Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and
AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background
and Issues for Congress
October 12, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL32418

Navy Virginia-Class Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal

Summary
Issues for Congress regarding the Navy’s Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN) program include the FY2024 procurement funding request for the program and
the proposal for selling three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia and transferring U.S.
submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology to Australia under a U.S.-UK-Australia
security agreement called AUKUS.
Virginia-class FY2024 procurement funding. The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774)
class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) since FY1998, and a total of 38 have been
procured through FY2023. Since FY2011, Virginia-class boats have been procured at a rate of
two per year. Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019-FY2023 were procured under a multiyear
procurement (MYP) contract. The Navy wants the next Virginia-class MYP contract to begin not
in FY2024, but in FY2025. The Virginia-class design has been updated multiple times since
FY1998. Most Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years are to be built with
the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped
with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk
missiles or other payloads. When procured at a rate of two boats per year, VPM-equipped
Virginia-class SSNs have an estimated procurement cost of about $4.3 billion per boat. The
Navy’s current ship force-level goal, which was released in December 2016, calls for achieving
and maintaining a fleet of 355 manned ships, including 66 SSNs. Under the Navy’s FY2024 30-
year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, which includes three alternatives, the SSN force would
reach a minimum of 46 boats in FY2030 and grow to 60, 69, or 63 boats by FY2053.
The Navy’s proposed budget requests the procurement of the 39th and 40th Virginia-class boats.
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission states that one of the two boats is to be built to a special
configuration referred to as the “Modified VIRGINIA Class Subsea and Seabed Warfare (Mod VA
SSW)” configuration. The two boats requested for procurement in FY2024 have an estimated
combined procurement cost of $9,427.6 million (i.e., about $9.4 billion), including $5,356.9
million for the Mod VA SSW boat and $4,070.7 million for the other boat. The two boats have
received a combined total of $2,297.7 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding,
and the Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining $7,130.0 million needed to
complete their estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget also
requests $1,855.5 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal
years, $1,360.0 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding, which is an additional kind
of AP funding that can occur under an MYP contract, and $168.2 million in cost-to-complete
(CTC) funding to cover cost growth on Virginia-class boats procured in prior years, bringing the
total amount of procurement, AP, EOQ, and CTC funding requested for FY2024 to $10,513.7
million (i.e., about $10.5 billion).
AUKUS submarine proposal. In September 2021, the U.S., UK, and Australian governments
announced a significant new security partnership, called AUKUS. The proposed first major
initiative under AUKUS, referred to as Pillar 1, would be a project to rotationally deploy up to
five U.S. and UK SSNs out of a port in Western Australia, and more significantly, for Australia,
with U.S. and UK assistance, to acquire, operate, and maintain its own force of conventionally
armed SSNs, including three to five Virginia-class SSNs that would be sold to Australia. Key
questions for Congress regarding the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include the following: Should
Congress approve, reject, or modify the proposed sale of three to five Virginia-class attack
submarines to Australia? Should Congress approve, reject, or modify the proposed transfer of
U.S. submarine and naval nuclear-propulsion technology to Australia?
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 71

Congressional Research Service

Navy Virginia-Class Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal

Introduction
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on
• the Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN)
procurement program, and
• a proposal for selling three to five Virginia-class SSNs and transferring U.S.
submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology to Australia under a U.S.-
UK-Australia security agreement called AUKUS.
The Navy has been procuring Virginia-class SSNs since FY1998, and a total of 38 have been
procured through FY2023. Since FY2011, Virginia-class boats have been procured at a rate of
two per year. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the procurement of the 39th and 40th
Virginia-class boats.
Issues for Congress include those relating to the proposed procurement of Virginia-class boats in
FY2024 and subsequent years, and those relating to the proposal under the AUKUS agreement
for selling three to five Virginia-class boats and transferring U.S. submarine and naval nuclear
propulsion technology to Australia under AUKUS. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues
could substantially affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, Australian military
capabilities, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.
The Navy’s SSN(X) next-generation attack submarine program, which is to be the eventual
successor to the Virginia-class SSN program, is discussed in another CRS product: CRS In Focus
IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X]) Program: Background and Issues
for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine program is discussed in
another CRS report—CRS Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile
Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
Background
U.S. Navy Submarines1
The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs),2 nuclear-powered cruise missile and special operations forces (SOF) submarines
(SSGNs),3 and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). The SSNs are general-purpose

1 In U.S. Navy submarine designations, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclear-powered, B stands for ballistic
missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile). Submarines can be powered by either nuclear
reactors or non-nuclear power sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-
powered. A submarine’s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is
armed with nuclear weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered
submarine can be armed with nuclear weapons.
2 The SSBNs’ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United States. The Navy’s SSBNs are discussed in CRS
Report R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force
Structure, by Amy F. Woolf.
3 The Navy’s four SSGNs are former Trident SSBNs that have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk
cruise missiles and SOF rather than SLBMs. Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission
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submarines that can (when appropriately equipped and armed) perform a variety of peacetime and
wartime missions, including the following:
• covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for
national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes;
• covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than possible with the
SSGNs);
• covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles (again on a
smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs);
• covert offensive and defensive mine warfare;
• anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and
• anti-surface warfare, or ASuW (i.e., attacking surface ships).
The technical (including acoustic) superiority of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered submarines is
generally considered a foundation of U.S. superiority in undersea warfare, which in turn
underpins a U.S. ability to leverage the world’s oceans as a medium of operations and maneuver,
deny that to others, and thereby generate a huge asymmetric strategic advantage for the United
States. During the Cold War, ASW against Soviet submarines was the primary stated mission of
U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery operations were reportedly
important on a day-to-day basis as well.4 In the post-Cold War era, although ASW remained a
mission, the SSN force focused more on performing the first three other missions listed above.
With the shift in recent years from the post-Cold War era to a situation of renewed great power
competition,5 ASW and ASuW against Russian and Chinese submarines and surface ships has
become a more prominent mission. DOD officials and other observers view SSNs as particularly
useful for implementing certain elements of the national defense strategy because of their ability
to evade China’s improving anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces.6
U.S. SSN Force Levels
Force-Level Goal
Goal Current Force-Level Goal of 66 Boats within 355-Ship Plan
The Navy’s current force-level goal, released in December 2016, is to achieve and maintain a
fleet of 355 manned ships, including 66 SSNs.7

orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs are
more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other submarine missions and are sometimes included in
counts of the projected total number of Navy attack submarines. The Navy’s SSGNs are discussed in CRS Report
RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
4 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection operations during the Cold War, see
Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs,
1998).
5 For more on this shift, see CRS Report R43838, Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
6 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
7 For more on the 355-ship force-level goal, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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Emerging Successor Force-Level Goal
The Navy and Department of Defense (DOD) since 2019 have been working to develop a new
force-level goal to replace the 355-ship force-level goal. Studies of this emerging force-level goal
that have been released by the Navy in summary form suggest that the new force-level goal could
call for achieving and maintaining a force of 66 to 72 SSNs.8 For a review of SSN force-level
goals since the Reagan Administration, see Appendix A.
Past and Current Force Levels
During most of the 1980s, when plans called for achieving a 600-ship Navy including 100 SSNs,
the SSN force included more than 90 boats, peaking at 98 boats at the end of FY1987. The
number of SSNs declined after that in a manner that roughly paralleled the decline in the total
size of the Navy over the same time period. The 50 SSNs in service at the end of FY2022
included the following:
• 26 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats;
• 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and
• 21 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.
The three classes of SSNs listed above are discussed further later in this report. In addition to the
50 SSNs shown above, the Navy operates four Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSGNs. Compared to the
Navy’s SSNs, the SSGNs have a much larger capacity for carrying cruise missiles and SOF, but
they are nevertheless general-purpose submarines that can perform missions performed by SSNs.
Projected Procurement Rates and Force Levels
The Navy’s FY2024 five-year (FY2024-FY2028) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 10
Virginia-class boats, to be procured at a rate of two per year. The Navy’s FY2024 30-year
(FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan includes three alternative 30-year shipbuilding profiles for
the period FY2029-FY2053. Under these profiles, the SSN force would reach a minimum of 46
boats in FY2030 and grow to 60, 69, or 63 boats by FY2053. Under the alternative where the
force grows to 69 boats by FY2053, the force would reach 66 boats in FY2049.
The number of boats in the SSN force is projected to experience a valley or trough from the mid-
2020s through the early 2030s. This valley is a projected consequence of having procured a
relatively small number of SSNs during the 1990s, in the early years of the post-Cold War era.
The projected SSN valley was first identified by CRS in 1995 and has been discussed in CRS
reports and testimony every year since then. As noted above, the FY2024 30-year shipbuilding
plan projects that the SSN force would reach a minimum of 46 boats in FY2030, return to 50
boats in FY2032, and then grow to more than 50 boats starting in FY2036.
Some observers are concerned that this projected valley in SSN force levels could lead to a period
of heightened operational strain for the SSN force, and perhaps a period of weakened
conventional deterrence against potential adversaries such as China.9 To help fill in part of the

8 For the effort to develop a successor to the 355-ship goal of 2016, including the studies that the Navy has released in
summary form, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
9 China took note of the projected valley. The November 2014 edition of a Chinese military journal, for example,
included an article with a passage that translates as follows:
... in 2028, the [U.S. Navy] force of nuclear attack submarines will fall from the current number of
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projected valley, the Navy plans to refuel and extend the service lives of up to seven Los Angeles-
class SSNs, while also pursuing “updated service life estimates for the remaining 688s based on
current hull by hull utilization.”10
Submarine Construction Industrial Base
U.S. Navy submarines are built by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of
Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News
Shipbuilding (HII/NNS), of Newport News, VA. These are the only two shipyards in the country
capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while HII/NNS also
builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships.
In addition to GD/EB and HII/NNS, the submarine construction industrial base includes hundreds
of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. Much of the
total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines comes from sole-
source suppliers. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing
work is the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction program.11 Much of the design
and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base is resident at GD/EB;
additional portions are resident at HII/NNS and some of the component makers.
SSN Maintenance Backlog
As shown in Table 1, the number of SSNs either in depot maintenance or idle (i.e., awaiting
depot maintenance) has increased from 11 boats (about 21% of the SSN force) in FY2012 to 18
boats (about 37% of the SSN force) as of May 2023. In advance policy questions submitted for a
September 14, 2023, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to consider her
nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, stated that the fraction of the SSN force either in depot maintenance or idle had been
reduced since May 2023 to 33%.12
The Navy has stated that industry best practice would call for about 20% of the SSN force to be
in depot maintenance (and for none to be idle) at any given moment,13 and Admiral Franchetti has

55 down to 41 boats. Some are concerned about whether this force level can meet the requirements
of the Asia-Pacific rebalance.”
(Lyle Goldstein, “Evolution of Chinese Power Projection Capabilities,” presentation to Center for a
New American Security (CNAS) roundtable discussion, September 29, 2016, slide 7 of 41.)
10 Source: Navy information paper on FY2022 Fiscal Planning Framework and SSN-688 class service live extension
program questions, February 5, 2021, provided by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) and CRS on February 5, 2021. See also Richard R. Burgess, “Vice Adm. Houston: Sub Force Approaching
Inflection Point of 50 SSNs,” Seapower, November 17, 2021; Justin Katz, “Navy Assessing LA Sub Fleet for Possible
Life Extensions,” Breaking Defense, November 18, 2021. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Assessing Los Angeles Subs For
Life Extension,” Defense Daily, November 19, 2021; David Axe, “To Keep Up Its Undersea Strength, The U.S. Navy
Aims To Keep Old Submarines Longer,” Forbes, November 22, 2021; Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Avoided a 2022
‘Trough’ in Submarine Fleet Size, but Industry Challenges Threaten Future Growth,” Defense News, January 3, 2022.
11 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. In terms of work provided to these firms, the Navy states
that a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants.
12 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for
Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 31, 32.
13 Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Hopes New Funding Model Can Cut Sub Maintenance Delays by 2026,” Defense News,
November 17, 2022; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Frustration Building over Late Weapons, Ship Deliveries,” Defense
News, January 11, 2023; Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,” Defense Daily,
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stated that the Navy has adopted the 20% figure as its goal.14 As also shown in Table 1, the
increase since FY2012 in the number of SSNs in depot maintenance or idle has substantially
reduced the number of SSNs operationally ready at any given moment, reducing the SSN force’s
capacity for meeting day-to-day mission demands and potentially putting increased operational
pressure on SSNs that are operationally ready.
Table 1. Numbers of SSNs in Maintenance or Awaiting Maintenance
Average number or percentage of SSNs for each fiscal year
Number
Combined
awaiting
number in
% of force in
Number in
depot
depot
depot
Number
Fiscal
Number
depot
maintenance
maintenance
maintenance operationally
year
in force
maintenance
(aka idle)
or idle
or idle
ready
FY08
51
11
0
11
22%
40
FY09
52
10
1
11
21%
41
FY10
52
10
0
10
19%
42
FY11
52
11
0
11
21%
41
FY12
53
10
1
11
21%
42
FY13
53
12
0
12
23%
41
FY14
53
13
2
15
28%
38
FY15
53
9
1
10
19%
43
FY16
52
12
1
13
25%
39
FY17
50
12
2
14
28%
36
FY18
50
14
2
16
32%
34
FY19
50
13
3
16
32%
34
FY20
50
10
5
15
30%
35
FY21
49
14
4
18
37%
31
FY22
49
11
5
16
33%
33
FY23*
49
14
4
18
37%
31
Source: U.S. Navy information paper dated June 13, 2023, and provided to CRS and Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on June 15, 2023. *Data for FY2023 is as of May 2023. In
advance policy questions submitted for a September 14, 2023, hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee to consider her nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations, stated that the fraction of the SSN force either in depot maintenance or idle had been
reduced since May 2023 to 33%. (Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa
M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 31, 32.)
The increase in the number of SSNs in depot maintenance or idle is due primarily to insufficient
numbers of workers and facility constraints at the four government-operated Naval Shipyards
(NSYs), which are the primary facilities for performing depot-level overhaul and maintenance
work on the Navy’s nuclear-powered ships, including the SSNs. Supply chain issues affecting the

January 12, 2023; Justin Katz, “As AUKUS Looms, US Navy Sub Leaders Sound Alarms at Home,” Breaking
Defense, November 4, 2022.
14 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for
Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 31, 32.
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availability of repair parts for SSNs are an additional issue. To address capacity constraints at the
NSYs, the Navy has increased staffing at the NSYs and in 2018 began a 20-year, multibillion-
dollar investment plan, called the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP), to
modernize the NSYs’ facilities.15 The Navy has also shifted a small number of SSN overhauls to
GD/EB and HII/NNS. For additional background information on the SSN maintenance backlog,
which has been a matter of concern and oversight for the congressional defense committees, see
Appendix C.
U.S. SSN Classes16
Los Angeles (SSN-688) Class
A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between
FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are 360 feet long, have a
beam (i.e., hull diameter) of 33 feet, and have a submerged displacement of about 6,900 tons.
They are equipped with four 21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of about 26
torpedoes in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class (SSN-719
and higher) were built with an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for
carrying and launching 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The final 23 boats in the class (SSN-751
and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles-class
boats or 688Is. As of the end of FY2022, 36 of the 62 boats in the class had been retired.
Seawolf (SSN-21) Class
Seawolf (SSN-21) class submarines are larger and more heavily armed than Los Angeles-class
submarines. They are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of
50 torpedoes or cruise missiles. The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30
boats, but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of the
Cold War and associated changes in military requirements and defense spending levels. The three
Seawolf-class submarines are Seawolf (SSN-21), Connecticut (SSN-22), and Jimmy Carter (SSN-
23).
SSN-21 and SSN-22 were procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and
1998, respectively. They are 353 feet long, have a beam of 40 feet, and have a submerged
displacement of 9,138 tons. SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was
suspended in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It entered service in 2005. SSN-23 was built to
a lengthened configuration compared to the other two ships in the class—it is 453 feet long (i.e.,
100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22), has a beam of 40 feet, and has a submerged
displacement of 12,158 tons. The Navy states that SSN-23 includes “a 100-foot-long, 2,500-ton

15 For an overview of the SIOP, see U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, “Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program” accessed June 22, 2023, at https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Shipyards/SIOP/. See also Government
Accountability Office, Navy Readiness[:] Actions Needed to Address Cost and Schedule Estimates for Shipyard
Improvement, GAO-23-106067, June 2023, 49 pp.; Government Accountability Office, Naval Shipyards[:] Ongoing
Challenges Could Jeopardize Navy’s Ability to Improve Shipyards, Statement of Diana C. Maurer, Director, Defense
Capabilities and Management, Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Readiness and Management Support and
Seapower, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, GAO 22-105993, May 10, 2022, 18 pp.
16 Source for submarine lengths, beams (i.e., hull diameters), and submerged displacements: U.S. Navy, “Attack
Submarines – SSN,” updated March 13, 2023.
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hull extension, known as the multi-mission platform, to test new generations of weapons and
support Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land forces) operations.”17
Virginia (SSN-774) Class
The Navy has been procuring Virginia-class SSNs (Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3) since
FY1998; the first entered service in October 2004. The Virginia-class design was developed to be
less expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the Seawolf-class
design. The baseline Virginia-class design is 377 feet long, has a beam of 34 feet, and has a
submerged displacement of about 7,800 tons. Virginia-class boats are equipped with four 21-inch
diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of about 25 torpedoes in their torpedo tubes and
internal magazines. Virginia-class boats are also equipped with vertical launch tubes in their bows
for carrying and launching 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Figure 1. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Dan Ward, “Opinion: How Budget Pressure Prompted
the Success of Virginia-Class Submarine Program,” USNI News, November 3, 2014. The caption credits the
photograph to the U.S. Navy and states that it shows USS Minnesota (SSN-783) under construction in 2012.
Virginia-class boats equipped with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM; see discussion below) are
84 feet longer—they are 461 feet long, have a beam of 34 feet, and have a submerged
displacement of about 10,200 tons. The VPM can be armed with 28 additional Tomahawk cruise
missiles. In addition to the VPM, the Virginia-class design has been updated multiple times in
other ways since FY1998.

17 Andrea Perez, “USS Jimmy Carter Conducts Change of Command,” Defense Visual Information Distribution
Service (DVIDS), December 18, 2020. See also H. I. Sutton, “SSN-23,” Covert Shores, August 27, 2017; John P.
Davis, “USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23), Expanding Future SSN Missions,” GlobalSecurity.org, undated. For a press
report on SSN-23, see, for example, Benjamin Brimelow, “The US Navy’s Only Operational Sub Named After a
President Has Been Doing Top-Secret Missions for 17 Years,” Business Insider, March 10, 2022.
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Figure 2. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Megan Eckstein, “Newport News Has Ful y Staffed
Attack Sub Line, After Years of Delays,” Defense News, February 9, 2023. The caption credits the photograph to
Matt Hildreth/HII and states that it shows USS Montana (SSN-794) under construction at HII/NNS.
Figure 3. Virginia-Class Attack Submarine

Source: Photograph accompanying Megan Eckstein, “The US Navy Is Spending Bil ions to Stabilize Vendors. Wil
It Work?” USNI News, September 8, 2023. The caption credits the photograph to Ashley Cowan/HII and states
that it shows the USS New Jersey (SSN-796) being moved at HII/NNS in April 2022.
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Virginia-Class Program
Program Elements
Unit Procurement Cost
Most Virginia-class boats to be procured in FY2019 and subsequent years are to be built to a
lengthened configuration that includes the Virginia Payload Module (VPM—see discussion
below). When procured at a rate of two boats per year, VPM-equipped Virginia-class SSNs have
an estimated procurement cost in FY2025 of about $4.3 billion per boat.
Annual Procurement Quantities
Table 2 shows annual numbers of Virginia-class boats procured from FY1998 (the lead boat)
through FY2023, and the numbers projected for procurement in FY2024-FY2028 under the
Navy’s FY2024 budget submission. A total of 38 Virginia-class boats have been procured through
FY2023.
Table 2. Actual and Projected Virginia-Class Procurement Quantities
Projected quantities for FY2024-FY2028 as shown in Navy’s FY2024 budget submission
FY98
1
FY06
1
FY14
2
FY22
2
FY99
1
FY07
1
FY15
2
FY23
2
FY00
0
FY08
1
FY16
2
FY24
2
FY01
1
FY09
1
FY17
2
FY25
2
FY02
1
FY10
1
FY18
2
FY26
2
FY03
1
FY11
2
FY19
2
FY27
2
FY04
1
FY12
2
FY20
2
FY28
2
FY05
1
FY13
2
FY21
2

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data.
Multiyear Contracting
With the exception of the Virginia-class boat that was procured in FY2003, all Virginia-class
boats procured from FY1998 through FY2023 were procured under multiyear contracting,
meaning either a block buy contract (for the boats procured in FY1998-FY2002) or multiyear
procurement (MYP) contracts (for the boats procured from FY2004 through FY2003).18

18 The first four Virginia-class boats, known as the Block I boats, were procured under an FY1998-FY2002 block buy
contract. This was the first instance of block buy contracting—the mechanism of a block buy contract was essentially
created for procuring the first four Virginia-class boats. The Virginia-class boat procured in FY2003 fell between the
FY1998-FY2002 block buy contract and the subsequent FY2004-FY2008 MYP contract, and was contracted for
separately. The next five Virginia-class boats, known as the Block II boats, were procured under an FY2004-FY2008
MYP contract. The next eight Virginia-class boats, known as the Block III boats, were procured under an FY2009-
FY2013 MYP contract. The next 10 Virginia-class boats, known as the Block IV boats, were procured under an
FY2014-FY2018 MYP contract. The next 10 Virginia-class boats, known as the Block V boats, were procured under an
FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. For more on MYP and block buy contracting, see CRS Report R41909, Multiyear
Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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The Navy wants the next Virginia-class MYP contract to begin not in FY2024, but in FY2025. As
part of its FY2024 budget submission, the Navy has requested authority for a Virginia-class MYP
contract that would begin in FY2025.19 The two boats requested for procurement for FY2024 are
to be added as non-MYP options to the FY2019-FY2023 Virginia MYP contract. The FY2019-
FY2023 MYP contract, in other words, is be used as a contractual vehicle for procuring the two
boats requested for procurement in FY2024, but those two boats would be executed as non-MYP
boats, without the special MYP procurement authorities (and resultant cost reductions) that were
applied to the other boats procured under the FY2019-FY2023 MYP contract. The Navy states
that treating the two boats requested for procurement in FY2024 in this manner would put the
next Virginia-class MYP contract—the one that is to cover boats procured in FY2025-FY2029—
into better schedule alignment with contracts for procuring Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarines, which would maximize efficiency and supplier-firm stability in those years for both
the Virginia- and Columbia-class programs.20
Joint Production Arrangement
Virginia-class boats are built jointly by GD/EB—the program’s prime contractor—and HII/NNS.
The arrangement for jointly building Virginia-class boats was proposed to Congress by GD/EB,
HII/NNS, and the Navy, and agreed to by Congress in 1997, as part of Congress’s action on the
Navy’s budget for FY1998, the year that the first Virginia-class boat was procured.21 A primary
aim of the arrangement was to minimize the cost of building Virginia-class boats at a relatively
low annual rate in two shipyards (rather than entirely in a single shipyard) while preserving key
submarine-construction skills at both shipyards.
Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat, HII/NNS builds certain other
parts of each boat, and the yards have taken turns building the reactor compartments and
performing final assembly of the boats. The arrangement has resulted in a roughly 50-50 division
of Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves both yards’ ability to build
submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a submarine-construction yard) and
perform submarine final-assembly work.22

19 The Navy typically requests authority for an MYP contract for the Virginia-class program one year in advance of the
proposed start of the MYP contract. The Navy states that “if the MYP [proposed to begin in FY2025] is not approved
in FY 2024, the Navy would lose EOQ savings across the procurement and the long-term shipbuilder and vendor base
stability achieved with an MYP authority. If an MYP is not authorized for the next Block of VCS submarines, the Navy
may have to enter a single ship procurement contract for FY 2025 ships forcing industry to assume greater risk and
raise prices.” (Source: “Twelfth Package of Legislative Proposals Sent to Congress for Inclusion in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 – Individual Proposals (Sent to Congress on May 18, 2023),” posted at
https://ogc.osd.mil/OGC-Offices/Office-of-Legislative-Counsel/DoD-Legislative-Proposals-2024/.) See also Nick
Wilson, “Citing Essential Cost Savings, DOD Seeks Multiyear Authority for Block VI Virginia Submarines,” Inside
Defense, May 19, 2023.
20 Source: Navy briefing on Virginia-class program for CRS and CBO, April 28, 2023.
21 See Section 121 of the FY1998 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997).
22 The joint production arrangement is a departure from prior U.S. submarine construction practices, under which
complete submarines were built in individual yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over
the Virginia-class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that occurred in 1995-1997
(i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB
and HII/NNS involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards capable of
building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a
submarine design that is being procured at a relatively low annual rate. The joint production agreement cannot be
changed without the agreement of both GD/EB and HII/NNS.
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Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP)
Under a plan it calls the Integrated Enterprise Plan (IEP),23 the Navy plans to build Columbia-
class ballistic missile submarines jointly at GD/EB and HII/NNS, with most of the work going to
GD/EB. As part of this plan, the Navy plans to adjust the division of work on the Virginia-class
attack submarine program so that HII/NNS would receive a larger share of the final-assembly
work for that program than it has received in the past.24
Virginia Payload Module (VPM)
The Navy plans to build most Virginia-class boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years with
the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), an additional, 84-foot-long, mid-body section equipped
with four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes for storing and launching additional Tomahawk
missiles or other payloads. The VPM’s vertical launch tubes are to be used to store and fire
additional Tomahawk cruise missiles or other payloads, including payloads with diameters larger
than the 21-inch diameter of a torpedo or Tomahawk missile.25 The four additional launch tubes
in the VPM could carry a total of 28 additional Tomahawk cruise missiles (seven per tube),26

23 The IEP was previously called the Submarine Unified Build Strategy, or SUBS.
24 Key elements of IEP include the following:
• GD/EB is to be the prime contractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
• HII/NNS is to be a subcontractor for designing and building Columbia-class boats;
• GD/EB is to build certain parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the parts that
GD/EB builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
• HII/NNS is to build certain other parts of each Columbia-class boat—parts that are more or less analogous to the
parts that HII/NNS builds for each Virginia-class attack submarine;
• GD/EB is to perform the final assembly on all 12 Columbia-class boats;
• as a result of the three previous points, the Navy estimates that GD/EB would receive an estimated 77%-78% of the
shipyard work building Columbia-class boats, and HII/NNS would receive 22%-23%;
• GD/EB is to continue as prime contractor for the Virginia-class program, but to help balance out projected
submarine-construction workloads at GD/EB and HII/NNS, the division of work between the two yards for building
Virginia-class boats is to be adjusted so that HII/NNS would perform the final assembly on a greater number of
Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current Virginia-class division of work (in which
final assemblies are divided more or less evenly between the two shipyards); as a consequence, HII/NNS would receive
a greater share of the total work in building Virginia-class boats than it would have under a continuation of the current
division of work.
See Richard B. Burgess, “Submarine Admirals: ‘Unified Build Strategy’ Seeks Affordability for Future Sub Fleet,”
Seapower, July 8, 2016; Julia Bergman, “Congressmen Visit EB A Day After It Is Named Prime Contractor for Ohio
Reaplcement Program,” The Day (New London), March 29, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Ohio Replacement Plan Is
Good News For Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, March 29, 2016; Robert McCabe, “Newport News Shipbuilding’s
Share of Virginia-Class Submarine Deliveries to Grow,” Virginian-Pilot (Newport News), March 29, 2016; Valerie
Insinna, “GD Electric Boat Chosen To Take Lead Role for Ohio Replacement Sub,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2016:
1-3; Hugh Lessig, “Navy: More Submarine Work Coming to Newport News Shipyard,” Military.com, March 30, 2016.
See also Statement of the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition), and Vice Admiral Joseph P. Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities
and Resources, and Lieutenant General Robert S. Walsh, Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration
& Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Department of the Navy Seapower and Projection
Forces Capabilities, February 25, 2016, p. 12.
25 For an illustration of the VPM, see http://www.gdeb.com/news/advertising/images/VPM_ad/VPM.pdf, which was
accessed by CRS on March 1, 2012.
26 Michael J. Conner, “Investing in the Undersea Future,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2011: 16-20.
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which would increase the total number of torpedo-sized weapons (such as Tomahawks) carried by
the Virginia-class design from about 37 to about 65—an increase of about 76%.27
Building Virginia-class boats with the VPM is intended to compensate for a sharp loss in
submarine force weapon-carrying capacity that will occur with the retirement in FY2026-FY2028
of the Navy’s four Ohio-class SSGNs. Each SSGN is equipped with 24 large-diameter vertical
launch tubes, of which 22 can be used to carry up to seven Tomahawks each, for a maximum of
154 vertically launched Tomahawks per boat, or 616 vertically launched Tomahawks for the four
boats. Twenty-two Virginia-class boats built with VPMs could carry 616 Tomahawks in their
VPMs.
Acoustic and Other Improvements
The Virginia-class design has been updated multiple times since FY1998. In addition to the VPM,
the Navy is introducing acoustic and other improvements to the Virginia-class design that are
intended to help maintain the design’s superiority over Russian and Chinese submarines.28
Schedule and Cost Performance
The Virginia-class program experienced cost growth in its early years that was due in part to
annual procurement rates that were lower than initially envisaged and challenges in restarting
submarine production at HII/NNS.29 The lead ship in the program, however, was delivered within
four months of the target date that had been established about a decade earlier, and subsequent
boats in the program were delivered largely on cost and ahead of schedule.30 The Virginia (SSN-
774) class program received a David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award from DOD in
2008.
Beginning in 2019, it was reported that GD/EB, HII/NNS, and their supplier firms were
experiencing challenges in meeting scheduled delivery times as the Virginia-class program was
transitioning from production of two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-
equipped boats per year. Delivery delays have continued since then, and cost growth has emerged

27 A Virginia-class SSN can carry about 25 torpedoes in its four horizontal torpedo tubes and associated torpedo room,
and an additional 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles (which are torpedo-sized) in its bow-mounted vertical lunch tubes, for a
total of about 37 torpedo-sized weapons. Another 28 Tomahawks in four mid-body vertical tubes would increase that
total by about 76%.
28 For press reports discussing these improvements, see Kris Osborn, “The Navy Wants to Turn Its Nuclear Attack
Submarines Into ‘Spy’ Ships,” National Interest, May 28, 2018; Kris Osborn, “Navy Launches Most High-Tech &
Stealthy Attack Sub Ever,” Scout Warrior, November 18, 2017; Megan Eckstein, “Navy Considering Mid-Block
Virginia-Class Upgrades, SSGN Construction in Late 2030s,” USNI News, November 2, 2017; Zachary Cohen, “US
Launches ‘Most Advanced’ Stealth Sub Amid Undersea Rivalry,” CNN, October 26, 2017; Franz-Stefan Gady, “US
Navy Christens Most Advanced Attack Sub Ever,” The Diplomat, October 17, 2017; Douglas Ernst, “Navy Christens
Its ‘Most Advanced’ Attack Submarine Ever,” Washington Times, October 16, 2017; Dave Majumdar, “Stealth and
Armed to the Teeth: US Navy’s Big Plan for Submarine Dominance,” National Interest, July 9, 2016; Kris Osborn,
“‘Acoustic Superiority’: US Navy’s Secret Submarine Plan to Dominate the Seas,” National Interest, June 20, 2016;
Dave Majumdar, “This Is How the U.S. Navy’s Submarine Force Dominates the World’s Oceans,” National Interest,
May 17, 2016; Megan Eckstein, “Submarines To Become Stealthier Through Acoustic Superiority Upgrades,
Operational Concepts,” USNI News, March 1, 2016.
29 See Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service, before the
House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Hearing on Submarine Force
Structure and Acquisition Policy, March 8, 2007, Table 10 on pp. 14-15.
30 For discussions of recent exceptions, see Christopher P. Cavas, “US Navy Submarine Program Loses Some of Its
Shine,” Defense News, March 13, 2017; David B. Larter, “Virginia-Class Attack Sub Delivers late As US Navy Aims
to Get Program Back on Course,” Defense News, June 26, 2018.
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as an additional issue. This issue is discussed in more detail in the “Issues for Congress” section
of this report.
December 2021 Determinations Pursuant to Defense Production Act (DPA)
On December 21, 2021, President Biden signed three determinations permitting the use of the
Defense Production Act (DPA) to strengthen the U.S. submarine industrial base for the purpose of
increasing production of Virginia-class submarines. For more on these determinations, see
Appendix D.
FY2024 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed budget requests the procurement of the 39th and 40th Virginia-class boats.
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission states that one of the two boats is to be built to a special
configuration referred to as the “Modified VIRGINIA Class Subsea and Seabed Warfare (Mod VA
SSW)” configuration,31 suggesting a configuration that includes a capability for conducting
seabed warfare missions.32
The two boats requested for procurement in FY2024 have an estimated combined procurement
cost of $9,427.6 million (i.e., about $9.4 billion), including $5,356.9 million for the Mod VA
SSW boat and $4,070.7 million for the other boat. The two boats have received a combined total
of $2,297.7 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s proposed
FY2024 budget requests the remaining $7,130.0 million needed to complete their estimated
combined procurement cost. The Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget also requests $1,855.5 million
in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future fiscal years; $1,360.0 million in
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding, which is an additional kind of AP funding that can
occur under an MYP contract; and $168.2 million in cost-to-complete (CTC) funding to cover
cost growth on Virginia-class boats procured in prior years, bringing the total amount of
procurement, AP, EOQ, and CTC funding requested for FY2024 to $10,513.7 million (i.e., about
$10.5 billion).
AUKUS Proposal for Selling Virginia-Class SSNs and Transferring
U.S. Submarine and Propulsion Technology to Australia
Proposal Is Referred to as Pillar 1 of AUKUS
In September 2021, the U.S., UK, and Australian governments announced a significant new
security partnership, called AUKUS (pronounced AW-kus, rhyming with caucus), with the

31 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book Volume 1 of 1,
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, March 2023, p. 113.
32 In a transcript published on September 27, 2022, of a podcast on subsea and seabed warfare recorded September 26,
2022, a GD/EB official states: “Subsea and Seabed warfare (SSW) is a new capability targeted for a single, late-block-
V Virginia-class submarine. While we can’t get into the details, we can say it is a complex, fast-moving program with
strong Navy and congressional support. We’re now well into the arrangement phase of the design, which is a critical
phase of the program when we lock down major decisions on systems and components and the configuration of
spaces.” Another EB official states that “prior Virginia insertions [i.e. insertions of new elements into the Virginia-class
design], like the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) compared to SSW, had about half as many arrangements and more
time to sell them all.” (Sydney Davies, “K. Graney Team Spotlight Podcast: Subsea and Seabed Warfare,” EB Landing,
September 27, 2022.)
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acronym referring to Australia, the UK, and the United States.33 The proposed first major
initiative under AUKUS, referred to as Pillar 1, would be a project to rotationally deploy up to
five U.S. and UK SSNs out of a port in Western Australia, and more significantly, for Australia,
with U.S. and UK assistance, to acquire, operate, and maintain its own force of conventionally
armed SSNs, including three to five Virginia-class SSNs that would be sold to Australia. Today
only six countries—the United States, the UK, France, Russia, China, and India—operate
nuclear-powered submarines. The United States since 1958 has provided assistance to the UK’s
nuclear-powered submarine program;34 under the AUKUS Pillar 1 initiative, Australia would
become the second country to receive U.S. assistance in this area.
Key Elements of Proposed Pillar 1 Pathway
Key elements of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway include the following:35
• Embedding of Australian personnel. Beginning in 2023, Australian military
and civilian personnel would embed with the U.S. and UK navies, and in the U.S.
and UK submarine industrial bases, to accelerate the training of Australian
personnel. The United States would increase SSN port visits to Australia
beginning in 2023, with Australian sailors joining U.S. crews for training and
development; the UK would increase visits to Australia beginning in 2026.
• Rotational deployments of U.S. and UK SSNs from Australia. As early as
2027, the United States and UK would begin forward rotations of SSNs out of
HMAS Stirling, an Australian naval base near Perth, in Western Australia, to
accelerate the development of Australian naval personnel, workforce,
infrastructure and regulatory system. Eventually, one UK SSN and up to four
Virginia-class SSNs would be rotationally deployed out of HMAS Stirling under
the arrangement, which would be called Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-
West).
• Sale of three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia. Starting in the early
2030s, the United States would sell Australia three Virginia-class submarines,
with the potential to sell up to two more if needed. Australian officials have
stated that the first two Virginia-class boats would be existing boats with more
than 20 years each of remaining expected service life, and that the third boat
would be sold to Australia directly from the U.S. production line, with a full 33-
year expected service life. In combination, the sale of three such boats would
transfer more than 73 boat-years of SSN capability from the U.S. Navy to

33 For more on the AUKUS agreement, see CRS In Focus IF12113, AUKUS and Indo-Pacific Security, by Derek E.
Mix and Bruce Vaughn; CRS In Focus IF11999, AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D.
Nikitin; CRS In Focus IF11678, The “Quad”: Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia,
coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery; and CRS Report R47378, Australia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Bruce
Vaughn.
34 For additional discussion of U.S. assistance to the UK’s nuclear-powered submarine program, see CRS Report
R41129, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
35 Sources: White House, “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” March 13, 2023; Commonwealth of Australia, The
AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway, A Partnership for the Future, undated, released ca. March 13, 2023, 57
pp.; U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2024, March 2023, p. 4, 15 (table note 3); John Hunter Farrell, “Australia To Get One New Build Virginia Class
Submarine, Two From U.S. Navy,” The Drive, June 8, 2023, which reports remarks made by Australian government
officials in testimony at a May 2023 Australian parliamentary hearing.
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Australia’s navy. The U.S. Navy anticipates building additional Virginia-class
SSNs in the 2030s as replacements for submarines sold to Australia.
• UK and Australia construction of AUKUS SSNs incorporating U.S.
technology. The UK and Australia would design and build a new class of
AUKUS SSNs for use in the UK and Australian navies that would incorporate
U.S. submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology. The boats would be
built in the UK and Australia, with the first boat delivered to the UK navy in the
late 2030s and the first boat built in Australia delivered to the Australian navy in
the early 2040s. If the Australian construction effort encounters delays, a fourth
and perhaps fifth Virginia-class boat would be sold to permit Australia to
continue the buildup of its SSN force. Australia by the mid-2050s would operate
a force of eight SSNs, including three to five Virginia-class boats and five to
three AUKUS SSNs.
• Australian investments in U.S. and UK submarine industrial bases. Australia
would invest at least $3 billion in its industrial base to establish its own capacity
for building and maintaining SSNs, and additionally would “make a
proportionate financial investment in the UK and US industrial bases.” Although
some press reports have stated that Australia’s investment in the U.S. (or U.S.
and UK) submarine construction industrial base would total $3 billion,36 the
Australian government as of August 2023 had not yet definitized the size or
timing of its proposed investment in the U.S. industrial base.37
Impact on Size of U.S. SSN Force
Selling three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia would reduce the size of the U.S. Navy’s
SSN force by three to five boats (i.e., by roughly 6% to 10%) from the time that the boats are
removed from U.S. Navy service until the earlier of the following two events:
• the three to five Virginia-class boats sold to Australia reach the end of their
service lives and are retired; or
• replacement SSNs for the three to five Virginia-class boats sold to Australia are
built and enter service with the U.S. Navy.
In advance policy questions submitted for a September 14, 2023, hearing before the
Senate Armed Services Committee to consider her nomination to be Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Lisa Franchetti, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
The sale of between three and five Virginia Class SSNs will reduce [the] U.S. [SSN]
inventory in the short term, but investments in the Submarine Industrial Base (SIB) are
expected to restore capacity [i.e., numbers of SSNs] by producing more new construction
submarines per year and reducing maintenance delays of our in-service submarines. In
addition, the establishment of a U.S./UK rotational presence in Western Australia and

36 See, for example, Farrah Tomazin, “AUKUS Faces First ‘Critical Hurdle’ in Election-Focused US Congress,”
Sydney Morning Herald, June 9, 2023; David Crowe, “New Fleet of Eight Nuclear Submarines to be Built in Australia
in $368 Billion Deal,” Sydney Morning Herald, March 14, 2023; Daniel Hurst and Julian Borger, “Aukus: Nuclear
Submarines Deal Will Cost Australia Up to $368bn,” Guardian, March 13, 2023; Lewis Jackson, “Australia’s Nuclear
Submarine Plan to Cost Up to $245 Billion by 2055—Defence Official,” Reuters, March 14, 2023.
37 Source: CRS meeting with Australian embassy officials, August 23, 2023.
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Australia operating its own sovereign SSN force increases Allied SSN presence in the Indo-
Pacific.38
The Navy states in its FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan, “the Navy anticipates building
additional Virginia class SSNs in the 2030s as replacements for submarines sold to Australia.”
Strictly construed, building additional SSNs as replacements for three to five Virginia-class boats
sold to Australia would involve building three to five SSNs that would be in addition to those that
were already envisaged as being built under the Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan that preceded the
announcement of the AUKUS agreement in September 2021. The Navy 30-year shipbuilding plan
with 30-year ship procurement profiles that preceded the announcement of the AUKUS
agreement in September 2021 is the Navy FY2020 30-year (FY2020-FY2049) shipbuilding plan,
which was submitted in March 2019. This 30-year plan includes the procurement of SSNs at a
steady rate of two boats per year from FY2021 through FY2049.39
On this basis, it might be argued that building replacement SSNs for three to five Virginia-class
boats sold to Australia would involve building SSNs at a rate of something more than two boats
per year. At the September 14, 2023, hearing, Admiral Franchetti stated: “My understanding is we
need to reach [a U.S. SSN construction rate of] 2.2 [SSNs per year] to be able to meet” the
additional SSN construction requirements resulting from the AUKUS agreement.40
Compared to a previously planned procurement rate of 2.0 boats per year, a procurement rate of
2.2 boats per year would equate to one additional boat every five years. If the first replacement
boat were procured in FY2030 and an additional replacement boat were procured every five years
thereafter (i.e., in FY2035, FY2040, and so on if needed), and if each boat were to take six years
to build (which is a typical construction time for U.S. SSNs), then the third replacement boat
would enter service in 2046, and the fourth and fifth replacement boats, if needed, would enter
service in 2051 and 2056, respectively.
Whether the U.S. submarine construction industrial base would be able to achieve an SSN
construction rate of 2.2 boats per year, particularly as it also is building new Columbia-class
ballistic missile submarines, is a question that may be considered. As discussed later in this
report, although Virginia-class submarines are currently being procured at a rate of two boats per
year, the submarine construction industrial base is currently able to build them at a rate of about
1.2 boats per year, resulting in a growing backlog of SSN construction work, and the Navy does
not anticipate the Virginia-class construction rate reaching 2.0 boats per year until 2028.
Under the Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan, the Navy’s SSN force—
without the sale of any Virginia-class boats to Australia—is projected to include 50 SSNs in
FY2035 and either 55, 57, or 60 SSNs in FY2045. The FY2035 figure of 50 SSNs represents a
shortfall of about 24% relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal of 66 boats, while the FY2045
figures of 55, 57, and 60 boats represent shortfalls of about 17%, 14%, and 9%, respectively,
relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal of 66 boats.
Selling three Virginia-class boats to Australia by FY2035, and not replacing them through the
construction of additional Virginia-class boats by FY2035, would reduce the projected number of
SSNs in FY2035 to 47 boats, which would increase the percentage shortfall in the number of

38 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for
Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, pp. 48-49.
39 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year
2020, March 2019, Table A2-1 on page 13.
40 Source: CQ transcript of hearing. See also Bryant Harris, “AUKUS Agreement Requires Submarine Production
Boost, Franchetti Says,” Defense News, September 14, 2023; Linda Hersey, “Franchetti Presses for Increase in
Virginia-Class Submarine Production,” Inside Defense, September 15, 2023.
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Navy SSNs relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal in FY2035 from the above-mentioned
figure of about 24% to about 29%.
Selling three Virginia-class boats to Australia by FY2045, and not replacing them through the
construction of additional Virginia-class boats by FY2045, would reduce the projected number of
SSNs in FY2045 to 52, 54, or 57 boats, which would increase the percentage shortfalls in the
number of Navy SSNs relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal in FY2045 from the above-
mentioned figures of about 17%, 14%, and 9%, respectively, to about 21%, 18%, and 14%,
respectively.
Selling five Virginia-class boats to Australia by FY2045, and not replacing them through the
construction of additional Virginia-class boats by FY2045, would reduce the projected number of
SSNs in FY2045 to 50, 52, or 55 boats, which would increase the percentage shortfalls in the
number of Navy SSNs relative to the Navy’s SSN force-level goal in FY2045 from the above-
mentioned figures of about 17%, 14%, and 9%, respectively, to about 24%, 21%, and 17%,
respectively.
May 2023 DOD Legislative Package
On May 2, 2023, DOD sent to Congress its eighth package of legislative proposals for inclusion
in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The package included proposed
measures that would
• provide DOD with the authority to accept payments from the government of
Australia for the purpose of improving the U.S. submarine industrial base;
• authorize the transfer of up to two Virginia-class SSNs to the government of
Australia in the form of a sale, with the costs of the transfer covered by the
government of Australia; and
• provide for the training of the Australian private-sector personnel to support the
development of the Australian submarine industrial base under the foreign
military sales program pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).
For the text of the legislative package, see the “Legislative Activity ” section of this report.
Potential Alternative of a U.S.-Australian Division of Labor
A potential alternative to the proposed sale of Virginia-class SSNs to Australia would be a U.S.-
Australian military division of labor under which U.S. SSNs would perform both U.S. and
Australian SSN missions while Australia invested in military forces for performing other military
missions for both Australia and the United States. Such a U.S.-Australian military division of
labor might be broadly similar to military divisions of labor that exist between the United States
and its NATO allies.
Under such a U.S.-Australian military division of labor, the proposed forward rotations of U.S.
and UK SSNs to Australia would still be implemented, the size of the U.S. SSN force would be
expanded by at least three to five boats above previous plans so as to provide additional U.S.
SSNs for performing Australian SSN missions, and Australia, instead of using funds to purchase,
operate, and maintain three to five Virginia-class SSNs, would instead invest those funds in other
military capabilities (such as, for example, the production of long-range anti-ship missiles), so as
to create an Australian capacity for performing other military missions for both Australia and the
United States.
Variations of this potential alternative include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
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• Under one variation of this potential alternative, the proposed sharing of U.S.
naval nuclear propulsion technology and U.S. submarine technology, the
proposed Australian investments in Australian and U.S. submarine-construction
capability, and the other proposed actions for supporting eventual Australian
construction of AUKUS SSNs would continue, and Australia would eventually
build its own AUKUS SSNs, reducing at that point the need for U.S. SSNs to
perform Australian SSN missions.
• Under another variation of this potential alternative, the performance of
Australian SSN missions by U.S. SSNs would continue indefinitely, and instead
of implementing the technology sharing, making Australian investments in
submarine-construction capability, and taking the other actions that would be
needed to eventually build AUKUS SSNs, Australia would continue investing in
other military capabilities for supporting a continuing U.S.-Australian division of
labor. Under this variation, the size of the U.S. SSN force would eventually be
expanded above previously planned levels by about eight boats (i.e., the planned
eventual number of SSNs that Australia had planned to acquire).
Table 3 summarizes certain features of the proposed AUKUS Pillar 1 pathway and the two
above-described variations of the potential alternative of a U.S.-Australian division of labor.
Table 3. Proposed AUKUS SSN Pathway and Potential Alternative
Potential alternative of U.S.-Australian
division of labor

Proposed AUKUS pathway
One variation
Another variation
Australian Navy SSNs,
Australian SSN missions to
consisting initially of Virginia-
U.S. Navy SSNs, until
be performed in 2030s and
class boats sold to Australia,
replaced by
U.S. Navy SSNs
beyond by…
later augmented by Australian-
Australian-made
made AUKUS SSNs
AUKUS SSNs
Forward rotations of U.S.
and UK SSNs to Australia
Yes
Yes
Yes
3 to 5 Virginia-class SSNs
sold to Australia
Yes
No
No
AUKUS SSNs built in
Australia for Australian use
Yes
Yes
No
Source: Table prepared by CRS.
Issues for Congress
AUKUS Proposal for Selling Virginia-Class SSNs and Transferring
U.S. Submarine and Propulsion Technology to Australia
Key Questions for Congress
Key questions for Congress regarding the proposed pathway for Pillar 1 of the AUKUS
agreement include the following:
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• Should Congress approve, reject, or modify the proposed sale of three to five
Virginia-class attack submarines to Australia?
• Should Congress approve, reject, or modify the proposed transfer of U.S.
submarine and naval nuclear-propulsion technology to Australia?
Each of these questions is discussed below.
Proposed Sale of Virginia-Class SSNs to Australia
Overview of Potential Questions to Consider
In considering whether to approve, reject, or modify, the proposed sale of three to five Virginia-
class attack submarines to Australia, Congress may assess the relative merits of the proposed
Pillar 1 pathway and the above-described potential alternative (with two variations) of a U.S.-
Australian division of labor. As a part of that assessment, Congress may consider several
questions, including but not limited to the following:
• Timing of a decision on whether to provide authority. To meet process-related
required lead times for selling Virginia-class boats to Australia, does a decision
on whether to provide authority for selling Virginia-class boats to Australia need
to be made by Congress in 2023, or could it be deferred until 2024 or later? If
process-related required lead times for selling Virginia-class boats to Australia do
not require that Congress make a decision in 2023, what would be the tradeoff
between making a decision in 2023 (and thus sending a signal of alliance
solidarity and deterrence to China sooner rather than later) and making a decision
in 2024 or later (when there might be more information available to Congress
about the details on specific elements of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway, including
elements addressed in some of the bullet points below)?
• Number of boats to include in an authorization. Should an authorization for
transferring Virginia-class boats to Australia, if one were to be provided, be for
up to two Virginia-class SSNs, as requested, or for some other number, such as
up to three, up to five, or three to five? (The proposal for authorizing the transfer
of two appears to reflect the above-discussed plan for the first two Virginia-class
boats to be in-service boats.)
• Sufficiency of information available to Congress. Does Congress have
sufficient information on the specific elements of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway
(including elements addressed in some of the bullet points below) to adequately
assess the merits of selling Virginia-class boats to Australia? Is the executive
branch being adequately forthcoming in providing Congress with such
information? What might be the potential implications if Congress were to make
a decision about selling Virginia-class boats to Australia without sufficient
information on the specific elements of the proposed Pillar 1 pathway (including
elements addressed in some of the bullet points below)?
• Dates that sold boats would be removed from U.S. Navy service. When,
exactly, would Virginia-class SSNs sold to Australia be removed from U.S. Navy
service (or delivered directly from the U.S. production line) and transferred to
Australia?
• Specific boats that would be sold. Which Virginia-class boats, specifically,
would be sold to Australia? How many of the three to five boats would be
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existing boats with less than 33 years of remaining expected service life, and how
many would be newly built boats?
• Prices of boats that would be sold. How much would Australia pay for each
boat that it would purchase? Adjusted for their remaining expected service lives,
how would those sale prices compare to the $4.3-billion procurement cost of a
new VPM-equipped Virginia-class boat?
• Australia’s investment in U.S. submarine industrial base. How much
additional funding would Australia provide as “a proportionate financial
investment” for the U.S. submarine construction industrial base? When would
this funding be provided? Would it be provided in a single payment or a series of
payments?
• Dates for procuring replacement boats. When would each of the three to five
replacement boats for the U.S. Navy be procured, and when would they each
enter service?
• U.S. industrial base capability for building replacement boats. How able
would the U.S. submarine construction base be in the 2030s to build, as
replacements for sold Virginia-class boats, three to five new SSNs for the U.S.
Navy that would be in addition to the SSNs already envisaged for procurement
for U.S. Navy use prior to the announcement of the AUKUS agreement?
• Operational impact of reduction in U.S. SSN force. What would be the impact
of a three- to five-boat reduction in the size of the U.S. SSN force on the ability
of the U.S. SSN force to perform day-to-day and wartime SSN missions of
interest to the United States? What is the U.S. Navy’s view on this issue?
• Net impact on collective allied deterrence and warfighting capability. What
would be the net impact on collective allied deterrence and warfighting
capabilities of selling three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia while
pursuing the construction of three to five replacement SSNs for the U.S. Navy?
• Broader considerations. How do broader considerations relating to U.S.
relations and nuclear cooperation with Australia and the UK, U.S. relations with
countries in the Indo-Pacific region other than Australia, and the overall political
and security situation in the Indo-Pacific region affect the assessment of whether
to authorize the sale of Virginia-class boats to Australia?41
Potential Arguments from Supporters
Potential arguments that might be made by supporters of the proposed sale of Virginia-class boats
to Australia include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
• Selling Virginia-class boats to Australia would substantially enhance deterrence
of potential Chinese aggression by sending a strong signal to China of the
collective determination of the United States and Australia, along with the UK, to
counter China’s military modernization effort. The fact that the United States has
never before sold a complete SSN to another country—not even the UK—would

41 For more on the these broader considerations, see CRS In Focus IF12113, AUKUS and Indo-Pacific Security, by
Derek E. Mix and Bruce Vaughn; CRS In Focus IF11999, AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary
Beth D. Nikitin; CRS In Focus IF11678, The “Quad”: Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and
Australia, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery; and CRS Report R47378, Australia: Background and U.S. Relations,
by Bruce Vaughn.
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underscore the depth of this determination, and thus the strength of the deterrent
signal it would send.
• The deterrent value of selling Virginia-class boats to Australia would be greater
than the deterrent value of keeping those SSNs in U.S. Navy service for two
reasons:
• Compared with the option of keeping the SSNs in U.S. Navy service and
waiting for Australia to build its own AUKUS SSNs, selling Virginia-class
boats to Australia would substantially accelerate the creation of an Australian
force of SSNs, and thus present China much sooner with a second allied
decisionmaking center (along with the United States) for SSN operations in
the Indo-Pacific, which would enhance deterrence of potential Chinese
aggression by complicating Chinese military planning. In this regard, the
accelerated deterrent effect of selling the boats to Australia would be broadly
comparable not only to the effect of the help that the United States provided
to the UK’s nuclear-powered submarine program starting in 1958, but also to
the help that the United States, secretly at the time, reportedly provided to
France during the Cold War on the design of France’s nuclear warheads, so
as to speed up the development and fielding of France’s strategic nuclear
deterrent force and thereby confront the Soviet Union more quickly with
three decisionmaking centers—the United States, the UK, and France—that
were armed with effective strategic nuclear deterrent forces.42 A division of
labor arrangement in which U.S. SSNs perform SSN missions for Australia
would not generate this multiple-decisionmaking-center form of deterrence.
• The U.S. Navy anticipates building additional Virginia-class SSNs in the
2030s as replacements for submarines sold to Australia. Australia’s promised
investment in the U.S. submarine industrial base would help accelerate the
date by which replacement boats, strictly construed, could be built and
thereby minimize the time during which the size of the U.S. SSN force is
reduced due to the sale of boats to Australia. Investments that Australia
would make in the U.S. and Australian submarine construction industrial
bases would increase the capacity of the combined U.S.-Australian
submarine construction industrial base at a time when limits on the capacity
of the U.S. submarine construction industrial base have become a matter of
concern for U.S. policymakers.
• Australia intends to increase its defense budget as needed to be able to finance
the purchase, operation, and maintenance of its Virginia-class boats without
having to reduce funding for other Australian military capabilities that are needed
for deterring potential Chinese aggression. Increases to Australia’s military
budget would be sufficient to ensure that selling Virginia-class boats to Australia
would have a net positive impact on Australia’s overall military capabilities for
deterring potential Chinese aggression.

42 See Richard H. Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1989 (No. 75): 3-33, accessed at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148862; “The French Bomb, with Secret U.S. Help, Documents from Nixon and Ford
Administrations Show U.S. Assistance for French Nuclear Forces Earlier Than Previously Reported,” National Security
Archive, George Washington University, May 26, 2011, accessed at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb346/;
William Burr, “U.S. Secret Assistance to the French Nuclear Program, 1969-1975: From ‘Fourth Country’ to Strategic
Partner,” Wilson Center, undated, accessed at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/us-secret-assistance-to-the-
french-nuclear-program-1969-1975-fourth-country-to-strategic.
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• The Australian Navy is a fully professional force that would operate and maintain
its Virginia-class boats in a manner fully adhering to the U.S. Navy’s strict and
exacting safety, quality-control, and accountability standards for submarines and
nuclear-powered ships43 so as to minimize, to the same extent as in the U.S.
Navy, the risk of an accident that might call into question for third-party
observers the safety of all U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships.
Potential Arguments from Skeptics
Potential arguments that might be made by supporters of the proposed sale of Virginia-class boats
to Australia include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
• The potential benefits, costs, and risks of selling three to five Virginia-class boats
to Australia are uncertain in the absence of specific information on items such as
the dates that the sold boats would be removed from U.S. Navy service, the
remaining service lives of the boats that would be sold, the prices of the boats
that would be sold, the amount and timing of Australia’s investment in the U.S.
submarine industrial base,44 the dates when each of the three to five replacement
boats would be procured, and the dates when they would each enter service, the
details of the Navy’s plan for increasing the SSN production rate to at least 2.2
SSNs per year while also building Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines,
and the impact of a three- to five-boat reduction in the size of the U.S. SSN force
on the ability of the U.S. SSN force to perform day-to-day and wartime SSN
missions of interest to the United States.
• Selling Virginia-class boats to Australia could weaken deterrence of potential
Chinese aggression if China were to find reason to believe, correctly or not, that
Australia might use its Virginia-class boats less effectively than the U.S. Navy
would use them if the boats were retained in U.S. Navy service, or that Australia
might not involve its military, including its Virginia-class boats, in U.S.-China
crises or conflicts that Australia viewed as not engaging important Australian
interests. Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles in March 2023 reportedly
confirmed that in exchange for the Virginia-class boats, Australia’s government
made no promises to the United States that Australia would support the United
States in a future conflict over Taiwan.45 Virginia-class boats are less certain to be
used in a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, or less certain to be used in such a
conflict in the way that the United States might prefer, if they are sold to
Australia rather than retained in U.S. Navy service.
• Given the challenges that the U.S. submarine industrial base is experiencing in
achieving a desired construction rate of two Virginia-class boats per year, the
ability to build replacement SSNs, strictly construed, for Virginia-class boats sold

43 For further discussion on these standards, see, for example, John W. Crawford and Steven L. Krahn, “The Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program: A Brief Case Study in Institutional Constancy,” Public Administration Review, vol. 58,
no. 2, March/April 1998: 159-166.
44 As noted earlier, although some press reports have stated that Australia’s investment in the U.S. (or U.S. and UK)
submarine construction industrial base would total $3 billion, the Australian government as of August 2023 had not yet
definitized the size or timing of its proposed investment in the U.S. industrial base..
45 Rod McGuirk, “Australia Won’t Promise to Side with US in Taiwan Conflict,” Associated Press, March 20, 2023;
Daniel Hurst, “Australia Has ‘Absolutely Not’ Committed to Join US in Event of War over Taiwan, Marles Says,”
Guardian, March 18, 2023; Georgia Hitch, “No Promise Given to US to Assist in Potential Taiwan Conflict in
Exchange for Submarines, Says Defence Minister Richard Marles,” abc.net.au, March 18, 2023.
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to Australia is uncertain. The duration of the impact of selling Virginia-class
boats to Australia on the size of the U.S. SSN force is thus uncertain and could be
longer than anticipated.
• The costs for Australia of acquiring, operating, and maintaining Virginia-class
boats could reduce, perhaps significantly, funding within Australia’s military
budget for other Australian military capabilities, particularly if Virginia SSN-
related costs turn out to be higher than expected. If this were to occur, there could
be a net negative impact on Australia’s overall military capabilities for deterring
potential Chinese aggression.
• It would be more cost-effective to pursue a U.S.-Australian division of labor
under which U.S. SSNs would perform both U.S. and Australian SSN missions
while Australia invests in other types of military forces.46 Such a division of labor
would follow the general model of military divisions of labor that exist between
the United States and its NATO allies for naval capabilities such as aircraft
carriers, SSNs, large surface combatants, and amphibious ships, and for non-
naval capabilities such as nuclear weapons, space assets, and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. It would be inconsistent to
argue that the U.S.-Australian relationship is close enough to contemplate the
transfer of U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology but not close enough to
permit a division of labor on SSNs. The proposed SSN AUKUS pathway would
result in parallel SSN-related investments in the United States and Australia
comparable to parallel investments in certain military capabilities among NATO
countries that have been criticized by some observers for their collective
inefficiencies.47

46 In connection with a project that Canada initiated in 1987 (and later canceled) to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK- or
French-made SSNs, Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, then-Director of the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (aka
Naval Reactors), testified in March 1988 that the project “puts at risk resources that ought to be used for other
purposes” and that Canada “could make a better contribution to NATO in other areas with the same amount of money.”
(U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989—H.R. 4264, and
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives,
Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, Title 1, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hearings held March 1, 3,
8, 9, 10, and 17, 1988, H.A.S.C. No. 100-70, p. 345. The hearing in question, on submarine programs, was held on
March 9, 1988. [Included in CRS/FDT bound volume collection as House Armed Services Committee, Hearings. (Vol.)
5, 100th Congress, 2d Sess., 1988, CRS-F.])
47 For examples of reports and articles discussing such inefficiencies among NATO countries and potential steps to
mitigate these inefficiencies, see “EU Incentivizing Common Procurement Between Members,” Aviation Week,
October 10, 2023; Stephen Flanagan and Anna M. Dowd, “Alliance Assignments: Defense Priorities for Key NATO
States,” War on the Rocks, October 4, 2023; David A. Ochmanek, et al., Inflection Point, How to Reverse the Erosion
of U.S. and Allied Military Power and Influence, RAND, 2023, 217 pp.; Nicole Koenig et al., Defense Sitters,
Transforming European Militaries in Times of War, Special Edition of the Munich Security Report on European
Defense, Munich Security Conference (MSC), June 2023, 95 pp.; Max Bergmann and Otto Svendsen, Transforming
European Defense, A New Focus on Integration, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 2023, 64
pp.; Sean Monaghan, “Solving Europe’s Defense Dilemma: Overcoming the Challenges to European Defense
Cooperation,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), March 1, 2023; Luigi Scazzieri, “Is European
Defence Missing Its Moment?” Centre for European Reform, January 16, 2023; “EU Defence Review Calls for Greater
European Cooperation to Match Defence Spending Increases,” European Defence Agency, November 15, 2022;
Bastian Giegerich and Ester Sabatino, “The (Sorry) State of EU Defense Cooperation,” Carnegie Europe, October 6,
2022; Paul Taylor, “How to Spend Europe’s Defense Bonanza Intelligently, EU Countries Must Coordinate
Procurement and Pool Resources to Avoid Wasting Money,” Politico, September 2, 2022; Max Bergmann, Colin Wall,
Sean Monaghan, and Pierre Morcos, “Transforming European Defense,” Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), August 18, 2022.
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• While the Australian Navy is a fully professional force that would operate and
maintain its Virginia-class boats in a manner fully adhering to the U.S. Navy’s
strict and exacting safety, quality-control, and accountability standards for
submarines and nuclear-powered ships, selling Virginia-class boats to Australia
would unavoidably make another country responsible for preventing an accident
with a U.S.-made SSN that that might call into question for third-party observers
the safety of all U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships. Such an accident might affect
U.S. public support for operating U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships and/or the
ability of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered ships to make port calls around the world
for purposes of sending deterrent signals of alliance resolve and solidarity to
China, Russia, or other potential adversaries; conducting diplomacy and
engagement activities with the countries being visited; resupplying U.S. Navy
nuclear-powered ships with food and other provisions; and providing crew rest
and recreation for those ships.48 In 1971, Australia suspended visits by U.S. Navy
and other nuclear-powered ships to Australian ports pending a review of the
safety implications of such visits.49

48 A 2020 publication from the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (aka Naval Reactors) states:
From the beginning, the [U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion] Program recognized that the
environmental safety of operating U.S. nuclear-powered ships would be key to their acceptance at
home and abroad. The Program maintains the same rigorous attitude toward the control of
radioactivity and protection of the environment as it does toward reactor design, testing, operation,
and servicing. As a result, the Program has a well-documented record showing the absence of any
adverse environmental effect from the operation of U.S. nuclear-powered warships. Because of this
record, these ships are welcome in over 150 ports in over 50 countries and dependencies.
(Department of Energy and Department of the Navy, The United States Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program 2020, Over 166 Million Miles Safely Steamed on Nuclear Power, p. 31.)
The document similarly states on page 1:
Naval Reactors maintains an outstanding record of over 166 million miles safely steamed on
nuclear power. The Program currently operates 98 reactors and has accumulated over 7,100
reactor-years of operation…. Because of the Program’s demonstrated reliability, U.S. nuclear-
powered warships are welcomed in more than 150 ports of call in over 50 foreign countries and
dependencies.
Regarding the program’s safety record, the document states on page 32:
Throughout the Program’s entire history—over 7,100 reactor years of operation and more than 166
million miles steamed on nuclear power—there has never been a reactor accident, nor any release
of radioactivity that has had an adverse effect on human health or the quality of the environment.
The Department of Energy similarly states:
The [U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion] Program maintains the same rigorous attitude toward the
control of radioactivity and protection of the environment as it does toward reactor design, testing,
operation, and servicing. As a result, the Program has a well-documented record showing the
absence of any adverse environmental effect from the operation of U.S. nuclear-powered warships.
Because of this record, these ships are welcome in over 150 ports in more than 50 countries and
dependencies, as well as in U.S. ports.
(Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Powering the Navy”
expandable section entitled “Concern for the Environment,” accessed October 11, 2023 at
https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/powering-navy.)
49 See Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Australian Navy, Port Visits to Australia by Nuclear-Powered Vessels: A
Historical Context, 2023, PDF pages 7 to 10 of 26, accessed October 11, 2023, at https://www.navy.gov.au/sites/
default/files/documents/Port%20Visits%20to%20Australia%20by%20Nuclear-Powered%20Vessels%20-
%20A%20Historical%20Context.pdf. See also Australian Government, Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear
Safety Agency, “Nuclear-Powered Vessel Visit Planning,” accessed October 11, 2023, at https://www.arpansa.gov.au/
research/radiation-emergency-preparedness-and-response/visits-by-nuclear-powered-warships.
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Proposed Transfer of Submarine and Naval Nuclear Propulsion Technology
Overview
U.S. submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology, reflecting decades of cumulative U.S.
Navy research, development, design, construction, and operational experience, are generally
considered crown jewels of U.S. military technology and consequently are highly protected. As
noted earlier, the technical (including acoustic) superiority of U.S. Navy nuclear-powered
submarines is generally considered a foundation of U.S. superiority in undersea warfare, which in
turn underpins a U.S. ability to leverage the world’s oceans as a medium of operations and
maneuver, deny that to others, and thereby generate a huge asymmetric strategic advantage for
the United States.
Given its high degree of importance to overall U.S. strategy, U.S. naval nuclear propulsion
technology to date has been shared with only one other country—the UK, through an
arrangement begun in 1958 reflecting the U.S.-UK special relationship and U.S.-UK cooperation
on nuclear-related matters dating back to the Manhattan project during World War II. During the
Cold War, when the United States and its allies were engaged in an extended, high-stakes
strategic competition against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact allies, the United States
reportedly turned down requests from U.S. allies other than the UK—including France, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Japan—to share U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology.50
Regarding France, a 1989 journal article on assistance that the United States provided to France
on the design of French nuclear warheads stated
One area in which the French requested but did not receive help was in antisubmarine-
warfare (ASW) technology and, in particular, in silencing their own ballistic missile
submarines to make them less easily tracked by Soviet hunter-killers. The U.S. Navy
adamantly opposed any such assistance. Behind the navy’s position was the extreme
sensitivity of its own counter-ASW regime. “The security of our Poseidon-Trident force
was so important that we were not going to share with anybody else the methods we used
to preserve it,” a senior civilian told me. Another said, “This is a jewel the navy will give
to no one.”51
Regarding Japan, Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee, then-Director of the U.S. Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program (aka Naval Reactors), testified in March 1988:
Frankly, I think Japan is smart enough, if they really want to, to develop a phase-to-phase
[sic: phased-array] radar.52 They have also asked us for help in nuclear submarines. We

50 Regarding France, Italy, and the Netherlands, see the letter from Representative Melvin Price that is reprinted in
Appendix E, which states in part
It is important to appreciate that there is nothing new about an ally wanting our naval nuclear
propulsion technology—or about the consistently strong U.S. policy against its releases. Over the
years, we have turned down requests from a number of countries, including France, Italy, and the
Netherlands.
51 Richard H. Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1989 (No. 75): 16-17, accessed at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148862.
52 Admiral McKee’s testimony at this point is referring to a proposal at the time, which he was asked to comment on, to
sell to Japan the U.S. Navy’s surface ship Aegis weapon system, which included the SPY-1 phased-array radar. The
system was eventually sold to Japan and is now used on eight Japanese destroyers. The system was also sold to South
Korea, Australia, Spain, and Norway for use on ships in the navies of those countries. For more on the Aegis system,
see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background
and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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say[,] “If you want to get into the nuclear submarine business, go ahead and do it. You
don’t need our help.”
Just as a matter of principle, I really have trouble with transferring that level of technology
to anybody. The second and third order effect of doing these things are the ones that kill
us. When you get right down to the key issue, “Why don’t we do it and make a little
money,” people tend to not want to be bothered with the side effects.53
Admiral McKee’s testimony above was given in connection with a project that Canada initiated in
1987 to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK- or French-made SSNs. A choice by Canada to select the
UK SSN design (the Trafalgar-class design) would have involved the transfer to Canada of naval
nuclear propulsion technology in the Trafalgar-class design that was derived from the naval
nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in 1958,
which would raise a question of U.S. approval for a potential sale of UK-made SSNs to Canada.
The issue was discussed in a 1988 CRS report.54
In a November 18, 1987, presentation at a conference in Ottawa, Canada, U.S. Navy Captain
Robert F. Hofford, the U.S. naval attaché in Ottawa—who stated that he was expressing his own
views, which did not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government—stated:
As a matter of fact, Canada stands at the end of a line of about six different nations [other
than the UK] that have requested exactly the same support from the U.S. for [a] nuclear
submarine program. In fact we have turned them all down up to this point, so Canada is in
a unique position of being the first country other than the British to be allowed or to even
start a technology information flow that will allow the country to pursue its lines toward a
nuclear program.55
Canada eventually canceled the project, mooting the potential question of whether to share with
Canada naval nuclear propulsion technology in the Trafalgar-class design that was derived from
the naval nuclear propulsion technology that the United States provided to the UK beginning in
1958.
Potential Arguments from Supporters
Potential arguments that might be made by supporters of a transfer of U.S. submarine and naval
nuclear propulsion technology under Pillar 1 include but are not necessarily limited to the
following:
• Transferring this technology would permit it to be leveraged not only by the
United States and the UK, but by Australia as well. This would enable the
technology to be leveraged by the United States and its allies at a larger scale—
through the addition of Australian funding, industrial base capacity, and
personnel—and thereby achieve greater collective allied deterrent and
warfighting capability.

53 U.S. Congress. House. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—1989, Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1989—H.R. 4264, and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, Department of Energy National
Security Programs, before the Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 3, 1988, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988, H.A.S.C. No.
100-75, p. 3. (Included in CRS/FDT bound volume collection as House Armed Services Committee, Hearings. [Vol.] 9,
100th Congress, 2d Sess., 1988, CRS-F.)
54 For a discussion of this issue, see CRS Issue Brief IB88083, Canadian Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine
Program: Issues for Congress, updated April 24, 1989 (archived), by Ronald O’Rourke. This report is available to
congressional clients directly from the author.
55 Transcript of presentation.
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• Not sharing this technology would mean that any Australian effort to design and
build its own SSNs, if attempted, would take many more years, cost much more
(potentially reducing funding for other Australian military capabilities), and
likely result in Australian SSNs with less capability. Such an effort would have a
much-delayed and reduced impact in terms of countering China.
• Australia is fully capable of, and fully committed to, protecting U.S. submarine
and naval nuclear propulsion technology. The Australian government has stated:
“Building on the decades of experience that the UK and the US have in
protecting sensitive and classified nuclear material, naval nuclear propulsion
technology and SSN capabilities, Australia has committed to a strong security
posture to deliver an uncompromised SSN program, as a responsible steward of
nuclear technology.”56
Potential Arguments from Skeptics
Potential arguments that might be made by supporters of a transfer of U.S. submarine and naval
nuclear propulsion technology under Pillar 1 include but are not necessarily limited to the
following:
• The Soviet Union and its allies during the Cold War posed a formidable military
challenge to the United States and its NATO allies that included a Soviet navy
with as many as 300 nuclear- and conventionally powered submarines armed
with a variety of nuclear and conventional weapons. Notwithstanding this
challenge, the U.S. government, taking into account the crown-jewel status of
U.S. submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology, reportedly turned down
requests from U.S. NATO allies such as France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan
to share U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology, and reportedly turned down a
request from France—to which the United States reportedly had provided
assistance regarding the design of France’s nuclear warheads—to share U.S.
ASW technology, including technology for silencing submarines.
• Notwithstanding Australia’s capability for, and commitment to, protecting U.S.
submarine and naval nuclear propulsion technology, sharing this technology with
another country, particularly in an era of advanced and persistent computer
hacking threats, would increase the number of potential digital and physical entry
points that China, Russia, or some other country could attempt to penetrate to
gain access to that technology.57 Chinese hackers in 2018 successfully stole a

56 The Australian government states: “Building on the decades of experience that the UK and the US have in protecting
sensitive and classified nuclear material, naval nuclear propulsion technology and SSN capabilities, Australia has
committed to a strong security posture to deliver an uncompromised SSN program, as a responsible steward of nuclear
technology.” (Commonwealth of Australia, The AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway, A Partnership for the
Future, undated, released ca. March 13, 2023, p. 38.)
57 Regarding Canada’s project to acquire a force of 10 to 12 UK- or French-made SSNs, Admiral Kinnaird R. McKee,
then-Director of the U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (aka Naval Reactors), testified in March 1988 (i.e., years
before the rise of the internet and internet-based cyber espionage):
We have a number of very sensitive arrangements with a lot of our allies on a government-to-
government, navy-to-navy, military-to-military basis that deal with certain things we do. But once
the Canadians talk about launching into a 12 nuclear submarine building program, we are talking
about a proliferation of technology across a very broad industrial base. The Canadians intend to do
65 percent of the work [for building those submarines] in Canada. That is proliferating the
technology over a wide range of industrial activities that have never had any involvement in this
(continued...)
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large amount of unclassified but sensitive information relating to undersea
warfare from a U.S. contractor working for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center
in Newport, RI.58 Hackers linked to China reportedly are highly active in
attempting to penetrate Australian government and contractor computers.59 A
March 1, 2023, press report stated that “Chinese hackers ‘significantly increased’
attacks on Australian government, industry and education after the AUKUS
nuclear submarine pact came under the crosshairs of the world’s most prolific
espionage operation, according to cyber security experts.” The article quoted a
senior employee of the cyber security company CrowdStrike as stating that the
AUKUS agreement “has been in the crosshairs of Australia’s cybersecurity
adversaries since it was announced.”60 Sharing this technology might ultimately
enable the construction of three to five AUKUS SSNs for Australia’s navy. It is
not clear that the risks of sharing this technology would be worth this benefit.
Projected SSN Force Levels vs. SSN Force-Level Goal
Another issue for Congress concerns projected SSN force-levels compared to the SSN force-level
goal. As mentioned earlier, the Navy’s current force-level goal, which was released in December
2016, calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 manned ships, including 66 SSNs. The
Navy and the Office of the Secretary Defense have been working since 2019 to develop a
successor Navy force-level goal to replace the 355-goal of 2016. Studies of this emerging force-
level goal that have been released by the Navy in summary form suggest that the new force-level
goal could call for achieving and maintaining a force of 66 to 72 SSNs.
The Navy’s FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan includes three alternative 30-
year shipbuilding profiles for the period FY2029-FY2053. Under these profiles, the SSN force
would reach a minimum of 46 boats in FY2030, and grow to 60, 69, or 63 boats by FY2053.
Under the alternative where the SSN force grows to 69 boats by FY2053, the force would reach
66 boats in FY2049. Potential questions for Congress include the following:

kind of business.
So there is, I think, a clear and present concern that dissemination would not be in our national
interests. That is how we get into it.
(U.S. Congress. House. Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989—
H.R. 4264, and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs, before the Committee on Armed
Services, House of Representatives, Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee,
Title 1, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., Hearings Held March 1, 3, 8, 9, 10, and 17, 1988, H.A.S.C. No. 100-
70, p. 351. The hearing in question, on submarine programs, was held on March 9, 1988. [Included
in CRS/FDT bound volume collection as, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings. (Vol.) 5,
100th Congress, 2d Sess., 1988, CRS-F.])
58 Ellen Nakashima and Paul Sonne, “China Hacked a Navy Contractor and Secured a Trove of Highly Sensitive Data
on Submarine Warfare,” Washington Post, June 8, 2018; Helene Cooper, “Chinese Hackers Steal Unclassified Data
From Navy Contractor,” New York Times, June 8, 2023.
59 See, for example, Max Mason, “Chinese Hackers Use G7 Ruse to Target Australian Government Officials,”
Australian Financial Review, June 19, 2023; News.com.au, “Chinese Cyber Attack on Australia Exposed,”
News.com.au, August 30, 2022; Bill Toulas, “Chinese Hackers Target Australian Govt with ScanBox Malware,”
Bleeping Computer, August 30, 2022; Jamie Tarabay, “How Hackers Hammered Australia After China Ties Turned
Sour,” Bloomberg, August 30, 2021; Jacob Greber, “US accuses Chinese nationals of hacking Australian defence
contractor,” Australian Financial Review, July 22, 2020; Daniel Hurst, “Hackers Linked to China Allegedly Stole Data
from Australian Defence Contractor,” Guardian, July 22, 2020; Lauren Ferri and Charlie Coë, “Top Chinese Hackers
Stole a Treasure Trove of Information from an Australian Defence Contractor Including Top-Secret Weapon and
Military Data,” Daily Mail, July 21, 2020.
60 Justin Vallejo, “Extent of Hacks against Australia after AUKUS Deal Revealed,” Herald Sun, March 1, 2023.
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• Should the Navy’s next force-level goal—the successor to the 355-ship goal of
2016—include an SSN force-level goal of 66 boats, 72 boats, or some other
number of boats?
• What are the potential operational implications of the SSN force declining to a
minimum of 46 boats in FY2030, and of remaining below the 66-boat force-level
goal until at least FY2049?
In assessing these questions, Congress may consider several factors, including but not necessarily
limited to the following:
• U.S. national security strategy and national defense strategy, and the
contributions that SSNs make to fulfilling those strategies;
• the funding that would be needed each year to procure SSNs and operate and
support the SSN force, and the potential impact of SSN-related funding
requirements on funding available for other Navy or DOD programs; and
• the capacity of the submarine construction industrial base.
Regarding the first factor above, DOD officials and other observers view SSNs as particularly
useful for implementing certain elements of the national defense strategy because of their ability
to evade China’s improving anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) forces.61
Regarding the second factor above, as noted earlier, when procured at a rate of two boats per year,
VPM-equipped Virginia-class SSNs have an estimated procurement cost of about $4.3 billion per
boat. Increasing the size of the SSN force would increase the SSN force’s annual operation and
support costs.
The third factor above—the capacity of the submarine construction industrial base—is discussed
further in the next section.
Industrial-Base Capacity for Building Both Virginia- and
Columbia-Class Boats
Overview
Another issue for Congress concerns the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to
execute the work associated with procuring two VPM-equipped Virginia-class SSNs plus one
Columbia-class SSBN per year (a procurement rate referred to in short as 2+1) from the mid-
2020s to the mid-2030s. Policymakers and other observers have expressed concern about the
industrial base’s capacity for executing such a workload without encountering bottlenecks or
other production problems in one or both of these programs. In a nutshell, the challenge for the
industrial base—both shipyards and supplier firms—is to ramp up production from one “regular”
Virginia-class boat’s work per year (the volume of work prior to FY2011) to the equivalent of
about five “regular” Virginia-class boats’ work per year (the approximate volume of work
represented by two VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-class boat).62

61 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
62 If building a Virginia-class boat is viewed as requiring one unit of work, then building a VPM-equipped Virginia-
class boat can be viewed as requiring about 1.25 units of work, and building a Columbia-class boat can be viewed as
requiring about 2.5 units of work. On this basis, building two VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-
class boat would require about five units of work (1.25 + 1.25 + 2.5 = 5.0).
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Concerns about the ability of the submarine construction industrial base to execute the workload
resulting from a sustained 2+1 procurement rate were heightened starting in 2019 by the earlier-
noted reports about challenges faced by the two submarine-construction shipyards and associated
supplier firms in meeting scheduled delivery times for Virginia-class boats as the Virginia-class
program transitions from production of two “regular” Virginia-class boats per year to two VPM-
equipped boats per year.63
Although Virginia-class submarines are being procured at a rate of two boats per year, Navy
officials have noted that deliveries of Virginia-class submarines from GD/EB and HII/NNS have
averaged 1.2 boats per year for the past five years.64 On March 29, 2023, Secretary of the Navy
Carlos Del Toro testified that the Virginia-class production rate was at that point about 1.4 boats
per year.65 At an April 28, 2023, briefing on the Virginia-class program for CRS and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Navy officials stated that the rate as of that date was about
1.3 boats per year.66 A March 31, 2023 press report stated that Navy officials estimate that it will
take another five years—until 2028—before the delivery rate will increase to 2.0 boats per year.67
In advance policy questions submitted for a September 14, 2023, hearing before the Senate
Armed Services Committee to consider her nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Lisa Franchetti, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the Navy’s goal is to stabilize the
Virginia-class construction rate at 1.4 boats per year by the end of 2023, increase it to at least 1.5
boats per year by the end of 2024, and increase it to 2.0 boats per year by 2028.68
The Navy’s report on its FY2024 30-year (FY2024-FY2053) shipbuilding plan states
Within the overall industrial base, including both shipyards and suppliers, varying levels
of capacity and risk exist. Nuclear powered ship production, a unique capability with little
to no opportunity for commercial or dual use production, is provided by two private
shipyards that are currently facilitized and certified to construct nuclear powered ships and
will be at capacity for the next 15-plus years building Columbia class SSBNs, Virginia
class SSNs, next generation SSNs, and Ford class CVNs. Industrial base funding was
provided in FY2023 to increase infrastructure, reduce production risk, help stabilize the

63 See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Columbia Class Submarine[:] Overly Optimistic Cost Estimate
Will Likely Lead to Budget Increases, GAO-19-497, April 2019, pp. 20-23; David B. Larter, “Late Is the New Normal
for Virginia-Class Attack Boats,” Defense News, March 20, 2019; Megan Eckstein, “Navy: Lack of Submarine Parts
Slowing Down Maintenance, New Construction,” USNI News, March 26, 2019; David B. Larter, “The US Navy,
Seeking Savings, Shakes Up Its Plans for More Lethal Attack Submarines,” Defense News, April 3, 2019; Anthony
Capaccio, “U.S. Navy Sub Firepower Upgrade Delayed by Welding Flaws,” Bloomberg, August 13, 2019; Paul
McLeary, “Weld Problems Spread To Second Navy Sub Program,” Breaking Defense, August 14, 2019; David B.
Larter, “Questions About US Navy Attack Sub Program Linger as Contract Negotiations Drag,” Defense News, August
16, 2019; Emma Watkins, “Will the U.S. Navy Soon Have a Missile-Tube Problem?” National Interest, August 19,
2019; David B. Larter, “As CNO Richardson Departs, US Submarine Builders Face Pressure,” Defense News, August
22, 2019; David B. Larter, “After a Leadership Shakeup at General Dynamics, a Murky Future for Submarine
Building,” Defense News, October 28, 2019; Rich Abott, “Navy Says Virginia Sub Delays Due To Faster Production
Rate,” Defense Daily, November 6, 2019.
64 See, for example, Megan Eckstein, “Navy Frustration Building over Late Weapons, Ship Deliveries,” Defense News,
January 11, 2023; Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,” Defense Daily,
January 12, 2023.
65 Sam LaGrone, “SECNAV Del Toro: Virginia Attack Sub Construction ‘Significantly Behind,’ District of Columbia
Submarine 10% Behind Schedule,” USNI News, March 29 (updated March 30), 2023. See also Rich Abott, “SECNAV:
Columbia Sub 10 Percent Behind, Virginia Subs Improving But Still Behind,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2023.
66 Navy briefing on Virginia-class program for CRS and CBO, April 28, 2023.
67 Sam LaGrone, “Navy Estimates 5 More Years for Virginia Attack Sub Production to Hit 2 Boats a Year,” USNI
News, March 31, 2023.
68 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Lisa M. Franchetti, USN, Nominee for
Appointment to be Chief of Naval Operations, p. 31.
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more than 350 critical suppliers, and help enable recruitment, training and retention of the
skilled production workforce. The PB2024 request includes funding to continue these
efforts.69
Some observers have expressed interest in expanding the capacity of the submarine construction
industrial base to support a procurement rate of three Virginia-class boats plus one Columbia-
class boat per year (referred to in short as 3+1). Building three VPM-equipped Virginia-class
boats and one Columbia-class boat per year would require the equivalent of about 6.25 “regular”
Virginia-class boats’ work per year.70 The Navy testified in June 2021 that increasing the capacity
of the submarine construction industrial base to support a 3+1 rate would require “$1.5 [billion]
to $2 billion of further investment by ourselves plus industry, and an increase in the workforce.”71
As noted earlier, on December 21, 2021, President Biden signed three determinations permitting
the use of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to strengthen the U.S. submarine industrial base for
the purpose of increasing production of Virginia-class submarines.
Press Report
A September 8, 2023, press report stated
The U.S. Navy expects the submarine-industrial base to start delivering attack submarines
on time by 2028—more than a decade after vendors and shipbuilders began struggling to
keep up with growing demand, made worse by the pandemic and the seismic disruption it
brought to the labor market.
In fact, the Navy says, industry will have additional capacity by the early 2030s to start
increasing the size of the attack sub fleet, which is currently smaller than its required size
and would be more so following the sale of a couple boats to Australia as part of the
AUKUS trilateral pact.
To get there, the sea service anticipates spending $6.3 billion to bolster the submarine-
industrial base—on top of the annual cost of buying and repairing submarines….
The Navy spent $2.3 billion from fiscal 2018 to fiscal 2023 “to build and strengthen the
Submarine Industrial Base’s capacity, capability and resiliency,” Whitney Jones, director
of the Navy’s Submarine Industrial Base initiative, told Defense News in a written
statement.
This money was spent across five main lines of effort.
First is supplier development, after what Jones called the “slow but sustained degradation
of domestic manufacturing over the past 40 years.”
This money would boost the production capacity of existing suppliers, develop new
suppliers in areas where there may be a single vendor building a critical part, and
addressing market sectors where there has been a significant demand increase, such as
electrical and electronics subcomponents….

69 See U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal
Year 2024 March 2023, p. 9.
70 If building a Virginia-class boat is viewed as requiring one unit of work, then building a VPM-equipped Virginia-
class boat can be viewed as requiring about 1.25 units of work, and building a Columbia-class boat can be viewed as
requiring about 2.5 units of work. On this basis, building three VPM-equipped Virginia-class boats and one Columbia-
class boat would require about 6.25 units of work (1.25 + 1.25 + 1.25 + 2.5 = 6.25).
71 Spoken testimony by Jay Stefany, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisition (i.e., the Navy’s acting acquisition executive), as quoted in Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Needs $50M to Get
Submarine Construction Back on Track after COVID-19,” Defense News, June 9, 2021.
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The second area is shipyard infrastructure, to ensure General Dynamics Electric Boat and
HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding can ramp up their production to a rate that will, in FY26,
hit its highest rate by tonnage since World War II: one Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarine and two Virginia-class attack submarines with the Virginia Payload Module
insert each year, dubbed a 1+2 production rate….
The shipyards are making their own investments. For example, Newport News
Shipbuilding spokesman Todd Corillo told Defense News the yard is in the midst of
making $1.9 billion in capital investments that started in 2016 and will run through 2025,
which include facilities to accelerate submarine production.
The Navy is also pitching in with support for the facilities and equipment needed to keep
up with growing demand.
The third effort, strategic outsourcing, appears to be taking some of this growing work
away from the two shipyards. Jones said the Navy is looking to move at least 5 million
production hours a year in large-scale steel fabrication, outfitting and other heavy
manufacturing work to other locations, allowing the shipyards to focus on outfitting, final
assembly and testing….
The fourth effort is workforce development, as companies in the submarine-industrial base
of all sizes and in all locations struggle to recruit and retain the workers they need.
And the fifth is investing in new manufacturing technologies that can make work processes
more efficient, such as automated welding, robotics and additive manufacturing.
In total, Jones said, the Navy and the submarine-industrial base are executing 79 projects
in the current fiscal year aimed at boosting the capability, capacity and quality of work in
the sub-tier supply chain, in support of the so-called 1+2 production rate of Columbia and
Virginia submarines….
The Navy proposed spending $2.4 billion from FY24 to FY28 to further infuse cash into
the supply chain and churn out parts to support submarine maintenance….
During an Aug. 3 earnings call, HII President Chris Kastner said the company, through the
second quarter of this year, “hired over 3,200 craftsmen and women on a solid pace to meet
our full year plan of approximately 5,000. Although we’re meeting our hiring targets,
attrition remains high and labor is still the greatest risk to meeting our plan.”
He called labor “the largest obstacle, the largest risk” on the Virginia-class program, and
said the company would have to focus on recruiting, training and retaining skilled workers
for years to come….
Jones, the Navy official, said FY24 money would address those issues. Beyond outlining
previous and upcoming initiatives, she highlighted an effort to use data analytics to identify
the best uses for this submarine-industrial base money.
The Navy team “must quantitatively and qualitatively describe challenges, gaps, and the
impact of efforts/investments,” she said.
As part of that effort, her office has mapped out and performed a risk assessment of the
16,000 suppliers in the submarine-industrial base. It identified the more than 200 million
parts the two shipbuilders will need to buy in the next 10 years, and found 15 critical
chokepoints that could threaten these future purchasing plans.72

72 Megan Eckstein, “The US Navy Is Spending Billions to Stabilize Vendors. Will It Work?” USNI News, September 8,
2023.
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Strategic Outsourcing
One option for addressing industrial-base challenges of building both Columbia-class boats and
Virginia-class SSNs at the same time is to increase the use of shipyards other than GD/EB and
HII/NNS, as well as other manufacturing facilities, in building components of Columbia- and/or
Virginia-class boats—a practice sometimes referred to as strategic outsourcing. An October 21,
2022, press report states
The U.S. Navy is pouring billions of dollars into shoring up the companies that help build
nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.
But these companies, and especially prime contractors General Dynamics Electric Boat
and HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding, cannot hire enough people to keep up with demand.
So they’re outsourcing work that was previously done in-house, two admirals said.
Rear Adm. Jon Rucker, the program executive officer for attack submarines, said the Navy
spent more than $1 billion between fiscal 2018 and fiscal 2022, and that the service is
committed to $2.4 billion from fiscal 2023 to fiscal 2027.
These funds cover supplier development, workforce development, shipbuilder
infrastructure, the development of technologies such as additive manufacturing and
nondestructive testing, government oversight, and strategic outsourcing.
In terms of tonnage of submarine construction, the Navy will see a 5.5 times increase from
FY11 to FY25. But the number of suppliers has dropped to about 5,000, compared to
17,000 companies during the last submarine construction surge in the 1980s, Rucker said
last month at an American Society of Naval Engineers conference.
Rucker said the Navy is trying to target its investments where it can make the most impact:
350 companies are considered “critical suppliers” in the submarine-industrial base, and
55% of those are located in six states. So workforce development dollars are focused on
those states to do the most good for critical suppliers in need of more workers. This effort
could see the establishment of new training sites in Virginia and Pennsylvania.
Outsourcing is becoming more important as some regions realize they aren’t receiving
enough interest for people to join the manufacturing industry, despite federal and state
government efforts to create manufacturing training opportunities.
“We are saturated in certain areas of the country. The Northeast is one of those. If we
cannot bring the people to the work, we’re going to take the work to the people,” Rucker
said.
Today, he explained, Electric Boat outsources 1.1 million hours’ worth of work a year and
Newport News Shipbuilding outsources 900,000 hours as they build new Virginia- and
Columbia-class submarines.
By 2025, that combined 2 million hours will grow to 5 million, he said—which equates to
half the work to build a Virginia submarine.
Rucker said companies across the U.S. are building structural pieces of submarines,
including some large modules, that were previously built at Electric Boat and Newport
News facilities. Now they’re constructed by companies with available workers and space,
and then shipped to the shipyard for assembly.73
A December 6, 2022, news release from Austal USA of Mobile, AL—a shipyard that builds
conventionally powered surface ships for the Navy—states

73 Megan Eckstein, “Defense Firms Outsource Sub, Carrier Construction amid Labor Woes,” Defense News, October
21, 2022.
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Production has commenced at Austal USA’s shipyard in Mobile, Ala., in support of their
strategic partnership with General Dynamics Electric Boat (GDEB) to support the U.S.
Navy’s recapitalization of the nation’s nuclear submarine fleet. Leveraging Austal USA’s
lean manufacturing techniques and modern steel production line facilities, a focus factory
approach is being used to expand production capacity of the submarine industrial base.
As part of the partnership, Austal USA is constructing and outfitting Command and Control
Systems Modules (CCSM) and Electronic Deck Modules (EDM) for the Virginia- and
Columbia-class programs. GDEB commenced on-the-job training efforts in April 2022 to
provide certification for skilled trades and supervisory positions to ensure consistent work
practices and adherence to quality assurance standards....
Work commenced in late November on two tanks for a Virginia class submarine. The first
CCSM is scheduled to arrive at Austal USA’s Mobile shipyard in late January 2023 for
initial outfitting efforts. The work will support a gradual ramp up to full fabrication and
outfitting of CCSMs and EDMs across both submarine classes beginning in 2026.74
Potential Oversight Questions for Congress
Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• What is the total estimated cost of actions needed to increase the capacity of the
submarine-construction industrial base to a 2+1 annual production rate? What
portion of this cost has been funded through FY2023, and what portion remains
to be funded in FY2024 and subsequent years? How much of that remaining cost
has been requested for FY2024 itself? What portions of all these costs are to be
funded by government, and what portions are to be funded by industry?
• Can the estimated date for achieving a construction rate of 2.0 Virginia-class
boats per year be achieved by 2028? Can it be accelerated from 2028 to an earlier
year? If so, what additional actions would be necessary, and what is their
estimated cost?
• What additional actions would be needed to increase the capacity of the
submarine-construction industrial base to a 3+1 annual production rate? What
would these actions cost, and when would the 3+1 capacity be attained?
• What impact is the December 21, 2021, presidential determinations relating to
the DPA having on the capacity of the submarine construction industrial base to
build both Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines? What actions has the
determinations made possible that were not previously permitted? What actions
are included in the proposed FY2024 budget, and at what cost? What would be
the specific effect of these actions, and how long would they take to implement?
Virginia-Class Delivery Delays and Cost Growth
Another potential issue for Congress concerns the delivery delays and cost growth in the Virginia-
class program.

74 Austal USA, “Austal USA Commences Submarine Work,” December 6, 2022. See also Justin Katz, “Known for
LCS, Alabama-Based Austal USA Starts Submarine Work,” Breaking Defense, January 19, 2023; Rojoef Manuel,
“Austal, General Dynamics Team Up for US Navy Nuclear Submarine Production,” Defense Post, December 8, 2022;
Rich Abott, “Austal Starts Submarine Construction Support Work,” Defense Daily, December 12, 2022.
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June 2023 GAO Report
A June 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report—the 2023 edition of GAO’s
annual report surveying DOD major acquisition programs—stated the following regarding the
Block V version of the Virginia-class design:
Current Status
Performance on VCS construction continues to degrade. The program now estimates
construction of each Block V submarine will take an average of over 2 years longer than
reported last year. The delays are due to problems meeting original staffing and work
efficiency estimates.
Due to delays, program officials are developing a new, more realistic schedule for Block
V. They said that they expect to complete this process in early 2023. Program officials
stated that the shipbuilders do not have sufficient workforce to complete VCS while also
constructing the Columbia class submarines and overhauling several Los Angeles class
submarines. They noted VCS construction is about 25 percent below staffing needs as of
September 2022.
In an effort to improve VCS construction, shipbuilders are outsourcing certain work that
they would have otherwise completed in their shipyards, noted program officials. The
officials told us that the shipbuilders implemented these changes due to shipbuilders’
workforce constraints and the limited physical capacity of some facilities.
The same factors that delayed the schedule also contributed to cost increases. While the
fixed price incentive contract set target and ceiling prices for each submarine, program
officials reported that the VCS shipbuilders have not met the work efficiency and material
cost estimates that informed the target pricing. Consequently, the Navy plans to request
more funds to complete Block V, as its prior budget requests covered the target prices, but
not up to the ceiling prices.
Program Office Comments
We provided a draft of this assessment to the program office for review and comment. The
program office provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
According to the program office, it remains challenged to meet a two ship per year
construction rate. It also stated that the Navy is working with shipbuilders and investing in
the submarine industrial base to address challenges, such as supply chain issues and
workforce skills gaps, and to improve production capacity through strategic outsourcing.75
Press Reports
A May 8, 2023, press report stated
Availability of parts, not people, is the largest barrier right now to catch up with the delays
in constructing Virginia-class nuclear attack boats, company officials at submarine builder
Newport News Shipbuilding told USNI News....
While work stoppages and worker attrition due to the COVID-19 pandemic have been cited
as reasons for the delay in submarine production, availability of parts and materials has
become the primary reason for delays, Newport News president Jennifer Boykin told USNI
News on Friday [May 5].
“COVID had an impact because we had such a large percent of the workforce that wasn’t
here during the six months in 2020. Many of our suppliers, if not most, were struggling

75 Government Accountability Office, Weapon Systems Annual Assessment[:] Programs Are Not Consistently
Implementing Practices That Can Help Accelerate Acquisitions, GAO-23-106059, June 2023, p. 165.
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with some of the same issues. Many of our suppliers got off track because they didn’t have
[the] workforce,” she said on Friday, a day ahead of the christening of Massachusetts (SSN-
798).
“Post COVID, not as many people came back … Most of our suppliers are really working,
doing what they can to increase their workforce pipeline.”
While Newport News is doing well with the workforce for the moment, its suppliers are
dealing with their own workforce issues that have increased the time it takes for parts to
get to the yard.
Workforce and supply chain concerns have prompted the Navy, HII and General Dynamics
Electric Boat to retool the schedule for the Block V Virginia-class.
“The intent was to incorporate some of these challenges,” Boykin said.76
A March 29, 2023, press report stated
Production of the Navy’s first-in-class Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine—
District of Columbia (SSBN-826)—is 10 percent behind schedule, Secretary of the Navy
Carlos Del Toro told a House panel on Wednesday [March 29].
Likewise, the production of Virginia-class attack boats is slowly improving but is
“significantly behind” the target of two submarines per year, Del Toro told the House
Appropriations defense subcommittee during a hearing.
Del Toro’s assessment was in response to questions from subcommittee chair Rep. Ken
Calvert (R-Calif.), who cited a January Government Accountability Office study that
warned the Navy did not have a clear understanding of the program’s schedule risks. Del
Toro contested the finding from GAO.
“We do have clear visibility into the schedule challenges that Columbia faces. She’s
currently about 10 percent behind schedule is what she is given the challenges that we’ve
faced with COVID and supply chain, not being able to get the advanced procurements that
are necessary to be able to fulfill those requirements leads to her being 10 percent behind,”
Del Toro told Calvert.
“The shortage of workers in the submarine community and across the nation is obviously
a national challenge that we all have to address collectively. I do believe that increasing
legal immigration in this country will help the blue-collar workforce, including those top
workers that we need actually in the submarine force as well. … We are working very
closely with industry to try to close these gaps.”
Following an earlier version of this post, a Navy official clarified to USNI News the
estimate to which Del Toro was referring was an internal General Dynamics Electric Boat
schedule 74-month schedule that was shorter than the Navy’s contract schedule....
“On the Virginia side of the house … they are significantly behind. They should be at two
boats per year. They’re currently [at] around 1.4. They have made some progress in moving
in [the right] direction. I’m concerned particularly about the construction of the sterns and
bows in Virginia and getting those up to Electric Boat up in Connecticut and integrating
them all,” Del Toro said.
“We are holding industry accountable in every which way that we possibly can and
working with them at the same time to try to close these gaps.”77

76 Sam LaGrone, “Submarine Supply Chain Largest Barrier to Improving Virginia Attack Sub Schedule, Says Boykin,”
USNI News, May 8, 2023.
77 Sam LaGrone, “SECNAV Del Toro: Virginia Attack Sub Construction ‘Significantly Behind,’ District of Columbia
(continued...)
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A March 6, 2023, press report stated
Electric Boat hired 3,700 shipbuilders last year. It wants to hire more than 5,000 this year
and just as many every year for decades into the future.
Last spring, it hired a fifth of UConn’s engineering grads. At the other end of the education
pipeline, it is promoting shipbuilding careers in elementary schools, setting its sights on
second graders who will join the workforce when EB hopes to hit its peak employment
target in 10 years.
“My first words to you this morning,” President Kevin Graney deadpanned last week to a
roomful of political, government and military officials at a breakfast meeting at the Mystic
Marriott. “EB is hiring.”
The nation’s foremost builder of submarines is, Graney said, in the midst of a “once in
generation expansion,” producing for its principal customer, the U.S. Navy, the ships that
will form the front line in a scramble by the U.S. and its allies to catch up with and contain
Chinese expansionism.
But one of the challenges emerging from a new shipbuilding boom is a shortage of
shipbuilders....
As [submarine] construction gears up, there is concern over whether Electric Boat—and
the thousands of other manufacturers in the supply chain known as the submarine industrial
base—can hire and begin production quickly enough to meet the aggressive construction
and delivery schedule on which the Navy says U.S. security depends....
By scouring the northeast for tradesmen and engineers, Electric Boat says it is meeting and
will continue to meet the Navy’s ambitious delivery schedule of two Virginia and one
Columbia class submarines a year....
Electric Boat said it is meeting the delivery schedule and will continue to do so, although
there was a slippage in the Virginia work after a portion of its tight workforce was shifted
to the Columbia program when the Navy designated that as the nation’s top defense
priority.78
A February 9, 2023, press report stated
The Virginia-class submarine production line at Newport News Shipbuilding is now fully
staffed, after taking a back seat to the preeminent Columbia-class submarine program for
years.
A larger workforce is one of several factors that give the company confidence the
remaining Block IV Virginia boats will be delivered on their new schedule. The vessels
were bought at a pace of two a year and were meant to deliver at the same rate. However,
they are only arriving at a rate of about 1.2 boats annually, several U.S. Navy officials
recently said.
In fact, Newport News Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Electric Boat, which co-build
all the submarines, did not deliver a single sub to the Navy from April 2020 to February
2022.
The boats were already behind schedule when the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the
issue. As the two submarine construction yards—Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia
and Electric Boat in Connecticut—ramped up the size of their workforce in anticipation of

Submarine 10% Behind Schedule,” USNI News, March 29 (updated March 30), 2023. See also Rich Abott, “SECNAV:
Columbia Sub 10 Percent Behind, Virginia Subs Improving But Still Behind,” Defense Daily, March 30, 2023.
78 Edmund H. Mahony, “CT’s Electric Boat Looking to Hire 5,000 More Employees Amidst ‘Once in Generation
Expansion,’” Hartford Courant, March 6, 2023.
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a greater workload, they had to ensure the Columbia production line was fully staffed and
remained on schedule.
Any shortfalls, then, fell on the Virginia program.
“We’re fully staffed on Block IV and Columbia, and we’re working very hard on execution
there,” the CEO of HII, Chris Kastner, said Feb. 9 on an earnings call.79
A January 31, 2023, press report stated
The U.S. Navy and its suppliers have thousands of open jobs at government repair yards
and in the private shipbuilding and ship repair industrial base, as hiring and retaining skilled
workers has become “our No. 1 strategic challenge across the enterprise,” according to the
head of Naval Sea Systems Command.
Vice Adm. Bill Galinis said Monday government and industry are competing against each
other for a undersized pool of talent in both trades and white-collar specialties....
Matt Sermon, the executive director for the Program Executive Office for Strategic
Submarines, noted at the same conference a recent analysis showed the submarine
industrial base will need to hire 100,000 people over the next 10 years for submarine
construction alone, at the two main shipyards as well as their 17,000 vendors. This would
cover the workforce needed to build one Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine and
two Virginia-class attack submarines each year.80
Additional Virginia-Class Issues
Maintenance Requirements and Operational Availability
Another issue for Congress concerns the maintenance requirements and operational availability of
Virginia-class boats. A September 22, 2022, press report states
With its Virginia class of attack submarines suffering from maintenance woes and low
operational availability, the U.S. Navy is working to ensure its next attack submarine is
easier to sustain, according to the program executive officer [PEO] for attack submarines....
[On September 21, at the American Society of Naval Engineers’ annual Fleet Maintenance
and Modernization Symposium, Rear Admiral Jonathan] Rucker said PEO Attack
Submarines is revisiting the maintenance plan for these Virginia SSNs in the hopes of
improving sustainment and that the Navy must take a better approach while designing the
SSN(X) next-generation attack submarine to ensure high operational availability and easier
sustainment throughout the lifecycle.
Coming off of the Cold War-era Seawolf-class submarine, designed to be fast, lethal and
stealthy, the Navy took a different approach with the Virginia class, Rucker said, and opted
to “build a submarine for an affordable cost to ensure we could get the numbers we
needed.”
“I’m not going to say that sustainment came as an afterthought but, to be honest, it was …
a challenge we’ll deal with later,” he added. “Unfortunately, some of that challenge is here
today.”

79 Megan Eckstein, “Newport News Has Fully Staffed Attack Sub Line, After Years Of Delays,” Defense News,
February 9, 2023.
80 Megan Eckstein, “Workforce Woes Are Top ‘Strategic Challenge’ for Navy, Admiral Says,” Defense News, January
31, 2023. See also Rich Abott, “Navy Official Describes 100,000-Person Submarine Workforce Challenges,” Defense
Daily, January 31, 2023; Nick Wilson, “Navy Officials Highlight Labor Shortages, Other Key Challenges for
Submarine Production And Maintenance,” Inside Defense, January 31, 2023.
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At the same conference, Rear Adm. Scott Brown, who oversees maintenance at the Navy’s
four public shipyards, said the service didn’t make the required upfront investments when
designing and acquiring the Virginia class, meaning shipyard workers today reach for parts
and components and find they’re not there.
“It’s resulting in a lot of churn, a lot of cannibalization—so we have to take things off other
boats to stick them on the boat we’re trying to get out—and a lot of, frankly, frustration
with the workforce on waiting for stuff that doesn’t exist,” Brown said. “Of course, that
leads to delays.”
Rucker said the Navy must ensure that doesn’t happen with future [submarine] classes.
... Rucker, who previously served as program manager for the Columbia class, said the
Navy designed the ship [i.e., the Columbia class submarine] with maintenance in mind,
even bringing in ship maintainers for their input on potential issues such as access and
rigging points.
Maintenance is also a focus for the SSN(X) [next-generation attack submarine] program,81
he said.
“There are things we’ve already learned on Virginia: of the over a million parts, less than
0.1% of the design is not doing what we thought it would from [a life expectancy
perspective]. It’s 32 items, to be exact,” Rucker said. “We’ve already figured out what
those were, we redesigned them or changed the maintenance cycle.”
Those improved parts could be used on SSN(X).
Rucker said the SSN(X) design phase prioritizes this focus on maintenance. The program’s
initial capabilities document lays out four top-level requirements: speed, stealth, payloads,
and operational availability.82
A September 21, 2022, press report stated
The earliest Virginia-class boats are among the hardest submarines to repair on time.
“We’ve seen a significant growth in the amount of man days required in submarine
availabilities, particularly in the Virginia class,” [Vice Admiral William] Galinis [the
commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command] said.
“We’re doing a deep dive to figure out why that is. It’s really a continuous process.”...
The Virginias were designed to operate closer to shore and with components that met
rigorous NAVSEA standards for submarine safety, but were not as durable as some of the
older components on the Los Angeles-class boats.
“When we came off the Sea Wolf-class we had an extremely capable but relevantly more
expensive submarine,” [Rear Admiral Jonathan] Rucker said.
“Where we were in the beginning of the Virginia class, we had a charge early on to build
a design and build a submarine for an affordable cost to make sure we got the numbers we
needed.”
Sustainment of the submarine class wasn’t a major requirement for the program and the
Navy pushed maintenance aside for other cost saving considerations.
“Unfortunately, some of those challenges are here today,” Rucker said.

81 For more on the SSN(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
82 Megan Eckstein, “Next-Generation Attack Subs Will Be Designed with Maintenance in Mind,” Defense News,
September 22, 2022.
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USS Virginia (SSN-774), commissioned in 2004, is wrapping up a mid-life availability
and lessons from that repair and other early boats in the class are informing a class-wide
maintenance plan to assist with scheduling and securing materials.
That Navy will implement that plan starting in Fiscal Year 2023 and may not see
improvements until FY 2024.
“If you throw a rudder over on the Titanic, it takes a while for the ship to turn,” Rucker
told USNI News.
“It’s going to take a little bit of time, just because there’s a lag and getting the resources or
changing behavior or ensuring that we plan better for what we’re going to do.”
In the long term, the lessons from the Virginia-class sustainment issue have informed how
the Navy planned for repairing and maintaining the Columbia-class ballistic missile
submarines and the next-generation attack submarine SSN(X), Rucker said.83
Shortage of Spare Parts for Boats Undergoing Maintenance
A related issue for Congress concerns a shortage of spare parts for existing Virginia-class boats
undergoing maintenance. A June 21, 2021, press report states
The U.S. Navy has swapped more than 1,600 parts among its new Virginia-class
submarines since 2013 to ease maintenance bottlenecks as components that are supposed
to last 33 years wear out decades sooner.
Parts are being shuttled regularly among the nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines so
that vessels in the $166 billion class built by General Dynamics Corp. and Huntington
Ingalls Industries Inc. can return to operations, according to data from the Naval Sea
Systems Command and the Congressional Budget Office84….
If a part isn’t available for a sub that’s finishing refurbishment, shipyard maintenance
workers may be forced to borrow, or “cannibalize,” one from a submarine entering
maintenance in order to reduce delays. Most cannibalized parts are for non-propulsion
electronic systems, but the Navy declined to specify which ones are affected, citing
operational security.
The number of swapped parts for the submarines, which began entering service in 2004,
increased from 100 in 2013 to 171 in 2016, 201 in 2018 and 452 in 2019 before declining
to 318 last year. The Navy projects the number will drop to 82 between this year and
next….
The big disadvantage of cannibalizing parts from one submarine to another is the extra
workload involved, according to the Congressional Budget Office, as well as the risk that
a part might be damaged during the extra steps. The Navy doesn’t know how much the
swaps add to workload, saying that at this point “there is limited range and depth of
data.”…
Some parts identified to last 33 years based on engineering analysis and testing,“were
subject to degradation” such as “corrosion caused by complex galvanic interactions,” or
when two dissimilar metals or electrical parts come in contact for an extended period of
time, “that had not been predicted in some operating environments,” the Navy said….

83 Sam LaGrone, “NAVSEA: Navy ‘Struggling’ to Get Attack Subs Out of Repairs on Time as Demand Increases,”
USNI News, September 21, 2022. See also Audrey Decker, “Navy Still ‘Really Struggling’ with On-Time Maintenance
for Virginia,” Inside Defense, September 21, 2022.
84 This is a reference to a recent CBO report: Congressional Budget Office, The Capacity of the Navy’s Shipyards to
Maintain Its Submarines, March 2021, 21 pp.
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The Navy’s submarine leaders are “not satisfied with any material cannibalization that
limits our submarine fleet’s ability to respond to national tasking and is taking all steps
necessary to avoid these scenarios,” the command said. It said it is ordering parts earlier to
“reduce material work stoppages and maintenance delays awaiting components.”
According to the Navy, 70% of the part swaps were between Block I subs that first entered
service in 2004 and Block II vessels initially delivered in 2008.
Flaws in contractor quality and parts that were out of specification “contribute to a small
percentage” of premature parts wear, the Navy said.85
Substandard Steel
Another issue for Congress concerns substandard steel used for building Navy submarines
between 1985 and 2017, a problem that investigators discovered in 2017 and that was first
reported in 2020.86
Problem with Hull Coating
Another issue for Congress concerns a problem with the hull coating used on Virginia-class boats
that was first reported years ago, and then again 201787 and 2019.88
Defective Parts
Another issue for Congress concerns three Virginia-class boats that were reported in 2016 to have
been built with defective parts.89
Legislative Activity Regarding FY2024 Procurement
Funding Request
Congressional Action on FY2024 Procurement Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed budget requests the procurement of the 39th and 40th Virginia-class boats.
The two boats have an estimated combined procurement cost of $9,427.6 million (i.e., about $9.4
billion). The two boats have received a combined total of $2,297.7 million in prior-year advance

85 Anthony Capaccio, “U.S. Navy’s Deadliest New Sub Is Hobbled over Spare Parts,” Bloomberg, June 21, 2021.
86 For press reports on this issue, see, for example, Gene Johnson, “Metallurgist Gets 2.5 Years for Faking Tests on Sub
Parts,” Associated Press, February 14, 2022; Gene Johnson (Associated Press), “Feds Say Company Provided Subpar
Steel for US Navy Subs,” Defense News, June 15, 2020; Sam LaGrone, “Navy Has ‘Mitigated’ Risk of Suspect Steel
From Company in Federal Fraud Case,” USNI News, June 19, 2020; Julia Bergman, “Submarine Supplier Mishaps
Lead to Call for Hearing,” New London Day, June 16 (updated June 17), 2020; Gene Johnson, “Metallurgist Admits
Faking Steel-Test Results for Navy Subs,” Associated Press, November 8, 2021; Agence France-Presse, “US Navy
Boosts Monitoring of Subs After Falsified Steel Tests,” France 24, November 10, 2021; Geoff Ziezulewicz, “Navy
Says It Ensured Sub Safety After Fake Strength Tests Surfaced, But Won’t Detail How,” Defense News, Navy Times,
January 6, 2022.
87 See William Cole, “Navy Subs Still Show Issue with Stealth Coating,” Military.com, March 6, 2017.
88 See James Clark, “Whistleblower Accuses Largest US Military Shipbuilder of Putting ‘American Lives at Risk’ by
Falsifying Tests on Submarine Stealth Coating,” Task & Purpose, October 3, 2019.
89 For press reports on this issue, see, for example, David Larter, “Secret Weld: How Shoddy Parts Disabled A $2.7
Billion Submarine,” Navy Times, March 28, 2016; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Welding Problems Fixed For Virginia
Subs; Carter Tours Electric Boat,” Breaking Defense, May 24, 2016; and David Larter, “Attack Sub Minnesota Rejoins
Fleet After Parts Fiasco,” Navy Times, June 4, 2016.
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procurement (AP) funding, and the Navy’s proposed FY2024 budget requests the remaining
$7,130.0 million needed to complete their estimated combined procurement cost. The Navy’s
proposed FY2024 budget also requests $1,855.5 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to
be procured in future fiscal years, $1,360.0 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding,
which is an additional kind of AP funding that can occur under an MYP contract, and $168.2
million in cost-to-complete (CTC) funding to cover cost growth on Virginia-class boats procured
in prior years, bringing the total amount of procurement, AP, EOQ, and CTC funding requested
for FY2024 to $10,513.7 million (i.e., about $10.5 billion).
As noted earlier, as part of its FY2024 budget submission, the Navy has requested authority for a
Virginia-class MYP contract that would begin in FY2025.90
Table 4 summarizes congressional action on the Navy’s FY2024 budget funding request for the
procurement of Virginia-class boats in FY2024 and subsequent years.
Table 4. Congressional Action on FY2024 Funding Request
Millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth, under Navy’s original FY2024 budget submission
Authorization
Appropriation

Request
HASC
SASC
Final
HAC
SAC
Final
Procurement
7,130.0
7,130.0
7,130.0

7,130.0
7,130.0

Advance procurement (AP)
3,215.5
2,890.4
3,215.5

3,215.5
3,158.8

(Quantity)
(2)
(2)
(2)

(2)
(2)

Cost-to-complete
168.2
168.2
168.0

168.2
168.2

TOTAL
10,513.7
10,188.6
10,513.7

10,513.7
10,457.0

Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on Navy’s original FY2024 budget submission, committee and
conference reports, and explanatory statements on FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act and FY2024
DOD Appropriations Act.
Notes: HASC is House Armed Services Committee, SASC is Senate Armed Services Committee, SAC is
Senate Appropriations Committee, HAC is House Appropriations Committee. Advance procurement funding
includes both “regular” AP funding and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding for multiyear procurement
(MYP).
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226)
House
The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-125 of June 30, 2023) on H.R.
2670, recommends the funding levels shown in the HASC column of Table 4. The recommended

90 As noted earlier, the Navy typically requests authority for an MYP contract for the Virginia-class program one year
in advance of the proposed start of the MYP contract. The Navy states that “if the MYP [proposed to begin in FY2025]
is not approved in FY 2024, the Navy would lose EOQ savings across the procurement and the long-term shipbuilder
and vendor base stability achieved with an MYP authority. If an MYP is not authorized for the next Block of VCS
submarines, the Navy may have to enter a single ship procurement contract for FY 2025 ships forcing industry to
assume greater risk and raise prices.” (Source: “Twelfth Package of Legislative Proposals Sent to Congress for
Inclusion in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 – Individual Proposals (Sent to Congress on
May 18, 2023),” posted at https://ogc.osd.mil/OGC-Offices/Office-of-Legislative-Counsel/DoD-Legislative-Proposals-
2024/.) See also Nick Wilson, “Citing Essential Cost Savings, DOD Seeks Multiyear Authority for Block VI Virginia
Submarines,” Inside Defense, May 19, 2023.
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reduction of $325.1 million in advance procurement (AP) funding is for “early to need.” (Page
445)
Section 131 of the bill would provide authority for a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for
not more than 13 Virginia-class submarines.
Section 344 would modify a requirement for a briefing on the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Plan (SIOP) and require a briefing on the implementation status of the SIOP.
Section 1024 would require quarterly briefings on SSN maintenance.
H.Rept. 118-125 states
Public Naval Shipyards
The committee recognizes the importance of the four naval public shipyards and is
encouraged by the ongoing work as part of the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization
Program (SIOP). The committee encourages the Secretary of the Navy to ensure SIOP
projects remain on schedule and to identify additional opportunities for enhanced
capabilities for increased throughput at the public shipyards. (Page 124)
Senate
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S.
2226, recommended the funding levels shown in the SASC column of Table 4. S.Rept. 118-58
states
Virginia Class Material Strategy.—The Committee remains concerned with persistent
delays in submarine repair maintenance activities that reduce operational availabilities of
submarines. The Committee notes that the availability of VIRGINIA Class submarine
[VCS] materials have been a significant driver of maintenance delays. Therefore, the
Committee supports the fiscal year 2024 President’s budget request of $470,000,000 for
the procurement of VCS spares and repair parts in support of the Navy’s revised VCS
material strategy. In order to facilitate appropriate congressional oversight of this novel
approach, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy not later than 90 days after the
enactment of this act, and quarterly thereafter, to brief the congressional defense
committees on the Navy’s VCS materials strategy. The briefing shall include (1) updates
on the implementation of the strategy; (2) plans for the obligation of funding appropriated
for VCS spares and repair parts; (3) an assessment of the health of the defense industrial
base for VCS materials; and (4) an updated analysis of estimated cost savings and
reductions in availability delays resulting from the Navy’s strategy. The Committee
encourages the Secretary of the Navy to use predictive modeling and make adjustments to
the budget development process and procurement lead times of VCS materials to improve
material readiness. (Pages 146-147)
Section 123 of the bill would provide authority for a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for
10 Virginia-class submarines.
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587)
House
The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 118-121 of June 27, 2023) on H.R.
4365, recommends the funding levels shown in the HAC column of Table 4.
Section 8010 of the bill would provide authority for a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for
Virginia-class submarines.
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Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587,
recommended the funding levels shown in the SAC column of Table 4. The recommended
reduction of $56.757 million in advance procurement (AP) funding is for “Long Lead Time CFE
[contractor-furnished equipment] Two Year AP prior year execution delays.” (Page 135)
Section 8010 of the bill would provide authority for a multiyear procurement (MYP) contract for
10 Virginia-class submarines and government-furnished equipment (GFE).
S.Rept. 118-81 states
Submarine Construction Performance.—The Committee continues to be concerned by
VIRGINIA Class Submarine [VCS] construction cost and schedule performance which
impact not only the construction and delivery to the fleet of VCS, but also affect the
COLUMBIA Class Submarine [COL] construction schedule. The Committee notes that the
fiscal year 2024 President’s budget request includes funds for cost overruns of VCSs
procured in fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 2017, and that cost overruns on additional ongoing
new VCS construction programs are expected to exceed $3,000,000,000 in future years.
The Secretary of the Navy is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees
the most current cost and schedule estimates, by VCS and COL, with the submission of
each annual President’s budget request until delivery of the twelfth and final COLUMBIA
hull. The report shall identify changes from the previous year, and include detailed
explanations for all submarines not fully resourced to the Navy’s cost estimate, as well as
all projected cost-to-complete requirements for previously appropriated submarines. (Page
137)
Legislative Activity Regarding Proposed Sale of
Virginia-Class Boats Under AUKUS Agreement91
May 2023 DOD Legislative Package Relating to AUKUS Agreement
On May 2, 2023, DOD sent to Congress its eighth package of legislative proposals for inclusion
in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The package included the following
proposed measures relating to the SSN part of the AUKUS agreement:
SEC. ___. ACCEPTANCE OF CONTRIBUTIONS IN SUPPORT OF AUSTRALIA,
UNITED KINGDOM,
AND UNITED STATES
SUBMARINE
SECURITY
ACTIVITIES.
Chapter 155 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2608 the
following new section:
“§ 2609. Acceptance of contributions for Australia, United Kingdom, and United States
submarine security activities; Submarine Security Activities Account
“(a) ACCEPTANCE AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of Defense may accept from the
Government of Australia contributions of money made by the Government of Australia for
use by the Department of Defense in support of non-nuclear related aspects of submarine
security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (in this
section referred to as ‘AUKUS’).

91 Legislation shown in this section includes bills listed in Congress.gov as of August 15, 2023, that contain the term
AUKUS and relate at least in part to Pillar 1 of AUKUS.
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“(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF SUBMARINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES ACCOUNT.—(1)
There is established in the Treasury of the United States a special account to be known as
the ‘Submarine Security Activities Account’.
“(2) Contributions of money accepted by the Secretary of Defense under subsection (a)
shall be credited to the Submarine Security Activities Account.
“(c) USE OF THE SUBMARINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES ACCOUNT.—(1) The
Secretary of Defense may use funds in the Submarine Security Activities Account—
“(A) for any purpose authorized by law that the Secretary determines would support
AUKUS submarine security activities; or
“(B) to carry out a military construction project that is consistent with the purposes for
which the contributions were made and is not otherwise authorized by law.
“(2) Funds in the Submarine Security Activities Account may be used as described in this
subsection without further specific authorization in law.
“(d TRANSFERS OF FUNDS.—(1) In carrying out subsection (c), the Secretary of
Defense may transfer funds available in the Submarine Security Activities Account to
appropriations available to the Department of Defense.
“(2) In carrying out subsection (c), and in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), the Secretary of Defense may transfer funds available in the
Submarine Security Activities Account to appropriations or funds of the Department of
Energy available to carry out activities related to AUKUS submarine security activities.
“(3) Funds transferred under this subsection shall be available for obligation for the same
time period and for the same purpose as the appropriation to which transferred.
“(4) Upon a determination by the Secretary that all or part of the funds transferred from the
Submarine Security Activities Account are not necessary for the purposes for which such
funds were transferred, all or such part of such funds shall be transferred back to the
Submarine Security Activities Account.
“(e) INVESTMENT OF MONEY.—(1) Upon request by the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Treasury may invest money in the Submarine Security Activities Account
in securities of the United States or in securities guaranteed as to principal and interest by
the United States.
“(2) Any interest or other income that accrues from investment in securities referred to in
paragraph (1) shall be deposited to the credit of the Submarine Security Activities Account.
“(f) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS.—The authority to accept or transfer funds
under this section is in addition to any other authority to accept or transfer funds.”.
—
SEC. ___. AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES SUBMARINE
SECURITY ACTIVITIES.
(a) AUTHORIZATION TO TRANSFER SUBMARINES.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (6), the President may transfer not more than
two Virginia class submarines from the inventory of the Navy to the Government of
Australia on a sale basis under section 21 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2761).
(2) COSTS OF TRANSFER.—Any expense incurred by the United States in connection
with the transfer authorized by this subsection shall be charged to the Government of
Australia.
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(3) WAIVER OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—The requirement for the Chief
of Naval Operations to make a certification under section 8678 of title 10, United States
Code, shall not apply to a transfer under this subsection.
(4) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of the Navy may use the proceeds of a transfer under
this subsection—
(A) for the acquisition of vessels to replace the vessels transferred to the Government of
Australia; or
(B) to carry out any other authority the use of which the Secretary of the Navy determines
would improve the submarine industrial base.
(5) CREDITING OF RECEIPTS.—Notwithstanding any provision of law pertaining to the
crediting of amounts received from a sale under the terms of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2761), any receipt of the United States as a result of a transfer under this section
shall—
(A) be credited, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy to—
(i) the appropriation, fund, or account used in incurring the original obligation;
(ii) an appropriate appropriation, fund, or account currently available for the purposes for
which the expenditures were made; or
(iii) any other appropriation, fund, or account available for the purpose specified in
paragraph (4)(B); and
(B) remain available for obligation until expended for the same purpose as the
appropriation to which the receipt is credited.
(6) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING LAW TO TRANSFER OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES FOR MILITARY APPLICATIONS.—
(A) IN GENERAL.—With respect to any special nuclear material for use in utilization
facilities or any portion of a vessel transferred under this subsection constituting utilization
facilities for military applications under section 91 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C.
2121), transfer of such material or such facilities shall only occur in accordance with such
section 91.
(B) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of Energy may use proceeds from a transfer
described in subparagraph (A) for the acquisition of submarine naval nuclear propulsion
plants and the nuclear fuel to replace the propulsion plants and fuel transferred to the
Government of Australia.
(b) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT OF AUKUS SUBMARINES.—Section 8680 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
“(c) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT OF CERTAIN SUBMARINES.—
“(1) SHIPYARD.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Secretary of
the Navy shall determine the appropriate shipyard in the United States, Australia, or the
United Kingdom to perform any repair or refurbishment of a United States submarine
involved in submarine security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (in this section referred to as “AUKUS”).
“(2) PERSONNEL.—Repair or refurbishment described in paragraph (1) may be carried
out by personnel of the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia in accordance with
the international arrangements governing AUKUS submarine security activities.”.
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—
SEC. ___. AUSTRALIA, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES SUBMARINE
SECURITY TRAINING.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may transfer or authorize export of defense services to
the Government of Australia under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.)
that may also be directly exported to Australian private-sector personnel to support the
development of the Australian submarine industrial base necessary for submarine security
activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (in this section
referred to as “AUKUS”), including where such private-sector personnel are not officers,
employees, or agents of the Government of Australia.
(b) APPLICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR FURTHER TRANSFER.—Any transfer
of defense services to the Government of Australia pursuant to subsection (a) to persons
other than those directly provided such defense services pursuant to such subsection shall
only be made in accordance with the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).92
FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2670/S. 2226)
House
In H.R. 2670 as passed by the House, Section 518 would require a report identifying gaps in the
level of staffing necessary to accomplish AUKUS-related efforts in DOD. Section 3132 would
require a report that contains a plan to establish a domestic enrichment capability dedicated to
solely satisfying DOD requirements for highly enriched uranium (HEU), high-assay low enriched
uranium, low enriched uranium, and depleted uranium, with such a report to include, among other
things, a description of any changes in the DOD requirement for HEU due to AUKUS. (U.S. and
British nuclear-powered warships use HEU in their reactors.)
Senate
Section 1353 of S. 2226 would require DOD to designate a senior DOD civilian official to be
responsible for overseeing DOD activities relating to the AUKUS partnership.
The Senate Armed Services committee’s report (S.Rept. 118-58 of July 12, 2023) on S. 2226
states
Public shipyard support for AUKUS
The committee strongly supports the trilateral security agreement between the United
States, Australia, and the United Kingdom, known as AUKUS, which presents a unique
opportunity to significantly increase security cooperation and enhance collective security
with two of our closest allies. Central to the agreement is the initiative to enable Australia
to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. The committee notes the importance of ensuring
appropriate attention is given to the Australian submarine industrial base, particularly
Australian shipyards, to ensure that it is prepared to meet the demands of maintaining these
advanced systems. As such, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense and the

92 Source: Office of Legislative Counsel, “DoD Legislative Proposals, Fiscal Year 2024,” under “Eighth Package of
Legislative Proposals Sent to Congress for Inclusion in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024—
Individual Proposals (Sent to Congress on May 2, 2023),” posted at https://ogc.osd.mil/OGC-Offices/Office-of-
Legislative-Counsel/DoD-Legislative-Proposals-2024/. See also Bryant Harris and Megan Eckstein, “Pentagon Seeks
Authority to Transfer Nuclear Submarines to Australia,” Defense News, May 17, 2023; Nick Wilson, “DOD Asks
Congress for AUKUS Provisions in FY-24 Defense Authorization Bill,” Inside Defense, May 17, 2023.
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Secretary of the Navy to provide a report, no later than January 30, 2024, on the
Department’s efforts and plans to leverage the expertise of the United States public
shipyards, including lessons learned as part of the ongoing Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Plan [SIOP], to support Australian shipyard improvements and worker
training. (Page 268)
FY2024 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4365/S. 2587)
Senate
The Senate Appropriations Committee’s report (S.Rept. 118-81 of July 27, 2023) on S. 2587
states
Australia-United Kingdom-United States Trilateral Partnership Agreement.—The
Committee supports the Australia-United Kingdom-United States Trilateral Partnership
Agreement, which will strengthen allied presence and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. Not
later than 90 days after the enactment of this act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit a
long-term plan to the congressional defense committees on the planned schedule,
milestones, costs, and funding requirements for the transfer of Virginia Class submarines
from the United States and to meet the U.S. Navy’s requirement for attack submarines.
This plan shall include funding requirements and plans for U.S. and partner investments in
the U.S. submarine industrial base. (Page 138)
AUKUS Undersea Defense Act (H.R. 3939)
Section 3 of H.R. 3939 would authorize the transfer not more than two Virginia class submarines
from the Navy to Australia on a sale basis under section 21 of the Arms Export Control Act, with
the cost of the transfer to be borne by Australia. Section 4 would permit DOD to accept from
Australia contributions of money made by Australia for use by DOD in support of non-nuclear
related aspects of submarine security activities between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Section 5 would permit the President to transfer or authorize the export of defense
services to Australia under the Arms Export Control Act that may also be directly exported to
Australian private-sector personnel to support the development of the Australian submarine
industrial base necessary for submarine security activities between Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorization Act (H.R. 4619)
Section 3 of H.R. 4619 would, among other things, authorize the transfer up to two Virginia-class
submarines from the Navy to Australia on a sale basis over a period of 15 years, with the cost of
the transfer to be borne by Australia, subject to the President making certain certifications not less
than 270 days prior to a transfer of a vessel, and providing for a joint resolution of disapproval by
Congress within the 270-day period.
Bilateral Resilience in Industry Trade Security Act (BRITS Act)
(H.R. 4715)
H.R. 4715 would amend the Arms Export Control Act to establish exceptions for the United
Kingdom relating to licensing of defense articles and defense services for export under the act.
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Keeping our Allies Leading in Advancement Act (KOALA Act)
(H.R. 4716)
H.R. 4716 would amend the Arms Export Control Act to establish exceptions for Australia
relating to licensing of defense articles and defense services for export under the act.
AUKUS Oversight and Accountability Act (H.R. 4725)
Section 2 of H.R. 4725 would require the Department of State to appoint a senior advisor in the
Department of State to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the AUKUS partnership,
establish a task force on AUKUS governance to be led by the senior advisor, and require the
senior advisor to submit reports to Congress on a quarterly and annual basis. Section 3 would
make modifications to the Arms Export Control Act and other authorities.
Truncating Onerous Regulations for Partners and Enhancing
Deterrence Operations (TORPEDO) Act of 2023 (S. 1471)
S. 1471 contains provisions that would address various proposed activities to be carried out under
the AUKUS agreement. Sections relating to the SSN AUKUS project (i.e., Pillar 1) include but
are not necessarily limited to Sections 3, 4, 6, and 12-15.

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Appendix A. Past SSN Force-Level Goals
This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan Administration
(1981-1989).
The Reagan-era (i.e., 1980s-era) plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and
maintaining a force of 100 SSNs.
The George H. W. Bush Administration’s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally
called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.93 In 1992, however, the SSN goal
was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level requirement study
(updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level
acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.94
The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy,
established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs.95 The
Clinton Administration’s 1997 QDR supported a requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and
established a tentative SSN force-level goal of 50 boats, “contingent on a reevaluation of
peacetime operational requirements.”96 The Clinton Administration later amended the SSN figure
to 55 boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships).
The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in December 1999. The study
had three main conclusions:
• “that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 62 [SSNs] in
the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC’s [the regional military commanders-
in-chief] with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands
without gapping other requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this
force structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to meet the
modeled war fighting requirements”;
• “that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18 Virginia class
SSNs in the 2015 time frame”; and
• “that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame
would meet all of the CINCs’ and national intelligence community’s highest
operational and collection requirements.”97

93 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials, Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral
Raymond G. Jones Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in U.S. Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs,
June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11.
94 See Richard W. Mies, “Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,” Submarine Review, July 1997, p. 35; “Navy Sub
Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,” Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9;
Attack Submarines in the Post-Cold War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, “Pentagon
Urges Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,” Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, “ Size of Sub
Force Next Policy Battle,” New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8.
95 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993,
pp. 55-57.
96 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review,
May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47.
97 Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy, February 14, 2000, p. 5.
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The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of required SSN force
levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not translated into official DOD force-level
goals.
The George W. Bush Administration’s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended
requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs. In revalidating
this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD’s
“transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value
from each element of the force—DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and
reorganize the Armed Forces.”98
DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in 2003-2004. One of
the Navy studies—an internal Navy study done in 2004—reportedly recommended reducing the
attack submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly
recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack
submarines.99
In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force levels out to
FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for FY2035—a 260-ship fleet including 37 SSNs
and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs and 4 SSGNs.100
In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack submarine
requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.101
In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships, including
48 SSNs.
Although the Navy’s ship force-level goals have changed repeatedly in subsequent years, the
figure of 48 SSNs remained unchanged until December 2016, when the Navy released a force-
level objective for achieving and maintaining a force of 355 ships, including 66 SSNs.

98 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23.
99 Bryan Bender, “Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,” Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p. 1; Lolita C. Baldor, “Study
Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,” NavyTimes.com, May 13, 2004.
100 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of
Naval Vessels for FY 2006. The report was delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees on March 23, 2005.
101 Robert A. Hamilton, “Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,” The Day (New London, CT), May 27,
2005; Jesse Hamilton, “Delegation to Get Details on Sub Report,” Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005.
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Appendix B. Options for Funding SSNs
This appendix presents information on some alternative profiles for funding the procurement of
SSNs. These alternatives include but are not necessarily limited to the following:
• two years of advance procurement (AP) funding followed by full funding—
the traditional approach, under which there are two years of AP funding for the
SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
• one year of AP funding followed by full funding—one year of AP funding for
the SSN’s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat’s
procurement funding in the year of procurement;
• full funding with no AP funding (single-year full funding, aka point-blank
full funding)—full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, with no AP
funding in prior years;
• incremental funding—partial funding of the SSN in the year of procurement,
followed by one or more years of additional funding increments needed to
complete the procurement cost of the ship; and
• advance appropriations—a form of full funding that can be viewed as a
legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.102
Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the FY2008 budget,
suggested that two years of AP funding are required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and
consequently that additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest.103 This
testimony understated Congress’s options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the
near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of AP funding (which is used
primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion components), Congress can procure an
SSN without prior-year AP funding, or with only one year of AP funding. Consequently, Congress
at that time had the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or FY2010.
Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships
for which no prior-year AP funding had been provided. Specifically, Congress used single-year
full funding in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71, and again in
FY1988 to procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the
Administration’s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in FY1990 and
FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial AP payment for CVN-74.
Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to

102 For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement:
Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
103 For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008 Department
of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships the Navy might want to procure in
FY2008, should additional funding be made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter stated in part: “The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced procurement, to be
able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we would need to start two years in advance. What
that says is, if we were able to start in ‘08 with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year
to 2010.” (Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same subcommittee on
March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007.
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FY1988, and fully funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships
entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.104
The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor components was
not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and 75 with single-year full
funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more quickly. What made it possible for
Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full funding was Congress’s constitutional authority
to appropriate funding for that purpose.
Procuring an SSN with one year of AP funding or no AP funding would not materially change the
way the SSN would be built—the process would still encompass two or three years of advance
work on long-leadtime components, and an additional five or six years or so of construction work
on the ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction of the
ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal, and the interval between the recorded
year of full funding and the year that the ship enters service would be longer than normal.
Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships would not begin
construction for some time and consequently would take longer to enter service than a ship of that
kind would normally require. When Congress procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
(CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both
cases in the knowledge that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some
time after the first.

104 In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear propulsion components in
inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted the carriers to be built more quickly than would have
otherwise been the case, but it is not what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it
possible was Congress’s authority to appropriate funds for the purpose.
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Appendix C. SSN Maintenance Backlog
This appendix presents additional background information on the SSN maintenance backlog.
A January 12, 2023, press report stated
Top Navy officials this week promoted the idea of adding more public shipyards [i.e.,
government-operated naval shipyards, or NSYs] to improve ship maintenance.
Speaking during the annual Surface Navy Association symposium on Wednesday [January
11], Adm. Daryl Caudle, Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command, emphatically said
there is a good argument for the need to add at least a fifth public shipyard.
“Of course. I need six! I need enough capacity in our shipyards to drive the backlog down
to zero…I can today, if I had the backlog chipped down, have a more effective, larger fleet
today.” Caudle said on Wednesday during the Surface Navy Association symposium.105
A November 17, 2022, press report stated (emphasis added)
The U.S. Navy has nearly twice as many submarines sidelined for maintenance than
it should, and those boats in maintenance ultimately require three times more unplanned
work than they should, the program executive officer for attacks subs has said.
But the service thinks it can turn these and other problematic statistics around by changing
when and how it funds submarine maintenance. In fact, Rear Adm. Jon Rucker said he
thinks the Navy can implement industry best practices starting in fiscal 2026 and, by the
end of that fiscal year, get to almost zero delay days.
Several aspects of submarine maintenance preparation are awry, setting up the boats for
poor outcomes, Rucker said this month at the Naval Submarine League’s annual
conference.
On the planning side, engineers aren’t sticking to milestones that lock the work package at
a certain point; instead, they continue to jam in more work, which throws off assumptions
about the materials to order and the availability of skilled labor.
Because of the addition of extra work once the maintenance availability starts, coupled
with unexpected problems that arise, Rucker said 30% of the total work on submarines is
unplanned, compared to an industry best practice of 10%.
The Navy has set a goal to get to 10% unplanned work by FY26, and much of that
improvement will come from discipline in the planning process.
When it comes to ordering materials, Rucker said, the Navy isn’t funding these at the right
amount or at the right time.
For starters, he explained, the Navy only funds 40% to 50% of materials ahead of the start
of a maintenance availability; the remaining amount is ordered after the availability starts
and workers can get a closer look at the insides of the boat. Much of this material is
considered “contingent”—the Navy will not order it until workers see that the condition of
the submarine requires certain work be done and therefore materials to be ordered.
The problem is that almost every single boat requires all the same contingent work, Rucker
said, meaning it would be better to assume up front the work will be done and the parts are
required. “We’re going to buy the material anyway; we just buy it late” under the current
system, he explained.
By fiscal 2026, he said, the Navy will aim to have 90% to 95% of total material on hand
when an availability starts, rather than today’s 40% to 50% figure. This issue of buying

105 Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,” Defense Daily, January 12, 2023.
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materials earlier is made all the more dire by the increasing delivery times of many
materials.
Rucker told reporters after his speech at the conference that the Navy used to get away with
later material orders for two reasons: The older Los Angeles-class attack boats had a more
plentiful inventory of spare parts on hand due to investments when that submarine class
was in construction, and because parts not already on hand could typically be delivered
within two to 12 months.
Today, the Navy has few spares on hand for the newer Virginia-class boats. And when
items like large pumps and valves are unexpectedly needed, it can take as long as three
years to get them made and delivered.
“We have to phase the money differently. Our model’s broken because it was built on an
assumption of the way things were 20 or 30 years ago, when we had three times the
suppliers [in the industrial base], a very mature class” with plenty of spares on hand, he
said.
“But the model doesn’t support the fact that we have longer leads, fewer suppliers; it takes
more time, and we didn’t buy all the stuff we needed to. We’re going to adjust the way we
buy things,” he added.
He made clear the Navy isn’t asking to buy materials “early,” but rather on a new timeline
that better reflects long delivery times and the imperative to have 90% to 95% of the
material on hand at the start of work.
Rucker said the submarine community decided on these changes too late to modify the
FY23 funding request. He’s working to get them implemented in the FY24 budget request,
which is to be released in the spring. If the Navy can properly phase its spending on
materials for submarine repair work, it will give industry a more predictable workload,
ensure more materials are on hand at the start of a repair project and reduce a major barrier
to submarines coming out of maintenance on schedule.
Overall, Rucker explained in his speech, the Navy has gone from nearly 1,600 delay days
of maintenance for attack submarines in FY19 to 1,100 delay days in FY22, which ended
Sept. 30.
Late materials alone account for more than 100 of those days, Rucker said.
His office projects that figure will come down to about 700 delay days by FY26 based on
changes already implemented—and Rucker said that better planning and earlier materials
purchased will get the community to as close to zero as possible by the end of FY26,
assuming the changes are implemented this next budget cycle.
This drive to zero delay days comes in the context of an undersized attack submarine force
that’s kept busy. Navy and Pentagon leadership repeatedly call the submarine force among
America’s top advantages over adversaries like China and Russia; yet the U.S. has 50
attack submarines and four related “large payload submarines,” compared to a requirement
for a combined 66 to 72 attack and large payload subs.
Of the 50 attack subs, Rucker said 18 are in maintenance or waiting for their turn.
Industry best practice would call for just 20% to be tied up in repairs, or 10 boats
instead of 18.106
The Navy in 2010 decided to put the submarines through fewer but longer maintenance
availabilities, allowing the boats to have longer operational cycles. But Rucker said this

106 Regarding this point, see also Megan Eckstein, “Navy Frustration Building over Late Weapons, Ship Deliveries,”
Defense News, January 11, 2023; Rich Abott, “Fleet Forces And SecNav Argue For More Maintenance Yards,”
Defense Daily, January 12, 2023; Justin Katz, “As AUKUS Looms, US Navy Sub Leaders Sound Alarms at Home,”
Breaking Defense, November 4, 2022.
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new model—when all the delays are taken into account—means a sub going into
maintenance is out of the fleet for an average of 450 to 700 days, depending on the class,
at a time when operational commanders are itching for all the submarine presence they can
get.
To help overcome the backlog of maintenance work faster, construction yards Newport
News Shipbuilding and General Dynamics Electric Boat are helping with some repairs of
Los Angeles-class subs. The former has Columbus, and the latter was awarded a contract
over the summer for repairs on Hartford.
Boise, the poster child for submarine maintenance woes—it returned from its last
deployment in January 2015 and has been waiting to get into maintenance since fiscal 2016,
losing its certification to dive amid the delays—is expected to go into maintenance at
Newport News. But Rucker said a final decision on its funding would be revealed in the
FY24 budget request, and he would not comment further on plans for that boat.107
A November 14, 2022, press report stated
When a U.S. attack submarine arrives for shipyard maintenance, Navy rules say the vast
majority of the necessary parts and materiel must be there waiting. But most jobs actually
begin with half or even fewer of the needed items on hand. That means delays, extra cost,
and usually, stealing items from other projects, which compounds the problems across the
sub force.
That’s a planning and funding problem, according to the program executive officer for
attack submarines, who says he’s working to fix it by 2026.
“On the material side, we are not funding them properly…We do not fund the right amount
and we do not phase it properly,” Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker said Nov. 2 at the annual
Naval Submarine League symposium in Arlington, Virginia....
Currently, just 40 to 50 percent of the required parts and material are on hand when a sub
arrives in the yard, Rucker said.
Part of the problem is that the Navy lacks funds for “contingent material”: parts to fix
problems that are discovered during the work, like valves that are found to need
replacement. But, Rucker said, these kinds of things are actually predictable.
“Every availability—about 90 percent—we use the same stuff. We know that, but we don't
order it until then,” he said.
Because submarine parts are so specialized and the supply chain so constrained, this
generally means the yard has to take the items from some other planned submarine-
maintenance project, Rucker said.
“And with lead times of material on the order of up to two years and some more, no wonder
we don't have the material we have to count on,” he said. “Because we order it after the
avail starts, and we don't get it in time to do it, so we got to take it from somewhere else.”
Rucker said for new construction, the material is bought upfront. He wants to do the same
for sustainment.
“So, we're changing that model so where we're going to phase the funding differently and
order the contingent material in advance and so it’s ready,” he said. “So when we get to
that point, the stuff’s on the shelf. That’s part of the problem of not buying all that stuff
early on. Decisions were made early; we got to get after it.”

107 Megan Eckstein, “US Navy Hopes New Funding Model Can Cut Sub Maintenance Delays by 2026,” Defense News,
November 17, 2022.
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By 2026, each availability will start with the required 90 to 95 percent of the material on
hand, he said.
But missing material is only part of what causes submarine-maintenance delays. Rucker
said that planning and shipyard throughput are also causes for not “executing.”
Currently, the attack submarine force has about 1,100 days of maintenance delay, down
from about 1,500 to 1,600 days in 2019, Rucker said, adding that improvements already in
the works will reduce total annual delay days to 700 by 2026.
Late material adds 100 to 111 days of delay to each availability. These are the delays that
better planning and funding is intended to reduce.
How the Navy could do this phased-funding approach is unclear. Rucker told reporters he
is working to see which budget year to introduce it. When asked about the budgeting
process for implementing something like this, officials with U.S. Naval Sea Systems
Command and the Navy said they could not comment on internal budget deliberations or
future budgets.108
A November 2, 2022, press report stated
Within the next year the US Navy wants to initiate a “scoping study” aimed at determining
if the service needs to establish a fifth public shipyard to support future submarine
maintenance, according to a senior officer involved in the task, a notion that previously
met with some resistance from lawmakers.
Rear Adm. Jonathan Rucker, program executive officer for attack submarines, told
reporters here at the Naval Submarine League symposium that industry frequently asks the
Navy about considerations for a new public shipyard. He also stressed that the scoping
study was preliminary and there is no clear consensus in the service yet about whether
another shipyard is even necessary, let alone whether it will be built.
“Right now, we’re in a stage to say: ‘Let’s go scope how capable our shipyards could be?’”
he said. Once the service completes its Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program,
“how efficient will we be?” he continued, referring to the Navy’s 20-year plan to overhaul
the four existing public shipyards....
Breaking Defense in May published an extensive report about one Ohio businessman’s
proposal to the Navy to do just that [see the May 9, 2022, press report excerpted below].
Ed Bartlett, an engineer and former enlisted sailor, called his proposal “the only actionable
plan” to relieve the Navy’s submarine maintenance backlog, and he has numerous former
admirals, shipbuilding industry giants and local politicians backing his ideas. But at the
time, lawmakers on Capitol Hill seemed unconvinced that now’s the time for such a major
investment. [Rep.] Joe Courtney, Conn., a House Democrat known for being hawkish on
Navy spending, called it a “tall order.”
Rucker today said the service had underestimated several issues that are now causing
problems, such as the second- and third-tier ramifications of the coronavirus pandemic.
But he added that another shipyard is a “big path to go down,” if that decision is ever made.
Right now, the Navy’s urgent focus is on improving the capabilities and efficacy of the
current shipyards, he added.109

108 Caitlin M. Kenney, “Only Half the Parts Are Waiting When US Attack Submarines Come in For Repairs,” Defense
One, November 14, 2022. See also Justin Katz, “As AUKUS looms, US Navy Sub Leaders Sound Alarms at Home,”
Breaking Defense, November 4, 2022.
109 Justin Katz, “Navy ‘Scoping Study’ to Examine Shipyard Capacity, Potential for a New Yard,” Breaking Defense,
November 2, 2022.
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A September 21, 2022, press report stated
The submarine industrial base, already strained by demand for new construction, may need
to accelerate its production of spare parts to alleviate submarine maintenance woes.
The vast majority of submarine maintenance availabilities run late, in part due to poor
planning practices and in part because repair yards rely on a pool of replacement parts “that
just doesn’t exist” after the Navy failed to sufficiently prepare for Virginia-class submarine
sustainment, according to two admirals.
“That upfront investment didn’t happen for Virginia-class, so we’re missing that whole
sustainment tail, or a big portion of that,” Rear Adm. Scott Brown, the deputy commander
of Naval Sea Systems Command for industrial operations (NAVSEA 04), said Sept. 20 at
the American Society of Naval Engineers’ annual Fleet Maintenance and Modernization
Symposium here.
“It’s resulting in a lot of churn, a lot of cannibalization—so we have to take things off other
boats to stick them on the boat we’re trying to get out—and a lot of, frankly, frustration
with the workforce on waiting for stuff that doesn’t exist,” he added. “Of course, that leads
to delays.”
He said the Navy asked the Center for Naval Analyses to study the connection between
material delays and extended maintenance availabilities; the research organization found
the lack of material on hand “is a fairly large contribution to our delays,” according to
Brown.
Vice Adm. Bill Galinis, the commander of NAVSEA, said Sept. 21 at the same conference
that only 20% to 30% of submarine maintenance availabilities over the last decade have
finished on time. The problem is worsening as the Virginia-class submarines account for a
greater percentage of the undersea fleet, he said.
“We’ve seen a significant growth in the amount of man days required to complete a
submarine [maintenance] availability, particularly a Virginia-class one, and [we’re] really
trying to deep-dive and understand why that really is,” Galinis added.
He pointed to a couple potential factors. For parts purchased with annual operations and
maintenance funding, global supply chain issues mean it takes longer for parts to be
delivered. In some cases, it’s taking up to two years, putting current and upcoming
availabilities at risk.
For spare parts managed through the Defense Logistics Agency or the Naval Supply
Systems Command, the Navy has only funded some of these at about 40% or 50% in recent
years. As a result, parts simply aren’t in the inventory when needed by the Navy’s four
public shipyards.
And, Galinis added, the rotable pool of spares is too small due to a lack of investment in
the early years of the Virginia-class acquisition. The rotable pool is made up of parts taken
off a submarine by shipyard workers and later refurbished for use in the future.
He added that the refurbishment process is moving too slowly, meaning parts aren’t
available when needed. Galinis said the Navy may have to contract out some of that
refurbishment work.
Brown told Defense News his office, which oversees the work of all four public shipyards,
wants to increase the inventory of each component in the rotable pool and also add new
types of components that have particularly blocked the service from completing
maintenance availabilities on time.
Brown said he doesn’t expect the problem to cost the Navy more, but the service may need
to spend more quickly on spares and sustainment.
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“That’s going to cause a push of material dollars to the left in the [five-year Future Years
Defense Program] to buy early to make sure we have that stuff. But it’s eventually going
to equalize out, because we’re going to end up buying it anyway,” he said.
Galinis also pointed to a lack of rigor in submarine planning and project management,
which he said is exacerbating the maintenance delays.
A number of pre-availability assessments and tests must take place on all submarines,
aircraft carriers and surface ships to help identify the exact condition of the ship and what
work is needed.
“The submarine force is probably the hardest one for us to get that done, principally
because of their operational schedule and just in some cases the difficulty getting teams
out to a submarine,” Galinis said. But it means some planning documents aren’t completed
until the submarine is back in port, generating additional delays.
Indeed, whereas surface ships only see about 10% so-called unplanned work, aircraft
carriers have been seeing a 22% unplanned work rate and submarines are nearing 30%, the
NAVSEA commander said.110
A July 11, 2022, press report stated that
maintenance issues are hindering the East Coast fleet’s readiness, according to Adm. Daryl
Caudle, who leads U.S. Fleet Forces Command....
[Caudle stated:] “As far as some things I’m seeing where we’re not performing: Let’s go
to the submarine force first. The lack of capacity and the lack of performance at our public
and private yards are driving availabilities—these are depot availabilities now—past our
class maintenance time frames to such an extent that they have consumed all the dry docks.
So if I have an emergent issue, I don’t really have good options to bring in units for those
things that may be emergent dry-docking repairs. They have also forced ships—because
submarines expire, their hulls expire—for them to be tied up alongside waiting on their
availability to start because there’s no place to put them. We call those idle submarines.
“The number of idle submarines has crept up over time. They fluctuate now between five
to, worst case, it got to a point we were at about nine out. So these are submarines just
sitting pierside because the hulls expired, they can’t submerge and they’re not ready to go
into their depot availability. This backlog is causing me to lose fleet size due to this
problem.”111
A May 12, 2022, press report states
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday had blunt words today for two
powerhouse companies that build submarines for the Navy: We need your shipyards, but
not the problems that come with them.
“We know that we don’t have the capacity in our public shipyards to handle all of that
[submarine] maintenance. We need Electric Boat and we need Huntington Ingalls to be
able to do that work,” said Gilday. “They are under performing. They are over cost and
way over schedule.”
Gilday was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee about the Navy’s fiscal
2023 budget request alongside Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro and Marine Corps
Commandant Gen. David Berger....

110 Megan Eckstein, “Submarine Fleet Needs More Spare Parts to Stem Maintenance Delays,” Defense News,
September 21, 2022. See also Sam LaGrone, “NAVSEA: Navy ‘Struggling’ to Get Attack Subs Out of Repairs on
Time as Demand Increases,” USNI News, September 21, 2022.
111 Megan Eckstein, “Six Questions with the Head of US Fleet Forces Command,” Defense News, July 11, 2022.
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Todd Corillo, a Newport News Shipbuilding spokesman, in a statement to Breaking
Defense, acknowledged the shipbuilder has “experienced challenges” since reconstituting
its submarine repair business “following a 10-year hiatus.”
“In this time, we have built a proficient workforce, matured the supply chain, developed
process improvements and made smart investments in required facilities,” he said.
“Although we experienced challenges with our transition back into this complex business,
we are now keeping pace with current submarine repair needs and also forecasting future
workflow to drive predictable capacity and performance.”112
A May 9, 2022, press report stated
With the Navy working through its long-term plan to relieve the notorious submarine
maintenance backlog and other well-known issues piling up at the service’s four public
shipyards, into the space has stepped Ed Bartlett, an engineer and former enlisted sailor
who has spent the last several years arguing that the solution is obvious: It’s time to build
a fifth shipyard.
Bartlett has now twice pitched the Navy on a proposal to buy and build a fifth public
shipyard and depot facility in Ohio. His company calls the proposal “the only actionable
plan” to relieve the Navy’s submarine maintenance backlog, and his offer has the backing
of former admirals, a shipbuilding industry giant and local politicians.
But what may seem an easy solution on paper has, so far, been met with cold reality. The
Navy rejected Bartlett’s proposal the first time due to cost and policy concerns, and still
sees issues with a revised proposal submitted earlier this year. There’s also a host of
technical and legal hurdles any plan for a new shipyard in the Great Lakes would have to
overcome.
And while lawmakers have been less than impressed with the Navy’s long-term, $21 billion
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP), there doesn’t seem to be much energy
around the idea of a new shipyard—at least outside of the Ohio delegation, who would
benefit from Bartlett’s pitch.
With the Navy’s first admiral directly charged with overseeing SIOP set to testify in front
of Congress this week for the first time, the one thing that all sides seem to agree on is this:
The Navy must move faster to get its ships out of port and underway, and business as usual
will only leave the US critically vulnerable in a future conflict.113
A February 16, 2022, press report stated
The U.S. Navy attack submarine force inventory is at a low, and maintenance backlogs are
making it harder to conduct important development work, the commander of the submarine
force in U.S. Pacific Fleet said this week.
Rear Adm. Jeffrey Jablon said the SSN fleet sits at just 47 today—down from 50 attack
subs in the fall, due in part to submarine decommissionings happening as planned while
new deliveries from industry run behind schedule.
That 47 is further diminished by maintenance challenges, he said while speaking at a Feb.
16 panel at the WEST 2022 conference, cohosted by the U.S. Naval Institute and AFCEA
International.
In fiscal 2016, because of idle time for subs awaiting maintenance—on boats which have
exceeded their operational limits and were no longer allowed to submerge under the water
until they underwent maintenance—the Navy lost about 360 days of operations.

112 Justin Katz, “Navy’s Submarine Builders ‘Over Cost’, ‘Under Performing’: Top Admiral,” Breaking Defense, May
12, 2022.
113 Justin Katz, “Is a New Navy Shipyard Realistic, or Just a ‘Tall Order?’” Breaking Defense, May 9, 2022.
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In FY21, the fleet lost nearly 1,500 days to idle time—the equivalent of taking four
submarines out of the fleet.
Additionally, Jablon said in FY21 the fleet lost the equivalent of 3.5 submarines to repair
periods that ran longer than planned.
“That’s about seven and a half SSNs that I cannot use last year because of awaiting
maintenance or maintenance delay,” he said.
Even with that smaller fleet, he told Defense News, “we meet all our operational
commitments. We’re able to ensure that our ships are combat ready when they deploy. We
meet the requirements of our combatant commanders that are placed upon us.”
But “it results in less ability to do tactical development at sea,” Jablon added, noting it also
cuts into commanding officers’ discretionary time at sea to bolster training in particular
areas.
“We’re still able to prepare the ship to be combat ready when they deploy,” he said, but
“it’s more difficult, it’s more deliberate, it takes more input from the [type commander]
staff to do that.”114
A September 22, 2020, press report stated
It has been five years since the attack submarine Boise returned from its last patrol, and
this whole time she has been waiting on some loving care and attention in the shipyards.
On Monday [September 21], the check cleared for roughly $351.8 million that covers the
initial planning and work as part of her overhaul at Huntington Ingalls Newport News
Shipbuilding where she has been in dry dock since earlier this year. Another contract
covering the full engineering overhaul is in negotiations, according to Naval Sea System
Command spokesperson Colleen O’Rourke,115 work that will include significant
maintenance on the nuclear propulsion system and modernization upgrades.
The running tab on Boise so far is $355 million, with advanced planning money already
awarded, according to the Defense Department contract announcement. The work under
this contract is scheduled to wrap up in May 2023, eight years after the sub left the
operational fleet.
While Boise could be wrapped up by 2023—the overhaul was initially scheduled for 25
months—it’s possible the repairs could take longer, O’Rourke said.
The bill will be paid out of 2020 Operations & Maintenance funding, according to the
contract announcement.
Boise has been something of a cause célèbre among congressional leaders, who have
pointed to the ship’s long wait to enter the shipyard as emblematic of the Navy’s struggle
with maintenance delays. The issue with attack submarines has been complicated, because
while that work would typically be done in the public shipyards, those have been backed
up with aircraft carriers and the Ohio-class ballistic missile subs.
Some of the Navy’s problems will resolve themselves after ballistic missile subs are
refueled, said Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and analyst with the Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, in a 2019 interview.
“The big factor here is that attack submarines are last in line when it comes to
maintenance,” Clark explained then. “And that maintenance is done in the public yards,
both the refueling and non-refueling overhauls. So that’s why you see submarines like

114 Megan Eckstein, “Submarine Maintenance Backlogs and Delays Take Toll on Fleet’s Development Work at Sea,”
Defense News, February 16, 2022.
115 Colleen O’Rourke is no relation to Ronald O’Rourke.
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Boise who have been waiting a long time to get in, because carriers had a lot of maintenance
backlog”.
“And working through that backlog pushed SSBN refuelings back, and that in turn pushed
attack subs to the end of the line. Now that they are working through the carrier backlog
and the SSBN refueling is now largely completed, that’s going to mean the attack
submarines can be brought back into the public shipyards. So that’s a structural issue that’s
going to work itself out.”
But other aspects of the Navy’s quest to dig out of the submarine backlog are thornier and
will require the service to make long-term commitments to private shipyards, Clark said.
One of the main issues with assigning attack subs to private shipyards is that they are not
necessarily set up as maintenance shops: They’re more so built and organized as new
construction yards.
Naval Sea Systems Command acknowledged as much in a statement to the Virginian Pilot
as part of a story on the delays of Columbus and Helena, which the command attributed to
“the workforce’s inexperience in conducting submarine maintenance, which differs greatly
from new construction.”…
In an interview with USNI News, former Naval Sea Systems Command head Vice Adm.
Thomas Moore said he thought Boise would go better than previous attempts at
maintaining attack boats in private shipyard.
“I think we are well-positioned on Boise, certainly way better than we were on Helena and
Columbus, when we learned so many lessons the hard way,” Moore said. “They hadn’t
done submarine work in 10 years, and I think we underestimated how they had atrophied
in that skill set. I think they did as well.
“And the other thing is, I think we recognized that we probably put too much on their plate,
with multiple [maintenance] availabilities [i.e., ship maintenance projects] on their plate at
one time.”116
An August 2020 GAO report on maintenance delays on aircraft carriers and submarines stated
The Navy’s four shipyards completed 38 of 51 (75 percent) maintenance periods late for
aircraft carriers and submarines with planned completion dates in fiscal years 2015 through
2019, for a combined total of 7,424 days of maintenance delay. For each maintenance
period completed late, the shipyards averaged 113 days late for aircraft carriers and 225
days late for submarines.

Unplanned work and workforce factors—such as shipyard workforce performance and
capacity (having enough people to perform the work)—were the main factors GAO
identified as causing maintenance delays for aircraft carriers and submarines. The Navy
frequently cited both factors as contributing to the same days of maintenance delay.
Unplanned work—work identified after finalizing maintenance plans—contributed to
more than 4,100 days of maintenance delays. Unplanned work also contributed to the

116 David B. Larter, “The Hapless Attack Sub Boise Could Return to the Fleet in 2023 After 8 Years Sidelined,”
Defense News, September 22, 2020.
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Navy’s 36 percent underestimation of the personnel resources necessary to perform
maintenance. The workforce factor contributed to more than 4,000 days of maintenance
delay on aircraft carriers and submarines during fiscal years 2015 through 2019.
The Navy has taken steps but has not fully addressed the unplanned work and workforce
factors causing the most maintenance delays. First, the Navy updated planning documents
to improve estimates and plans to annually update these data, but knowing whether changes
improve results may take several years. Second, the Navy has consistently relied on high
levels of overtime to carry out planned work. GAO’s analysis found that high overtime
among certain production shops, such as painting or welding, averaged from 25 to 32
percent for fiscal years 2015 through 2019, with peak overtime as high as 45 percent.
Furthermore, shipyard officials told us that production shops at all four shipyards are
working beyond their capacity. Overtime at such rates has been noted as resulting in
diminished productivity. Third, the Navy initiated the Shipyard Performance to Plan
initiative in the fall of 2018 to address the unplanned work and workforce factors, but it
has not yet developed 13 of 25 planned metrics that could improve the Navy’s
understanding of the causes of maintenance delays. In addition, the Shipyard Performance
to Plan initiative does not include goals, milestones, and a monitoring process along with
fully developed metrics to address unplanned work and workforce weaknesses. Without
fully developing metrics and implementing goals, action plans, milestones, and a
monitoring process, the shipyards are not likely to address unplanned work and workforce
weaknesses and the Navy is likely to continue facing maintenance delays and reduced time
for training and operations with its aircraft carriers and submarines.117
A May 26, 2020, press report stated
After years of struggling to conduct attack submarine maintenance—with the four public
naval shipyards prioritizing SSN work last, behind a backlog of ballistic-missile sub and
aircraft carrier work, and private shipyards finding it tough to resume submarine repair
work after years of only doing new construction—the Navy appears back on track for its
SSN maintenance, the head of Naval Sea Systems Command told USNI News.
The move of attack submarine USS Boise (SSN-764) to the dry dock at Newport News
Shipbuilding in Virginia is the most visible sign of things moving in the right direction,
after the sub has been sitting pier side at nearby Norfolk Naval Shipyard for more than four
years waiting for maintenance to begin.
The Navy had previously hoped to get Boise into Newport News as early as 2018, but the
private yard struggled with its first two Los Angeles-class SSN maintenance periods—for
USS Helena (SSN-725) and USS Columbus (SSN-762)—and didn’t have the room for the
sub or the workforce to start working on it. As Boise lingered, it became a focal point in
the discussion about a lack of repair capacity and a backup of work at the four public naval
shipyards.
But, NAVSEA Commander Vice Adm. Tom Moore told USNI News, the Navy is moving
into a new era of on-time submarine maintenance….
Moore told USNI News in an interview last week that “I think we are well-positioned on
Boise, certainly way better than we were on Helena and Columbus, when we learned so
many lessons the hard way: that, one, they hadn’t done submarine work in 10 years, and I
think we underestimated how they had atrophied in that skill set, and I think they did as
well; and the other thing is, I think we recognized that we probably put too much on their
plate, with multiple availabilities on their plate at one time.” …
Moore said that Electric Boat likely won’t be a provider of submarine maintenance for
much longer–aside from an availability for USS Hartford (SSN-768) that starts in

117 Government Accountability Office, Navy Shipyards[:] Actions Needed to Address the Main Factors Causing
Maintenance Delays for Aircraft Carriers and Submarines, GAO-20-588, August 2020, summary page.
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November 2021, the Connecticut yard will have its hand full with construction of
Columbia-class SSBNs and Block V Virginia-class SSNs. Moore said it’s important to get
the sub repair capability reconstituted at Newport News Shipbuilding so that one private
yard can serve as part of the SSN repair community….
Moore acknowledged that the bulk of the Navy’s problems in recent years was that its four
public shipyards, tasked with maintaining nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft
carriers, did not have the capacity to keep up with demand….
If the plan can be executed, Moore said the anticipated work at Norfolk Naval Shipyard
matches the workforce capacity, meaning there should be no more backlog….
Though Boise has remained a “problem child” for longer than anticipated, Moore noted in
the recent interview that SSN maintenance is wrapping up on time more and more as
capacity at the public yards grows….
Moore said he was confident NAVSEA was in a good position on SSN maintenance
because a whole set of improvements had been made in tandem in recent years: not only
was the [naval shipyard] workforce now up to its goal of 36,700 personnel, but an effort to
create better business practices is underway and the first projects in a 20-year Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP) program are already hitting the waterfront.118
A March 2019 Navy report to Congress states that in response to the above committee report
language
The Navy submitted an initial [submarine maintenance] plan in December 2018, that
reflected FY 2019 budget information. The Navy has [now] updated this plan to
incorporate data from the President’s FY 2020 budget submitted on March 11, 2019….
… In the post-Cold War and post 9/11 era, there have been decades of decisionmaking
associated with the re-posturing of defense strategies, such as: the reduction in maintenance
capacity and flexibility though Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC), increased
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO), evolution of submarine life cycle maintenance plans,
budget reductions, and budget uncertainties that have contributed to the current challenges
facing the submarine fleet.
The root cause of submarine idle time and associated loss of operational availability, as
discussed in the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 19-229, “Actions
Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet” (issued
November 2018), is largely due to public shipyard capacity not keeping pace with growing
maintenance requirements that have been building for a number of years prior to the USS
BOISE (SSN 764) FY 2016 Engineered Overhaul (EOH). The workload to capacity
mismatch resulted in lower priority attack submarine (SSN) availabilities (as compared to
ballistic missile submarines and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers) being delivered late and
a bow-waving of workload from one fiscal year to the next that could not be executed. The
workload backlog exacerbated the public shipyard workload-to-capacity mismatch and
contributed to an increasing trend in late SSN [maintenance] deliveries.
The Navy has taken several actions to improve the workload-to-capacity balance at the
public shipyards. Notably, over 20,600 workers were hired from FY 2013 through FY
2018, which after accounting for attrition, increased total end strength from 29,400 to
36,700. However, the accelerated hiring resulted in 56 percent of the production workforce
having less than five years of experience. The less experienced workforce requires a greater
investment in training, as described in the Navy’s Report to Congress on the Naval
Shipyard Development Plan (issued March 2018), which offers some near term
productivity gains. The Navy has also taken additional actions to balance workload at our

118 Megan Eckstein, “NAVSEA Says Attack Sub Repairs Much Improved as USS Boise Enters Yard Following 4-Year
Wait,” USNI News, May 26, 2020.
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public shipyards by outsourcing four submarine maintenance availabilities to the private
sector and plans to outsource another two submarine availabilities to the private shipyards
starting in FY 2020 and FY 2021. Additionally, to ensure on-time delivery from
maintenance availabilities, availability inductions have been rescheduled to occur when the
shipyards have the capacity to accomplish the availability(s) within programmed schedule
durations. This necessary action to improve the on-time delivery of current maintenance
availabilities has resulted in some additional submarine maintenance backlog and some
accumulation of idle time. Based on actions and initiatives the Navy is currently pursuing
to improve submarine operational availability and the outsourcing of two additional
submarine availabilities to the private sector, the Navy assesses that the submarine idle
time will be eliminated by the end of FY 2023 and the submarine maintenance backlog will
be worked off by the end of FY 2023.119
A November 2018 GAO report on the issue stated the following:
The Navy has been unable to begin or complete the vast majority of its attack submarine
maintenance periods on time resulting in significant maintenance delays and operating and
support cost expenditures. GAO’s analysis of Navy maintenance data shows that between
fiscal year 2008 and 2018, attack submarines have incurred 10,363 days of idle time and
maintenance delays as a result of delays in getting into and out of the shipyards. For
example, the Navy originally scheduled the USS Boise to enter a shipyard for an extended
maintenance period in 2013 but, due to heavy shipyard workload, the Navy delayed the
start of the maintenance period. In June 2016, the USS Boise could no longer conduct
normal operations and the boat has remained idle, pierside for over two years since then
waiting to enter a shipyard…. GAO estimated that since fiscal year 2008 the Navy has
spent more than $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2018 constant dollars to support attack
submarines that provide no operational capability—those sitting idle while waiting to enter
the shipyards, and those delayed in completing their maintenance at the shipyards.
The Navy has started to address challenges related to workforce shortages and facilities
needs at the public shipyards. However, it has not effectively allocated maintenance
periods among public shipyards and private shipyards that may also be available to help
minimize attack submarine idle time. GAO’s analysis found that while the public shipyards
have operated above capacity for the past several years, attack submarine maintenance
delays are getting longer and idle time is increasing. The Navy may have options to mitigate
this idle time and maintenance delays by leveraging private shipyard capacity for repair
work. But the Navy has not completed a comprehensive business case analysis as
recommended by Department of Defense guidelines to inform maintenance workload
allocation across public and private shipyards. Navy leadership has acknowledged that they
need to be more proactive in leveraging potential private shipyard repair capacity. Without
addressing this challenge, the Navy risks continued expenditure of operating and support
funding to crew, maintain, and support attack submarines that provide no operational
capability because they are delayed in getting into and out of maintenance.120

119 U.S. Navy, President’s FY 2020 Budget Update to Report to Congress on Submarine Depot Maintenance Prepared
by Secretary of the Navy, generated March 12, 2019, with cover letters dated March 21, 2019, provided to CRS by
Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on March 27, 2019, pp. 3-4.
120 Government Accountability Office, Navy Readiness[:] Actions Needed to Address Costly Maintenance Delays
Facing the Attack Submarine Fleet, GAO-19-229, November 2018, summary page.
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Appendix D. December 2021 Determinations
Pursuant to Defense Production Act (DPA)
This appendix presents background information on three determinations signed by President
Biden on December 21, 2021, permitting the use of the Defense Production Act (DPA)121 to
strengthen the U.S. submarine industrial base for the purpose of increasing production of
Virginia-class submarines.
A December 21, 2021, memorandum from President Biden to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin
stated
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, including section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as
amended (the “Act”) (50 U.S.C. 4533), I hereby determine, pursuant to section 303(a)(5)
of the Act, that:
(1) Large Scale Fabrication, Shipbuilding Industrial Base Expansion for Resilience and
Robustness, and Maritime Workforce Training Pipelines in support of Virginia Class attack
submarine production are industrial resources, materials, or critical technology items
essential to the national defense;
(2) without Presidential action under section 303 of the Act, United States industry cannot
reasonably be expected to provide the capability for the needed industrial resource,
material, or critical technology item in a timely manner; and
(3) purchases, purchase commitments, or other action pursuant to section 303 of the Act
are the most cost-effective, expedient, and practical alternative method for meeting the
need.
Pursuant to section 303(a)(7)(B) of the Act, I find that action to expand the domestic
production capability for these supply chains is necessary to avert an industrial resource or
critical technology item shortfall that would severely impair national defense capability.
Therefore, I waive the requirements of section 303(a)(l)-(a)(6) of the Act for the purpose
of expanding the domestic production capability for these supply chains.
Ensuring a robust, resilient, and competitive domestic defense industrial base that has the
capability, capacity, and workforce to meet the Virginia Class submarine undersea
warfighting mission is essential to our national security.
You are authorized and directed to publish this determination in the Federal Register.122
A December 22, 2021, DOD statement about the presidential determinations stated
The president signed on Dec. 21, 2021 three determinations permitting the use of the
Defense Production Act (DPA) to strengthen the U.S. submarine industrial base. The
expansion of the authority will allow the U.S. Navy to maintain its maritime superiority.
Scaling the production of Virginia Class Attack Submarines will ensure the U.S. Navy can
meet its missions to maintain open sea lanes for global communication and commerce,
enhance diplomatic partnerships, and grow a robust underwater warfare capability.

121 For more on the DPA, see CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and
Considerations for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters, and CRS In Focus IF11767, The Defense Production Act Committee
(DPAC): A Primer, by Michael H. Cecire.
122 White House, “Memorandum on the Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production
Act of 1950, as amended,” December 21, 2021.
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Through the DPA, the U.S. Navy can make key investments with the manufacturers and
suppliers executing the submarine shipbuilding plan.
These activities will strengthen the shipbuilding industrial base and allow its heavy
manufacturing and large scale fabrication suppliers to meet growing demand and expand
the maritime workforce training pipeline.
The department continues to work with key stakeholders to use the DPA authorities to
address risks and challenges across the Submarine Enterprise supply chain. These
authorities expand options and opportunities to accelerate and scale critical investments
across key markets.123
Regarding Title III of the DPA, DOD states
The Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III program is dedicated to ensuring the timely
availability of essential domestic industrial resources to support national defense and
homeland security requirements. The program works in partnership with the Uniformed
services, other government agencies, and industry to identify areas where critical industrial
capacity is lagging or non-existent. Once an area is identified, the program engages with
domestic companies to mitigate these risks using grants, purchase commitments, loans, or
loan guarantees. By executing its mission, the DPA Title III program reduces the nation’s
reliance on foreign supply chains and ensures the integrity of materials supplied to the
American Warfighter.
The DPA Title III program, governed by 50 USC 4531-4534, is one of the key investment
tools of the [DOD] Industrial Policy office.124
A December 22, 2021, Navy information paper states
The Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III program is dedicated to ensuring the timely
availability of essential domestic industrial resources to support national defense and
homeland security requirements. The program works in partnership with the Uniformed
services, other government agencies, and industry to identify areas where critical industrial
capacity is lagging or non-existent. Once these fragilities, vulnerabilities, or opportunities
are identified, DPA authorities are uniquely positioned to allow engagement with domestic
suppliers that mitigate capacity and capability risks using grants, purchase commitments,
loans, or loan guarantees
As the U.S. Navy continues to build a more lethal force that maintains maritime superiority,
enables sea lanes of global communication and commerce, and ensures diplomatic
partnerships, strategic undersea warfare remains the foundation. With VIRGINIA Class
(VCS) currently challenged to meet a two per year production cadence, increasing the
capacity and capabilities of the submarine industrial base is necessary to achieve the
generational increase in demand. This demand will continue to grow with serial production
of one (1) COLUMBIA Class (CLB) submarine plus two VIRGINIA Class (VCS)
submarines per year expected to start in Fiscal Year 2026.
DPA Title III authorities granted in these PDs support Navy efforts to achieve and sustain
consistent production of the VCS Program, meeting schedule and a cadence of two VCS
per year in accordance with authorizations and appropriations, concurrent with the national
priority CLB Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program. Specific areas of focus for
leveraging these authorities are: strategic sourcing expansion, shipbuilding industrial base
expansion for resilience and robustness, and growing the maritime workforce training
pipeline.

123 Department of Defense, “Defense Production Act Title III Presidential Determinations for Submarine Industrial
Base Production Capacity Essential to the Virginia Class Attack Submarine Program,” December 22, 2021.
124 Department of Defense, “Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III,” undated, accessed January 3, 2022.
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Specific projects with associated costs and timelines to support sustained 1 CLB + 2 VCS
per year are being refined, and the Navy will consider where this DPA Title III authority
will best mitigate capacity and capability risks.125

125 Navy information paper entitled “Defense Production Act Title III—Presidential Determination for Virginia Class
Production,” December 22, 2021, provided to CRS and CBO by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs on January 7, 2022.
See also Sten Spinella, “Defense Production Expansion Could Bring Help to Region’s Submarine Industry,” New
London Day, January 3, 2022.
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Appendix E. 1987 Letters from Members Regarding
Canadian SSN Project
The following are the texts of the bodies of two 1987 letters from Members of Congress
regarding Canada’s proposed SSN acquisition project, which Canada later canceled.
Letter from Representative Charles E. Bennett
A November 3, 1987, letter from Representative Charles E. Bennett, Chairman, Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee,126 to Secretary
of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger stated
I would like to comment on Secretary of Energy [John S.] Herrington’s letter to the
committee of October 28, 1987 concerning the Statutory Determination signed by both of
you regarding transfer of information by the U.K. to Canada about nuclear propulsion.
In addition to considering the potential defense benefits that a force of Canadian [nuclear-
powered] submarines might offer to the West, I believe it is also important for the United
States to keep in mind some of the possible drawbacks such a program might involve. One,
of course, is the issue of the use of such vessels for enforcement of the disputed Canadian
claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Another is the danger of compromise of
our nuclear [propulsion] technology, one of our most prized achievements. And third is the
fact that a mishap involving a Canadian nuclear submarine could undermine the public
confidence necessary for the successful operation of our own nuclear [-powered] Navy,
[which accounts for] over 40 percent of our ships.
I have recently had an “op-ed” piece published on this matter in the Toronto Globe and
Mail, which I am enclosing.127 I hope you will find these views helpful as you continue
your deliberations on this important issue. I have sent a similar letter to Secretary
Herrington.
Letter from Representative Melvin Price
A November 5, 1987, letter from Representative Melvin Price128 to Secretary of Defense Caspar
W. Weinberger and Secretary of Energy John S. Herrington stated
I have recently learned that the Government of Canada is seeking access to U.S. naval
nuclear propulsion technology via the United Kingdom. Apparently Canada wants to
develop its first nuclear submarine. Since Congress and previous administrations have
considered similar proposals in the past from other countries, I believe it is important that
I convey to you the thoughts expressed in this letter.
As a charter member and former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I
was privileged to participate in the shaping of our national Naval [nuclear] Propulsion
Program. The safety and performance record of our nuclear [-powered] ships is the payoff
for engineering excellence. We gained our naval nuclear propulsion technology by

126 Charles E. Bennett was a Member of Congress from January 3, 1949 to January 3, 1993. (Source:
https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/B000371.)
127 Charles E. Bennett, “Tough Questions Rise to the Surface,” Globe and Mail, October 29, 1987.
128 Melvin Price was a Member of Congress from January 3, 1945 until his death on April 22, 1988. He was Chairman
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the 93rd Congress (1973-1974) and Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee in the 94th through 98th Congresses (1975-1984). (Source: https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/
bio/P000522.)
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spending taxpayer dollars wisely under highly disciplined managerial and technical
direction.
It is important to appreciate that there is nothing new about an ally wanting our naval
nuclear propulsion technology—or about the consistently strong U.S. policy against its
releases. Over the years, we have turned down requests from a number of countries,
including France, Italy, and the Netherlands. Heretofore, the United States’ position has
been clear and firm.
As you know, applicable law tightly controls any disclosure of naval nuclear propulsion
technology. Congress authorized the 1958 DREADNOUGHT129 agreement with Great
Britain only because of special circumstances. The British, having already embarked in
developing their own naval nuclear propulsion plant, encountered problems and requested
the assistance of the United States. The United States decided to help in nuclear propulsion
and provide nuclear weapons technology because we needed to have British nuclear
submarines and weapons on line in a strategic location at the earliest date. We also took
into account the special relationship we had with the British and our close cooperation on
nuclear matters during the war [i.e., World War II], including the Manhattan project.
Technical data alone did not prove to solve Britain’s problems, so the United States ended
up providing an entire U.S. nuclear propulsion plant. U.S. assistance, however, was limited
to the propulsion pant on the lead ship to help ensure that the United Kingdom would not
become dependent on the United States. We considered the requirement for self-
sufficiency to be essential for the establishment of the type of discipline necessary for the
safe application of naval nuclear propulsion. In addition to strict security precautions, the
agreement provides that this technology may not be transferred to third parties without
prior U.S. approval.
Over the years, earnest diplomats have urged that we share our sensitive nuclear submarine
technology for purposes of worthwhile objectives. Congress rejected those proposals,
recognizing the significant differences between exporting sensitive nuclear propulsion and
exporting airplanes or tanks. It is one thing to share very sensitive intelligence between two
allies; quite another to expose in a commercial environment the technology that has enabled
us to hold a military advantage over a much larger Soviet submarine fleet.
Your decision to authorize the United Kingdom to release certain naval nuclear propulsion
information to Canada is a softening of U.S. policy and invites further interest by Canada
and imilar propositions from other nations. The considerations that persuaded us to grant
an exception for the British simply do not exist today with respect to Canada or other allies.
In one of its last reports, (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—1970) the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy addressed this issue succinctly:
“The Joint Committee noted with concern the testimony regarding persistent efforts of
elements within the Executive Branch to disseminate sensitive and strategically vital
U.S. naval nuclear propulsion technology among foreign governments as diplomatic
‘currency’ in cooperative arrangements of marginal military value. The committee has
reviewed the arguments favoring such cooperation repeatedly in the past, and has
found them lacking in appreciation for both the technical complexities and strategic
value of this critical technology.”
“The committee strongly recommends that no further consideration be given to
cooperative arrangements in the field of naval nuclear propulsion for the indefinite
future.”
The Joint Committee’s recommendation is as sound today as it was then.

129 The UK’s first nuclear-powered submarine—the one built with a transferred U.S. Navy submarine propulsion
plant—was HMS Dreadnought.
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Incidentally, the bilateral agreement with Canada on Cooperation for Mutual Defense
Purposes, in paragraph E of Article II which you are proposing to implement, states that
the “extent” and “means” of the exchange of classified information are to be agreed upon
by the U.S. and Canada, presumably in advance. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this
matter, if and when such agreement is reached it should be submitted to the Armed Services
Committees of both Houses of Congress.
In any event, I want to state unequivocally my opposition to the transfer of any U.S. naval
nuclear propulsion technology to Canada, because I believe it would be contrary to the best
interests of our own submarine program and our national security.

Author Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

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