Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
Submarine Procurement: Background and
Issues for Congress
June 7, 2019
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32418

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement

Summary
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) since FY1998. The three Virginia-class boats that the Navy has requested for procurement
in FY2020 would be the 31st, 32nd, and 33rd boats in the class. Virginia-class submarines are being
procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract covering at least 10 boats to be procured
in FY2019-FY2023.
Navy plans previously called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. The third boat
requested for FY2020 was added to the budget request as part of the FY2020 budget-planning
cycle. The Navy states that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance
procurement (AP) funding, it would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of
a boat procured in FY2023.
The Navy plans to build the second of the two boats procured in FY2019, the second and third
boats requested for procurement in FY2020, the second of the two boats planned for procurement
in FY2021, and all subsequent Virginia-class boats with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an
additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch
tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads. The Navy’s
FY2020 budget submission shows that Virginia-class boats with and without the VPM have
estimated recurring unit procurement costs of roughly $3.2 billion and $2.8 billion, respectively.
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three Virginia-class boats requested for
procurement in FY2020 at $9.274.4 (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The boats have received $1,756.9
million in prior-year “regular” advance procurement (AP) funding and $361.6 million in
additional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being procured
under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests the
remaining $7,155.9 million in procurement funding needed to complete the boats’ estimated
combined procurement cost, as well as $1,887.6 million in “regular” AP funding for Virginia-
class boats to be procured in future fiscal years and $882.0 million in additional EOQ AP funding
for components of boats to be procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the
total amount of procurement and AP funding requested for the program in FY2020 to $9,925.5
million (i.e., about $9.9 billion), excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
The Navy’s SSN force included 51 boats at the end of FY2018. The Navy’s force-level goal for
SSNs is to achieve and maintain a force of 66 boats. From the mid-2020s through the early 2030s,
the number of SSNs is projected to experience a valley or trough, reaching a minimum of 42
boats in FY2027-FY2028. Some observers are concerned that this projected valley—a
consequence of having procured a relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early
years of the post-Cold War era—could lead to a period of heightened operational strain for the
SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened conventional deterrence against potential
adversaries such as China. The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has
been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every year since then. The Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding plan projects that, after reaching its projected 42-boat minimum, the SSN force will
increase to 66 boats by FY2048.
Issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include whether to approve, reject, or
modify the Navy’s FY2020 procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding requests for the
Virginia-class program; the funding profile for the third Virginia-class boat requested for
procurement in FY2020; the potential industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class
boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time; and technical risk in the
design for the Block V version of the Virginia-class program.
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Virginia-class
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) program. The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests
$9,925.5 million (i.e., about $9.9 billion) in procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding
for the program. Decisions that Congress makes on procurement of Virginia-class boats could
substantially affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding
industrial base.
The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in
another CRS report—CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Virginia-class program and
other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
U.S. Navy Submarines1
The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs),2 nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces (SOF) submarines
(SSGNs),3 and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The SSNs are general-purpose
submarines that can (when appropriately equipped and armed) perform a variety of peacetime and
wartime missions, including the following:
 covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for
national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
 covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than possible with the
SSGNs);

1 In U.S. Navy submarine designations, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered, B stands for ballistic
missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile). Submarines can be powered by either nuclear
reactors or non-nuclear power sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-
powered. A submarine’s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is
armed with nuclear weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered
submarine can be armed with nuclear weapons.
2 The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United States. The Navy’s SSBNs are discussed inCRS
Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure, by Amy F. Woolf.
3 The Navy’s four SSGNs are former Trident SSBNs that have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk
cruise missiles and SOF rather than SLBMs. Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission
orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs are
more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other submarine missions and are sometimes included in
counts of the projected total number of Navy attack submarines. The Navy’s SSGNs are discussed in CRS Report
RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
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 covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles (again on a
smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
 covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
 anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
 anti-surface ship warfare.
During the Cold War, ASW against Soviet submarines was the primary stated mission of U.S.
SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery operations were reportedly
important on a day-to-day basis as well.4 In the post-Cold War era, although anti-submarine
warfare remained a mission, the SSN force focused more on performing the other missions noted
on the list above. Due to the shift in the strategic environment in recent years from the post-Cold
War era to a new situation featuring renewed great power competition,5 ASW against Russian and
Chinese submarines has once again become a more prominent mission for U.S. Navy SSNs.
U.S. Attack Submarine Force Levels
Force-Level Goal
The Navy’s force-level goal, released in December 2016, is to achieve and maintain a 355-ship
fleet, including 66 SSNs.6 For a review of SSN force-level goals since the Reagan
Administration, see Appendix A.
Force Level at End of FY2018
The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, when plans called for
achieving a 600-ship Navy including 100 SSNs. The number of SSNs peaked at 98 boats at the
end of FY1987 and declined after that in a manner that roughly paralleled the decline in the total
size of the Navy over the same time period. The 51 SSNs in service at the end of FY2018
included the following:
 31 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
 17 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.
Los Angeles- and Seawolf-Class Boats
A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between
FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four
21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise missiles
in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class (SSN-719 and
higher) were built with an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for
carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The final 23 boats in the class

4 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection operations during the Cold War, see
Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs,
1998).
5 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential
Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
6 For additional information on Navy force-level goals, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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(SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as Improved Los
Angeles class boats or 688Is. As of the end of FY2018, 31 of the 62 boats in the class had been
retired.
The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class
procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated
changes in military requirements and defense spending levels. The three Seawolf-class
submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21), the Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-
23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and
1998, respectively. SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was suspended
in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It entered service in 2005. Seawolf-class submarines are
larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous U.S. Navy SSNs.7 They are equipped with eight
30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles. SSN-23
was built to a lengthened configuration compared to the other two ships in the class.8
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program
General
The Virginia-class attack submarine (see Figure 1) was designed to be less expensive and better
optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the Seawolf-class design. The Virginia-
class design is slightly larger than the Los Angeles-class design,9 but incorporates newer
technologies. Virginia-class boats procured in recent years cost roughly $2.8 billion each to
procure, but Virginia-class boats to be procured in coming years will be built to a lengthened
configuration that includes the Virginia Payload Module (see discussion below) and have an
estimated unit procurement cost of roughly $3.2 billion. The first Virginia-class boat entered
service in October 2004.
Annual Procurement Quantities
Table 1 shows annual numbers of Virginia-class boats procured from FY1998 (the lead boat)
through FY2019, the number requested for procurement in FY2020, and the numbers projected
for procurement in FY2021-FY2024 under the FY2020-FY2024 Future Years Defense Plan
(FYDP).
Table 1. Annual Numbers of Virginia-Class Boats Procured
or Projected for Procurement
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01 FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09 FY10 FY11
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15 FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
FY22
FY23
FY24

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.

7 Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged displacement of about 7,150 tons.
Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet. SSN-21 and SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons.
8 SSN-23 is 100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged displacement of 12,158 tons.
9 Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.
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Figure 1. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine

Source: U.S. Navy file photo accessed by CRS on January 11, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?
story_id=55715.
Three Boats (Rather Than Two) Requested for FY2020
Navy plans previously called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. The third boat
requested for FY2020 was added to the budget request as part of the FY2020 budget-planning
cycle. The Navy states that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance
procurement (AP) funding, it would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of
a boat procured in FY2023.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP)
The Virginia-class submarines shown in Table 1 for FY2019-FY2023, which are referred to as
the Block V boats, are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract covering
those years.10 This is the fourth consecutive MYP contract used by the Virginia-class program—
three earlier MYP contracts were used to procure the 10 Virginia-class boats shown in the table
for the period FY2014-FY2018 (the Block IV boats), the 8 Virginia-class boats shown in the table
for the period FY2009-FY2013 (the Block III boats), and the 5 Virginia-class boats shown in the
table for the period FY2004-FY2008 (the Block II boats). The four boats shown in the table for
the period FY1998-FY2002 (the Block I boats) were procured under a block buy contract, which

10 For a discussion of MYP contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
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is an arrangement somewhat similar to an MYP contract.11 The boat procured in FY2003 fell
between the FY1998-FY2002 block buy contract and the FY2004-FY2008 MYP contract, and
was contracted for separately.
Joint Production Arrangement
Overview
Virginia-class boats are built jointly by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of
Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News
Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. The arrangement for jointly building Virginia-
class boats was proposed to Congress by GD/EB, HII/NNS, and the Navy, and agreed to by
Congress in 1997, as part of Congress’s action on the Navy’s budget for FY1998, the year that
the first Virginia-class boat was procured.12 A primary aim of the arrangement is to minimize the
cost of building Virginia-class boats at a relatively low annual rate in two shipyards (rather than
entirely in a single shipyard) while preserving key submarine-construction skills at both
shipyards.
Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat, HII/NNS builds certain other
parts of each boat, and the yards have taken turns building the reactor compartments and
performing final assembly of the boats. The arrangement has resulted in a roughly 50-50 division
of Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves both yards’ ability to build
submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and
perform submarine final-assembly work.13
Navy’s Proposed Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS)
Under a plan it calls the Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS), the Navy plans to build
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of the
work going to GD/EB. As part of this plan, the Navy plans to adjust the division of work on the
Virginia-class attack submarine program so that HII/NNS would receive a larger share of the
work for that program than it has received in the past.14

11 For a discussion of block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
The FY1998-FY2002 Virginia-class block buy contract was the first instance of block buy contracting—the mechanism
of a block buy contract was essentially created for procuring the first for Virginia-class boats.
12 See Section 121 of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997).
13 The joint production arrangement is a departure from prior U.S. submarine construction practices, under which
complete submarines were built in individual yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over
the Virginia-class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that occurred in 1995-1997
(i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB
and HII/NNS involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards capable of
building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a
submarine design that is being procured at a relatively low annual rate. The joint production agreement cannot be
changed without the agreement of both GD/EB and HII/NNS.
14 Key elements of SUBS include the following:
•
GD/EB is to be the prime contractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
•
HII/NNS is to be a subcontractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
•
GD/EB is to build certain parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the
parts that GD/EB builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
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Cost-Reduction Effort
The Navy states that it achieved a goal of reducing the procurement cost of Virginia-class
submarines so that two boats could be procured in FY2012 for a combined cost of $4.0 billion in
constant FY2005 dollars—a goal referred to as “2 for 4 in 12.” Achieving this goal involved
removing about $400 million (in constant FY2005 dollars) from the cost of each submarine. (The
Navy calculated that the unit target cost of $2.0 billion in constant FY2005 dollars for each
submarine translated into about $2.6 billion for a boat procured in FY2012.)15

•
HII/NNS is to build certain other parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to
the parts that HII/NNS builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
•
GD/EB is to perform the final assembly on all 12 Columbia-class boats;
•
as a result of the three previous points, the Navy estimates that GD/EB would receive an estimated 77%-78%
of the shipyard work building Columbia-class boats, and HII/NNS would receive 22%-23%;
•
GD/EB is to continue as prime contractor for the Virginia-class program, but to help balance out projected
submarine-construction workloads at GD/EB and HII/NNS, the division of work between the two yards for
building Virginia-class boats is to be adjusted so that HII/NNS would perform the final assembly on a greater
number of Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current Virginia-class division
of work (in which final assemblies are divided more or less evenly between the two shipyards); as a
consequence, HII/NNS would receive a greater share of the total work in building Virginia-class boats than it
would have under a continuation of the current division of work.
See Richard B. Burgess, “Submarine Admirals: ‘Unified Build Strategy’ Seeks Affordability for Future Sub Fleet,”
Seapower, July 8, 2016; Julia Bergman, “Congressmen Visit EB A Day After It Is Named Prime Contractor for Ohio
Reaplcement Program,” The Day (New London), March 29, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Ohio Replacement Plan Is
Good News For Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, March 29, 2016; Robert McCabe, “Newport News Shipbuilding’s
Share of Virginia-Class Submarine Deliveries to Grow,” Virginian-Pilot (Newport News), March 29, 2016; Valerie
Insinna, “GD Electric Boat Chosen To Take Lead Role for Ohio Replacement Sub,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2016: 1-
3; Hugh Lessig, “Navy: More Submarine Work Coming to Newport News Shipyard,” Military.com, March 30, 2016.
See also Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration
& Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection
Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2016, p. 12.
15 The Navy says that, in constant FY2005 dollars, about $200 million of the $400 million in the sought-after cost
reductions was accomplished simply through the improved economies of scale (e.g., better spreading of shipyard fixed
costs and improved learning rates) of producing two submarines per year rather than one per year. The remaining $200
million in sought-after cost reductions, the Navy says, was accomplished through changes in the ship’s design (which
will contribute roughly $100 million toward the cost-reduction goal) and changes in the shipyard production process
(which will contribute the remaining $100 million or so toward the goal). Some of the design changes are being
introduced to Virginia-class boats procured prior to FY2012, but the Navy said the full set of design changes would not
be ready for implementation until the FY2012 procurement.
Changes in the shipyard production process are aimed in large part at reducing the total shipyard construction time of a
Virginia-class submarine from 72 months to 60 months. (If the ship spends less total time in the shipyard being built, its
construction cost will incorporate a smaller amount of shipyard fixed overhead costs.) The principal change involved in
reducing shipyard construction time to 60 months involves increasing the size of the modules that form each
submarine, so that each submarine can be built out of a smaller number of modules. For detailed discussions of the
Virginia-class cost-reduction effort, see David C. Johnson et al., “Managing Change on Complex Programs:
VIRGINIA Class Cost Reduction,” Naval Engineers Journal, No. 4, 2009: 79-94; and John D. Butler, “The Sweet
Smell of Acquisition Success,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 22-28.
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Schedule and Cost Performance on Deliveries
Earlier Record
As noted in CRS testimony in 2014,16 the Virginia (SSN-774) class attack program has been cited
as an example of a successful acquisition program. The program received a David Packard
Excellence in Acquisition Award from the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2008. Although the
program experienced cost growth in its early years that was due in part to annual procurement
rates that were lower than initially envisaged and challenges in restarting submarine production at
Newport News Shipbuilding,17 the lead ship in the program was delivered within four months of
the target date that had been established about a decade earlier, and until recently, ships had been
delivered largely on cost and ahead of schedule.18
More-Recent Reported Delays Relative to Targeted Delivery Dates
In March and April 2019, it was reported that GD/EB, HII/NNS, and their supplier firms were
experiencing challenges in meeting scheduled delivery times as the Virginia-class program
transitions over time from production of two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-
equipped boats per year. As a result of these challenges, it was reported, the program has
experienced months-long delays in efforts to build boats relative to their targeted delivery dates.19
Virginia Payload Module (VPM)
The Navy plans to build the second of the two boats procured in FY2019, the second and third
boats requested for procurement in FY2020, the second of the two boats planned for procurement
in FY2021, and all subsequent Virginia-class boats with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an
additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped with four large-diameter, vertical launch
tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads.
The VPM’s vertical launch tubes are to be used to store and fire additional Tomahawk cruise
missiles or other payloads, such as large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).20 The
four additional launch tubes in the VPM could carry a total of 28 additional Tomahawk cruise
missiles (7 per tube),21 which would increase the total number of torpedo-sized weapons (such as

16 See Statement of Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, before
the House Armed Services Committee on Case Studies in DOD Acquisition: Finding What Works, June 24, 2014, p. 4.
17 See Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, before the
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Hearing on Submarine Force
Structure and Acquisition Policy, March 8, 2007, Table 10 on pp. 14-15.
18 For discussions of recent exceptions, see Christopher P. Cavas, “US Navy Submarine Program Loses Some of Its
Shine,” Defense News, March 13, 2017; David B. Larter, “Virginia-Class Attack Sub Delivers late As US Navy Aims
to Get Program Back on Course,” Defense News, June 26, 2018.
19 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Overly Optimistic Cost Estimate
Will Likely Lead to Budget Increases, GAO-19-497, April 2019, pp. 20-23; David B. Larter, “Late Is the New Normal
for Virginia-Class Attack Boats,” Defense News, March 20, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Lack of Submarine Parts
Slowing Down Maintenance, New Construction,” USNI News, March 26, 2019. See also David B. Larter, “The US
Navy, Seeking Savings, Shakes Up Its Plans for More Lethal Attack Submarines,” Defense News, April 3, 2019.
20 For an illustration of the VPM, see http://www.gdeb.com/news/advertising/images/VPM_ad/VPM.pdf, which was
accessed by CRS on March 1, 2012.
21 Michael J. Conner, “Investing in the Undersea Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 16-20.
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Tomahawks) carried by the Virginia class design from about 37 to about 65—an increase of about
76%.22
Building Virginia-class boats with the VPM is intended to compensate for a sharp loss in
submarine force weapon-carrying capacity that will occur with the retirement in FY2026-FY2028
of the Navy’s four Ohio-class cruise missile/special operations forces support submarines
(SSGNs).23 Each SSGN is equipped with 24 large-diameter vertical launch tubes, of which 22 can
be used to carry up to 7 Tomahawks each, for a maximum of 154 vertically launched Tomahawks
per boat, or 616 vertically launched Tomahawks for the four boats. Twenty-two Virginia-class
boats built with VPMs could carry 616 Tomahawks in their VPMs.
The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission shows that Virginia-class boats with and without the
VPM have estimated recurring unit procurement costs of roughly $3.2 billion and $2.8 billion,
respectively.
The joint explanatory statement for the FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R.
3547/P.L. 113-76 of January 17, 2014) required the Navy to submit biannual reports to the
congressional defense committees describing the actions the Navy is taking to minimize costs for
the VPM.24
Acoustic and Other Improvements
In addition to the VPM, the Navy is introducing acoustic and other improvements to the Virginia-
class design that are intended to help maintain the design’s superiority over Russian and Chinese
submarines.25
FY2020 Funding Request
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the three Virginia-class boats requested for
procurement in FY2020 at $9.274.4 (i.e., about $9.3 billion). The boats have received $1,756.9
million in prior-year “regular” advance procurement (AP) funding and $361.6 million in
additional Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) AP funding for components of boats being procured
under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests the
remaining $7,155.9 million in procurement funding needed to complete the boats’ estimated

22 A Virginia-class SSN can carry about 25 Tomahawks or other torpedo-sized weapons in its four horizontal torpedo
tubes and associated torpedo room, and an additional 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles in its bow-mounted vertical lunch
tubes, for a total of about 37 torpedo-sized weapons. Another 28 Tomahawks in four mid-body vertical tubes would
increase that total by about 76%.
23 Michael J. Conner, “Investing in the Undersea Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 16-20.
24 See PDF page 239 of 351 of the joint explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 3547.
25 For press reports discussing these improvements, see Kris Osborn, “The Navy Wants to Turn ITs Nuclear Attack
Submarines Into ‘Spy’ Ships,” National Interest, May 28, 2018; Kris Osborn, “Navy Launches Most High-Tech &
Stealthy Attack Sub Ever,” Scout Warrior, November 18, 2017; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Considering Mid-Block
Virginia-Class Upgrades, SSGN Construction in Late 2030s,” USNI News, November 2, 2017; Zachary Cohen, “US
Launches ‘Most Advanced’ Stealth Sub Amid Undersea Rivalry,” CNN, October 26, 2017; Franz-Stefan Gady, “US
Navy Christens Most Advanced Attack Sub Ever,” The Diplomat, October 17, 2017; Douglas Ernst, “Navy Christens
Its ‘Most Advanced’ Attack Submarine Ever,” Washington Times, October 16, 2017; Dave Majumdar, “Stealth and
Armed to the Teeth: US Navy's Big Plan for Submarine Dominance,” National Interest, July 9, 2016; Kris Osborn,
“‘Acoustic Superiority’: US Navy's Secret Submarine Plan to Dominate the Seas,” National Interest, June 20, 2016;
Dave Majumdar, “This Is How the U.S. Navy's Submarine Force Dominates the World's Oceans,” National Interest,
May 17, 2016; Megan Eckstein, “Submarines To Become Stealthier Through Acoustic Superiority Upgrades,
Operational Concepts,” USNI News, March 1, 2016.
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combined procurement cost, as well as $1,887.6 million in “regular” AP funding for Virginia-
class boats to be procured in future fiscal years and $882.0 million in additional EOQ AP funding
for components of boats to be procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract, bringing the
total amount of procurement and AP funding requested for the program in FY2020 to $9,925.5
million (i.e., about $9.9 billion), excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs.
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
U.S. Navy submarines are built by GD/EB and HII/NNS. These are the only two shipyards in the
country capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while
HII/NNS also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of
surface ships.
In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes hundreds
of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. Much of the
total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from sole-
source suppliers. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing
work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program.26 In terms of work
provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine
propulsion plants. Much of the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction
industrial base is resident at GD/EB; smaller portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the
component makers.
Projected SSN Force Levels
Table 2 shows the Navy’s projection of the number of SSNs over time if the Navy’s FY2020 30-
year shipbuilding plan were fully implemented. As can be seen in the table, the FY2020 30-year
shipbuilding plan would achieve the Navy’s 66-boat SSN force-level goal by FY2048.
As also shown in the table, the number of SSNs is projected to experience (relative to a previous
Navy SSN force-level goal of 48 boats) a valley or trough from the mid-2020s through the early
2030s, reaching a minimum of 42 boats (i.e., 24 boats, or about 36%, less than the current 66-boat
force-level goal) in FY2027-FY2028. This projected valley is a consequence of having procured a
relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era.
Some observers are concerned that this projected valley in SSN force levels could lead to a period
of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps also a period of weakened
conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China.27 The projected SSN valley
was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every
year since then. As one measure for mitigating this valley, the Navy’s FY2020 budget submission
proposes to refuel and extend the service life of two older Los Angeles (SSN-688) class
submarines. The Navy states that this could be followed by refuelings and service life extensions

26 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
27 China has taken note of the valley. The November 2014 edition of a Chinese military journal, for example, includes
an article with a passage that translates as follows:
... in 2028, the [U.S. Navy] force of nuclear attack submarines will fall from the current number of
55 down to 41 boats. Some are concerned about whether this force level can meet the requirements
of the Asia-Pacific rebalance.”
(Lyle Goldstein, “Evolution of Chinese Power Projection Capabilities,” presentation to Center for a
New American Security (CNAS) roundtable discussion, September 29, 2016, slide 7 of 41.)
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for up to five more Los Angeles-class SSNs that would be funded in fiscal years beyond the
FY2020-FY2024 Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP).28
Table 2. Projected SSN Force Levels
As shown in Navy’s FY2020 30-Year (FY2020-FY2049) Shipbuilding Plan
Force level relative to
Annual
Projected
current 66-boat goal
Fiscal
procurement
number of
Number of
year
quantity
SSNs
ships
Percent
20
3
52
-14
-21%
21
2
53
-13
-20%
22
2
52
-14
-21%
23
2
51
-15
-23%
24
2
47
-19
-29%
25
2
44
-22
-33%
26
2
44
-22
-33%
27
2
42
-24
-36%
28
2
42
-24
-36%
29
2
44
-22
-33%
30
2
46
-20
-30%
31
2
48
-18
-27%
32
2
49
-17
-26%
33
2
51
-15
-23%
34
2
53
-13
-20%
35
2
54
-12
-18%
36
2
56
-10
-15%
37
2
58
-8
-12%
38
2
57
-9
-14%
39
2
58
-8
-12%
40
2
59
-7
-11%
41
2
59
-7
-11%
42
2
61
-5
-8%
43
2
61
-5
-8%
44
2
62
-4
-6%
45
2
63
-3
-5%
46
2
64
-2
-3%
47
2
65
-1
-2%
48
2
66
--
--
49
2
67
+1
+2%
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2020 30-year shipbuilding plan. Percent figures rounded to
nearest percent.
SSN Deployments Delayed Due to Maintenance Backlogs
In recent years, a number of the Navy’s SSNs have had their deployments delayed due to
maintenance backlogs at the Navy’s four government-operated shipyards, which are the primary
facilities for conducting depot-level maintenance work on Navy SSNs. Delays in deploying SSNs
can put added operational pressure on other SSNs that are available for deployment. A November
2018 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the issue stated:

28 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2020, February 2018, p. 6. For background information on a study initiated by the Navy in 2006 for mitigating the
valley in the SSN force levels projected for the 2020s and 2030s, see Appendix C.
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The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine
maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and
support cost expenditures. GAO’s analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between
fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and
maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For
example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended
maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the
start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct
normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then
waiting to enter a shipyard…. GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has
spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack
submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter
the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards.
The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities
needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance
periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help
minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO’s analysis found that while the public shipyards
have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance
delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate
this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair
work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as
recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload
allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they
need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without
addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support
funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational
capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance.29
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 115-769 of June 20, 2018) on the
FY2019 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 6157) stated:
SUBMARINE MAINTENANCE SHORTFALLS
The Committee recognizes that the nuclear-capable public naval shipyards are backlogged
with submarine maintenance work, while private nuclear-capable shipyards have
underutilized capacity. The Los Angeles (SSN–688) class submarines are especially
impacted by this backlog, which significantly reduces their operational availability for
missions in support of combatant commanders. The Committee directs the Secretary of the
Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than 90 days
after the enactment of this Act that outlines a comprehensive, five-year submarine
maintenance plan that restores submarine operational availability and fully utilizes both
public and private nuclear-capable shipyards in accordance with all applicable laws. The
plan should strive to provide both private and public shipyards with predictable frequency
of maintenance availabilities and estimate any potential cost savings that distributing the
workload may deliver. (Page 71)
A March 2019 Navy report to Congress states that in response to the above committee report
language,
The Navy submitted an initial [submarine maintenance] plan in December 2018, that
reflected FY 2019 budget information. The Navy has [now] updated this plan to
incorporate data from the President’s FY 2020 budget submitted on March 11, 2019….

29 Government Accountability Office, Navy Readiness[:] Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays
Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet, GAO-19-229, November 2018, summary page.
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… In the post-Cold War and post 9/11 era, there have been decades of decision making
associated with the re-posturing of defense strategies, such as: the reduction in maintenance
capacity and flexibility though Baes Realignment and Closures (BRAC), increased
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), evolution of submarine life cycle maintenance plans,
budget reductions, and budget uncertainties that have contributed to the current challenges
facing the submarine fleet.
The root cause of submarine idle time and associated loss of operational availability, as
discussed in the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 19-229, “Actions
Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet” (issued
November 2018), is largely due to public shipyard capacity not keeping pace with growing
maintenance requirements that have been building for a number of years prior to the USS
BOISE (SSN 764) FY 2016 Engineered Overhaul (EOH). The workload to capacity
mismatch resulted in lower priority attack submarine (SSN) availabilities (as compared to
ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers) being delivered late and
a bow-waving of workload from one fiscal year to the next that could not be executed. The
workload backlog exacerbated the public shipyard workload-to-capacity mismatch and
contributed to an increasing trend in late SSN [maintenance] deliveries.
The Navy has taken several actions to improve the workload-to-capacity balance at the
public shipyards. Notably, over 20,600 workers were hired from FY 2013 through FY
2018, which after accounting for attrition, increased total end strength from 29,400 to
36,700. However, the accelerated hiring resulted in 56 percent of the production workforce
having less than five years of experience. The less experienced workforce requires a greater
investment in training, as described in the Navy’s Report to Congress on the Naval
Shipyard Development Plan (issued March 2018), which offers some near term
productivity gains. The Navy has also taken additional actions to balance workload at our
public shipyards by outsourcing four submarine maintenance availabilities to the private
sector and plans to outsource another two submarine availabilities to the private shipyards
starting in FY 2020 and FY 2021. Additionally, to ensure on-time delivery from
maintenance availabilities, availability inductions have been rescheduled to occur when the
shipyards have the capacity to accomplish the availability(s) within programmed schedule
durations. This necessary action to improve the on-time delivery of current maintenance
availabilities has resulted in some additional submarine maintenance backlog and some
accumulation of idle time. Based on actions and initiatives the Navy is currently pursuing
to improve submarine operational availability and the outsourcing of two additional
submarine availabilities to the private sector, the Navy assesses that the submarine idle
time will be eliminated by the end of FY 2023 and the submarine maintenance backlog will
be worked off by the end of FY 2023.30
Issues for Congress
FY2020 Funding
One issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2020 procurement
and advance procurement (AP) funding requests for the Virginia-class program. In considering
this issue, Congress may consider several factors, including the amount of work the Navy is
proposing to fund for the program in FY2020 and whether the Navy has accurately priced the
work it is proposing to do in FY2020. Another element of this issue concerns the funding profile

30 U.S. Navy, President’s FY 2020 Budget Update to Report to Congress on Submarine Depot Maintenance Prepared
by Secretary of the Navy, generated March 12, 2019, with cover letters dated March 21, 2019, provided to CRS by
Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on March 27, 2019, pp. 3-4.
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for the third Virginia-class boat requested for procurement in FY2020. This issue is discussed
separately in the next section.
Funding Profile for Third Virginia-Class Boast Requested
for FY2020
Another issue for Congress concerns the funding profile for the third Virginia-class boat that the
Navy has requested for procurement in FY2020. As discussed earlier, Navy plans previously
called for procuring two Virginia-class boats in FY2020. The third boat requested for FY2020
was added to the budget request as part of the FY2020 budget-planning cycle. The Navy states
that since this third boat has not received any prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, it
would execute (i.e., be constructed) on a schedule similar to that of a boat procured in FY2023.
The Navy is proposing to fully fund the procurement of the third boat in FY2020. As discussed in
Appendix B, Congress in the past has fully funded the procurement of nuclear-powered ships
(specifically, aircraft carriers) for which no prior-year AP funding had been provided. Given the
anticipated schedule for executing a third Virginia-class boat procured in FY2020, one alternative
funding profile for this boat would be to provide AP funding for the boat in FY2020-FY2022,
followed by full funding (i.e., the remainder of the boat’s procurement cost, in the form of regular
procurement funding) for the boat in FY2023 (or perhaps AP funding in FY2020-FY2021,
followed by full funding in FY2022).
Supporters of providing only AP funding for the boat in FY2020 could argue that it would reduce
FY2020 funding requirements for the Virginia-class program, which could make more FY2020
funding available for other programs, such as, for example, the LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship
program,31 the LHA-9 amphibious assault ship program, the Expeditionary Support Base (ESB)
ship program, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program,32 Navy aircraft or weapon acquisition
programs, Navy maintenance and readiness initiatives, or other DOD programs.
Supporters of fully funding a third Virginia-class boat in FY2020 could argue that it would reduce
FY2021-FY2023 funding requirements for the Virginia-class program, which could make
available more funding in those years for other programs, including most of those mentioned
above, as well as the Virginia-class program itself (where it could, for example, support the
procurement of a third Virginia-class boat in FY2022 and/or a third Virginia-class boat in
FY2023). They could also argue that fully funding the procurement of a third Virginia-class boat
in FY2020 would send a signal of resolve to potential adversaries such as China, particularly
since it would make FY2020 the first year since FY1989 in which three SSNs were procured in a
single year.33

31 For more on the LPD-17 Flight II program, see CRS Report R43543, Navy LPD-17 Flight II (LX[R]) Amphibious
Ship Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
32 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
33 In FY1989, Congress funded the procurement of two Los Angeles (SSN-688) class SSNs and the first Seawolf (SSN-
21) class SSN. (Congress in FY1989 also funded the procurement of an Ohio [SSBN-726] class ballistic missile
submarine.) In FY1990, Congress funded the procurement of two submarines—the final Los Angeles-class SSN and an
Ohio-class SSBN. In FY1991, Congress again funded the procurement of two submarines—the second Seawolf-class
SSN and the final Ohio-class SSBN. In FY1992, Congress funded the procurement of one submarine—the third and
final Seawolf-class boat. The procurement of that boat was suspended and then reinstated in FY1996. No submarines
other than the third Seawolf-class boat were procured during the period FY1992-FY1997. As shown in Table 1,
procurement of Virginia-class boats began in FY1998. After FY1991, Congress did not again fund the procurement of
two submarines in a single year until FY2011, when it funded the procurement of two Virginia-class boats.
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Industrial-Base Challenges of Building Both Columbia- and
Virginia-Class Boats
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the potential industrial-base challenges of building
both Columbia-class boats and Virginia-class attack submarines (SSNs) at the same time. Along
with continued production of Virginia-class SSNs, the Navy in FY2021 is to also begin building
Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Observers have expressed concern about
the industrial base’s capacity for building both Virginia- and Columbia-class boats without
encountering bottlenecks or other production problems in one or both of these programs.
Concerns about the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to execute an eventual
procurement rate of two VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat per
year have been heightened by recent reports of challenges faced by the two submarine-
construction shipyards (GD/EB and HII/NNS), as well as submarine component supplier firms in
meeting scheduled delivery times for Virginia-class boats as the Virginia-class program
transitions over time from production of two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-
equipped boats per year.34
Technical Risk in Virginia-Class Block V Design
Another potential issue for Congress concerns technical risk in the design for the Block V version
of the Virginia-class program—the version being procured in FY2019-2023. A May 2019 GAO
report—the 2019 edition of GAO’s annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs—
stated the following regarding the Block V version of the Virginia-class design:
Current Status
In 2019, the Navy plans to award a multibillion dollar, multiyear contract for construction
of 10 Block V submarines. Under the Navy’s plan, all Block V ships will include acoustic
superiority improvements, while the VPM will be added starting with the second Block V
submarine.
According to program officials, the design of Block V submarines will differ from Block
IV by approximately 20 percent. Of this 20 percent, the program office considers 70
percent to constitute major changes. The program office plans to complete basic and
functional designs for VPM by construction start—an approach consistent with best
practices. However, the shipbuilder is currently behind schedule in completing detail
design work, where (1) the design advances to the highest level of fidelity, (2) specific
fabrication and installation instructions for the shipyard are developed, and (3) required
production materials are identified. The program now plans to complete 76 percent of this
work by construction start, compared to the 86 percent it initially planned, in part due to
the shipbuilder’s challenges in using a new design tool. Going forward, the Navy and
shipbuilder will need to balance staffing levels for the remaining Block V design work with
design efforts for the new Columbia class ballistic missile submarine. Construction of
Block V and the Columbia class will coincide beginning in fiscal year 2021.This will
require the Navy and its shipbuilder to manage staffing demands and other resources across
both programs. In addition, program officials said vendor quality issues with welding on
VPM have caused a 3.5-month delay in the schedule for the payload tubes for the first two

34 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Overly Optimistic Cost Estimate
Will Likely Lead to Budget Increases, GAO-19-497, April 2019, pp. 20-23; David B. Larter, “Late Is the New Normal
for Virginia-Class Attack Boats,” Defense News, March 20, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Lack of Submarine Parts
Slowing Down Maintenance, New Construction,” USNI News, March 26, 2019. See also David B. Larter, “The US
Navy, Seeking Savings, Shakes Up Its Plans for More Lethal Attack Submarines,” Defense News, April 3, 2019.
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submarines with VPM. The Navy plans to recover some time by accelerating tube
manufacturing with a second vendor, but this approach may increase program costs.
The Block V effort is subsumed under the SSN 774 major defense acquisition program,
and is not managed as a separate program. In 2015, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
shifted the program’s oversight to the Navy. SSN 774 had already completed its required
defense acquisition system milestone reviews before Block V started, but program officials
said the Navy continues to conduct regular oversight of the Block V.
Program Office Comments
In commenting on a draft of this assessment, the program office provided technical
comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.35
Additional Issues
Issues Raised in January 2018 DOT&E Report
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns Virginia-class program issues raised in a January
2018 report from DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)—DOT&E’s
annual report for FY2017.36
Problem with Hull Coating Reported in 2017
Another issue for Congress concerns a problem with the hull coating used on Virginia-class boats
that was reported in 2017.37
Defective Parts Reported in 2016
Another issue for Congress concerns three Virginia-class boats that were reported in 2016 to have
been built with defective parts, and the operational and cost implications of this situation.38
Legislative Activity for FY2020
Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding Request
Table 3 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2020 funding request for the Virginia-
class program.

35 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Limited Use of Knowledge-Based
Practices Continues to Undercut DOD’s Investments, GAO-19-336SP, May 2019, p. 137.
36 Department of Defense, Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, FY2017 Annual Report, January 2018, pp. 217-
218.
37 For a press report discussing this issue, see William Cole, “Navy Subs Still Show Issue with Stealth Coating,”
Military.com, March 6, 2017.
38 For press reports discussing this issue, see David Larter, “Secret Weld: How Shoddy Parts Disabled A $2.7 Billion
Submarine,” Navy Times, March 28, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Welding Problems Fixed For Virginia Subs;
Carter Tours Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2016; and David Larter, “Attack Sub Minnesota Rejoins Fleet
After Parts Fiasco,” Navy Times, June 4, 2016.
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Table 3. Congressional Action on FY2020 Funding
(Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Virginia class procurement
7,155.9

4,192.3

Virginia class advance procurement (AP)
2,769.6

4,266.6

TOTAL
9,925.5

8,458.9

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2020 budget submission, committee and conference
reports, and explanatory statements on FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2020 DOD
Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee, SAC is
Senate Appropriations Committee, HAC is House Appropriations Committee, Conf. is conference agreement.
FY2020 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2968)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 116-84 of May 23, 2019) on H.R.
2968, recommended the funding levels for the Virginia-class program shown in the HAC column
of Table 3.
The recommended net reduction of $2,963.6 million in procurement funding includes reductions
for a transfer to the advance procurement (AP) funding line ($1,497.0 million); transfers to the
Operations and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) account for maintenance work on the attack
submarines Boise ($290.0 million), Hartford ($306 million), and Columbus ($57.0 million); and
“Early to need” ($813.6 million). It also includes a reduction for “Program realignment” ($236.4
million), and an increase for “Program realignment” (also $236.4 million). (Page 175)
The recommended increase of $1,497.0 million for in advance procurement (AP) funding is the
above-noted transfer from the procurement funding line. (Page 175)
H.Rept. 116-84 states:
SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE
The Committee is disappointed that the Chief of Naval Operations requested an additional
$814,000,000 on the Navy’s fiscal year 2020 unfunded priority list for the Ship Depot
Maintenance account. The fiscal year 2020 budget request for this activity is
$10,426,913,000, an increase of $652,740,000 above the fiscal year 2019 enacted level of
$9,774,173,000.
The Committee is concerned by the maintenance delays that persistently occur under this
account and finds these delays completely unacceptable. A Government Accountability
Office study noted delays for different vessels range from 1,000 to almost 19,000 days.
These delays increase the costs of repairs as ships and submarines wait for their respective
slots at the various public and private shipyards. It is imperative the Navy improve its
scheduling and budgeting for these activities to reduce the length of time that ships and
submarines remain unable to deploy and to reduce the costs associated with lengthy delays
in the maintenance process.
The Committee recommendation includes a transfer of $653,000,000 from Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy to Operation and Maintenance, Navy to address the urgent
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maintenance requirements for the USS Boise, the USS Hartford, and the USS Columbus.
The Committee appreciates and supports the need for new attack submarines, but believes
that the Navy must also address repairs of its current fleet, with these three submarines
receiving priority attention. In particular, the Committee believes the USS Boise must
receive immediate attention and resources, given that it lost its dive certification in 2017
and has been effectively out of operation for two years.
To provide more transparency and accountability, the Committee directs the Secretary of
the Navy to provide with the submission of the fiscal year 2021 budget request the names
and estimated costs of the ships and submarines scheduled for maintenance that correspond
to the fiscal year 2021 budget request for ship depot maintenance, for both base and
overseas contingency operations funding requests. (Page 80)
H.Rept. 116-84 also states:
RESEARCH AND WORKFORCE PARTNERSHIPS FOR SUBMARINE AND
UNDERSEA VEHICLE PROGRAMS
The Committee recognizes the need for greater partnerships between Navy research labs,
academia, and industry. The Committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to coordinate
efforts with its industrial base partners to ensure that funded research projects are relevant
to specific engineering and manufacturing needs, as well as defined systems capabilities.
Partnerships with academia should focus on specific, well-defined short- and long-term
submarine and autonomous undersea vehicle research needs, accelerated technology
transition, and should also include a strong workforce development component to help
ensure a sustainable industrial base. (Page 264)

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Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan Administration
(1981-1989).
The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and maintaining a
force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally
called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.39 In 1992, however, the SSN goal
was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level requirement study
(updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level
acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.40
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy,
established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs.41 The
Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR supported a requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and
established a tentative SSN force-level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of
peacetime operational requirements.”42 The Clinton Administration later amended the SSN figure
to 55 boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in December 1999. The study
had three main conclusions:
 “that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 62 [SSNs] in
the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the regional military commanders-
in-chief] with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands
without gapping other requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this
force structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to meet the
modeled war fighting requirements”;
 “that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18 Virginia class
SSNs in the 2015 time frame”; and

39 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials, Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral
Raymond G. Jones Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in U.S. Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs,
June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
40 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July 1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub
Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,” Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9;
Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon
Urges Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “ Size of Sub
Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
41 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, pp.
55-57.
42 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
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 “that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame
would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence community’s highest
operational and collection requirements.”43
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of required SSN force
levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not translated into official DOD force-level
goals.
The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended
requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs. In revalidating
this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD’s
“transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value
from each element of the force—DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and
reorganize the Armed Forces.”44
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in 2003-2004. One of
the Navy studies—an internal Navy study done in 2004—reportedly recommended reducing the
attack submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly
recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack
submarines.45
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force levels out to
FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035—a 260-ship fleet including 37 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs and 4 SSGNs.46
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack submarine
requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.47
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships, including
48 SSNs.
Although the Navy’s ship force-level goals have changed repeatedly in subsequent years, the
figure of 48 SSNs remained unchanged until December 2016, when the Navy released a force-
level objective for achieving and maintaining a force of 355 ships, including 66 SSNs.

43 Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy, February 14, 2000, p. 5.
44 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
45 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p. 1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study
Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May 13, 2004.
46 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of
Naval Vessels for FY 2006. The report was delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees on March 23, 2005.
47 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day (New London, CT), May 27,
2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.
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Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs
This appendix presents information on some alternative profiles for funding the procurement of
SSNs. These alternatives include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
 two years of advance procurement (AP) funding followed by full funding—
the traditional approach, under which there are two years of AP funding for the
SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
 one year of AP funding followed by full funding—one year of AP funding for
the SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
 full funding with no AP funding (single-year full funding, aka point-blank
full funding)—full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, with no AP
funding in prior years;
 incremental funding—partial funding of the SSN in the year of procurement,
followed by one or more years of additional funding increments needed to
complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
 advance appropriations—a form of full funding that can be viewed as a
legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.48
Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the FY2008 budget,
suggested that two years of AP funding are required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and
consequently that additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest.49 This
testimony understated Congress’s options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the
near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of AP funding (which is used
primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion components), Congress can procure an
SSN without prior-year AP funding, or with only one year of AP funding. Consequently, Congress
at that time had the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or FY2010.
Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships
for which no prior-year AP funding had been provided. Specifically, Congress used single-year
full funding in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71, and again in
FY1988 to procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the
Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in FY1990 and
FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial AP payment for CVN-74.
Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to

48 For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement:
Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
49 For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008 Department
of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships the Navy might want to procure in
FY2008, should additional funding be made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter stated in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced procurement, to be
able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we would need to start two years in advance. What
that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08 with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year
to 2010.” (Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same subcommittee on
March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007.
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FY1988, and fully funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships
entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.50
The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor components was
not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and 75 with single-year full
funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more quickly. What made it possible for
Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full funding was Congress’s constitutional
authority to appropriate funding for that purpose.
Procuring an SSN with one year of AP funding or no AP funding would not materially change the
way the SSN would be built—the process would still encompass two or three years of advance
work on long-leadtime components, and an additional five or six years or so of construction work
on the ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction of the
ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal, and the interval between the recorded
year of full funding and the year that the ship enters service would be longer than normal.
Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships would not begin
construction for some time and consequently would take longer to enter service than a ship of that
kind would normally require. When Congress procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
(CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both
cases in the knowledge that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some
time after the first.

50 In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear propulsion components in
inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted the carriers to be built more quickly than would have
otherwise been the case, but it is not what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it
possible was Congress’s authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.
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Appendix C. 2006 Navy Study on Options for
Mitigating Projected Valley in SSN Force Level
This appendix presents background information on a study initiated by the Navy in 2006 for
mitigating the valley in the SSN force levels projected for the 2020s and 2030s. The study was
completed in early 2007 and briefed to CRS and CBO on May 22, 2007.51 At the time of the
study, the SSN force was projected to bottom out at 40 boats and then recover to 48 boats by the
early 2030s. Principal points in the Navy study (which cite SSN force-level projections as
understood at that time) include the following:
 The day-to-day requirement for deployed SSNs is 10.0, meaning that, on
average, a total of 10 SSNs are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis.52
 The peak projected wartime demand is about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain
amount of time. This figure includes both the 10.0 SSNs that are to be deployed
on a day-to-day basis and 25 additional SSNs surged from the United States
within a certain amount of time.53
 Reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months—something
that the Navy already plans to do as part of its strategy for meeting the Virginia-
class cost-reduction goal (see earlier discussion on cost-reduction goal)—will
increase the size of the SSN force by two boats, so that the force would bottom
out at 42 boats rather than 40.54
 If, in addition to reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months,
the Navy also lengthens the service lives of 16 existing SSNs by periods ranging
from 3 months to 24 months (with many falling in the range of 9 to 15 months),
this would increase the size of the SSN force by another two boats, so that the
force would bottom out at 44 boats rather than 40 boats.55 The total cost of

51 Navy briefing entitled, “SSN Force Structure, 2020-2033,” presented to CRS and CBO on May 22, 2007.
52 The requirement for 10.0 deployed SSNs, the Navy stated in the briefing, was the current requirement at the time the
study was conducted.
53 The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time, the Navy stated, is
an internal Navy figure that reflects several studies of potential wartime requirements for SSNs. The Navy stated that
these other studies calculated various figures for the number of SSNs that would be required, and that the figure of 35
SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time was chosen because it was representative of the results of these other
studies.
54 If shipyard construction time is reduced from 72 months to 60 months, the result would be a one-year acceleration in
the delivery of all boats procured on or after a certain date. In a program in which boats are being procured at a rate of
two per year, accelerating by one year the deliveries of all boats procured on or after a certain date will produce a one-
time benefit of a single year in which four boats will be delivered to the Navy, rather than two. In the case of the
Virginia-class program, this year might be around 2017. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the Virginia-class
cost-reduction goal, the Navy believes that the goal of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time is a medium-
risk goal. If it turns out that shipyard construction time is reduced to 66 months rather than 60 months (i.e., is reduced
by 6 months rather than 12 months), the size of the SSN force would increase by one boat rather than two, and the force
would bottom out at 41 boats rather than 42.
55 The Navy study identified 19 existing SSNs whose service lives currently appear to be extendable by periods of 1 to
24 months. The previous option of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy
concluded, would make moot the option of extending the service lives of the three oldest boats in this group of 19,
leaving 16 whose service lives would be considered for extension.
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extending the lives of the 16 boats would be roughly $500 million in constant
FY2005 dollars.56
 The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could meet the 10.0 requirement
for day-to-day deployed SSNs throughout the 2020-2033 period if, as an
additional option, about 40 SSN deployments occurring in the eight-year period
2025-2032 were lengthened from six months to seven months. These 40 or so
lengthened deployments would represent about one-quarter of all the SSN
deployments that would take place during the eight-year period.
 The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could not meet the peak projected
wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
The force could generate a total deployment of 32 SSNs within the time in
question—3 boats (or about 8.6%) less than the 35-boat figure. Lengthening SSN
deployments from six months to seven months would not improve the force’s
ability to meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed
within a certain amount of time.
 To meet the 35-boat figure, an additional four SSNs beyond those planned by the
Navy would need to be procured. Procuring four additional SSNs would permit
the resulting 48-boat force to surge an additional three SSNs within the time in
question, so that the force could meet the peak projected wartime demand of
about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
 Procuring one to four additional SSNs could also reduce the number of seven-
month deployments that would be required to meet the 10.0 requirement for day-
to-day deployed SSNs during the period 2025-2032. Procuring one additional
SSN would reduce the number of seven-month deployments during this period to
about 29; procuring two additional SSNs would reduce it to about 17, procuring
three additional SSNs would reduce it to about 7, and procuring four additional
SSNs would reduce it to 2.
The Navy added a number of caveats to these results, including but not limited to the following:
 The requirement for 10.0 SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis is a current
requirement that could change in the future.
 The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain
amount of time is an internal Navy figure that reflects recent analyses of potential
future wartime requirements for SSNs. Subsequent analyses of this issue could
result in a different figure.
 The identification of 19 SSNs as candidates for service life extension reflects
current evaluations of the material condition of these boats and projected use
rates for their nuclear fuel cores. If the material condition of these boats years
from now turns out to be worse than the Navy currently projects, some of them
might no longer be suitable for service life extension. In addition, if world
conditions over the next several years require these submarines to use up their
nuclear fuel cores more quickly than the Navy now projects, then the amounts of
time that their service lives might be extended could be reduced partially, to zero,

56 The Navy stated that the rough, order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost of extending the lives of 19 SSNs would be $595
million in constant FY2005 dollars, and that the cost of extending the lives of 16 SSNs would be roughly proportional.
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 or to less than zero (i.e., the service lives of the boats, rather than being
extended, might need to be shortened).
 The analysis does not take into account potential rare events, such as accidents,
that might force the removal of an SSN from service before the end of its
expected service life.57
 Seven-month deployments might affect retention rates for submarine personnel.

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

57 In January 2005, the Los Angeles-class SSN San Francisco (SSN-711) was significantly damaged in a collision with
an undersea mountain near Guam. The ship was repaired in part by transplanting onto it the bow section of the
deactivated sister ship Honolulu (SSN-718). (See, for example, Associated Press, “Damaged Submarine To Get Nose
Transplant,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 26, 2006.) Prior to the decision to repair the San Francisco, the Navy
considered the option of removing it from service. (See, for example, William H. McMichael, “Sub May Not Be Worth
Saving, Analyst Says,” Navy Times, February 28, 2005; Gene Park, “Sub Repair Bill: $11M,” Pacific Sunday News
(Guam), May 8, 2005.)
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