Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack
Submarine Procurement: Background and
Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
April 14, 2016
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL32418
Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
Summary
The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines since
FY1998. The two Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2017 are to be the 25th and
26th boats in the class. The 10 Virginia-class boats programmed for procurement in FY2014-
FY2018 (two per year for five years) are being procured under a multiyear-procurement (MYP)
contract.
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two Virginia-class boats requested for
procurement in FY2017 at $5,408.9 million, or an average of $2,704.5 million each. The boats
have received a total of $1,623.3 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding and
$597.6 million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy’s proposed
FY2017 budget requests the remaining $3,188.0 million needed to complete the boats’ estimated
combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget also requests $1,767.2 million
in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years, bringing the total
FY2017 funding request for the program (excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs) to
$4,955.2 million.
The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget also requests $97.9 million in research and development
funding for the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). The funding is contained in Program Element
(PE) 0604580N, entitled Virginia Payload Module (VPM), which is line 128 in the Navy’s
FY2017 research and development account.
The Navy plans to build some of the Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent
years with an additional mid-body section, called the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), that
contains four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes that the boats would use to store and fire
additional Tomahawk cruise missiles or other payloads, such as large-diameter unmanned
underwater vehicles (UUVs).
The Navy’s FY2017 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be sufficient to
maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. The Navy projects under that plan the
SSN force would fall below 48 boats starting in FY2025, reach a minimum of 41 boats in
FY2029, and remain below 48 boats through FY2036.
Potential issues for Congress regarding the Virginia-class program include the Virginia-class
procurement rate in coming years and the number of Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and
subsequent years that will be equipped with the VPM.
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Strategic and Budgetary Context............................................................................................... 1
U.S. Navy Submarines .............................................................................................................. 1
U.S. Attack Submarine Force Levels ........................................................................................ 2
Force-Level Goal ................................................................................................................ 2
Force Level at End of FY2015 ............................................................................................ 2
Los Angeles- and Seawolf-Class Boats ..................................................................................... 2
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program ........................................................................................... 3
General ................................................................................................................................ 3
Past and Projected Annual Procurement Quantities ............................................................ 3
Multiyear Procurement (MYP) ........................................................................................... 4
Joint Production Arrangement ............................................................................................ 5
Cost-Reduction Effort ......................................................................................................... 7
Virginia Payload Module (VPM) ........................................................................................ 7
FY2017 Funding Request ................................................................................................... 8
Submarine Construction Industrial Base ................................................................................... 9
Projected SSN Shortfall ............................................................................................................ 9
Size and Timing of Shortfall ............................................................................................... 9
2006 Navy Study on Options for Mitigating Projected Shortfall ..................................... 10
March 2016 Press Report on Options for Mitigating Projected Shortfall ......................... 12
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 15
Funding an Additional Virginia-Class Boat in FY2021 .......................................................... 15
Navy Plans for Building VPM-Equipped Virginia-Class Boats .............................................. 17
Virginia-Class Procurement Rate More Generally in Coming Years ...................................... 17
Mitigating Projected SSN Shortfall .................................................................................. 17
Larger Debate on Defense Strategy and Defense Spending ............................................. 18
Three Virginia-Class Boats Built with Defective Parts ........................................................... 19
Legislative Activity for FY2017 .................................................................................................... 21
Congressional Action on FY2017 Funding Request ............................................................... 21
Figures
Figure 1. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine ..................................................................................... 4
Tables
Table 1. Annual Numbers of Virginia-Class Boats Procured or Projected for Procurement ........... 3
Table 2. Projected SSN Shortfall ................................................................................................... 10
Table 3. Congressional Action on FY2017 Funding ..................................................................... 21
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals .................................................................................... 22
Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs ....................................................................................... 24
Appendix C. July 2014 Navy Report to Congress on Virginia Payload Module (VPM) .............. 26
Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 37
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the Virginia-class
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) program. The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget requests
$4,955.2 million in procurement and advance procurement (AP) funding for the program.
Decisions that Congress makes on procurement of Virginia-class boats could substantially affect
U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
The Navy’s Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in
another CRS report.1
Background
Strategic and Budgetary Context
For an overview of the strategic and budgetary context in which the Virginia-class program and
other Navy shipbuilding programs may be considered, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
U.S. Navy Submarines2
The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs),3 nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces (SOF) submarines
(SSGNs),4 and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The SSNs are general-purpose
submarines that can (when appropriately equipped and armed) perform a variety of peacetime and
wartime missions, including the following:
covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for
national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
1 See CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
2 In U.S. Navy submarine designations, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered, B stands for ballistic
missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile). Submarines can be powered by either nuclear
reactors or non-nuclear power sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-
powered. A submarine’s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is
armed with nuclear weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered
submarine can be armed with nuclear weapons.
3 The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United States. The Navy’s SSBNs are discussed in CRS
Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure, by Amy F. Woolf.
4 The Navy’s four SSGNs are former Trident SSBNs that have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk
cruise missiles and SOF rather than SLBMs. Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission
orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs are
more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other submarine missions and are sometimes included in
counts of the projected total number of Navy attack submarines. The Navy’s SSGNs are discussed in CRS Report
RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.
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covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than possible with the
SSGNs);
covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles (again on a
smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
anti-surface ship warfare.
During the Cold War, ASW against Soviet submarines was the primary stated mission of U.S.
SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery operations were reportedly
important on a day-to-day basis as well.5 In the post-Cold War era, although anti-submarine
warfare remained a mission, the SSN force focused more on performing the other missions noted
on the list above. In light of the recent shift in the strategic environment from the post-Cold War
era to a new situation featuring renewed great power competition that some observers conclude
has occurred, ASW against Russian and Chinese submarines may once again become a more
prominent mission for U.S. Navy SSNs.6
U.S. Attack Submarine Force Levels
Force-Level Goal
The Navy wants to achieve and maintain a fleet in coming years of 308 ships, including 48
SSNs.7 For a review of SSN force level goals since the Reagan Administration, see Appendix A.
Force Level at End of FY2015
The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, when plans called for
achieving a 600-ship Navy including 100 SSNs. The number of SSNs peaked at 98 boats at the
end of FY1987 and has declined since then in a manner that has roughly paralleled the decline in
the total size of the Navy over the same time period. The 54 SSNs in service at the end of
FY2015 included the following:
39 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
12 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.
Los Angeles- and Seawolf-Class Boats
A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between
FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four
5 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection operations during the Cold War, see
Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs,
1998).
6 For further discussion of this shift in the strategic environment and how it has led to, among other things, an increased
emphasis in discussions of U.S. defense policy on submarines and ASW, see CRS Report R43838, A Shift in the
International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 For additional information on Navy force-level goals, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise missiles
in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class (SSN-719 and
higher) are equipped with an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for
carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The final 23 boats in the class
(SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as Improved Los
Angeles class boats or 688Is. As of the end of FY2015, 23 of the 62 boats in the class had been
retired.
The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class
procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated
changes in military requirements. The three Seawolf-class submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21),
the Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were procured
in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively. SSN-23 was
originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was suspended in 1992 and then reinstated in
FY1996. It entered service in 2005. Seawolf-class submarines are larger than Los Angeles-class
boats or previous U.S. Navy SSNs.8 They are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes
and can carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles. SSN-23 was built to a lengthened
configuration compared to the other two ships in the class.9
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program
General
The Virginia-class attack submarine (see Figure 1) was designed to be less expensive and better
optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the Seawolf-class design. The Virginia-
class design is slightly larger than the Los Angeles-class design,10 but incorporates newer
technologies. Virginia-class boats currently cost about $2.7 billion each to procure. The first
Virginia-class boat entered service in October 2004.
Past and Projected Annual Procurement Quantities
Table 1 shows annual numbers of Virginia-class boats procured from FY1998 (the lead boat)
through FY2016, and numbers scheduled for procurement under the FY2017-FY2021 Future
Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
Table 1. Annual Numbers of Virginia-Class Boats Procured
or Projected for Procurement
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19
FY20
FY21
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
8 Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged displacement of about 7,150 tons.
Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet. SSN-21 and SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons.
9 SSN-23 is 100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged displacement of 12,158 tons.
10 Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.
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Figure 1. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine
Source: U.S. Navy file photo accessed by CRS on January 11, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?
story_id=55715.
Multiyear Procurement (MYP)
The 10 Virginia-class boats shown in Table 1 for the period FY2014-FY2018 (referred to as the
Block IV boats) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract11 that was
approved by Congress as part of its action on the FY2013 budget, and awarded by the Navy on
April 28, 2014. The eight Virginia-class boats procured in FY2009-FY2013 (the Block III boats)
were procured under a previous MYP contract, and the five Virginia-class boats procured in
FY2004-FY2008 (the Block II boats) were procured under a still-earlier MYP contract. The four
boats procured in FY1998-FY2002 (the Block I boats) were procured under a block buy contract,
which is an arrangement somewhat similar to an MYP contract.12 The boat procured in FY2003
fell between the FY1998-FY2002 block buy contract and the FY2004-FY2008 MYP
arrangement, and was contracted for separately.
11 For a discussion of MYP contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
12 For a discussion of block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy
Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Moshe Schwartz.
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
Joint Production Arrangement
Overview
Virginia-class boats are built jointly by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of
Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News
Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. GD/EB and HII/NNS are the only two shipyards
in the country capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while
HII/NNS also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of
surface ships.
The arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats was proposed to Congress by GD/EB,
HII/NNS, and the Navy, and agreed to by Congress in 1997, at the outset of Virginia-class
procurement.13 A primary aim of the arrangement is to minimize the cost of building Virginia-
class boats at a relatively low annual rate in two shipyards (rather than entirely in a single
shipyard) while preserving key submarine-construction skills at both shipyards.
Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat, HII/NNS builds certain other
parts of each boat, and the yards have taken turns building the reactor compartments and
performing final assembly of the boats. GD/EB has built the reactor compartments and
performing final assembly on boats 1, 3, and so on, while HII/NNS has done so on boats 2, 4, and
so on. The arrangement has resulted in a roughly 50-50 division of Virginia-class profits between
the two yards and preserves both yards’ ability to build submarine reactor compartments (a key
capability for a submarine-construction yard) and perform submarine final-assembly work.14
Navy’s Proposed Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS)
The Navy, under a plan it calls the Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS), is proposing to
build Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarines jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of
the work going to GD/EB. As part of this plan, the Navy is also proposing to adjust the division
of work on the Virginia-class attack submarine program so that HII/NNS would receive a larger
share of the work for that program than it has received in the past. Key elements of the Navy’s
proposed plan include the following:
GD/EB is to be the prime contractor for designing and building Ohio replacement
boats;
HII/NNS is to be a subcontractor for designing and building Ohio replacement
boats;
GD/EB is to build certain parts of each Ohio replacement boat—parts that are
more or less analogous to the parts that GD/EB builds for each Virginia-class
attack submarine;
13 See Section 121 of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997).
14 The joint production arrangement is a departure from prior U.S. submarine construction practices, under which
complete submarines were built in individual yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over
the Virginia-class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that occurred in 1995-1997
(i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB
and HII/NNS involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards capable of
building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a
submarine design that is being procured at a relatively low annual rate. The joint production agreement cannot be
changed without the agreement of both GD/EB and HII/NNS.
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HII/NNS is to build certain other parts of each Ohio replacement boat—parts that
are more or less analogous to the parts that HII/NNS builds for each Virginia-
class attack submarine;
GD/EB is to perform the final assembly on all 12 Ohio replacement boats;
as a result of the three previous points, the Navy estimates that GD/EB would
receive an estimated 77%-78% of the shipyard work building Ohio replacement
boats, and HII/NNS would receive 22%-23%;
GD/EB is to continue as prime contractor for the Virginia-class program, but to
help balance out projected submarine-construction workloads at GD/EB and
HII/NNS, the division of work between the two yards for building Virginia-class
boats is to be adjusted so that HII/NNS would perform the final assembly on a
greater number of Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of
the current Virginia-class division of work (in which final assemblies are divided
more or less evenly between the two shipyards); as a consequence, HII/NNS
would receive a greater share of the total work in building Virginia-class boats
than it would have under a continuation of the current division of work.15
The Navy described the plan in February 25, 2016, testimony before the Seapower and Projection
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. At that hearing, Navy officials
testified that:
In 2014, the Navy led a comprehensive government-Industry assessment of shipbuilder
construction capabilities and capacities at GDEB and HII-NNS to formulate the
Submarine Unified Build Strategy (SUBS) for concurrent OR and Virginia class
submarine production. This build strategy's guiding principles are: affordability,
delivering OR on time and within budget, maintaining Virginia class performance with a
continuous reduction in costs, and maintaining two shipbuilders capable of delivering
nuclear-powered submarines. To execute this strategy, GDEB has been selected as the
prime contractor for OR with the responsibilities to deliver the twelve OR [Ohio
replacement] submarines [i.e., GD/EB will perform final assembly on all 12 boats in the
program]. HII-NNS will design and construct major assemblies and OR modules
leveraging their expertise with Virginia construction [i.e., HII/NNS will build parts of
Ohio replacement boats that are similar to the parts it builds for Virginia-class boats].
Both shipbuilders will continue to deliver [i.e., perform final assembly of] Virginia class
submarines throughout the period with GDEB continuing its prime contractor
responsibility for the program. Given the priority of the OR Submarine Program, the
delivery [i.e., final assembly] of Virginia class submarines will be adjusted with HII-NNS
performing additional deliveries. Both shipbuilders have agreed to this build strategy.16
15 See Julia Bergman, “Congressmen Visit EB A Day After It Is Named Prime Contractor for Ohio Reaplcement
Program,” The Day (New London), March 29, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Ohio Replacement Plan Is Good News
For Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, March 29, 2016; Robert McCabe, “Newport News Shipbuilding’s Share of
Virginia-Class Submarine Deliveries to Grow,” Virginian-Pilot (Newport News), March 29, 2016; Valerie Insinna,
“GD Electric Boat Chosen To Take Lead Role for Ohio Replacement Sub,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2016: 1-3; Hugh
Lessig, “Navy: More Submarine Work Coming to Newport news Shipyard,” Military.com, March 30, 2016.
16 Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration
& Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection
Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2016, p. 12.
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
Cost-Reduction Effort
The Navy states that it achieved a goal of reducing the procurement cost of Virginia-class
submarines so that two boats could be procured in FY2012 for a combined cost of $4.0 billion in
constant FY2005 dollars—a goal referred to as “2 for 4 in 12.” Achieving this goal involved
removing about $400 million (in constant FY2005 dollars) from the cost of each submarine. (The
Navy calculated that the unit target cost of $2.0 billion in constant FY2005 dollars for each
submarine translated into about $2.6 billion for a boat procured in FY2012.)17
Virginia Payload Module (VPM)
The Navy plans to build one of the two Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019, and all Virginia-
class boats procured in FY2020 and subsequent years, with an additional mid-body section, called
the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). The VPM, reportedly about 70 feet in length18 (earlier
design concepts for the VPM were reportedly about 94 feet in length),19 contains four large-
diameter, vertical launch tubes that would be used to store and fire additional Tomahawk cruise
missiles or other payloads, such as large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).20
The four additional launch tubes in the VPM could carry a total of 28 additional Tomahawk cruise
missiles (7 per tube),21 which would increase the total number of torpedo-sized weapons (such as
Tomahawks) carried by the Virginia class design from about 37 to about 65—an increase of about
76%.22 The Navy wants to start building Virginia-class boats with the VPM in FY2019.
Building Virginia-class boats with the VPM would compensate for a sharp loss in submarine
force weapon-carrying capacity that will occur with the retirement in FY2026-FY2028 of the
17 The Navy says that, in constant FY2005 dollars, about $200 million of the $400 million in the sought-after cost
reductions was accomplished simply through the improved economies of scale (e.g., better spreading of shipyard fixed
costs and improved learning rates) of producing two submarines per year rather than one per year. The remaining $200
million in sought-after cost reductions, the Navy says, was accomplished through changes in the ship’s design (which
will contribute roughly $100 million toward the cost-reduction goal) and changes in the shipyard production process
(which will contribute the remaining $100 million or so toward the goal). Some of the design changes are being
introduced to Virginia-class boats procured prior to FY2012, but the Navy said the full set of design changes would not
be ready for implementation until the FY2012 procurement.
Changes in the shipyard production process are aimed in large part at reducing the total shipyard construction time of a
Virginia-class submarine from 72 months to 60 months. (If the ship spends less total time in the shipyard being built, its
construction cost will incorporate a smaller amount of shipyard fixed overhead costs.) The principal change involved in
reducing shipyard construction time to 60 months involves increasing the size of the modules that form each
submarine, so that each submarine can be built out of a smaller number of modules. For detailed discussions of the
Virginia-class cost-reduction effort, see David C. Johnson et al., “Managing Change on Complex Programs:
VIRGINIA Class Cost Reduction,” Naval Engineers Journal, No. 4, 2009: 79-94; and John D. Butler, “The Sweet
Smell of Acquisition Success,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 22-28.
18 “Navy Selects Virginia Payload Module Design Concept,” USNI News (http://news.usni.org), November 4, 2013.
19 Christopher P. Cavas, “Innovations, No-Shows At Sea-Air-Space Exhibition,” Defense News, April 18, 2011: 4. See
also Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Eyes Dual-Mission Sub,” Defense News, October 17, 2011; and Lee Hudson,
“New Virginia-Class Payload Module May Replace SSGN Capability,” Inside the Navy, October 24, 2011.
20 For an illustration of the VPM, see http://www.gdeb.com/news/advertising/images/VPM_ad/VPM.pdf, which was
accessed by CRS on March 1, 2012.
21 Michael J. Conner, “Investing in the Undersea Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 16-20.
22 A Virginia-class SSN can carry about 25 Tomahawks or other torpedo-sized weapons in its four horizontal torpedo
tubes and associated torpedo room, and an additional 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles in its bow-mounted vertical lunch
tubes, for a total of about 37 torpedo-sized weapons. Another 28 Tomahawks in four mid-body vertical tubes would
increase that total by about 76%.
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Navy’s four Ohio-class cruise missile/special operations forces support submarines (SSGNs).23
Each SSGN is equipped with 24 large-diameter vertical launch tubes, of which 22 can be used to
carry up to 7 Tomahawks each, for a maximum of 154 vertically launched Tomahawks per boat,
or 616 vertically launched Tomahawks for the four boats. Twenty-two Virginia-class boats built
with VPMs could carry 616 Tomahawks in their VPMs.
A November 18, 2015, press report states:
The Virginia-class submarine program is finalizing the Virginia Payload Module design
and will start prototyping soon to reduce risk and cost as much as possible ahead of the
2019 construction start, according to a Navy report to Congress.
According to the “Virginia Class Submarine Cost Containment Strategy for Block V
Virginia Payload Module Design” report, dated Aug. 31 but not received by the Senate
until mid-October, the Navy says late Fiscal Year 2015 and early FY 2016 is a “critical”
time period for the program....
The Naval Sea Systems Command’s (NAVSEA) engineering directorate will update cost
estimates soon based on the final concept design, but so far the program has been
successful in sticking to its cost goals. The program had a threshold requirement of $994
million and an objective requirement of $931 million in non-recurring engineering costs,
and as of January 2015 the program estimated it would end up spending $936 million.
The first VPM module is required to cost $633 million with an objective cost of $567
million, and the most recent estimate puts the lead ship VPM at $563 million. Follow-on
VPMs would be required to cost $567 million each with an objective cost of $527
million, and the January estimate puts them at an even lower $508 million.24
The joint explanatory statement for the FY2014 Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriations
Act (Division C of H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76 of January 17, 2014) requires the Navy to submit
biannual reports to the congressional defense committees describing the actions the Navy is
taking to minimize costs for the VPM.25 The first such report, dated July 2014, is reprinted in
Appendix C.26
FY2017 Funding Request
The Navy estimates the combined procurement cost of the two Virginia-class boats requested for
procurement in FY2017 at $5,408.9 million, or an average of $2,704.5 million each. The boats
have received a total of $1,623.3 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding and
$597.6 million in prior-year Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy’s proposed
FY2017 budget requests the remaining $3,188.0 million needed to complete the boats’ estimated
combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget also requests $1,767.2 million
in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years, bringing the total
FY2017 funding request for the program (excluding outfitting and post-delivery costs) to
$4,955.2 million.
The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget also requests $97.9 million in research and development
funding for the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). The funding is contained in Program Element
23 Michael J. Conner, “Investing in the Undersea Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 16-20.
24 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Finalizing Virginia Payload Module Design, Will Begin Prototyping To Reduce Risk,”
USNI News, November 18, 2015.
25 See PDF page 239 of 351 of the joint explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 3547.
26 For an article discussing the navy’s report, see Lee Hudson, “Stackley Outlines Virginia Payload Module Cost
Strategy For Congress,” Inside the Navy, November 3, 2014.
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link to page 14 Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
(PE) 0604580N, entitled Virginia Payload Module (VPM), which is line 128 in the Navy’s
FY2017 research and development account.
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes scores of
supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. Much of the total
material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from single or
sole source suppliers. Observers in recent years have expressed concern for the continued survival
of many of these firms. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of
stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program.27 In terms of
work provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five
submarine propulsion plants.
Much of the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base is
resident at GD/EB. Smaller portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the component makers.
Several years ago, some observers expressed concern about the Navy’s plans for sustaining the
design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base. These concerns
appear to have receded, in large part because of the Navy’s plan to design and procure a next-
generation ballistic missile submarine called the Ohio Replacement Program or SSBN(X).28
Projected SSN Shortfall
Size and Timing of Shortfall
The Navy’s FY2017 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be sufficient to
maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. As shown in Table 2, the Navy
projects under the plan that the SSN force would fall below 48 boats starting in FY2025, reach a
minimum of 41 boats in FY2029, and remain below 48 boats through FY2036. Since the Navy
plans to retire the four SSGNs by 2028 without procuring any replacements for them, no SSGNs
would be available in 2028 and subsequent years to help compensate for a drop in SSN force
level below 48 boats. The projected SSN shortfall was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has
been discussed in CRS reports and testimony every year since then.
27 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
28 For more on the SBN(X) program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Table 2. Projected SSN Shortfall
As shown in Navy’s FY2017 30-Year (FY2017-FY2046) Shipbuilding Plan
Annual
Shortfall relative to 48-boat goal
procurement
Projected
Fiscal year
quantity
number of SSNs
Number of ships
Percent
17
2
52
18
2
53
19
2
52
20
2
52
21
1
51
22
2
48
23
2
49
24
1
48
25
2
47
1
-2%
26
1
45
3
-6%
27
1
44
4
-8%
28
1
42
6
-13%
29
1
41
7
-15%
30
1
42
6
-13%
31
1
43
5
-10%
32
1
43
5
-10%
33
1
44
4
-8%
34
1
45
3
-6%
35
1
46
2
-4%
36
2
47
1
-2%
37
2
48
38
2
47
1
-2%
39
2
47
1
-2%
40
1
47
1
-2%
41
2
47
1
-2%
42
1
49
43
2
49
44
1
50
45
2
50
46
1
51
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2017 30-year shipbuilding plan. Percent figures rounded to
nearest percent.
2006 Navy Study on Options for Mitigating Projected Shortfall
The Navy in 2006 initiated a study on options for mitigating the projected SSN shortfall. The
study was completed in early 2007 and briefed to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) on May 22, 2007.29 At the time of the study, the SSN force was projected to bottom out at
40 boats and then recover to 48 boats by the early 2030s. Principal points in the Navy study
(which cite SSN force-level projections as understood at that time) include the following:
The day-to-day requirement for deployed SSNs is 10.0, meaning that, on
average, a total of 10 SSNs are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis.30
29 Navy briefing entitled, “SSN Force Structure, 2020-2033,” presented to CRS and CBO on May 22, 2007.
30 The requirement for 10.0 deployed SSNs, the Navy stated in the briefing, was the current requirement at the time the
study was conducted.
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The peak projected wartime demand is about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain
amount of time. This figure includes both the 10.0 SSNs that are to be deployed
on a day-to-day basis and 25 additional SSNs surged from the United States
within a certain amount of time.31
Reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months—something
that the Navy already plans to do as part of its strategy for meeting the Virginia-
class cost-reduction goal (see earlier discussion on cost-reduction goal)—will
increase the size of the SSN force by two boats, so that the force would bottom
out at 42 boats rather than 40.32
If, in addition to reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months,
the Navy also lengthens the service lives of 16 existing SSNs by periods ranging
from 3 months to 24 months (with many falling in the range of 9 to 15 months),
this would increase the size of the SSN force by another two boats, so that the
force would bottom out at 44 boats rather than 40 boats.33 The total cost of
extending the lives of the 16 boats would be roughly $500 million in constant
FY2005 dollars.34
The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could meet the 10.0 requirement
for day-to-day deployed SSNs throughout the 2020-2033 period if, as an
additional option, about 40 SSN deployments occurring in the eight-year period
2025-2032 were lengthened from six months to seven months. These 40 or so
lengthened deployments would represent about one-quarter of all the SSN
deployments that would take place during the eight-year period.
The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could not meet the peak projected
wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
The force could generate a total deployment of 32 SSNs within the time in
question—3 boats (or about 8.6%) less than the 35-boat figure. Lengthening SSN
deployments from six months to seven months would not improve the force’s
ability to meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed
within a certain amount of time.
31 The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time, the Navy stated, is
an internal Navy figure that reflects several studies of potential wartime requirements for SSNs. The Navy stated that
these other studies calculated various figures for the number of SSNs that would be required, and that the figure of 35
SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time was chosen because it was representative of the results of these other
studies.
32 If shipyard construction time is reduced from 72 months to 60 months, the result would be a one-year acceleration in
the delivery of all boats procured on or after a certain date. In a program in which boats are being procured at a rate of
two per year, accelerating by one year the deliveries of all boats procured on or after a certain date will produce a one-
time benefit of a single year in which four boats will be delivered to the Navy, rather than two. In the case of the
Virginia-class program, this year might be around 2017. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the Virginia-class
cost-reduction goal, the Navy believes that the goal of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time is a medium-
risk goal. If it turns out that shipyard construction time is reduced to 66 months rather than 60 months (i.e., is reduced
by 6 months rather than 12 months), the size of the SSN force would increase by one boat rather than two, and the force
would bottom out at 41 boats rather than 42.
33 The Navy study identified 19 existing SSNs whose service lives currently appear to be extendable by periods of 1 to
24 months. The previous option of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy
concluded, would make moot the option of extending the service lives of the three oldest boats in this group of 19,
leaving 16 whose service lives would be considered for extension.
34 The Navy stated that the rough, order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost of extending the lives of 19 SSNs would be $595
million in constant FY2005 dollars, and that the cost of extending the lives of 16 SSNs would be roughly proportional.
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To meet the 35-boat figure, an additional four SSNs beyond those planned by the
Navy would need to be procured. Procuring four additional SSNs would permit
the resulting 48-boat force to surge an additional three SSNs within the time in
question, so that the force could meet the peak projected wartime demand of
about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time.
Procuring one to four additional SSNs could also reduce the number of seven-
month deployments that would be required to meet the 10.0 requirement for day-
to-day deployed SSNs during the period 2025-2032. Procuring one additional
SSN would reduce the number of seven-month deployments during this period to
about 29; procuring two additional SSNs would reduce it to about 17, procuring
three additional SSNs would reduce it to about 7, and procuring four additional
SSNs would reduce it to 2.
The Navy added a number of caveats to these results, including but not limited to the following:
The requirement for 10.0 SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis is a current
requirement that could change in the future.
The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain
amount of time is an internal Navy figure that reflects recent analyses of potential
future wartime requirements for SSNs. Subsequent analyses of this issue could
result in a different figure.
The identification of 19 SSNs as candidates for service life extension reflects
current evaluations of the material condition of these boats and projected use
rates for their nuclear fuel cores. If the material condition of these boats years
from now turns out to be worse than the Navy currently projects, some of them
might no longer be suitable for service life extension. In addition, if world
conditions over the next several years require these submarines to use up their
nuclear fuel cores more quickly than the Navy now projects, then the amounts of
time that their service lives might be extended could be reduced partially, to zero,
or to less than zero (i.e., the service lives of the boats, rather than being extended,
might need to be shortened).
The analysis does not take into account potential rare events, such as accidents,
that might force the removal an SSN from service before the end of its expected
service life.35
Seven-month deployments might affect retention rates for submarine personnel.
March 2016 Press Report on Options for Mitigating Projected Shortfall
A March 8, 2016, press report discussed options the Navy is currently considering for mitigating
the projected SSN shortfall, including the option of finding a way to procure a second Virginia-
class boat in FY2021. The press report stated:
35 In January 2005, the Los Angeles-class SSN San Francisco (SSN-711) was significantly damaged in a collision with
an undersea mountain near Guam. The ship was repaired in part by transplanting onto it the bow section of the
deactivated sister ship Honolulu (SSN-718). (See, for example, Associated Press, “Damaged Submarine To Get Nose
Transplant,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 26, 2006.) Prior to the decision to repair the San Francisco, the Navy
considered the option of removing it from service. (See, for example, William H. McMichael, “Sub May Not Be Worth
Saving, Analyst Says,” Navy Times, February 28, 2005; Gene Park, “Sub Repair Bill: $11M,” Pacific Sunday News
(Guam), May 8, 2005.)
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
A spike in demand for the Navy’s attacks submarines, just ahead of a spate of
decommissionings and a dip in new SSN construction, is leading the Navy to look at
some previously unthinkable measures to mitigate the upcoming shortfall in the fleet.
Those measures include extending the life of some legacy boats and increasing submarine
production despite the cost and workforce strain the Ohio Replacement Program will put
on the Navy and industry....
Even though the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget request released in early February
called for just one attack submarine to be built in 2021 – a deviation from the current
two-a-year build rate to accommodate the construction of the first Ohio Replacement
Program ballistic missile submarine – just two weeks later officials floated the idea of
trying to find money to buy back that second attack sub....
Seeing this situation approaching, the Navy devised a three-pronged approach in the mid-
2000s to try to mitigate the upcoming strain on the attack sub fleet.
First, the Navy would consider extending the life of the Los Angeles-class boats –
something almost unheard of with the carefully managed nuclear-powered subs.
Schedules, and therefore nuclear fuel consumption, for these boats are rigidly managed
throughout the life of the sub, and conventional wisdom dictates that a sub’s service life
cannot be lengthened.
However, Jabaley said, the Navy has found some exceptions to the rule. A couple years
before each Los Angeles-class sub hits the end of its life, the Navy has begun an
engineering analysis process. First, will there be enough nuclear fuel to support a six-
month deployment tacked on to the end of the boat’s life? If yes, proceed to the next
question: will the submarine still be structurally sound enough to support submerging and
operating for an additional six months? Jabaley said the Navy would not pay for
additional work to extend the life of the boats, but if the answer to both questions
happens to be yes then the Navy will deploy the Los-Angeles class boat once more,
providing a bit of extra overseas presence to fill combatant commander needs, before
retiring the boat.
Second, Jabaley said the Navy began lengthening some Los Angeles-class deployments –
also considered taboo.
“By deploying for eight months instead of six, you’re using incrementally more fuel than
you would otherwise in a normal operating cycle, so that can actually be
counterproductive to the ability to extend that same submarine when you get to the end of
life,” Jabaley said, explaining that submarines consume nuclear fuel more rapidly during
overseas deployments than during in-port training or maintenance availabilities.
“It requires a very close management of fuel usage so we’re sure that the submarine has
the ability to operate to the end of its life, and if you have more fuel remaining then you
can consider the extension.”
Despite the complications it presented, Jabaley said the lengthened deployments were
worth the extra overseas presence they provided as well.
Third in the mitigation strategy, the Navy would try to build the new Virginia-class
submarines faster. Whereas the first Virginia-class boats took about 84 months to build,
General Dynamics Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding now can deliver a sub
to the fleet in about 61 months.
“We have a goal to get down to 55 months, the shipbuilders have a plan they call ‘Drive
for 55,’” Jabaley said. That plan revolves around “productivity improvements, changes to
the manufacturing and assembly plan to be able to deliver a submarine in as short a time
as 55 months.” The faster the industrial base can deliver each submarine, the faster those
boats can get through training and get out to sea.
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
“That was all well and good in 2006: we had a problem, we knew we were facing it,”
Jabaley said.
“But things have changed since then. In particular, the resurgence of Russia and the
ascendance of China, both of which are producing numerous submarines, and in
particular in Russia’s part, extremely capable submarines. So we’re facing challenges of
both quantity and quality from our competitors....
Though attack submarine requirements can be hard to talk about publicly due to
classification, the combatant commanders have, as Jabaley said, “started to proclaim
quite clearly that they are not getting enough submarines on deployment.” During FY
2017 budget hearings, both U.S. Pacific Command commander Adm. Harry Harris and
U.S. European Command commander Gen. Philip Breedlove made clear to lawmakers
they are only getting about 60 percent of the submarines they request, and they need more
to keep up with evolving Russian and Chinese threats.
“All of that put together has made the urgency even greater,” Jabaley said....
or Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley, the entire situation presents challenges and
opportunities. The challenge is maintaining the efficient two-a-year Virginia construction
rate, while also moving into the larger Block V configuration in 2019 which includes a
Virginia Payload Module section, while also keeping the Ohio Replacement Program on
track – while grappling with other Navy shipbuilding needs, and while adhering to
spending caps from Congress.
The opportunity, he explained March 3 at the American Society of Naval Engineers’
annual ASNE Day, is leveraging authorities given by Congress in the 2015 and 2016
National Defense Authorization Act to get creative. Not only did Congress give
incremental funding and advanced construction authority for the Ohio Replacement
Program to help keep costs down, lawmakers also passed a key provision “that allows us
to look across programs, across years in terms of procuring material to buy it as
efficiently as possible and drive cost down,” Stackley said.
“Quietly in the background we’ve been working with industry to figure out, given this
significant amount of submarine workload coming, how can we best accomplish it in
terms of not just efficiency but looking at facility investments that have to be made at our
two boatyards, EB and Newport News,” Stackley said.
“We laid that all out, and in doing that we identified where we have risk and also where
we have opportunity – opportunity in terms of capacity and also opportunity in terms of
driving down cost.”
“What we see is opportunity, and if we don’t nail that opportunity down, if we let 2021
pass, we are not going to get that boat back in the future and it just deepens the valley
we’re looking at,” he concluded.
Jabaley explained that the 2021 submarine is the most important for shaping the
submarine shortfall. The shortfall would begin in 2025 or 2026, depending on the success
of the effort to extend the life of the Los Angeles boats. A Virginia-class boat procured in
2021 would deliver in 2026, possibly staving off the start of the shortfall another year.
Then, that boat would decrease the depth of the shortfall each year, slightly decreasing
the impact felt by the fleet. And it would negate the one-sub shortfall expected in the last
year of the trough, in 2036, and from 2038 to 2041.
Put another way, Jabaley said there is currently a 51 SSN-year shortfall over 17 years.
The addition of the second 2021 boat — and its subsequent effects — could reduce the
attack boat shortfall to 35.
Stackley tasked Jabaley and the rest of PEO Subs with making it happen, and he made
clear last week how serious he was about buying back the second boat in 2021.
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“That’s frankly our requirement this year inside our shipbuilding program to figure out
how to get there because that is our asymmetrical advantage: we own the undersea
domain, we cannot give it up and 2021 is our next big opportunity to deepen, frankly,
deepen our hold on that,” Stackley said....
The first thing to figure out was if industry could handle the workload, and Jabaley said
“we are convinced that it can.”...
With industry on board and ready for the workload, the next question is how to pay for
the second 2021 attack sub.
First, “there are some savings just by adding it in,” Jabaley said, due to the savings that
buying more units creates throughout the supply chain.
Second, as the Navy analyzes the Block V contract – it owes the Secretary of Defense a
cost estimate for the addition of the Virginia Payload Module – “we’re aggressively
looking for ways we can reduce cost, so the Virginia program has their work to do in
lowering cost.”
And lastly, as Stackley alluded to in his comments about the contracting authorities
provided in the NDAA, there are savings to be had if the Navy can find creative ways to
move away from stovepiped contracting for each ship class and look more holistically at
its overall shipbuilding needs.
“I need to bring [the Virginia class and Ohio Replacement Program] together, and I need
to employ innovative contracting and acquisition strategies to find synergy and cost
savings,” Jabaley said.”36
Issues for Congress
Funding an Additional Virginia-Class Boat in FY2021
As discussed in the previous section (see “March 2016 Press Report on Options for Mitigating
Projected Shortfall”), the Navy wants to find a way to procure a second Virginia-class boat in
FY2021 as a way to help mitigate the projected SSN shortfall. The issue for Congress is whether
to support this effort, and if so, whether to provide any advance procurement (AP) funding in
FY2017 to begin paying for that boat. In assessing this question, Congress may consider various
factors, including the amount of funding that would be needed to procure the boat, the operational
value the boat would have, and the potential impact, in a situation of constrained defense funding,
on other Navy or DOD programs of funding the additional boat.
At an April 6, 2016, hearing on Navy shipbuilding programs before the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the following exchange occurred:
SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE (continuing):
I wanted to follow up, Admiral Mulloy on—you were talking about the requirements
overall for the size of our fleet. Well, one of the issues that I'm concerned about, as we
look at all the threats that we're facing and all the challenges that were certainly outlined
well by Senator King is the Navy's requirement for the attack submarine fleet was
actually established, as I understand it, in I think it was around 2006.
36 Megan Eckstein, “Navy Finds Urgency In Staving Off A Sub Shortfall Decades In The Making,” USNI News, March
8, 2016. See also Kris Osborn, “Navy Wants More Attack Submarines Faster,” Scout, February 26, 2016.
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And given all the things that have changed since 2006 and the challenges that we face
and in particular, obviously, that in the Asia Pacific region, is the Navy going to
undertake establishing a new requirement for the attack submarine fleet as well? We
already know that 50 percent to 60 percent of our combatant commander's request[s] [f]or
the attack submarine is not being met.
VICE ADMIRAL JOSEPH P. MULLOY, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES:
Yes, ma'am. As part of that four (ph)-structure assessment [sic: Force Structure
Assessment], there's actually nine analysis [sic: analyses:] of carriers, large service
combatants [and other ship types] and one of those is SSNs and SSBNs as well and
clearly, the [SSN] number is 48, it has been since the 2006 study.
Unfortunately, and we're probably above it right now, but based upon the
decommissioning rate of the Virginia Class—[correction:] of the 688 (ph) Class
submarines, we built them at four or five a year with the tremendous support of Congress
back in the '80s. We will go down to a number of 41 [SSNs] in 2009 [sic: 2029] and we'll
stable it [sic: stay] at 48 for over 10 more years.
So, it's important to get—actually, that multiyear [contact], [and] one item that we've
been asked by the host [sic: House] Arms Services Committee and we're looking at now
in next year's budget is, there's—in FY21, we got to one Virginia because we started
[procuring] the first Ohio Replacement [boat in FY2021].
AYOTTE:
You're reading my mind. We love this.
MULLOY:
That is clearly—that is—clearly, we are now looking at what are the disadvantages [sic]
that would come from the authorization of more of those ships in the multiyear. Could we
get further savings out of the halls [sic: hulls?] that—that we'll ask them and we'll have to
come back next year?
But clearly, the first submarine that fills in that activities (ph) is buying the [FY]'21
submarine. Mr. Stackley had commissioned a group and he'll probably talk—they'll talk
more about it, the Submarine Bill Unified Strategy that looked at Virginia Class, Virginia
payload, and Ohio Replacement. And we think we'd be able to do that.
AYOTTE:
Well, Secretary Stackley, I certainly love your comment on that of what Admiral Mulloy
just said because this is also something that has been raised by both the Chief and the
Vice Chief have expressed a real interest in not going down to one Virginia Class
submarine in 2021 and our ability to keep it at two. Even with two, you know, we have a
gap. But with one, it's just—it's not sensible.
SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION:
Yes, ma'am. We've been building two [Virginia class] submarines a year since 2011 and
this year is actually the first year. [that] We start delivering at two per year.
So, we've got stability in a [production] line. Admiral Mulloy referred to the Submarine
Unified Build Strategy. [FY]'21 is a challenge year because of the Ohio Replacement
[lead ship]. We spent a lot of time this past year working with industry taking a look at
how can we best build the Ohio Replacement program so that we can leverage the best of
our two submarine builders, Electric Boat and Newport News.
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And as we work through that, what we're uncovering is opportunity and capacity across
the two builders. So, one of the challenges was capacity and imposing a potential risk on
the Ohio Replacement. We think we have the capacity to address that.
The second challenge is design associated with the Ohio Replacement [program]. We
have that on track today. A third challenge then becomes cost. And so, as we look at
building the Virginia multiyear and as we look at driving down cost frankly in the Ohio
Replacement program, we're finding more opportunities.
So, we're working—this is a top priority in our [FY]2018 budget build, to be able to
come back and fill in that [second] [FY]2021 [Virginia-class] submarine because of all
the decisions going forward to mitigate the [SSN] shortfall that Admiral Mulloy
described. That vote [sic: boat, i.e., a second Virginia-class boat in FY2021] is the first
and best mitigation effort that we can have.
So, it's a priority. We think we have tools available to address it as opposed to just bring
it back to large bill and a lot of risk associated with it and we look forward to continue to
work with you all in the course of this year and with next year's budget to do so.
AYOTTE:
Well, I think that's excellent and I look forward to working with you both on that issue.37
Navy Plans for Building VPM-Equipped Virginia-Class Boats
As discussed earlier (see “Virginia Payload Module (VPM)”), the Navy plans to build one of the
two Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019, and all Virginia-class boats procured in FY2020
and subsequent years, with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM). An issue for Congress is
whether to approve, modify, or reject the Navy’s plans for building VPM-equipped Virginia-class
boats. In assessing this question, Congress may consider various factors, including the cost and
operational value of the VPM, the impact on the submarine construction industrial base and the
Virginia-class construction effort of building Virginia-class boats with VPMs, and the potential
impact, in a situation of constrained defense funding, on other Navy or DOD programs of funding
VPMs for Virginia-class boats.
Virginia-Class Procurement Rate More Generally in Coming Years
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the Virginia-class procurement rate more generally
in coming years (i.e., beyond the question of whether to procure an additional boat in FY2021),
particularly in the context of the SSN shortfall projected for FY2025-FY2036 shown in Table 2
and the larger debate over future U.S. defense strategy and defense spending.
Mitigating Projected SSN Shortfall
In addition to lengthening SSN deployments to 7 months and extending the service lives of
existing SSNs by periods ranging from 3 months to 24 months (see “2006 Navy Study on Options
for Mitigating Projected Shortfall” above), options for more fully mitigating the projected SSN
shortfall include
refueling a small number of (perhaps one to five) existing SSNs and extending
their service lives by 10 years or more, and
putting additional Virginia-class boats into the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
37 Transcript of hearing.
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Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement
It is not clear whether it would be feasible or cost-effective to refuel existing SSNs and extend
their service lives by 10 or more years, given factors such as limits on submarine pressure hull
life.
Larger Debate on Defense Strategy and Defense Spending
Some observers—particularly those who propose reducing U.S. defense spending as part of an
effort to reduce the federal budget deficit—have recommended that the SSN force-level goal be
reduced to something less than 48 boats, and/or that Virginia-class procurement be reduced. A
June 2010 report from a group called the Sustainable Defense Task Force recommends a Navy of
230 ships, including 37 SSNs,38 and a September 2010 report from the Cato Institute recommends
a Navy of 241 ships, including 40 SSNs.39 Both reports recommend limiting Virginia-class
procurement to one boat per year, as does a September 2010 report from the Center for American
Progress.40 A November 2010 report from a group called the Debt Reduction Task Force
recommends “deferring” Virginia-class procurement.41 The November 2010 draft
recommendations of the co-chairs of the Fiscal Commission include recommendations for
reducing procurement of certain weapon systems; the Virginia-class program is not among them.
Other observers have recommended that the SSN force-level goal should be increased to
something higher than 48 boats, particularly in light of Chinese naval modernization.42 The July
2010 report of an independent panel that assessed the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR)—an assessment that is required by the law governing QDRs (10 U.S.C. 118)—
recommends a Navy of 346 ships, including 55 SSNs.43 An April 2010 report from the Heritage
Foundation recommends a Navy of 309 ships, including 55 SSNs.44
Factors to consider in assessing whether to maintain, increase, or reduce the SSN force-level goal
and/or planned Virginia-class procurement include but are not limited to the federal budget and
debt situation, the value of SSNs in defending U.S. interests and implementing U.S. national
security strategy, and potential effects on the submarine industrial base.
As discussed earlier, Virginia-class boats scheduled for procurement in FY2014 are covered under
an MYP contract for the period FY2014-FY2018. This MYP contract includes the procurement of
two Virginia-class boats in FY2017. If fewer than two boats were procured in FY2017, the Navy
might need to terminate the MYP contract and pay a cancellation penalty to the contractor.
38 Debt, Deficits, and Defense, A Way Forward[:] Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force, June 11, 2010, pp.
19-20, 31.
39 Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, Washington, Cato
Institute, September 23, 2010 (Policy Analysis No. 667), p. 9.
40 Lawrence J. Korb and Laura Conley, Strong and Sustainable[:] How to Reduce Military Spending While Keeping
Our Nation Safe, Center for American Progress, September 2010, pp. 19-20.
41 Debt Reduction Task Force, Restoring America’s Future[:] Reviving the Economy, Cutting Spending and Debt, and
Creating a Simple, Pro-Growth Tax System, November 2010, p. 103.
42 For further discussion of China’s naval modernization effort, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval
Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
43 Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National
Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel,
Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.
44 A Strong National Defense[:] The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost, Heritage Foundation,
April 5, 2011, pp. 25-26.
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Three Virginia-Class Boats Built with Defective Parts
Another issue for Congress concerns three Virginia-class boats that were discovered to have been
built with defective parts, and the operational and cost implications of this situation. A March 28,
2016, press report states:
In early 2015 engineers on a brand-new submarine made a troubling find: A pipe joint
near the innermost chamber of its nuclear-powered engine showed signs of tampering.
The defective elbow pipe, used to funnel steam from the reactor to the sub's propulsion
turbines and generators, showed evidence of jury-rigged welding that could've been
designed to make it appear satisfactory. But the part was already installed, the sub already
commissioned.
These defective parts, each probably valued on the order of $10,000 or less, have kept the
$2.7 billion attack submarine Minnesota languishing in an overhaul for two years, while
engineers attempt to cut out and replace a difficult to reach part near the nuclear reactor.
Meanwhile, Navy engineers are scouring aircraft carriers and other submarines for
problems and criminal investigators are gathering evidence.
The unauthorized parts are impacting three new Virginia-class attack submarines, likely
extending the post-shakedown overhauls for the other two subs and adding greatly to the
final tab at a time these fearsome vessels are needed around the globe to defend carrier
groups and strike America's adversaries. It's also trapped its crew in limbo as repair
deadlines come and go, while other subs must take their place.
The Minnesota, the 10th Virginia-class attack boat, was delivered 11 months ahead of
schedule. But it has been in the shipyards at Electric Boat in Groton, Connecticut for two
years — more than twice as long as a normal post-shakedown availability. It still has
months to go. The plankowner crew has spent only a handful of days at sea since joining
the fleet and experts say they're likely to forfeit their whole deployment cycle, forcing
fleet bosses to make tough decisions about whether to extend deployments or withhold
forces from missions overseas.
News of the lousy parts first emerged in August, a month after the Minnesota was to have
finished its overhaul. Since then, a Justice Department-led investigation is examining the
quality control issues that led the shoddy part to be installed in the $2.7-billion sub.
The same shoddy elbow joints were installed aboard attack subs North Dakota and John
Warner, forcing the Navy to spend millions of dollars and many more months to repair
them. If these pipes ruptured, they would leak steam and force the submarine to take
emergency measures that would impair its combat effectiveness....
At the center of the debacle is pipe-maker Nuflo Inc., a Jacksonville, Florida-based
manufacturer that is the focus of the investigation into quality control issues, according to
two Navy sources familiar with the inquiry. The investigation has delayed the repairs so
that agents can recover evidence, sources said....
Making matters worse are concerns that the flawed pipe fittings may extend well beyond
the three identified attack submarines. In a statement, NAVSEA, which oversees ship
construction and maintenance, said it has sent inspectors across the fleet to test Nuflo-
made fittings on other ships.
“As part of an ongoing investigation into a quality control issue with a supplier, General
Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Incorporated, Newport News, determined
that fittings supplied by the vendor in question required additional testing and repair due
to incorrect test documentation, incorrect testing, or unauthorized and undocumented
weld repairs performed on these fittings,” a NAVSEA spokeswoman said in the
statement. “The fittings, which are used in various piping applications aboard new
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construction submarines, are also installed on other ships. Therefore, out of an abundance
of caution, the Navy, in coordination with its industry partners, has been performing
additional inspections and surveys throughout the fleet to fully bound the issue.”
The full scope of the problem remains unclear. NAVSEA declined to comment on
whether any other shoddy parts had been found on other ships, citing the ongoing
investigation....
Spokespeople for the Navy and NAVSEA declined to provide an estimated cost for
Minnesota's extra year in the shipyards or to say how much it will likely cost to fix the
John Warner and North Dakota. The Navy spokesman acknowledged that maintenance
delays affect what ships are sent on deployment, but declined to go into any specifics
about how other crews were affected.
“Generally speaking, delays in maintenance periods will impact the overall operational
availability of the submarine force,” Lt. Cmdr. Tim Hawkins said. “Leaders regularly
review operational schedules and adjust them based on force availability and presence
requirements. Attack submarines, which are always in high demand, will continue to be
deployed when and where they are needed most.”
No subs have been recalled from deployment for related repairs, NAVSEA said. But the
parts must be replaced within a few years of its commissioning to reduce the risk that the
joint will leak or even burst in a combat scenario.
It the pipe joint were to rupture, it would not cause a radioactive incident. But it could
effectively render the submarine unable to operate for weeks or months until fixed. The
crew of the attack submarine Jefferson City discovered a water leak in the propulsion
plant; finding and fixing that kept the sub stuck in Guam for five months in 2014....
What’s not clear is how long the repairs of John Warner and North Dakota will take, how
many other ships have these deficient fittings, and what the total cost will be in terms of
money and lost operational time.
The Navy refuses to comment while the investigation grinds on.45
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
How did this problem of defective parts occur in the Virginia-class program,
which has been in production since FY1998? Was there a breakdown in the
following of procedures, and if so, what was the nature of the breakdown, and
why did it happen?
How many Virginia-class boats (or other Navy ships) are affected?
How much time and money will it cost to fix the affected ships? How much of
this cost will be borne by the government, and how much by private industry?
What is the operational impact of affected ships being unavailable for
deployment due to the need to fix problems with these defective parts?
When does the Navy anticipate completing its investigation into the matter?
What steps has the Navy taken, or what steps does it plan to take, to ensure that
this does not happen again in the Virginia-class program or other Navy
shipbuilding programs?
45 David Larter, “Secret Weld: How Shoddy Parts Disabled A $2.7 Billion Submarine,” Navy Times, March 28, 2016.
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Legislative Activity for FY2017
Congressional Action on FY2017 Funding Request
Table 3 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2017 funding request for the Virginia-
class program.
Table 3. Congressional Action on FY2017 Funding
(Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)
Authorization
Appropriation
Request
HASC
SASC
Conf.
HAC
SAC
Conf.
Virginia class procurement
3,188.0
Virginia class advance procurement (AP)
1,767.2
Virginia Payload Module (VPM) research
97.9
and development (PE 0604580N, line 128)
Source: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s FY2017 budget submission.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee; SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee, SAC is
Senate Appropriations Committee, HAC is House Appropriations Committee, Conf. is conference agreement.
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Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan Administration
(1981-1989).
The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and maintaining a
force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally
called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.46 In 1992, however, the SSN goal
was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level requirement study
(updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level
acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.47
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy,
established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs.48 The
Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR supported a requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and
established a tentative SSN force-level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of
peacetime operational requirements.”49 The Clinton Administration later amended the SSN figure
to 55 boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in December 1999. The study
had three main conclusions:
“that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 62 [SSNs] in
the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the regional military commanders-
in-chief] with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands
without gapping other requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this
force structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to meet the
modeled war fighting requirements”;
“that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18 Virginia class
SSNs in the 2015 time frame”; and
46 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials, Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral
Raymond G. Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in U.S. Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs,
June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
47 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July 1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub
Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,” Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9;
Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon
Urges Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “ Size of Sub
Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
48 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, pp.
55-57.
49 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
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“that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame
would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence community’s highest
operational and collection requirements.”50
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of required SSN force
levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not translated into official DOD force-level
goals.
The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended
requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs. In revalidating
this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD’s
“transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value
from each element of the force—DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and
reorganize the Armed Forces.”51
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in 2003-2004. One of
the Navy studies—an internal Navy study done in 2004—reportedly recommended reducing the
attack submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly
recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack
submarines.52
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force levels out to
FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035—a 260-ship fleet including 37 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs and 4 SSGNs.53
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack submarine
requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.54
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships, including
48 SSNs. Some of the Navy’s ship force-level goals have changed since 2006, and the goals now
add up to a desired fleet of 308 ships. The figure of 48 SSNs, however, remains unchanged from
2006.
50 Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy, February 14, 2000, p. 5.
51 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
52 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p. 1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study
Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May 13, 2004.
53 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of
Naval Vessels for FY 2006. The report was delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees on March 23, 2005.
54 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day (New London, CT), May 27,
2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.
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Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs
This appendix presents information on some alternatives for funding SSNs that was originally
incorporated into this report during discussions in earlier years on potential options for Virginia-
class procurement.
Alternative methods of funding the procurement of SSNs include but are not necessarily limited
to the following:
two years of advance procurement funding followed by full funding—the
traditional approach, under which there are two years of advance procurement
funding for the SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of
the boat’s procurement funding in the year of procurement;
one year of advance procurement funding followed by full funding—one year
of advance procurement funding for the SSN’s long-leadtime components,
followed by the remainder of the boat’s procurement funding in the year of
procurement;
full funding with no advance procurement funding (single-year full
funding)—full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, with no advance
procurement funding in prior years;
incremental funding—partial funding of the SSN in the year of procurement,
followed by one or more years of additional funding increments needed to
complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
advance appropriations—a form of full funding that can be viewed as a
legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.55
Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the FY2008 budget,
suggested that two years of advance procurement funding are required to fund the procurement of
an SSN, and consequently that additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the
earliest.56 This testimony understated Congress’s options regarding the procurement of additional
SSNs in the near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of advance
procurement funding (which is used primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion
components), Congress can procure an SSN without prior-year advance procurement funding, or
with only one year of advance procurement funding. Consequently, Congress at that time had
option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or FY2010.
Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships
for which no prior-year advance procurement funding had been provided. Specifically, Congress
used single-year full funding in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71,
and again in FY1988 to procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement,
55 For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement:
Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
56 For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008 Department
of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships the Navy might want to procure in
FY2008, should additional funding be made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter stated in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced procurement, to be
able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we would need to start two years in advance. What
that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08 with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year
to 2010.” (Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same subcommittee on
March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007.
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under the Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in
FY1990 and FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial advance
procurement payment for CVN-74. Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to
accelerate the procurement of both ships to FY1988, and fully funded the two ships that year at a
combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.57
The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor components was
not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and 75 with single-year full
funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more quickly. What made it possible for
Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full funding was Congress’s constitutional authority
to appropriate funding for that purpose.
Procuring an SSN with one year of advance procurement funding or no advance procurement
funding would not materially change the way the SSN would be built—the process would still
encompass about two years of advance work on long-leadtime components, and an additional six
years or so of construction work on the ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as
outlays for construction of the ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal.
Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships would not begin
construction for some time and consequently would take longer to enter service than a ship of that
kind would normally require. When Congress procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
(CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both
cases in the knowledge that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some
time after the first.
57 In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear propulsion components in
inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted the carriers to be built more quickly than would have
otherwise been the case, but it is not what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it
possible was Congress’s authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.
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Appendix C. July 2014 Navy Report to Congress on
Virginia Payload Module (VPM)
The joint explanatory statement for the FY2014 DOD Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R.
3547/P.L. 113-76 of January 17, 2014) requires the Navy to submit biannual reports to the
congressional defense committees describing the actions the Navy is taking to minimize costs for
the VPM.58 This appendix reprints the first of these reports, which is dated July 2014.59
58 See PDF page 239 of 351 of the joint explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 3547.
59 The report was posted at InsideDefense.com (subscription required) on November 13, 2014.
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Author Contact Information
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610
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