Order Code RL32418
Navy Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated October 1, 2008
Ronald O’'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionApril 29, 2009
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32418
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Navy Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget requested $2,107.0 million to complete
the procurement funding for an 11th Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN). This boat had already received $756.0 million in prior-year
advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget also requested
$719.8 million in advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats to be
procured in future fiscal years, and $596.8 million in additional procurement funding
for economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of key components for eight Virginiaclass submarines (the 11th boat and seven others) that are to be procured under a
multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement during the five-year period FY2009FY2013.
As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2008 shipbuilding budget, Congress added
$588 million in advance procurement funding for an additional Virginia class
submarine to be procured in a year prior to FY2012. The Navy, as part of its
proposed FY2009 budget, included this additional submarine in its shipbuilding plan
and scheduled it to be fully funded in FY2011, thus accelerating from FY2012 to
FY2011 the year in which the Virginia-class procurement rate is to shift from one
boat per year to two boats per year.
Section 122 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense authorization bill
(S. 3001) modifies the authority to use an MYP arrangement for Virginia-class boats
to be procured in FY2009-FY2013 that was granted to the Secretary of the Navy by
Section 121 of FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 1585/P.L. 110-181 of January
28, 2008) so as to additionally permit the Secretary enter into one or more contracts
for advance procurement and advance construction of components for the boats
procured under that MYP arrangement.
Section 8011 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense appropriations
act (Division C of H.R. 2368/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008) grants authority
for using FY2009 funds for an MYP arrangement for the Virginia-class program.
The act approves the Navy’s FY2009 procurement funding request for the Virginiaclass program and increases by $79 million the Navy’s FY2009 advance procurement
funding request for the program. The $79-million increase is for “Economic Order
Quantity.”
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Submarines in the U.S. Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Types of Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Roles and Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Attack Submarine Force Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Historical Force Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Force Level As of End Of FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Past and Planned Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Changes in Planned Procurement Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Joint Production Arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Cost-Reduction Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Submarine Construction Industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Design and Engineering Portion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Projected SSN Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Size and Timing of Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Navy Study On Options For Mitigating Projected Shortfall . . . . . . . . 10
Funding Additional SSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Alternative Funding Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Procuring SSNs in a 2-1-2 Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Accelerating Procurement of Second FY2011 Boat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Maintaining Design and Engineering Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
48-Boat Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Potential Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Legislative Activity for FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
FY2009 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329) . . . . . . . . 24
House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix B. Views Regarding 48-Boat SSN Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Navy View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Alternative View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
List of Tables
Table 1. Past and Planned Virginia-Class Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Planned Virginia-Class Procurement in Various FYDPs . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 3. SSN Force Level, 2009-2038 (Navy Projection) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Navy Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget requested $2,107.0 million to complete
the procurement funding for an 11th Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN). This boat had already received $756.0 million in prior-year
advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget also requested
$719.8 million in advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats to be
procured in future fiscal years, and $596.8 million in additional procurement funding
for economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of key components for eight Virginiaclass submarines (the 11th boat and seven others) that are to be procured under a
multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement during the five-year period FY2009FY2013.
As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2008 shipbuilding budget, Congress added
$588 million in advance procurement funding for an additional Virginia class
submarine to be procured in a year prior to FY2012. The Navy, as part of its
proposed FY2009 budget, included this additional submarine in its shipbuilding plan
and scheduled it to be fully funded in FY2011, thus accelerating from FY2012 to
FY2011 the year in which the Virginia-class procurement rate is to shift from one
boat per year to two boats per year.
Section 122 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense authorization bill
(S. 3001) modifies the authority to use an MYP arrangement for Virginia-class boats
to be procured in FY2009-FY2013 that was granted to the Secretary of the Navy by
Section 121 of FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 1585/P.L. 110-181 of January
28, 2008) so as to additionally permit the Secretary enter into one or more contracts
for advance procurement and advance construction of components for the boats
procured under that MYP arrangement.
Section 8011 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense appropriations
act (Division C of H.R. 2368/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008) grants authority
for using FY2009 funds for an MYP arrangement for the Virginia-class program.
The act approves the Navy’s FY2009 procurement funding request for the Virginiaclass program, and increases by $79 million the Navy’s FY2009 advance
procurement funding request for the program. The $79-million increase is for
“Economic Order Quantity.”
CRS-2
Background
Submarines in the U.S. Navy
Types of Submarines. Submarines are one of four principal categories of
combat ships that traditionally have helped define the size and structure of the U.S.
Navy. The other three are aircraft carriers, surface combatants (e.g., cruisers,
destroyers, frigates, and Littoral Combat Ships), and amphibious ships. (The Navy
also includes mine warfare ships and a variety of auxiliary and support ships.)
Submarines can be powered by either nuclear reactors or non-nuclear power
sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclearpowered. A submarine’s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source is
not an indication of whether it is armed with nuclear weapons — a nuclear-powered
submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered submarine can be
armed with nuclear weapons.
Roles and Missions. U.S. Navy submarines fall into three types — nuclearpowered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).1
SSBNs. The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their
nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and thereby deter a
strategic nuclear attack on the United States.2 As of the end of FY2008, the Navy
included 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs, which are commonly called Trident
submarines because they carry Trident SLBMs. Each Trident SSBN can carry 24
Trident SLBMs.
SSGNs. The Navy’s four SSGNs, which are a recent addition to the fleet, are
former Trident SSBNs that have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk
cruise missiles and special operations forces (SOF) rather than SLBMs. Although the
SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission orientation (with the SSGNs
being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs
are more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other submarine
missions and are sometimes included in counts of the projected total number of Navy
attack submarines.3
1
In the designations SSBN, SSGN, and SSN, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclearpowered, B stands for ballistic missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise
missile).
2
Although this mission is often associated with the Cold War-era nuclear competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union, it has continued, with some modifications, in the
post-Cold War era. For a discussion of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons policy and force
structure, see CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure, by Amy F. Woolf.
3
For more on the Navy’s SSGN conversion program, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy
Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
(continued...)
CRS-3
SSNs. The SSNs — the focus of this report — are general-purpose submarines
that perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions, including the following:
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!
covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of
it done for national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than
possible with the SSGNs);
covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise
missiles (again on a smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
anti-surface ship warfare.
During the Cold War, ASW against the Soviet submarine force was the primary
stated mission of U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery
operations were reportedly important on a day-to-day basis as well.4 In the post-Cold
War era, although anti-submarine warfare remains a mission, the SSN force has
focused more on performing the other missions noted on the list above.
Attack Submarine Force Levels
Force-Level Goal. In February 2006, the Navy proposed achieving and
maintaining in coming years a fleet with a total of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs (and
4 SSGNs). For a review of SSN force level goals since the Reagan Administration,
see Appendix A.
Historical Force Levels. The SSN force included more than 90 boats during
most of the 1980s, peaked at 98 boats at the end of FY1987, and then began to
decline. The force included 85 to 88 boats during the early 1990s, 79 boats at the end
of FY1996, 65 boats at the end of FY1998, 57 boats at the end of FY1999, and 56
boats at the end of FY2000. It has since numbered 53 to 56 boats. The decline in the
number of SSNs since the late-1980s has roughly paralleled the decline in the total
size of the Navy over the same time period.
Force Level As of End Of FY2007. The 53 SSNs in service at the end of
FY2007 included the following:
!
!
!
47 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
3 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class SSNs. A total of 62 Los Angeles-class
submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between FY1970 and FY1990 and
3
(...continued)
Ronald O’Rourke.
4
For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection
operations during the Cold War, see Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette
Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).
CRS-4
entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four 21-inch
diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise
missiles in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class
(SSN-719 and higher) are equipped with an additional 12 vertical launch system
(VLS) tubes in their bows for carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise
missiles. The final 23 boats in the class (SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further
improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles class boats or 688Is. As
of the end of FY2007, 15 of the 62 boats in the class had been retired.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class SSNs. The Seawolf class was originally intended
to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three
boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated changes in military
requirements. The three Seawolf-class submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21), the
Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were
procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively.
SSN-23, which was built to a lengthened configuration compared to the other two
ships in the class, was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was
suspended in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It entered service in 2005.
Seawolf-class submarines are larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous U.S.
Navy SSNs.5 They are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can
carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles.
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program
General. The Virginia-class attack submarine was designed to be less
expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the
Seawolf-class design. The Virginia-class design is slightly larger than the Los
Angeles-class design,6 but incorporates newer technologies. Virginia-class boats
currently cost about $2.8 billion each to procure. The three Virginia-class boats in
service as of the end of FY2007 entered service on October 23, 2004, September 9,
2006, and May 5, 2007.
Past and Planned Procurement. As shown in Table 1, 11 Virginia-class
boats have been procured through FY2009, and 7 more are planned for procurement
during the period FY2009-FY2013.
5
Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged
displacement of about 7,150 tons. Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet. SSN-21 and
SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons. SSN-23 is 100 feet longer than
SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged displacement of 12,158 tons.
6
Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.
CRS-5
Table 1. Past and Planned Virginia-Class Procurement
FY98
1
FY06
1
FY99
1
FY07
1
FY00
0
FY08
1
FY01
1
FY09
1
FY02
1
FY10
1
FY03
1
FY11
2
FY04
1
FY12
2
FY05
1
FY13
2
Source: FY2009 Navy budget submission and congressional action on Navy’s proposed
FY2009 budget.
Changes in Planned Procurement Rates. When Virginia-class
procurement began in the 1990s, DOD originally projected that the procurement rate
would increase to two boats per year in FY2002. (The originally envisaged
procurement profile for the Virginia-class program for the years FY1998-FY2002
was 1-0-1-0-2.) In subsequent budgets, the date for starting two-per-year
procurement was progressively pushed back. Table 2 shows planned Virginia-class
procurement in FYDPs submitted since the mid-1990s.
Table 2. Planned Virginia-Class Procurement in Various FYDPs
FYDP (date
submitted)
FY95-99 (2/94)
FY96-01 (2/95)
FY97-01 (3/96)
FY98-03 (2/97)
FY99-03 (2/98)
FY00-05 (2/99)
FY01-05 (2/00)
FY2002 (6/01)b
FY03-07 (2/02)
FY04-09 (2/03)
FY05-09 (2/04)
FY06-11 (2/05)
FY07-11 (2/06)
FY08-13 (2/07)
FY09-13 (2/08)
98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
1 0
1 0 1 0
1 1a 1 1a
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
Source: Prepared by CRS using Navy data.
a. Included at Congressional direction, but not funded in the plan.
b. Submission for FY2002 budget only; no FYDP for FY2002-FY2007 submitted.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP). The Virginia-class boats planned for
procurement in FY2009-FY2013 are being procured under a multiyear procurement
(MYP) arrangement requested by the Navy and approved by Congress in FY2008.
The five Virginia-class boats procured in FY2004-FY2008 were also procured under
a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. The four boats procured in FY1998FY2002 were procured under a somewhat similar arrangement called a block buy.
The boat procured in FY2003 fell between the FY1998-FY2002 block buy and the
FY2004-FY2008 MYP.
CRS-6
Joint Production Arrangement. Virginia-class boats are built jointly by
General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset
Point, RI, and the Newport News, VA, shipyard that forms part of Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).7 Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain
parts of each boat, Newport News builds certain other parts of each boat, and the
yards take turns building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly of
the boats. GD/EB is building the reactor compartments and performing final
assembly on boats 1, 3, and so on, while Newport News is doing so on boats 2, 4, and
so on. The arrangement results in a roughly 50-50 division of Virginia-class profits
between the two yards and preserves both yards’ ability to build submarine reactor
compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and perform
submarine final-assembly work.
The joint production arrangement is a departure from past U.S. submarine
construction practices, under which complete submarines were built in individual
yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over the Virginiaclass acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that
occurred in 1995-1997 (i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense
budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB and Newport News
involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S.
shipyards capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the
cost penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a submarine design that is
being procured at a low annual rate.
Cost-Reduction Effort. The Navy is working to reduce the cost of Virginiaclass submarines so that two boats can be procured in FY2012 for combined cost of
$4.0 billion in FY2005 dollars — a goal referred to as “2 for 4 in 12.” Achieving this
goal involves removing about $400 million (in FY2005 dollars) from the cost of each
submarine. The Navy calculates that the unit target cost of $2.0 billion in FY2005
dollars for each submarine translates into about $2.6 billion for a boat procured in
FY2012, and about $2.7 billion for a boat procured in FY2013.
The Navy says that, in constant FY2005 dollars, about $200 million of the $400
million in the sought-after cost reductions would be accomplished simply through the
improved economies of scale (e.g., better spreading of shipyard fixed costs and
improved learning rates) of producing two submarines per year rather than one per
year. The remaining $200 million in sought-after cost reductions, the Navy says, is
to be accomplished through changes in the ship’s design (which will contribute
roughly $100 million toward the cost-reduction goal) and changes in the shipyard
production process (which will contribute the remaining $100 million or so toward
the goal). Some of the design changes will be introduced to Virginia-class boats
procured prior to FY2012, but the Navy says the full set of design changes will not
be ready for implementation until the FY2012 procurement.
7
GD/EB and the Newport News shipyard are the only two shipyards in the country capable
of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while the Newport
News shipyard also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other
types of surface ships.
CRS-7
Changes in the shipyard production process are aimed in large part at reducing
the total shipyard construction time of a Virginia-class submarine from 72 months
to 60 months. (If the ship spends less total time in the shipyard being built, its
construction cost will incorporate a smaller amount of shipyard fixed overhead
costs.) The principal change involved in reducing shipyard construction time to 60
months involves increasing the size of the modules that form each submarine, so that
each submarine can be built out of a smaller number of modules. The Navy says that
the goal of reducing shipyard construction time to 60 months is a medium-risk goal,
meaning that the Navy believes that there is a moderate (as opposed to low or high)
risk that the goal will not be achieved.
Because the full set of design changes and the reduction in construction time to
60 months will not be achieved until FY2012, the Navy says that the $2.0 billion goal
cannot be fully met for boats procured prior to FY2012, even if those boats are
procured at a rate of two per year.
The Navy says that if improved economies of scale and changes in the ship’s
design and in the shipyard production process are not sufficient to achieve the $2.0billion target, the Navy may consider reducing the capabilities of the Virginia class
in certain areas until the target is achieved.8
The Navy’s goal to reduce the cost of each Virginia-class boat to $2.0 billion in
constant FY2005 dollars is a goal that the Navy has set for itself. While Congress
may take this goal into account, it need not control congressional action.
In December 2007, it was reported that the Navy believed it had reduced the
estimated cost of each boat planned for procurement in FY2012 to within $40 million
of the $2.0 billion goal.9 In March 2008, it was reported that the Navy believed it had
reduced the estimated cost of each FY2012 boat to within $30 million of goal.10
The cost-reducing design changes are to be implemented in part through an
effort known as the Technology Insertion Program (TIP). In March 2008, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that:
8
For more on the Navy’s plan for reducing the procurement cost of the Virginia-class
design, see Statement of Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship
Programs) and RDML [Rear Admiral] William Hilarides, Program Executive Officer for
Submarines, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee [hearing on] Force Structure Requirements and Alternative
Funding Strategies for the United States Submarine Fleet, March 8, 2007; Richard R.
Burgess, “Sub Force Innovation,” Seapower, February 2008: 16-19; Dave Johnson and
Dustin Muniz, “More for Less,” Undersea Warfare, Winter 2007: 22-23, 28; and William
Hilarides, “2 For 4 in 2012, The Virginia-Class Road Ahead,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, June 2006: 68-69.
9
Geoff Fein, “Navy Closing In On $2 Billion Price Tag For Virginia-Class Subs,” Defense
Daily, December 11, 2007.
10
Dan Taylor, “Virginia-Class Subs $30 Million From $2 Billion-Per-Sub Price Goal,”
Inside the Navy, March 24, 2008.
CRS-8
a recent cost analysis indicated that the Navy may have difficulty achieving its
[Virginia-class] cost target. The Technology Insertion Program was delayed to
reduce cost and schedule risk, and further evaluate technologies. The TIP
consists of three systems: Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction,
Advanced Sail, and Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array,
the first of which is scheduled for insertion in 2010....
The Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction (AESR) is a software
package that uses improved algorithms to continuously monitor and recalibrate
the submarine’s signature. Similar software has been demonstrated in British
submarines, but the technology is considered immature because modifications
to the software will require additional testing. Software modification is expected
to begin in October 2008, and insertion is scheduled for fiscal year 2010. Once
development is complete, AESR will be retrofitted on all Virginia-class
submarines.
The Advanced Sail is a redesign of the structure that sits atop the main
body of the submarine. The new design provides expanded space to carry
weapons, anti-submarine systems, and communications systems external to the
hull. Development began in June 2006, and the composite material used to
construct the sail has been demonstrated under a separate program. However,
insertion of the Advanced Sail has been delayed because related costs may
exceed budget limits. A new bow design that also adds payload space for
weapons and systems will be used on submarines starting in fiscal year 2009.
The Navy will await testing of the new bow before completing a new sail design.
The Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array (CAVES
WAA) is intended to be a more cost-effective sensor array. CAVES WAA
consists of two developmental technologies — fiber optic sensors and integrated
panels that house them and manage their signature — that will be integrated
together. Both technologies are still immature. To save costs, the insertion
schedule has been deferred 2 years, to fiscal year 2014. In fiscal year 2009, the
Navy will conduct at-sea testing of a CAVES WAA integrated panel being used
as part of another application, but not in the form necessary for the Virginia-class
submarine....
The Navy hopes to reduce construction time from more than 80 months to just
60 months. While SSN 778 and SSN 779 are expected to be delivered in 72 and
68 months, respectively, construction time must be reduced by another 17 and 12
percent, respectively, in order to meet the 60 month target. Historically,
construction efficiencies tend to be captured in the early part of a production run,
but SSN 778 and SSN 779 are the fifth and sixth ships being built. Additionally,
a recent Navy estimate indicates that construction for the SSN 784 may take 6
months longer than target....
According to program officials, about 79 percent of the program’s target
savings for construction and design has already been achieved (approximately
$158 million). However, a recent cost analysis of the program indicated that the
Navy may have difficulty achieving target costs in fiscal year 2012.11
11
Government Accountability office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected
Weapons Systems, GAO-08-467SP, March 2008, pp. 171-172.
CRS-9
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
General. In addition to GD/EB and Newport News, the submarine
construction industrial base includes scores of supplier firms, as well as laboratories
and research facilities, in numerous states. About 80% of the total material procured
from supplier firms for the construction of submarines (measured in dollars rather
than pieces, parts, or purchase orders) comes from single or sole source suppliers.
Observers in recent years have expressed concern for the continued survival of many
of these firms. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of
stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction
program.12 In terms of work provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear propulsion
plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
Design and Engineering Portion. The part of the submarine industrial
base that some observers have been the most concerned about in recent years is the
design and engineering portion, much of which is resident at GD/EB and Newport
News. (A small portion is resident at a some of the component makers.) With
Virginia-class design work now winding down and no other submarine-design
projects underway, the submarine design and engineering base is facing the near-term
prospect, for the first time in about 50 years, of having no major submarine-design
project on which to work.
Navy and industry officials, Members of Congress, and other observers are
concerned that unless a major submarine-design project is begun soon, the submarine
design and engineering base will begin to atrophy through the departure of
experienced personnel. Rebuilding an atrophied submarine design and engineering
base, Navy and industry officials believe, could be time-consuming, adding time and
cost to the task of the next submarine-design effort, whenever it might begin.
Concern about this possibility among some Navy and industry officials was
strengthened by the UK’s difficulties a few years ago in designing its new Astuteclass SSN. The UK submarine design and engineering base atrophied for lack of
work, and the subsequent Astute-class design effort experienced considerable delays
and cost overruns. Submarine designers and engineers from GD/EB were assigned
to the Astute-class project to help the UK overcome these problems.13
Projected SSN Shortfall
Size and Timing of Shortfall. The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan,
if implemented, would not be sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently
12
For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class
(CVN-21) Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
13
See, for example, Andrew Chuter, “U.K. Spending Mounts for U.S. Help on Sub,”
Defense News, September 13, 2005: 4; Richard Scott, “Electric Boat Provides Project
Director for Astute Class,” Jane’s Navy International, May 2004: 33; Richard Scott, “Astute
Sets Out on the Long Road to Recovery,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2003, pp.
28-30; Richard Scott, “Recovery Plan Shapes Up for Astute Submarines,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly, November 19, 2003, p. 26.
CRS-10
over the long run. As shown in Table 3, the Navy projects that the SSN force will
fall below 48 boats during the 12-year period 2022-2033, reaching a minimum of 41
boats in 2028-2029. Since the Navy plans to retire the four SSGNs by 2028 without
procuring any replacements for them, no SSGNs would be available in 2028 and
subsequent years to help compensate for a drop in SSN force level below 48 boats.
Table 3. SSN Force Level, 2009-2038 (Navy Projection)
09
53
24
46
10
52
25
45
11
52
26
44
12
53
27
43
13
54
28
41
14
51
29
41
15
51
30
42
16
49
31
44
17
50
32
45
18
49
33
47
19
50
34
49
20
48
35
50
21
48
36
52
22
47
37
53
23
47
38
53
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY
2009, p. 8.
The potential for the Navy’s long-range SSN procurement plan to produce a
shortfall in the SSN force over the long run has been discussed by CRS since 1995,
in the form of testimony to Congress in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006,
and 2007, a 1997 CRS presentation to a Defense Science Board task force on the
submarine of the future, which issued its report in 1998;14 a 1999-2000 CRS report,15
a 2002 CRS report,16 and this report since its inception in 2004.
Navy Study On Options For Mitigating Projected Shortfall. The Navy
in 2006 initiated a study on options for mitigating the projected SSN shortfall. The
study was completed in early 2007 and briefed to CRS and the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) on May 22, 2007.17 At the time of the study, the SSN force was
projected to bottom out at 40 boats — an 8-boat shortfall. The addition of a second
submarine to be procured in FY2011 has since reduced the projected shortfall to
seven boats, as shown in Table 3. Principal points in the Navy study include the
following:
!
The day-to-day requirement for deployed SSNs is 10.0, meaning
that, on average, a total of 10 SSNs are to be deployed on a day-today basis.18
14
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition
& Technology, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on [the] Submarine of the
Future, July 1998, pp. 7, 19-20.
15
CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress (out of print; for a copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
16
CRS Report RL31372, Navy Shipbuilding in the FY2003 Defense Budget: Issues for
Congress (out of print; for a copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
17
Navy briefing entitled, “SSN Force Structure, 2020-2033,” presented to CRS and CBO
on May 22, 2007.
18
The requirement for 10.0 deployed SSNs, the Navy stated in the briefing, was the current
requirement at the time the study was conducted.
CRS-11
!
The peak projected wartime demand is about 35 SSNs deployed
within a certain amount of time. This figure includes both the 10
SSNs that are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis and 25 additional
SSNs surged from the United States within a certain amount of
time.19
!
Reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months —
something that the Navy already plans to do as part of its strategy for
meeting the Virginia-class cost-reduction goal (see earlier discussion
on cost-reduction goal) — will increase the size of the SSN force by
two boats, so that the force would bottom out at 42 boats rather than
40.20
!
If, in addition to reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time
to 60 months, the Navy also lengthens the service lives of 16
existing SSNs by periods ranging from 3 months to 24 months (with
many falling in the range of 9 to 15 months), this would increase the
size of the SSN force by another two boats, so that the force would
bottom out at 44 boats rather than 40 boats.21 The total cost of
extending the lives of the 16 boats would be roughly $500 million
in constant FY2005 dollars.22
!
The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could meet the 10.0
requirement for day-to-day deployed SSNs throughout the 2020-
19
The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount
of time, the Navy stated, is an internal Navy figure that reflects several studies of potential
wartime requirements for SSNs. The Navy stated that these other studies calculated various
figures for the number of SSNs that would be required, and that the figure of 35 SSNs
deployed within a certain amount of time was chosen because it was representative of the
results of these other studies.
20
If shipyard construction time is reduced from 72 months to 60 months, the result would
be a one-year acceleration in the delivery of all boats procured on or after a certain date. In
a program in which boats are being procured at a rate of two per year, accelerating by one
year the deliveries of all boats procured on or after a certain date will produce a one-time
benefit of a single year in which four boats will be delivered to the Navy, rather than two.
In the case of the Virginia-class program, this year might be around 2017. As mentioned
earlier in the discussion of the Virginia-class cost-reduction goal, the Navy believes that the
goal of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time is a medium-risk goal. If it turns
out that shipyard construction time is reduced to 66 months rather than 60 months (i.e., is
reduced by 6 months rather than 12 months), the size of the SSN force would increase by
one boat rather than two, and the force would bottom out at 41 boats rather than 42.
21
The Navy study identified 19 existing SSNs whose service lives currently appear to be
extendable by periods of 1 to 24 months. The previous option of reducing Virginia-class
shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy concluded, would make moot the option
of extending the service lives of the three oldest boats in this group of 19, leaving 16 whose
service lives would be considered for extension.
22
The Navy stated that the rough, order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost of extending the lives of
19 SSNs would be $595 million in constant FY2005 dollars, and that the cost of extending
the lives of 16 SSNs would be roughly proportional.
CRS-12
2033 period if, as an additional option, about 40 SSN deployments
occurring in the eight-year period 2025-2032 were lengthened from
six months to seven months. These 40 or so lengthened
deployments would represent about one-quarter of all the SSN
deployments that would take place during the eight-year period.
!
The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could not meet the
peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within
a certain amount of time. The force could generate a total
deployment of 32 SSNs within the time in question — three boats
(or about 8.6%) less than the 35-boat figure. Lengthening SSN
deployments from six months to seven months would not improve
the force’s ability to meet the peak projected wartime demand of
about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
!
To meet the 35-boat figure, an additional four SSNs beyond those
planned by the Navy would need to be procured. Procuring four
additional SSNs would permit the resulting 48-boat force to surge an
additional three SSNs within the time in question, so that the force
could meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs
deployed within a certain amount of time.
!
Procuring one to four additional SSNs could also reduce the number
of seven-month deployments that would be required to meet the 10.0
requirement for day-to-day deployed SSNs during the period 20252032. Procuring one additional SSN would reduce the number of 7month deployments during this period to about 29; procuring two
additional SSNs would reduce it to about 17, procuring three
additional SSNs would reduce it to about 7, and procuring four
additional SSNs would reduce it to 2.
The Navy added a number of caveats to these results, including but not limited
to the following:
!
The requirement for 10.0 SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis is a
current requirement that could change in the future.
!
The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed
within a certain amount of time is an internal Navy figure that
reflects recent analyses of potential future wartime requirements for
SSNs. Subsequent analyses of this issue could result in a different
figure.
!
The identification of 19 SSNs as candidates for service life
extension reflects current evaluations of the material condition of
these boats and projected use rates for their nuclear fuel cores. If the
material condition of these boats years from now turns out to be
worse than the Navy currently projects, some of them might no
longer be suitable for service life extension. In addition, if world
conditions over the next several years require these submarines to
CRS-13
use up their nuclear fuel cores more quickly than the Navy now
projects, then the amounts of time that their service lives might be
extended could be reduced partially, to zero, or to less than zero (i.e.,
the service lives of the boats, rather than being extended, might need
to be shortened).
!
!
The analysis does not take into account potential rare events, such as
accidents, that might force the removal an SSN from service before
the end of its expected service live.23
Seven-month deployments might affect retention rates for submarine
personnel.
Funding Additional SSNs
Alternative Funding Methods. Alternative methods of funding the
procurement of SSNs include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
!
two years of advance procurement funding followed by full
funding — the traditional approach, under which there are two years
of advance procurement funding for the SSN’s long-leadtime
components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s procurement
funding in the year of procurement;
!
one year of advance procurement funding followed by full
funding — one year of advance procurement funding for the SSN’s
long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
!
full funding with no advance procurement funding (single-year
full funding) — full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement,
with no advance procurement funding in prior years;
!
incremental funding — partial funding of the SSN in the year of
procurement, followed by one or more years of additional funding
increments needed to complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
!
advance appropriations — a form of full funding which can be
viewed as a legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.24
23
In January 2005, the Los Angeles-class SSN San Francisco (SSN-711) was significantly
damaged in a collision with an undersea mountain near Guam. The ship was repaired in part
by transplanting onto it the bow section of the deactivated sister ship Honolulu (SSN-718).
(See, for example, Associated Press, “Damaged Submarine To Get Nose Transplant,”
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 26, 2006.) Prior to the decision to repair the San Francisco,
the Navy considered the option of removing it from service. (See, for example, William H.
McMichael, “Sub May Not Be Worth Saving, Analyst Says,” Navy Times, February 28,
2005; Gene Park, “Sub Repair Bill: $11M,” Pacific Sunday News (Guam), May 8, 2005.)
24
For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy
(continued...)
CRS-14
Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the
FY2008 budget, suggested that two years of advance procurement funding are
required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and consequently that additional SSNs
could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest.25 This testimony understated
Congress’s options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the near term.
Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of advance procurement
funding (which is used primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion
components), Congress can procure an SSN without prior-year advance procurement
funding, or with only one year of advance procurement funding. Consequently,
Congress currently has the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or
FY2010.
Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure
nuclear-powered ships for which no prior-year advance procurement funding had
been provided. Specifically, Congress used single-year full funding in FY1980 to
procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71, and again in FY1988 to
procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the
Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in
FY1990 and FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial
advance procurement payment for CVN-74. Congress, in acting on the FY1988
budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to FY1988, and fully
funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships
entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.26
The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor
components was not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and
75 with single-year full funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more
quickly. What made it possible for Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full
funding was Congress’s constitutional authority to appropriate funding for that
purpose.
24
(...continued)
Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches — Background and Options for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
25
For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee
on the FY2008 Department of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which
additional ships the Navy might want to procure in FY2008, should additional funding be
made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stated
in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced
procurement, to be able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we
would need to start two years in advance. What that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08
with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year to 2010.”
(Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same
subcommittee on March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
March 29, 2007.
26
In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear
propulsion components in inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted
the carriers to be built more quickly than would have otherwise been the case, but it is not
what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it possible was
Congress’ authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.
CRS-15
Procuring an SSN with one year of advance procurement funding or no advance
procurement funding would not materially change the way the SSN would be built
— the process would still encompass about two years of advance work on longleadtime components, and an additional six years or so of construction work on the
ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction
of the ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal.
Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships
would not begin construction for some time and consequently would take longer to
enter service than a ship of that kind would normally require. When Congress
procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and
another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both cases in the knowledge
that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some time after
the first.
Procuring SSNs in a 2-1-2 Pattern. Some potential approaches for
procuring additional boats in FY2009-FY2011 could result in a pattern of procuring
two boats in a given year, followed by one boat the following year, and two boats the
year after that — a 2-1-2 pattern. Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007 and
early 2008 suggested that if the procurement rate were increased in a given year to
two boats, it would not be best, from an industrial-base point of view, to decrease the
rate to a single boat the following year, and then increase it again to two boats the
next year, because of the workforce fluctuations such a profile would produce.27
This statement may overstate the production-efficiency disadvantages of a 2-1-2
pattern. If two boats were procured in a given year, followed by one boat the next
year — a total of three boats in 24 months — the schedule for producing the three
boats could be phased so that, for a given stage in the production process, the
production rate would be one boat every eight months. A production rate of one boat
every eight months might actually help the industrial base make the transition from
the current schedule of one boat every twelve months (one boat per year) to one boat
every six months (two boats per year). Viewed this way, a 2-1-2 pattern might
actually lead to some benefits in production efficiency on the way to a steady rate of
two boats per year. The Navy’s own 30-year (FY2009-FY2038) SSN procurement
plan calls for procuring SSNs in a 1-2-1-2 pattern in FY2029-FY2038.
27
See, for example, the spoken remarks of Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter at hearings
before the House Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2007, and March 6, 2008, and
spoken remarks by other Navy officials at a March 29, 2007, hearing before the Senate
Armed Services Committee and at a March 14, 2008, hearing before the Seapower and
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
CRS-16
Issues for Congress
Accelerating Procurement of Second FY2011 Boat
One issue for Congress is whether to accelerate the full funding of the second
Virginia-class boat now planned for FY2011 to either FY2010, so as to facilitate a
follow-on option of funding an additional Virginia-class submarine in FY2011.
Supporters of this option might argue the following:
!
The operational risks of allowing the SSN force to drop below 48 are
unacceptable. The Navy has described the 48-boat goal as a
moderate-risk force, so dropping substantially below 48 boats would
imply a high-risk force. Although the deepest part of the projected
SSN shortfall lasts only a certain number of years, potential
adversaries can know in advance when this will occur and make
plans to take advantage of it.
!
The Navy’s non-procurement options for mitigating the SSN
shortfall carry their own risks. The Navy might not be able to reduce
the shipyard construction period for Virginia-class boats to 60
months due to unexpected problems in the effort to reduce shipyard
construction time. The Navy might not be able to extend the service
lives of existing SSNs as much as currently projected due to fasterthan-anticipated deterioration in ship material condition or higherthan-anticipated rates of nuclear fuel core use in coming years. The
Navy might not be able to lengthen SSN deployments without
adversely affecting retention rates for submarine personnel.
!
Accelerating the second FY2011 SSN to FY2010 and procuring an
additional SSN in FY2011 would reduce the number of seven-month
SSN deployments needed to meet the requirement for having 10
SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis between 2025 and 2032, and
permit the SSN force to fulfill more of the peak wartime demand for
35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
Opponents of this option might argue the following:
!
Given constraints on Navy funding, the Navy cannot afford to
accelerate the second FY2011 SSN to FY2010 and procure an
additional SSN in FY2011 without reducing funding for one or more
other Navy programs in those years. The operational risks that
would be created by reducing funding for these other programs is
greater than the operational risk that would result from procuring an
additional SSN in FY2011.
!
The Navy has non-procurement options for mitigating the projected
SSN shortfall. These options would allow the Navy to meet the
current requirement for the number of SSNs to be deployed on a
CRS-17
day-to-day basis, and to come close to meeting the projected peak
wartime demand for SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
Maintaining Design and Engineering Base
Navy and industry officials appear to agree that preserving the submarine design
and engineering base over the next several years will require funding substantial
submarine design and engineering work in the near term. The Navy plans to address
the issue by accelerating into the near term the start of design work on the nextgeneration SSBN. Given the ages of the Navy’s 14 current SSBNs, work on a
replacement SSBN design would normally not need to start for several years. The
Navy, however, is accelerating the start of this project into the near term, with an eye
toward carrying out the project as a steady-state effort over several years, rather than
as a more-concentrated effort starting several years from now. The Navy’s plan will
provide a significant amount of submarine design and engineering work for several
years, and engage a wide range of submarine design and engineering skills.
The Navy asked RAND to study the question of sustaining the submarine design
and engineering base. The RAND study, which was published in 2007, states that,
based on RAND’s analysis,
we reach the following recommendations:
— Seriously consider starting the design of the next submarine class by 2009,
to run 20 years, taking into account the substantial advantages and disadvantages
involved.
If the 20-year-design alternative survives further evaluation, the issue of a
gap in submarine design is resolved, and no further actions need be taken. If that
alternative is judged too risky, we recommend the following:
— Thoroughly and critically evaluate the degree to which options such as the
spiral development of the Virginia class or design without construction will be
able to substitute for new-submarine design in allowing design professionals to
retain their skills.
If options to sustain design personnel in excess of demand are judged on
balance to offer clear advantages over letting the workforce erode, then the Navy
should take the following actions:
— Request sufficient funding to sustain excess design workforces at the
shipyards large enough to permit substantial savings in time and money later.
— Taking into account trends affecting the evolution of critical skills, continue
efforts to determine which shipyard skills need action to preserve them within the
sustained design core.
— Conduct a comprehensive analysis of vendors to the shipyards to determine
which require intervention to preserve critical skills.
CRS-18
— Invest $30 million to $35 million annually in the NSWC’s Carderock
Division submarine design workforce in excess of reimbursable demand to
sustain skills that might otherwise be lost.28
48-Boat Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
Some observers have argued that the Navy in coming years should maintain a
force of more than 48 SSNs, particularly in light of, for example, Chinese naval
modernization29 and the possibility of a rejuvenated Russian submarine force. The
Navy has defended the 48-boat force-level goal. For additional discussion of this
issue, see Appendix B.
Potential Options for Congress
Potential options for Congress include but are not limited to the following, some
of which might be combined:
!
approving the Navy’s current plans for procuring Virginia-class
boats;
!
accelerating the full funding of the second Virginia-class boat now
planned for FY2011 to FY2010, so as to facilitate a follow-on option
of funding an additional Virginia-class submarine in FY2011;
!
funding near-term submarine design and engineering work that is in
addition to the work of this kind that the Navy is currently planning;
and
!
directing the Navy to review the 48-boat SSN force level objective
in light of recent developments, including Chinese naval
modernization and the possibility of a rejuvenated Russian
submarine force.
With regard to the second option above, options for providing additional work
for the submarine design and engineering base over the next few years (in addition
to the Navy’s plan for accelerating the start of design work on the next-generation
SSBN) include the following:
!
Expanded Virginia-class modification effort. The Navy is
currently funding certain work to modify the Virginia-class design,
28
John F. Schank, et al, Sustaining U.S. Submarine Design Capabilities, RAND, Santa
Monica (CA), 2007. pp. xxvii-xxviii. (Prepublication copy posted on the Internet by
RAND, accessed on May 9, 2007, at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
2007/RAND_MG608.pdf].)
29
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
CRS-19
in part to reach the Navy’s Virginia-class cost-reduction target. The
scope of this effort could be expanded to include a greater number
and variety of modifications. An expanded modification effort
would add to the amount of submarine design and engineering work
currently programmed, but by itself might not be sufficient in terms
of volume of work or number of skills areas engaged to fully
preserve the submarine design and engineering base.
!
New Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). The ASDS is a
mini-submarine that is attached to the back of an SSGN or SSN to
support operations by Navy special operations forces (SOF), who are
called SEALs, an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. DOD
has decided, after building one copy of the current ASDS design, not
to put that design into serial production. Some observers have
proposed developing a new ASDS design with the intention of
putting this new design into serial production. This option, like the
previous one, would add to the amount of submarine design and
engineering work currently programmed, but by itself might not be
sufficient in terms of volume of work or number of skills areas
engaged to fully preserve the submarine design and engineering
base.
!
Diesel-electric submarine for Taiwan. In April 2001, the Bush
Administration announced a proposed arms-sales package for
Taiwan that included, among other things, eight diesel-electric
submarines.30 Since foreign countries that build diesel-electric
submarines appear reluctant to make their designs available for a
program to build such boats for Taiwan, some observers have
proposed that the United States develop its own design for this
purpose. This option would generate a substantial volume of work
and engage many skill areas. Uncertainty over whether and when
this project might occur could make it difficult to confidently
incorporate it into an integrated schedule of work for preserving the
U.S. design and engineering base. Although the project would
engage many skill areas, it might not engage all of them. Skills
related to the design of nuclear propulsion plants, for example, might
not be engaged. In addition, this project might raise concerns
regarding the potential for unintended transfer of sensitive U.S.
submarine technology — an issue that has been cited by the Navy in
the past for not supporting the idea of designing and building dieselelectric submarines in the United States for sale to foreign buyers.31
30
For more on the proposed arms sales package, including the diesel-electric submarines,
see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley A. Kan.
31
An additional issue that some observers believe might be behind Navy resistance to the
idea of designing and building diesel-electric submarines in the United States for sale to
foreign buyers, but which these observers believe the Navy is unwilling to state publicly, is
a purported fear among Navy officials that the establishment of a U.S. production line for
(continued...)
CRS-20
!
New SSN design. Developing a completely new SSN design as the
successor to the Virginia-class design would fully support the design
and engineering base for several years. The Navy in the past has
estimated that the cost of this option would be roughly equivalent to
the procurement cost of three SSNs. The House version of the
FY2006 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1815) proposed this idea,
but the idea was not supported by the Navy, in large part because of
its cost, and the conference version of the bill did not mandate it.
Legislative Activity for FY2009
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)
House. Section 122 of H.R. 5658 as reported by the House Armed Services
Committee would amend the authority that Congress provided in the FY2008 defense
authorization act for the Navy to use multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts for
procurement of Virginia-class submarines starting in FY200932 to require the
Secretary of the Navy to certify that any such contract will be awarded in accordance
with the 1997 teaming agreement between GD/EB and NGSB for joint production
of Virginia-class submarines. In its report (H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) on
H.R. 5658, the committee states that the provision would modify the MYP authority
granted in the FY2008 legislation “to include the requirement that any multi-year
contract entered into between the Navy and the shipbuilders must specify that the
previous teaming agreements for submarine construction between the two
shipbuilders shall remain in effect.” (Page 141)
The committee’s report on H.R. 5658 recommended $722 million in additional
FY2009 advance procurement funding for the Virginia-class program to support the
acceleration to FY2010 of the procurement of the second boat currently planned for
procurement in FY2011. (Page 79, line 004) The report states that “The committee
disagrees with the submitted Future Years Defense Plan and budget request for: ...
not requesting funding to increase the build rate of Virginia class submarines to 2
ships per year starting in 2010....” (pages 82-83), and that the additional advance
procurement funding recommended by the committee is “necessary for the
procurement of 2 ships in fiscal year 2010...” (page 83). The report also states:
Attack submarine force structure requirements
The committee directs the Secretary of the Defense to assess the total
number of attack submarines required to fulfill the missions of the Department
31
(...continued)
such boats would lead to political pressure for the Navy to accept the procurement of such
boats for its own use, perhaps in lieu of nuclear-powered submarines. The Navy argues that
non-nuclear-powered submarines are not well suited for U.S. submarine operations, which
typically involve long, stealthy transits to the operating area, long submerged periods in the
operating area, and long, stealthy transits back to home port.
32
Section 121 of H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008.
CRS-21
of Defense and to support the national defense strategy, as part of the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) conducted in fiscal year 2009 pursuant to
section 118 of title 10, United States Code. Such an assessment should be based
upon an analysis and prioritization of unconstrained attack submarine
requirements, sorted by mission, provided by the combatant commanders. The
committee further directs that results of such an assessment be included in the
report on the quadrennial defense review, submitted to the Senate Committee on
Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed Services in accordance
with section 118(d) of title 10, United States Code.
Service-life extension of SSN-688 Los Angeles class hulls
The committee understands that the Secretary of the Navy has conducted
an assessment of the feasibility of extending the service life of certain SSN-688
Los Angeles class submarines in order to mitigate the projected shortfall in the
Navy’s attack submarine force structure. The committee is encouraged by this
effort, but notes that the assessment did not explore options that would increase
the number of attack submarines above 48, in the long-term. The committee also
notes that the assessment did not explore options for limiting deployments or
other actions that could limit hull fatigue in the near term, in order to conserve
service life of more Los Angeles class submarines over the long-term.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a
report which includes an assessment of the feasibility and cost of extending the
service life of all current Los Angeles class submarines. This report should
explore the options in the near term which would fully utilize all available hull
life and maximize the total number of attack submarines available after 2016.
The committee directs the Secretary to submit this report within 120 days after
the date of enactment of this Act. (Pages 81-82)
The report recommended $10 million in additional Navy research and
development funding for work on an underwater launched missile study (ULMS) in
support of a new sea-based strategic deterrent. (Page 182, line 42). The report
elsewhere refers to the increase being $5 million rather than $10 million, stating:
The budget request [for the Navy’s research and development account]
contained $141.7 million in PE [program element] 63561N for advanced
submarine system development but contained no funds for design and
development of a sea-based strategic undersea launched missile.
The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense has no
coherent plan for undersea launched strategic deterrent weapons systems to
eventually replace the current undersea strategic force. The committee believes
that research and development is necessary now to ensure undersea launched
weapons capability is available in the future.
The committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million in PE 63561N to
begin initial studies and concept designs of future undersea launched weapons
systems. (Page 203)
The report recommended $15 million in additional Navy research and
development funding for work on a large-diameter launch tube for Virginia-class
submarines. (Page 182, line 42) The report states:
CRS-22
The budget request contained $141.7 million in PE 63561N for advanced
submarine system design but contained no funds for continued design and
development efforts of a large diameter weapons launch tube for Virginia class
submarines.
The committee understands that development of a large diameter launch
tube for Virginia class submarines will increase combat capability and reduce
overall construction costs. The large diameter tube also has the potential to field
new technologies, such as undersea autonomous vehicles, as those technologies
mature.
The committee recommends an increase of $15.0 million in PE 63561N for
design and development of a large diameter weapons launch tube for Virginia
class submarines. (Pages 203-204)
Senate. Section 131 of S. 3001 as reported by the Senate Armed Services
Committee would amend the authority that Congress provided in the FY2008 defense
authorization act for the Navy to use multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts for
procurement of Virginia-class submarines starting in FY200933 to permit the
Secretary of the Navy to enter into one or more contracts for advance procurement
and advance construction of those components for Virginia-class submarines for
which authority for using MYP contracts was granted in the FY2008 legislation if the
Secretary determines that cost savings or construction efficiencies may be achieved
for Virginia-class submarines through the use of such contracts. In its report (S.Rept.
110-335 of May 12, 2008) on S. 3001, the committee states that “The Navy believes
that having such an option available could help achieve greater cost savings and
production efficiencies as the program increases throughput to a rate of two boats per
year in fiscal year 2011.” (Page 74)
The committee’s report on S. 3001 recommended $79 million in additional
FY2009 advance procurement funding for the Virginia-class program “to smooth
[the] ramp up to 2 boats per year.” (Page 57, line 004). The report states:
The budget request included approximately $1.3 billion for advance
procurement for the Virginia-class submarine program, including $596.8 million
for economic order quantity (EOQ) procurement of long lead material in
conjunction with the current multiyear procurement program.
Congress approved the Navy’s request to enter into a multiyear
procurement contract in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 (Public Law 110-181), and added $588.0 million to help accelerate
increasing the attack submarine program to a rate of two boats per year. At that
time, the Navy planned to increase production to a rate of two boats per year in
fiscal year 2012.
This year, as a part of the fiscal year 2009 request, the Navy plans to
accelerate that production increase to fiscal year 2011. The Navy has also
identified that additional EOQ funding in fiscal year 2009 and additional
authority to conduct advance construction activities would help achieve greater
33
Section 121 of H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008.
CRS-23
cost savings and production efficiencies, and reduce the span time for
construction as the program increases throughput to a rate of two boats per year
in fiscal year 2011.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase for EOQ funding of
$79.0 million. (Page 76)
The above-quoted language from pages 74 and 76 of the report suggest that the
$79 million in additional advance procurement funding is not intended to accelerate
to FY2010 the procurement of the second boat currently planned for procurement in
FY2011.
The report recommended $15 million in additional Navy research and
development funding to continue SSBN(X) design and study activities. (Page 178,
line 42). The report states:
The budget request [for the Navy’s research and development account]
included $141.7 million in PE [program element] 63561N for advanced
submarine systems development. The design and development efforts in these
programs are to evaluate a broad range of system and technology alternatives to
directly support and enhance the mission capability of current submarines and
future submarine concepts.
QThe budget request included no funding to begin studies that would lead to
developing a replacement for the Ohio class strategic missile submarine program
which was designed in the 1970s. The Navy has begun studies under a program
called the Undersea Launch Missile Study (ULMS). The efforts within ULMS
will involve exploring new technologies, conceptual design of ship
configurations, supporting ship systems, consideration of strategic payloads, and
development of other payloads.
However, there appears to be insufficient work to maintain the skill set
among submarine designers until the Navy would otherwise start designing a
replacement for the Ohio class. A previous report by the RAND Corporation
evaluating the submarine design industrial base concluded that it would be less
expensive to sustain some number of workers in excess of those needed to meet
the residual design demands during such a gap. One means of achieving this goal
would be to begin the more extensive design activities earlier than the Navy
would otherwise start them to support a specific date to start building the next
class. The committee believes that the Navy should continue that effort in fiscal
year 2009 and recommends an increase of $15.0 million for that purpose. (Page
193)
Compromise. In lieu of a conference report, there was compromise version
of S. 3001 that was accompanied by a joint explanatory statement. Section 4 of S.
3001 states that the joint explanatory statement “shall have the same effect with
respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement
of a committee of conference.”
Section 122 of the compromise version of S. 3001 modifies the authority to use
an MYP arrangement for Virginia-class boats to be procured in FY2009-FY2013 that
was granted to the Secretary of the Navy by Section 121 of FY2008 defense
CRS-24
authorization act (H.R. 1585/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008) so as to additionally
permit the Secretary enter into one or more contracts for advance procurement and
advance construction of components for the boats procured under that MYP
arrangement.
FY2009 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329)
House. The House Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the
FY2009 defense appropriations bill. On July 30, 2008, Representative John Murtha,
the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee,
issued a press release summarizing the subcommittee’s markup of the bill that same
day.34 The press release states that the markup “redistributes the Shipbuilding
account to include ... $397.6 million for long lead items in the Virginia Class
submarine program.” Although the press release does not say so explicitly, the
wording suggests that this $397.6 million was advance procurement funding that
would be in addition to the $719.8 million in advance procurement funding that the
Navy requested for the Virginia-class program.35
Senate. The Senate Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the
FY2009 defense appropriations bill. On September 10, 2008, the committee issued
a press release summarizing the markup of the bill that day by its Defense
subcommittee. The press release stated that the markup “adds $79 million for the
Virginia Class submarine Program.”36
Compromise. In lieu of a conference report, there was compromise version
of the FY2009 defense appropriations bill that was incorporated as Division C of
H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008. (H.R. 2638, the FY2009
Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, was amended to become a
consolidated appropriations bill that includes, among other things, the FY2009
defense appropriations bill.) The compromise version of H.R. 2638 was
accompanied by an explanatory statement. Section 4 of H.R. 2638 states that the
explanatory statement “shall have the same effect with respect to the allocation of
funds and implementation of this Act as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a
committee of conference.”
34
July 30, 2008, press release from The Honorable John P. Murtha, entitled “Murtha
Summary of the FY09 Defense Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
35
Long leadtime items are procured with advance procurement funding. Since $397.6
million is less than the $719.8 million the Navy requested for advance procurement, the
$397.6 million cannot be said to include the $719.8 million. The reference to redistributing
shipbuilding funding to various programs, including the Virginia-class program, suggests
that each of the programs listed received additional funding. In light of this, an
interpretation that the $719.8-million advance procurement funding request was reduced to
$397.6 million appears unlikely.
36
September 10, 2008, press release from Senate Appropriations Committee, entitled
“Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Approves Fiscal Year 2009 Defense
Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
CRS-25
Section 8011 of H.R. 2368/P.L. 110-329 grants authority for using FY2009
funds for an MYP arrangement for the Virginia-class program. The explanatory
statement approves the Navy’s FY2009 procurement funding request for the
Virginia-class program, and increases by $79 million the Navy’s FY2009 advance
procurement funding request for the program. The $79-million increase is for
“Economic Order Quantity.”
CRS-26
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan
Administration (1981-1989).
The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and
maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 19911992 originally called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.37 In
1992, however, the SSN goal was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992
Joint Staff force-level requirement study (updated in 1993) that called for a force of
51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level acoustic quieting, by the year
2012.38
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of
U.S. defense policy, established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships,
including 45 to 55 SSNs.39 The Clinton administration’s 1997 QDR supported a
requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and established a tentative SSN forcelevel goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of peacetime operational
requirements.”40 The Clinton administration later amended the SSN figure to 55
boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in
December 1999. The study had three main conclusions:
!
“that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and
62 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the
regional military commanders-in-chief] with insufficient capability
to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other
37
For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials,
Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral Raymond
G. Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare),
in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces
and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs, June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
38
See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July
1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,”
Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era:
The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon Urges Navy to
Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “
Size of Sub Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
39
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up
Review, October 1993, pp. 55-57.
40
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
CRS-27
requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this force
structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to
meet the modeled war fighting requirements;”
!
“that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18
Virginia class SSNs in the 2015 time frame;” and
!
“that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025
time frame would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence
community’s highest operational and collection requirements.”41
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of
required SSN force levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not
translated into official Department of Defense (DOD) force-level goals.
The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the
amended requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including
55 SSNs. In revalidating this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report
cautioned that as DOD’s “transformation effort matures — and as it produces
significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force — DOD
will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed
Forces.”42
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in
2003-2004. One of the Navy studies — an internal Navy study done in 2004 —
reportedly recommended reducing the attack submarine force level requirement to
as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly recommended homeporting a total of nine
attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack submarines.43
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force
levels out to FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035 — a 260ship fleet including 37 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs.44
41
Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy,
February 14, 2000, p. 5.
42
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
43
Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p.
1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May
13, 2004.
44
U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan
for the Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2006. The report was delivered to the House
and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on March 23, 2005.
CRS-28
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack
submarine requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.45
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313
ships, including 48 SSNs.
45
Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day
(New London, CT), May 27, 2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub
Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.
CRS-29
Appendix B. Views Regarding 48-Boat SSN
Force-Level Goal
This appendix summarizes the Navy’s view and an alternative view regarding
the appropriateness of the Navy’s 48-boat SSN force-level goal.
Navy View.46 In support of its position that 48 is the correct number of SSNs
to meet future needs, the Navy in 2006 argued the following:
!
The figure of 48 SSNs was derived from a number of force-level
studies that converged on a figure of about 48 boats, making this
figure an analytical “sweet spot.”
!
A force of 48 boats is a moderate-risk (i.e., acceptable-risk) force, as
opposed to the low-risk force called for in the 1999 JCS study.
!
A force of 48 boats will be sufficient in coming years to maintain
about 10 forward-deployed SSNs on a day-to-day basis — the same
number of forward-deployed boats that the Navy has previously
maintained with a force of more than 50 SSNs. The Navy will be
able to maintain 10 forward-deployed SSNs in coming years with
only 48 boats because the force in coming years will include an
increased number of newer SSNs that require less maintenance over
their lives and consequently are available for operation a greater
percentage of the time.
!
U.S. regional military commanders would prefer a day-to-day
forward-deployed total of about 18 SSNs, but total of 10 will be
sufficient to meet their most important needs.
!
All 10 of the forward-deployed SSNs are needed for day-to-day
missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),
while about 7.5 of these submarines are also needed to ensure that
an adequate number of SSNs are in position for the opening phases
of potential conflicts in various locations.
On the issue of meeting U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for
day-to-day forward-deployed SSNs, the Navy states:
Each Combatant Commander (COCOM) requests assets to execute required
missions utilizing the Global Force Management Process. Broad categories of
mission types are used to make requests including National and Fleet ISR,
Exercise and Training (supporting US tactical development), Exercise and
Operations (supporting US engagement strategy), Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
/Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) tasking, OPLAN (war plans) support, and
46
This section is based on Navy testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006, and to the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, and April 6, 2006.
CRS-30
Other. As assignment of Critical, High Priority, Priority or Routine is assigned
to each of the requested missions. The theater allocation request process prior
to 2004 did not include a priority breakdown. In general, ISR missions have
been assigned as Critical or High Priority requirements. Other mission areas
have been assigned from High Priority to Routine, based on the relative
importance to the theater commander. No allocation is currently requested to
support OPLAN or Other mission areas.
Each COCOM has authority to use its allocated SSNs as required to meet
current national and theater priorities. The CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff] allocation order to the Submarine Force strictly directs an allotted number
of SSN days of presence be provided, capable of meeting each theaters’ [sic]
taskings. The breakdown of mission priorities into Critical, High Priority,
Priority and Routine is predominantly a construct to demonstrate how a COCOM
could meet their priorities, given a specific level of SSN presence. It serves as
an aid to the CJCS in apportioning limited SSN presence to the various theaters.
The number of SSNs allocated against Critical Missions enabled COCOMs
to meet all requirements in 2004 and 2005, and 99% of the requirements in 2006.
For High Priority missions, sufficient SSNs were allocated to meet 25%, 50%
and 34% of requirements in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. Overall, the
number of SSNs forward deployed was sufficient to cover 66%, 61% and 54%
of Combatant Commanders’ requested SSN mission taskings in 2004, 2005, and
2006 respectively.47
Alternative View. Some observers believe that more than 48 SSNs will be
needed to meet future needs. One such observer — retired Vice Admiral Albert
Konetzni, Jr., a former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet submarine force —
argued the following in 2006:48
!
The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses called for a force of 48 to 60
SSNs. In this context, a force of 48 SSNs looks more like a sour
spot than a sweet spot.
!
The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses reflect “reverse engineering,”
in which an SSN force-level number is selected at the outset for
affordability reasons, and assumptions used in the force-level study
are then adjusted to produce that figure.
!
The 1999 JCS study on SSN requirements remains valid today.
47
Source: Written response by Vice Admiral Charles L. Munns, Commander Naval
Submarine Forces, to a question posed by Representative Rob Simmons at a March 28,
2006, hearing before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on submarine force structure. Munns’ written response was provided to CRS
on July 5, 2006, by the office of Representative Simmons and is used here with the
permission of that office.
48
These points are based on Konetzni’s testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006.
CRS-31
49
!
All of the U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for dayto-day forward-deployed SSNs, and not just the 60% or so of those
requirements that are being met, are critical.
!
In light of the potential size of China’s submarine force in 2020, a
force of 48 SSNs in that year will be insufficient.49
For more on China’s submarine force, and China’s naval modernization effort in general,
see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
Summary
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) at a rate of one per year for the past several years. The procurement rate is scheduled to
increase to two boats per year starting in FY2011. A total of 11 boats have been procured through
FY2009. The eight Virginia-class submarines to be procured in the five-year period FY2009FY2013 (boats 11 through 18) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP)
arrangement.
FY2010
The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget, which is expected to be submitted to Congress in early- to
mid-May, is expected to request procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the
12th Virginia-class boat, advance procurement funding for the two Virginia-class boats scheduled
to be procured in FY2011, and additional advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats
scheduled to be procured in subsequent fiscal years.
FY2009
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget requested $2,107.0 million to complete the procurement
funding for the 11th Virginia-class boat. This boat had already received $756.0 million in prioryear advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget also requested $719.8
million in advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal
years, and $596.8 million in additional procurement funding for economic order quantity (EOQ)
purchases of key components for the eight Virginia-class boats being procured under the FY2009FY2013 MYP arrangement.
Section 8011 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense appropriations act (Division C of
H.R. 2368/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008) granted authority for using FY2009 funds for an
MYP arrangement for the Virginia-class program. The act approved the Navy’s FY2009
procurement funding request for the Virginia-class program and increased by $79 million the
Navy’s FY2009 advance procurement funding request for the program. The $79-million increase
was for “Economic Order Quantity.”
Section 122 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense authorization bill (S. 3001/P.L.
110-417 of October 14, 2008) modified the authority to use an MYP arrangement for Virginiaclass boats to be procured in FY2009-FY2013 that was granted to the Secretary of the Navy by
Section 121 of FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 1585/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008).
The modification additionally permits the Secretary to enter into one or more contracts for
advance procurement and advance construction of components for the boats procured under the
MYP arrangement.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Congressional Research Service
Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background ................................................................................................................................1
Submarines in the U.S. Navy.................................................................................................1
Types of Submarines .......................................................................................................1
Roles and Missions .........................................................................................................1
Attack Submarine Force Levels.............................................................................................3
Force-Level Goal ............................................................................................................3
Historical Force Levels ...................................................................................................3
Force Level As of End Of FY2008 ..................................................................................3
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program........................................................................................4
General ...........................................................................................................................4
Past and Planned Procurement.........................................................................................4
Changes in Planned Procurement Rates...........................................................................4
Multiyear Procurement (MYP)........................................................................................5
Joint Production Arrangement .........................................................................................6
Cost-Reduction Effort .....................................................................................................6
Submarine Construction Industrial Base................................................................................7
General ...........................................................................................................................7
Design and Engineering Portion ......................................................................................8
Projected SSN Shortfall ........................................................................................................8
Size and Timing of Shortfall............................................................................................8
Navy Study On Options For Mitigating Projected Shortfall .............................................9
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 11
48-Boat Force-Level Goal and Planned SSN Procurement................................................... 11
Virginia-Class Technology Insertion.................................................................................... 12
Potential Options for Congress .................................................................................................. 12
Tables
Table 1. Past and Planned Virginia-Class Procurement.................................................................4
Table 2. Planned Virginia-Class Procurement in Various FYDPs..................................................5
Table 3. SSN Force Level, 2009-2038 (Navy Projection).............................................................8
Appendixes
Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2009............................................................................ 13
Appendix B. Past SSN Force-Level Goals ................................................................................. 18
Appendix C. Views Regarding 48-Boat SSN Force-Level Goal ................................................. 20
Appendix D. Options for Funding SSNs.................................................................................... 22
Appendix E. Maintaining Submarine Design and Engineering Base .......................................... 25
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Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 26
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Navy Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) at a rate of one per year for the past several years. The procurement rate is scheduled to
increase to two boats per year starting in FY2011. A total of 11 boats have been procured through
FY2009. The eight Virginia-class submarines to be procured in the five-year period FY2009FY2013 (boats 11 through 18) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP)
arrangement.
The Navy’s proposed FY2010 budget, which is expected to be submitted to Congress in early- to
mid-May, is expected to request procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the
12th Virginia-class boat, advance procurement funding for the two Virginia-class boats scheduled
to be procured in FY2011, and additional advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats
scheduled to be procured in subsequent fiscal years.
Background
Submarines in the U.S. Navy
Types of Submarines
Submarines are one of four principal categories of combat ships that traditionally have helped
define the size and structure of the U.S. Navy. The other three are aircraft carriers, surface
combatants (e.g., cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and Littoral Combat Ships), and amphibious ships.
(The Navy also includes mine warfare ships and a variety of auxiliary and support ships.)
Submarines can be powered by either nuclear reactors or non-nuclear power sources such as
diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-powered. A submarine’s use of
nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is armed with
nuclear weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclearpowered submarine can be armed with nuclear weapons.
Roles and Missions
U.S. Navy submarines fall into three types—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered attack
submarines (SSNs).1
SSBNs
The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their nuclear-armed submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United
1
In the designations SSBN, SSGN, and SSN, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered, B stands for
ballistic missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile).
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States.2 As of the end of FY2008, the Navy included 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs, which
are commonly called Trident submarines because they carry Trident SLBMs. Each Trident SSBN
can carry 24 Trident SLBMs.
SSGNs
The Navy’s four SSGNs, which are a recent addition to the fleet, are former Trident SSBNs that
have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and special operations
forces (SOF) rather than SLBMs. Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of
mission orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF
support, while the SSNs are more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other
submarine missions and are sometimes included in counts of the projected total number of Navy
attack submarines. The Navy’s SSGNs are discussed in another CRS report.3
SSNs
The SSNs—the focus of this report—are general-purpose submarines that perform a variety of
peacetime and wartime missions, including the following:
•
covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for
national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
•
covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than possible with the
SSGNs);
•
covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles (again on a
smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
•
covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
•
anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
•
anti-surface ship warfare.
During the Cold War, ASW against the Soviet submarine force was the primary stated mission of
U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery operations were reportedly
important on a day-to-day basis as well. 4 In the post-Cold War era, although anti-submarine
warfare remains a mission, the SSN force has focused more on performing the other missions
noted on the list above.
2
Although this mission is often associated with the Cold War-era nuclear competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union, it has continued, with some modifications, in the post-Cold War era. For a discussion of U.S. strategic nuclear
weapons policy and force structure, see CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure, by Amy F. Woolf.
3
CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O’Rourke.
4
For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection operations during the Cold War, see
Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs,
1998).
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Attack Submarine Force Levels
Force-Level Goal
In February 2006, the Navy proposed achieving and maintaining in coming years a fleet with a
total of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs (and 4 SSGNs). For a review of SSN force level goals since
the Reagan Administration, see Appendix B.
Historical Force Levels
The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, peaked at 98 boats at the
end of FY1987, and then began to decline. The force included 85 to 88 boats during the early
1990s, 79 boats at the end of FY1996, 65 boats at the end of FY1998, 57 boats at the end of
FY1999, and 56 boats at the end of FY2000. It has since numbered 53 to 56 boats. The decline in
the number of SSNs since the late-1980s has roughly paralleled the decline in the total size of the
Navy over the same time period.
Force Level As of End Of FY2008
The 53 SSNs in service at the end of FY2008 included the following:
•
45 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
•
3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
•
5 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class SSNs
A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between
FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four
21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise missiles
in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class (SSN-719 and
higher) are equipped with an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for
carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The final 23 boats in the class
(SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as Improved Los
Angeles class boats or 688Is. As of the end of FY2008, 17 of the 62 boats in the class had been
retired.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class SSNs
The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class
procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated
changes in military requirements. The three Seawolf-class submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21),
the Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were procured
in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively. SSN-23, which was
built to a lengthened configuration compared to the other two ships in the class, was originally
procured in FY1992. Its procurement was suspended in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It
entered service in 2005. Seawolf-class submarines are larger than Los Angeles-class boats or
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previous U.S. Navy SSNs.5 They are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can
carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles.
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program
General
The Virginia-class attack submarine was designed to be less expensive and better optimized for
post-Cold War submarine missions than the Seawolf-class design. The Virginia-class design is
slightly larger than the Los Angeles-class design,6 but incorporates newer technologies. Virginiaclass boats currently cost about $2.8 billion each to procure. The first Virginia-class boat entered
service in October 2004.
Past and Planned Procurement
As shown in Table 1, 11 Virginia-class boats have been procured through FY2009, and 7 more
are planned for procurement during the period FY2010-FY2013.
Table 1. Past and Planned Virginia-Class Procurement
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
Source: FY2009 Navy budget submission and congressional action on Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget.
Changes in Planned Procurement Rates
When Virginia-class procurement began in the 1990s, DOD originally projected that the
procurement rate would increase to two boats per year in FY2002. (The originally envisaged
procurement profile for the Virginia-class program for the years FY1998-FY2002 was 1-0-1-0-2.)
In subsequent budgets, the date for starting two-per-year procurement was progressively pushed
back. Table 2 shows planned Virginia-class procurement in FYDPs submitted since the mid1990s.
5
Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged displacement of about 7,150 tons.
Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet. SSN-21 and SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons.
SSN-23 is 100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged displacement of 12,158 tons.
6
Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.
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Table 2. Planned Virginia-Class Procurement in Various FYDPs
FYDP (date submitted)
98
99
00
01
FY95-99 (2/94)
1
0
FY96-01 (2/95)
1
FY97-01 (3/96)
FY98-03 (2/97)
0
1
0
1
1a
1
1a
1
1
0
1
FY99-03 (2/98)
FY00-05 (2/99)
02
03
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
FY01-05 (2/00)
FY2002 (6/01)b
FY03-07 (2/02)
FY04-09 (2/03)
FY05-09 (2/04)
04
05
06
07
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
08
09
1
1
1
1
1
1
10
11
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
12
13
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
FY06-11 (2/05)
FY07-11 (2/06)
FY08-13 (2/07)
FY09-13 (2/08)
Source: Prepared by CRS using Navy data.
a.
Included at Congressional direction, but not funded in the plan.
b.
Submission for FY2002 budget only; no FYDP for FY2002-FY2007 submitted. This was the first year of the
George W. Bush administration.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP)
The either Virginia-class boats planned for procurement in FY2009-FY2013 (boats 11 through
18) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement requested by the Navy
and approved by Congress in FY2008. The five Virginia-class boats procured in FY2004-FY2008
were also procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. The four boats procured
in FY1998-FY2002 were procured under a somewhat similar arrangement called a block buy. The
boat procured in FY2003 fell between the FY1998-FY2002 block buy and the FY2004-FY2008
MYP.
Section 8011 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense appropriations act (Division C of
H.R. 2368/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008) granted authority for using FY2009 funds for an
MYP arrangement for the Virginia-class program.
Section 122 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense authorization bill (S. 3001/P.L.
110-417 of October 14, 2008) modified the authority to use an MYP arrangement for Virginiaclass boats to be procured in FY2009-FY2013 that was granted to the Secretary of the Navy by
Section 121 of FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 1585/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008).
The modification additionally permits the Secretary to enter into one or more contracts for
advance procurement and advance construction of components for the boats procured under the
MYP arrangement.
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Joint Production Arrangement
Virginia-class boats are built jointly by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of
Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and the Newport News, VA, shipyard that forms part of
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).7 Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts
of each boat, Newport News builds certain other parts of each boat, and the yards take turns
building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly of the boats. GD/EB is building
the reactor compartments and performing final assembly on boats 1, 3, and so on, while Newport
News is doing so on boats 2, 4, and so on. The arrangement results in a roughly 50-50 division of
Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves both yards’ ability to build submarine
reactor compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and perform
submarine final-assembly work.
The joint production arrangement is a departure from past U.S. submarine construction practices,
under which complete submarines were built in individual yards. The joint production
arrangement is the product of a debate over the Virginia-class acquisition strategy within
Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that occurred in 1995-1997 (i.e., during the markup
of the FY1996-FY1998 defense budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB
and Newport News involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two
U.S. shipyards capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost
penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a submarine design that is being procured at
a relatively low annual rate.
Cost-Reduction Effort
The Navy states that it has achieved a goal of reducing the cost of Virginia-class submarines so
that two boats can be procured in FY2012 for combined cost of $4.0 billion in FY2005 dollars—a
goal referred to as “2 for 4 in 12.” Achieving this goal involved removing about $400 million (in
FY2005 dollars) from the cost of each submarine. (The Navy calculates that the unit target cost of
$2.0 billion in FY2005 dollars for each submarine translates into about $2.6 billion for a boat
procured in FY2012, and about $2.7 billion for a boat procured in FY2013.)
The Navy says that, in constant FY2005 dollars, about $200 million of the $400 million in the
sought-after cost reductions were accomplished simply through the improved economies of scale
(e.g., better spreading of shipyard fixed costs and improved learning rates) of producing two
submarines per year rather than one per year. The remaining $200 million in sought-after cost
reductions, the Navy says, was accomplished through changes in the ship’s design (which will
contribute roughly $100 million toward the cost-reduction goal) and changes in the shipyard
production process (which will contribute the remaining $100 million or so toward the goal).
Some of the design changes will be introduced to Virginia-class boats procured prior to FY2012,
but the Navy says the full set of design changes will not be ready for implementation until the
FY2012 procurement.
Changes in the shipyard production process are aimed in large part at reducing the total shipyard
construction time of a Virginia-class submarine from 72 months to 60 months. (If the ship spends
7
GD/EB and the Newport News shipyard are the only two shipyards in the country capable of building nuclearpowered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while the Newport News shipyard also builds nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships.
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less total time in the shipyard being built, its construction cost will incorporate a smaller amount
of shipyard fixed overhead costs.) The principal change involved in reducing shipyard
construction time to 60 months involves increasing the size of the modules that form each
submarine, so that each submarine can be built out of a smaller number of modules. The Navy
says that the goal of reducing shipyard construction time to 60 months is a medium-risk goal,
meaning that the Navy believes that there is a moderate (as opposed to low or high) risk that the
goal will not be achieved.
Because the full set of design changes and the reduction in construction time to 60 months will
not be achieved until FY2012, the Navy says that the $2.0 billion goal cannot be fully met for
boats procured prior to FY2012, even if those boats are procured at a rate of two per year.
The Navy earlier stated that if improved economies of scale and changes in the ship’s design and
in the shipyard production process are not sufficient to achieve the $2.0-billion target, the Navy
might consider reducing the capabilities of the Virginia class in certain areas until the target is
achieved. 8
The Navy’s goal to reduce the cost of each Virginia-class boat to $2.0 billion in constant FY2005
dollars is a goal that the Navy has set for itself. While Congress may take this goal into account, it
need not control congressional action.
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
General
In addition to GD/EB and Newport News, the submarine construction industrial base includes
scores of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. About
80% of the total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines
(measured in dollars rather than pieces, parts, or purchase orders) comes from single or sole
source suppliers. Observers in recent years have expressed concern for the continued survival of
many of these firms. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of
stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program. 9 In terms of
work provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five
submarine propulsion plants.
8
For more on the Navy’s plan for reducing the procurement cost of the Virginia-class design, see Statement of Ms.
Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship Programs) and RDML [Rear Admiral] William Hilarides,
Program Executive Officer for Submarines, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee [hearing on] Force Structure Requirements and Alternative Funding Strategies for
the United States Submarine Fleet, March 8, 2007; Richard R. Burgess, “Sub Force Innovation,”Seapower, February
2008: 16-19; Dave Johnson and Dustin Muniz, “More for Less,” Undersea Warfare, Winter 2007: 22-23, 28; and
William Hilarides, “2 For 4 in 2012, The Virginia-Class Road Ahead,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2006:
68-69.
9
For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
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Design and Engineering Portion
Earlier in this decade, some observers expressed concern about the design and engineering
portion of the submarine construction industrial base. Much of the design and engineering portion
is resident at GD/EB and Newport News. (A small portion is resident at a some of the component
makers.) With Virginia-class design work winding down and no other submarine-design projects
underway, the submarine design and engineering base faced the near-term prospect, for the first
time in about 50 years, of having no major submarine-design project on which to work. Navy and
industry officials, Members of Congress, and other observers were concerned that unless a major
submarine-design project is begun soon, the submarine design and engineering base would begin
to atrophy through the departure of experienced personnel. Rebuilding an atrophied submarine
design and engineering base, Navy and industry officials believe, could be time-consuming,
adding time and cost to the task of the next submarine-design effort, whenever it might begin.
Concern about this possibility among some Navy and industry officials was strengthened by the
UK’s difficulties a few years ago in designing its new Astute-class SSN. The UK submarine
design and engineering base atrophied for lack of work, and the subsequent Astute-class design
effort experienced considerable delays and cost overruns. Submarine designers and engineers
from GD/EB were assigned to the Astute-class project to help the UK overcome these problems. 10
The issue of maintaining the submarine design and engineering base appears to have been
addressed by bringing forward, to FY2010, the start of design work on the next-generation SSBN.
Under a more traditional schedule for designing the next-generation SSBN, design work on that
ship might not have begun for another few years. For further discussion, see Appendix E.
Projected SSN Shortfall
Size and Timing of Shortfall
The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be sufficient to maintain a
force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. As shown in Table 3, the Navy in 2008 projected
that the SSN force will fall below 48 boats during the 12-year period 2022-2033, reaching a
minimum of 41 boats in 2028-2029. Since the Navy plans to retire the four SSGNs by 2028
without procuring any replacements for them, no SSGNs would be available in 2028 and
subsequent years to help compensate for a drop in SSN force level below 48 boats.
Table 3. SSN Force Level, 2009-2038 (Navy Projection)
09
53
24
46
10
52
25
45
11
52
26
44
12
53
27
43
13
54
28
41
14
51
29
41
15
51
30
42
16
49
31
44
17
50
32
45
18
49
33
47
19
50
34
49
20
48
35
50
21
48
36
52
22
47
37
53
23
47
38
53
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009, p. 8.
10
See, for example, Andrew Chuter, “U.K. Spending Mounts for U.S. Help on Sub,” Defense News, September 13,
2005: 4; Richard Scott, “Electric Boat Provides Project Director for Astute Class,” Jane’s Navy International, May
2004: 33; Richard Scott, “Astute Sets Out on the Long Road to Recovery,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2003,
pp. 28-30; Richard Scott, “Recovery Plan Shapes Up for Astute Submarines,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 19,
2003, p. 26.
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The potential for the Navy’s long-range SSN procurement plan to produce a shortfall in the SSN
force over the long run has been discussed by CRS since 1995, in the form of testimony to
Congress in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007, a 1997 CRS presentation to a
Defense Science Board task force on the submarine of the future, which issued its report in
1998;11 a 1999-2000 CRS report,12 a 2002 CRS report,13 and this report since its inception in
2004.
Navy Study On Options For Mitigating Projected Shortfall
The Navy in 2006 initiated a study on options for mitigating the projected SSN shortfall. The
study was completed in early 2007 and briefed to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) on May 22, 2007.14 At the time of the study, the SSN force was projected to bottom out at
40 boats—an 8-boat shortfall. The addition of a second submarine to be procured in FY2011 has
since reduced the projected shortfall to seven boats, as shown in Table 3. Principal points in the
Navy study include the following:
•
The day-to-day requirement for deployed SSNs is 10.0, meaning that, on
average, a total of 10 SSNs are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis.15
•
The peak projected wartime demand is about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain
amount of time. This figure includes both the 10 SSNs that are to be deployed on
a day-to-day basis and 25 additional SSNs surged from the United States within a
certain amount of time. 16
•
Reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months—something
that the Navy already plans to do as part of its strategy for meeting the Virginiaclass cost-reduction goal (see earlier discussion on cost-reduction goal)—will
increase the size of the SSN force by two boats, so that the force would bottom
out at 42 boats rather than 40.17
11
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition & Technology, Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on [the] Submarine of the Future, July 1998, pp. 7, 19-20.
12
CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for Congress (out of print; for a
copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
13
CRS Report RL31372, Navy Shipbuilding in the FY2003 Defense Budget: Issues for Congress (out of print; for a
copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
14
Navy briefing entitled, “SSN Force Structure, 2020-2033,” presented to CRS and CBO on May 22, 2007.
15
The requirement for 10.0 deployed SSNs, the Navy stated in the briefing, was the current requirement at the time the
study was conducted.
16
The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time, the Navy stated, is
an internal Navy figure that reflects several studies of potential wartime requirements for SSNs. The Navy stated that
these other studies calculated various figures for the number of SSNs that would be required, and that the figure of 35
SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time was chosen because it was representative of the results of these other
studies.
17
If shipyard construction time is reduced from 72 months to 60 months, the result would be a one-year acceleration in
the delivery of all boats procured on or after a certain date. In a program in which boats are being procured at a rate of
two per year, accelerating by one year the deliveries of all boats procured on or after a certain date will produce a onetime benefit of a single year in which four boats will be delivered to the Navy, rather than two. In the case of the
Virginia-class program, this year might be around 2017. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the Virginia-class
cost-reduction goal, the Navy believes that the goal of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time is a mediumrisk goal. If it turns out that shipyard construction time is reduced to 66 months rather than 60 months (i.e., is reduced
by 6 months rather than 12 months), the size of the SSN force would increase by one boat rather than two, and the force
(continued...)
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•
If, in addition to reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months,
the Navy also lengthens the service lives of 16 existing SSNs by periods ranging
from 3 months to 24 months (with many falling in the range of 9 to 15 months),
this would increase the size of the SSN force by another two boats, so that the
force would bottom out at 44 boats rather than 40 boats.18 The total cost of
extending the lives of the 16 boats would be roughly $500 million in constant
FY2005 dollars.19
•
The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could meet the 10.0 requirement
for day-to-day deployed SSNs throughout the 2020-2033 period if, as an
additional option, about 40 SSN deployments occurring in the eight-year period
2025-2032 were lengthened from six months to seven months. These 40 or so
lengthened deployments would represent about one-quarter of all the SSN
deployments that would take place during the eight-year period.
•
The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could not meet the peak projected
wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
The force could generate a total deployment of 32 SSNs within the time in
question—three boats (or about 8.6%) less than the 35-boat figure. Lengthening
SSN deployments from six months to seven months would not improve the
force’s ability to meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs
deployed within a certain amount of time.
•
To meet the 35-boat figure, an additional four SSNs beyond those planned by the
Navy would need to be procured. Procuring four additional SSNs would permit
the resulting 48-boat force to surge an additional three SSNs within the time in
question, so that the force could meet the peak projected wartime demand of
about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
•
Procuring one to four additional SSNs could also reduce the number of sevenmonth deployments that would be required to meet the 10.0 requirement for dayto-day deployed SSNs during the period 2025-2032. Procuring one additional
SSN would reduce the number of 7-month deployments during this period to
about 29; procuring two additional SSNs would reduce it to about 17, procuring
three additional SSNs would reduce it to about 7, and procuring four additional
SSNs would reduce it to 2.
The Navy added a number of caveats to these results, including but not limited to the following:
•
The requirement for 10.0 SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis is a current
requirement that could change in the future.
(...continued)
would bottom out at 41 boats rather than 42.
18
The Navy study identified 19 existing SSNs whose service lives currently appear to be extendable by periods of 1 to
24 months. The previous option of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy
concluded, would make moot the option of extending the service lives of the three oldest boats in this group of 19,
leaving 16 whose service lives would be considered for extension.
19
The Navy stated that the rough, order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost of extending the lives of 19 SSNs would be $595
million in constant FY2005 dollars, and that the cost of extending the lives of 16 SSNs would be roughly proportional.
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•
The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain
amount of time is an internal Navy figure that reflects recent analyses of potential
future wartime requirements for SSNs. Subsequent analyses of this issue could
result in a different figure.
•
The identification of 19 SSNs as candidates for service life extension reflects
current evaluations of the material condition of these boats and projected use
rates for their nuclear fuel cores. If the material condition of these boats years
from now turns out to be worse than the Navy currently projects, some of them
might no longer be suitable for service life extension. In addition, if world
conditions over the next several years require these submarines to use up their
nuclear fuel cores more quickly than the Navy now projects, then the amounts of
time that their service lives might be extended could be reduced partially, to zero,
or to less than zero (i.e., the service lives of the boats, rather than being extended,
might need to be shortened).
•
The analysis does not take into account potential rare events, such as accidents,
that might force the removal an SSN from service before the end of its expected
service live.20
•
Seven-month deployments might affect retention rates for submarine personnel.
Issues for Congress
48-Boat Force-Level Goal and Planned SSN Procurement
Some observers have argued that the Navy in coming years should seek to maintain a force of
more than 48 SSNs, particularly in light of Chinese naval modernization21 and the possibility of a
rejuvenated Russian submarine force. Other observers argue that given the kinds of irregular
warfare operations in which the United States appears likely to participate in coming years, the
United States can afford to reduce the SSN force-level goal to something less than 48 boats. The
issue of the SSN force-level goal could be a topic of discussion in the Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), which is currently in progress.
A February press report suggests that the Navy may seek to reduce the cost of the FY2010
version of its 30-year shipbuilding plan by reducing planned procurements of certain higher-cost
ships. According to the report, proposals being considered by the Navy included reducing planned
procurement of attack submarines (SSNs) over 30 years from 53 boats to 40 boats, a reduction of
about 25%.22 This proposal, if implemented, could result in an SSN force that eventually declines
20
In January 2005, the Los Angeles-class SSN San Francisco (SSN-711) was significantly damaged in a collision with
an undersea mountain near Guam. The ship was repaired in part by transplanting onto it the bow section of the
deactivated sister ship Honolulu (SSN-718). (See, for example, Associated Press, “Damaged Submarine To Get Nose
Transplant,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 26, 2006.) Prior to the decision to repair the San Francisco, the Navy
considered the option of removing it from service. (See, for example, William H. McMichael, “Sub May Not Be Worth
Saving, Analyst Says,” Navy Times, February 28, 2005; Gene Park, “Sub Repair Bill: $11M,” Pacific Sunday News
(Guam), May 8, 2005.)
21
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
22
Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. May Cut 52 Ships From Plan,” Defense News, February 16, 2009, p. 1.
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to the low- to mid-40s and stays there indefinitely. This profile raises a question as to whether
consideration is being given to reducing the attack submarine force-level goal from the current
figure of 48 to a figure in the low- to mid-40s.
For additional discussion of the 48-boat goal, see Appendix C.
Virginia-Class Technology Insertion
Regarding Navy plans for inserting new technology into the Virginia-class design, a March 2009
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated:
There are three new technologies that the Navy plans to incorporate on current and future
Virginia Class submarines once they mature. Advanced electromagnetic signature reduction
is a software package comprised of two systems that use improved algorithms to
continuously monitor and recalibrate the submarine’s signature. The basic algorithms
required to support this technology have been proven on other submarines, and Navy
officials stated they are now developing software and conducting laboratory tests in support
of algorithm development. Navy officials stated they expect the technology to be installed
during new construction starting with SSN 781 and back-fit during modernization for earlier
ships.
The flexible payload sail (formerly the advanced sail)—a redesign of the structure that sits
atop the main body of the submarine—will allow the sail to house additional systems and
payloads. According to Navy officials, the flexible payload sail design replaced the advanced
sail due to concerns about weight, hydrodynamic performance, and access to the weapons
trunk. The design of the flexible payload is under review for inclusion on later submarines.
The conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array is intended to be a more costeffective sensor array that replaces transducers with accelerometers, while providing the
same capability. According to the Navy, the new array is expected to save $11 milliion to
$12 million per submarine, and consists of panels that will be integrated with one of two
types of sensors designed to detect vibrations and acoustic signatures of targets—ceramic
accelerometers, a mature but more costly technology, or fiber-optic accelerometers, a less
expensive but immature technology. According to program officials, testing of panels
incorporating both types of sensors was completed in December 2008, and a decision on
which accelerometer will be selected is expected by the end of fiscal year 2009, and at-sea
testing is expected in 2010.23
Potential Options for Congress
Potential options for Congress in FY2010 include approving or modifying the Navy’s FY2010
funding request for the Virginia-class program and directing the Navy to provide an update on
options for mitigating the projected attack submarine shortfall.
23
Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09326SP, March 2009, p. 146.
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Appendix A. Legislative Activity for FY2009
FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)
House
Section 122 of H.R. 5658 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee would amend the
authority that Congress provided in the FY2008 defense authorization act for the Navy to use
multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts for procurement of Virginia-class submarines starting in
FY200924 to require the Secretary of the Navy to certify that any such contract will be awarded in
accordance with the 1997 teaming agreement between GD/EB and NGSB for joint production of
Virginia-class submarines. In its report (H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) on H.R. 5658, the
committee states that the provision would modify the MYP authority granted in the FY2008
legislation “to include the requirement that any multi-year contract entered into between the Navy
and the shipbuilders must specify that the previous teaming agreements for submarine
construction between the two shipbuilders shall remain in effect.” (Page 141)
The committee’s report on H.R. 5658 recommended $722 million in additional FY2009 advance
procurement funding for the Virginia-class program to support the acceleration to FY2010 of the
procurement of the second boat currently planned for procurement in FY2011. (Page 79, line 004)
The report states that “The committee disagrees with the submitted Future Years Defense Plan
and budget request for: ... not requesting funding to increase the build rate of Virginia class
submarines to 2 ships per year starting in 2010.... ” (pages 82-83), and that the additional advance
procurement funding recommended by the committee is “necessary for the procurement of 2
ships in fiscal year 2010 ... ” (page 83). The report also states:
Attack submarine force structure requirements
The committee directs the Secretary of the Defense to assess the total number of attack
submarines required to fulfill the missions of the Department of Defense and to support the
national defense strategy, as part of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) conducted in
fiscal year 2009 pursuant to section 118 of title 10, United States Code. Such an assessment
should be based upon an analysis and prioritization of unconstrained attack submarine
requirements, sorted by mission, provided by the combatant commanders. The committee
further directs that results of such an assessment be included in the report on the quadrennial
defense review, submitted to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House
Committee on Armed Services in accordance with section 118(d) of title 10, United States
Code.
Service-life extension of SSN-688 Los Angeles class hulls
The committee understands that the Secretary of the Navy has conducted an assessment of
the feasibility of extending the service life of certain SSN-688 Los Angeles class submarines
in order to mitigate the projected shortfall in the Navy’s attack submarine force structure.
The committee is encouraged by this effort, but notes that the assessment did not explore
options that would increase the number of attack submarines above 48, in the long-term. The
committee also notes that the assessment did not explore options for limiting deployments or
24
Section 121 of H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008.
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other actions that could limit hull fatigue in the near term, in order to conserve service life of
more Los Angeles class submarines over the long-term.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report which includes
an assessment of the feasibility and cost of extending the service life of all current Los
Angeles class submarines. This report should explore the options in the near term which
would fully utilize all available hull life and maximize the total number of attack submarines
available after 2016. The committee directs the Secretary to submit this report within 120
days after the date of enactment of this Act. (Pages 81-82)
The report recommended $10 million in additional Navy research and development funding for
work on an underwater launched missile study (ULMS) in support of a new sea-based strategic
deterrent. (Page 182, line 42). The report elsewhere refers to the increase being $5 million rather
than $10 million, stating:
The budget request [for the Navy’s research and development account] contained $141.7
million in PE [program element] 63561N for advanced submarine system development but
contained no funds for design and development of a sea-based strategic undersea launched
missile.
The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense has no coherent plan for
undersea launched strategic deterrent weapons systems to eventually replace the current
undersea strategic force. The committee believes that research and development is necessary
now to ensure undersea launched weapons capability is available in the future.
The committee recommends an increase of $5.0 million in PE 63561N to begin initial studies
and concept designs of future undersea launched weapons systems. (Page 203)
The report recommended $15 million in additional Navy research and development funding for
work on a large-diameter launch tube for Virginia-class submarines. (Page 182, line 42) The
report states:
The budget request contained $141.7 million in PE 63561N for advanced submarine system
design but contained no funds for continued design and development efforts of a large
diameter weapons launch tube for Virginia class submarines.
The committee understands that development of a large diameter launch tube for Virginia
class submarines will increase combat capability and reduce overall construction costs. The
large diameter tube also has the potential to field new technologies, such as undersea
autonomous vehicles, as those technologies mature.
The committee recommends an increase of $15.0 million in PE 63561N for design and
development of a large diameter weapons launch tube for Virginia class submarines. (Pages
203-204)
Senate
Section 131 of S. 3001 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee would amend the
authority that Congress provided in the FY2008 defense authorization act for the Navy to use
multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts for procurement of Virginia-class submarines starting in
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FY200925 to permit the Secretary of the Navy to enter into one or more contracts for advance
procurement and advance construction of those components for Virginia-class submarines for
which authority for using MYP contracts was granted in the FY2008 legislation if the Secretary
determines that cost savings or construction efficiencies may be achieved for Virginia-class
submarines through the use of such contracts. In its report (S.Rept. 110-335 of May 12, 2008) on
S. 3001, the committee states that “The Navy believes that having such an option available could
help achieve greater cost savings and production efficiencies as the program increases throughput
to a rate of two boats per year in fiscal year 2011.” (Page 74)
The committee’s report on S. 3001 recommended $79 million in additional FY2009 advance
procurement funding for the Virginia-class program “to smooth [the] ramp up to 2 boats per
year.” (Page 57, line 004). The report states:
The budget request included approximately $1.3 billion for advance procurement for the
Virginia-class submarine program, including $596.8 million for economic order quantity
(EOQ) procurement of long lead material in conjunction with the current multiyear
procurement program.
Congress approved the Navy’s request to enter into a multiyear procurement contract in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), and added $588.0
million to help accelerate increasing the attack submarine program to a rate of two boats per
year. At that time, the Navy planned to increase production to a rate of two boats per year in
fiscal year 2012.
This year, as a part of the fiscal year 2009 request, the Navy plans to accelerate that
production increase to fiscal year 2011. The Navy has also identified that additional EOQ
funding in fiscal year 2009 and additional authority to conduct advance construction
activities would help achieve greater cost savings and production efficiencies, and reduce the
span time for construction as the program increases throughput to a rate of two boats per year
in fiscal year 2011.
Therefore, the committee recommends an increase for EOQ funding of $79.0 million.
(Page 76)
The above-quoted language from pages 74 and 76 of the report suggest that the $79 million in
additional advance procurement funding is not intended to accelerate to FY2010 the procurement
of the second boat currently planned for procurement in FY2011.
The report recommended $15 million in additional Navy research and development funding to
continue SSBN(X) design and study activities. (Page 178, line 42). The report states:
The budget request [for the Navy’s research and development account] included $141.7
million in PE [program element] 63561N for advanced submarine systems development. The
design and development efforts in these programs are to evaluate a broad range of system
and technology alternatives to directly support and enhance the mission capability of current
submarines and future submarine concepts.
The budget request included no funding to begin studies that would lead to developing a
replacement for the Ohio class strategic missile submarine program which was designed in
the 1970s. The Navy has begun studies under a program called the Undersea Launch Missile
25
Section 121 of H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008.
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Study (ULMS). The efforts within ULMS will involve exploring new technologies,
conceptual design of ship configurations, supporting ship systems, consideration of strategic
payloads, and development of other payloads.
However, there appears to be insufficient work to maintain the skill set among submarine
designers until the Navy would otherwise start designing a replacement for the Ohio class. A
previous report by the RAND Corporation evaluating the submarine design industrial base
concluded that it would be less expensive to sustain some number of workers in excess of
those needed to meet the residual design demands during such a gap. One means of
achieving this goal would be to begin the more extensive design activities earlier than the
Navy would otherwise start them to support a specific date to start building the next class.
The committee believes that the Navy should continue that effort in fiscal year 2009 and
recommends an increase of $15.0 million for that purpose. (Page 193)
Compromise
In lieu of a conference report, there was compromise version of S. 3001 that was accompanied by
a joint explanatory statement. Section 4 of S. 3001 states that the joint explanatory statement
“shall have the same effect with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were a joint
explanatory statement of a committee of conference.”
Section 122 of the compromise version of S. 3001 modifies the authority to use an MYP
arrangement for Virginia-class boats to be procured in FY2009-FY2013 that was granted to the
Secretary of the Navy by Section 121 of FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 1585/P.L. 110181 of January 28, 2008) so as to additionally permit the Secretary enter into one or more
contracts for advance procurement and advance construction of components for the boats
procured under that MYP arrangement.
FY2009 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329)
House
The House Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the FY2009 defense appropriations
bill. On July 30, 2008, Representative John Murtha, the chairman of the Defense subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee, issued a press release summarizing the subcommittee’s
markup of the bill that same day. 26 The press release states that the markup “redistributes the
Shipbuilding account to include ... $397.6 million for long lead items in the Virginia Class
submarine program.” Although the press release does not say so explicitly, the wording suggests
that this $397.6 million was advance procurement funding that would be in addition to the $719.8
million in advance procurement funding that the Navy requested for the Virginia-class program. 27
26
July 30, 2008, press release from The Honorable John P. Murtha, entitled “Murtha Summary of the FY09 Defense
Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
27
Long leadtime items are procured with advance procurement funding. Since $397.6 million is less than the $719.8
million the Navy requested for advance procurement, the $397.6 million cannot be said to include the $719.8 million.
The reference to redistributing shipbuilding funding to various programs, including the Virginia-class program,
suggests that each of the programs listed received additional funding. In light of this, an interpretation that the $719.8million advance procurement funding request was reduced to $397.6 million appears unlikely.
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Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee did not file a report on the FY2009 defense appropriations
bill. On September 10, 2008, the committee issued a press release summarizing the markup of the
bill that day by its Defense subcommittee. The press release stated that the markup “adds $79
million for the Virginia Class submarine Program.”28
Compromise
In lieu of a conference report, there was compromise version of the FY2009 defense
appropriations bill that was incorporated as Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September
30, 2008. (H.R. 2638, the FY2009 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill, was
amended to become a consolidated appropriations bill that includes, among other things, the
FY2009 defense appropriations bill.) The compromise version of H.R. 2638 was accompanied by
an explanatory statement. Section 4 of H.R. 2638 states that the explanatory statement “shall have
the same effect with respect to the allocation of funds and implementation of this Act as if it were
a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.”
Section 8011 of H.R. 2368/P.L. 110-329 grants authority for using FY2009 funds for an MYP
arrangement for the Virginia-class program. The explanatory statement approves the Navy’s
FY2009 procurement funding request for the Virginia-class program, and increases by $79
million the Navy’s FY2009 advance procurement funding request for the program. The $79million increase is for “Economic Order Quantity.”
28
September 10, 2008, press release from Senate Appropriations Committee, entitled “Senate Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee Approves Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Appropriations Bill,” p. 2.
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Appendix B. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan Administration
(1981-1989).
The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and maintaining a
force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally
called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.29 In 1992, however, the SSN goal
was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level requirement study
(updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level
acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.30
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy,
established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs.31 The
Clinton administration’s 1997 QDR supported a requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and
established a tentative SSN force-level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of
peacetime operational requirements.”32 The Clinton administration later amended the SSN figure
to 55 boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in December 1999. The study
had three main conclusions:
•
“that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 62 [SSNs] in
the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the regional military commandersin-chief] with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands
without gapping other requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this
force structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to meet the
modeled war fighting requirements;”
•
“that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18 Virginia class
SSNs in the 2015 time frame;” and
29
For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials, Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral
Raymond G. Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in U.S. Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs,
June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
30
See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July 1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub
Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,” Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9;
Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon
Urges Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “ Size of Sub
Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
31
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, pp.
55-57.
32
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
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•
“that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame
would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence community’s highest
operational and collection requirements.”33
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of required SSN force
levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not translated into official Department of
Defense (DOD) force-level goals.
The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended
requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs. In revalidating
this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD’s
“transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value
from each element of the force—DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and
reorganize the Armed Forces.”34
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in 2003-2004. One of
the Navy studies—an internal Navy study done in 2004—reportedly recommended reducing the
attack submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly
recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack
submarines.35
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force levels out to
FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035—a 260-ship fleet including 37 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs and 4 SSGNs.36
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack submarine
requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.37
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships, including
48 SSNs.
33
34
Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy, February 14, 2000, p. 5.
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
35
Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p. 1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study
Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May 13, 2004.
36
U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of
Naval Vessels for FY 2006. The report was delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees on March 23, 2005.
37
Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day (New London, CT), May 27,
2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.
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Appendix C. Views Regarding 48-Boat SSN
Force-Level Goal
This appendix summarizes the Navy’s view and an alternative view regarding the appropriateness
of the Navy’s 48-boat SSN force-level goal.
Navy View38
In support of its position that 48 is the correct number of SSNs to meet future needs, the Navy in
2006 argued the following:
•
The figure of 48 SSNs was derived from a number of force-level studies that
converged on a figure of about 48 boats, making this figure an analytical “sweet
spot.”
•
A force of 48 boats is a moderate-risk (i.e., acceptable-risk) force, as opposed to
the low-risk force called for in the 1999 JCS study.
•
A force of 48 boats will be sufficient in coming years to maintain about 10
forward-deployed SSNs on a day-to-day basis—the same number of forwarddeployed boats that the Navy has previously maintained with a force of more
than 50 SSNs. The Navy will be able to maintain 10 forward-deployed SSNs in
coming years with only 48 boats because the force in coming years will include
an increased number of newer SSNs that require less maintenance over their lives
and consequently are available for operation a greater percentage of the time.
•
U.S. regional military commanders would prefer a day-to-day forward-deployed
total of about 18 SSNs, but total of 10 will be sufficient to meet their most
important needs.
•
All 10 of the forward-deployed SSNs are needed for day-to-day missions such as
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), while about 7.5 of these
submarines are also needed to ensure that an adequate number of SSNs are in
position for the opening phases of potential conflicts in various locations.
On the issue of meeting U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for day-to-day
forward-deployed SSNs, the Navy states:
Each Combatant Commander (COCOM) requests assets to execute required missions
utilizing the Global Force Management Process. Broad categories of mission types are used
to make requests including National and Fleet ISR, Exercise and Training (supporting US
tactical development), Exercise and Operations (supporting US engagement strategy),
Carrier Strike Group (CSG) /Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) tasking, OPLAN (war plans)
support, and Other. As assignment of Critical, High Priority, Priority or Routine is assigned
to each of the requested missions. The theater allocation request process prior to 2004 did not
include a priority breakdown. In general, ISR missions have been assigned as Critical or
38
This section is based on Navy testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on March 28, 2006, and to the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March
29, and April 6, 2006.
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High Priority requirements. Other mission areas have been assigned from High Priority to
Routine, based on the relative importance to the theater commander. No allocation is
currently requested to support OPLAN or Other mission areas.
Each COCOM has authority to use its allocated SSNs as required to meet current national
and theater priorities. The CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff] allocation order to the
Submarine Force strictly directs an allotted number of SSN days of presence be provided,
capable of meeting each theaters’ [sic] taskings. The breakdown of mission priorities into
Critical, High Priority, Priority and Routine is predominantly a construct to demonstrate how
a COCOM could meet their priorities, given a specific level of SSN presence. It serves as an
aid to the CJCS in apportioning limited SSN presence to the various theaters.
The number of SSNs allocated against Critical Missions enabled COCOMs to meet all
requirements in 2004 and 2005, and 99% of the requirements in 2006. For High Priority
missions, sufficient SSNs were allocated to meet 25%, 50% and 34% of requirements in
2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. Overall, the number of SSNs forward deployed was
sufficient to cover 66%, 61% and 54% of Combatant Commanders’ requested SSN mission
taskings in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. 39
Alternative View
Some observers believe that more than 48 SSNs will be needed to meet future needs. One such
observer—retired Vice Admiral Albert Konetzni, Jr., a former commander of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet submarine force—argued the following in 2006:40
•
The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses called for a force of 48 to 60 SSNs. In this
context, a force of 48 SSNs looks more like a sour spot than a sweet spot.
•
The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses reflect “reverse engineering,” in which an
SSN force-level number is selected at the outset for affordability reasons, and
assumptions used in the force-level study are then adjusted to produce that figure.
•
The 1999 JCS study on SSN requirements remains valid today.
•
All of the U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for day-to-day
forward-deployed SSNs, and not just the 60% or so of those requirements that are
being met, are critical.
•
In light of the potential size of China’s submarine force in 2020, a force of 48
SSNs in that year will be insufficient. 41
39
Source: Written response by Vice Admiral Charles L. Munns, Commander Naval Submarine Forces, to a question
posed by Representative Rob Simmons at a March 28, 2006, hearing before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on submarine force structure. Munns’ written response was provided to CRS on
July 5, 2006, by the office of Representative Simmons and is used here with the permission of that office.
40
These points are based on Konetzni’s testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on March 28, 2006.
41
For more on China’s submarine force, and China’s naval modernization effort in general, see CRS Report RL33153,
China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
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Appendix D. Options for Funding SSNs
This appendix presents information on some alternatives for funding SSNs that was originally
incorporated into this report during discussions in earlier years on potential options for Virginiaclass procurement.
Alternative Funding Methods
Alternative methods of funding the procurement of SSNs include but are not necessarily limited
to the following:
•
two years of advance procurement funding followed by full funding—the
traditional approach, under which there are two years of advance procurement
funding for the SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of
the boat’s procurement funding in the year of procurement;
•
one year of advance procurement funding followed by full funding—one year
of advance procurement funding for the SSN’s long-leadtime components,
followed by the remainder of the boat’s procurement funding in the year of
procurement;
•
full funding with no advance procurement funding (single-year full
funding)—full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, with no advance
procurement funding in prior years;
•
incremental funding—partial funding of the SSN in the year of procurement,
followed by one or more years of additional funding increments needed to
complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
•
advance appropriations—a form of full funding that can be viewed as a
legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.42
Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the FY2008 budget,
suggested that two years of advance procurement funding are required to fund the procurement of
an SSN, and consequently that additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the
earliest.43 This testimony understated Congress’s options regarding the procurement of additional
SSNs in the near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of advance
procurement funding (which is used primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion
components), Congress can procure an SSN without prior-year advance procurement funding, or
42
For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement:
Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
43
For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008 Department
of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships the Navy might want to procure in
FY2008, should additional funding be made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter stated in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced procurement, to be
able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we would need to start two years in advance. What
that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08 with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year
to 2010.” (Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same subcommittee on
March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007.
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with only one year of advance procurement funding. Consequently, Congress currently has the
option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or FY2010.
Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships
for which no prior-year advance procurement funding had been provided. Specifically, Congress
used single-year full funding in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71,
and again in FY1988 to procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement,
under the Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in
FY1990 and FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial advance
procurement payment for CVN-74. Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to
accelerate the procurement of both ships to FY1988, and fully funded the two ships that year at a
combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.44
The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor components was
not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and 75 with single-year full
funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more quickly. What made it possible for
Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full funding was Congress’s constitutional authority
to appropriate funding for that purpose.
Procuring an SSN with one year of advance procurement funding or no advance procurement
funding would not materially change the way the SSN would be built—the process would still
encompass about two years of advance work on long-leadtime components, and an additional six
years or so of construction work on the ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as
outlays for construction of the ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal.
Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships would not begin
construction for some time and consequently would take longer to enter service than a ship of that
kind would normally require. When Congress procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
(CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both
cases in the knowledge that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some
time after the first.
Procuring SSNs in a 2-1-2 Pattern
Some potential approaches for procuring additional boats in FY2009-FY2011 could result in a
pattern of procuring two boats in a given year, followed by one boat the following year, and two
boats the year after that—a 2-1-2 pattern. Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007 and early
2008 suggested that if the procurement rate were increased in a given year to two boats, it would
not be best, from an industrial-base point of view, to decrease the rate to a single boat the
following year, and then increase it again to two boats the next year, because of the workforce
fluctuations such a profile would produce. 45
44
In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear propulsion components in
inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted the carriers to be built more quickly than would have
otherwise been the case, but it is not what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it
possible was Congress’ authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.
45
See, for example, the spoken remarks of Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter at hearings before the House Armed
Services Committee on March 1, 2007, and March 6, 2008, and spoken remarks by other Navy officials at a March 29,
2007, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee and at a March 14, 2008, hearing before the Seapower and
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This statement may overstate the production-efficiency disadvantages of a 2-1-2 pattern. If two
boats were procured in a given year, followed by one boat the next year—a total of three boats in
24 months—the schedule for producing the three boats could be phased so that, for a given stage
in the production process, the production rate would be one boat every eight months. A
production rate of one boat every 8 months might actually help the industrial base make the
transition from the current schedule of one boat every 12 months (one boat per year) to one boat
every 6 months (two boats per year). Viewed this way, a 2-1-2 pattern might actually lead to some
benefits in production efficiency on the way to a steady rate of two boats per year. The Navy’s
own 30-year (FY2009-FY2038) SSN procurement plan calls for procuring SSNs in a 1-2-1-2
pattern in FY2029-FY2038.
(...continued)
Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.
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Appendix E. Maintaining Submarine Design and
Engineering Base
Navy and industry officials earlier in this decade appeared to agree that preserving the submarine
design and engineering base over the next several years would require funding substantial
submarine design and engineering work in the near term. The Navy plans to address the issue by
accelerating into the near term the start of design work on the next-generation SSBN. Given the
ages of the Navy’s 14 current SSBNs, work on a replacement SSBN design would normally not
need to start for another few years. The Navy, however, is accelerating the start of this project into
FY2010, with an eye toward carrying out the project as a steady-state effort over several years,
rather than as a more-concentrated effort starting several years from now. The Navy’s plan will
provide a significant amount of submarine design and engineering work for several years, and
engage a wide range of submarine design and engineering skills.
The Navy asked RAND to study the question of sustaining the submarine design and engineering
base. The RAND study, which was published in 2007, states that, based on RAND’s analysis,
we reach the following recommendations:
—Seriously consider starting the design of the next submarine class by 2009, to run 20 years,
taking into account the substantial advantages and disadvantages involved.
If the 20-year-design alternative survives further evaluation, the issue of a gap in submarine
design is resolved, and no further actions need be taken. If that alternative is judged too
risky, we recommend the following:
—Thoroughly and critically evaluate the degree to which options such as the spiral
development of the Virginia class or design without construction will be able to substitute for
new-submarine design in allowing design professionals to retain their skills.
If options to sustain design personnel in excess of demand are judged on balance to offer
clear advantages over letting the workforce erode, then the Navy should take the following
actions:
—Request sufficient funding to sustain excess design workforces at the shipyards large
enough to permit substantial savings in time and money later.
—Taking into account trends affecting the evolution of critical skills, continue efforts to
determine which shipyard skills need action to preserve them within the sustained design
core.
—Conduct a comprehensive analysis of vendors to the shipyards to determine which require
intervention to preserve critical skills.
—Invest $30 million to $35 million annually in the NSWC’s Carderock Division submarine
design workforce in excess of reimbursable demand to sustain skills that might otherwise be
lost.46
46
John F. Schank, et al, Sustaining U.S. Submarine Design Capabilities, RAND, Santa Monica (CA), 2007. pp. xxviixxviii. (Prepublication copy posted on the Internet by RAND, accessed on May 9, 2007, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
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Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
(...continued)
monographs/2007/RAND_MG608.pdf.)
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