Order Code RL32418
Navy Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated April 8, 2008
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Navy Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget requests $2,107.0 million to complete the
procurement funding for an 11th Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN). This boat has already received $756.0 million in prior-year
advance procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget also requests
$719.8 million in advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats to be
procured in future fiscal years, and $596.8 million in additional procurement funding
for economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of key components for eight Virginia-
class submarines (the 11th boat and seven others) that are to be procured under a
multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement during the five-year period FY2009-
FY2013.
As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2008 shipbuilding budget, Congress added
$588 million in advance procurement funding for an additional Virginia class
submarine to be procured in a year prior to FY2012. The Navy, as part of its
proposed FY2009 budget, included this additional submarine in its shipbuilding plan
and scheduled it to be fully funded in FY2011.
One issue for Congress for FY2009 is whether to accelerate the full funding of
the newly added submarine from FY2011 to FY2010 or FY2009, so as to facilitate
a follow-on option of funding an additional one or two Virginia-class submarines in
FY2010 and/or FY2011. Supporters of this option could argue that it would mitigate
a projected seven-boat shortfall in SSNs. Opponents could argue that it would place
added pressure on the Navy’s FY2009 budget and/or its FY2010 budget, making it
more difficult for the Navy to fund other priorities in those years. This report will be
updated as events warrant.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Submarines in the U.S. Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Types of Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Roles and Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Attack Submarine Force Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Historical Force Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Force Level As of End Of FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Past and Planned Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Changes in Planned Procurement Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Joint Production Arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Cost-Reduction Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Submarine Construction Industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Design and Engineering Portion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Projected SSN Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Size and Timing of Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Navy Study On Options For Mitigating Projected Shortfall . . . . . . . . 10
Funding Additional SSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Alternative Funding Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Procuring SSNs in a 2-1-2 Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Accelerating Procurement of Second FY2011 Boat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Maintaining Design and Engineering Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
48-Boat Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Potential Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Legislative Activity for FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Views Regarding 48-Boat SSN Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Navy View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Alternative View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
List of Tables
Table 1. Past and Planned Virginia-Class Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Table 2. Planned Virginia-Class Procurement in Various FYDPs . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 3. SSN Force Level, 2009-2038 (Navy Projection) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Navy Attack Submarine Procurement:
Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget requests $2,107.0 million to complete the
funding for an 11th Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarine
(SSN). This boat has already received $756.0 million in prior-year advance
procurement funding. The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget also requests $719.8
million in advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in
future fiscal years, and $596.8 million in additional procurement funding for
economic order quantity (EOQ) purchases of key components for eight Virginia-class
submarines (the 11th boat and seven others) that are to be procured under a multiyear
procurement (MYP) arrangement during the five-year period FY2009-FY2013.
As part of its action on the Navy’s FY2008 shipbuilding budget, Congress added
$588 million in advance procurement funding for an additional Virginia class
submarine to be procured in a year prior to FY2012. The Navy, as part of its
proposed FY2009 budget, included this additional submarine in its shipbuilding plan
and scheduled it to be fully funded in FY2011.
One issue for Congress for FY2009 is whether to accelerate the full funding of
the newly added submarine from FY2011 to FY2010 or FY2009, so as to facilitate
a follow-on option of funding an additional one or two Virginia-class submarines in
FY2010 and/or FY2011. Congress’s decisions on these issues could affect future
Navy capabilities, Navy funding requirements, and the submarine industrial base.
Background
Submarines in the U.S. Navy
Types of Submarines. Submarines are one of four principal categories of
combat ships that traditionally have helped define the size and structure of the U.S.
Navy. The other three are aircraft carriers, surface combatants (e.g., cruisers,
destroyers, frigates, and Littoral Combat Ships), and amphibious ships. (The Navy
also includes mine warfare ships and a variety of auxiliary and support ships.)
Submarines can be powered by either nuclear reactors or non-nuclear power
sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-
powered. A submarine’s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source is
not an indication of whether it is armed with nuclear weapons — a nuclear-powered

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submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered submarine can be
armed with nuclear weapons.
Roles and Missions. U.S. Navy submarines fall into three types — nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).1
SSBNs. The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their
nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and thereby deter a
strategic nuclear attack on the United States.2 As of the end of FY2007, the Navy
included 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs, which are commonly called Trident
submarines because they carry Trident SLBMs. Each Trident SSBN can carry 24
Trident SLBMs.
SSGNs. The Navy’s four SSGNs, which are a new addition to the fleet, are
former Trident SSBNs that have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk
cruise missiles and special operations forces (SOF) rather than SLBMs. Although the
SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission orientation (with the SSGNs
being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs
are more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other submarine
missions and are sometimes included in counts of the projected total number of Navy
attack submarines.3
SSNs. The SSNs — the focus of this report — are general-purpose submarines
that perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions, including the following:
! covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of
it done for national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
! covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than
possible with the SSGNs);
! covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise
missiles (again on a smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
! covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
! anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
! anti-surface ship warfare.
1 In the designations SSBN, SSGN, and SSN, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-
powered, B stands for ballistic missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise
missile).
2 Although this mission is often associated with the Cold War-era nuclear competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union, it has continued, with some modifications, in the
post-Cold War era. For a discussion of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons policy and force
structure, see CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure,
by Amy F. Woolf.
3 For more on the Navy’s SSGN conversion program, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy
Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by
Ronald O’Rourke.

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During the Cold War, ASW against the Soviet submarine force was the primary
stated mission of U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery
operations were reportedly important on a day-to-day basis as well.4 In the post-Cold
War era, although anti-submarine warfare remains a mission, the SSN force has
focused more on performing the other missions noted on the list above.
Attack Submarine Force Levels
Force-Level Goal. In February 2006, the Navy proposed achieving and
maintaining in coming years a fleet with a total of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs (and
4 SSGNs). For a review of SSN force level goals since the Reagan Administration,
see Appendix A.
Historical Force Levels. The SSN force included more than 90 boats during
most of the 1980s, peaked at 98 boats at the end of FY1987, and then began to
decline. The force included 85 to 88 boats during the early 1990s, 79 boats at the end
of FY1996, 65 boats at the end of FY1998, 57 boats at the end of FY1999, and 56
boats at the end of FY2000. It has since numbered 53 to 56 boats. The decline in the
number of SSNs since the late-1980s has roughly paralleled the decline in the total
size of the Navy over the same time period.
Force Level As of End Of FY2007. The 53 SSNs in service at the end of
FY2007 included the following:
! 47 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
! 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
! 3 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class SSNs. A total of 62 Los Angeles-class
submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between FY1970 and FY1990 and
entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four 21-inch
diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise
missiles in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class
(SSN-719 and higher) are equipped with an additional 12 vertical launch system
(VLS) tubes in their bows for carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise
missiles. The final 23 boats in the class (SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further
improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles class boats or 688Is. As
of the end of FY2007, 15 of the 62 boats in the class had been retired.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class SSNs. The Seawolf class was originally intended
to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three
boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated changes in military
requirements. The three Seawolf-class submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21), the
Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were
procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively.
4 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection
operations during the Cold War, see Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette
Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).

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SSN-23, which was built to a lengthened configuration compared to the other two
ships in the class, was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was
suspended in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It entered service in 2005.
Seawolf-class submarines are larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous U.S.
Navy SSNs.5 They are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can
carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles.
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program
General. The Virginia-class attack submarine was designed to be less
expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the
Seawolf-class design. The Virginia-class design is slightly larger than the Los
Angeles-class design,6 but incorporates newer technologies. Virginia-class boats
currently cost about $2.8 billion each to procure. The three Virginia-class boats in
service as of the end of FY2007 entered service on October 23, 2004, September 9,
2006, and May 5, 2007.
Past and Planned Procurement. As shown in Table 1, 10 Virginia-class
boats have been procured through FY2008, and 8 more are planned for procurement
during the period FY2009-FY2013.
Table 1. Past and Planned Virginia-Class Procurement
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
Source: FY2009 Navy budget submission.
Changes in Planned Procurement Rates. When Virginia-class
procurement began in the 1990s, DOD originally projected that the procurement rate
would increase to two boats per year in FY2002. (The originally envisaged
procurement profile for the Virginia-class program for the years FY1998-FY2002
was 1-0-1-0-2.) In subsequent budgets, the date for starting two-per-year
procurement was progressively pushed back. Table 2 shows planned Virginia-class
procurement in FYDPs submitted since the mid-1990s.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP). The Virginia-class boats planned for
procurement in FY2009-FY2013 are being procured under a multiyear procurement
(MYP) arrangement requested by the Navy and approved by Congress in FY2008.
The five Virginia-class boats procured in FY2004-FY2008 were also procured under
a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. The four boats procured in FY1998-
5 Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged
displacement of about 7,150 tons. Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet. SSN-21 and
SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons. SSN-23 is 100 feet longer than
SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged displacement of 12,158 tons.
6 Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.

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FY2002 were procured under a somewhat similar arrangement called a block buy.
The boat procured in FY2003 fell between the FY1998-FY2002 block buy and the
FY2004-FY2008 MYP.
Table 2. Planned Virginia-Class Procurement in Various FYDPs
FYDP (date
submitted)

98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
FY95-99 (2/94)
1
0
FY96-01 (2/95)
1
0
1
0
FY97-01 (3/96)
1
1a
1
1a
FY98-03 (2/97)
1
1
0
1
1
0
FY99-03 (2/98)
1
0
1
1
0
FY00-05 (2/99)
0
1
1
1
1
1
FY01-05 (2/00)
1
1
1
1
1
FY2002 (6/01)b
1
FY03-07 (2/02)
1
1
1
1
1
FY04-09 (2/03)
1
1
1
2
2
2
FY05-09 (2/04)
1
1
1
1
2
FY06-11 (2/05)
1
1
1
1
1
1
FY07-11 (2/06)
1
1
1
1
1
FY08-13 (2/07)
1
1
1
1
2
2
FY09-13 (2/08)
1
1
2
2
2
Source: Prepared by CRS using Navy data.
a. Included at Congressional direction, but not funded in the plan.
b. Submission for FY2002 budget only; no FYDP for FY2002-FY2007 submitted.
Joint Production Arrangement. Virginia-class boats are built jointly by
General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset
Point, RI, and the Newport News, VA, shipyard that forms part of Northrop
Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).7 Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain
parts of each boat, Newport News builds certain other parts of each boat, and the
yards take turns building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly of
the boats. GD/EB is building the reactor compartments and performing final
assembly on boats 1, 3, and so on, while Newport News is doing so on boats 2, 4, and
so on. The arrangement results in a roughly 50-50 division of Virginia-class profits
between the two yards and preserves both yards’ ability to build submarine reactor
compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and perform
submarine final-assembly work.
The joint production arrangement is a departure from past U.S. submarine
construction practices, under which complete submarines were built in individual
yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over the Virginia-
7 GD/EB and the Newport News shipyard are the only two shipyards in the country capable
of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while the Newport
News shipyard also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other
types of surface ships.

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class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that
occurred in 1995-1997 (i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense
budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB and Newport News
involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S.
shipyards capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the
cost penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a submarine design that is
being procured at a low annual rate.
Cost-Reduction Effort. The Navy is working to reduce the cost of Virginia-
class submarines so that two boats can be procured in FY2012 for combined cost of
$4.0 billion in FY2005 dollars — a goal referred to as “2 for 4 in 12.” Achieving this
goal involves removing about $400 million (in FY2005 dollars) from the cost of each
submarine. The Navy calculates that the unit target cost of $2.0 billion in FY2005
dollars for each submarine translates into about $2.6 billion for a boat procured in
FY2012, and about $2.7 billion for a boat procured in FY2013.
The Navy says that, in constant FY2005 dollars, about $200 million of the $400
million in the sought-after cost reductions would be accomplished simply through the
improved economies of scale (e.g., better spreading of shipyard fixed costs and
improved learning rates) of producing two submarines per year rather than one per
year. The remaining $200 million in sought-after cost reductions, the Navy says, is
to be accomplished through changes in the ship’s design (which will contribute
roughly $100 million toward the cost-reduction goal) and changes in the shipyard
production process (which will contribute the remaining $100 million or so toward
the goal). Some of the design changes will be introduced to Virginia-class boats
procured prior to FY2012, but the Navy says the full set of design changes will not
be ready for implementation until the FY2012 procurement.
Changes in the shipyard production process are aimed in large part at reducing
the total shipyard construction time of a Virginia-class submarine from 72 months
to 60 months. (If the ship spends less total time in the shipyard being built, its
construction cost will incorporate a smaller amount of shipyard fixed overhead
costs.) The principal change involved in reducing shipyard construction time to 60
months involves increasing the size of the modules that form each submarine, so that
each submarine can be built out of a smaller number of modules. The Navy says that
the goal of reducing shipyard construction time to 60 months is a medium-risk goal,
meaning that the Navy believes that there is a moderate (as opposed to low or high)
risk that the goal will not be achieved.
Because the full set of design changes and the reduction in construction time to
60 months will not be achieved until FY2012, the Navy says that the $2.0 billion goal
cannot be fully met for boats procured prior to FY2012, even if those boats are
procured at a rate of two per year.
The Navy says that if improved economies of scale and changes in the ship’s
design and in the shipyard production process are not sufficient to achieve the $2.0-

CRS-7
billion target, the Navy may consider reducing the capabilities of the Virginia class
in certain areas until the target is achieved.8
The Navy’s goal to reduce the cost of each Virginia-class boat to $2.0 billion in
constant FY2005 dollars is a goal that the Navy has set for itself. While Congress
may take this goal into account, it need not control congressional action.
In December 2007, it was reported that the Navy believed it had reduced the
estimated cost of each boat planned for procurement in FY2012 to within $40 million
of the $2.0 billion goal.9 In March 2008, it was reported that the Navy believed it had
reduced the estimated cost of each FY2012 boat to within $30 million of goal.10
The cost-reducing design changes are to be implemented in part through an
effort known as the Technology Insertion Program (TIP). In March 2008, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that:
a recent cost analysis indicated that the Navy may have difficulty achieving its
[Virginia-class] cost target. The Technology Insertion Program was delayed to
reduce cost and schedule risk, and further evaluate technologies. The TIP
consists of three systems: Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction,
Advanced Sail, and Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array,
the first of which is scheduled for insertion in 2010....
The Advanced Electromagnetic Signature Reduction (AESR) is a software
package that uses improved algorithms to continuously monitor and recalibrate
the submarine’s signature. Similar software has been demonstrated in British
submarines, but the technology is considered immature because modifications
to the software will require additional testing. Software modification is expected
to begin in October 2008, and insertion is scheduled for fiscal year 2010. Once
development is complete, AESR will be retrofitted on all Virginia-class
submarines.
The Advanced Sail is a redesign of the structure that sits atop the main
body of the submarine. The new design provides expanded space to carry
weapons, anti-submarine systems, and communications systems external to the
hull. Development began in June 2006, and the composite material used to
8 For more on the Navy’s plan for reducing the procurement cost of the Virginia-class
design, see Statement of Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship
Programs) and RDML {Rear Admiral] William Hilarides, Program Executive Officer for
Submarines, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee [hearing on] Force Structure Requirements and Alternative
Funding Strategies for the United States Submarine Fleet, March 8, 2007; Richard R.
Burgess, “Sub Force Innovation,” Seapower, February 2008: 16-19; Dave Johnson and
Dustin Muniz, “More for Less,” Undersea Warfare, Winter 2007: 22-23, 28; and William
Hilarides, “2 For 4 in 2012, The Virginia-Class Road Ahead,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
, June 2006: 68-69.
9 Geoff Fein, “Navy Closing In On $2 Billion Price Tag For Virginia-Class Subs,” Defense
Daily
, December 11, 2007.
10 Dan Taylor, “Virginia-Class Subs $30 Million From $2 Billion-Per-Sub Price Goal,”
Inside the Navy, March 24, 2008.

CRS-8
construct the sail has been demonstrated under a separate program. However,
insertion of the Advanced Sail has been delayed because related costs may
exceed budget limits. A new bow design that also adds payload space for
weapons and systems will be used on submarines starting in fiscal year 2009.
The Navy will await testing of the new bow before completing a new sail design.
The Conformal Acoustic Velocity Sensor Wide Aperture Array (CAVES
WAA) is intended to be a more cost-effective sensor array. CAVES WAA
consists of two developmental technologies — fiber optic sensors and integrated
panels that house them and manage their signature — that will be integrated
together. Both technologies are still immature. To save costs, the insertion
schedule has been deferred 2 years, to fiscal year 2014. In fiscal year 2009, the
Navy will conduct at-sea testing of a CAVES WAA integrated panel being used
as part of another application, but not in the form necessary for the Virginia-class
submarine....
The Navy hopes to reduce construction time from more than 80 months to just
60 months. While SSN 778 and SSN 779 are expected to be delivered in 72 and
68 months, respectively, construction time must be reduced by another 17 and 12
percent, respectively, in order to meet the 60 month target. Historically,
construction efficiencies tend to be captured in the early part of a production run,
but SSN 778 and SSN 779 are the fifth and sixth ships being built. Additionally,
a recent Navy estimate indicates that construction for the SSN 784 may take 6
months longer than target....
According to program officials, about 79 percent of the program’s target
savings for construction and design has already been achieved (approximately
$158 million). However, a recent cost analysis of the program indicated that the
Navy may have difficulty achieving target costs in fiscal year 2012.11
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
General. In addition to GD/EB and Newport News, the submarine
construction industrial base includes scores of supplier firms, as well as laboratories
and research facilities, in numerous states. About 80% of the total material procured
from supplier firms for the construction of submarines (measured in dollars rather
than pieces, parts, or purchase orders) comes from single or sole source suppliers.
Observers in recent years have expressed concern for the continued survival of many
of these firms. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of
stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction
program.12 In terms of work provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear propulsion
plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
Design and Engineering Portion. The part of the submarine industrial
base that some observers are currently most concerned about is the design and
11 Government Accountability office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected
Weapons Systems, GAO-08-467SP, March 2008, pp. 171-172.
12 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class
(CVN-21) Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald
O’Rourke.

CRS-9
engineering portion, much of which is resident at GD/EB and Newport News. (A
small portion is resident at a some of the component makers.) With Virginia-class
design work now winding down and no other submarine-design projects underway,
the submarine design and engineering base is facing the near-term prospect, for the
first time in about 50 years, of having no major submarine-design project on which
to work.
Navy and industry officials, Members of Congress, and other observers are
concerned that unless a major submarine-design project is begun soon, the submarine
design and engineering base will begin to atrophy through the departure of
experienced personnel. Rebuilding an atrophied submarine design and engineering
base, Navy and industry officials believe, could be time-consuming, adding time and
cost to the task of the next submarine-design effort, whenever it might begin.
Concern about this possibility among some Navy and industry officials was
strengthened by the UK’s difficulties a few years ago in designing its new Astute-
class SSN. The UK submarine design and engineering base atrophied for lack of
work, and the subsequent Astute-class design effort experienced considerable delays
and cost overruns. Submarine designers and engineers from GD/EB were assigned
to the Astute-class project to help the UK overcome these problems.13
Projected SSN Shortfall
Size and Timing of Shortfall. The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan,
if implemented, would not be sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently
over the long run. As shown in Table 3, the Navy projects that the SSN force will
fall below 48 boats during the 12-year period 2022-2033, reaching a minimum of 41
boats in 2028-2029. Since the Navy plans to retire the four SSGNs by 2028 without
procuring any replacements for them, no SSGNs would be available in 2028 and
subsequent years to help compensate for a drop in SSN force level below 48 boats.
Table 3. SSN Force Level, 2009-2038 (Navy Projection)
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
53
52
52
53
54
51
51
49
50
49
50
48
48
47
47
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
46
45
44
43
41
41
42
44
45
47
49
50
52
53
53
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY
2009
, p. 8.
The potential for the Navy’s long-range SSN procurement plan to produce a
shortfall in the SSN force over the long run has been discussed by CRS since 1995,
13 See, for example, Andrew Chuter, “U.K. Spending Mounts for U.S. Help on Sub,”
Defense News, September 13, 2005: 4; Richard Scott, “Electric Boat Provides Project
Director for Astute Class,” Jane’s Navy International, May 2004: 33; Richard Scott, “Astute
Sets Out on the Long Road to Recovery,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2003, pp.
28-30; Richard Scott, “Recovery Plan Shapes Up for Astute Submarines,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly
, November 19, 2003, p. 26.

CRS-10
in the form of testimony to Congress in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006,
and 2007, a 1997 CRS presentation to a Defense Science Board task force on the
submarine of the future, which issued its report in 1998;14 a 1999-2000 CRS report,15
a 2002 CRS report,16 and this report since its inception in 2004.
Navy Study On Options For Mitigating Projected Shortfall. The Navy
in 2006 initiated a study on options for mitigating the projected SSN shortfall. The
study was completed in early 2007 and briefed to CRS and the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) on May 22, 2007.17 At the time of the study, the SSN force was
projected to bottom out at 40 boats — an 8-boat shortfall. The addition of a second
submarine to be procured in FY2011 has since reduced the projected shortfall to
seven boats, as shown in Table 3. Principal points in the Navy study include the
following:
! The day-to-day requirement for deployed SSNs is 10.0, meaning
that, on average, a total of 10 SSNs are to be deployed on a day-to-
day basis.18
! The peak projected wartime demand is about 35 SSNs deployed
within a certain amount of time. This figure includes both the 10
SSNs that are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis and 25 additional
SSNs surged from the United States within a certain amount of
time.19
! Reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months —
something that the Navy already plans to do as part of its strategy for
meeting the Virginia-class cost-reduction goal (see earlier discussion
on cost-reduction goal) — will increase the size of the SSN force by
14 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition
& Technology, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on [the] Submarine of the
Future
, July 1998, pp. 7, 19-20.
15 CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
(out of print; for a copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
16 CRS Report RL31372, Navy Shipbuilding in the FY2003 Defense Budget: Issues for
Congress
(out of print; for a copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
17 Navy briefing entitled, “SSN Force Structure, 2020-2033,” presented to CRS and CBO
on May 22, 2007.
18 The requirement for 10.0 deployed SSNs, the Navy stated in the briefing, was the current
requirement at the time the study was conducted.
19 The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount
of time, the Navy stated, is an internal Navy figure that reflects several studies of potential
wartime requirements for SSNs. The Navy stated that these other studies calculated various
figures for the number of SSNs that would be required, and that the figure of 35 SSNs
deployed within a certain amount of time was chosen because it was representative of the
results of these other studies.

CRS-11
two boats, so that the force would bottom out at 42 boats rather than
40.20
! If, in addition to reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time
to 60 months, the Navy also lengthens the service lives of 16
existing SSNs by periods ranging from 3 months to 24 months (with
many falling in the range of 9 to 15 months), this would increase the
size of the SSN force by another two boats, so that the force would
bottom out at 44 boats rather than 40 boats.21 The total cost of
extending the lives of the 16 boats would be roughly $500 million
in constant FY2005 dollars.22
! The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could meet the 10.0
requirement for day-to-day deployed SSNs throughout the 2020-
2033 period if, as an additional option, about 40 SSN deployments
occurring in the eight-year period 2025-2032 were lengthened from
six months to seven months. These 40 or so lengthened
deployments would represent about one-quarter of all the SSN
deployments that would take place during the eight-year period.
! The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could not meet the
peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within
a certain amount of time. The force could generate a total
deployment of 32 SSNs within the time in question — three boats
(or about 8.6%) less than the 35-boat figure. Lengthening SSN
deployments from six months to seven months would not improve
the force’s ability to meet the peak projected wartime demand of
about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
20 If shipyard construction time is reduced from 72 months to 60 months, the result would
be a one-year acceleration in the delivery of all boats procured on or after a certain date. In
a program in which boats are being procured at a rate of two per year, accelerating by one
year the deliveries of all boats procured on or after a certain date will produce a one-time
benefit of a single year in which four boats will be delivered to the Navy, rather than two.
In the case of the Virginia-class program, this year might be around 2017. As mentioned
earlier in the discussion of the Virginia-class cost-reduction goal, the Navy believes that the
goal of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time is a medium-risk goal. If it turns
out that shipyard construction time is reduced to 66 months rather than 60 months (i.e., is
reduced by 6 months rather than 12 months), the size of the SSN force would increase by
one boat rather than two, and the force would bottom out at 41 boats rather than 42.
21 The Navy study identified 19 existing SSNs whose service lives currently appear to be
extendable by periods of 1 to 24 months. The previous option of reducing Virginia-class
shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy concluded, would make moot the option
of extending the service lives of the three oldest boats in this group of 19, leaving 16 whose
service lives would be considered for extension.
22 The Navy stated that the rough, order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost of extending the lives of
19 SSNs would be $595 million in constant FY2005 dollars, and that the cost of extending
the lives of 16 SSNs would be roughly proportional.

CRS-12
! To meet the 35-boat figure, an additional four SSNs beyond those
planned by the Navy would need to be procured. Procuring four
additional SSNs would permit the resulting 48-boat force to surge an
additional three SSNs within the time in question, so that the force
could meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs
deployed within a certain amount of time.
! Procuring one to four additional SSNs could also reduce the number
of seven-month deployments that would be required to meet the 10.0
requirement for day-to-day deployed SSNs during the period 2025-
2032. Procuring one additional SSN would reduce the number of 7-
month deployments during this period to about 29; procuring two
additional SSNs would reduce it to about 17, procuring three
additional SSNs would reduce it to about 7, and procuring four
additional SSNs would reduce it to 2.
The Navy added a number of caveats to these results, including but not limited
to the following:
! The requirement for 10.0 SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis is a
current requirement that could change in the future.
! The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed
within a certain amount of time is an internal Navy figure that
reflects recent analyses of potential future wartime requirements for
SSNs. Subsequent analyses of this issue could result in a different
figure.
! The identification of 19 SSNs as candidates for service life
extension reflects current evaluations of the material condition of
these boats and projected use rates for their nuclear fuel cores. If the
material condition of these boats years from now turns out to be
worse than the Navy currently projects, some of them might no
longer be suitable for service life extension. In addition, if world
conditions over the next several years require these submarines to
use up their nuclear fuel cores more quickly than the Navy now
projects, then the amounts of time that their service lives might be
extended could be reduced partially, to zero, or to less than zero (i.e.,
the service lives of the boats, rather than being extended, might need
to be shortened).
! The analysis does not take into account potential rare events, such as
accidents, that might force the removal an SSN from service before
the end of its expected service live.23
23 In January 2005, the Los Angeles-class SSN San Francisco (SSN-711) was significantly
damaged in a collision with an undersea mountain near Guam. The ship was repaired in part
by transplanting onto it the bow section of the deactivated sister ship Honolulu (SSN-718).
(continued...)

CRS-13
! Seven-month deployments might affect retention rates for submarine
personnel.
Funding Additional SSNs
Alternative Funding Methods. Alternative methods of funding the
procurement of SSNs include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
! two years of advance procurement funding followed by full
funding — the traditional approach, under which there are two years
of advance procurement funding for the SSN’s long-leadtime
components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s procurement
funding in the year of procurement;
! one year of advance procurement funding followed by full
funding — one year of advance procurement funding for the SSN’s
long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
! full funding with no advance procurement funding (single-year
full funding) — full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement,
with no advance procurement funding in prior years;
! incremental funding — partial funding of the SSN in the year of
procurement, followed by one or more years of additional funding
increments needed to complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
! advance appropriations — a form of full funding which can be
viewed as a legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.24
Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the
FY2008 budget, suggested that two years of advance procurement funding are
required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and consequently that additional SSNs
could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest.25 This testimony understated
23 (...continued)
(See, for example, Associated Press, “Damaged Submarine To Get Nose Transplant,”
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 26, 2006.) Prior to the decision to repair the San Francisco,
the Navy considered the option of removing it from service. (See, for example, William H.
McMichael, “Sub May Not Be Worth Saving, Analyst Says,” Navy Times, February 28,
2005; Gene Park, “Sub Repair Bill: $11M,” Pacific Sunday News (Guam), May 8, 2005.)
24 For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy
Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches — Background and Options for
Congress
, by Ronald O’Rourke.
25 For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee
on the FY2008 Department of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which
additional ships the Navy might want to procure in FY2008, should additional funding be
made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stated
(continued...)

CRS-14
Congress’s options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the near term.
Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of advance procurement
funding (which is used primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion
components), Congress can procure an SSN without prior-year advance procurement
funding, or with only one year of advance procurement funding. Consequently,
Congress currently has the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or
FY2010.
Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure
nuclear-powered ships for which no prior-year advance procurement funding had
been provided. Specifically, Congress used single-year full funding in FY1980 to
procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71, and again in FY1988 to
procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the
Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in
FY1990 and FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial
advance procurement payment for CVN-74. Congress, in acting on the FY1988
budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to FY1988, and fully
funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships
entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.26
The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor
components was not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and
75 with single-year full funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more
quickly. What made it possible for Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full
funding was Congress’s constitutional authority to appropriate funding for that
purpose.
Procuring an SSN with one year of advance procurement funding or no advance
procurement funding would not materially change the way the SSN would be built
— the process would still encompass about two years of advance work on long-
leadtime components, and an additional six years or so of construction work on the
ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction
of the ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal.
Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships
would not begin construction for some time and consequently would take longer to
25 (...continued)
in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced
procurement, to be able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we
would need to start two years in advance. What that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08
with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year to 2010.”
(Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same
subcommittee on March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
March 29, 2007.
26 In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear
propulsion components in inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted
the carriers to be built more quickly than would have otherwise been the case, but it is not
what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it possible was
Congress’ authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.

CRS-15
enter service than a ship of that kind would normally require. When Congress
procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and
another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both cases in the knowledge
that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some time after
the first.
Procuring SSNs in a 2-1-2 Pattern. Some potential approaches for
procuring additional boats in FY2009-FY2011 could result in a pattern of procuring
two boats in a given year, followed by one boat the following year, and two boats the
year after that — a 2-1-2 pattern. Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007
suggested that if the procurement rate were increased in a given year to two boats, it
would not be best, from a production efficiency point of view, to decrease the rate to
a single boat the following year, and then increase it again to two boats the next year,
because of the workforce fluctuations such a profile would produce.27
This statement may overstate the production-efficiency disadvantages of a 2-1-2
pattern. If two boats were procured in a given year, followed by one boat the next
year — a total of three boats in 24 months — the schedule for producing the three
boats could be phased so that, for a given stage in the production process, the
production rate would be one boat every eight months. A production rate of one boat
every eight months might actually help the industrial base make the transition from
the current schedule of one boat every twelve months (one boat per year) to one boat
every six months (two boats per year). Viewed this way, a 2-1-2 pattern might
actually lead to some benefits in production efficiency on the way to a steady rate of
two boats per year. The Navy’s own 30-year (FY2009-FY2038) SSN procurement
plan calls for procuring SSNs in a 1-2-1-2 pattern in FY2029-FY2038.
Issues for Congress
Accelerating Procurement of Second FY2011 Boat
One issue for Congress for FY2009 is whether to accelerate the full funding of
the second Virginia-class boat now planned for FY2011 to either FY2010 or FY2009,
so as to facilitate a follow-on option of funding an additional one or two Virginia-
class submarines in FY2010 and/or FY2011.
Supporters of this option might argue the following:
27 At a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008
Department of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships
the Navy might want to procure in FY2008, should additional funding be made available for
that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stated in part: “If we’re
going to go to two a year in 2010, we really need to go to two a year for 2010, 2011 and out
from there on. We don’t want to go to two a year and then back to one a year. I think that
would create too much stress into the workforce there.” (Source: Transcript of hearing.)
Navy officials made similar statements before Senate Armed Services Committee on March
29, 2007.

CRS-16
! The operational risks of allowing the SSN force to drop below 48 are
unacceptable. The Navy has described the 48-boat goal as a
moderate-risk force, so dropping substantially below 48 boats would
imply a high-risk force. Although the deepest part of the projected
SSN shortfall lasts only a certain number of years, potential
adversaries can know in advance when this will occur and make
plans to take advantage of it.
! The Navy’s non-procurement options for mitigating the SSN
shortfall carry their own risks. The Navy might not be able to reduce
the shipyard construction period for Virginia-class boats to 60
months due to unexpected problems in the effort to reduce shipyard
construction time. The Navy might not be able to extend the service
lives of existing SSNs as much as currently projected due to faster-
than-anticipated deterioration in ship material condition or higher-
than-anticipated rates of nuclear fuel core use in coming years. The
Navy might not be able to lengthen SSN deployments without
adversely affecting retention rates for submarine personnel.
! Accelerating the second FY2011 SSN to FY2010 or FY2009 and
procuring one or two additional SSNs in FY2010 and/or FY2011
would reduce the number of seven-month SSN deployments needed
to meet the requirement for having 10 SSNs deployed on a day-to-
day basis between 2025 and 2032, and permit the SSN force to
fulfill more of the peak wartime demand for 35 SSNs deployed
within a certain amount of time.
Opponents of this option might argue the following:
! Given constraints on Navy funding, the Navy cannot afford to
accelerate the second FY2011 SSN to FY2010 or FY2009 and
procure one or two additional SSNs in FY2010 and/or FY2011
without reducing funding for one or more other Navy programs in
those years. The operational risks that would be created by reducing
funding for these other programs is greater than the operational risk
that would result from procuring one or two additional SSNs in
FY2010 and/or FY2011.
! The Navy has non-procurement options for mitigating the projected
SSN shortfall. These options would allow the Navy to meet the
current requirement for the number of SSNs to be deployed on a
day-to-day basis, and to come close to meeting the projected peak
wartime demand for SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
Maintaining Design and Engineering Base
Navy and industry officials appear to agree that preserving the submarine design
and engineering base over the next several years will require funding substantial
submarine design and engineering work in the near term. The Navy plans to address
the issue by accelerating into the near term the start of design work on the next-

CRS-17
generation SSBN. Given the ages of the Navy’s 14 current SSBNs, work on a
replacement SSBN design would normally not need to start for several years. The
Navy, however, is accelerating the start of this project into the near term, with an eye
toward carrying out the project as a steady-state effort over several years, rather than
as a more-concentrated effort starting several years from now. The Navy’s plan will
provide a significant amount of submarine design and engineering work for several
years, and engage a wide range of submarine design and engineering skills.
The Navy asked RAND to study the question of sustaining the submarine design
and engineering base. The RAND study, which was briefed in early 2007 and
published in mid-2007, states that, based on RAND’s analysis,
we reach the following recommendations:
— Seriously consider starting the design of the next submarine class by 2009,
to run 20 years, taking into account the substantial advantages and disadvantages
involved.
If the 20-year-design alternative survives further evaluation, the issue of a
gap in submarine design is resolved, and no further actions need be taken. If that
alternative is judged too risky, we recommend the following:
— Thoroughly and critically evaluate the degree to which options such as the
spiral development of the Virginia class or design without construction will be
able to substitute for new-submarine design in allowing design professionals to
retain their skills.
If options to sustain design personnel in excess of demand are judged on
balance to offer clear advantages over letting the workforce erode, then the Navy
should take the following actions:
— Request sufficient funding to sustain excess design workforces at the
shipyards large enough to permit substantial savings in time and money later.

Taking into account trends affecting the evolution of critical skills, continue
efforts to determine which shipyard skills need action to preserve them within the
sustained design core.
— Conduct a comprehensive analysis of vendors to the shipyards to determine
which require intervention to preserve critical skills.
— Invest $30 million to $35 million annually in the NSWC’s Carderock
Division submarine design workforce in excess of reimbursable demand to
sustain skills that might otherwise be lost.28
28 John F. Schank, et al, Sustaining U.S. Submarine Design Capabilities, RAND, Santa
Monica (CA), 2007. pp. xxvii-xxviii. (Prepublication copy posted on the Internet by
RAND, accessed on May 9, 2007, at [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
2007/RAND_MG608.pdf].)

CRS-18
48-Boat Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
Some observers have argued that the Navy in coming years should maintain a
force of more than 48 SSNs, particularly in light of, for example, Chinese naval
modernization29 and the possibility of a rejuvenated Russian submarine force. The
Navy has defended the 48-boat force-level goal. For additional discussion of this
issue, see Appendix B.
Potential Options for Congress
Potential options for Congress include but are not limited to the following, some
of which might be combined:
! approving the Navy’s current plans for procuring Virginia-class
boats;
! accelerating the full funding of the second Virginia-class boat now
planned for FY2011 to either FY2010 or FY2009, so as to facilitate
a follow-on option of funding an additional one or two Virginia-
class submarines in FY2010 and/or FY2011;
! funding near-term submarine design and engineering work that is in
addition to the work of this kind that the Navy is currently planning;
and
! directing the Navy to review the 48-boat SSN force level objective
in light of recent developments, including Chinese naval
modernization and the possibility of a rejuvenated Russian
submarine force.
With regard to the third option above, options for providing additional work for
the submarine design and engineering base over the next few years (in addition to the
Navy’s plan for accelerating the start of design work on the next-generation SSBN)
include the following:
! Expanded Virginia-class modification effort. The Navy is
currently funding certain work to modify the Virginia-class design,
in part to reach the Navy’s Virginia-class cost-reduction target. The
scope of this effort could be expanded to include a greater number
and variety of modifications. An expanded modification effort
would add to the amount of submarine design and engineering work
currently programmed, but by itself might not be sufficient in terms
of volume of work or number of skills areas engaged to fully
preserve the submarine design and engineering base.
29 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald
O’Rourke.

CRS-19
! New Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). The ASDS is a
mini-submarine that is attached to the back of an SSGN or SSN to
support operations by Navy special operations forces (SOF), who are
called SEALs, an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. DOD
has decided, after building one copy of the current ASDS design, not
to put that design into serial production. Some observers have
proposed developing a new ASDS design with the intention of
putting this new design into serial production. This option, like the
previous one, would add to the amount of submarine design and
engineering work currently programmed, but by itself might not be
sufficient in terms of volume of work or number of skills areas
engaged to fully preserve the submarine design and engineering
base.
! Diesel-electric submarine for Taiwan. In April 2001, the Bush
Administration announced a proposed arms-sales package for
Taiwan that included, among other things, eight diesel-electric
submarines.30 Since foreign countries that build diesel-electric
submarines appear reluctant to make their designs available for a
program to build such boats for Taiwan, some observers have
proposed that the United States develop its own design for this
purpose. This option would generate a substantial volume of work
and engage many skill areas. Uncertainty over whether and when
this project might occur could make it difficult to confidently
incorporate it into an integrated schedule of work for preserving the
U.S. design and engineering base. Although the project would
engage many skill areas, it might not engage all of them. Skills
related to the design of nuclear propulsion plants, for example, might
not be engaged. In addition, this project might raise concerns
regarding the potential for unintended transfer of sensitive U.S.
submarine technology — an issue that has been cited by the Navy in
the past for not supporting the idea of designing and building diesel-
electric submarines in the United States for sale to foreign buyers.31
! New SSN design. Developing a completely new SSN design as the
successor to the Virginia-class design would fully support the design
and engineering base for several years. The Navy in the past has
30 For more on the proposed arms sales package, including the diesel-electric submarines,
see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley A. Kan.
31 An additional issue that some observers believe might be behind Navy resistance to the
idea of designing and building diesel-electric submarines in the United States for sale to
foreign buyers, but which these observers believe the Navy is unwilling to state publicly, is
a purported fear among Navy officials that the establishment of a U.S. production line for
such boats would lead to political pressure for the Navy to accept the procurement of such
boats for its own use, perhaps in lieu of nuclear-powered submarines. The Navy argues that
non-nuclear-powered submarines are not well suited for U.S. submarine operations, which
typically involve long, stealthy transits to the operating area, long submerged periods in the
operating area, and long, stealthy transits back to home port.

CRS-20
estimated that the cost of this option would be roughly equivalent to
the procurement cost of three SSNs. The House version of the
FY2006 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1815) proposed this idea,
but the idea was not supported by the Navy, in large part because of
its cost, and the conference version of the bill did not mandate it.
Legislative Activity for FY2009
The Navy’s proposed FY2009 budget was submitted to Congress in early
February 2008.

CRS-21
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan
Administration (1981-1989).
The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and
maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-
1992 originally called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.32 In
1992, however, the SSN goal was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992
Joint Staff force-level requirement study (updated in 1993) that called for a force of
51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level acoustic quieting, by the year
2012.33
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of
U.S. defense policy, established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships,
including 45 to 55 SSNs.34 The Clinton administration’s 1997 QDR supported a
requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and established a tentative SSN force-
level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of peacetime operational
requirements.”35 The Clinton administration later amended the SSN figure to 55
boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in
December 1999. The study had three main conclusions:
! “that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and
62 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the
regional military commanders-in-chief] with insufficient capability
to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other
32 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials,
Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral Raymond
G. Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare),
in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces
and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs, June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
33 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July
1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,”
Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era:
The Issues Facing Policymakers
, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon Urges Navy to
Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “
Size of Sub Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
34 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up
Review
, October 1993, pp. 55-57.
35 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Revie
w, May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.

CRS-22
requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this force
structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to
meet the modeled war fighting requirements;”
! “that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18
Virginia class SSNs in the 2015 time frame;” and
! “that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025
time frame would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence
community’s highest operational and collection requirements.”36
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of
required SSN force levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not
translated into official Department of Defense (DOD) force-level goals.

The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the
amended requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including
55 SSNs. In revalidating this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report
cautioned that as DOD’s “transformation effort matures — and as it produces
significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force — DOD
will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed
Forces.”37
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in
2003-2004. One of the Navy studies — an internal Navy study done in 2004 —
reportedly recommended reducing the attack submarine force level requirement to
as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly recommended homeporting a total of nine
attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack submarines.38
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force
levels out to FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035 — a 260-
ship fleet including 37 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs.39
36 Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy,
February 14, 2000, p. 5.
37 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
38 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p.
1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May
13, 2004.
39 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan
for the Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2006
. The report was delivered to the House
and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on March 23, 2005.

CRS-23
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack
submarine requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.40
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313
ships, including 48 SSNs.
40 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day
(New London, CT)
, May 27, 2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub
Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.

CRS-24
Appendix B. Views Regarding 48-Boat SSN
Force-Level Goal
This appendix summarizes the Navy’s view and an alternative view regarding
the appropriateness of the Navy’s 48-boat SSN force-level goal.
Navy View.41 In support of its position that 48 is the correct number of SSNs
to meet future needs, the Navy in 2006 argued the following:
! The figure of 48 SSNs was derived from a number of force-level
studies that converged on a figure of about 48 boats, making this
figure an analytical “sweet spot.”
! A force of 48 boats is a moderate-risk (i.e., acceptable-risk) force, as
opposed to the low-risk force called for in the 1999 JCS study.
! A force of 48 boats will be sufficient in coming years to maintain
about 10 forward-deployed SSNs on a day-to-day basis — the same
number of forward-deployed boats that the Navy has previously
maintained with a force of more than 50 SSNs. The Navy will be
able to maintain 10 forward-deployed SSNs in coming years with
only 48 boats because the force in coming years will include an
increased number of newer SSNs that require less maintenance over
their lives and consequently are available for operation a greater
percentage of the time.
! U.S. regional military commanders would prefer a day-to-day
forward-deployed total of about 18 SSNs, but total of 10 will be
sufficient to meet their most important needs.
! All 10 of the forward-deployed SSNs are needed for day-to-day
missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),
while about 7.5 of these submarines are also needed to ensure that
an adequate number of SSNs are in position for the opening phases
of potential conflicts in various locations.
On the issue of meeting U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for
day-to-day forward-deployed SSNs, the Navy states:
Each Combatant Commander (COCOM) requests assets to execute required
missions utilizing the Global Force Management Process. Broad categories of
mission types are used to make requests including: National and Fleet ISR,
Exercise and Training (supporting US tactical development), Exercise and
Operations (supporting US engagement strategy), Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
/Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) tasking, OPLAN (war plans) support, and
41 This section is based on Navy testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006, and to the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, and April 6, 2006.

CRS-25
Other. As assignment of Critical, High Priority, Priority or Routine is assigned
to each of the requested missions. The theater allocation request process prior
to 2004 did not include a priority breakdown. In general, ISR missions have
been assigned as Critical or High Priority requirements. Other mission areas
have been assigned from High Priority to Routine, based on the relative
importance to the theater commander. No allocation is currently requested to
support OPLAN or Other mission areas.
Each COCOM has authority to use its allocated SSNs as required to meet
current national and theater priorities. The CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff] allocation order to the Submarine Force strictly directs an allotted number
of SSN days of presence be provided, capable of meeting each theaters’ [sic]
taskings. The breakdown of mission priorities into Critical, High Priority,
Priority and Routine is predominantly a construct to demonstrate how a COCOM
could meet their priorities, given a specific level of SSN presence. It serves as
an aid to the CJCS in apportioning limited SSN presence to the various theaters.
The number of SSNs allocated against Critical Missions enabled COCOMs
to meet all requirements in 2004 and 2005, and 99% of the requirements in 2006.
For High Priority missions, sufficient SSNs were allocated to meet 25%, 50%
and 34% of requirements in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. Overall, the
number of SSNs forward deployed was sufficient to cover 66%, 61% and 54%
of Combatant Commanders’ requested SSN mission taskings in 2004, 2005, and
2006 respectively.42
Alternative View. Some observers believe that more than 48 SSNs will be
needed to meet future needs. One such observer — retired Vice Admiral Albert
Konetzni, Jr., a former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet submarine force —
argued the following in 2006:43
! The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses called for a force of 48 to 60
SSNs. In this context, a force of 48 SSNs looks more like a sour
spot than a sweet spot.
! The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses reflect “reverse engineering,”
in which an SSN force-level number is selected at the outset for
affordability reasons, and assumptions used in the force-level study
are then adjusted to produce that figure.
! The 1999 JCS study on SSN requirements remains valid today.
42 Source: Written response by Vice Admiral Charles L. Munns, Commander Naval
Submarine Forces, to a question posed by Representative Rob Simmons at a March 28,
2006, hearing before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on submarine force structure. Munns’ written response was provided to CRS
on July 5, 2006, by the office of Representative Simmons and is used here with the
permission of that office.
43 These points are based on Konetzni’s testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006.

CRS-26
! All of the U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for day-
to-day forward-deployed SSNs, and not just the 60% or so of those
requirements that are being met, are critical.
! In light of the potential size of China’s submarine force in 2020, a
force of 48 SSNs in that year will be insufficient.44
44 For more on China’s submarine force, and China’s naval modernization effort in general,
see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O’Rourke.