Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S.
November 8, 2022
Response
Carla E. Humud
In March 2022, the Syria conflict marked its 11th year. Analysts estimate that the conflict Analyst in Middle Eastern
has kil ed over half a mil ion people (including combatants) and displaced half of
Affairs
Syria’s prewar population. Chal enges for U.S. policymakers in Syria include countering
groups linked to Al Qaeda, responding to the threat posed by Islamic State (IS/ISIS)

remnants and detainees, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and managing Russian and
Iranian chal enges to U.S. operations.
Conflict Status. In early 2022, United Nations (U.N.) Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen described the
conflict in Syria—between the Syrian government and its partners on one side and various opposition and
extremist groups on the other side—as a “stalemate,” noting that “militarily, front lines remain unshifted” (see
Figure 1). Pedersen stated that “any of a number of flashpoints could ignite a broader conflagration.” In 2022,
incoming U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General Michael Kuril a stated that the Asad
government is “positioned to end the civil war militarily,” but noted that the underlying conditions driving the
conflict (including political disenfranchisement, poverty, water scarcity, and economic instability) would likely
persist.
Islamic State. Despite the territorial defeat in Syria of the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the
Arabic acronym Daesh) in 2019 by U.S.-backed Kurdish-led forces (known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, or
SDF), IS fighters continue to operate as an insurgency. The SDF holds roughly 10,000 IS detainees—whom
CENTCOM officials have described as “an ISIS army in waiting”—in detention facilities described as
“overcrowded, ad-hoc structures that were not built to house detainees.” In January 2022, U.S. air and ground
forces in Syria joined Kurdish partner forces in a lengthy battle to retake a prison seized by IS fighters, which
renewed concern among policymakers regarding the security of IS detainees in SDF custody.
External Actors. Five countries operate in or maintain military forces in Syria: Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and
the United States. U.S. and Russian forces operate in close proximity in northern Syria, and maintain a
deconfliction channel to avoid inadvertent conflict between the respective forces. Turkey also maintains forces in
northern Syria, at times targeting Kurdish elements of SDF forces that the Turkish government views as terrorists.
Israel reportedly conducts regular air strikes inside Syria on Iranian, Syrian, and Hezbollah targets that the Israeli
government views as threats to its security.
Humanitarian Situation. According to the United Nations 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview for Syria, 14.6
mil ion people are in need of humanitarian assistance, an increase of 1.2 mil ion from 2021. In 2014, the U.N.
Security Council authorized the provision of cross-border humanitarian assistance into Syria via four approved
crossing points; subsequent Russian vetoes have since reduced the U.N. authorization to a single crossing. In July
2022, the U.N. Security Council renewed its authorization for cross-border assistance into Syria for a period of 6
months, following a Russian veto of a 12-month extension. The new resolution is scheduled to expire on January
10, 2023.
U.S. Policy. Biden Administration officials have stated that the United States seeks a political settlement to the
conflict in Syria consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015). U.S. policy priorities in
Syria include (1) defeating the Islamic State and Al Qaeda; (2) increasing access to humanitarian aid; (3) reducing
violence by maintaining local cease-fires; and (4) promoting accountability for atrocity crimes committed during
the course of the conflict.
Congressional Research Service


Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

U.S. Military Presence. Roughly 900 U.S. troops operate in Syria in support of counter-IS operations by local
partner forces, as part of Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). U.S. forces in Syria continue to face threats from
Iran-backed militias, which have targeted U.S. positions in the country.
Policy Debates. Policymakers are faced with a number of—at times competing—policy priorities in Syria. The
Islamic State seeks to exploit deteriorating economic conditions in the country; however, projects to bolster
economic activity in Syria may have the unintended effect of aiding the Asad government. Similarly,
policymakers disagree on whether the benefits of efforts to al eviate economic conditions in neighboring Lebanon
outweigh the risk that these efforts could benefit Asad. Policymakers also face the additional complications of
regional states, including U.S. al ies, pursuing their own objectives in Syria, whether in the form of military
operations or efforts to normalize diplomatic ties with the Asad government.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 20 link to page 22 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 24 link to page 26 link to page 29 link to page 31 link to page 7 link to page 16 link to page 33 Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Contents
Evolution of Conflict and U.S. Policy ........................................................................... 1
Governance & Areas of Control ................................................................................... 3
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State .................................................................................... 5
Islamic State Detention Facilities ............................................................................ 5
External Actors ......................................................................................................... 7
Russia ................................................................................................................ 7
Iran .................................................................................................................... 8
Turkey ................................................................................................................ 9
Israel ................................................................................................................ 10
Humanitarian Situation............................................................................................. 11
Cross-Border Aid ............................................................................................... 11
Political Negotiations ............................................................................................... 12
Syrian Political Opposition .................................................................................. 13
U.S. Policy ............................................................................................................. 13
The FY2023 Request .......................................................................................... 14
U.S. Military Presence: Operation Inherent Resolve................................................. 14
Syria Train and Equip Program............................................................................. 15
Post-IS Stabilization ........................................................................................... 16
Humanitarian Assistance ..................................................................................... 16

U.S. Sanctions ................................................................................................... 16
Atrocity Crimes and Potential Avenues for Accountability ............................................. 18
Policy Debates and Issues for Congress....................................................................... 20
Protecting Local Partner Forces ............................................................................ 20
Islamic State Detainees ....................................................................................... 20
Economic Recovery............................................................................................ 22
Asad Government Finances ................................................................................. 25
Ongoing Chal enges ................................................................................................. 27

Figures
Figure 1. Areas of Influence.............................................................................................. 3
Figure 2. Current and Former U.N. Border Crossings......................................................... 12

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 29

Congressional Research Service


Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Evolution of Conflict and U.S. Policy
In March 2011, antigovernment protests broke out in Syria, which has been ruled by the Asad
family for more than four decades. Violence escalated, and, in August 2011, President Barack
Obama cal ed on Syrian President Bashar al Asad to step down. Over time, the rising death toll
from the conflict, and the use of chemical weapons by the Asad government, intensified pressure
for the United States to assist the opposition. In 2013, Congress debated lethal and nonlethal
assistance to vetted Syrian opposition groups, and authorized the latter. Congress also debated,
but did not authorize, the use of force in response to an August 2013 chemical weapons attack.
In 2014, the Obama Administration requested authority and funding from Congress to provide
lethal support to vetted Syrians for select purposes. The original request sought authority to
support vetted Syrians in “defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime,” but
the subsequent advance of the Islamic State organization from Syria across Iraq refocused
executive and legislative deliberations onto counterterrorism. Congress authorized a Department
of Defense-led train and equip program for select Syrian forces to combat terrorist groups active
in Syria, defend the United States and its partners from Syria-based terrorist threats, and “promote
the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”1
In September 2014, the United States began air strikes in Syria, with the stated goal of preventing
the Islamic State from using Syria as a base for its operations in neighboring Iraq. In October
2014, the Defense Department established Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent
Resolve (CJTF-OIR) to “formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by
ISIS in Iraq and Syria.”2 CJTF-OIR is “the military component” of the Global Coalition to Defeat
ISIS.3 In 2015, the United States deployed military forces to Syria to counter the Islamic State
and train local partner forces.
Coalition and U.S. gains against the Islamic State came largely through the assistance of Syrian
Kurdish partner forces, but neighboring Turkey’s concerns about those Kurdish forces emerged as
a persistent chal enge for U.S. policymakers. In 2019, Turkey launched a cross-border military
operation attempting to expel Syrian Kurdish U.S. partner forces from areas adjacent to the
Turkish border. President Trump ordered the withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Syria and the
repositioning of others in areas of eastern Syria once held by the Islamic State.
While U.S.-led coalition forces focused on defeating the Islamic State in northern and eastern
Syria, support from Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah forces enabled the Syrian government to
retake many areas of the country formerly held by the opposition. In 2018, the U.S. intel igence
community assessed that the conflict had “decisively shifted in the Syrian regime’s favor.”4
Remaining armed opposition forces (including groups linked to Al Qaeda) were pushed into a
shrinking geographic space around Idlib, a province in northwestern Syria in which roughly 3
mil ion Syrian civilians live.

1 For additional background, see CRS Report R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-2020: Selected Case
Studies
, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
2 Operation Inherent Resolve Combined Joint T ask Force (CJT F-OIR), “Who We Are: History,”
https://www.inherentresolve.mil/WHO-WE-ARE/History/.
3 CJT F-OIR, Fact Sheet,
https://www.inherentresolve.mil/Portals/14/Documents/Mission/20210915%20Updated%20Mission%20Statement%20
Fact%20Sheet.pdf.pdf?ver=5OLdNQ7T rF7R4YjokCHosQ%3D%3D.
4 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community:
2018.
Congressional Research Service

1

link to page 7 Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

The United Nations (U.N.) has sponsored peace talks in Geneva since 2012. However, with many
armed opposition groups weakened, defeated, or geographical y isolated, military pressure on the
Syrian government to make concessions to the opposition has been reduced. In 2022, U.N.
Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen described the conflict as a “stalemate,” noting that
“militarily, front lines remain unshifted” (see Figure 1).5

5 U.N. Security Council, “Amid Stalemate, Acute Suffering in Syria, Special Envoy T ells Security Council Political
Solution ‘Only Way Out,’” Meetings Coverage, SC/14807, February 25, 2022, available at https://www.un.org/press/
en/2022/sc14807.doc.htm.
Congressional Research Service

2


Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Figure 1. Areas of Influence

Source: Created by CRS using area of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor, last revised October 3, 2022.
Al areas of influence approximate and subject to change. Base information from “The Operating Environment in
Syria,” in Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve | Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress | April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022, p. 55, and press reports.
Governance & Areas of Control
While the Asad government has recaptured most areas of Syria formerly held by opposition
forces, a number of other groups have asserted varying levels of control outside of government-
Congressional Research Service

3

link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 7 Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

held areas. Groups that exercise territorial control over parts of Syria, as of October 2022, are
described below.
The Asad Government
The Asad government—backed by Russia, Iran, and aligned militia forces—controls about two-
thirds of Syria’s territory (shown in green in Figure 1), including most major cities. Pockets of
armed resistance to Asad rule remain, particularly in the south. Over 60% of the 14.6 mil ion
people in Syria who need humanitarian assistance live in government-controlled areas.6
Kurdish-Arab Military and Civilian Authorities
Following the defeat of the Islamic State by the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
Kurdish authorities affiliated with the SDF and their Arab partners in northeast Syria established
the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), also known as the Self
Administration of Northeast Syria (SANES)—shown in yel ow in Figure 1. The SDF and its
political wing (the Syrian Democratic Council, SDC) play a leading role in the AANES, whose
leaders have stated that it is not aligned with either the Asad government or with opposition
forces.
Opposition and Extremist Forces
Opposition-held areas of northwest Syria (shown in light blue in Figure 1) are administered by
the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). The SSG was established in 2017 and is affiliated with
Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), which the United States has designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) due to its links to Al Qaeda. Roughly 3 mil ion Syrian civilians also reside in
Idlib, many displaced from areas of Syria now under Asad control. An estimated 75% of Idlib
residents depend on U.N. assistance to meet their basic needs.7
Turkish Forces and Aligned Militias
Turkish-held areas of northern Syria (shown in dark blue in Figure 1) include territories occupied
in three military operations by Turkish forces in cooperation with Syrian Arab proxy forces
known as the Syrian National Army (SNA). In these areas, Turkey has established local councils
subordinate to the Turkish provinces they border, with Turkish provincial governments
overseeing the provision of some basic services. Many of the original inhabitants of Turkish-held
areas remain in camps for internal y displaced persons (IDPs) in AANES-held areas. The Syrian
Interim Government (SIG), established by opposition groups in 2013, is headquartered in
Turkish-held northern Syria (Azaz, Aleppo province). The SNA is formal y part of the SIG, but
the SIG lacks authority over SNA forces, which are composed of rival factions and beset by
infighting.8

6 Natasha Hall, Rescuing Aid in Syria, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 2022, p. 32.
7 Ibid, p. 18.
8 T he Carter Center, The State of the Syrian National Army, March 15, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

4

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State
Al Qaeda
Since 2014, the United States has conducted air strikes in northwest Syria—outside the
framework of Operation Inherent Resolve—targeting Al Qaeda linked groups. In 2022, U.S.
military officials reiterated that, “Al Qaeda-aligned militants use Syria as a safe haven to
coordinate with their external affiliates and plan operations outside of Syria.”9 Al Qaeda-linked
groups in Syria include Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) and Hurras al Din. The rival groups, both
designed by the United States as FTOs, operate in Idlib. In June 2022, CENTCOM announced
that it had conducted a strike on a senior leader of Hurras al Din in Idlib province.10
Islamic State
In March 2019, the SDF—with coalition air support—captured the Islamic State’s final
remaining territorial outpost in Syria. In October 2019, IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi died in a
U.S. raid on his compound in Idlib.11 He was succeeded by Abu Ibrahim al Hashimi al Qurayshi,
who died after detonating an explosive device during a U.S. raid on his compound (also in Idlib),
in February 2022.12 In March 2022, the group named a new leader. Some reports identified him as
Juma Awad al Badri, an Iraqi national and brother of former IS leader Baghdadi.13
While the Islamic State no longer controls territory outright in Syria and Iraq, U.S. military
officials warn that it maintains a low-level insurgency and has worked to expand its global
presence via a burgeoning number of affiliate groups. The 2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the
U.S. intel igence community (IC) stated that “ISIS leaders remain committed to their vision of
building a self-styled global caliphate headquartered in Iraq and Syria and are working to rebuild
capabilities and wear down opponents until conditions are ripe for seizing and holding
territory.”14
Islamic State Detention Facilities
Since the 2019 defeat of the Islamic State, the SDF has held about 10,000 IS detainees (roughly
5,000 Syrians, 3,000 Iraqis, and 2,000 foreign fighters) at detention facilities across northern
Syria;15 U.S. officials have described these facilities as “overcrowded, ad-hoc structures that were
not built to hold detainees.”16 U.S. officials have emphasized that repatriation of detainees is the

9 U.S. Central Command, “Strike conducted in Syria,” press release, June 27, 2022.
10 Ibid.
11 U.S. Department of Defense, “ Central Command Chief Gives Details on Baghdadi Raid,” press release October 30,
2019.
12 U.S. Department of Defense, “ Leader of ISIS Dead Following U.S. Raid in Syria,” press release, February 3, 2022.
13 Reuters, “New Islamic State leader is brother of slain caliph Baghdadi—sources,” March 11, 2022.
14 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 2022, available at https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/AT A-2022-Unclassified-
Report.pdf.
15 Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve (LIG-OIR), Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,
July 1, 2022-September 30, 2022, p. 58.
16 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022, p. 68.
Congressional Research Service

5

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

only long-term solution.17 In February 2022, incoming CENTCOM commander General Kuril a
described the 10,000 IS detainees in SDF detention as “an ISIS army in waiting.”18
2022 IS Prison Attack. In January 2022, IS forces launched an attack on the SDF-run
Ghuwayran Detention Facility in Hasakah province, sparking a 10-day battle. U.S. military
officials reported that the SDF “were able to repel the attack and recapture many detainees, but
only with significant Coalition ground and air support.”19 It was the largest U.S. military
engagement with the group since 2019. The facility was guarded primarily by the SDF Provincial
Interior Security Forces (PrISF), which receive U.S. funding.20 Following the attack, the SDF
replaced the entire guard force at Ghuwayran. The U.S. Special Operations Task Force is working
to rebuild the guard force at the facility.21
Al Hol IDP Camp. Built to house a maximum of 10,000 persons, the Al Hol camp for IDPs
houses roughly 56,000 people as of October 2022—94% of whom are women and children—
most of whom fled the Islamic State’s final outpost in eastern Syria in 2019.22 Security conditions
at the camp, which is managed by the SDF, have reportedly continued to deteriorate.23
CENTCOM leaders have stated that the slow repatriation of individuals in SDF-run IDP camps
and detention facilities remains “the biggest impediment to ensuring the enduring defeat of
ISIS.”24 CENTCOM leaders have expressed concern about IS indoctrination efforts inside the
camp, and stated that, unless the IDPs at Al Hol are repatriated to their home countries, “we’re
going to face ISIS 2.0 down the road.”25
Al Hol is run by the AANES; the U.S. Department of State funds essential services at the camp
including maintenance of physical infrastructure and the provision of food, water, and other
assistance.26 In September 2022, the Department of State’s Counterterrorism Bureau announced
that it would oversee a new interagency Al-Hol Working Group to “improve coordination of U.S.
efforts to address the security and humanitarian situation in northeast Syria.”27

17 Department of Defense T ranscript, “CENT COM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie Holds a Press Briefing, March
18, 2022.”
18 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings to Consider the Nomination of Lieutenant General
Michael E. Kurilla, USA to be General and Com m ander, United States Central Com m and
, February 8, 2022.
19 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022, p. v (Message from the
Lead Inspector General).
20 Ibid, p.68.
21 Ibid, p.68.
22 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139
(2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), 2449 (2018), 2504 (2020),
2533 (2020) and 2585 (2021)
, S/2022/492, June 16, 2022.
23 Ibid.
24 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022, p. 22.
25 Department of Defense T ranscript, “CENT COM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie Holds a Press Briefing, March
18, 2022.”
26 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2022-September 30, 2022, p. 63.
27 Remarks by Ian Moss, State Department Deputy Coordinator for Countering Violent Extremism and T errorist
Detentions, Bureau of Counterterrorism, September 29, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

6

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

External Actors
Russia
Russian military involvement in Syria dates back to the 1950s. Soviet and Russian Federation
naval forces have accessed a facility at the Syrian port of Tartus since the early 1970s, using it as
a logistical hub to enable longer Mediterranean operations. While Russian personnel have since
been based in Syria to maintain Russia military equipment and train Syrians, their numbers have
fluctuated over time.
Since the onset of unrest in 2011, Russia has provided sustained political and military support to
the Syrian government. In 2015, Russia began a gradual buildup of personnel, combat aircraft,
and military equipment inside Syria, before beginning air strikes inside the country that enabled
pro-Asad forces to reverse most opposition gains by 2018.28 Russia also deployed private military
companies (PMCs) to Syria.29 Russia repeatedly used its veto at the Security Council to block
council resolutions on Syria; according to U.S. officials, Russia vetoed 17 Security Council
resolutions on Syria between 2011 and 2022.30
Russia also expanded its economic presence in Syria over the course of the conflict. In 2019,
Syria’s parliament approved a plan for the U.S.-sanctioned Russian company Stroytransgaz to
manage, expand, and operate Syria’s largest port at Tartus for 49 years.31 In 2020 and 2021,
Russia reportedly extended two loans totaling $1 bil ion to Syria with the condition that the funds
be used to make payments to specific Russian companies—including to those owned by oligarchs
sanctioned by the United States for facilitating Russian military operations in Ukraine.32
There has been occasional tension between U.S. and Russian personnel operating in Syria.33 U.S.
officials have stated that Syria remains “the one area in the world where U.S. and Russian forces
operate in close proximity on a daily basis.”34 The two countries have maintained a deconfliction
channel to reduce the chance of conflict between their forces; in March 2022, then-CENTCOM
commander General Kenneth F. “Frank” McKenzie stated, “over the three years of my command
at CENTCOM we have general y had a brisk, professional de-confliction relationship with the
Russians in Syria. They—we can always contact them if we have a problem, they’l always pick
up the phone. And we feel that we respond in kind to them.”35 General McKenzie added that “we
have no evidence that the Russians are intent on escalating anything in Syria” as a result of
ongoing events in Ukraine.

28 “What has Russia gained from five years of fighting in Syria?” Al Jazeera, October 1, 2020.
29 Candace Rondeaux, “ Decoding the Wagner Group: Analyzing t he Role of Private Military Security Contractors in
Russian Proxy Warfare,” New Am erica, November 7, 2019.
30 Ambassador Richard Mills, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Remarks at a U.N. General Assembly
Meeting Following Russia’s Veto of a UN Security Council Resolution on the Syria Cross-Border Humanitarian
Mechanism
, July 21, 2022.
31 Agence France Presse, “ Syria parliament okays Russian lease of T artus port: state media,” June 12, 2019.
32 Michael Weiss, “ How Russia Evades Sanctions via Syrian Loan Schemes,” New Lines Magazine, April 5, 2022.
33 See, for example, T homas Gibbons-Neff, “ How a 4-Hour Battle Between Russian Mercenaries and U.S. Commandos
Unfolded in Syria,” New York Tim es, May 24, 2018.
34 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Path Forward On U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy And
Accountability
, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 8, 2022.
35 Department of Defense T ranscript, “CENT COM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie Holds a Press Briefing, March
18, 2022.”
Congressional Research Service

7

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

In early 2022, media reports suggested that some Russian personnel in Syria had repositioned and
consolidated to enable possible redeployment to Russia.36 In June 2022, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Dana Stroul testified that, “we have not seen a notable change in Russian
activities in Syria, nor in its commitment to backing Asad.”37 In August, Russia transferred an S-
300 anti-aircraft battery from Syria to southern Russia, reportedly to bolster its air defenses
against Ukraine; Russia continued to reinforce its existing military positions in northern Syria.38
Iran
Since 2011, Iran has provided technical, training, and financial assistance both to the Syrian
government and to proregime Shia militias operating in Syria. The Asad government is a key
Iranian al y, permitting the use of its territory as a transshipment point for the flow of weapons
from Iran to Lebanese Hezbollah. In 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the
Iranian Ministry of Intel igence and Security (MOIS) for providing substantial technical
assistance to Syrian intel igence, noting that MOIS also participated in multiple joint projects
with Hezbollah.39 Treasury also designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force
(IRGC-QF) for training Syrian forces.
Iran-backed miltias. Hezbollah has provided training, advice, and logistical support to the
Syrian government since at least 2012.40 Iran-backed Iraqi Shi’a militias—such as Kata’ib
Hezbollah (KH) and Kata’ib Sayyid Shuhada (KSS)—also have fought in Syria on behalf of the
Asad government, and have at times threatened U.S. forces in both Syria and Iraq.
U.S. Air Strikes
The Biden Administration has conducted air strikes on Iranian or Iran-backed forces in Syria on
at least three occasions:
 February 2021: On February 25, U.S. air strikes “destroyed multiple facilities
located at a border control point used by a number of Iranian-backed militant
groups, including Kait’ib Hezbollah (KH) and Kait’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada
(KSS).”41 The strikes were authorized “in response to recent attacks against
American and Coalition personnel in Iraq, and to ongoing threats to those
personnel,” according to the same statement.
 June 2021: On June 27, U.S. military forces “conducted defensive precision
airstrikes against facilities used by Iran-backed militia groups in the Iraq-Syria
border region. The targets were selected because these facilities are utilized by
Iran-backed militias that are engaged in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks
against U.S. personnel and facilities in Iraq.... Several Iran-backed militia groups,

36 Walid Al Nofal, “Amid war in Ukraine, Russia withdraws and Iran expands in Syria,” Syria Direct, May 4, 2022;
Tim es of Israel, “ Russia said to pull troops from Syria to bolster forces in Ukraine,” May 8, 2022; T iina Hyyppä an d
Aaron Pilkington, “How the Ukraine crisis could make the Syrian civil war worse,” Monkey Cage (blog), Washington
Post
, May 24, 2022.
37 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Path Forward On U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy And
Accountability
, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 8, 2022.
38 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2022-September 30, 2022, p. 54.
39 Department of the Treasury, press release, February 16, 2012.
40 U.S. Department of T reasury, E.O. 13582, August 10, 2012.
41 U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Conducts Defensive Precision Strike,” press release, February 25, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

8

link to page 7 Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

including Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH) and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), used
these facilities.”42
 August 2022: On August 23, the U.S. military carried out strikes in eastern Syria
on “infrastructure facilities used by groups linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps” in retaliation for attacks on U.S. bases in Syria on August 15.43 On
August 24, rockets struck U.S. facilities in Deir ez Zor, prompting an additional
round of U.S. retaliatory strikes.44
Turkey
The United States and Turkey have some competing priorities in Syria, with the former largely
focused on countering the Islamic State and preventing its resurgence, and the latter focused on
the perceived threat posed by Kurdish forces along the Turkish border. Turkey conducted three
major military operations in Syria between 2016 and 2019, aiming to prevent the Syrian Kurdish
People’s Protection Units (YPG) from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern
border with Turkey. Turkey views the YPG as an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
which both Turkey and the United States classify as a terrorist group.45 The YPG is the primary
component of the SDF, which CENTCOM has described as “the only reliable and effective
partner in Syria.”46
As of mid-2022, Turkey controls two major swaths of territory inside northern Syria, spanning
parts of Aleppo, Raqqah, and Hasakah provinces (see Figure 1). Turkish forces operate alongside
various Syrian militias known as the Syrian National Army (SNA). In May 2022, Turkey’s
president announced plans to build homes in Turkish-held areas of Syria for up to 1 mil ion
Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey.47
Potential Turkish Military Expansion. In May 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
stated that Turkey was considering a military operation to expand areas of Turkish control in
Syria as a means of countering YPG influence.48 In response, the U.S. State Department
spokesperson recognized Turkey’s “legitimate security concerns” but condemned any escalation
and said that the United States supports maintenance of the current cease-fire lines to avoid
destabilization and putting U.S. forces at risk in the campaign against the Islamic State.49 U.S.

42 Department of Defense, “Statement by the Department of Defense,” press release, June 27, 2021.
43 Sirwan Kajjo, “ Experts: Military Facilities T argeted by US in Syria Were Vital for Iran,” Voice of America, August
24, 2022; White House, “ Letter to the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate consistent with the
War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148),” press release, August 25, 2022.
44 Jared Malsin, “ U.S. Helicopter Gunships Hit Iran-Backed Militia in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2022.
45 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include U.S. State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria
; International Crisis Group, “ T urkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in
Flux,” February 18, 2022; and Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, April 2016.
46 Posture Statement of General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., Commander, United States Central Command before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, March 15, 2022.
47 Ben Hubbard and Elif Ince, “ T urkey’s Plan to Draw Refugees Back to Syria: Homes for 1 Million,” New York Times,
May 4, 2022.
48 Reuters, “Syrian rebels says ready to back T urkish-operation in northeast,” May 29, 2022.
49 State Department Press Briefing, May 24, 2022. T he United States and Russia established separate arrangements
with T urkey in October 2019 for managing certain areas of northeast Syria. White House, “T he United States and
T urkey Agree to Ceasefire in Northeast Syria,” press release, October 17, 2019; State Department, “Special
Representative for Syria Engagement James F. Jeffrey Remarks to the T raveling Press,” October 17, 2019; President of
Russia, “Memorandum of Understanding Between T urkey and the Russian Federation,” October 22, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

9

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

military officials also expressed concern over the impact of such an operation on the counter-IS
campaign, “because it could draw off potential SDF personnel to move away from the counter
ISIS fight.”50 In June 2022, Turkey announced plans for military operations that involve areas
west of the Euphrates River away from U.S. forces, which are concentrated on the river’s east
side.51 In August, Turkey began negotiations with the Asad government, reportedly at Russia’s
request; the Defense Intel igence Agency assessed that these talks likely delayed a Turkish ground
operation.52
Israel
Israel has largely stayed out of the civil conflict between Syrian government and opposition
forces, but regularly conducts air strikes in Syria against Iranian and Hezbollah targets it views as
a threat to its security. In the early years of the Syria conflict, Israel primarily employed air strikes
to prevent Iranian weapons shipments destined for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Later, as the Asad
government reacquired control of large portions of Syria’s territory, Israeli leaders expressed
intentions to prevent Iran from constructing and operating bases or advanced weapons
manufacturing facilities in Syria. In 2019, Israeli Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot, then chief of
the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces, stated, “In January 2017 we began attacking the
infrastructure the Iranians were building in Syria. The critical mass was from mid-2017. We
began attacking systematical y a number of times each week. Without making any statements.
Beneath the radar.”53 Eisenkot added that Israel carried out “thousands” of attacks in Syria,
stating that in 2018 alone Israel dropped 2,000 bombs on Iranian targets. In 2021, the deployment
of some Iranian air defense systems in Syria prompted Israel to start sending larger aircraft
formations to reduce the chances of having an aircraft downed.54
On occasion, Israeli strikes against Iranian targets in Syria appear to have resulted in retaliatory
Iranian strikes against U.S. personnel in Syria. In October 2021, unnamed U.S. officials stated
that an armed drone strike on the U.S. garrison at At Tanf in southeast Syria was Iranian
retaliation for Israeli air strikes in Syria.55 The strike on At Tanf, which U.S. officials described as
a “deliberate and coordinated attack,” was reportedly conducted by Iranian proxy forces.56 In
March 2022, then-CENTCOM commander General McKenzie stated, “I do worry about these
exchanges between Iran and Israel because many times, our forces are at risk, whether we’re in
Iraq or in Syria.”57 In June 2022, Syrian officials stated that Damascus International Airport had
suspended operations as a result of Israeli strikes that heavily damaged the facility’s
infrastructure.58

50 Department of Defense T ranscript, “Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing,” May 26, 2022.
51 Nazlan Ertan, “ Erdogan announces military operations in Syria’s Manbij, T al Rifaat,” Al Monitor, June 1, 2022.
52 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2022-September 30, 2022, p. 53.
53 Anshel Pfeffer, “Smash the bases, spare the men—Israel’s invisible war in Syria” Sunday Times, January 13, 2019.
54 Anna Ahronheim, “ Iran has used advanced air defense bat teries against Israel in Syria,” Jerusalem Post, March 7,
2022.
55 Eric Schmitt and Ronen Bergman, “ Strike on U.S. Base Was Iranian Response to Israeli Attack, Officials Say ,” New
York Tim es
, November 18, 2021.
56 White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, October 22, 2021.
57 Department of Defense T ranscript, “CENT COM Commander Gen. Frank McKenzie Holds a Press Briefing, March
18, 2022.”
58 Sarah Dadouch, “ Syria says Damascus airport operations suspended after Israeli strikes,” Washington Post, June 14,
2022.
Congressional Research Service

10

link to page 16 Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Humanitarian Situation
The humanitarian crisis in Syria is one of the most serious and widely dispersed in the world,
with an estimated 6.9 mil ion internal y displaced persons and roughly 5.6 mil ion registered
refugees in neighboring countries.59 The U.N. humanitarian assessment in Syria for 2022 found
that more people are in need than at any time since the start of the conflict, with as many as 14.6
mil ion people dependent on humanitarian assistance.60 More than 90% of Syrians live below the
poverty line, and approximately 12.4 mil ion people—nearly 60% of Syria’s population—are
now considered food insecure.61 The World Food Programme in August 2022 stated that the
number of Syrians facing food insecurity was “51 percent more than in 2019.”62
Cross-Border Aid
Cross-line convoys (between government-held and opposition-held areas) have provided
humanitarian assistance and protection services to mil ions of people across Syria’s 14 provinces.
In 2014, U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2165 authorized the provision of cross-
border humanitarian assistance into Syria via four approved crossing points (see Figure 2).
Cross-border aid deliveries conducted under this authority, which must be renewed annual y by
the Security Council, require notification to (but not consent from) the government of Syrian
President Bashar al Asad. In 2019, Russia used its veto at the Security Council to reduce the U.N.
authorization to two crossings and then, in 2020, to a single crossing at Bab al Hawa.63

59 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian
Arab Republic,” February 2022; Data on registered Syrian refugees available at https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/
syria.
60 UNOCHA, “ 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic,” February 2022.
61 U.N. Security Council Report , “December 2021 Monthly Forecast,” November 30, 2021; U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees, “Message from the United Nations humanitarian, refugee, and development chiefs on the situation in
Syria and the region,” May 10, 2022.
62 World Food Programme, “Syrian Arab Republic,” at https://www.wfp.org/countries/syrian-arab-republic.
63 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “T he Implications of the UN Cross-Border Vote in Syria,” June 4,
2021.
Congressional Research Service

11


Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

2022 Renewal. On July 12, 2022, the
Security Council renewed its authorization for
Figure 2. Current and Former U.N.
cross-border assistance (UNSCR 2642) for a
Border Crossings
period of six months, following a Russian
veto of a 12-month extension. The new
resolution is to expire on January 10, 2023. A
U.S. official stated that the shortened mandate
and uncertain renewal have undermined
procurement efforts for humanitarian
assistance, as these orders must be placed
months in advance.64
Political Negotiations
Since 2012, the Syrian government and some
elements of the opposition have participated
in U.N.-brokered peace negotiations known

as the Geneva process. As part of the Geneva
Source: Created by CRS.
process, UNSCR 2254 (2015) endorsed a
Notes: Of the four crossing points authorized by
road map for a political settlement in Syria,
the Security Council in 2014, one (Bab al Hawa) is
including the drafting of a new constitution
currently authorized as of 2022.
and the administration of U.N.-supervised
elections.65 Negotiations exclude some of the most powerful armed local actors in Syria: the
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control large areas of northeast Syria, and Islamist armed
groups linked to Al Qaeda, which control parts of Syria’s northwest. Geneva talks instead focus
on negotiations between the Asad government and Turkey-based political opposition figures,
which do not control territory inside Syria and exert little, if any, influence over Syrian armed
groups, including armed groups Turkey uses as proxies inside areas it controls in northern Syria.
Constitutional Committee. Since 2019, the U.N. has facilitated the meetings of the Syrian
Constitutional Committee (SCC), which was formed to draft a new Syrian constitution as cal ed
for by UNSCR 2254.66 In 2021, Syria held presidential elections under the framework of the
country’s existing constitution; U.N. observers were not present. A U.S. official described the
election, in which President Asad won a fourth seven-year term with a reported 95% of the vote,
as “an insult to democracy.”67
Some have criticized what they describe as a disproportionate focus on the SCC at the expense of
broader political negotiations to resolve the conflict. According to one analyst, “The
constitutional committee has been consuming political capital and bandwidth that are
disproportionate to its value add. The committee was not meant to be in itself ‘the political
process’, it was intended to be a gate opener to more political tracks. Instead, it has been the sole
avenue for intra-Syrian talks.”68

64 Ambassador Robert Wood, United States Mission to the United Nations, “ Remarks at a UN Security Council
Briefing on Syria,” October 25, 2022.
65 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015), S/Res/2254 (2015), December 18, 2015.
66 “Syria’s Constitutional Committee: T he Devil in the Detail,” Middle East Institute, January 6, 2021.
67 Ambassador Richard Mills, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations, “Remarks at a UN Security Council
Briefing on Syria,” May 26, 2021.
68 Barbara Bibbo, “ Syria constitutional talks fail again in Geneva,” Al Jazeera, March 25, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

12

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Syrian Political Opposition
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, aka Etilaf,
Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC)

The SOC was established in 2012 in Doha, Qatar, as an umbrel a group encompassing an
ideological y diverse range of political groups opposed to the Asad government. In late 2012, the
Obama Administration recognized the SOC as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian people
in opposition to the Asad regime,”69 without conferring upon the group the legal authority of a
state.70 Based in Turkey, the SOC does not control territory inside Syria. The group frequently has
served as an interlocutor with international actors, and plays a leading role in U.N.-brokered
peace talks with the Syrian government. However, it exerts little, if any, influence over armed
groups operating inside Syria.
Syrian Interim Government (SIG)
In 2013, the SOC established the SIG to serve as a political institution capable of assuming power
following what many at the time hoped would be the imminent fal of the Asad regime. Its
founders also sought—unsuccessfully—to establish the SIG as a civilian authority over Syrian
armed groups via the body’s self-appointed defense ministry. The SIG continued to operate even
as the Asad government regained territory and the likelihood of a political transition began to
appear more remote. The SIG maintained offices in Idlib, until it was forced out following the
establishment of the HTS-affiliated SSG in 2017. Over time, the SIG became increasingly
affiliated with the Turkish government; currently it operates out of Turkish-control ed areas of
Aleppo province. One analyst has noted that the SIG “is formal y the authority managing the
areas taken over by armed groups funded and armed by Turkey.. . In practice, however, it is the
Turks that control these regions through their various proxies, including armed groups and
civilian entities.”71
U.S. Policy
In a continuation of goals pursued by the Obama Administration in Syria, the Trump
Administration sought (1) the enduring defeat of the Islamic State; (2) a political settlement to the
Syrian civil war; and (3) the withdrawal of Iranian-commanded forces. In late 2021, the Biden
Administration completed a policy review on Syria. Based on the review, the State Department
identified five core policy priorities:
 sustaining the U.S. government and coalition campaign against ISIS;
 supporting local cease-fires in place across the country;
 supporting the expansion of humanitarian access throughout Syria;

69 Devin Dwyer and Dana Hughes, “ Obama Recognizes Syrian Opposition Group,” ABC News, December 11, 2012.
70 Mark Lander, Michael R. Gordon, and Anne Barnard, “ U.S. Will Grant Recognition to Syrian Rebels, Obama Says,”
New York Tim es, December 11, 2012.
71 “Use of T urkish Lira to Be Expanded in Northern Areas,” Syria Report, December 18, 2019.
Congressional Research Service

13

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

 pressing for accountability and respect for international law while promoting
human rights and nonproliferation, including through the imposition of targeted
sanctions; and
 supporting a political process led by the Syrian people, as envisioned in U.N.
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254.72
U.S. officials have stated that the defeat of ISIS “includes ensuring that the terrorist group cannot
reconstitute its forces, plan and execute attacks, and control population and territory.”73 U.S.
military officials in March 2022 assessed that “forces affiliated with the Syrian regime, Russia,
Iran and Turkey sought to disrupt SDF and coalition operations against ISIS and to erode the
SDF’s base of support.”74
The FY2023 Request
The Biden Administration’s FY2023 Department of State and Foreign Operations funding request
seeks $143 mil ion for assistance programs in Syria, including $125 mil ion in Economic Support
Fund (ESF), $10 mil ion in International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds,
and $8 mil ion in Non-proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR)
funds.75 One U.S. official stated that these funds wil go toward “targeted assistance in Syria to
restore normal life in areas liberated from ISIS, and create a bulwark against violent extremists
who seek to exploit vacuums in security and essential services.”76
U.S. Military Presence: Operation Inherent Resolve
U.S. forces have conducted operations involving and related to the use of military force inside
Syria since 2015 pursuant to the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), amid ongoing debate in Congress about the authorization for U.S. operations in Syria.77
U.S. operations focus on countering the Islamic State as part of Operation Inherent Resolve
(OIR). As of early 2022, roughly 900 U.S. troops are based in Syria to support counter-IS
operations by local partner forces; an additional 6,770 Defense Department contractors are spread
between Syria and Iraq.78 Most U.S. forces are deployed in what military officials term the
Eastern Syria Security Area (ESSA), in support of the SDF.79 About 100 U.S. personnel support
Jaysh Mughawir ath Thawra (MaT), an Arab force, at the At Tanf garrison.80 At Tanf is located

72 State Department as cited in LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2021-December
31, 2021, February 8, 2022, p. 12.
73 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022, p. 12.
74 LIG-OIR, OIR In Brief, January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022.
75 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Program s, Fiscal Year 2023
.
76 T estimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf in U.S. Congress, House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism , The Biden Adm inistration’s Policy
Objectives in the Middle East and North Africa
, hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 22, 2022.
77 In a June 8, 2022, hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
the Middle East Dana Stroul stated, “as a matter of domestic law, we rely on the 2001 AUMF to authorize the use of
force in Syria against al-Qaida and ISIS.” Previous presidential administrations also have cited the 2002 AUMF for
U.S. operations in Syria.
78 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022, p. 12.
79 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2020-December 31, 2020, p.70.
80 Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “The Future of al T anf Garrison in Syria,” December 6, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

14

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

along a primary transit route between Iraq and Syria, including for IS fighters. Congress
appropriated $7 bil ion for OIR for FY2022, a decrease from $12.7 bil ion appropriated for
FY2021 but more than the Administration’s $5.4 bil ion request.81 The Department of Defense
requested $5.5 bil ion for OIR for FY2023, and projects further declines in OIR force al ocations,
related theater overhead costs, and force reset needs.82
In response to a series of policy questions submitted in advance of his February 2022
confirmation hearing, incoming CENTCOM commander General Kuril a stated that, “the
military’s mission in Syria is to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS.”83 Kuril a added that
our presence supports a whole-of-government approach to achieve other strategic
objectives in Syria, including countering Iran and Russia. Tehran’s military, paramilitary,
and proxy involvement in Syria should be of concern, as it directly threatens Israel and
Jordan, and risks dangerously escalating regional tensions. Lastly, our security presence
allows for provision of humanitarian assistance by international and non-governmental
organizations that would otherwise not be possible.84
Since 2015, CENTCOM has conducted periodic strikes in Syria outside the framework of OIR,
including on targets linked to Al Qaeda, the Syrian government, and Iran-backed militias. In
February and June 2021, the U.S. military conducted air strikes on Iran-backed militias in Syria,
which used Syria-based facilities to target U.S. forces in Iraq. Iran-backed militias also targeted
U.S. forces at At Tanf with armed drones.
Syria Train and Equip Program
Section 1209 of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291, as amended)
authorizes the Department of Defense to provide assistance to “appropriately vetted elements of
the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals.” The Syria
Train and Equip program began in late 2015; as of 2022, U.S. forces continue to advise, assist,
and enable partner forces in Syria to counter the Islamic State. Congress periodical y has
amended or placed conditions on the Syria Train and Equip authority, reflecting Member focus on
issues such as vetting requirements for groups receiving U.S. funding.85
Current Funding and the FY2023 Request. The DOD Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund
(CTEF) is the primary fiscal authority for the Syria Train and Equip program. The FY2022
Consolidated Appropriations Act (Division C of P.L. 117-103) makes $500 mil ion available for
CTEF, including $155 mil ion for Syria. It also directs the rescission of $250 mil ion in prior year
CTEF funds. The Biden Administration’s FY2023 defense request seeks $541 mil ion in CTEF
funds, including $183 mil ion for Syria. This reflects an increase from the prior two years ($500
mil ion and $460 mil ion enacted for CTEF in FY2022 and FY2021, respectively).86 The Defense

81 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022, p. 9, and DOD
Comptroller, Overview—FY2022 Defense Budget, May 2021, p. 7-3.
82 U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, Overview—FY2022 Defense Budget, April 2022, p. 3-5.
83 Senate Armed Services Committee, Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General Michael E. Kurilla, USA
Nom inee to be Com m ander, United States Central Com m and
, p. 9, available at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Kurilla%20APQ%20responses.pdf.
84 Ibid., p. 10.
85 For a history of the Syria T rain and Equip Program, see CRS Report R46796, Congress and the Middle East, 2011-
2020: Selected Case Studies
, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
86 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Justification for FY 2023 Overseas Operations: Counter-Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund (CTEF)
, April 2022, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials.
Congressional Research Service

15

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Department reports that it intends to enlarge the number of vetted Syrian groups and individuals
in FY2023 by 3,500 personnel, primarily to recruit and train new detention facility guard forces. 87
The Administration has not provided a public estimate of long-term partner force maintenance
and sustainment costs in Syria or described related plans.
Post-IS Stabilization
The United States has provided stabilization assistance in areas of Syria and Iraq liberated from
the Islamic State in an effort to prevent the group’s reemergence, including more than $1.3 bil ion
in stabilization assistance for Syria since 2011.88 The State Department reports that stabilization
assistance plays “a critical role in this stage of the OIR mission” because it mitigates the
economic and social cleavages that ISIS seeks to exploit, closes gaps in local authority capacity,
and supports civil society to advocate for citizen needs.89 Current State Department-funded
stabilization programs include those designed to support education, community security,
independent media, civil society, social cohesion, transitional justice, accountability, restoration
of essential services, and a political resolution to the Syrian conflict.90 U.S. Agency of
International Development (USAID)-funded stabilization assistance supports livelihoods,
economic governance, women’s empowerment, political participation, essential service
restoration, access to water and irrigation, and agriculture.91
Humanitarian Assistance
The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the Syria crisis, providing
over $15.7 bil ion since 2011.92 In FY2022, the United States provided $1.6 bil ion in
humanitarian funding for the Syria regional crisis response, including $808 mil ion announced at
the sixth annual Brussels Conference on Supporting Syria and the Region, held on May 10, 2022,
and $756 mil ion announced during a U.N. Security Council meeting on September 14, 2022.93
U.S. humanitarian funds have gone toward meeting humanitarian needs inside Syria, as wel as
toward support for communities in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt that host Syrian
refugees.
U.S. Sanctions
Syria is subject to a broad range of U.S. sanctions, many of which predate the current conflict.
The United States has maintained economic sanctions on Syria since 1979, when the State
Department designated the Syrian government as a state sponsor of international terrorism. The
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-175) required
additional restrictions on U.S. exports, investments, transactions, and diplomatic relations
because of Syrian interference in Lebanon and its support for U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) including Hezbollah and Hamas. The United States has imposed additional
sanctions under nonproliferation legislation since the early 1990s and under national emergency
authorities since the beginning of the current conflict in 2011. In 2013, the State Department

87 Ibid, p.16.
88 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Syria Country Profile, February 28, 2022.
89 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022, p.64.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 USAID, SyriaComplex Emergency, Fact Sheet #10 FY2022, September 15, 2022.
93 USAID, SyriaComplex Emergency, Fact Sheet #10 FY2022, September 15, 2022, and USAID, Syria—Complex
Em ergency
, Fact Sheet #7 FY2022, June 10, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

16

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

determined that the government of Syria had used chemical weapons in contravention of
international law, spurring another round of economic and diplomatic restrictions.
Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019
The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 was incorporated into the FY2020 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92, Title LXXIV). Section 7412 directs the
President to impose sanctions on any foreign person who the President determines is knowingly
providing significant financial, material, or technological support to the government of Syria or to
a foreign person operating in a military capacity inside Syria on behalf of the governments of
Syria, Russia, or Iran. It also makes eligible for sanctions foreign persons who the President
determines knowingly sel or provide
 goods, services, technology, or information that significantly facilitates the
maintenance or expansion of the government of Syria’s domestic production of
natural gas, petroleum, or petroleum products;
 aircraft or spare aircraft parts that are used for military purposes in Syria in areas
controlled by the Syrian government or associated forces; or
 significant construction or engineering services to the government of Syria.94
As of late 2022, 15 individuals and entities have been designated specifical y under the Caesar
Act (over 650 Syria-linked individuals and entities have been designated as Special y Designated
Nationals [SDNs]).95 Caesar designations to date have focused on individuals and entities
involved in large-scale real estate development projects constructed on land expropriated from
Syrians displaced by the conflict.96
U.S. Sanctions on Syria and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. sanctions legislation contains a variety of waivers that permit trade in essential goods (such as food and
medicine) and al ow for humanitarian assistance. Since the early years of the conflict, sanctions on the Syrian
financial sector have nonetheless resulted in what some analysts describe as “over-compliance,” whereby regional
and international financial institutions are “highly reluctant to service Syrian nationals, in order to pre-empt any
breach of the sanctions.”97 NGOs operating in Syria continue to face obstacles due to bank “derisking,” the
process whereby banks delay or deny even permissible transactions to avoid the risk of violating sanctions.
Complicating matters, both the United States and the European Union (E.U.) place restrictions on “dual-use”
items (items that have both a civilian and military use). This includes many items used in health, water, sanitation,
and hygiene (WASH) operations, such as pipes, water pumps, spare parts for electrical generators, and essential
construction and industrial equipment.
In November 2021, the U.S. Department of the Treasury amended the general license for NGOs operating in
Syria, authorizing them to engage in the fol owing additional transactions in support of certain not-for-profit
activities in Syria: “new investment in Syria; the purchase of refined petroleum products of Syrian origin for use in
Syria; and certain transactions with elements of the Government of Syria.”98 These transactions are authorized

94 FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92, T itle LXXIV, Section 7412).
95 See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Sanctions List search, at
https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/.
96 Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, “Syria Sanctions: a deeper look at the Caesar Act Designations,” September
10, 2020.
97 Rune Friberg Lyme, “Sanctioning Assad’s Syria,” Danish Institute for International Studies, 2012.
98 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “U.S. T reasury Expands Syria Nongovernmental Organizations General License,”
press release, November 24, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

17

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

only in support of not-for-profit activities already authorized under the general license, including humanitarian
projects.
Atrocity Crimes and Potential Avenues for Accountability99
International law recognizes the perpetration of certain grave harms, often committed in the
context of armed conflict, as “atrocity crimes,” including war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. States sometimes treat atrocity crimes as crimes of “universal jurisdiction,”
meaning that any state can prosecute individuals for such crimes, even if the crime was not
committed on that state’s territory or by one of its nationals.100
Multiple parties have made al egations of war crimes against multiple parties to the Syrian
conflict, including the Syrian government, Syrian opposition groups, and extremist groups,
including the Islamic State. Reported violations of international law by multiple parties have been
extensively documented by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic (IICI, established in August 2011 by U.N. Human Rights Council resolution S-
17/1), as wel as by regular reports of the U.N. Secretary-General to the U.N. Security Council on
the implementation of Security Council resolutions.101
In situations where atrocity crimes are committed in a state that potential y cannot or wil not hold
perpetrators accountable, there are international and national judicial avenues for possible
accountability. Three avenues are described below.
International Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established to
exercise jurisdiction over al atrocity crimes when such crimes are not investigated and
prosecuted by a competent national court system.102 Because Syria is not a party to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, the treaty establishing the ICC, the court cannot
automatical y exercise jurisdiction over atrocity crimes committed in Syria. The ICC can exercise
jurisdiction over al eged atrocity crimes that occur on the territory of or are perpetrated by
nationals of a state
 after the Rome Statute enters into force for a state party;103
 during a period of time in which a nonparty state accepts jurisdiction;104 or
 pursuant to a U.N. Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter referring the situation in a State to the ICC.105

99 Prepared by Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation.
100 See Jenny Gesley, FALQs: The Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Germany, Law Library of Congress, June 30,
2022, https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2022/06/falqs-the-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction-in-germany/.
101 See regular reporting of the U.N. Secretary-General pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions, to include
S/RES/2139 (2014), S/RES/2165 (2014), S/RES/2191 (2014), S/RES/2258 (2015), S/RES/2332 (2016), S/RES/2393
(2017), S/RES/2401 (2018), S/RES/2449 (2018), S/RES/2504 (2020), S/RES/2533 (2020) and S/RES/2585 (2021)
available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959071.
102 See International Criminal Court, “ About the Court,” at https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/the-court; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 17(1).
103 Rome Statute art. 12(1)-(2).
104 Rome Statute art. 12(3).
105 Rome Statute art. 13(b).
Congressional Research Service

18

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

The Security Council could extend ICC jurisdiction to the situation in Syria by adopting a
resolution of referral, but Russia and China have vetoed previous council action to do so.106 (The
Security Council could also establish ad hoc criminal tribunals like those for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but Russia and China could veto such proposals as wel .) Syria could
accept ad hoc ICC jurisdiction over the situation on its territory by declaration, but this is more
likely to occur in the event of the conclusion of the conflict and the presumed removal of the
Asad regime from power. In 2022, lawyers representing Syrian victims have asked the ICC
Prosecutor to exercise jurisdiction over al eged cases of forced deportation of persons from Syria
to Jordan, arguing that such crimes were partial y completed on the territory of Jordan, a state
party to the Rome Statute.107
Even if the ICC eventual y exercises jurisdiction over the situation in Syria, this is not a guarantee
of ICC prosecution of al eged atrocity crimes in Syria. It is the role of the ICC Prosecutor to
determine, subject to the limitations to ICC jurisdiction as decided in each case by the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber, whether to bring charges against and prosecute an individual; no state party can
force the prosecution of an individual before the ICC.108 In addition, a case is inadmissible before
the ICC if it concerns conduct that is the subject of “genuine” legal proceedings brought by a
state with jurisdiction, including a state, such as Syria, that is not party to the Rome Statute.109
Hybrid Tribunals. There have been proposals for the establishment of a mixed
international/national tribunal for Syria atrocity crimes. Such “hybrid” criminal tribunals have
been established by agreement between a state and an international organization (usual y the
United Nations) to jointly undertake a specified judicial process for accountability. National
legislation often supports or directly authorizes the operation of such tribunals. These tribunals
can be established by agreement with the U.N. Secretary-General and approval from the U.N.
General Assembly, thereby avoiding Security Council vetoes.110 Any such hybrid tribunal,
however, would be more likely after an end to the Syrian conflict and removal of the Asad
regime, as Syria would have to be party to its establishment.
Foreign National Courts. Austria, France, Germany, Spain, and other states have instituted
criminal proceedings against al eged perpetrators of atrocity crimes under the concept of
“universal jurisdiction,” meaning any state can prosecute perpetrators of such crimes.111 With
encouragement from U.N. officials, some states have specifical y enacted universal jurisdiction
provisions in their criminal codes as states’ wil ingness to extend the normal y territorial nature of

106 UN News, “ Russia, China block Security Council referral of Syria to International Criminal Court ,” May 22, 2014.
107 Patrick Wintour, “Human rights lawyers attempt to bring Syria war crimes cases to ICC,” The Guardian, February
16, 2022. T he ICC Pre-T rial Chamber has accepted this interpretation of the court’s territorial jurisdiction over the
situation in Bangladesh, a Rome Statute state party, where thousands of alleged victims of the Rohingya minority
crossed the border from Burma after being forcibly displaced by the Burmese military. International Criminal Court,
“ICC judges authorise opening of an investigation into the situation in Bangladesh/Myanmar,” press release, November
14, 2019.
108 See Rome Statute art. 15 & part 5.
109 Rome Statute art. 17.
110 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict
States: Maxim izing the legacy of hybrid courts
, 2008, pp. 3-4. T he Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(ECCC), for example, were established by agreement between Cambodia and the U.N. Secretary -General, and
approved by a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 57/228B, Khm er Rouge
Trials
, A/RES/57/228B (2003).
111 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Universal Jurisdiction, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/universal-
jurisdiction.
Congressional Research Service

19

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

criminal jurisdiction to atrocity crimes committed on foreign soil grows.112 In January 2022, for
example, a German court convicted Anwar Raslan, formerly a colonel in the Syrian armed forces,
for directing and overseeing systematic torture of prisoners in a Syrian detention center.113
Congress previously has sought additional details and reporting from the executive branch on
accountability efforts in Syria. The FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act required the
Secretary of State to submit a report on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in
Syria—including a description and assessment of programs that the United States has undertaken
to ensure accountability for these crimes.114 Members could consider whether updated reporting
on such programs could provide opportunities to address technical or financing gaps.
Policy Debates and Issues for Congress
Since the territorial defeat of the Islamic State in Syria in 2019, legislative action on Syria has
focused on limiting the resurgence of the Islamic State while avoiding measures that could
empower the Asad government. Some Members have expressed particular interest in supporting
SDF partner forces, securing IS detainees, and limiting Asad government finances. There is
ongoing debate on how best to accomplish these goals, and how to weigh these goals relative to
other—at times conflicting—foreign policy priorities, such as seeking to ensure that economic
recovery measures—including “early recovery” projects intended to stabilize the country and
avoid an IS resurgence—do not inadvertently benefit the Asad government.
Protecting Local Partner Forces
U.S. operations against the Islamic State in Syria have relied on a partnership with the Syrian
Democratic Forces, which have served as the primary local ground force in the counter-IS
campaign. Members have debated the eligibility of these local partners for admission into the
United States in the case of attack by Turkish and/or Syrian forces. Several bil s in the 116th
Congress would have extended the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program to foreign nationals
employed by the U.S. military in Syria, as wel as their immediate families. The Syrian SIV
programs proposed by these bil s general y were modeled on the existing temporary SIV
programs for Iraqis and Afghans who have worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government.
During the 117th Congress, Representatives Jason Crow and Michael Waltz reintroduced one such
bil , the Syrian Partner Protection Act (H.R. 2838), which would provide SIV status to a national
of Syria or a stateless person who has habitual y resided in Syria that “has partnered with, was
employed by, or worked for or directly with the United States Government in Syria as an
interpreter, translator, intel igence analyst, or in another sensitive and trusted capacity, on or after
January 1, 2014, for an aggregate period of not less than 1 year.”
Islamic State Detainees
Some Members have questioned the Administration regarding its strategy for mitigating the risk
posed by IS detainees.115 In early 2022, IS fighters in SDF-run detention facilities conducted a
large-scale prison attack, which the SDF was able to repel “only with significant Coalition ground

112 Reuters, “Step up trials of alleged Syrian war criminals, U.N. rights chief says,” March 11, 2021; Mia Swart,
“National courts lead the way in prosecuting Syrian war crimes,” Al Jazeera, March 15, 2021.
113 “Former Syrian Colonel Guilty in War Crimes T rial in Germany,” The New York Times, January 14, 2022.
114 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, P.L. 115-232, Subtitle C, Section 1232.
115 T ranscript, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Pending Nominations, May 10, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

20

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

and air support.”116 The report accompanying the Senate version of the FY2023 NDAA states that
“the committee is concerned about threats from Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) detainees
held in partner-run detention facilities. The February 2022 attack by ISIS militants on the
detention facility in Hasakah, Syria, highlights the grave national security concern to the United
States and its al ies and partners if this threat goes unaddressed.”117
IS detention facilities. Congress has appropriated CTEF funds for the Syria Train and Equip
program, including for the fortification of IS detention facilities in Syria. In Section 1221 of the
2022 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress amended the authority for the train and equip
program in Syria to al ow the President to waive restrictions on the use of funds for construction
and repair projects, if the President certifies that projects comply with international law relating to
refugees, torture, and treatment of prisoners. This waiver al ow ed for the use of funds during
2022 to improve and construct IS detention facilities. (Prior to enactment of this waiver, the cost
of construction and repair projects carried out under Section 1221 could not exceed, in any fiscal
year, $4 mil ion per project or $20 mil ion in the aggregate.) Nonetheless, the July 2022 report
accompanying S. 4543 (S.Rept. 117-130) states,
The committee notes, however, that the waiver authority provided in section 1221 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81) has not yet been
utilized, and the committee has not been informed of a comprehensive plan to address these
urgent concerns. The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report, not
later than December 15, 2022, on its plans to use the authorities provided in this section in
fiscal year 2022 to assist partners to improve security at these detention facilities, including
through the use of waivers provided for construction and repair on a per-project basis.
The Senate committee-reported version of the FY2023 NDAA (S. 4543) would extend the
national security waiver on the cost of construction and repair projects until December 2023.
Members could consider whether to seek regular updates on the security of IS detention
facilities—including on the expenditure of funds to refurbish or construct detention facilities—
through existing reporting channels, such as the congressional y mandated quarterly Lead
Inspector General reports on Operation Inherent Resolve.118 Members could also consider
whether to seek updates on the transfer of detainees into secure facilities. The Departments of
Defense and State reported that roughly half of al IS detainees had been consolidated into more
secure facilities as of mid-2022; Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve noted
that future CTEF-funded construction projects, particularly a proposed $27 mil ion Rumaylan
Detention Facility, “wil ultimately provide capacity for al detainees to be housed in purpose-
built facilities that meet international standards.”119
Some Members have introduced legislation cal ing on the Administration to establish a detainee
coordinator. In September 2022, Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Lindsey Graham introduced the
Syria Detainee and Displaced Persons Act (S. 4996). The bil would amend the FY2020 NDAA,
and direct the President to “designate an existing official to serve within the executive branch as
senior-level coordinator to coordinate, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, al matters
related to ISIS members who are in the custody of the Syrian Democratic Forces and other

116 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2022-March 31, 2022, p. v (Message from the
Lead Inspector General).
117 S.Rept. 117-30.
118 T he Defense Department reported that more than $3.6 million in CT EF funds were used in the first quarter of 2022
to refurbish detention facilities; t he LIG-OIR report for the second quarter of 2022 included information on CT EF
expenditure but not on prison refurbishment.
119 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022, p.58.
Congressional Research Service

21

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

relevant displaced populations in Syria.”120 The bil also would require a report laying out “an
interagency strategy with respect to ISIS-affiliated individuals and ISIS-related detainee and other
displaced persons camps in Syria.”121
Economic Recovery
In mid-2022, the State Department reported that while levels of violence in Syria were at their
lowest point in the 11-year conflict, “the economic and humanitarian situation was at its
worst.”122 In 2021, a U.S. official stated that the Islamic State is “actively seeking to exploit that
economic situation to reconstitute ... in areas hardest hit by the economic downturn.”123 In 2022,
the State Department reported that high commodity price fluctuations, combined with the
continued devaluation of the Syrian pound and “historical levels of drought,” have increased the
need for both stabilization and humanitarian funding over the past two years.124 More than 90%
of Syrians live below the poverty line.125
The Biden Administration has taken steps to al eviate economic distress, in part by issuing new
general licenses to permit broader categories of economic activities that otherwise would be
subject to U.S. sanctions. In May 2022, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License No. 22, authorizing activities in 12 different
economic sectors of northeast and northwest Syria.126 A media report quoted an unnamed
Administration official saying, “Our aim is to prevent the resurgence of IS by mitigating the
growing economic insecurity and restoring essential services in the areas liberated from the
terrorist group.”127
Some Members have questioned whether Biden Administration efforts to spur economic recovery
in Syria bypass existing U.S. sanctions and inadvertently benefit the Asad government. In a letter
to Secretary of State Antony Blinken, three Members wrote:
It is troubling that the administration has reportedly reached a decision to issue a broad
geographic waiver while having offered no explanation to Congress for why the existing
waiver and license structure is insufficient to achieve U.S. objectives in northern Syria.
The administration also has offered no explanation for how it would propose to prevent
Assad regime affiliates or front companies from exploiting a geographic waiver by
conducting business in northern Syria and generating revenues or foreign currency under
the waiver.128
In a June 2022 hearing, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf
testified that the license was issued “to enhance the opportunities for economic regeneration in
the areas liberated from ISIS,” in order to “create resiliency” in formerly IS-controlled areas and

120 S. 4996, Syria Detainee and Displaced Persons Act, Section 5(a)(1).
121 S. 4996, Syria Detainee and Displaced Persons Act, Section 6(a).
122 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022, p. 72.
123 Al Monitor, “Islamic State exploits economic downturn in Iraq, Syria, US envoy says,” July 1, 2021.
124 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2022-September 30, 2022, p. 68.
125 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, “ Message from the United Nations humanitarian, refugee, and development
chiefs on the situation in Syria and the region ,” May 10, 2022.
126 U.S. Department of the T reasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR
part 542; General License No. 22.
127 Amberin Zaman, “US eases sanctions on investment in Kurdish, T urkish areas of Syria,” Al Monitor, May 12, 2022.
128 Republican Study Committee National Security and Foreign Affairs T ask Force, Letter to Secretary of State Antony
Blinken, March 11, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

22

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

reduce the prospects of an IS resurgence.129 The license, which notes the specific districts in
which it is applicable—as wel as subdistricts that are excluded—does not authorize “any
transactions involving any person, including the Government of Syria, whose property or interests
in property are blocked pursuant to the [Syrian Sanctions Regulations] or the Caesar Syria
Civilian Protection Act of 2019.” Members may consider to what extent current U.S. assistance to
Kurdish authorities in northern Syria includes technical assistance for sanctions compliance—and
whether or not additional resources should be provided in an effort to reduce instances of local
authorities inadvertently transacting with sanctioned entities.
Early Recovery Projects
Through annual State and Foreign Operations appropriations legislation, Congress has specified
that bilateral economic assistance and international security assistance should not be used in areas
of Syria controlled by the Asad government.130 Humanitarian assistance, by contrast, is provided
throughout Syria, independent of political considerations and based solely on humanitarian need.
Some Members have expressed concern about a subset of humanitarian assistance known as
“early recovery.” These Members argue that early recovery projects blur the boundaries between
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction assistance. Successive Administrations have said the
United States wil not provide reconstruction assistance until the Asad government makes
significant progress toward a political settlement to the conflict.
In June 2022, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator James Risch
stated, “I'm deeply concerned with the administration’s funding of so-cal ed early recovery
projects in regime-held areas. These activities cross the line against Caesar-prohibited
reconstruction and opened the door to normalization with Assad.”131 Senator Risch added that, “it
is my concern that the Administration’s efforts have expanded beyond humanitarian access and
into the realm of reconstruction.”
In response, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf stated that the
United States wil not “support efforts to normalize or rehabilitate Bashar al-Assad in any way;
lift sanctions on the regime; or change our position opposing reconstruction in Syria until there is
authentic, enduring progress towards a political solution.”132 In response to a Member question on
how the Administration plans to ensure that early recovery projects do not benefit the Asad
government, Leaf stated:
Early recovery is really a subset of humanitarian assistance. It’s what we've done for years
in Syria as well as around the world. So it’s a subset of humanitarian assistance. It’s carried
out by the same independent humanitarian actors, and it is squarely focused at the sort of
micro level of society, the individuals, households, communities, strictly on need. So
targeting the most vulnerable regardless of where they live, 60 percent of those in need live
in regime-held areas around Syria, but it is not done at the direction of or by the
government. It is done strictly by humanitarian actors who are independent.133

129 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Path Forward On U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy And
Accountability
, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 8, 2022.
130 See, most recently, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Division K, Section 7041(j).
131 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Path Forward On U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy And
Accountability
, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 8, 2022.
132 Ibid.
133 T estimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf in U.S. Congress, House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism, The Biden Adm inistration’s Policy
Congressional Research Service

23

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

USAID and the Department of State fund early recovery projects in Syria, which they define as
“activities that aim to reduce immediate and protracted humanitarian needs by strengthening the
self-reliance of affected populations, and improving individual, household, and community
resilience, and therefore reducing dependence on external assistance.”134 The agencies base these
programs on their assessments of humanitarian need across Syria.
Early recovery has been a stated part of the annual U.N. Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for
Syria since 2013,135 and language endorsing early recovery projects in Syria was introduced by
Russia in U.N. Security Council Resolution 2585 (2021), which authorized cross-border
assistance into Syria for an additional year.136 According to the U.N. Secretary-General,
Early recovery and livelihood activities represent one of three core pillars of the
humanitarian response, in addition to providing life-saving and life-sustaining
humanitarian assistance, and enhancing the prevention and mitigation of protection risks
and responding to protection needs. In 2022, $1.1 billion, or 26 per cent, of the overal
request for humanitarian aid to the Syrian Arab Republic is aimed at promoting early
recovery and resilience.137
Early recovery and livelihood projects implemented by U.N. agencies in 2022 have included the
rehabilitation of some sewerage and electricity networks, as wel as the rehabilitation of facilities
such as health clinics, bakeries, and classrooms.138
Members may consider the risk, expressed by one analyst, that “the restoration of essential
services through early recovery wil consolidate the Bashar al-Assad regime’s grip on power,
thus, lowering its desire to come to the negotiating table to arrive at a lasting settlement to the
conflict.”139 On the other hand, some analysts and humanitarian workers express the view that
early recovery, which “entails helping Syrians support themselves—rehabilitating local water
infrastructure instead of delivering water by tanker truck, for example, or supporting agriculture
and farmers’ livelihoods instead of offering food handouts” is “the only way forward. We can’t
just keep giving to people forever. In no country in the world is this viable.”140
The report accompanying the House committee version of the FY2023 State and Foreign
Operations bil (H.Rept. 117-401) “encourages” the State Department and USAID to utilize
humanitarian and stabilization funds to “help implement early recovery and resilience activities
alongside increased support for lifesaving interventions in Syria.”

Objectives in the Middle East and North Africa , hearings, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 22, 2022.
134 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022, p.72.
135 T he Revised Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (2013) listed among its strategic objectives: “Expand
humanitarian response to encompass early recovery, and restoration/stabilization of livelihoods, supporting the
government in the rehabilitation of vital public services affected by the crisis and creating an environment for
humanitarian assistance to enhance the resilience of affected communities.”
136 Security Council Report, “In Hindsight: Getting Across the Line on Syria’s Cross-Border Mechanism,” July 30,
2021, at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly -forecast/2021-08/getting-across-the-line-reaching-an-
agreement -on-syrias-cross-border-mechanism.php.
137 Report of the Secretary-General to the U.N. Security Council, S/2022/635, August 22, 2022, p 10.
138 Ibid.
139 Atlantic Council, “ T he politics of early recovery aid in Syria. Is it actually reconstruction aid?” February 8, 2022.
140 Sam Heller, Syrians Are Going Hungry. Will the West Act?, T he Century Foundation, June 7, 2021. See also Sam
Heller, “Early Recovery” Aid Can Provide Vital Relief to Syrians—If Donors Follow Through, T he Cent ury
Foundation, December 16, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

24

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

Asad Government Finances
Members have sought to analyze and limit the sources of funding available to the Asad
government; the FY2022 NDAA required the State Department to publish a report on the Asad
family’s sources of income.141 Some Members criticized the final report, noting that they sought
something “more comprehensive.”142 While there is broad congressional interest in measures that
could reduce funds available to the Asad government, different views among Members have
emerged in cases where measures potential y conflict with other foreign policy goals.
Captagon Trade
Production and trade of the amphetamine Captagon have emerged as a key source of funding for
the Asad government. Syria’s Captagon industry has been linked to the Syrian state, with reports
noting a significant and unexplained increase in Syrian exports of precursor chemicals and
industrial-sized production centers concentrated in regime-held areas.143 Congress has sought to
limit the Asad government’s ability to profit from the Captagon trade. The Countering Assad’s
Proliferation Trafficking And Garnering of Narcotics Act (H.R. 6265, also known as the
CAPTAGON Act) was introduced by Representative French Hil in December 2021, passed by
the House in September 2022, and incorporated into the House-engrossed version of the FY2023
NDAA (Section 1229). It would require an interagency strategy to disrupt and dismantle drug
trafficking networks linked to the Asad government, as wel as information on the use of existing
statutory authorities, including the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, and the Foreign
Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act. It also would require an assessment of current U.S. assistance
and training programs to build counternarcotics capacity in countries receiving or transiting large
shipments of Captagon.
Regional Gas Deal
In 2021, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon finalized a deal to import natural gas from Egypt and
electricity from Jordan into Lebanon via Syria, generating criticism from some Members of
Congress. In a February 2022 letter to Secretary of State Blinken, the ranking members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee argued that the
deal would “undoubtedly enrich the Assad regime and trigger U.S. sanctions under the Caesar
Syria Civilian Protection Act.”144 In June 2022, Assistant Secretary Leaf stated that the
Administration had “made no commitments” regarding sanctions exemptions or waivers, and
would make a final determination after reviewing the finalized contracts.145 In September,
Lebanon’s energy minister stated that the World Bank was seeking a number of prerequisites
including an increase in tariffs and the establishment of an electricity regulatory authority

141 State Department, Report to Congress on The Estimated Net Worth and Known Sources of Income of Syrian
President Bashar Assad and His Fam ily Mem bers Section 6507 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81)
.
142 Elizabeth Hagedorn, “US report offers few clues on Assad family wealth,” Al Monitor, April 29, 2022. See also,
Adam Kredo, “ How the Biden Admin Is Protecting Syria’s Assad From Sanctions,” Washington Free Beacon, April
29, 2022.
143 For additional details, see New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, The Captagon Threat: A Profile of Illicit
Trade, Consum ption, and Regional Realities
, April 2022.
144 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “ Risch, McCaul Express Concern over Biden Administration’s
Engagement in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt Energy Deals,” press release, February 1, 2022.
145 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Path Forward On U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy And
Accountability
, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., June 8, 2022.
Congressional Research Service

25

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

(ERA).146 In November 2021, Lebanese authorities implemented a tariff increase; progress on an
ERA appears to have stal ed.
Legislative options for constraining a regional gas deal funded by the World Bank as a
humanitarian project may be limited. Members could consider legislation directing U.S.
representatives to international financial institutions to oppose and/or vote against any extension
of loan credit to the Lebanese government that would include transfers (monetary or in-kind) to
Syria—echoing prior legislation such as the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act
of 2001 (P.L. 107-99, also known as the ZDERA Act).
At the same time, Members may weigh the expected benefits to Syria from the deal—which
reportedly include an in-kind transfer of 8% of electricity imports and 7%-10% of the natural gas
imports147—against the expected benefits to Lebanon (up to six hours of additional electricity per
day).148 Lebanon’s state power company currently provides about two to three hours of electricity
a day,149 triggering widespread blackouts and prompting some U.S. adversaries to attempt to fil
the gap in basic service provision. In 2021, Hezbollah reportedly transported more than 1 mil ion
gal ons of diesel fuel into Lebanon.150 In September 2022, Iranian officials stated that Iran could
provide Lebanon with 600,000 tonnes of fuel to help ease power shortages.151
Misuse of Aid Funds
Some Members have expressed concern regarding reports that some humanitarian assistance to
Syria may be diverted to the Asad government, or otherwise misused.152 In a March 2022 hearing
on the humanitarian impact of the Syria conflict, Members sought information on the screening
mechanisms used to ensure that humanitarian programs do not benefit the Asad government.153
In October 2022, a study entitled UN Procurement Contracts in Syria: A “few” Bad Apples?
examined the extent to which private companies involved in human rights abuses benefit from the
U.N. procurement process in Syria. The study found that “nearly 47% of procurement funding in
Syria, during the period studied in the report, is estimated to have been awarded to risky or highly
risky suppliers.”154 Examples of indicators that define a supplier as “very high risk” include cases
in which the company or a person with significant control or ownership over the company

146 The Syrian Observer, “T he Caesar Act and World Bank T erms Disrupt Egypt -Lebanon Gas Deal,” September 21,
2022; see also Middle East Institute, “ Power sector reforms are new Lebanese governments’ ultimate test ,” September
27, 2021.
147 Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “T he White House Is Bending the Law on Syria Sanctions,” May 12, 2022.
148 Bryant Harris and Joyce Karam, “Arab states get cold feet over Egypt-to-Lebanon gas deal,” The National, February
22, 2022.
149 Wilson Center, “ U.S. Policy on Lebanon: A Conversation with Assistant Secretary of State f or NEA Ambassador
Barbara Leaf”, November 4, 2022.
150 Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, “With Fuel from Iran, Hezbollah Steps In Where Lebanon Has Failed,” New York
Tim es
, September 16, 2021.
151 Reuters, “Iran ready to offer Lebanon 600,000 tonnes of fuel, Al Manar T V reports,” September 20, 2022.
152 Natasha Hall, Rescuing Aid in Syria, CSIS, February 2022; Human Rights Watch, Rigging the System: Government
Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria
, June 28, 2019. Other studies have found that aid diversion is
a challenge across a range of conflicts. See, for example, CSIS, Denial, delay, diversion: Tackling access challenges in
an evolving hum anitarian landscape
, October 30, 2019.
153 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global
Counterterrorism, 11 Years of War: The Hum anitarian Im pact of the Ongoing Conflict in Syria, hearing, 117th Cong.,
2nd sess., March 16, 2022.
154 Syrian Legal Development Programme and Observatory of Political and Economic Networks, UN Procurement
Congressional Research Service

26

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

 is a front for an individual or an entity involved in conflict-related human rights
abuses;
 provided logistical or other types of support to the Syrian armed
forces/government since 2011;
 financed and/or controlled the military operations of paramilitary groups; or
 has investments/is involved in urban redevelopment projects in areas affected by
forced displacement and housing land and property rights violations.
The study also found that “the share of funds going to companies with owners sanctioned by the
US, EU, or the UK was at least 23% (68 mil ion USD).”155 Separately, in October 2020, the
Associated Press reported on an ongoing investigation regarding al egations of misspent funds
and other abuses by the head of the World Health Organization’s local office in Syria.156
Members could seek additional information on U.N. procurement efforts in Syria, or consider
whether to implement some of the recommendations for donor states highlighted in the October
2022 report. Some of these recommendations include requesting human rights due diligence
reports on local suppliers to improve oversight (as wel as providing additional funds to conduct
human rights risks assessments). Some Members previously have explored legislative options for
increasing oversight of U.S. funding for U.N. programs in Syria. In the 116th Congress,
Representatives Wilson, Kildee, Gonzalez, and Chabot introduced the Stop UN Support for Assad
Act of 2019 (H.R. 4868), which would have prohibited U.S. funding for U.N. programs in Syria
unless the Department of State certified that such funding (1) was delivered impartial y; (2) did
not directly provide material support to the Syrian government or associated forces; (3) adhered
to the United Nations Supplier Code of Conduct; and (4) was vetted by an independent
mechanism that reviews contract procurement in Syrian government-held areas.157
Ongoing Challenges
There are divergent views regarding how the United States should approach Syria policy going
forward. One view—reflecting the approach of the Biden Administration to date—maintains that
U.S. goals in Syria should remain limited. In mid-2022, the Departments of Defense and State
reported to Congress that U.S. policy in Syria is focused on “practical and achievable goals,” such
as defeating the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, maintaining local cease-fires, and promoting
accountability for Asad government crimes.158
This policy has faced criticism, including by one observer who contends that a limited approach
focused on counterterrorism may prove destabilizing over the long term. He argues that the U.S.
decision
to work “by, with, and through” the SDF makes sense from a counterterrorism
perspective.... The SDF is a problematic choice however, when it comes to other aspects
of the larger struggle to defeat IS. Under U.S. auspices, the SDF has become the de facto
governing authority, the “key powerbroker,” over Arab majority areas that largely reject
its legitimacy and view its governance as arbitrary, abusive, and discriminatory.... In

Contracts in Syria: A “few” Bad Apples? October 2022.
155 Ibid.
156 Associated Press, “WHO Syria boss accused of corruption, fraud, abuse, AP finds,” October 20, 2022.
157 Stop UN Support for Assad Act of 2019, H.R. 4868, Section 4.
158 LIG-OIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2022-June 30, 2022, p. 52.
Congressional Research Service

27

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

outsourcing local governance to the SDF, the U.S. is contributing to conditions in which
local grievances thrive.159
The Administration policy has also faced criticism from some Members who argue that
Administration efforts to date—focused on the delivery of humanitarian aid and the expansion of
stabilization support in areas liberated from the Islamic State—“merely address symptoms of the
underlying conflict and wil ultimately fal flat in the absence of a broader diplomatic strategy to
resolve the decade-long civil war.”160
Another analyst characterized the Administration’s approach as one of “ruthless pragmatism,”
based on the implicit acknowledgement that President Bashar Assad has won and there is
nothing anyone can do about it. Team Biden apparently believes that by coming to terms
with this reality, the United States will stand a better chance of getting more aid to the
people in Syria who need it, help the poor Lebanese, alter relations with Russia ... and peel
the Syrians from the Iranians.161
This approach could lead the Administration to focus increasingly on stabilization and early
recovery as a means of preventing the resurgence of the Islamic State while providing urgently
needed humanitarian support. Such efforts would align with arguments made by some
humanitarian actors and political observers. Following Russia’s veto of a 12-month extension to
the authorization for cross-border aid, some humanitarian actors argued that aid agencies may
need to shift from humanitarian interventions focused on immediate needs to early recovery
programs, such as support for agriculture and related critical infrastructure, stating that such
programs can gradual y decrease food insecurity and reliance on outside food aid.162 Similarly,
some political analysts have argued that the United States should devote more funds to early
recovery programs in Syria, and that “the emphasis must shift from emergency aid toward
stabilization and targeted reconstruction.”163
While international and U.S. plans are for humanitarian assistance to continue to be implemented
throughout Syria based on need, Congress may play a determining role in shaping whether, to
what extent, and under what terms bilateral economic assistance can or should be expanded to
regime-held areas, where the majority of Syria’s population is concentrated. Members may debate
the potential long-term risks and benefits of limiting bilateral assistance to areas of the country
controlled by U.S.-backed forces.
Some experts have differed with the Biden Administration’s policy, cal ing for the United States
to exert greater pressure on the Asad regime and its al ies. Advocates of this approach argue that
the United States should increase economic pressure on the Asad government (including by
potential y expanding secondary sanctions on countries dealing with sanctioned Syrian entities),
as wel as focus on efforts to force the withdrawal of Iran and Iran-backed militias from Syria. In
this vein, congressional action could include legislation designed to seek to “close sanctions

159 Steven Heydemann, “ Not by counterterrorism alone: Root causes and the defeat of the Islamic State group ,”
Brookings Institution, February 17, 2022.
160 House Foreign Affairs Committee, “ Meeks, McCaul, Menendez, Risch Raise Concerns Over U.S. Policy in Syria,”
press release, January 11, 2022.
161 Steven Cook, “ Biden’s Middle East Strategy Is Ruthless Pragmatism,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2022.
162 See, for example, Sahar Atrache and Sabiha Khan, Transforming Syria’s Lifeline: A Plan for Sustaining Cross-
Border Aid in Northwest Syria
, Refugees International, July 2022.
163 Charles Lister, “Freeze and Build: A Strategic Approach to Syria Policy,” Middle East Institute, March 2022. See
also Sam Heller, “Early Recovery” Aid Can Provide Vital Relief to Syrians—If Donors Follow Through, T he Century
Foundation, December 16, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

28

Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response

loopholes, thwart the pipeline deal, and make some sanctions against Assad and his al ies
mandatory.”164 One supporter of this position argues that “where UN aid is concerned, the Biden
administration and Congress should work together to stop U.S. funds from going to the World
Food Program and other UN agencies in Damascus until they do transparent due diligence on
their contractors and subcontractors.”165
This alternative approach would likely also face chal enges. The expansion of secondary
sanctions to countries economical y engaged in Syria could implicate a growing number of U.S.
regional al ies, as countries such as Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey explore
outreach to Damascus. Efforts to stem the diversion of humanitarian assistance by the Asad
government—if set as a prerequisite to the continued flow of aid—would impact mil ions of
Syrian civilians who depend on such aid to meet their basic needs.
Ultimately, any approach to Syria could involve a series of trade-offs, where policymakers could
try to clearly prioritize their objectives and potential y face limits to U.S. leverage in altering the
course of the decade-long war.


Author Information

Carla E. Humud

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs



Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.


164 Joel Rayburn, “T he Vacuum In U.S. Syria Policy—And How T o Fill It,” Hoover Institution, September 6, 2022.
165 Ibid.
Congressional Research Service
RL33487 · VERSION 170 · UPDATED
29