Order Code RL32418
Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and
Procurement Rate: Background and
Issues for Congress
Updated April 26, 2007
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress
Summary
Of the 281 ships in the Navy at the end of FY2006, 55 were nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs). The Navy is planning to maintain in coming years a fleet
of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs.
The Navy is currently procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class SSNs. The first was
procured in FY1998, a total of nine have been procured through FY2007, and the
first two had entered service as of the end of FY2006.
The FY2008-FY2013 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) proposes procuring
one Virginia-class boat per year through FY2011, and then two boats per year starting
in FY2012.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $2,571.3 million in the Navy’s
shipbuilding budget (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, or SCN, appropriation
account) for the Virginia-class program. This total includes $1,796.2 million to
complete the procurement funding for the Virginia-class boat that the Navy is
requesting to procure in FY2008, which would be the tenth ship in the program. The
total estimated procurement cost of this ship is $2,653.7 million, and the ship has
received a total of $857.5 million in prior-year funding. The $2,571.3 million being
requested for the program for FY2008 also includes, among other things, $702.7
million in advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in
future years.
The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be
sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. The Navy
projects that the SSN force under this plan would fall below 48 boats during the 14-
year period 2020-2033, reaching a minimum of 40 boats in 2028-2029. In addition,
for the first time in about 50 years, there is currently no new submarine being
designed, which has led to a decline in work for submarine designers and engineers.
Issues for Congress include the following: Is 48 the correct number of SSNs to
meet future needs? Should the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement be
accelerated from FY2012 to an earlier year, so as to come closer to maintaining a
force of 48 SSNs in the 2020s-2030s, and if so, how might that be done financially?
How should the submarine design and engineering base be maintained in coming
years?
There are several potential options for mitigating the projected SSN shortfall,
including, among other things, compressing SSN construction times, increasing SSN
operational tempo, extending SSN service lives, and procuring SSNs that are in
addition to those the Navy plans to procure. Congress has several options for
procuring additional SSNs in the near term, and for providing additional work to the
submarine design and engineering base. This report will be updated as events
warrant.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Submarines in the U.S. Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Types of Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Roles and Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Attack Submarine Force Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Historical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
As of End of FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Joint Production Arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Procurement Through FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Boats in Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Multiyear Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Planned Procurement Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Cost-Reduction Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Funding Requirements for Accelerated Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Submarine Construction Industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Design and Engineering Portion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Projected SSN Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Projected Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Navy Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Potential Options for Mitigating the Shortfall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Reducing SSN Construction Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Increasing SSN Operational Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Extending SSN Service Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Procuring Additional SSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Combining Life Extension and Procuring Additional SSNs . . . . . . . . 14
Alternative Funding Approaches for Additional SSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Procuring SSNs Without Advance Procurement Funding . . . . . . . . . . 16
Procuring SSNs With Single-Year Full Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Procuring SSNs in a 2-1-2 Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
48-Boat Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Accelerated Virginia-Class Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Navy View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Alternative View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Maintaining the Design and Engineering Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Potential Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Options for Procuring Additional SSNs in FY2008-FY2011 . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Procuring One Additional Boat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Procuring Two Additional Boats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Procuring Three Additional Boats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Procuring Four Additional Boats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Options for Submarine Design and Engineering Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Legislative Activity for FY2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix B. Views Regarding 48-Boat SSN Force-Level Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Navy View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Alternative View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
List of Tables
Table 1. Virginia-Class Procurement, FY1998-FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Table 2. Planned Virginia-Class Procurement in Various FYDPs . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 3. Funding for Accelerated Virginia-Class Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 4. SSN Force Level, 2008-2037 (Navy Projection) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 5. SSN Shortfall and Service-Life Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table 6. SSN Shortfall and Procuring Additional SSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Table 7. Life Extension Combined With Additional SSNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 8. Some Potential Profiles for Procuring Two Additional Boats . . . . . . . . 21
Table 9. Some Potential Profiles for Procuring Three Additional Boats . . . . . . 21

Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
and Procurement Rate:
Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
Of the 281 ships in the Navy at the end of FY2006, 55 were nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSNs). The Navy is planning to maintain in coming years a fleet
of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs.1
The Navy is currently procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class SSNs. The first was
procured in FY1998, a total of nine have been procured through FY2007, and the
first two had entered service as of the end of FY2006.
The FY2008-FY2013 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) proposes procuring
one Virginia-class boat per year through FY2011, and then two boats per year starting
in FY2012.
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $2,571.3 million in the Navy’s
shipbuilding budget (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, or SCN, appropriation
account) for the Virginia-class program. This total includes $1,796.2 million to
complete the procurement funding for the Virginia-class boat that the Navy is
requesting to procure in FY2008, which would be the tenth ship in the program. The
total estimated procurement cost of this ship is $2,653.7 million, and the ship has
received a total of $857.5 million in prior-year funding. The $2,571.3 million being
requested for the program for FY2008 also includes, among other things, $702.7
million in advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in
future years.
The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be
sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. The Navy
projects that the SSN force under this plan would fall below 48 boats during the 14-
year period 2020-2033, reaching a minimum of 40 boats in 2028-2029. In addition,
for the first time in about 50 years, there is currently no new submarine being
designed, which has led to a decline in work for submarine designers and engineers.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the
administration’s plans for the future size of the SSN force, for procuring Virginia-
class submarines, and for maintaining the submarine design and engineering base.
1 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O’Rourke.

CRS-2
Congress’s decisions on these issues could significantly affect future Navy
capabilities, Navy funding requirements, and the submarine industrial base.
Background
Submarines in the U.S. Navy
Types of Submarines. Submarines are one of four principal categories of
combat ships that traditionally have helped define the size and structure of the U.S.
Navy. The other three are aircraft carriers, surface combatants (e.g., cruisers,
destroyers, frigates, and Littoral Combat Ships), and amphibious ships.2
Submarines can be powered by either nuclear reactors or non-nuclear power
sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-
powered.3 A submarine's use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source
is not an indication of whether it is armed with nuclear weapons. A nuclear-powered
submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered submarine can be
armed with nuclear weapons.
Roles and Missions. U.S. Navy submarines fall into three types — nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).4
SSBNs. The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their
nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and thereby deter a
strategic nuclear attack on the United States. Although this mission is often
associated with the Cold War-era nuclear competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union, it has continued, with some modifications, in the post-Cold War
2 The Navy also includes mine warfare ships and a variety of auxiliary and support ships.
3 Until recently, an exception for the U.S. Navy was the non-combat auxiliary submarine
Dolphin (AGSS-555), a small submarine that the Navy used for research and development
work. As a non-combat research asset, the Dolphin was not included in counts of the total
number of submarines (or battle force ships of all kinds) in the Navy. The Dolphin was
decommissioned on January 15, 2007.
Until the 1950s, the U.S. Navy included many non-nuclear-powered combat submarines.
Following the advent of nuclear power in the mid-1950s, construction of new non-nuclear-
powered combat submarines ended and the total number of non-nuclear-powered combat
submarines in Navy service began to decline. The Navy’s last in-service non-nuclear-
powered combat submarine was retired in 1990.
Most military submarines around the world are non-nuclear-powered. Five countries — the
United States, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Russia, and China — operate nuclear-
powered submarines. The United States and the UK operate all-nuclear submarine fleets,
while the other three countries operate both nuclear- and non-nuclear-powered submarines.
4 In the designations SSBN, SSGN, and SSN, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-
powered, B stands for ballistic missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise
missile).

CRS-3
era.5 As of the end of FY2006, the Navy included 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class
SSBNs, which are commonly called Trident submarines because they carry Trident
SLBMs. Each Trident SSBN can carry 24 Trident SLBMs.
SSGNs. The Navy’s SSGNs, which are a new addition to the fleet,6 are former
Trident SSBNs that are being converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk cruise
missiles and special operations forces (SOF) rather than SLBMs. A total of four
SSGNs are planned; the first was completed in January 2006, and the fourth is
scheduled to be completed by September 2007. Upon reentering service as SSGNs,
the ships are scheduled to remain in operation for about 20 years.7
Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission
orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and
SOF support, while the SSNs are more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can
perform other submarine missions and are sometimes included in counts of the
projected total number of Navy attack submarines.
SSNs. The SSNs — the focus of this report — are general-purpose submarines
that perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions, including the following:
! covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of
it done for national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
! covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than
possible with the SSGNs);
! covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise
missiles (again on a smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
! covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
! anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
! anti-surface ship warfare.
5 For a discussion of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons policy and force structure, see CRS Report
RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, by Amy F. Woolf.
6 The Navy in the late 1950s and early 1960s built and operated two non-nuclear-powered
cruise missile submarines (or SSGs — the Grayback [SSG-574] and the Growler [SSG-577])
and one nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (the Halibut [SSGN-587]). The
submarines could each carry two Regulus II strategic nuclear cruise missiles. In the mid-
1960s, following the deployment of the Navy’s initial SSBNs, the Regulus cruise missile
was removed from service and the Grayback, Growler, and Halibut were converted into
attack and auxiliary transport submarines.
7 Each SSGN as converted will retain its 24 large (7-foot-diameter, 44-foot-long) SLBM
launch tubes. In one possible configuration, 22 of these tubes would be used to carry a total
of 154 Tomahawks (7 Tomahawks per tube) while the remaining two would be used as
lockout chambers for an embarked force of 66 SOF personnel. In the future, the 24 tubes
could be used to carry large numbers of other payloads, such as unmanned vehicles. The
SSGNs as converted will also retain their four original 21-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and
their internal torpedo magazines. In discussing the SSGNs, Navy officials often express a
desire to take maximum advantage of the very large payload volume on each SSGN by
developing new unmanned vehicles or other advanced payloads. For more on the Navy’s
SSGN conversion program, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion
(SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O’Rourke.

CRS-4
During the Cold War, ASW against the Soviet submarine force was the primary
stated mission of U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery
operations were important on a day-to-day basis as well.8 In the post-Cold War era,
although maintaining a capability for conducting anti-submarine warfare against the
Russian submarine force remains a mission, the SSN force now focuses more on
performing missions oriented toward countries other than Russia and toward non-
state entities such as terrorist organizations.
Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313
ships, including 48 SSNs. Under this plan, SSNs would account for about 15% of
the fleet. For a review of SSN force level goals since the Reagan Administration, see
Appendix A.
Attack Submarine Force Levels
Historical. During the first half of the Cold War, the total number of attack
submarines (both nuclear- and non-nuclear-powered) accounted for an increasing
percentage of the total size of the Navy, increasing from roughly 10% of total battle
force ships in the early 1950s to about 17% by the late 1970s. Since that time, attack
submarines have accounted for roughly 17% to 22% of total battle force ships. At
the end of FY2006, they accounted for about 20% (55 ships of 281).
The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, peaked
at 98 boats at the end of FY1987, and then began to decline. The force included 85
to 88 boats during the early 1990s, 79 boats at the end of FY1996, 65 boats at the end
of FY1998, 57 boats at the end of FY1999, and 56 boats at the end of FY2000. It has
since numbered 53 to 56 boats.
As of End of FY2006. The 55 SSNs in service at the end of FY2006 included
the following:
! 50 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
! 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
! 2 Virginia (SSN-774) class boat.
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class SSNs. A total of 62 Los Angeles-class
submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between FY1970 and FY1990 and
entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four 21-inch
diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise
missiles in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class
(SSN-719 and higher) are equipped with an additional 12 vertical launch system
(VLS) tubes in their bows for carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise
missiles. The final 23 boats in the class (SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further
8 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection
operations during the Cold War, see Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette
Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).

CRS-5
improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles class boats or 688Is. As
of the end of FY2006, 12 of the 62 boats in the class had been retired.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class SSNs. The Seawolf class was originally intended
to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three
boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated changes in military
requirements. The three Seawolf-class submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21), the
Connecticut (SSN-22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were
procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively.
SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was suspended in 1992
and then reinstated in FY1996. It was commissioned into service on February 19,
2005. Seawolf-class submarines are larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous
U.S. Navy SSNs,9 and are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and
can carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles.
Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program
General. The Virginia-class attack submarine was designed to be less
expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the
Seawolf-class design. The Virginia-class design is slightly larger than the Los
Angeles-class design,10 but incorporates newer technologies. Virginia-class boats
currently cost about $2.7 billion each to procure.
Joint Production Arrangement. Virginia-class boats are built jointly by
General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset
Point, RI, and Northrop Grumman Newport News Shipbuilding (NGNN) of Newport
News, VA.11 Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat,
NGNN builds certain other parts of each boat, and the yards take turns building the
reactor compartments and performing final assembly of the boats. GD/EB is building
the reactor compartments and performing final assembly on boats 1, 3, and so on,
while NGNN is doing so on boats 2, 4, and so on. The arrangement results in a
roughly 50-50 division of Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves
both yards’ ability to build submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a
submarine-construction yard) and perform submarine final-assembly work.
The joint production arrangement is a departure from past U.S. submarine
construction practices, under which complete submarines were built in individual
yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over the Virginia-
class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that
9 Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged
displacement of about 7,150 tons. Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet. SSN-21 and
SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons. SSN-23 was built to a
modified configuration. It is 100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged
displacement of 12,158 tons.
10 Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons.
11 GD/EB and NGNN are the only two shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-
powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while NGNN also builds nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships.

CRS-6
occurred in 1995-1997 (i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense
budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB and NGNN involved
in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards
capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties
of using two yards rather than one to build a submarine design that is being procured
at a low annual rate.
Procurement Through FY2006. As shown in Table 1, nine Virginia-class
boats have been procured through FY2007.
Table 1. Virginia-Class Procurement, FY1998-FY2006
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Boats in Service. The first two Virginia-class boats entered service on
October 23, 2004 and September 9, 2006.
Multiyear Procurement. The five Virginia-class boats being procured in
FY2004-FY2008 are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP)
arrangement.12 The Navy estimates that this MYP arrangement will reduce the total
cost of the five boats by a total of about $400 million, or an average of $80 million
per boat.13
Section 8008 of the conference report (H.Rept. 108-283 of September 24, 2003)
on the FY2004 defense appropriations act (H.R. 2568/P.L. 108-87 of September 30,
2003) approved the five-boat MYP arrangement for FY2004-FY2009, “Provided,
That the Secretary of the Navy may not enter into a multiyear contract for the
procurement of more than one Virginia Class submarine per year.” Accompanying
report language stated that “The Navy’s request to procure more than one submarine
in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 is denied....”14 The Navy and other observers interpreted
Section 8008 and the accompanying report language as strongly cautioning the Navy
against including funding in future budgets to support the procurement of a second
boat in either FY2007 or FY2008.
The Navy plans to request congressional approval for a new MYP arrangement
to cover the seven Virginia-class boats planned for procurement in FY2009-FY2013.
12 As part of its proposed FY2004 budget submitted to Congress in February 2003, the Navy
requested multiyear procurement authority (MYP) to procure a total of seven Virginia-class
boats during the five-year period FY2004-FY2008 (i.e., one boat per year for
FY2004-FY2006, then two boats per year for FY2007-FY2008). Congress, as part of its
action on the FY2004 defense budget, granted authority in appropriation bill language for
a five-boat MYP during this period (i.e., one boat per year for FY2004-FY2008).
13 The Navy estimated that a seven-boat MYP arrangement would have reduced the cost of
the seven boats in question by an average of about $115 million per boat.
14 H.Rept. 108-283, p. 185.

CRS-7
Planned Procurement Rates. When Virginia-class procurement began in
the 1990s, DOD originally projected that the procurement rate would increase to two
boats per year in FY2002. (The originally envisaged procurement profile for the
Virginia-class program for the years FY1998-FY2002 was 1-0-1-0-2.) In subsequent
budgets, the date for starting two-per-year procurement was progressively pushed
back, and it is now FY2012. Table 2 shows planned Virginia-class procurement in
FYDPs submitted since the mid-1990s.
Table 2. Planned Virginia-Class Procurement in Various FYDPs
FYDP (date
9
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
submitted)
8
9
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1
2
3
FY95-99 (2/94)
1
0
FY96-01 (2/95)
1
0
1
0
FY97-01 (3/96)
1
1a
1
1a
FY98-03 (2/97)
1
1
0
1
1
0
FY99-03 (2/98)
1
0
1
1
0
FY00-05 (2/99)
0
1
1
1
1
1
FY01-05 (2/00)
1
1
1
1
1
FY2002 (6/01)b
1
FY03-07 (2/02)
1
1
1
1
1
FY04-09 (2/03)
1
1
1
2
2
2
FY05-09 (2/04)
1
1
1
1
2
FY06-11 (2/05)
1
1
1
1
1
1
FY07-11 (2/06)
1
1
1
1
1
FY08-13 (2/07)
1
1
1
1
2
2
Source: Prepared by CRS using Navy data.
a. Included at Congressional direction, but not funded in the plan.
b. Submission for FY2002 budget only; no FYDP for FY2002-FY2007 submitted.
Cost-Reduction Goal. The Navy says that its plan to increase Virginia-class
procurement to two per year starting in FY2012 is contingent on being able to reduce
the procurement cost of Virginia-class submarines to $2.0 billion each in constant
FY2005 dollars, compared to a current cost of about $2.4 billion each in constant
FY2005 dollars. The Navy has established cost-reduction targets for several of its
shipbuilding programs, but the Virginia-class program is apparently the only program
that must meet its cost reduction target as an internal Navy condition for retaining all
ships of that type in the Navy’s shipbuilding program.
The Navy calculates that the target cost of $2.0 billion in constant FY2005
dollars translates into about $2.6 billion for a boat procured in FY2012, and about
$2.7 billion for a boat procured in FY2013.
The Navy says that, in constant FY2005 dollars, about $200 million of the $400
million in sought-after cost reductions would be accomplished simply through the
improved economies of scale (e.g., better spreading of shipyard fixed costs and
improved learning rates) of producing two submarines per year rather than one per
year. The remaining $200 million in sought-after cost reductions, the Navy says, is
to be accomplished through changes in the ship’s design and in the shipyard

CRS-8
production process. The design changes, the Navy says, are scheduled to be ready
for boats procured in FY2012. Consequently, the Navy says, the $2.0 billion target
cost cannot be fully achieved before FY2012. The Navy says that if improved
economies of scale and changes in the ship’s design and in the shipyard production
process are insufficient to achieve the $2.0-billion target, it may consider reducing
the capabilities of the Virginia class in certain areas until the target is achieved.15
The Navy’s goal to reduce the cost of each Virginia-class boat to $2.0 billion in
constant FY2005 dollars as a condition for increasing the procurement rate to two
boats per year in FY2012 is a goal that the Navy has set for itself. While Congress
may take this goal into account, it need not control congressional action. Congress
may decide to fund the procurement of two boats per year in FY2012 or some other
year even if the goal is not met.
Funding Requirements for Accelerated Production. Some observers
have proposed accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class production to a
year earlier than FY2012, so as to mitigate a projected future shortfall in SSNs that
is discussed in the next section. Table 3 shows the additional funding that the Navy
says would be needed in FY2008-FY2011 to accelerate the start of two-per-year
Virginia-class procurement to FY2010. As shown in the table, the Navy estimates
that this would require adding $400 million in additional funding in FY2008, and a
total of $5.1 billion in additional funding through FY2011.
Table 3. Funding for Accelerated Virginia-Class Procurement
(procurement funding in billions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)
FY08-
FY11
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
total
FY2007-FY2011 FYDP
Ship quantity
1
1
1
1
4
Program funding
2.5
3.4
3.7
3.7
13.3
Acceleration of two-per year procurement to FY2009
Ship quantity
1
1
2
2
6
Program funding
2.9
4.2
5.9
5.4
18.4
Additional funding for acceleration relative to FY2009-FY2011 FYDP
0.4
0.8
2.2
1.7
5.1
Source: U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Accelerating Virginia-Class Submarine Construction,
February 2007.
15 For more on the Navy’s plan for reducing the procurement cost of the Virginia-class
design, see Statement of Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship
Programs) and RDML {Rear Admiral] William Hilarides, Program Executive Officer for
Submarines, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee [hearing on] Force Structure Requirements and Alternative
Funding Strategies for the United States Submarine Fleet, March 8, 2007, and William
Hilarides, “2 For 4 in 2012, The Virginia-Class Road Ahead,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
, June 2006: 68-69.

CRS-9
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
General. In addition to GD/EB and NGNN, the submarine construction
industrial base includes scores of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research
facilities, in numerous states. About 80% of the total procured material from supplier
firms (measured in dollars rather than pieces, parts, or purchase orders) comes from
single or sole source suppliers. Observers in recent years have expressed concern for
the continued survival of many of these firms. For nuclear-propulsion component
suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier construction program.16 In terms of work provided to these firms, a
carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion
plants.
Design and Engineering Portion. The part of the submarine industrial
base that some observers are currently most concerned about is the design and
engineering portion, much of which is resident at GD/EB and NGNN. (A small
portion is resident at a some of the component makers.) With Virginia-class design
work now winding down and no other submarine-design projects underway, the
submarine design and engineering base is facing the near-term prospect, for the first
time in about 50 years, of having no major submarine-design project on which to
work.
Navy and industry officials, some Members of Congress, and some other
observers are concerned that unless a major submarine-design project is begun soon,
the submarine design and engineering base will begin to atrophy through the
departure of experienced personnel. Rebuilding an atrophied submarine design and
engineering base, Navy and industry officials believe, could be time-consuming,
adding time and cost to the task of the next submarine-design effort, whenever it
might begin. Concern about this possibility among some Navy and industry officials
has been strengthened by the UK’s difficulties a few years ago in designing its new
Astute-class SSN. The UK submarine design and engineering base atrophied for lack
of work, and the subsequent Astute-class design effort experienced considerable
delays and cost overruns. Submarine designers and engineers from GD/EB were
assigned to the Astute-class project to help the UK overcome these problems.17
Projected SSN Shortfall
The Projected Shortfall. The Navy’s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if
implemented, would not be sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently
over the long run. As shown in Table 4, the Navy projects that the SSN force under
16 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O’Rourke.
17 See, for example, Andrew Chuter, “U.K. Spending Mounts for U.S. Help on Sub,”
Defense News, September 13, 2005: 4; Richard Scott, “Electric Boat Provides Project
Director for Astute Class,” Jane’s Navy International, May 2004: 33; Richard Scott, “Astute
Sets Out on the Long Road to Recovery,” Jane’s Navy International, December 2003, pp.
28-30; Richard Scott, “Recovery Plan Shapes Up for Astute Submarines,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly
, November 19, 2003, p. 26.

CRS-10
this plan would fall below 48 boats during the 14-year period 2020-2033, reaching
a minimum of 40 boats in 2028-2029. Since the Navy plans to retire the four SSGNs
by 2028 without procuring any replacements for them, no SSGNs would be available
in 2028 and subsequent years to help compensate for a drop in SSN force level below
48 boats.
Table 4. SSN Force Level, 2008-2037 (Navy Projection)
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
52
53
52
52
53
54
51
51
49
49
48
49
47
47
46
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
46
45
44
43
42
40
40
41
43
44
46
48
49
51
52
Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY
2008
, p. 6.
The potential for the Navy’s long-range SSN procurement plan to produce a
shortfall in the SSN force over the long run has been discussed by CRS since 1995,
in the form of testimony to Congress in 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, and
2006, a 1997 CRS presentation to a Defense Science Board task force on the
submarine of the future, which issued its report in 1998;18 a 1999-2000 CRS report,19
a 2002 CRS report,20 and this report since its inception in 2004.
Navy Study. In testimony to Congress in 2006, Navy officials have stated that
the Navy has conducted a study on options for mitigating the projected SSN
shortfall.21 Navy officials have testified that employing a combination of options
could reduce the maximum SSN shortfall from the currently projected figure of 8
boats to something like 2 or 3 boats. Specific options mentioned by the Navy are
discussed in the next section.
Potential Options for Mitigating the Shortfall
In addition to reducing submarine construction time, potential options for
mitigating the projected SSN shortfall include:
! reducing SSN construction time;
18 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition
& Technology, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on [the] Submarine of the
Future
, July 1998, pp. 7, 19-20.
19 CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine Programs: Background and Issues for
Congress
(out of print; for a copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
20 CRS Report RL31372, Navy Shipbuilding in the FY2003 Defense Budget: Issues for
Congress
(out of print; for a copy, contact the author at 707-7610), by Ronald O’Rourke.
21 See, for example, the testimony of Navy officials before the Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2006, and
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007. The discussion of Navy
views in this section and the following section is based on this testimony.

CRS-11
! taking steps to improve the operational availability of SSNs;
! extending SSN service life; and
! procuring SSNs in addition to those that the Navy plans to procure.
Each of these options is discussed below.
Reducing SSN Construction Time. One option for mitigating the
projected SSN shortfall, Navy officials have testified, concerns the Navy’s plan for
reducing the construction time of Virginia-class submarines by one year — from
about six years to about five years. This effort forms part of the Navy’s Virginia-
class cost-reduction effort. The Navy hopes to fully achieve a one-year reduction in
construction time with the boats to be procured in FY2012. This reduction in
construction time, Navy officials have testified, will increase the size of the SSN
force in coming years by two boats above current projections.22
Increasing SSN Operational Availability. A second option for mitigating
the projected SSN shortfall that Navy officials have mentioned would be to increase
the operational tempo of SSNs during the time of the shortfall, so that a force of less
than 48 boats could, for a time, look more like a force of 48 boats in terms of the total
number of deployed SSNs or the total number of SSN days on station.
Possible steps that could be taken to increase SSN operational availability
include but are not necessarily limited to the following, some of which could be
combined:
! rescheduling planned SSN maintenance away from the shortfall
years (i.e., accelerating it to years before the shortfall, or deferring
it to years after the shortfall);
! increasing average SSN transit speeds between home port and
overseas operating areas during the shortfall period, so as to increase
the fraction of deployed time that is actually spent on station;
! reducing transit distances to overseas operating areas during the
shortfall period by temporarily transferring some SSNs from home
ports in the continental United States to more-forward home ports
such as Pearl Harbor or Guam; and
! operating SSNs during the shortfall period with an average of more
than one crew per boat.
22 Although Navy officials did not provide a more detailed explanation in their testimony,
it can be observed that, in a program in which boats are being procured at a rate of two per
year, accelerating by one year the deliveries of all boats procured on or after a certain date
will produce a one-time benefit of a single year in which four boats will be delivered to the
Navy, rather than two. In the case of the Virginia-class program, this year might be around
FY2018.

CRS-12
Although these measures could, for a time at least, make a force of fewer than
48 SSNs look more like a force of 48 SSNs in terms of the total number of deployed
SSNs or the total number of SSN days on station, they have some potential
disadvantages:
! Rescheduling planned maintenance away from the shortfall years
could reduce average SSN operational availability in years before or
after the shortfall. If, in the years before or after the shortfall, the
SSN fleet is at or not much above the 48-boat figure, then this might
lead to a shortfall in the number of SSNs deployed (or the total
number of SSN days on station) in these other years.
! Accelerating planned maintenance for an SSN to a year prior to the
shortfall period might lead to a longer-than-optimal interval for that
SSN between the accelerated maintenance availability and the SSN’s
next planned maintenance availability. If such a lengthened interval
were deemed undesirable, subsequent maintenance availabilities
might need to be similarly accelerated, which could result, toward
the end of the ship’s life, in a need to schedule one more
maintenance availability than would normally be required for an
SSN with a 33-year life. This could increase the SSN’s total life-
cycle maintenance costs and increase the fraction of its life spent in
maintenance.
! Deferring planned maintenance for an SSN to a year after the
shortfall might lead to a longer-than-optimal interval for that SSN
between the previous maintenance availability and the deferred
availability. This could complicate the task of maintaining the
SSN’s material condition during the final years of the lengthened
interval.
! Increasing average SSN transit speeds could expend nuclear fuel
core life more quickly, which could complicate the task of keeping
SSNs in service for 33 years. If SSNs are retired prior to age 33, it
could eventually reduce SSN force levels below what they otherwise
would be.
! Temporarily shifting the home ports of SSNs could require the
construction at the more-forward home ports of additional SSN
basing and support facilities that might not be fully utilized after the
SSNs are subsequently transferred back to home ports in the
continental United States. Shifting SSNs to more-forward home
ports, and then returning them years later to home ports in the
continental United States, could also impact the quality of life of
SSN crew members and their families.
! Operating SSNs during the shortfall period with an average of more
than one crew per boat could shorten SSN lives to something less
than 33 years by expending nuclear fuel core life and basic ship

CRS-13
mechanical life more quickly. If SSNs are retired prior to age 33, it
could eventually reduce SSN force levels below what they otherwise
would be.
Extending SSN Service Life. A third option for mitigating the projected
SSN shortfall that Navy officials have mentioned would be to extend SSN service
life by one or more years, from the current figure of 33 years to 34 or more years.
Navy officials have testified that the Navy has identified 19 Los Angeles-class boats
as candidates for service life extension, and that extending the lives of some or all of
these boats could provide an additional 10 SSN deployments.
More generally, as shown in Table 5, extending the currently planned 33-year
service life of SSNs by one to four years could reduce or eliminate the projected SSN
shortfall. Each year of service life extension would reduce the total duration of the
shortfall and increase by two boats the minimum size of the SSN force.
Table 5. SSN Shortfall and Service-Life Extension
(shortfall years in lighter gray; maximum shortfall years in darker gray)
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
No extension*
47
47
46
46
45
44
43
42
40
40
41
43
44
46
1-ye ar extension
51
49
49
48
48
47
46
45
44
42
42
43
45
46
2-ye ar extension
52
53
51
51
50
50
49
48
47
46
44
44
45
47
3-ye ar extension
55
54
55
53
53
52
52
51
50
49
48
46
46
47
4-ye ar extension
56
57
56
57
55
55
54
54
53
52
51
50
48
48
Source: Prepared by CRS based on Navy data.
* Baseline situation — no changes to current Navy plan.
Issues to include in examining the feasibility and cost of extending SSN service
lives by one to four years would include, among other things, the mechanical
condition of the boats and the operational implications of husbanding pressure hull
cycles23 and nuclear fuel core life enough so that it could suffice for 34 to 37 years
of ship operation rather than 33. Due to the potential need to husband pressure hull
cycles and core life, this option might not be compatible with the previously
discussed options of increasing SSN transit speed or operating SSNs with an average
or more than one crew per boat.
Procuring Additional SSNs. Increasing the number of SSNs procured
above Navy plans could reduce or eliminate the SSN shortfall. Adding eight SSNs
to the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan between FY2008 and FY2022 would
eliminate the shortfall. Each SSN that is added to the plan between FY2008 and
FY2022 would increase by one boat the minimum size of the SSN force. Increasing
the number of SSNs to be procured also generally reduces the duration of the
shortfall period.
23 Each time the submarine submerges and resurfaces, the pressure hull is compresses and
then relaxes. Over time, these cycles of submerging and resurfacing can fatigue the metal
in the pressure hull.

CRS-14
Since the Navy plans to procure two SSNs per year starting in FY2012, adding
SSNs to the shipbuilding plan during the period FY2012-FY2022 would result in
years in which three SSNs are to be procured. Some observers have questioned
whether it would be affordable to procure three SSNs in a given year while also
meeting other Navy funding needs. Interest consequently has sometimes focused on
the alternative of adding SSNs to the period FY2008-FY2011, a period during which
the Navy currently plans to procure one SSN per year. Since FY2008-FY2011 is a
four-year period, this results in a potential maximum addition of four SSNs to the
shipbuilding plan.
As shown in Table 6, adding one to four SSNs to the shipbuilding plan in the
period FY2008-FY2011 would reduce the duration and maximum depth of the
shortfall.
Table 6. SSN Shortfall and Procuring Additional SSNs
(shortfall years in lighter gray; maximum shortfall years in darker gray)
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
0 ad
d’l boats*
47
47
46
46
45
44
43
42
40
40
41
43
44
46
1 ad
d’l boat
48
48
47
47
46
45
44
43
41
41
42
44
45
47
2 add’l boats
49
49
48
48
47
46
45
44
42
42
43
45
46
48
3 add’l boats
50
50
49
49
48
47
46
45
43
43
44
46
47
49
4 add’l boats
51
51
50
50
49
48
47
46
44
44
45
47
48
50
Source: Prepared by CRS based on Navy data.
* Baseline situation — no changes to current Navy plan.
Combining Life Extension and Procuring Additional SSNs. Table 7
shows the matrix of potential options that results from combining SSN service life
extension (if feasible) with procurement of additional SSNs in FY2008-FY2011.
Points that arise from Table 7 include the following:
! The duration and maximum depth of the shortfall could be
significantly reduced by
— extending SSN service life by 1 year and procuring 3 or 4 additional
SSNs, or
— extending SSN service life by 2 years and procuring 1, 2, or 3
additional SSNs, or
— extending SSN service live by 3 years and procuring no additional
SSNs or 1 additional SSN;
! The shortfall could be eliminated by
— extending SSN service life by 2 years and procuring 4 additional
SSNs, or
— extending SSN service life by 3 years and procuring 2 additional
SSNs, or
— extending SSN service life by 4 years and procuring no additional
SSNs.

CRS-15
! Procuring more additional SSNs than would be needed to
significantly reduce or eliminate the shortfall could
— hedge against
— unforeseen events (such as collisions or other accidents) that could
result in the early removal of one or more SSNs from service, or
— the possibility that measures to extend the service lives of some
SSNs prove less than fully successful, or
— permit the Navy to consistently maintain a force of more than 48
SSNs, should it be decided that 48 is not enough.
Table 7. Life Extension Combined With Additional SSNs
(shortfall years in lighter gray; maximum shortfall years in darker gray)
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
No service-life extension of existing boats, plus procurement in FY08-FY11 of...
0 ad
d’l boats*
47
47
46
46
45
44
43
42
40
40
41
43
44
46
1 ad
d’l boat
48
48
47
47
46
45
44
43
41
41
42
44
45
47
2 add’l boats
49
49
48
48
47
46
45
44
42
42
43
45
46
48
3 add’l boats
50
50
49
49
48
47
46
45
43
43
44
46
47
49
4 add’l boats
51
51
50
50
49
48
47
46
44
44
45
47
48
50
1-year service-life extension of existing boats, plus procurement in FY08-FY11 of...
0 add’l boats
51
49
49
48
48
47
46
45
44
42
42
43
45
46
1 ad
d’l boat
52
50
50
49
49
48
47
46
45
43
43
44
46
47
2 add’l boats
53
51
51
50
50
49
48
47
46
44
44
45
47
48
3 add’l boats
54
52
52
51
51
50
49
48
47
45
45
46
48
49
4 add’l boats
55
53
53
52
52
51
50
49
48
46
46
47
49
50
2-year service-life extension of existing boats, plus procurement in FY08-FY11 of...
0 add’l boats
52
53
51
51
50
50
49
48
47
46
44
44
45
47
1 ad
d’l boat
53
54
52
52
51
51
50
49
48
47
45
45
46
48
2 add’l boats
54
55
53
53
52
52
51
50
49
48
46
46
47
49
3 add’l boats
55
56
54
54
53
53
52
51
50
49
47
47
48
50
4 add’l boats
56
57
55
55
54
54
53
52
51
50
48
48
49
51
3-year service-life extension of existing boats, plus procurement in FY08-FY11 of...
0 add’l boats
55
54
55
53
53
52
52
51
50
49
48
46
46
47
1 ad
d’l boat
56
55
56
54
54
53
53
52
51
50
49
47
47
48
2 add’l boats
57
56
57
55
55
54
54
53
52
51
50
48
48
49
3 add’l boats
58
57
58
56
56
55
55
54
53
52
51
49
49
50
4 add’l boats
59
58
59
57
57
56
56
55
54
53
52
50
50
51
4-year service-life extension of existing boats, plus procurement in FY08-FY11 of...
0 add’l boats
56
57
56
57
55
55
54
54
53
52
51
50
48
48
1 ad
d’l boat
57
58
57
58
56
56
55
55
54
53
52
51
49
49
2 add’l boats
58
59
58
59
57
57
56
56
55
54
53
52
50
50
3 add’l boats
59
60
59
60
58
58
57
57
56
55
54
53
51
51
4 add’l boats
60
61
60
61
59
59
58
58
57
56
55
54
52
52
Source: Prepared by CRS based on Navy data.
* Baseline situation — no changes to current Navy plan.

CRS-16
Alternative Funding Approaches for Additional SSNs
Alternatives for funding the procurement of one to four additional SSNs in the
period FY2008-FY2011 include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
! full funding with advance procurement — the traditional
approach, under which there are two years or so of advance
procurement funding for the SSN’s long-leadtime components,
followed by the remainder of the boat’s procurement funding in the
year of procurement;
! single-year full funding — full funding of the SSN in the year of
procurement, with no advance procurement funding in prior years;
! incremental funding — partial funding of the SSN in the year of
procurement, followed by one or more years of additional funding
increments needed to complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
! advance appropriations — a form of full funding which can be
viewed as a legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.24
Procuring SSNs Without Advance Procurement Funding. Navy
testimony to Congress in 2007 has suggested that two years of advance procurement
funding are required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and consequently that
additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest.25 This testimony
understates Congress’ options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the
near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of advance
procurement funding (which is used primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear
propulsion components), an SSN can be procured without advance procurement
funding, or with only one year of advance procurement funding. Consequently,
Congress has the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2008 or FY2009, even
though no advance procurement funding has been provided for such ships in prior-
year budgets. Doing so would not materially change the way such an SSN would be
built — the process would still encompass about two years of advance work on long-
leadtime components, and an additional six years or so of construction work on the
24 For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy
Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches — Background and Options for
Congress
, by Ronald O’Rourke.
25 For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee
on the FY2008 Department of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which
additional ships the Navy might want to procure in FY2008, should additional funding be
made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stated
in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced
procurement, to be able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we
would need to start two years in advance. What that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08
with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year to 2010.”
(Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same
subcommittee on March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
March 29, 2007.

CRS-17
ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction
of the ship itself would begin two years later than normal (for an SSN procured in
FY2008 or FY2009 with no advance procurement funding) or one year later than
normal (for an SSN procured in FY2009 with a single year of advance procurement
funding in FY2008).
Procuring SSNs With Single-Year Full Funding. Single-year full
funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships for
which no prior-year advance procurement funding had been provided. Specifically,
Congress used single-year full funding in FY1988 to procure the nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers CVN-74 and CVN-75, and in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier CVN-71. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the
Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVN-74 and CVN-75 were to be
procured in FY1990 and FY1993, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial
advance procurement payment for CVN-74. Congress, in acting on the FY1988
budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to FY1988, and fully
funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships
entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.26
Procuring SSNs in a 2-1-2 Pattern. Some potential approaches for
procuring additional boats in FY2008-FY2011 (see the Options For Congress
section) would result in a pattern of procuring two boats in a given year, followed
by one boat the following year, and two boats the year after that — a 2-1-2 pattern.
Navy testimony to Congress in 2007 has suggested that if the procurement rate were
increased in a given year to two boats, it would not be best, from a production
efficiency point of view, to decrease the rate to a single boat the following year, and
then increase it again to two boats the next year, because of the workforce
fluctuations such a profile would produce.27
This statement may overstate the production-efficiency disadvantages of a 2-1-2
pattern. If two boats were procured in a given year, followed by one boat the next
year — a total of three boats in 24 months — the schedule for producing the three
boats could be phased so that, for a given stage in the production process, the
production rate would be one boat every eight months. A production rate of one boat
every eight months might actually help the industrial base make the transition from
26 In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear
propulsion components in inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted
the carriers to be built more quickly than would have otherwise been the case, but it is not
what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it possible was
Congress’ authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.
27 At a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008
Department of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships
the Navy might want to procure in FY2008, should additional funding be made available for
that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stated in part: “If we're
going to go to two a year in 2010, we really need to go to two a year for 2010, 2011 and out
from there on. We don't want to go to two a year and then back to one a year. I think that
would create too much stress into the workforce there.” (Source: Transcript of hearing.)
Navy officials made similar statements before Senate Armed Services Committee on March
29, 2007.

CRS-18
the current schedule of one boat every twelve months (one boat per year) to one boat
every six months (two boats per year). Viewed this way, a 2-1-2 pattern might
actually lead to some benefits in production efficiency on the way to a steady rate of
two boats per year. The Navy’s own 30-year (FY2008-FY2037) SSN procurement
plan calls for procuring SSNs in a 1-2-1-2 pattern in FY2029-FY2037.
Issues for Congress
48-Boat Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal
Is 48 the correct number of SSNs to meet future needs?
Some observers have argued that the Navy in coming years should maintain a
force of more than 48 SSNs. The Navy has defended the 48-boat force-level goal.
For additional discussion of this issue, see Appendix B.
Accelerated Virginia-Class Procurement
Should the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement be accelerated
from FY2012 to an earlier year, so as to come closer to maintaining a force of 48
SSNs in the 2020s-2030s, and if so, how might that be done financially?

Navy View. Those who support the position that two-per-year Virginia-class
procurement should not start until FY2012 could argue the following:
! Given constraints on Navy funding, the Navy cannot afford to
accelerate the start of two-per-year procurement to a year earlier than
FY2012 without reducing funding for one or more other Navy
programs budgeted that year. Accommodating the additional
funding that would be needed between FY2008 and FY2011 to
accelerate the start of two-per-year procurement to FY2010 would
require substantial reductions to other Navy programs. The
operational risk that would be created by reducing funding for these
other programs is greater than the operational risk that would result
from waiting until FY2012 to start two-per-year procurement of
Virginia-class boats.
! The Navy can take steps to mitigate the projected SSN shortfall. In
addition, although the force will be below 48 boats for 14 years, for
some of these years, the shortfall will be only one or two or three
boats.
! The Navy can mitigate or eliminate the projected SSN shortfall
without accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class
procurement by adding additional SSNs to the procurement plan in
the 11-year period FY2012-FY2022.

CRS-19
! If two Virginia-class boats were procured per year before FY2012,
those boats would not meet the Navy’s unit procurement cost target
of $2.0 billion each in FY2005 dollars, because certain cost-reducing
technologies needed to meet the $2.0-billion target will not be ready
until FY2012.
Alternative View. Supporters of accelerating Virginia-class procurement to
a year earlier than FY2012 could argue one or more of the following:
! The operational risks of allowing the SSN force to drop below 48 are
unacceptable. The Navy has described the 48-boat goal as a
moderate-risk force, so dropping substantially below 48 boats would
imply a high-risk force. If the force drops to 40 boats, as currently
projected, the Navy would be without one of every six SSNs it is
supposed to have. Although the deepest part of the projected SSN
shortfall lasts only a certain number of years, potential adversaries
can know in advance when this will occur and make plans to take
advantage of it.
! Taking steps to increase the operational availability of SSNs during
the shortfall period have their own potential disadvantages,
including the possibility of reducing SSN operational availability in
the years before or after the shortfall, which could create a virtual
SSN shortfall in those years. If the Navy attempts to manage the
SSN shortfall by shifting SSNs from some operational areas to
others, it could increased operational risks in the vacated areas.
! Accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement to
FY2010 would mitigate the projected SSN shortfall by creating a
force that would bottom out at 42 boats rather than 40, and by
reducing the projected duration of the shortfall period from 14 years
(FY2020-FY2033) to nine years (FY2024-FY2032).
! The Navy may find it very difficult to fund three Virginia-class boats
per year in future years without forcing undue reductions in other
Navy programs. Accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-
class procurement to a year earlier than FY2012 would reduce the
number of years in FY2012 and beyond where three SSNs per year
would need to be procured to further mitigate, or fully eliminate, the
SSN shortfall.
! Accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement to
a year earlier than FY2012 would mitigate a potential roller-coaster
effect on shipyard and supplier-firm workloads and employment
levels that would result if SSNs were procured for several years at
one per year, then increased at some future point to three per year,
then fell back to 1.5 or two per year.
! Accelerating the start of two-per-year Virginia-class procurement to
a year earlier than FY2012 would permit the Navy to begin reaping

CRS-20
sooner the cost-reducing effects of procuring two SSNs per year.
The boats might cost more than the Navy’s target of $2.0 billion
each in FY2005 dollars, but this is an internal Navy goal that need
not control congressional action.
Maintaining the Design and Engineering Base
How should the submarine design and engineering base be maintained in
coming years?
Navy and industry officials appear to agree that preserving the submarine design
and engineering base over the next several years will require funding submarine
design and engineering work that is in addition to the amount of such work currently
planned. In assessing options for additional submarine design and engineering work,
issues of interest include the total volume of work that the options would provide,
and the number of submarine design and engineering skills they would engage and
thereby help preserve.
Potential Options for Congress
Options for Procuring Additional SSNs in FY2008-FY2011
This section discusses some potential funding approaches for procuring one to
four additional boats in FY2008-FY2011. The examples shown are illustrative but
not exhaustive, as there are many possible permutations.
Procuring One Additional Boat. One potential approach to fund a single
additional boat in FY2008-FY2011 would be to procure the boat in FY2011 using
the traditional approach — full funding in FY2011 with advance procurement in
FY2009 and FY2010. This option would require little or no additional procurement
funding in FY2008.
A second potential approach would be to procure the boat in FY2010 using the
traditional approach — full funding in FY2010 and advance procurement funding in
FY2008 and FY2009. As discussed earlier in this report, the Navy estimates that this
approach would require $400 million in additional advance procurement funding in
FY2008. This approach would also preserve an option for adding a second additional
boat in FY2011, should Congress decide next year that it wanted to fund a second
additional boat in FY2011.
Procuring Two Additional Boats. Table 8 below shows three potential
profiles for procuring two additional boats in FY2008-FY2011 (i.e., a total of six
boats during this period).

CRS-21
Table 8. Some Potential Profiles for Procuring
Two Additional Boats
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
In first profile in Table 8, the additional boats in FY2010 and FY2011 could be
funded in the traditional manner, with advance procurement funding starting in
FY2008 for the FY2010 boat and in FY2009 for the FY2011 boat.
In the second profile in Table 8, the additional boat in FY2009 could be
procured with single-year full funding in FY2009, which would not require any
additional funding in FY2008. Under this approach, the boat might enter service in
FY2017, as opposed to FY2015 for a boat procured in FY2009 that had received
traditional advance procurement funding starting in FY2007. Alternatively, the
second boat in FY2009 could be procured with a combination of funding in FY2008
and FY2009 (and perhaps also FY2010). Under this approach, the FY2008 funding
might be limited to the $400 million that the Navy states would be required for long-
leadtime components, and the boat might enter service in FY2016.
In the third profile in Table 8, the additional boat in FY2008 could be funded
using either single-year full funding in FY2008, or two-year incremental funding
(i.e., split funding) in FY2008 and FY2009. In either case, the boat might enter
service in FY2016, as opposed to FY2014 for a boat procured in FY2008 that had
received advance procurement funding starting in FY2006. The additional boat in
FY2010 could be procured with advance procurement funding starting in FY2008
(which might permit the boat to enter service in FY2016) or with advance
procurement funding starting in FY2009 (which might permit the boat to enter
service in FY2017). The remainder of the boat’s procurement cost could be fully
funded in FY2010, or divided between FY2010 and FY2011 (split funding).
Procuring Three Additional Boats. Table 9 below shows two potential
profiles for procuring three additional boats in FY2008-FY2011 (i.e., a total of seven
boats during this period).
Table 9. Some Potential Profiles for Procuring
Three Additional Boats
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
In the first profile in Table 9, the additional boat in FY2008 could be procured
using either single-year full funding in FY2008, or split funding in FY2008 and
FY2009. In either case, the boat might enter service in FY2016, as opposed to
FY2014 for a boat procured in FY2008 that had received advance procurement
funding starting in FY2006. In the second profile, the additional boat in FY2009

CRS-22
could be procured with single-year full funding in FY2009, or with a combination of
funding in FY2008 and FY2009, in which case the FY2008 funding might be limited
to the $400 million that the Navy states would be required for long-leadtime
components.
Procuring Four Additional Boats. If four additional boats were procured
in FY2008-FY2011, with one additional boat in each year, then the additional boat
in FY2008 could be procured using either single-year full funding or incremental
funding. The second boat could be procured with advance procurement funding in
FY2008 followed by either full funding in FY2009 or incremental funding in
FY2009 and one or more subsequent years. The additional boats in FY2010 and
FY2011 could be funded in the traditional manner, with advance procurement
funding starting in FY2008 and FY2009, respectively.
Options for Submarine Design and Engineering Base
Options for providing additional work for the submarine design and engineering
base over the next few years include the following:
! Expanded Virginia-class modification effort. The Navy is
currently funding certain work to modify the Virginia-class design,
in part to reach the Navy’s Virginia-class cost-reduction target. The
scope of this effort could be expanded to include a greater number
and variety of modifications. An expanded modification effort
would add to the amount of submarine design and engineering work
currently programmed, but by itself might not be sufficient in terms
of volume of work or number of skills areas engaged to fully
preserve the submarine design and engineering base.
! New Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). The ASDS is a
mini-submarine that is attached to the back of an SSGN or SSN to
support operations by Navy special operations forces (SOF), who are
called SEALs, an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. DOD
has decided, after building one copy of the current ASDS design, not
to put that design into serial production. Some observers have
proposed developing a new ASDS design with the intention of
putting this new design into serial production. This option, like the
previous one, would add to the amount of submarine design and
engineering work currently programmed, but by itself might not be
sufficient in terms of volume of work or number of skills areas
engaged to fully preserve the submarine design and engineering
base.
! Diesel-electric submarine for Taiwan. In April 2001, the Bush
Administration announced a proposed arms-sales package for
Taiwan that included, among other things, eight diesel-electric

CRS-23
submarines.28 Since foreign countries that build diesel-electric
submarines appear reluctant to make their designs available for a
program to build such boats for Taiwan, some observers have
proposed that the United States develop its own design for this
purpose. This option would generate a substantial volume of work
and engage many skill areas. Uncertainty over whether and when
this project might occur could make it difficult to confidently
incorporate it into an integrated schedule of work for preserving the
U.S. design and engineering base. Although the project would
engage many skill areas, it might not engage all of them. Skills
related to the design of nuclear propulsion plants, for example, might
not be engaged. In addition, this project might raise concerns
regarding the potential for unintended transfer of sensitive U.S.
submarine technology — an issue that has been cited by the Navy in
the past for not supporting the idea of designing and building diesel-
electric submarines in the United States for sale to foreign buyers.29
! New SSN design. Developing a completely new SSN design as the
successor to the Virginia-class design would fully support the design
and engineering base for several years. The Navy in the past has
estimated that the cost of this option would be roughly equivalent to
the procurement cost of three SSNs. The House version of the
FY2006 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1815) proposed this idea,
but the idea was not supported by the Navy, in large part because of
its cost, and the conference version of the bill did not mandate it.
! Accelerated start of next SSBN design. Given the ages of the
Navy’s 14 current SSBNs, work on a replacement SSBN design
would normally not need to start for several years. The start of this
project, however, could be accelerated to FY2008. The project
could then be carried out as a steady-state effort over several years,
rather than as a more-concentrated effort starting several years from
now. This option could provide a significant amount of submarine
design and engineering work for several years, and could engage all
submarine design and engineering skills. The total cost of this effort
would be comparable to that of the previous option of designing a
new SSN, but this option would accelerate a cost that the Navy
28 For more on the proposed arms sales package, including the diesel-electric submarines,
see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, by Shirley A. Kan.
29 An additional issue that some observers believe might be behind Navy resistance to the
idea of designing and building diesel-electric submarines in the United States for sale to
foreign buyers, but which these observers believe the Navy is unwilling to state publicly, is
a purported fear among Navy officials that the establishment of a U.S. production line for
such boats would lead to political pressure for the Navy to accept the procurement of such
boats for its own use, perhaps in lieu of nuclear-powered submarines. The Navy argues that
non-nuclear-powered submarines are not well suited for U.S. submarine operations, which
typically involve long, stealthy transits to the operating area, long submerged periods in the
operating area, and long, stealthy transits back to home port.

CRS-24
already plans to incur, whereas the option for designing a new SSN
would be an additional cost.
The Navy has acknowledged the need to devise a strategy to preserve the
submarine design and engineering base, and asked the RAND Corporation to study
the issue. The RAND report, which is to be published shortly, concludes that
accelerating the start of design work on the next SSBN, and carrying out this work
as a steady-state effort over several years, could maintain the submarine design and
engineering base for several years. An exception, RAND found, relates to designers
and engineers employed by about 50 supplier firms that design the submarine
components they make for the Navy. The RAND report concluded that accelerating
the start of design work of the next SSBN might not help maintain the designers and
engineers at some of these firms.30
Legislative Activity for FY2008
The Navy’s proposed FY2008 budget requests $2,571.3 million in the Navy’s
shipbuilding budget (the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, or SCN, appropriation
account) for the Virginia-class program. This total includes $1,796.2 million to
complete the procurement funding for the Virginia-class boat that the Navy is
requesting to procure in FY2008, which would be the tenth ship in the program. The
total estimated procurement cost of this ship is $2,653.7 million, and the ship has
received a total of $857.5 million in prior-year funding. The $2,571.3 million being
requested for the program for FY2008 also includes, among other things, $702.7
million in advance procurement funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in
future years.
30 RAND briefing on the study provided to Navy, industry, and congressional staff
(including CRS), February 9, 2007.

CRS-25
Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan
Administration (1981-1989).
The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and
maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-
1992 originally called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.31 In
1992, however, the SSN goal was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992
Joint Staff force-level requirement study (updated in 1993) that called for a force of
51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level acoustic quieting, by the year
2012.32
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of
U.S. defense policy, established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships,
including 45 to 55 SSNs.33 The Clinton administration’s 1997 QDR supported a
requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and established a tentative SSN force-
level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of peacetime operational
requirements.”34 The Clinton administration later amended the SSN figure to 55
boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in
December 1999. The study had three main conclusions:
! “that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and
62 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the
regional military commanders-in-chief] with insufficient capability
to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other
31 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy,
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials,
Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral Raymond
G. Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare),
in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces
and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs, June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
32 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July
1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,”
Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era:
The Issues Facing Policymakers
, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon Urges Navy to
Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “
Size of Sub Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
33 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up
Review
, October 1993, pp. 55-57.
34 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Revie
w, May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.

CRS-26
requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this force
structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to
meet the modeled war fighting requirements;”
! “that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18
Virginia class SSNs in the 2015 time frame;” and
! “that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025
time frame would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence
community’s highest operational and collection requirements.”35
The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of
required SSN force levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not
translated into official Department of Defense (DOD) force-level goals.

The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the
amended requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including
55 SSNs. In revalidating this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report
cautioned that as DOD’s “transformation effort matures — and as it produces
significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force — DOD
will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed
Forces.”36
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in
2003-2004. One of the Navy studies — an internal Navy study done in 2004 —
reportedly recommended reducing the attack submarine force level requirement to
as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly recommended homeporting a total of nine
attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and unmanned underwater vehicles
(UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack submarines.37
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force
levels out to FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035 — a 260-
ship fleet including 37 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs.38
35 Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy,
February 14, 2000, p. 5.
36 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
37 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p.
1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May
13, 2004.
38 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan
for the Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2006
. The report was delivered to the House
and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on March 23, 2005.

CRS-27
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack
submarine requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.39
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313
ships, including 48 SSNs.
39 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day
(New London, CT)
, May 27, 2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub
Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.

CRS-28
Appendix B. Views Regarding 48-Boat SSN
Force-Level Goal
This appendix summarizes the Navy’s view and an alternative view regarding
the appropriateness of the Navy’s 48-boat SSN force-level goal.
Navy View.40 In support of its position that 48 is the correct number of SSNs
to meet future needs, the Navy in 2006 argued the following:
! The figure of 48 SSNs was derived from a number of force-level
studies that converged on a figure of about 48 boats, making this
figure an analytical “sweet spot.”
! A force of 48 boats is a moderate-risk (i.e., acceptable-risk) force, as
opposed to the low-risk force called for in the 1999 JCS study.
! A force of 48 boats will be sufficient in coming years to maintain
about 10 forward-deployed SSNs on a day-to-day basis — the same
number of forward-deployed boats that the Navy has previously
maintained with a force of more than 50 SSNs. The Navy will be
able to maintain 10 forward-deployed SSNs in coming years with
only 48 boats because the force in coming years will include an
increased number of newer SSNs that require less maintenance over
their lives and consequently are available for operation a greater
percentage of the time.
! U.S. regional military commanders would prefer a day-to-day
forward-deployed total of about 18 SSNs, but total of 10 will be
sufficient to meet their most important needs.
! All 10 of the forward-deployed SSNs are needed for day-to-day
missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR),
while about 7.5 of these submarines are also needed to ensure that
an adequate number of SSNs are in position for the opening phases
of potential conflicts in various locations.
On the issue of meeting U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for
day-to-day forward-deployed SSNs, the Navy states:
Each Combatant Commander (COCOM) requests assets to execute required
missions utilizing the Global Force Management Process. Broad categories of
mission types are used to make requests including: National and Fleet ISR,
Exercise and Training (supporting US tactical development), Exercise and
Operations (supporting US engagement strategy), Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
/Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) tasking, OPLAN (war plans) support, and
Other. As assignment of Critical, High Priority, Priority or Routine is assigned
40 This section is based on Navy testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006, and to the Seapower subcommittee
of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, and April 6, 2006.

CRS-29
to each of the requested missions. The theater allocation request process prior
to 2004 did not include a priority breakdown. In general, ISR missions have
been assigned as Critical or High Priority requirements. Other mission areas
have been assigned from High Priority to Routine, based on the relative
importance to the theater commander. No allocation is currently requested to
support OPLAN or Other mission areas.
Each COCOM has authority to use its allocated SSNs as required to meet
current national and theater priorities. The CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of
Staff] allocation order to the Submarine Force strictly directs an allotted number
of SSN days of presence be provided, capable of meeting each theaters’ [sic]
taskings. The breakdown of mission priorities into Critical, High Priority,
Priority and Routine is predominantly a construct to demonstrate how a COCOM
could meet their priorities, given a specific level of SSN presence. It serves as
an aid to the CJCS in apportioning limited SSN presence to the various theaters.
The number of SSNs allocated against Critical Missions enabled COCOMs
to meet all requirements in 2004 and 2005, and 99% of the requirements in 2006.
For High Priority missions, sufficient SSNs were allocated to meet 25%, 50%
and 34% of requirements in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. Overall, the
number of SSNs forward deployed was sufficient to cover 66%, 61% and 54%
of Combatant Commanders’ requested SSN mission taskings in 2004, 2005, and
2006 respectively.41
Alternative View. Some observers believe that more than 48 SSNs will be
needed to meet future needs. One such observer — retired Vice Admiral Albert
Konetzni, Jr., a former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet submarine force —
argued the following in 2006:42
! The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses called for a force of 48 to 60
SSNs. In this context, a force of 48 SSNs looks more like a sour
spot than a sweet spot.
! The Navy’s SSN force-level analyses reflect “reverse engineering,”
in which an SSN force-level number is selected at the outset for
affordability reasons, and assumptions used in the force-level study
are then adjusted to produce that figure.
! The 1999 JCS study on SSN requirements remains valid today.
41 Source: Written response by Vice Admiral Charles L. Munns, Commander Naval
Submarine Forces, to a question posed by Representative Rob Simmons at a March 28,
2006, hearing before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on submarine force structure. Munns’ written response was provided to CRS
on July 5, 2006, by the office of Representative Simmons and is used here with the
permission of that office.
42 These points are based on Konetzni’s testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006.

CRS-30
! All of the U.S. regional military commanders’ requirements for day-
to-day forward-deployed SSNs, and not just the 60% or so of those
requirements that are being met, are critical.
! In light of the potential size of China’s submarine force in 2020, a
force of 48 SSNs in that year will be insufficient.43
crsphpgw
43 For more on China’s submarine force, and China’s naval modernization effort in general,
see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress
, by Ronald O’Rourke.