismatch resulted in lower priority attack submarine (SSN) availabilities (as compared to
ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers) being delivered late and
a bow-waving of workload from one fiscal year to the next that could not be executed. The
workload backlog exacerbated the public shipyard workload-to-capacity mismatch and
contributed to an increasing trend in late SSN [maintenance] deliveries.
The Navy has taken several actions to improve the workload-to-capacity balance at the
public shipyards. Notably, over 20,600 workers were hired from FY 2013 through FY
2018, which after accounting for attrition, increased total end strength from 29,400 to
36,700. However, the accelerated hiring resulted in 56 percent of the production workforce
having less than five years of experience. The less experienced workforce requires a greater
investment in training, as described in the Navy’s Report to Congress on the Naval
Shipyard Development Plan (issued March 2018), which offers some near term
productivity gains. The Navy has also taken additional actions to balance workload at our

160 Megan Eckstein, “NAVSEA Says Attack Sub Repairs Much Improved as USS Boise Enters Yard Following 4-Year
Wait,” USNI News, May 26, 2020.
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public shipyards by outsourcing four submarine maintenance availabilities to the private
sector and plans to outsource another two submarine availabilities to the private shipyards
starting in FY 2020 and FY 2021. Additionally, to ensure on-time delivery from
maintenance availabilities, availability inductions have been rescheduled to occur when the
shipyards have the capacity to accomplish the availability(s) within programmed schedule
durations. This necessary action to improve the on-time delivery of current maintenance
availabilities has resulted in some additional submarine maintenance backlog and some
accumulation of idle time. Based on actions and initiatives the Navy is currently pursuing
to improve submarine operational availability and the outsourcing of two additional
submarine availabilities to the private sector, the Navy assesses that the submarine idle
time will be eliminated by the end of FY 2023 and the submarine maintenance backlog will
be worked off by the end of FY 2023.161
A November 2018 GAO report on the issue stated the following:
The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine
maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and
support cost expenditures. GAO’s analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between
fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and
maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For
example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended
maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the
start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct
normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then
waiting to enter a shipyard…. GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has
spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack
submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter
the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards.
The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities
needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance
periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help
minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO’s analysis found that while the public shipyards
have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance
delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate
this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair
work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as
recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload
allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they
need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without
addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support
funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational
capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance.162


161 U.S. Navy, President’s FY 2020 Budget Update to Report to Congress on Submarine Depot Maintenance Prepared
by Secretary of the Navy
, generated March 12, 2019, with cover letters dated March 21, 2019, provided to CRS by
Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on March 27, 2019, pp. 3-4.
162 Government Accountability Office, Navy Readiness[:] Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays
Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet
, GAO-19-229, November 2018, summary page.
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Appendix D. December 2021 Determinations
Pursuant to Defense Production Act (DPA)
This appendix presents background information on three determinations signed by President
Biden on December 21, 2021, permitting the use of the Defense Production Act (DPA)163 to
strengthen the U.S. submarine industrial base for the purpose of increasing production of
Virginia-class submarines.
A December 21, 2021, memorandum from President Biden to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
stated
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, including section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as
amended (the “Act”) (50 U.S.C. 4533), I hereby determine, pursuant to section 303(a)(5)
of the Act, that:
(1) Large Scale Fabrication, Shipbuilding Industrial Base Expansion for Resilience and
Robustness, and Maritime Workforce Training Pipelines in support of Virginia Class attack
submarine production are industrial resources, materials, or critical technology items
essential to the national defense;
(2) without Presidential action under section 303 of the Act, United States industry cannot
reasonably be expected to provide the capability for the needed industrial resource,
material, or critical technology item in a timely manner; and
(3) purchases, purchase commitments, or other action pursuant to section 303 of the Act
are the most cost-effective, expedient, and practical alternative method for meeting the
need.
Pursuant to section 303(a)(7)(B) of the Act, I find that action to expand the domestic
production capability for these supply chains is necessary to avert an industrial resource or
critical technology item shortfall that would severely impair national defense capability.
Therefore, I waive the requirements of section 303(a)(l)-(a)(6) of the Act for the purpose
of expanding the domestic production capability for these supply chains.
Ensuring a robust, resilient, and competitive domestic defense industrial base that has the
capability, capacity, and workforce to meet the Virginia Class submarine undersea
warfighting mission is essential to our national security.
You are authorized and directed to publish this determination in the Federal Register.164
A December 22, 2021, DOD statement about the presidential determinations stated
The president signed on Dec. 21, 2021 three determinations permitting the use of the
Defense Production Act (DPA) to strengthen the U.S. submarine industrial base. The
expansion of the authority will allow the U.S. Navy to maintain its maritime superiority.
Scaling the production of Virginia Class Attack Submarines will ensure the U.S. Navy can
meet its missions to maintain open sea lanes for global communication and commerce,
enhance diplomatic partnerships, and grow a robust underwater warfare capability.

163 For more on the DPA, see CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and
Considerations for Congress
, by Heidi M. Peters, and CRS In Focus IF11767, The Defense Production Act Committee
(DPAC): A Primer
, by Michael H. Cecire.
164 White House, “Memorandum on the Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production
Act of 1950, as amended,” December 21, 2021.
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Through the DPA, the U.S. Navy can make key investments with the manufacturers and
suppliers executing the submarine shipbuilding plan.
These activities will strengthen the shipbuilding industrial base and allow its heavy
manufacturing and large scale fabrication suppliers to meet growing demand and expand
the maritime workforce training pipeline.
The department continues to work with key stakeholders to use the DPA authorities to
address risks and challenges across the Submarine Enterprise supply chain. These
authorities expand options and opportunities to accelerate and scale critical investments
across key markets.165
Regarding Title III of the DPA, DOD states
The Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III program is dedicated to ensuring the timely
availability of essential domestic industrial resources to support national defense and
homeland security requirements. The program works in partnership with the Uniformed
services, other government agencies, and industry to identify areas where critical industrial
capacity is lagging or non-existent. Once an area is identified, the program engages with
domestic companies to mitigate these risks using grants, purchase commitments, loans, or
loan guarantees. By executing its mission, the DPA Title III program reduces the nation’s
reliance on foreign supply chains and ensures the integrity of materials supplied to the
American Warfighter.
The DPA Title III program, governed by 50 USC 4531-4534, is one of the key investment
tools of the [DOD] Industrial Policy office.166
A December 22, 2021, Navy information paper states
The Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III program is dedicated to ensuring the timely
availability of essential domestic industrial resources to support national defense and
homeland security requirements. The program works in partnership with the Uniformed
services, other government agencies, and industry to identify areas where critical industrial
capacity is lagging or non-existent. Once these fragilities, vulnerabilities, or opportunities
are identified, DPA authorities are uniquely positioned to allow engagement with domestic
suppliers that mitigate capacity and capability risks using grants, purchase commitments,
loans, or loan guarantees
As the U.S. Navy continues to build a more lethal force that maintains maritime superiority,
enables sea lanes of global communication and commerce, and ensures diplomatic
partnerships, strategic undersea warfare remains the foundation. With VIRGINIA Class
(VCS) currently challenged to meet a two per year production cadence, increasing the
capacity and capabilities of the submarine industrial base is necessary to achieve the
generational increase in demand. This demand will continue to grow with serial production
of one (1) COLUMBIA Class (CLB) submarine plus two VIRGINIA Class (VCS)
submarines per year expected to start in Fiscal Year 2026.
DPA Title III authorities granted in these PDs support Navy efforts to achieve and sustain
consistent production of the VCS Program, meeting schedule and a cadence of two VCS
per year in accordance with authorizations and appropriations, concurrent with the national
priority CLB Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program. Specific areas of focus for
leveraging these authorities are: strategic sourcing expansion, shipbuilding industrial base
expansion for resilience and robustness, and growing the maritime workforce training
pipeline.

165 Department of Defense, “Defense Production Act Title III Presidential Determinations for Submarine Industrial
Base Production Capacity Essential to the Virginia Class Attack Submarine Program,” December 22, 2021.
166 Department of Defense, “Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III,” undated, accessed January 3, 2022.
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Specific projects with associated costs and timelines to support sustained 1 CLB + 2 VCS
per year are being refined, and the Navy will consider where this DPA Title III authority
will best mitigate capacity and capability risks.167

167 Navy information paper entitled “Defense Production Act Title III—Presidential Determination for Virginia Class
Production,” December 22, 2021, provided to CRS and CBO by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on January 7, 2022.
See also Sten Spinella, “Defense Production Expansion Could Bring Help to Region’s Submarine Industry,” New
London Day
, January 3, 2022.
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Appendix E. 1987-1988 Letters and Statements from
Members Regarding Canadian SSN Project
The following are the texts of letters and statements from Members of Congress in 1987 and 1988
regarding Canada’s proposed SSN acquisition project, which Canada canceled in 1989.
1987 Letter from Representative Charles E. Bennett
A November 3, 1987, letter from Representative Charles E. Bennett, Chairman, Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee,168 to Secretary
of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger stated
I would like to comment on Secretary of Energy [John S.] Herrington’s letter to the
committee of October 28, 1987 concerning the Statutory Determination signed by both of
you regarding transfer of information by the U.K. to Canada about nuclear propulsion.
In addition to considering the potential defense benefits that a force of Canadian [nuclear-
powered] submarines might offer to the West, I believe it is also important for the United
States to keep in mind some of the possible drawbacks such a program might involve. One,
of course, is the issue of the use of such vessels for enforcement of the disputed Canadian
claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Another is the danger of compromise of
our nuclear [propulsion] technology, one of our most prized achievements. And third is the
fact that a mishap involving a Canadian nuclear submarine could undermine the public
confidence necessary for the successful operation of our own nuclear [-powered] Navy,
[which accounts for] over 40 percent of our ships.
I have recently had an “op-ed” piece published on this matter in the Toronto Globe and
Mail
, which I am enclosing.169 I hope you will find these views helpful as you continue
your deliberations on this important issue. I have sent a similar letter to Secretary
Herrington.
1987 Letter from Representative Melvin Price
A November 5, 1987, letter from Representative Melvin Price170 to Secretary of Defense Caspar
W. Weinberger and Secretary of Energy John S. Herrington stated
I have recently learned that the Government of Canada is seeking access to U.S. naval
nuclear propulsion technology via the United Kingdom. Apparently Canada wants to
develop its first nuclear submarine. Since Congress and previous administrations have
considered similar proposals in the past from other countries, I believe it is important that
I convey to you the thoughts expressed in this letter.
As a charter member and former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I
was privileged to participate in the shaping of our national Naval [nuclear] Propulsion
Program. The safety and performance record of our nuclear [-powered] ships is the payoff
for engineering excellence. We gained our naval nuclear propulsion technology by

168 Charles E. Bennett was a Member of Congress from January 3, 1949 to January 3, 1993. (Source:
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/B000371.)
169 Charles E. Bennett, “Tough Questions Rise to the Surface,” Globe and Mail, October 29, 1987.
170 Melvin Price was a Member of Congress from January 3, 1945 until his death on April 22, 1988. He was Chairman
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the 93rd Congress (1973-1974) and Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee in the 94th through 98th Congresses (1975-1984). (Source: https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/
bio/P000522.)
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spending taxpayer dollars wisely under highly disciplined managerial and technical
direction.
It is important to appreciate that there is nothing new about an ally wanting our naval
nuclear propulsion technology—or about the consistently strong U.S. policy against its
releases. Over the years, we have turned down requests from a number of countries,
including France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Heretofore, the United States’ position has
been clear and firm.
As you know, applicable law tightly controls any disclosure of naval nuclear propulsion
technology. Congress authorized the 1958 DREADNOUGHT171 agreement with Great
Britain only because of special circumstances. The British, having already embarked in
developing their own naval nuclear propulsion plant, encountered problems and requested
the assistance of the United States. The United States decided to help in nuclear propulsion
and provide nuclear weapons technology because we needed to have British nuclear
submarines and weapons on line in a strategic location at the earliest date. We also took
into account the special relationship we had with the British and our close cooperation on
nuclear matters during the war [i.e., World War II], including the Manhattan project.
Technical data alone did not prove to solve Britain’s problems, so the United States ended
up providing an entire U.S. nuclear propulsion plant. U.S. assistance, however, was limited
to the propulsion plant on the lead ship to help ensure that the United Kingdom would not
become dependent on the United States. We considered the requirement for self-
sufficiency to be essential for the establishment of the type of discipline necessary for the
safe application of naval nuclear propulsion. In addition to strict security precautions, the
agreement provides that this technology may not be transferred to third parties without
prior U.S. approval.
Over the years, earnest diplomats have urged that we share our sensitive nuclear submarine
technology for purposes of worthwhile objectives. Congress rejected those proposals,
recognizing the significant differences between exporting sensitive nuclear propulsion and
exporting airplanes or tanks. It is one thing to share very sensitive intelligence between two
allies; quite another to expose in a commercial environment the technology that has enabled
us to hold a military advantage over a much larger Soviet submarine fleet.
Your decision to authorize the United Kingdom to release certain naval nuclear propulsion
information to Canada is a softening of U.S. policy and invites further interest by Canada
and similar propositions from other nations. The considerations that persuaded us to grant
an exception for the British simply do not exist today with respect to Canada or other allies.
In one of its last reports, (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—1970) the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy addressed this issue succinctly:
“The Joint Committee noted with concern the testimony regarding persistent efforts of
elements within the Executive Branch to disseminate sensitive and strategically vital
U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology among foreign governments as diplomatic
‘currency’ in cooperative arrangements of marginal military value. The committee has
reviewed the arguments favoring such cooperation repeatedly in the past, and has
found them lacking in appreciation for both the technical complexities and strategic
value of this critical technology.”
“The committee strongly recommends that no further consideration be given to
cooperative arrangements in the field of naval nuclear propulsion for the indefinite
future.”
The Joint Committee’s recommendation is as sound today as it was then.

171 The UK’s first nuclear-powered submarine—the one built with a transferred U.S. Navy submarine propulsion
plant—was HMS Dreadnought.
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Incidentally, the bilateral agreement with Canada on Cooperation for Mutual Defense
Purposes, in paragraph E of Article II which you are proposing to implement, states that
the “extent” and “means” of the exchange of classified information are to be agreed upon
by the U.S. and Canada, presumably in advance. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this
matter, if and when such agreement is reached it should be submitted to the Armed Services
Committees of both Houses of Congress.
In any event, I want to state unequivocally my opposition to the transfer of any U.S. naval
nuclear propulsion technology to Canada, because I believe it would be contrary to the best
interests of our own submarine program and our national security.
1988 Exchange at Hearing Involving Senator J. James Exon
At a March 21, 1988, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider the
nomination of William Ball III to be Secretary of the Navy, the following exchange occurred
between Ball and Senator J. James Exon, the chairman of the Strategic Forces and Nuclear
Deterrence subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
SENATOR EXON [addressing Ball]: I’m going to ask you about another subject now that
we talked about when you were in to see me a few days ago. Senator Warner and I will
definitely be on the floor this week raising some questions publicly about the matter that
we discussed with regard to the Canadians wishing to acquire our nuclear submarine
technology that we share only with Britain. The Canadians are trying to get into an
arrangement with regard to the British providing them with nuclear submarines and some
training.
There have been many other discussions with them [the Canadians] regarding why don’t
they work into this gradually. They want to go into it as a crash program. There are some
serious concerns in this area with regard to the safety, and what that might do to the whole
nuclear submarine program. Certainly before any arrangement is made on this, which
seems to be about to happen, the Congress should review it. I have talked to several people
about this including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs [of Staff] and the general consensus
I obtained was well, is that this is a political situation that we don’t see we can stop.
The Congress has a role to play in this because as you know it is [written] into the law that
nothing like this can happen if the Congress wants to stop it. There are some of us that want
to know a great deal more about this than we know right now, including Senator Warner
and myself and others that I have mentioned. I think it would be very appropriate if you
would give us what views you have on this subject before you become Secretary of the
Navy.
MR. BALL: Senator, let me mention that I understand that the Canadian Defense Ministry
has first of all put together a white paper that sets forth a number of areas where they wish
to improve their forces. At the outset let me say that having reviewed that effort, the [U.S]
Navy is exceedingly high on the concept of the Canadians investing more in certain areas,
such as maritime patrol aircraft and the construction of new frigates and other areas where
we have a good and strong relationship, and we feel that those kinds of initiatives are going
in the right direction.
The Navy does have some concerns, and I’ve not had an opportunity to speak with
everyone in the Navy who would have an interest in this yet, but the Navy leadership does
have some concerns about sharing nuclear power technology which members of this
committee are very familiar with.
The ultimate decision on this question I imagine will be made by Congress. Prior to there
being any decision taken by the administration I am sure there will be a healthy review of
all aspect of this. There are political questions involved, there are also military questions
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involved, and that will be, I’m sure, extensively discussed before a recommendation is
taken to the President.172
A March 22, 1988, press report about the hearing stated
After the hearing, [Senator J. James] Exon and fellow committee member Sen. John
Warner (R-Va.) said in an interview that the [Canadian SSN] project is a dangerous
technological and political gamble for Canada and the United States.
Both said they plan to take the matter to the Senate floor within a few days to spotlight
what they termed the dangers.
“Any minor accident with the nuclear power plant could result in our own nuclear-powered
vessels being barred from 80 percent of the world’s ports,” Exon said. “If we let Canada
have this secret nuclear technology, what do we say to the next ally who wants it?”173
1988 Floor Statement from Senator J. James Exon
The Congressional Record for March 25, 1988, includes the following floor statement from
Senator Exon.
THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR SUBMARINE
TECHNOLOGY TO CANADA
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my concern regarding the proposed transfer
of United States nuclear submarine technology to Canada. Let me state up front that I am
not necessarily opposed to such a transfer. However, I do have a number of concerns which
I would like to explore in hearings when and if this proposed transfer is sent to the Congress
for our approval.
In its 1987 “Defence White Paper,” our good ally and very close friend, Canada, expressed
a commitment to acquire 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines. Canada does have diesel-
electric submarines in its fleet today but is opting for nuclear propulsion for its future
submarines. The rationale for this is that Canada must patrol three oceans, the Pacific,
Atlantic, and Arctic, and only nuclear-powered submarines have the speed, endurance, and
the ability to safely operate under ice.
The wisdom of this decision is not one for our Nation to yield to the Canadian on. It is not
for this Nation to determine what should be the proper course of action to our friend and
ally to the north. There are good arguments for the Canadians to spend an awful lot of
money on this proposition but at the same time I think we could legitimately ask the
question of our key supporter in NATO whether or not it is wise for them to spend $8
billion of their defense dollars for a fleet of 10 to 12 nuclear submarines.
Indeed, I personally welcome the recent acknowledgment by the Canadians that they
should be doing more for their own defense and in contribution to NATO. The concern of
the United States should focus, in my opinion, on whether or not we wish to transfer nuclear

172 U.S. Congress. Senate. Nominations before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Second Session, 100th Congress,
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., on nominations of
Grant S. Green (January 28); J. Daniel Howard (January 28); Ronald F. Lehman II (February 1); Jack Katzen (March
3); William Lockhart Ball III (March 21); Gordon A Smith (May 13); Michael P.W. Stone (May 13); Kenneth P.
Bergquist (May 27); David S.C. Chu (June 24); Charles S. Whitehouse (June 24); Milton L. Lohr (September 14); Ken
Kramer (September 23); Clyde O. Glaister (October 4); Karen R. Keesling (October 11); George L. Monahan Jr.
(October 12); January 28; February 1; March 3, 21; May 13, 27; June 24; September 14, 23; October 4, 11, 12, 1988;
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1989. S. Hrg. 100-991, pp. 116-117.
173 George C Wilson, “Transfer of U.S. Nuclear Sub technology Considered,” Washington Post, March 22, 1988, p. 4.
The article was published in other editions of the paper with the headline “U.S. Considers Transfer of Secret Sub
Technology.”
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submarine technology to another nation. We have done so only once in the past, to the
British, who now operate 19 nuclear submarines of their own. Great Britain is a special
friend and ally with whom we have very close defense ties. We enjoy similar ties with the
Canadians.
My specific concern, however, has to do with whether Canada fully recognizes and can
afford the extensive infrastructure of training and support facilities to ensure that our
transferred technology will be operated safely. Mr. President, more and more ports of the
world are being closed to the U.S. Navy for reasons of antinuclear sentiment around the
world. From New Zealand to the Philippines to Northern Europe, we are faced with a
serious challenge to the continued operation of and support for the necessary presence of
the U.S. Navy. In short, in this era of nuclear phobia, we must maintain and enhance our
safe standards of shipboard nuclear propulsion.
Our Navy has had over 34 years experience with nuclear-powered ships and we have had
no accidents. This is the result of a very careful training program, very stringent operating
procedures, and shipyards and workers highly skilled in nuclear technology.
For Canada, nuclear-powered ships will be a new experience. Although the Canadians
considered acquiring nuclear subs in the early 1960’s and began an exchange program with
the United States and Royal Navies on the matter, the proposed submarines would be
Canada's first nuclear-powered ships. To be fair, the Canadians do operate nuclear
powerplants and their safety record is good. But submarines are different.
Canada’s Navy is indeed impressive in its professionalism and technology. Its record is
long and admirable. In fact, the Royal Canadian Navy was the third largest navy in the
world at the end of World War II. We have worked long and closely with the Canadians in
the area of nuclear weapons and defense. That is a sound relationship which could be
expanded if it proves prudent to do so.
But Mr. President, I want to be absolutely sure that the Canadians understand the
tremendous responsibility they assume when they acquire nuclear submarines.
If they should ever experience a nuclear accident or incident, the blame, rightly or wrongly,
could be transferred by the United States. Rightly or wrongly, our Nation as well as Canada,
could and probably would bear the consequences. We could see more ports around the
world closed to our nuclear powered or nuclear armed ships. This is the heart of my
concern. With 40 percent of our naval forces nuclear, any nuclear-powered accident,
however minimal, would be blown all out of proportion and we would very likely find a
"Not Welcome" sign posted more prominently in more ports where it is vital for our ships
to port if they are to perform their critical mission.
So before we either transfer nuclear power technology or allow the British to transfer the
technology we initially provided to them, I will pursue this matter very carefully in the
hearings in the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
This subcommittee, which I chair, has oversight responsibility for our Navy's Nuclear
Propulsion Program. I have already discussed this issue with Secretary of Defense Frank
Carlucci, Secretary of State George Shultz, and other officials of our Defense and Navy
Departments. I think they understand and share my concerns.
I want to alert all that, should the administration decide to transfer this technology, the
Senator will exercise his right and responsibility to review and act on such a decision. This
is a decision that thus far has been pursued without congressional consultation. I am also
fearful that the administration has not addressed the fundamental question that if we
authorize the British to transfer our highly classified and closely held naval nuclear
technology to the Canadians, how can we justify keeping this from other allies?
This is the decision that has thus far been pursued by the administration simply on their
own without consultation with Congress. I am also fearful that the administration has not
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addressed the fundamental question: If we authorize the British to transfer our highly
classified and closely held technology in this area to the Canadians, how, Mr. President,
can we justify keeping this from our other allies?
I am pleased and delighted to see my good friend [Senator John Warner], working
colleague, the Senator from Virginia, former Secretary of the Navy, and the ranking
member of the Armed Services Committee is here on the floor. He has expressed similar
sentiment. And without objection, I would like to yield to the Senator from Virginia at this
time. [See floor statement below from Senator John Warner.]174
1988 Floor Statement from Senator John Warner
Immediately following the statement from Senator Exon quoted above, the Congressional Record
for March 25, 1988, includes the following floor statement from Senator John Warner, the ranking
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my distinguished colleague.
Mr. President, the Senator from Nebraska [Senator Exon], and I came to the Senate some
9 years ago, and we have sat side by side at the table of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, where he succeeded me as the chairman of an important subcommittee, the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence.
He speaks with considerable knowledge on all subjects relating to nuclear power, and in
particular on this one.
Mr. President, on March 15 I had an opportunity to attend a breakfast meeting with
members of the British press. During the course of that breakfast, we discussed the current
proposal of the Canadian Government to manufacture nuclear-powered submarines. This
is an ambitious undertaking. Simply stated, it entails the building and operating of one of
the most complicated and costly weapons platforms in the world.
It has come to my attention that portions of that morning's discussion have been reported
in the British press in a way that might imply that I have reached a final decision to oppose
this Canadian proposal. I have not made a decision, but take this opportunity to state my
present concerns, along with my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Nebraska [Mr.
Exon.] The United States executive and legislative branches should weigh these concerns
when viewing Canada's proposal to acquire a nuclear submarine fleet by the year 2010,
because those submarines might incorporate restricted United States technology. I plan to
take an active role in the congressional debate.
In June of 1987, the Canadian Government issued a White Paper on defense proposing the
acquisition of 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines. Canada is currently considering
options of either acquiring the British Trafalgar-class submarine design or the French
Rubis-class submarine design. Since the Trafalgar-class nuclear propulsion technology is
a derivative of designs and equipment supplied to the British by the United States in the
late 1950's, United States approval-including congressional consent-is required prior to
transfer from Great Britain to Canada of this technology.
The role of Congress in any transfer of naval nuclear propulsion technology is set forth in
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. That act provides for a 90-day notice-and-
wait period, during which Congress has the opportunity to hold hearings—which our

174 Congressional Record, March 25, 1988, pp. 5293-5294.

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distinguished chairman and I recommend—and, if it chooses, to pass a joint resolution of
disapproval.
As a former Secretary and Under Secretary of the Navy (1969-74), I am familiar with the
enormous complexities and special requirements of nuclear submarine technology and
procedures. I was involved with the development, design approval, acquisition, and
continuing infrastructure needed to support nuclear-powered vessels, particularly the SSN-
688 class attack boats and the initiation of the Trident program; and also had responsibility
for developing and supporting before the U.S. Congress the budgets required to support
these programs. I have an appreciation, both in that capacity and today as a member of the
Armed Services Committee, of the potential for the enormous cost overruns that often
accompany nuclear construction programs.
Just recently, the problem of the current cost overruns with the [Los Angeles] [SSN-]688
class [nuclear-powered attack submarines], both past and present, were brought to the
attention of the Armed Services Committee. A news article reported that the cost to
complete construction of 23 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class submarines might be $1.2 billion
above contract target costs.
The U.S. Congress knows from decades of experience that the costs associated with ocean-
going nuclear vessels are enormous, encompassing not just development and acquisition,
but also constant training and elaborate supporting shore establishment and overhaul
facilities. Let there be no misunderstanding: This is an enormously complex and costly
matter, and no nation should enter into such an undertaking without an exhaustively
thorough appreciation for those complexities and costs. Congress will carry certain
responsibilities as assigned by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, should the Canadians desire
the British submarine design. With the benefit of knowledge derived from our own
experience, Congress must conscientiously and fairly examine the Canadian proposal, in
our own national security interests. We need to know how Canada proposes to institute this
program; and how Canada proposes to insure, as my distinguished chairman mentioned,
that the standard of nuclear safety of such a fleet will be at least as high as that of the United
States and the British in the operation of their fleets.
Additional questions should be raised. For example, the Soviets have introduced eight new
attack submarine designs within the last 10 years and have accelerated the rate at which
they are reducing the noise levels of their submarines. Soviet technological advances are
expected to continue. The Soviets are pouring unrestricted sums into their submarine
program. Will the Trafalgar or the Rubis designs—if one or the other is selected for the
Canadian submarine force—will they be sufficiently quiet and combat capable to produce
a credible force against the likely increase in capability of the Soviet submarine fleet? That
Soviet force will be entering operation in the late 1900’s and beyond and would be in direct
competition with any such submarines as Canada may have operating in its Arctic waters.
Canada is a close ally and trusted friend. We need not mention that here. Canada is a
sovereign nation, entitled to decide how it will allocate its defense resources. As an ally, it
is the responsibility of the United States to give such advice as may be requested—I repeat,
advice as may be requested—to assist Canada in structuring its proposal. It is my
understanding that the administration is now cooperating with Canada and Great Britain to
ascertain the scope of United States technology involved; and it is my expectation and hope
that the United States will share in every other respect our experience, both cost and
otherwise, in operating our submarine force.
In the past, other allies have made inquiries of the United States for assistance in developing
nuclear submarine programs and, with the exception of Great Britain, this assistance has
not been provided. This newest proposal would involve changing U.S. policies and
procedures developed over the years for the transfer of naval nuclear propulsion
technology.
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Mr. President, let me make my position clear. I have not yet taken a position in opposition
to the transfer of this nuclear technology to Canada. I now alert the Congress, however, to
the magnitude of the decision it may be asked to make. I am simply reserving my judgment
until all inter-government discussions are completed, both the United States and the
Canadians have a thorough understanding of the implications of this undertaking, together
with Great Britain, and the administration, if it so elects, petitions the Congress.
Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the relevant
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act concerning the role of Congress in this procedure.
This is set forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2152),
paragraphs c and d.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:…175


175 Congressional Record, March 25, 1988, pp. 5294-5295.
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Appendix F. October 25, 2023, Navy Testimony on
Increasing Capacity of Submarine Industrial Base
At an October 25, 2023, hearing on the submarine industrial base and its ability to support the
AUKUS framework before the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee, the Navy testified on its efforts (and associated funding) for
increasing the capacity of the submarine construction industrial base to support a construction
rate of one Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) per year plus 2.33 Virginia-class
attack submarines (SSNs) per year (i.e., a “1+2.33” rate). This is the rate, the Navy testified, that
would be sufficient to meet both U.S. Navy needs and needs under the AUKUS agreement for
building SSNs while also building Columbia-class SSBNs for the U.S. Navy. The Navy’s
testimony stated
Submarine Industrial Base (SIB)
The US Submarine Force and our SIB [submarine industrial base] are crucial to the security
of our Nation, and maintaining overmatch in the Undersea Warfare domain is one of the
top priorities in the Department of Defense. Submarines, therefore, are one of the most
important battle force vessels in our Navy. Forward deployed, combat-credible attack
submarines project US decisive naval power essential in today’s security environment.
Construction and sustainment of our submarine force is complex, difficult, and requires a
continuous focus on safety and nuclear stewardship. Our SIB is supporting the largest
submarine recapitalization effort in nearly 50 years and at a time when American
manufacturing and shipbuilding capacity has atrophied by more than 60 percent since the
end of the Cold War.
The US is simultaneously replacing our strategic Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) force
with the COLUMBIA Class, transitioning our SSN force from LOS ANGELES to VACL
[Virginia class] , and replacing our Guided Missile Submarine (SSGN) capability176 with
‘strike optimized’ VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) submarines. VPM includes a new
hull section with additional vertical launch tubes for conventionally armed missiles to the
VACL submarine design. Adding AUKUS requires us to improve our new-construction
and sustainment efforts to ensure we meet our domestic requirements while supporting the
trilateral partnership. Both our SIB uplift effort and the AUKUS program are executing
aggressive and deliberate schedules designed to meet our national security needs.
Continued partnership with Congress is foundational to our collective success in these two
generational opportunities. The SIB, consisting of our public shipyards and two prime
shipbuilders, General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB) and Huntington Ingalls Industries
Newport News Shipbuilding (HII-NNS), along with the 16,000 suppliers (5,000 direct
contractual relationships and 11,000 sub-tier vendors) across the country, support both our
new-construction submarines and sustainment of the in-service submarine fleet.
It has been nearly 50 years since the US ramped-up its submarine construction capability
and infused equivalent volumes of complexity and work into the industrial base. Following
the Cold War, the country underwent significant shifts in economics and culture,
punctuated by a clear transition from a manufacturing-based economy to a services-based
economy. This pivot undermined foundational industrial capabilities and capacities and

176 This is a reference to the first four Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs, which were converted into cruise missile and
special operations forces (SOF) submarines (SSGNs). The four conversions were completed in 2005-2007. The SSGNs
are to reach their ends of their service lives and be retired in FY2026-FY2028. For more on the SSGN conversion
program, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for
Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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challenged our ability to maintain the sufficiently skilled and sized workforce needed for a
resilient and robust SIB.
In FY 2018, with leadership and support from Congress, the DON began infusing funding
into the SIB to increase capability and capacity at new and existing suppliers to meet
growing demand and increase resilience across the supply chain. In October 2020, the DON
established the SIB Program within the Program Executive Office for Strategic Submarines
(PEO SSBN). The SIB Program, in partnership with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment program, is executing a holistic strategy to
expand and strengthen the SIB by investing in six key areas: shipbuilder infrastructure,
supply chain capability/capacity, scaling new technologies, addressing workforce trade
skill gaps and constraints, expanding capacity via strategic outsourcing, and government
oversight of expanded industrial base efforts.
The AUKUS partnership provides an unprecedented opportunity to leverage the
capabilities of our partner nations, strengthen our defense industrial bases, create jobs, and
drive innovation across our SSN force. AUKUS relies on a strong SIB that designs,
delivers, maintains, and modernizes our apex predators of the oceans – SSNs. Our domestic
industrial base will benefit from the industrial capabilities of our partner nations, such as
joining with an Australian company to mature and scale metallic additive manufacturing
across the SIB. Ultimately, AUKUS will increase commonality, interoperability, and
therefore, warfighting lethality across our three submarine forces.
Australia’s investment into the US SIB builds upon on-going efforts to improve industrial
base capability and capacity, create jobs, and utilize new technologies. This contribution is
necessary to augment VACL production from 2.0 to 2.33 submarines per year to support
both US Navy and AUKUS requirements. Through sustained investment, consistent with
our ongoing strategy, the ultimate goal is to increase repair capacity and capability of US
shipyards to get more SSNs out of maintenance and back to the Fleet. AUKUS also presents
a unique demand on the US SIB requiring a “Whole of Government, Whole of Industry”
approach to achieve and sustain pace, including supporting both US and partner nation
efforts.
Submarine Construction:
The current submarine construction rate, coupled with systemic challenges facing the US
SIB, resulted in the current annual production rate of 1.2 to 1.3 VACL SSNs per year,
compared to the goal of 2.0 VACL SSNs per year. This SSN construction rate, coupled
with COLUMBIA Class SSBN serial production starting in FY 2026 (pending
Congressional authorization and appropriations) is what we call “1+2,” for the one
COLUMBIA Class SSBN and two VACL SSNs per year.
The recapitalization process to achieve the 1+2 cadence increases the demand on the US
SIB by a “workload equivalent” factor of five by 2028. 2015 was the last year the Navy
was scheduled to deliver one VACL SSN (1.0). One COLUMBIA Class SSBN represents
approximately 2.5 VACL SSNs in terms of build resources (manning) and tonnage. The
addition of the VPM design equates to 1.25 legacy (2015) VACL SSNs. Thus, a 1.0 build
rate from 2015 becomes 5.0 in 2028 to achieve 1+2 cadence (2.5 + (1.25 + 1.25)). The
DON’s submarine builders, GDEB and HII-NNS, and their supporting supplier base are
working to achieve this 1+2 rate in 2028 by investing in workforce development and
retention efforts, increasing capacity and capability through infrastructure and equipment
upgrades, and partnering with the DON to mature and scale advanced manufacturing
technology throughout the SIB….
SIB Recapitalization
The recapitalization of the US Submarine Force, plus the investment in AUKUS, requires
continued and significant investments in US facilities, infrastructure, and workforce. Our
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SIB recapitalization effort creates large numbers of hands-on jobs across the nation.
Targeted workforce growth includes, but is not limited to:
• Trades – Welders, Shipfitters, Electricians, Machinists, Pipefitters, Painters, and
Electronics Technicians.
• Supporting Disciplines – Planners, Estimators, Material Managers, Contract Specialists,
Information Technology Experts, Quality Assurance Specialists, and Project Leaders.
• STEM – Structural, Electrical, Mechanical, and Nuclear Engineers; Designers; Test
Coordinators; Metallurgists; Computer Scientists; Logisticians; etc.
Significant investments into the submarine supplier base will produce increased volume of
basic materials, specialized materials, and engineered components required for modern
nuclear-powered submarine construction, such as:
• Steel and specialty metals.
• High-tech castings and forgings.
• Electrical components.
• Combat Systems.
• Propulsion Plant components.
• Valves, pumps, pipes, fittings, and fans.
• Software and information systems.
In partnership with Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the DON made
substantial SIB investments, with $2.3 billion across FY 2018 through FY 2023 currently
in execution and $1.6 billion planned for FY 2024 through FY 2027. There is also an
additional $2.2 billion for submarine sustainment efforts submitted in the President’s
Budget for FY 2024 through 2028. This much-needed resourcing is purposefully designed
to help build and strengthen SIB capacity, capability, and resilience. These resources are
primarily being utilized across six lines of effort, and are needed to support efforts to
increase submarine construction and sustainment rates:
1. Supplier Development: Add capability and/or capacity to existing suppliers, reduce
single/sole-source risks for resiliency and robustness, improve first time quality.
2. Shipyard Infrastructure: Accelerate investments in shipbuilder facilities, footprint, and
machines/fixtures.
3. Strategic Outsourcing: Increase supplier capacity to shift non-core workload away from
the two submarine shipbuilders to free up footprint, resources, and focus for shipbuilder-
only work.
4. Workforce Development: Train current and future trades at sufficient rates, and help
build adequate hiring pool for vendors and shipbuilders.
5. Government Oversight: Increase the Navy’s oversight of the vendor base as result of
lessons learned from historical quality and schedule adherence challenges.
6. Technology Opportunities: Implement additive manufacturing, and non-destructive test
imaging technology to remove known production risk areas and bottlenecks.
The DON began execution of these SIB efforts several years ago as building facilities,
growing workforces, and increasing production rates takes time. Our dividends are not
fully matured yet. Some of the significant returns on this investment include:
• 194 suppliers in 31 states received funding to generate increased production and increase
capacity.
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• Approximately 4 million hours strategically sourced by EB and HII-NNS to key
fabricators (goal is at least 6 million hours by 2026).
• Approximately 1,000 new workforce members in more than 120 second and third-tier
key suppliers with more to come each year.
• Establishment of dedicated training centers trained more than 3,500 workers since 2020.
• Establishment of an industry-wide consortium for advanced manufacturing technology
supplying critical submarine components from 6 crucial submarine-specific metals
contributing to 75-percent of troubled submarine components.
The DON also worked with a non-profit partner to develop the workforce recruiting and
support website, “Build Submarines.com.” This site serves as a central hub of information
to support workforce development efforts related to our national advertising campaign for
the SIB including resources for those interested in submarine construction or SIB related
careers. The DON is on a mission to make ship and submarine manufacturing a preferred
profession again and it is a national imperative.
Deepening our cooperation and integration with AU [Australia] and the UK across the
submarine enterprise presents a unique opportunity for innovation, growth, and mutual
development. The partnership will create jobs, contribute to the diversification of ideas,
and augment our collective technical and intellectual base. The partnership will also open
up new markets and business opportunities, enhancing the resilience of both nations’
economies. This will pave the way for additional joint ventures, thereby fostering a shared
sense of purpose, knowledge exchange, and a more connected community of subject matter
experts.177


Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs


Disclaimer
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shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
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177 Joint Statement, Honorable Erik K. Raven, Under Secretary of the Navy, VADM William J. Houston, Commander,
Naval Submarine Forces, [and] RDML Jonathan Rucker, Program Executive Officer, Attack Submarines, before the
House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, October 25, 2023, pp. 4-8.
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