Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
Submarine Procurement: Background and
Issues for Congress

August 7, 2020
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32418




Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement

Summary
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) since FY1998. The one Virginia-class boat that the Navy is requesting for procurement in
FY2021 would be the 33rd boat in the class. The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission had projected
that the Navy would request two Virginia-class boats in FY2021.
Virginia-class boats scheduled for procurement in FY2019-FY2023 are being procured under a
multiyear procurement (MYP) contract. Most Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and
subsequent years are to be built with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-
long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and
launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads.
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates the procurement cost of the Virginia-class boat
requested for procurement in FY2021 at $3,539.4 million (i.e., about $3.5 billion). The boat has
received $915.7 million in prior-year “regular” advance procurement (AP) funding, and $289.0
million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being
procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget
requests the remaining $2,334.7 million needed to complete the boat’s estimated procurement
cost, as well as $1,473.8 million in “regular” AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured
in future fiscal years and $427.4 million in EOQ AP funding for components of boats being
procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the total amount of procurement and
AP funding requested for the program in FY2021 to $4,235.9 million (i.e., about $4.2 billion),
excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
The FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract for the Virginia-class program includes a total of nine boats
(in annual quantities of 2-2-1-2-2), with an option for adding a 10th boat. The contract allows for
the 10th boat to be added in either FY2021 (which would make for a total procurement of two
Virginia-class boats in FY2021) or a subsequent year. The Navy’s FY2021 unfunded priorities list
(UPL) reportedly lists the 10th boat as the Navy’s top unfunded priority for FY2021 and states
that fully funding this additional boat in FY2021 would require an additional $2.76 billion in
funding.
The Navy’s force-level goal for SSNs is to achieve and maintain a force of 66 boats. The Navy’s
SSN force included 50 boats at the end of FY2019. From the mid-2020s through the early 2030s,
the number of SSNs is projected to experience a valley or trough, reaching a minimum of 42
boats in FY2027-FY2028. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley could lead to a
period of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened
conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valley
was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every
year since then. The Navy’s FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan projects that, after reaching its
projected 42-boat minimum, the SSN force will increase to 66 boats by FY2048.
Issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include the potential impact of the
COVID-19 (coronavirus) situation on the execution of U.S. military shipbuilding programs,
including the Virginia-class program; whether to provide funding for procuring a second Virginia-
class boat in FY2021 (which would be the 10th boat under the MYP contract); the potential
industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack
submarines (SSNs) at the same time; and technical risk in the design for the latest (i.e., Block V)
version of the Virginia-class submarine.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

U.S. Navy Submarines .............................................................................................................. 1
U.S. SSN Force Levels .............................................................................................................. 2
Force-Level Goal ................................................................................................................ 2
Force Level at End of FY2019 ............................................................................................ 2
Projected Force Levels ........................................................................................................ 3
U.S. SSN Classes ...................................................................................................................... 4
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class ............................................................................................. 4
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class ..................................................................................................... 4
Virginia (SSN-774) Class.................................................................................................... 5
Virginia-Class Procurement Program ........................................................................................ 5
Unit Procurement Cost ........................................................................................................ 5
Annual Procurement Quantities .......................................................................................... 5
Multiyear Contracting ......................................................................................................... 6
FY2019-FY2023 MYP Contract ......................................................................................... 6
Joint Production Arrangement ............................................................................................ 7
Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP) ......................................................................................... 7
Schedule and Cost Performance ......................................................................................... 8
Virginia Payload Module (VPM) ........................................................................................ 9
Acoustic and Other Improvements ................................................................................... 10
FY2021 Funding Request ................................................................................................. 10
Second Boat Included in Navy’s FY2021 Unfunded Priorities List ................................. 10

Submarine Construction Industrial Base .................................................................................. 11
SSN Deployments Delayed Due to Maintenance Backlogs ..................................................... 11

Issues for Congress ......................................................................................................................... 11
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Situation ......................................................... 11
Funding for Second Boat in FY2021 ...................................................................................... 13
Industrial-Base Challenges of Building Both Virginia- and Columbia-Class Boats ............... 14
Technical Risk in Virginia-Class Block V Design .................................................................. 16
Additional Issues ..................................................................................................................... 17
Classified Recommendations in December 2019 DOT&E Report ................................... 17
Problem with Hull Coating ............................................................................................... 17
Defective Parts Reported in 2016 ..................................................................................... 17
Substandard Steel Reported in 2020 ................................................................................. 17

Legislative Activity for FY2021 .................................................................................................... 19
Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding Request ............................................................... 19
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/S. 4049) ........................................ 19

House ................................................................................................................................ 19
Senate ................................................................................................................................ 21
FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 7617) ...................................................................... 23
House ................................................................................................................................ 23

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Figures
Figure 1. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine ..................................................................................... 5

Tables
Table 1. Projected SSN Force Levels .............................................................................................. 3
Table 2. Annual Numbers of Virginia-Class Boats Procured or Projected for Procurement ........... 6
Table 3. Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding ..................................................................... 19

Appendixes
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals .................................................................................... 24
Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs ....................................................................................... 26
Appendix C. 2006 Navy Study on Options for Mitigating Projected Valley in SSN Force
Level ........................................................................................................................................... 28
Appendix D. SSN Deployments Delayed Due to Maintenance Backlogs .................................... 31

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 34

Congressional Research Service

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Virginia-class
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) program. The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget requests
$4,235.9 million (i.e., about $4.2 billion) in procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding
for the program. Decisions that Congress makes on procurement of Virginia-class boats could
substantially affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base.
The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in
another CRS report—CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Virginia-class program and
other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
U.S. Navy Submarines1
The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs),2 nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces (SOF) submarines
(SSGNs),3 and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The SSNs are general-purpose
submarines that can (when appropriately equipped and armed) perform a variety of peacetime and
wartime missions, including the following:
 covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for
national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
 covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than possible with the
SSGNs);

1 In U.S. Navy submarine designations, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered, B stands for ballistic
missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile). Submarines can be powered by either nuclear
reactors or non-nuclear power sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-
powered. A submarine’s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is
armed with nuclear weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered
submarine can be armed with nuclear weapons.
2 The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United States. The Navy’s SSBNs are discussed in CRS
Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for
Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure
, by Amy F. Woolf.
3 The Navy’s four SSGNs are former Trident SSBNs that have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk
cruise missiles and SOF rather than SLBMs. Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission
orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs are
more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other submarine missions and are sometimes included in
counts of the projected total number of Navy attack submarines. The Navy’s SSGNs are discussed in CRS Report
RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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 covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles (again on a
smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
 covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
 anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
 anti-surface ship warfare.
During the Cold War, ASW against Soviet submarines was the primary stated mission of U.S.
SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery operations were reportedly
important on a day-to-day basis as well.4 In the post-Cold War era, although ASW remained a
mission, the SSN force focused more on performing the first three other missions listed above.
With the shift in the strategic environment in recent years from the post-Cold War era to a new
situation featuring renewed great power competition,5 ASW against Russian and Chinese
submarines has once again become a more prominent mission for U.S. Navy SSNs.
U.S. SSN Force Levels
Force-Level Goal
The Navy’s force-level goal, released in December 2016, is to achieve and maintain a 355-ship
fleet, including 66 SSNs.6 A June 1, 2020, press report stated that a study led by the Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) had recommended increasing the SSN force-level goal to 68 or 69 boats.7 For a review of
SSN force-level goals since the Reagan Administration, see Appendix A.
Force Level at End of FY2019
The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, when plans called for
achieving a 600-ship Navy including 100 SSNs. The number of SSNs peaked at 98 boats at the
end of FY1987 and declined after that in a manner that roughly paralleled the decline in the total
size of the Navy over the same time period. The 50 SSNs in service at the end of FY2018
included the following:
 30 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
 17 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.

4 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection operations during the Cold War, see
Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs,
1998).
5 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential
Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
6 For additional information on Navy force-level goals, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 David B. Larter, “To Compete with China, An Internal Pentagon Study Looks to Pour Money into Robot
Submarines,” Defense News, June 1, 2020.
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Projected Force Levels
Table 1 shows the Navy’s projection of the number of SSNs over time if the Navy’s FY2020 30-
year shipbuilding plan were fully implemented. As can be seen in the table, the FY2020 30-year
shipbuilding plan would achieve the Navy’s 66-boat SSN force-level goal by FY2048.
Table 1. Projected SSN Force Levels
As shown in Navy’s FY2020 30-Year (FY2020-FY2049) Shipbuilding Plan
Force level relative to
Annual
Projected
current 66-boat goal
Fiscal
procurement
number of
Number of
year
quantity
SSNs
ships
Percent
20
3
52
-14
-21%
21
2
53
-13
-20%
22
2
52
-14
-21%
23
2
51
-15
-23%
24
2
47
-19
-29%
25
2
44
-22
-33%
26
2
44
-22
-33%
27
2
42
-24
-36%
28
2
42
-24
-36%
29
2
44
-22
-33%
30
2
46
-20
-30%
31
2
48
-18
-27%
32
2
49
-17
-26%
33
2
51
-15
-23%
34
2
53
-13
-20%
35
2
54
-12
-18%
36
2
56
-10
-15%
37
2
58
-8
-12%
38
2
57
-9
-14%
39
2
58
-8
-12%
40
2
59
-7
-11%
41
2
59
-7
-11%
42
2
61
-5
-8%
43
2
61
-5
-8%
44
2
62
-4
-6%
45
2
63
-3
-5%
46
2
64
-2
-3%
47
2
65
-1
-2%
48
2
66


49
2
67
+1
+2%
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan. Percent figures rounded to
nearest percent.
As also shown in the table, the number of SSNs is projected to experience (relative to a previous
Navy SSN force-level goal of 48 boats) a valley or trough from the mid-2020s through the early
2030s, reaching a minimum of 42 boats (i.e., 24 boats, or about 36%, less than the current 66-boat
force-level goal) in FY2027-FY2028. This projected valley is a consequence of having procured a
relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era.
Some observers are concerned that this projected valley in SSN force levels could lead to a period
of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened
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conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China.8 The projected SSN valley
was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every
year since then. As one measure for mitigating this valley, the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission
proposes to refuel and extend the service life of two older Los Angeles (SSN-688) class
submarines. The Navy states that this could be followed by refuelings and service life extensions
for up to five more Los Angeles-class SSNs that would be funded in fiscal years beyond the
FY2020-FY2024 Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP).9
U.S. SSN Classes
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class
A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between
FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four
21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise missiles
in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class (SSN-719 and
higher) were built with an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for
carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The final 23 boats in the class
(SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as Improved Los
Angeles class boats or 688Is. As of the end of FY2019, 32 of the 62 boats in the class had been
retired.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class
The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class
procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated
changes in military requirements and defense spending levels. The three Seawolf-class
submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21), the Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-
23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and
1998, respectively. SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was suspended
in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It entered service in 2005. Seawolf-class submarines are
larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous U.S. Navy SSNs.10 They are equipped with eight
30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles. SSN-23
was built to a lengthened configuration compared to the other two ships in the class.11

8 China has taken note of the valley. The November 2014 edition of a Chinese military journal, for example, includes
an article with a passage that translates as follows:
... in 2028, the [U.S. Navy] force of nuclear attack submarines will fall from the current number of
55 down to 41 boats. Some are concerned about whether this force level can meet the requirements
of the Asia-Pacific rebalance.”
(Lyle Goldstein, “Evolution of Chinese Power Projection Capabilities,” presentation to Center for a
New American Security (CNAS) roundtable discussion, September 29, 2016, slide 7 of 41.)
9 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2020
, February 2018, p. 6. For background information on a study initiated by the Navy in 2006 for mitigating the
valley in the SSN force levels projected for the 2020s and 2030s, see Appendix C.
10 Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged displacement of about 7,150 tons.
Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet. SSN-21 and SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons.
11 SSN-23 is 100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged displacement of 12,158 tons.
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement

Virginia (SSN-774) Class
The Navy has been procuring Virginia-class SSNs (see Figure 1) since FY1998; the first entered
service in October 2004. The Virginia-class design was developed to be less expensive and better
optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the Seawolf-class design. The baseline
Virginia-class design is slightly larger than the Los Angeles-class design12 but incorporates newer
technologies, including technologies used in the Seawolf-class design.
Figure 1. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine

Source: U.S. Navy file photo accessed by CRS on January 11, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?
story_id=55715.
Virginia-Class Procurement Program
Unit Procurement Cost
Most Virginia-class boats to be procured in FY2019 and subsequent years are to be built to a
lengthened configuration that includes the Virginia Payload Module (see discussion below) and
generally have an estimated unit procurement cost in the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission of
roughly $3.4 billion.
Annual Procurement Quantities
Table 2 shows annual numbers of Virginia-class boats procured from FY1998 (the lead boat)
through FY2020, the number requested for procurement in FY2021, and the numbers projected

12 The baseline Virginia-class design has a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.
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for procurement in FY2022-FY2025 under the FY2022-FY2025 Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP).
Table 2. Annual Numbers of Virginia-Class Boats Procured
or Projected for Procurement
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01 FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09 FY10 FY11
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15 FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24
FY25
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
Multiyear Contracting
With the exception of a single Virginia-class boat procured in FY2003, all Virginia-class boats
have been procured or are to be procured under multiyear contracting, meaning either a block buy
contract or multiyear procurement (MYP) contract:13
 The first four Virginia-class boats, known as the Block I boats, were procured in
FY1998-FY2002 under a block buy contract covering those years.14 This was the
first instance of block buy contracting—the mechanism of a block buy contract
was essentially created for procuring the first four Virginia-class boats.
 The Virginia-class boat procured in FY2003 fell between the FY1998-FY2002
block buy contract noted above and the FY2004-FY2008 MYP contract noted
below, and was contracted for separately.
 The five Virginia-class boats procured FY2004-FY2008, known as the Block II
boats, were procured under an MYP contract covering those years.
 The eight Virginia-class boats procured in FY2009-FY2013, known as the Block
III boats, were procured under an MYP contract covering those years.
 The 10 Virginia-class boats procured in FY2014-FY2018, known as the Block IV
boats, were procured under an MYP contract covering those years.
 The Virginia-class boats being procured in FY2019-FY2023, known as the Block
V boats, are to be procured under an MYP contract covering those years.
FY2019-FY2023 MYP Contract
Table 2 shows a total of nine Virginia-class boats scheduled for procurement under the FY2019-
FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission had stated that the Navy was
negotiating an MYP contract for 10 Virginia-class boats during these years. On this basis,
observers anticipated that the FY2019-FY2023 Virginia-class MYP contract would include a total
of 10 or perhaps even 11 boats.

13 For more on block buy contracting and MYP contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP)
and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
14 For a discussion of block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
The FY1998-FY2002 Virginia-class block buy contract was the first instance of block buy contracting—the mechanism
of a block buy contract was essentially created for procuring the first for Virginia-class boats.
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In early November 2019, however, the Navy confirmed to reporters that, after lengthy
negotiations with the program’s prime contractor, General Dynamics, the two sides had reached
an agreement for an MYP contract including nine Virginia-class boats with an option for a 10th.
The Navy awarded the contract—a fixed-price incentive fee (FPIF) MYP contract—on December
2, 2019. The contract includes nine Virginia-class boats (eight of which are to be built with the
Virginia Payload Module, or VPM (see discussion below), plus an option for a 10th boat that
would also be built with the VPM. The contract also includes a 10th shipset of supplier-made
components, so that if the option for the 10th boat is exercised, the ship can be constructed in a
timely manner. The option for the 10th boat can be awarded any time during the contract’s five-
year period. Of the nine firm boats in the contract, six are to have their final assembly done at
HII/NNS and three at GD/EB. The 10th boat, if awarded, would have its final assembly done at
GD/EB.15
Joint Production Arrangement
Virginia-class boats are built jointly by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of
Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI—the program’s prime contractor—and Huntington Ingalls
Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. The arrangement for
jointly building Virginia-class boats was proposed to Congress by GD/EB, HII/NNS, and the
Navy, and agreed to by Congress in 1997, as part of Congress’s action on the Navy’s budget for
FY1998, the year that the first Virginia-class boat was procured.16 A primary aim of the
arrangement was to minimize the cost of building Virginia-class boats at a relatively low annual
rate in two shipyards (rather than entirely in a single shipyard) while preserving key submarine-
construction skills at both shipyards.
Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat, HII/NNS builds certain other
parts of each boat, and the yards have taken turns building the reactor compartments and
performing final assembly of the boats. The arrangement has resulted in a roughly 50-50 division
of Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves both yards’ ability to build
submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and
perform submarine final-assembly work.17
Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP)
Under a plan it calls the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP), the Navy plans to build Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarines jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of the work going to

15 For press reports about the contract, see, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Awards $22B Contract to Electric
Boat, Newport News Shipbuilding for 9 Block V Virginia Subs,” USNI News, December 2, 2019; David B. Larter, “US
Navy Awards Largest-Ever Shipbuilding Contract to Electric Boat for New Attack Submarines,” Defense News,
December 2, 2019; Rich Abott, “Navy Awards Largest Contract Ever, $22.2 Billion For 9 Block V Virginia Subs,”
Defense Daily, December 2, 2019.
16 See Section 121 of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997).
17 The joint production arrangement is a departure from prior U.S. submarine construction practices, under which
complete submarines were built in individual yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over
the Virginia-class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that occurred in 1995-1997
(i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB
and HII/NNS involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards capable of
building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a
submarine design that is being procured at a relatively low annual rate. The joint production agreement cannot be
changed without the agreement of both GD/EB and HII/NNS.
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GD/EB. (The IEP was previously called the Submarine Unified Build Strategy, or SUBS.) As part
of this plan, the Navy plans to adjust the division of work on the Virginia-class attack submarine
program so that HII/NNS would receive a larger share of the final-assembly work for that
program than it has received in the past.18
Schedule and Cost Performance
Earlier Record
As noted in CRS testimony in 2014,19 the Virginia (SSN-774) class attack program was cited as
an example of a successful acquisition program. The program received a David Packard
Excellence in Acquisition Award from the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2008. Although the
program experienced cost growth in its early years that was due in part to annual procurement
rates that were lower than initially envisaged and challenges in restarting submarine production at
Newport News Shipbuilding,20 the lead ship in the program was delivered within four months of

18 Key elements of IEP include the following:

GD/EB is to be the prime contractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;

HII/NNS is to be a subcontractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;

GD/EB is to build certain parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the
parts that GD/EB builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;

HII/NNS is to build certain other parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to
the parts that HII/NNS builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;

GD/EB is to perform the final assembly on all 12 Columbia-class boats;

as a result of the three previous points, the Navy estimates that GD/EB would receive an estimated 77%-78%
of the shipyard work building Columbia-class boats, and HII/NNS would receive 22%-23%;

GD/EB is to continue as prime contractor for the Virginia-class program, but to help balance out projected
submarine-construction workloads at GD/EB and HII/NNS, the division of work between the two yards for
building Virginia-class boats is to be adjusted so that HII/NNS would perform the final assembly on a greater
number of Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current Virginia-class division
of work (in which final assemblies are divided more or less evenly between the two shipyards); as a
consequence, HII/NNS would receive a greater share of the total work in building Virginia-class boats than it
would have under a continuation of the current division of work.
See Richard B. Burgess, “Submarine Admirals: ‘Unified Build Strategy’ Seeks Affordability for Future Sub Fleet,”
Seapower, July 8, 2016; Julia Bergman, “Congressmen Visit EB A Day After It Is Named Prime Contractor for Ohio
Reaplcement Program,” The Day (New London), March 29, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Ohio Replacement Plan Is
Good News For Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, March 29, 2016; Robert McCabe, “Newport News Shipbuilding’s
Share of Virginia-Class Submarine Deliveries to Grow,” Virginian-Pilot (Newport News), March 29, 2016; Valerie
Insinna, “GD Electric Boat Chosen To Take Lead Role for Ohio Replacement Sub,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2016: 1-
3; Hugh Lessig, “Navy: More Submarine Work Coming to Newport News Shipyard,” Military.com, March 30, 2016.
See also Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration
& Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection
Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2016, p. 12.
19 See Statement of Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before
the House Armed Services Committee on Case Studies in DOD Acquisition: Finding What Works, June 24, 2014, p. 4.
20 See Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, before the
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Hearing on Submarine Force
Structure and Acquisition Policy, March 8, 2007, Table 10 on pp. 14-15.
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the target date that had been established about a decade earlier, and until recently, ships had been
delivered largely on cost and ahead of schedule.21
More-Recent Reported Delays Relative to Targeted Delivery Dates
Beginning in March and April 2019, it was reported that GD/EB, HII/NNS, and their supplier
firms were experiencing challenges in meeting scheduled delivery times as the Virginia-class
program transitions over time from production of two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to
two VPM-equipped boats per year. As a result of these challenges, it was reported, the program
has experienced months-long delays in efforts to build boats relative to their targeted delivery
dates.22 A November 4, 2019, press report stated that “the most recent Virginia-class boat, the
Delaware, was delivered by Huntington Ingalls Newport News nearly nine months behind
schedule, which is later than the four-to-seven month delays the Navy predicted earlier in the
year.”23
Virginia Payload Module (VPM)
The Navy plans to build most Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years with
the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped
with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk
missiles or other payloads. The VPM’s vertical launch tubes are to be used to store and fire
additional Tomahawk cruise missiles or other payloads, such as large-diameter unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs).24 The four additional launch tubes in the VPM could carry a total of
28 additional Tomahawk cruise missiles (7 per tube),25 which would increase the total number of
torpedo-sized weapons (such as Tomahawks) carried by the Virginia class design from about 37
to about 65—an increase of about 76%.26
Building Virginia-class boats with the VPM is intended to compensate for a sharp loss in
submarine force weapon-carrying capacity that will occur with the retirement in FY2026-FY2028
of the Navy’s four Ohio-class cruise missile/special operations forces support submarines
(SSGNs).27 Each SSGN is equipped with 24 large-diameter vertical launch tubes, of which 22 can
be used to carry up to 7 Tomahawks each, for a maximum of 154 vertically launched Tomahawks

21 For discussions of recent exceptions, see Christopher P. Cavas, “US Navy Submarine Program Loses Some of Its
Shine,” Defense News, March 13, 2017; David B. Larter, “Virginia-Class Attack Sub Delivers late As US Navy Aims
to Get Program Back on Course,” Defense News, June 26, 2018.
22 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Overly Optimistic Cost Estimate
Will Likely Lead to Budget Increases
, GAO-19-497, April 2019, pp. 20-23; David B. Larter, “Late Is the New Normal
for Virginia-Class Attack Boats,” Defense News, March 20, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Lack of Submarine Parts
Slowing Down Maintenance, New Construction,” USNI News, March 26, 2019. See also David B. Larter, “The US
Navy, Seeking Savings, Shakes Up Its Plans for More Lethal Attack Submarines,” Defense News, April 3, 2019.
23 David B. Larter, “US Navy to Slash the Number of Virginia-Class Attack Subs in Long-Delayed Block V Contract,”
Defense News, November 4, 2019.
24 For an illustration of the VPM, see http://www.gdeb.com/news/advertising/images/VPM_ad/VPM.pdf, which was
accessed by CRS on March 1, 2012.
25 Michael J. Conner, “Investing in the Undersea Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 16-20.
26 A Virginia-class SSN can carry about 25 torpedoes in its four horizontal torpedo tubes and associated torpedo room,
and an additional 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles (which are torpedo-sized) in its bow-mounted vertical lunch tubes, for a
total of about 37 torpedo-sized weapons. Another 28 Tomahawks in four mid-body vertical tubes would increase that
total by about 76%.
27 Michael J. Conner, “Investing in the Undersea Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 16-20.
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per boat, or 616 vertically launched Tomahawks for the four boats. Twenty-two Virginia-class
boats built with VPMs could carry 616 Tomahawks in their VPMs.
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission shows that Virginia-class boats with the VPM generally
have estimated recurring unit procurement costs of roughly $3.4 billion. The joint explanatory
statement for the FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76 of
January 17, 2014) required the Navy to submit biannual reports to the congressional defense
committees describing the actions the Navy is taking to minimize costs for the VPM.28
Acoustic and Other Improvements
In addition to the VPM, the Navy is introducing acoustic and other improvements to the Virginia-
class design that are intended to help maintain the design’s superiority over Russian and Chinese
submarines.29
FY2021 Funding Request
The Navy’s FY2021 budget submission estimates the procurement cost of the Virginia-class boat
requested for procurement in FY2021 at $3,539.4 million (i.e., about $3.5 billion). The boat has
received $915.7 million in prior-year “regular” advance procurement (AP) funding, and $289.0
million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being
procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy’s proposed FY2021 budget
requests the remaining $2,334.7 million needed to complete the boat’s estimated procurement
cost, as well as $1,473.8 million in “regular” AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured
in future fiscal years and $427.4 million in EOQ AP funding for components of boats being
procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the total amount of procurement and
AP funding requested for the program in FY2021 to $4,235.9 million (i.e., about $4.2 billion),
excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
Second Boat Included in Navy’s FY2021 Unfunded Priorities List
The Navy’s FY2021 unfunded priorities list (UPL) reportedly lists a second Virginia-class boat
(which would be the 10th boat under the FY2019-FY2023 Virginia-class MYP contract) as the
Navy’s top unfunded priority for FY2021, and states that fully funding this additional boat in

28 See PDF page 239 of 351 of the joint explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 3547.
29 For press reports discussing these improvements, see Kris Osborn, “The Navy Wants to Turn Its Nuclear Attack
Submarines Into ‘Spy’ Ships,” National Interest, May 28, 2018; Kris Osborn, “Navy Launches Most High-Tech &
Stealthy Attack Sub Ever,” Scout Warrior, November 18, 2017; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Considering Mid-Block
Virginia-Class Upgrades, SSGN Construction in Late 2030s,” USNI News, November 2, 2017; Zachary Cohen, “US
Launches ‘Most Advanced’ Stealth Sub Amid Undersea Rivalry,” CNN, October 26, 2017; Franz-Stefan Gady, “US
Navy Christens Most Advanced Attack Sub Ever,” The Diplomat, October 17, 2017; Douglas Ernst, “Navy Christens
Its ‘Most Advanced’ Attack Submarine Ever,” Washington Times, October 16, 2017; Dave Majumdar, “Stealth and
Armed to the Teeth: US Navy’s Big Plan for Submarine Dominance,” National Interest, July 9, 2016; Kris Osborn,
“‘Acoustic Superiority’: US Navy’s Secret Submarine Plan to Dominate the Seas,” National Interest, June 20, 2016;
Dave Majumdar, “This Is How the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Force Dominates the World’s Oceans,” National Interest,
May 17, 2016; Megan Eckstein, “Submarines To Become Stealthier Through Acoustic Superiority Upgrades,
Operational Concepts,” USNI News, March 1, 2016.
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FY2021 would require an additional $2.76 billion in funding.30 The Navy believes the industrial
base has the capacity to take on the additional work associated with building the 10th boat.31
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
U.S. Navy submarines are built by GD/EB and HII/NNS. These are the only two shipyards in the
country capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while
HII/NNS also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of
surface ships.
In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes hundreds
of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. Much of the
total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from sole-
source suppliers. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing
work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program.32 In terms of work
provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine
propulsion plants. Much of the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction
industrial base is resident at GD/EB; additional portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the
component makers.
SSN Deployments Delayed Due to Maintenance Backlogs
In recent years, a number of the Navy’s SSNs have had their deployments delayed due to
maintenance backlogs at the Navy’s four government-operated naval shipyards (NSYs), which
are the primary facilities for conducting depot-level maintenance work on Navy SSNs. Delays in
deploying SSNs can put added operational pressure on other SSNs that are available for
deployment. For additional background information on this issue, see Appendix D.
Issues for Congress
Potential Impact of COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Situation
One issue for Congress concerns the potential impact of the COVID-19 (coronavirus) situation on
the execution of U.S. military shipbuilding programs, including the Virginia-class program. An
August 6, 2020, press report states:
Newport News Shipbuilding has seen a disproportionate amount of its COVID-19-related
delays and inefficiencies hit its Virginia-class attack submarine production line, as the yard
has prioritized its available workforce on supporting maintenance for in-service
submarines and aircraft carriers, the company’s CEO told investors today.
Mike Petters, the president and CEO of parent company Huntington Ingalls Industries, said
Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia and Ingalls Shipbuilding in Mississippi saw about
65-percent attendance among its hourly production workforce during the second quarter of
the year. In April and May, he said, when the company’s liberal leave policy was in place,

30 See, for example, David B. Larter, “Here’s the $5.4 Billion of Stuff the US Navy Says It Wants But Didn’t Fit in Its
FY21 Budget Request,” Defense News, February 21, 2020; Ben Werner, “Second Virginia Attack Boat Tops Navy’s
Fiscal Year 2021 Unfunded Priorities List,” USNI News, February 20, 2020.
31 Source: Navy briefing on its proposed FY2021 budget, February 11, 2020.
32 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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daily attendance was closer to 50 percent, and by June and July that rose to as much as 77
percent.
But not having full attendance meant having to prioritized skilled workers across the large
portfolio of work that happens at Newport News: building new Virginia-class submarines
and Ford-class aircraft carriers, conducting maintenance on Los Angeles-class subs,
performing refueling and complex overhauls (RCOH) on Nimitz-class carriers, and
sending skilled workers to support maintenance work at the Navy’s public shipyards across
the country, Petters said.
“What happens is, when you’re at less than full attendance, you start moving people from
one area to another, and you start trying to make sure that you are focused on getting the
right skills onto the right place. And so I think that’s unique to Newport News, I think that
dealing with commissioned ships and deployable assets is a unique challenge for them in
this environment” compared to other yards that just build new ships, Petters said this
morning during a second quarter earnings call.
“At the beginning of this process, working with the Navy to try to make sure we prioritized
deployable ships, and then unit deliveries, that starts to move around the priorities in the
business a little bit,” he said.
Though Petters said the shipyard is prioritizing the work the Navy wants prioritized, this
presents a problem for the Virginia-class construction cost and schedule estimates. The
yard is currently building Block IV submarines, the contract for which included an
aggressive learning curve that would bring construction length from about 70 months down
to 60 months, with the cost of each boat coming down as the construction time also came
down.
If welders, electricians and other skilled workers are moved from the Virginia assembly
line to other parts of the shipyard, that means this submarine work may be done slower or
out of order compared to the original plan, and the opportunity for the cost to come down
on each successive submarine hull is diminished. Petters said during the call that the
company faces $167 million in unfavorable adjustments this quarter, with $111 million of
that coming from the cost and schedule performance of Virginia submarines alone.
“Our plan called for cost and schedule improvements as we worked down the learning
curve on the Block IV boats in support of a two-boat-per-year cadence. As we conducted
our regular second quarter program status reviews, it became clear that the [Virginia-class]
program was particularly impacted by staffing and efficiency challenges as we prioritized
work to align with our customer’s priorities at Newport News. This, in turn, disrupted the
cadence of work and significantly impacted our ability to reasonably rely on the
assumptions we were using in our risk registers for boat-to-boat learning and cost
improvement. As a result, we are resetting our risk registers to reflect the performance
trends we experienced in the quarter, including the impact of COVID-19,” Petters said.
In a news release accompanying the release of the quarterly earnings figures, HII reported
that “the $111 million unfavorable cumulative catch-up adjustments on the Block IV boats
of the Virginia–class submarine program included $95 million for cost and schedule
performance and updates to our assumptions for future program efficiencies and
performance as a result of cost and schedule trends, as well as $16 million from delay and
disruption directly attributable to COVID-19.”
Petters explained during the call that some costs are directly attributable to the pandemic—
the cost of adding hand-washing stations, buying cleaning supplies, paying for employees
to stay at home and quarantine, and more—and those costs could be reimbursed by the
government. Congress has authorized the Navy to reimburse its defense contractors for
these direct costs, but lawmakers have not yet appropriated the money, Petters said, leaving
this situation unclear.
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More unclear is who will pay the bill for the indirect costs, chiefly the inability to have a
full workforce at the yard and take advantage of the planned efficiencies that would drive
down cost and schedule. Petters said the Pentagon has expressed interest in helping
industry cover these costs but that a plan doesn’t exist yet, and so financial statements
released this week count those indirect costs as a loss for the company.…
The overall situation at the yard is leading to several expected delays: for the future
Montana (SSN-794), float-off will be delayed from mid-2020 to late 2020, with delivery
now expected in late 2021. The future New Jersey (SSN-796) will have its pressure hull
complete milestone pushed from late 2020 to mid-2021, with float-off now in late 2021
and delivery in late 2022.33
For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Funding for Second Boat in FY2021
Another issue for Congress is whether to provide funding for procuring a second Virginia-class
boat in FY2021 (which would be the 10th boat under the MYP contract).
Supporters of adding funding for the procurement of a second Virginia-class boat in FY2021
could argue that it is the top item on the Navy’s FY2021 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL), that
some observers have identified attack submarines as particularly important for countering China’s
improving naval capabilities,34 that procuring a second Virginia-class boat in FY2021 could help
the Navy to more quickly recover from the projected valley or trough in SSN force levels and
achieve the Navy’s 66-boat SSN force-level objective, that the Navy believes the industrial base
has the capacity to take on the additional work associated with a 10th boat, and that adding a
second Virginia-class boat in FY2021 could improve production economies of scale in the
Virginia-class program and provide better support for supplier firms, including firms involved in
making nuclear propulsion components for Navy ships.35
Opponents of adding funding for the procurement of a second Virginia-class boat in FY2021
could argue that adding a 10th boat to the FY2019-FY2023 Virginia-class MYP contract could
stress the submarine industrial base, particularly in the context of FY2021 being the year that the
Navy wants to also start building the first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine (see next
section), that there may be more cost-effective uses for the additional $2.76 billion that would be
needed to fully fund the second boat, including other items on the unfunded lists of the Navy and
the other services, and that the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract already contains funding for a 10th
shipset of Virginia-class supplier-made components, the purpose of which is to help provide
stability for key component makers.

33 Megan Eckstein, “Petters: Virginia-Class Subs Facing Most COVID-19 Delays at Newport News Shipbuilding,”
USNI News, August 6, 2020. See also Huntington Ingalls Industries, “Huntington Ingalls Industries Reports Second
Quarter 2020 Results, Provides COVID-19 Update and Updates 2020 Outlook,” August 6, 2020.
34 For discussion of China’s naval modernization effort and U.S. Navy responses to that effort, see CRS Report
RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
35 For a news report discussing the final point, see Ben Werner, “Nuclear Reactor Builder Warns of Loss if Navy Buys
Single Virginia Attack Boat in FY ’21,” USNI News, February 25, 2020.
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Industrial-Base Challenges of Building Both Virginia- and
Columbia-Class Boats
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base challenges of building
both Virginia- and Columbia-class boats at the same time. Along with continued production of
Virginia-class SSNs, the Navy in FY2021 is to also begin building Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs). Observers have expressed concern about the industrial base’s
capacity for building both Virginia- and Columbia-class boats without encountering bottlenecks
or other production problems in one or both of these programs. Concerns about the ability of the
submarine construction industrial base to execute an eventual procurement rate of two VPM-
equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat per year have been heightened by
recent reports of challenges faced by the two submarine-construction shipyards (GD/EB and
HII/NNS), as well as submarine component supplier firms in meeting scheduled delivery times
for Virginia-class boats as the Virginia-class program transitions over time from production of
two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-equipped boats per year.36 Potential
oversight questions for Congress include the following:
 Do the Navy and the submarine builders agree on the question of the capacity of
the industrial base to support various potential Virginia- and Columbia-class
workloads?
 What steps are the Navy, the submarine builders, and submarine supplier firms
taking to bring the capacity of the industrial base more into alignment with
desired submarine procurement rates? What are the costs of these steps, and what
portion of these costs will be borne by the government?
Regarding the second bullet point above, a November 7, 2019, press report states:
The Navy and submarine builders General Dynamics Electric Boat and Newport News
Shipbuilding are executing a recovery plan to get Block IV Virginia-class submarine
production back on track, after the last five submarines in Block III delivered late.
The Virginia-class program had previously been held up as a model of efficient
procurement, as the boats were delivering on-cost and on-schedule—or at times beating
cost and schedule—and former Navy Secretary Ray Mabus grew to joke about the program
as having a punch-card rewards program to get 10 subs for the price of nine. Delivery times
also dropped from 84 months to 72 and then to 66, on their way down to 60 months for
Block IV.
But as the program moved from building one a year to two a year, the subs stopped
delivering on time.

36 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Overly Optimistic Cost Estimate
Will Likely Lead to Budget Increases
, GAO-19-497, April 2019, pp. 20-23; David B. Larter, “Late Is the New Normal
for Virginia-Class Attack Boats,” Defense News, March 20, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Lack of Submarine Parts
Slowing Down Maintenance, New Construction,” USNI News, March 26, 2019; David B. Larter, “The US Navy,
Seeking Savings, Shakes Up Its Plans for More Lethal Attack Submarines,” Defense News, April 3, 2019; Anthony
Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Sub Firepower Upgrade Delayed by Welding Flaws,” Bloomberg, August 13, 2019; Paul
McLeary, “Weld Problems Spread To Second Navy Sub Program,” Breaking Defense, August 14, 2019; David B.
Larter, “Questions About US Navy Attack Sub Program Linger as Contract Negotiations Drag,” Defense News, August
16, 2019; Emma Watkins, “Will the U.S. Navy Soon Have a Missile-Tube Problem?” National Interest, August 19,
2019; David B. Larter, “As CNO Richardson Departs, US Submarine Builders Face Pressure,” Defense News, August
22, 2019; David B. Larter, “After a Leadership Shakeup at General Dynamics, a Murky Future for Submarine
Building,” Defense News, October 28, 2019; Rich Abott, “Navy Says Virginia Sub Delays Due To Faster Production
Rate,” Defense Daily, November 6, 2019.
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“The way we build our submarines, there’s four super modules [that make up each boat]:
two built at EB, two built at Newport News. From their module perspective, they have to
deliver a module (one of each kind) every six months. And you look the entire fabrication,
from the pipe shop to pre-fab to sub-modules to modules, when you’re at that cadence of
two per year, every part of that assembly line must be on cadence. At the pre-fab, at the
sub-module, the footprint, the people, the tools, the procedures. So what we learned is, if
you get out of cadence in any part of that step, you’re going to impact final assembly and
test. So that’s what happened,” Rear Adm. David Goggins, the program executive officer
for submarines, said in response to a USNI News question during a question-and-answer
session at the Naval Submarine League’s annual symposium.
“So the companies have put together a recovery plan. We have the metrics. And the key
thing is getting back to cadence across the entire production line, from the pipe shop, pre-
fab, sub-modules, modules and final assembly and test. Our plan has us getting back to
cadence by the end of next year,” he said.
Speaking to USNI News after the event, Goggins said that Newport News Shipbuilding
had expanded its footprint at its Virginia shipyard to try to keep up with the higher
workload, which wouldn’t be sustainable in the long-run as the shipyard also begins work
on the upcoming Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program.
“At Newport News they expanded to additional footprint, and now the key thing is, over
the next year and a half, through the end of next year, is getting those modules completed
on schedule,” Goggins told USNI News.
“So by the end of next year, we’re back to cadence and using the planned footprint with
the planned resources to go execute module deliveries.”
He said metrics are in place to ensure the company is on track to meet this goal. Asked if
any significant hurdles remain, he said, “they need to go execute the plan. They have the
people, they have the footprint, they have the tooling; they just have to go execute, which
they’re doing today.”
Tom Plante, the director of strategic planning for Electric Boat, told USNI News during a
September visit to the Connecticut shipyard that some of the vendors were unable to keep
up with the faster pace of shipbuilding, either sending parts late or sending parts with
deficiencies that had to be later ripped out of modules and replaced.
“We were challenged to meet our schedules in Block IV, and some of that is program
execution, some of that is ripples caused by [continuing resolutions] and funding and plus-
ups,” Plante said.
“If we get off that rhythm, if we get off that cadence, that causes these ripples, and it takes
multiple ships to work through that. If you have a supply problem—non-conforming
material comes in and I’ve got to stop, I’ve got to go assess, I’ve got to rip things out, I’ve
got to re-do things—then that all adds time and cost to construction execution by
shipbuilders.”
Goggins said Wednesday [November 6] that it would be important to keep the recovery
plan on track and get the Virginia production line under control so problems don’t spill
over and affect the Columbia class of SSBNs.
“The key thing is getting back to cadence across the entire production line, and that is
needed to ensure the success of the Columbia program, which is key,” the rear admiral
said.
Despite the challenge keeping up with the faster delivery schedule, Goggins said the
Virginia-class submarines have been delivering at ever-higher quality. The future Delaware
(SSN-791) completed its sea trials on Oct. 10 and delivered on Oct. 25 and was the highest-
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quality sub delivered to date, according to the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV)
report, Goggins said.37
Technical Risk in Virginia-Class Block V Design
Another potential issue for Congress concerns technical risk in the design for Block V version of
the Virginia-class submarine—the version to be procured during the FY2019-FY2023 Virginia-
class MYP contract. A June 2020 GAO report—the 2020 edition of GAO’s annual report
surveying DOD major acquisition programs—stated the following regarding the Block V version
of the Virginia-class design:
Current Status
In December 2019, the Navy awarded a multiyear contract valued at approximately $22
billion for construction of nine VCS Block V submarines, with options for three more.
According to program officials and a Navy report, Block IV construction challenges
stemming from poor Navy oversight and an optimistic schedule made it difficult for the
Navy to negotiate the Block V contract in line with initial plans.
The Navy plans for all of Block V to include acoustic superiority improvements, and VPM
will be added starting with the second Block V sub. Program officials said that the Block
V design will differ from Block IV by approximately 20 percent. The program office
previously planned to largely complete basic and functional designs for VPM by
construction start. However, the shipbuilders are currently behind schedule. The program
now plans to complete 75 percent of the basic and functional design by construction start—
compared to the 86 percent it initially planned—despite having an additional 6 months due
to contract award delays. This lag in design progress is partly due to shipbuilders’
challenges in using a new software design tool. The Columbia class program (CLB) has
already experienced challenges converting its design into instructions to build the CLB. If
the VCS starts construction prior to maturing its design, it will place itself at greater risk
of cost growth and schedule delays.
The Navy and its shipbuilders will also face challenges in simultaneously building Block
V while starting construction on the CLB in 2021. The Navy and shipbuilders will need to
manage staffing and other resources across both programs. Program officials said that the
CLB is a higher Navy priority, which could mean delays to the Block V to keep the CLB
on schedule.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
The program office stated that poor Block IV construction performance is improving. It
said that the focus is now on modular outfitting followed by final assembly and test. The
program office stated that completing 75 percent of the VPM design prior to starting
construction will be adequate to build the first hull within cost and schedule. The program
said shipbuilders and the VCS and CLB programs are actively working to minimize any
impacts stemming from CLB construction start.38

37 Megan Eckstein, “Navy, Sub Builders Have Recovery Plan to Get Virginia Attack Boat deliveries Back on
Schedule,” USNI News, November 7, 2019. See also Megan Eckstein, “Sub Builders Confident Young Workforce Can
Keep Virginia Attack Boats On track,” USNI News, December 3, 2019.
38 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions Annual Assessment[:] Drive to Deliver Capabilities Faster
Increases Importance of Program Knowledge and Consistent Data for Oversight
, GAO-20-439, June 2020, p. 149.
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Additional Issues
Classified Recommendations in December 2019 DOT&E Report
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns 15 classified recommendations for the Virginia-
class program mentioned in a December 2019 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E’s annual report for FY2019.39
Problem with Hull Coating
Another issue for Congress concerns a problem with the hull coating used on Virginia-class boats
that was first reported years ago, and then again 201740 and 2019.41
Defective Parts Reported in 2016
Another issue for Congress concerns three Virginia-class boats that were reported in 2016 to have
been built with defective parts, and the operational and cost implications of this situation.42
Substandard Steel Reported in 2020
Another issue for Congress concerns substandard steel used for building Navy submarines going
back decades. A June 15, 2020, press report stated:
For decades, the Navy’s leading supplier of high-strength steel for submarines provided
subpar metal because one of the company’s longtime employees falsified lab results —
putting sailors at greater risk in the event of collisions or other impacts, federal prosecutors
said in court filings Monday.
The supplier, Kansas City-based Bradken Inc., paid $10.9 million as part of a deferred
prosecution agreement, the Justice Department said. The company provides steel castings
that Navy contractors Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding use to make
submarine hulls.
Bradken in 2008 acquired a foundry in Tacoma, Washington, that produced steel castings
for the Navy. According to federal prosecutors, Bradken learned in 2017 that the foundry's
director of metallurgy had been falsifying the results of strength tests, indicating that the
steel was strong enough to meet the Navy's requirements when in fact it was not.
Prosecutors say the company initially disclosed its findings to the Navy but then wrongfully
suggested that the discrepancies were not the result of fraud. That hindered the Navy's
investigation into the scope of the problem as well as its efforts to remediate the risks to its
sailors, prosecutors said.
“Bradken placed the Navy’s sailors and its operations at risk,” Seattle U.S. Attorney Brian
Moran said in a news release. “Government contractors must not tolerate fraud within their

39 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2019 Annual Report, December 2019, p. 162.
40 See William Cole, “Navy Subs Still Show Issue with Stealth Coating,” Military.com, March 6, 2017.
41 See James Clark, “Whistleblower Accuses Largest US Military Shipbuilder of Putting ‘American Lives at Risk’ by
Falsifying Tests on Submarine Stealth Coating,” Task & Purpose, October 3, 2019.
42 For press reports discussing this issue, see David Larter, “Secret Weld: How Shoddy Parts Disabled A $2.7 Billion
Submarine,” Navy Times, March 28, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Welding Problems Fixed For Virginia Subs;
Carter Tours Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2016; and David Larter, “Attack Sub Minnesota Rejoins Fleet
After Parts Fiasco,” Navy Times, June 4, 2016.
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organizations, and they must be fully forthcoming with the government when they discover
it.”
There is no allegation in the court documents that any submarine parts failed, but Moran
said the Navy had incurred increased costs and maintenance to ensure the subs remain
seaworthy. The government did not disclose which subs were affected.
The foundry's director of metallurgy, Elaine Thomas, 66, of Auburn, Washington, was
charged criminally with one count of major fraud against the United States. Thomas, who
worked in various capacities at the lab for 40 years, was due to make an initial appearance
in federal court June 30. Her attorney, John Carpenter, declined to comment.
The criminal complaint said investigators were able to compare internal company records
with test results that Thomas certified. The analysis showed that she fabricated the results
of 240 productions of steel, representing nearly half of the high-yield steel Bradken
produced for Navy submarines — often toughness tests conducted at negative-100 degrees
Fahrenheit, the complaint said.
When a special agent with the Department of Defense's Criminal Investigative Service
confronted her with falsified results dating back to 1990, she eventually conceded that the
results were altered — “Yeah, that looks bad,” the complaint quoted her as saying. She
said she may have done it because she believed it was “a stupid requirement” that the test
be conducted at such a cold temperature, the complaint said.
Investigators said the fraud came to light when a metallurgist being groomed to replace
Thomas upon her planned 2017 retirement noticed some suspicious results. The company
said it immediately fired Thomas.
“While the company acknowledges that it failed to discover and disclose the full scope of
the issue during the initial stages of the investigation, the government has recognized
Bradken’s cooperation over the last eighteen months to be exceptional,” the company said
in an emailed statement. “Bradken has a long history of proudly serving its clients, and this
incident is not representative of our organization. We deeply regret that a trusted employee
engaged in this conduct.”
Bradken agreed to take steps that include increased oversight over the lab, fraud protections
and changes to the foundry’s management team. If Bradken complies with the requirements
outlined in the deferred prosecution agreement, the government will dismiss the criminal
fraud charge against it after three years.43
A June 19, 2020, press report states:
Sailors underway on submarines with steel from a company that pleaded guilty to providing
the Navy with fraudulent materials aren’t at risk, the service’s top acquisition official told
reporters on Thursday [June 18].
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition James Geurts
said the Navy had evaluated the potential risks for suspect steel that was used to build Navy
submarines from a Washington state foundry owned by Bradken, Inc.
“We have done the work to understand any potential risk, and believe we have mitigated
any potential risk for our in-service submarines,” Geurts said in response to a question to
USNI News.
“It did cost us some time to go do the exploration to make sure that we were comfortable
with the safety of our sailors.”…

43 Gene Johnson (Associated Press), “Feds Say Company Provided Subpar Steel for US Navy Subs,” Defense News,
June 15, 2020.
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Guerts said the Navy also evaluated submarines under construction for problems derived
from the steel.
“We have done a sweep of any material that was in the queue for new construction
submarines. That’s a little easier because it isn’t in the submarine yet, and we’re confident
in the material for any of the new construction submarines,” he said.
“We are working closely with the company and have instituted additional audits and
inspections in reviewing with them and Electric Boat to ensure that we won’t have a repeat
of this.”
The foundry continues to make steel castings for both Electric Boat and Newport News.
Both companies said they are working to maintain the quality of the materials from
Bradken.44
Legislative Activity for FY2021
Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding Request
Table 3
summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2021 funding request for the Virginia-
class program.
Table 3. Congressional Action on FY2021 Funding
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Virginia class procurement
2,334.7
4,630.7
2,260.3

4,603.2


Virginia class advance procurement (AP)
1,901.2
2,173.2
2,373.2

2,173.2


(Quantity)
(1)
(2)
(1)

(2)


TOTAL
4,235.9
6,803.9
4,633.5

6,776.4


Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2021 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2021 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee, SAC is
Senate Appropriations Committee, HAC is House Appropriations Committee, Conf. is conference agreement.
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 6395/S. 4049)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-442 of July 9, 2020) on H.R.
6395, recommended the funding levels and ship quantity shown in the HASC column of Table 3.
Regarding these recommended funding levels and the recommended ship quantity, H.Rept. 116-
442 states:

44 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Has ‘Mitigated’ Risk of Suspect Steel From Company in Federal Fraud Case,” USNI News,
June 19, 2020. See also Julia Bergman, “Submarine Supplier Mishaps Lead to Call for Hearing,” New London Day,
June 16 (updated June 17), 2020.
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Virginia-class submarine
The budget request included $2.33 billion for one Virginia-class submarine. The committee
was discouraged to see that the second submarine that had been previously planned and
was reflected in the fiscal year 2020 budget, was no longer included in the budget request
despite clear direction from Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92). This not only conflicts with years of testimony from
combatant commanders, not only deepens the gap between the projected fleet size versus
the requirement, but it also puts the Department of Defense’s highest priority procurement
program, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, at additional risk. Due to the
nature of the multiyear procurement contract, the true impact of not funding the second
Virginia-class submarine in fiscal year 2021 will not be realized until 2023, at a time when
both shipyards are reaching a peak in their hiring in order to support the construction of the
first Columbia-class submarine. A decline in Virginia-class work during that period will
likely have a dramatic impact on the Columbia program due to the hiring agreements that
were previously negotiated between the labor unions and the two shipyards. The committee
believes that all measures should be taken to avoid any disruptions to the Columbia-class
submarine program, which has consumed all schedule margin and is still at great risk of
achieving its required first strategic patrol date.
Therefore, the committee recommends $4.43 billion, an increase of $2.1 billion, for a
second Virginia-class submarine. (Page 21)
H.Rept. 116-442 also states:
Submarine Supplier Development
The committee recognizes that the submarine supply base lost approximately 12,000
suppliers since the end of the Cold War. Material provided by the submarine industrial base
is planned to grow by more than 200 percent over the next 5 years, after more than two
decades of nurturing a fragile industrial base where 75 percent of funding for supplier
material was awarded to single or sole-source suppliers. Congress authorized and
appropriated funding in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 and provided flexible
authorities supporting submarine industrial base expansion and stability initiatives. In
fiscal year 2019, the Navy identified 324 suppliers as execution-critical and has been
conducting assessments of the health and readiness of those suppliers. In the 2020
assessment, the number of critical suppliers has grown to 350, of which 61 have been
identified as challenged to meet future demand. The committee believes that continued
investment in supplier development will reduce material lead times and improve the ability
of the submarine industrial base to meet challenging construction schedules at higher rates
of production. Therefore, the committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to include
supplier development funding in future budget requests until the number of challenged
suppliers has been significantly reduced. (Pages 19-20)
H.Rept. 116-442 also states:
SSN(X) future propulsion and power requirements
The committee supports the efforts of the Navy to develop a new class of attack submarine
capable of meeting future threats posed by near peer competitors through the end of the
century. The Next Generation Attack Submarine, SSN(X), will counter threats posed by
peer adversary submarines, future unmanned underwater vehicles, and emerging persistent
threats to U.S. undersea supremacy that already utilize the benefits of electric propulsion.
Critical to the success of the Next Generation Attack Submarine is the ability to combine
stealth and speed while maintaining the power needed to operate future sensors and
weapons to prosecute undersea warfare. The Navy’s prior investments and advancements
achieved in the Columbia class program have led to a superior quiet acoustic propulsion
system capable of meeting current and future threats while also providing the power
architecture and flexibility needed to enable future weapons and sensors. The committee
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supports efforts by the Navy to seek designs and technologies that will provide the future
SSN(X) with greater warfighting capabilities combined with total reduced costs through
leveraging prior investments from the Columbia class program. The committee encourages
the Navy to balance superior technological capability with affordability by evaluating non-
developmental electric power and propulsion solutions. These solutions have demonstrated
superior quiet operational capabilities and lethality and will ensure the future SSN(X) can
meet the essential operational and mission requirements within an accelerated submarine
build cycle. (Page 47)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 116-236 of June 24, 2020) on S.
4049, recommended the funding levels and ship quantity shown in the SASC column of Table 3.
The recommended reduction of $74.4 million in procurement funding is for “Unjustified cost
growth.” The recommended increase of $472.0 million in advance procurement (AP) funding is
for “Long lead material for option ship.” (Page 458) Regarding these recommended funding
levels and the recommended ship quantity, S.Rept. 116-236 states:
Virginia-class submarines
The budget request included $2.3 billion in line number 5 of Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN), for procurement of Virginia-class submarines.
The committee notes unjustified unit cost growth in plans ($25.0 million), modular mast
($8.8 million), propulsor ($25.6 million), and command, control, communications and
information ($15.0 million) systems.
Therefore, the committee recommends a decrease of $74.4 million in line number 5 of
SCN.
Virginia-class submarine advance procurement
The budget request included $1.9 billion in line number 6 of Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy (SCN), for Virginia-class submarine advance procurement.
The committee notes that on December 2, 2019, the Navy awarded a contract modification
to procure 9 Virginia-class submarines in fiscal years 2019 through 2023, as authorized by
section 124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Public Law
115–91). This contract includes an option for one additional submarine.
The committee supports preserving the option to procure 10 Virginia-class attack
submarines in fiscal years 2019 through 2023. The committee understands that
construction on this additional submarine would not begin until March 2024, that the
typical procurement funding profile for Virginia-class submarines consists of 2 years of
advance procurement followed by 1 year of full funding procurement, and that $272.0
million is the minimum amount of additional advance procurement funding required in
fiscal year 2021.
The committee supports utilizing a typical procurement funding profile and believes doing
so would also provide additional time to more fully assess previous concerns of Navy
officials regarding the ability of the submarine industrial base to build 10 Virginia-class
submarines, with 9 having the Virginia Payload Module in this time frame.
Additionally, as noted in the Senate report accompanying S. 1790 (S. Rept. 116–48) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, the committee still has
insufficient clarity on the Navy’s intentions regarding a significant Virginia-class
submarine design change, which could occur in the same time frame.
The committee recognizes that this additional submarine was the Chief of Naval
Operations’ top unfunded priority for fiscal year 2021. If this level of support continues,
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the committee expects the Navy to budget accordingly in its fiscal year 2022 future years
defense program submission.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $472.0 million in line number 6 of
SCN. (Pages 30-31)
Section 1025 of S. 4049 as reported by the committee states (emphasis added):
SEC. 1025. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ACTIONS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A 355-
SHIP NAVY.
It is the sense of Congress that to achieve the national policy of the United States to have
available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships—
(1) the Navy must be adequately resourced to increase the size of the Navy in accordance
with the national policy, which includes the associated ships, aircraft, personnel,
sustainment, and munitions;
(2) across fiscal years 2021 through 2025, the Navy should start construction on not
fewer than

(A) 12 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers;
(B) 10 Virginia-class submarines;
(C) 2 Columbia-class submarines;
(D) 3 San Antonio-class amphibious ships;
(E) 1 LHA-class amphibious ship;
(F) 6 John Lewis-class fleet oilers; and
(G) 5 guided missile frigates;
(3) new guided missile frigate construction should increase to a rate of between two and
four ships per year once design maturity and construction readiness permit;
(4) the Columbia-class submarine program should be funded with additions to the Navy
budget significantly above the historical average, given the critical single national mission
that these vessels will perform and the high priority of the shipbuilding budget for
implementing the National Defense Strategy;
(5) stable shipbuilding rates of construction should be maintained for each vessel class,
utilizing multi-year or block buy contract authorities when appropriate, until a deliberate
transition plan is identified; and
(6) prototyping of potential new shipboard sub systems should be accelerated to build
knowledge systematically, and, to the maximum extent practicable, shipbuilding
prototyping should occur at the subsystem-level in advance of ship design.
S.Rept. 116-232 also states:
Submarine Construction Workforce Training Pipeline
The budget request included $9.2 million in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E), Defense-wide, for PE 67210D8Z Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment
Support.
The committee notes that, over the next decade, the submarine shipbuilding industry must
hire at least 18,000 new skilled workers to support the production of the Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarine and the continued construction of the Virginia-class submarine.
The submarine industry has worked closely with State and local governments, community
colleges, high schools, and community-based non-profits for the past several years to
establish new training pipelines to support these increased hiring needs.
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Thus far, such pipeline training programs have placed nearly 2,500 people in submarine
industry jobs. The committee notes that additional funding will increase the throughput of
these pipelines and expand them into additional States to more adequately respond to the
hiring demand.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $20.0 million in RDT&E, Defense-
wide, for PE 67210D8Z for increasing the submarine construction workforce training
pipeline. (Page 124)
FY2021 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 7617)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-453 of July 16, 2020) on H.R.
7617, recommended the funding levels and ship quantity shown in the HAC column of Table 3.
The recommended net increase of $2,268.520 million includes recommended decreases for
“Universal modular mast excess funds” ($4.449 million), “Propulsor excess funds” ($12.809
million), and “Hardware excess funds” ($10.222 million), and an increase of $2,296.0 million for
“Program increase—one additional submarine.” (Page 184) The recommended increase of $272.0
million for advance procurement (AP) funding is for “Program increase—one additional
submarine.” (Page 184)

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Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan Administration
(1981-1989).
The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and maintaining a
force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally
called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.45 In 1992, however, the SSN goal
was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level requirement study
(updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level
acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.46
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy,
established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs.47 The
Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR supported a requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and
established a tentative SSN force-level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of
peacetime operational requirements.”48 The Clinton Administration later amended the SSN figure
to 55 boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in December 1999. The study
had three main conclusions:
 “that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 62 [SSNs] in
the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the regional military commanders-
in-chief] with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands
without gapping other requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this
force structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to meet the
modeled war fighting requirements”;
 “that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18 Virginia class
SSNs in the 2015 time frame”; and

45 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials, Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral
Raymond G. Jones Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in U.S. Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs,
June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
46 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July 1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub
Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,” Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9;
Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon
Urges Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “ Size of Sub
Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
47 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, pp.
55-57.
48 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
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 “that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame
would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence community’s highest
operational and collection requirements.”49
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of required SSN force
levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not translated into official DOD force-level
goals.
The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended
requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs. In revalidating
this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD’s
“transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value
from each element of the force—DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and
reorganize the Armed Forces.”50
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in 2003-2004. One of
the Navy studies—an internal Navy study done in 2004—reportedly recommended reducing the
attack submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly
recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack
submarines.51
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force levels out to
FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035—a 260-ship fleet including 37 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs and 4 SSGNs.52
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack submarine
requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.53
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships, including
48 SSNs.
Although the Navy’s ship force-level goals have changed repeatedly in subsequent years, the
figure of 48 SSNs remained unchanged until December 2016, when the Navy released a force-
level objective for achieving and maintaining a force of 355 ships, including 66 SSNs.

49 Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy, February 14, 2000, p. 5.
50 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
51 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p. 1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study
Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May 13, 2004.
52 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of
Naval Vessels for FY 2006
. The report was delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees on March 23, 2005.
53 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day (New London, CT), May 27,
2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.
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Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs
This appendix presents information on some alternative profiles for funding the procurement of
SSNs. These alternatives include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
two years of advance procurement (AP) funding followed by full funding
the traditional approach, under which there are two years of AP funding for the
SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
one year of AP funding followed by full funding—one year of AP funding for
the SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
full funding with no AP funding (single-year full funding, aka point-blank
full funding)—full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, with no AP
funding in prior years;
incremental funding—partial funding of the SSN in the year of procurement,
followed by one or more years of additional funding increments needed to
complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
advance appropriations—a form of full funding that can be viewed as a
legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.54
Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the FY2008 budget,
suggested that two years of AP funding are required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and
consequently that additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest.55 This
testimony understated Congress’s options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the
near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of AP funding (which is used
primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion components), Congress can procure an
SSN without prior-year AP funding, or with only one year of AP funding. Consequently, Congress
at that time had the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or FY2010.
Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships
for which no prior-year AP funding had been provided. Specifically, Congress used single-year
full funding in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71, and again in
FY1988 to procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the
Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in FY1990 and
FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial AP payment for CVN-74.
Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to

54 For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement:
Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress
, by Ronald O'Rourke.
55 For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008 Department
of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships the Navy might want to procure in
FY2008, should additional funding be made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter stated in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced procurement, to be
able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we would need to start two years in advance. What
that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08 with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year
to 2010.” (Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same subcommittee on
March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007.
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FY1988, and fully funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships
entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.56
The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor components was
not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and 75 with single-year full
funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more quickly. What made it possible for
Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full funding was Congress’s constitutional
authority to appropriate funding for that purpose.
Procuring an SSN with one year of AP funding or no AP funding would not materially change the
way the SSN would be built—the process would still encompass two or three years of advance
work on long-leadtime components, and an additional five or six years or so of construction work
on the ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction of the
ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal, and the interval between the recorded
year of full funding and the year that the ship enters service would be longer than normal.
Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships would not begin
construction for some time and consequently would take longer to enter service than a ship of that
kind would normally require. When Congress procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
(CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both
cases in the knowledge that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some
time after the first.

56 In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear propulsion components in
inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted the carriers to be built more quickly than would have
otherwise been the case, but it is not what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it
possible was Congress’s authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.
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Appendix C. 2006 Navy Study on Options for
Mitigating Projected Valley in SSN Force Level
This appendix presents background information on a study initiated by the Navy in 2006 for
mitigating the valley in the SSN force levels projected for the 2020s and 2030s. The study was
completed in early 2007 and briefed to CRS and CBO on May 22, 2007.57 At the time of the
study, the SSN force was projected to bottom out at 40 boats and then recover to 48 boats by the
early 2030s. Principal points in the Navy study (which cite SSN force-level projections as
understood at that time) include the following:
 The day-to-day requirement for deployed SSNs is 10.0, meaning that, on
average, a total of 10 SSNs are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis.58
 The peak projected wartime demand is about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain
amount of time. This figure includes both the 10.0 SSNs that are to be deployed
on a day-to-day basis and 25 additional SSNs surged from the United States
within a certain amount of time.59
 Reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months—something
that the Navy already plans to do as part of its strategy for meeting the Virginia-
class cost-reduction goal (see earlier discussion on cost-reduction goal)—will
increase the size of the SSN force by two boats, so that the force would bottom
out at 42 boats rather than 40.60
 If, in addition to reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months,
the Navy also lengthens the service lives of 16 existing SSNs by periods ranging
from 3 months to 24 months (with many falling in the range of 9 to 15 months),
this would increase the size of the SSN force by another two boats, so that the
force would bottom out at 44 boats rather than 40 boats.61 The total cost of

57 Navy briefing entitled, “SSN Force Structure, 2020-2033,” presented to CRS and CBO on May 22, 2007.
58 The requirement for 10.0 deployed SSNs, the Navy stated in the briefing, was the current requirement at the time the
study was conducted.
59 The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time, the Navy stated, is
an internal Navy figure that reflects several studies of potential wartime requirements for SSNs. The Navy stated that
these other studies calculated various figures for the number of SSNs that would be required, and that the figure of 35
SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time was chosen because it was representative of the results of these other
studies.
60 If shipyard construction time is reduced from 72 months to 60 months, the result would be a one-year acceleration in
the delivery of all boats procured on or after a certain date. In a program in which boats are being procured at a rate of
two per year, accelerating by one year the deliveries of all boats procured on or after a certain date will produce a one-
time benefit of a single year in which four boats will be delivered to the Navy, rather than two. In the case of the
Virginia-class program, this year might be around 2017. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the Virginia-class
cost-reduction goal, the Navy believes that the goal of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time is a medium-
risk goal. If it turns out that shipyard construction time is reduced to 66 months rather than 60 months (i.e., is reduced
by 6 months rather than 12 months), the size of the SSN force would increase by one boat rather than two, and the force
would bottom out at 41 boats rather than 42.
61 The Navy study identified 19 existing SSNs whose service lives currently appear to be extendable by periods of 1 to
24 months. The previous option of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy
concluded, would make moot the option of extending the service lives of the three oldest boats in this group of 19,
leaving 16 whose service lives would be considered for extension.
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extending the lives of the 16 boats would be roughly $500 million in constant
FY2005 dollars.62
 The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could meet the 10.0 requirement
for day-to-day deployed SSNs throughout the 2020-2033 period if, as an
additional option, about 40 SSN deployments occurring in the eight-year period
2025-2032 were lengthened from six months to seven months. These 40 or so
lengthened deployments would represent about one-quarter of all the SSN
deployments that would take place during the eight-year period.
 The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could not meet the peak projected
wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
The force could generate a total deployment of 32 SSNs within the time in
question—3 boats (or about 8.6%) less than the 35-boat figure. Lengthening SSN
deployments from six months to seven months would not improve the force’s
ability to meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed
within a certain amount of time.
 To meet the 35-boat figure, an additional four SSNs beyond those planned by the
Navy would need to be procured. Procuring four additional SSNs would permit
the resulting 48-boat force to surge an additional three SSNs within the time in
question, so that the force could meet the peak projected wartime demand of
about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
 Procuring one to four additional SSNs could also reduce the number of seven-
month deployments that would be required to meet the 10.0 requirement for day-
to-day deployed SSNs during the period 2025-2032. Procuring one additional
SSN would reduce the number of seven-month deployments during this period to
about 29; procuring two additional SSNs would reduce it to about 17, procuring
three additional SSNs would reduce it to about 7, and procuring four additional
SSNs would reduce it to 2.

62 The Navy stated that the rough, order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost of extending the lives of 19 SSNs would be $595
million in constant FY2005 dollars, and that the cost of extending the lives of 16 SSNs would be roughly proportional.
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The Navy added a number of caveats to these results, including but not limited to the following:
 The requirement for 10.0 SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis is a current
requirement that could change in the future.
 The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain
amount of time is an internal Navy figure that reflects recent analyses of potential
future wartime requirements for SSNs. Subsequent analyses of this issue could
result in a different figure.
 The identification of 19 SSNs as candidates for service life extension reflects
current evaluations of the material condition of these boats and projected use
rates for their nuclear fuel cores. If the material condition of these boats years
from now turns out to be worse than the Navy currently projects, some of them
might no longer be suitable for service life extension. In addition, if world
conditions over the next several years require these submarines to use up their
nuclear fuel cores more quickly than the Navy now projects, then the amounts of
time that their service lives might be extended could be reduced partially, to zero,
or to less than zero (i.e., the service lives of the boats, rather than being extended,
might need to be shortened).
 The analysis does not take into account potential rare events, such as accidents,
that might force the removal of an SSN from service before the end of its
expected service life.63
 Seven-month deployments might affect retention rates for submarine personnel.

63 In January 2005, the Los Angeles-class SSN San Francisco (SSN-711) was significantly damaged in a collision with
an undersea mountain near Guam. The ship was repaired in part by transplanting onto it the bow section of the
deactivated sister ship Honolulu (SSN-718). (See, for example, Associated Press, “Damaged Submarine To Get Nose
Transplant,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 26, 2006.) Prior to the decision to repair the San Francisco, the Navy
considered the option of removing it from service. (See, for example, William H. McMichael, “Sub May Not Be Worth
Saving, Analyst Says,” Navy Times, February 28, 2005; Gene Park, “Sub Repair Bill: $11M,” Pacific Sunday News
(Guam)
, May 8, 2005.)
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Appendix D. SSN Deployments Delayed Due to
Maintenance Backlogs
This appendix presents additional background information on delays in SSN deployments due to
a backlog in SSN maintenance at the Navy’s four government-operated naval shipyards (NSYs),
which are the primary facilities for conducting depot-level maintenance work on Navy SSNs.
Delays in deploying SSNs can put added operational pressure on other SSNs that are available for
deployment.
A May 26, 2020, press report stated:
After years of struggling to conduct attack submarine maintenance—with the four public
naval shipyards prioritizing SSN work last, behind a backlog of ballistic-missile sub and
aircraft carrier work, and private shipyards finding it tough to resume submarine repair
work after years of only doing new construction—the Navy appears back on track for its
SSN maintenance, the head of Naval Sea Systems Command told USNI News.
The move of attack submarine USS Boise (SSN-764) to the dry dock at Newport News
Shipbuilding in Virginia is the most visible sign of things moving in the right direction,
after the sub has been sitting pier side at nearby Norfolk Naval Shipyard for more than four
years waiting for maintenance to begin.
The Navy had previously hoped to get Boise into Newport News as early as 2018, but the
private yard struggled with its first two Los Angeles-class SSN maintenance periods—for
USS Helena (SSN-725) and USS Columbus (SSN-762)—and didn’t have the room for the
sub or the workforce to start working on it. As Boise lingered, it became a focal point in
the discussion about a lack of repair capacity and a backup of work at the four public naval
shipyards.
But, NAVSEA Commander Vice Adm. Tom Moore told USNI News, the Navy is moving
into a new era of on-time submarine maintenance….
Moore told USNI News in an interview last week that “I think we are well-positioned on
Boise, certainly way better than we were on Helena and Columbus, when we learned so
many lessons the hard way: that, one, they hadn’t done submarine work in 10 years, and I
think we underestimated how they had atrophied in that skill set, and I think they did as
well; and the other thing is, I think we recognized that we probably put too much on their
plate, with multiple availabilities on their plate at one time.”…
Moore said that Electric Boat likely won’t be a provider of submarine maintenance for
much longer – aside from an availability for USS Hartford (SSN-768) that starts in
November 2021, the Connecticut yard will have its hand full with construction of
Columbia-class SSBNs and Block V Virginia-class SSNs. Moore said it’s important to get
the sub repair capability reconstituted at Newport News Shipbuilding so that one private
yard can serve as part of the SSN repair community….
Moore acknowledged that the bulk of the Navy’s problems in recent years was that its four
public shipyards, tasked with maintaining nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
carriers, did not have the capacity to keep up with demand….
If the plan can be executed, Moore said the anticipated work at Norfolk Naval Shipyard
matches the workforce capacity, meaning there should be no more backlog….
Though Boise has remained a “problem child” for longer than anticipated, Moore noted in
the recent interview that SSN maintenance is wrapping up on time more and more as
capacity at the public yards grows….
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Moore said he was confident NAVSEA was in a good position on SSN maintenance
because a whole set of improvements had been made in tandem in recent years: not only
was the [naval shipyard] workforce now up to its goal of 36,700 personnel, but an effort to
create better business practices is underway and the first projects in a 20-year Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) program are already hitting the waterfront.64
A November 2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the issue stated the
following:
The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine
maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and
support cost expenditures. GAO’s analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between
fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and
maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For
example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended
maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the
start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct
normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then
waiting to enter a shipyard…. GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has
spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack
submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter
the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards.
The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities
needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance
periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help
minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO’s analysis found that while the public shipyards
have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance
delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate
this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair
work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as
recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload
allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they
need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without
addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support
funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational
capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance.65
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 115-769 of June 20, 2018) on the
FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 6157) stated the following:
SUBMARINE MAINTENANCE SHORTFALLS
The Committee recognizes that the nuclear-capable public naval shipyards are backlogged
with submarine maintenance work, while private nuclear-capable shipyards have
underutilized capacity. The Los Angeles (SSN–688) class submarines are especially
impacted by this backlog, which significantly reduces their operational availability for
missions in support of combatant commanders. The Committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than 90 days
after the enactment of this Act that outlines a comprehensive, five-year submarine
maintenance plan that restores submarine operational availability and fully utilizes both
public and private nuclear-capable shipyards in accordance with all applicable laws. The

64 Megan Eckstein, “NAVSEA Says Attack Sub Repairs Much Improved as USS Boise Enters Yard Following 4-Year
Wait,” USNI News, May 26, 2020.
65 Government Accountability Office, Navy Readiness[:] Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays
Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet
, GAO-19-229, November 2018, summary page.
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plan should strive to provide both private and public shipyards with predictable frequency
of maintenance availabilities and estimate any potential cost savings that distributing the
workload may deliver. (Page 71)
A March 2019 Navy report to Congress states that in response to the above committee report
language
The Navy submitted an initial [submarine maintenance] plan in December 2018, that
reflected FY 2019 budget information. The Navy has [now] updated this plan to
incorporate data from the President’s FY 2020 budget submitted on March 11, 2019….
… In the post-Cold War and post 9/11 era, there have been decades of decision making
associated with the re-posturing of defense strategies, such as: the reduction in maintenance
capacity and flexibility though Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC), increased
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), evolution of submarine life cycle maintenance plans,
budget reductions, and budget uncertainties that have contributed to the current challenges
facing the submarine fleet.
The root cause of submarine idle time and associated loss of operational availability, as
discussed in the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 19-229, “Actions
Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet” (issued
November 2018), is largely due to public shipyard capacity not keeping pace with growing
maintenance requirements that have been building for a number of years prior to the USS
BOISE (SSN 764) FY 2016 Engineered Overhaul (EOH). The workload to capacity
mismatch resulted in lower priority attack submarine (SSN) availabilities (as compared to
ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers) being delivered late and
a bow-waving of workload from one fiscal year to the next that could not be executed. The
workload backlog exacerbated the public shipyard workload-to-capacity mismatch and
contributed to an increasing trend in late SSN [maintenance] deliveries.
The Navy has taken several actions to improve the workload-to-capacity balance at the
public shipyards. Notably, over 20,600 workers were hired from FY 2013 through FY
2018, which after accounting for attrition, increased total end strength from 29,400 to
36,700. However, the accelerated hiring resulted in 56 percent of the production workforce
having less than five years of experience. The less experienced workforce requires a greater
investment in training, as described in the Navy’s Report to Congress on the Naval
Shipyard Development Plan (issued March 2018), which offers some near term
productivity gains. The Navy has also taken additional actions to balance workload at our
public shipyards by outsourcing four submarine maintenance availabilities to the private
sector and plans to outsource another two submarine availabilities to the private shipyards
starting in FY 2020 and FY 2021. Additionally, to ensure on-time delivery from
maintenance availabilities, availability inductions have been rescheduled to occur when the
shipyards have the capacity to accomplish the availability(s) within programmed schedule
durations. This necessary action to improve the on-time delivery of current maintenance
availabilities has resulted in some additional submarine maintenance backlog and some
accumulation of idle time. Based on actions and initiatives the Navy is currently pursuing
to improve submarine operational availability and the outsourcing of two additional
submarine availabilities to the private sector, the Navy assesses that the submarine idle
time will be eliminated by the end of FY 2023 and the submarine maintenance backlog will
be worked off by the end of FY 2023.66


66 U.S. Navy, President’s FY 2020 Budget Update to Report to Congress on Submarine Depot Maintenance Prepared
by Secretary of the Navy
, generated March 12, 2019, with cover letters dated March 21, 2019, provided to CRS by
Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on March 27, 2019, pp. 3-4.
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Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs


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