Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against
the Asad Regime
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
November 9, 2011February 16, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33487
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Summary
This report analyzes the current unrest in Syria and the U.S. response to the Syrian government’s
crackdown against demonstrators. It also provides background information on U.S. sanctions
against the Asad regime and its supporters.
A variety of U.S. legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit direct foreign assistance
funding to Syria and restrict bilateral trade relations, largely because of the U.S. State
Department’s designation of Syria as a sponsor of international terrorism. On December 12, 2003,
President George W. Bush signed the Syria Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175, which imposed
additional economic sanctions against Syria. Syrian individuals and government officials are
subject to targeted financial sanctions pursuant to executive orders relating to terrorism,
proliferation, and regional security. Successive administrations have designated several Syrian
entities as weapons proliferators and sanctioned several Russian companies for alleged weapons
of mass destruction or advanced weapons sales to Syria.
The following legislation introduced in the 112th Congress addresses the current situation in
Syria.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act. Sanctions the development of
petroleum resources of Syria, the production of refined petroleum products in
Syria, and the exportation of refined petroleum products to Syria.
•
H.Res. 296 (S.Res. 180 in the Senate). Expresses support for peaceful
demonstrations and universal freedoms in Syria and condemns the human rights
violations by the Assad Regime.
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and
Modernization Act of 2011. States that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement
and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their proliferation
activities and policies.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011.
Amends the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the
scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or extracted within
North Korea’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the
transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such
countries’ weapons of mass destruction programs, support for acts of
international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions
shipping services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011. Denies companies that conduct
business in Syria’s energy sector (investment, oil purchases, and sale of gasoline)
access to U.S. financial institutions and requires federal contractors to certify that
they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Contents
Uprising and Crackdown in Syria.................................................................................................... 1
Overview: Syria’s Changing Political Landscape and Repercussions For U.S. Policy............. 1
Current Status ............................................................................................................................ 1
The Syrian Opposition and Armed Resistance .......................................................................... 3
International Reactions and Policy Responses .......................................................................... 4
Syria’s Neighbors ................................................................................................................ 5
Regional and Global Actors ................................................................................................ 5
U.S. Policy and Sanctions ......................................................................................................... 6
Congressional Action................................................................................................................. 8
Syria’s Economy Under Strain .................................................................................................. 9
Sanctions and Syria’s Oil and Gas Sector ......................................................................... 10
Options and Uncertainty.......................................................................................................... 11
Overview ................................................................................................................................. 12
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria .................................................................................... 12
Specific Sanctions Against Syria............................................................................................. 14
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act ................................................................................... 15
Targeted Financial Sanctions............................................................................................. 16
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria ............................................................ 18
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Syria..................................................................................................................... 3
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011 ................................................................................ 7
Table A-1. U.S.-Syrian Trade Statistics 2005-2010 ......................................................................... 7
Appendixes
Appendix. Previous U.S. Sanctions and Legislation ..................................................................... 12
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 19
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Uprising and Crackdown in Syria
For a full account of recent events and an assessment of their implications, see “Current Status.”
Overview: Syria’s Changing Political Landscape and Repercussions
For U.S. Policy
The Asad family has ruled Syria since 1970. President Bashar al Asad, like his father Hafez al
Asad before him, has wielded almost total control over domestic politics and has steered the
country’s outsized foreign policy to play key roles in multiple arenas in the Middle East
(Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, Iran, and Iraq) despite Syria’s small size and lack of resources. Now,
with the country in turmoil, many observers are interested in how prolonged Syrian instability (or
a possible changing of the guard there) might affect other U.S. foreign policy priorities in the
region, such as Lebanese stability and countering Hezbollah; limiting Iranian influence; and
solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unlike in Egypt, where the United States has provided support
to the military and democracy assistance to newly empowered
political groups, the U.S. role in Syria is more limited. Some
As of November 8, 2011, the United
U.S. sanctions are already in place and Syria has been ineligible Nations High Commissioner for
for U.S. aid due to its inclusion on the State Sponsor of
Human Rights estimates that that
Terrorism list. Military and intelligence cooperation is sporadic
over 3,500 civilians have been killed.
In addition, Syrian human rights
and limited. Thus the role the United States can play in Syria’s
groups report that over 12,000
evolving domestic crisis is in question, and policymakers may
Syrian protestors have been
be searching for channels of influence in order to preserve U.S.
arrested.
interests in a rapidly changing political landscape.
Current Status
More than 3,500 people have been killed during the uprising in Syria according to official
estimates. The actual figure may be much higher. In addition, between 11,000 and 25,000 people
have fled the country due to violence or regime threats against protestors and their families.
Activists estimate that tens of thousands of people have been detained for organizing or
participating in anti-government demonstrations. Despite the Syrian government’s recent formal
agreement to an Arab League-proposed end to the government crackdown, most observers expect
violence between regime forces and protestors to continue for some time.
Unrest in Syria shows no sign of abating, and much uncertainty persists regarding the country’s
future. Some experts believe that the Alawite-dominated regime, in one form or another (perhaps
without Asad family rule), can remain in power. Others believe that a sectarian war is likely and
that recent violent clashes between Alawites and Sunnis reflect a trend toward heightened intercommunal conflict. Another view posits that international sanctions are working, and that
economic pressure may eventually topple the regime perhaps within the next two years. Finally,
some fear that the violence within Syria’s borders may spread elsewhere, with what has been a
domestic conflict turning regional due to possible Sunni-Shiite tensions, a Syrian or Hezbollah
provocation of Israel, or transnational Kurdish restiveness in Syria-Turkey-Iraq-Iran border areas.
Within Syria, protests continue nationwide, though central Damascus and Aleppo, the two largest
cities, have remained quieter than most areas. The frequency of protests has remained steady,
although unconfirmed reports suggest that in some cities, protest turnouts are diminishing. The
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
opposition has begun to coalesce around a new umbrella organization, the Syrian National
Council (SNC), most of whose members are exiles. Inside Syria, some local activists question
SNC positions and leadership. The SNC remains officially committed to non-violent, peaceful
protest. However new rebel groups composed of defected soldiers espouse and are conducting
armed resistance. Most Syrians still reject international military intervention, though some have
stated their support for U.N.-mandated assistance.1
Various urban and rural areas (Dara’a, Hama, Idlib, Rastan, Deir Al Zour) have experienced
regime-opposition clashes, but none more so than Homs, Syria’s third largest city. There, local
fighters and army defectors reportedly are protecting whole neighborhoods from regime security
forces, and casualties on both sides occur daily. Civilians in some areas are confined to their
houses. In recent weeks, there has been a spate of reportedly sectarian-motivated killings of
doctors, a nuclear engineer, and professors. However, some reports indicate that some Alawites
inside Homs are opposed to the government crackdown.2 In early November, regime forces have
attempted to retake areas of Homs controlled by defectors, allegedly deploying tanks to the Baba
Amr area of Homs in attempt to wipe out rebel forces based there. According to one opposition
figure, “The defectors and the people don’t have enough weapons or strength to wage a war
against a professional and disciplined army. We cannot talk about a war between them because
they’re not equal powers. It’s impossible for defectors to keep the city.”3
Fear of all-out sectarian warfare, akin to the situation in Iraq between 2006 and 2008, may drive
many religious minorities to continue their support for the Asad regime. Some Christians have
participated in and are leaders of the protest movement, yet many are at least still publicly
hesitant to withdraw their support from the government. Christian religious leaders have been
especially vocal lately in articulating their communities’ ongoing support for the Asad regime, as
have some Lebanese Christian leaders.4
In order to bolster its claim that it is at least attempting to adopt political reforms, the Syrian
government has taken formal steps toward liberalization, though many skeptics doubt the
regime’s intentions to truly promote political pluralism in the midst of a brutal crackdown. In
April, the regime abolished the Emergency Law, though it has continued its apparently unlawful
detention of protestors. To date, the government has pledged to implement a new political parties
law5 to allow for competition with the ruling Ba’ath party; to implement a new media law to
promote press freedom; to implement a new decree to allow for more competition for state jobs;
to hold parliamentary elections in early 2012; and to rewrite the constitution. In addition, several
1
In October, one prominent longtime activist, Haitham al Maleh, called for United Nations assistance but rejected help
from NATO. According to Maleh, “NATO means America and I'm against that. But it's different when the Security
Council intervenes. That provides an international umbrella, which is what is needed.” See, U.S. Open Source Center
(OSC) Report GMP20111016637001, “Syria: Opposition Figure Al-Malih Supports International Intervention,” Al
Akhbar (Beirut), October 14, 2011.
2
In September, three senior Alawite shaykhs in Homs issued a statement in which they said that the Asad regime does
not represent their entire religious sect. OSC Report GMP20110912631001, “Syria: Three Alawite Figures Condemn
'Savage Acts,' Ask Syrians To Join Protests,” Al-Arabiyah.net (Dubai), September 12, 2011.
3
"Death Toll in Syria Mounts as Government Assault Continues," New York Times, November 8, 2011.
4
In early October, Lebanon's Maronite Catholic Patriarch, Beshara al Rai, stated that hat he feared the collapse of
“regimes described as dictatorial... could lead to civil war, with Christians being the main victims.”
5
On July 25, 2011, the Syrian government issued a bill that would permit the establishment of various new political
parties. See, Syria: Bill Proposed to Allow New Political Parties, available online at:
[http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402763_text]
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
pro-regime rallies have taken place in recent months, with crowds estimated by government
sources to be as large as 100,000. The Syrian government continues to place the blame for
instability on terrorist elements with external support.
Figure 1. Map of Syria
Source: CRS Graphics.
The Syrian Opposition and Armed Resistance
Syrian opposition groups have grown increasingly organized as the uprising has unfolded, but
remain divided over strategy and tactics. Local Coordinating Councils active in many areas create
an informal network linking activists around the country. Two opposition coalition groups, one
based in Syria and the other based in neighboring Turkey, are seeking to shape the political
agenda and strategy of the movement:
•
The Syrian National Council (SNC) was formally organized in Turkey in
October 2011 and brings together a range of external activists, along with
representatives of the Damascus Declaration Forces for National and Democratic
Change, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and the Syrian Revolution General
Commission (SRGC). The National Council has called for “immediate protection
for civilians,” in contrast to some of its domestic counterparts. The Council also
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
firmly believes that dialogue with the Asad government is impossible. The
Council rejected the Arab League agreement with the Syrian government on
November 2 (see below), and called on the Arab League “to freeze Syria’s
membership, ensure the protection of civilians and recognize the SNC as the
representative of the Syrian revolution.” Prominent leaders of the SNC include
Council chairman Burhan Ghalyun, a France-based Syrian academic, and
Muhammad Riyad al Shaqfah, the Controller General of the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood.
•
The National Coordination Commission of the Forces of Democratic Change
(NCC) is a Syria-based alliance of leftist groups, Kurdish activists, and
individuals associated with the 2005 Damascus Declaration on political reform.
The NCC has criticized calls for any civilian protection measures that might
invite external military intervention and has left open the prospect of dialogue
with the Syrian government, predicated on an end to the use of force against
civilians. Prominent leaders of the NCC include general coordinator Hassan Abd
al Azim and long-time domestic opposition activists such as Michel Kilo.
Reports from Syria increasingly suggest that dissident military personnel and officers, many
acting under the aegis of two organizations called the Free Syrian Army and the Free Officers
Movement, are actively targeting government security forces in armed attacks. Free Syrian Army
forces are rumored to number several hundred personnel, but precise and verifiable estimates are
not available. Public accounts further suggest that thousands of Syrian military and security
personnel may have defected during the uprising as forces have been increasingly stretched
geographically and logistically and as individuals have rejected orders to crack down on civilian
protestors. The Syrian government has condemned the use of force against state security
personnel and attributes the growing number of attacks on military and police forces to
“terrorists” and armed Islamists.
The use of force by Syrian opposition groups raises fundamental questions about the nature and
future of the Syrian uprising. It also is complicating internal opposition debates over strategy and
tactics. Some groups view force as a necessary and appropriate response to the violently
repressive tactics being used by government personnel. Others argue that the use of force opens
the opposition to criticism, undercuts its international legitimacy, and could increase fear among
“fence sitting” supporters of the government about the likelihood of violent chaos in the wake of
regime change. The debate over the use of force is an extension of the broader political debate
that divides the leading opposition groups over the possibility of dialogue with the Asad
government. Those who view the government as disingenuous in its offers of reform and dialogue
may be more likely to support or acquiesce to the use of force as the political confrontation
continues.
International Reactions and Policy Responses
Syria’s geographic location, its diverse population, and its leaders’ foreign policy tactics raise the
stakes of the current political confrontation for Syria’s neighbors and the international
community. Destabilizing refugee flows, cross-border sectarian rivalries, the future of regional
terrorist groups, the prospect of weapons proliferation, and potential changes to regional power
dynamics all hang in the balance.
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Syria’s Neighbors
To date, Syria’s neighbors have taken cautious and concerned approaches in response to the
country’s unrest. Groups in each country have particular concerns about conflict in Syria
potentially having destabilizing effects on their national security and diverse populations. Turkey
has been the most vocal and involved of Syria’s neighbors to date, and the government of Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has shifted its approach from seeking to foster dialogue
between the Asad government and its critics to hosting Syrian opposition groups and warning of
unspecified sanctions or military actions if Syrian authorities continue to use force against
civilians. This change in approach by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan seems to
coincide with his desire to project a regionally populist stance that is not viewed by Arab
populations as siding with autocrats or entrenched commercial interests. One of Turkey’s
concerns is that region-wide unrest, especially in neighboring Syria, could endanger the political
stability of the entire area and possibly jeopardize Turkey’s political and economic influence in
the region.
Lebanese concerns are focused on the potential for conflict or regime change in Syria to affect
Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance. Some prominent Lebanese Christians have warned that the
rise of Syria’s majority Sunni population to power could pose risks to Christians and other
religious minorities in Syria and Lebanon. Reciprocally, Syrian officials accuse Lebanese Sunnis
of providing shelter and support to armed opposition forces inside Syria. A number of disputed
cross-border incidents illustrate rising Lebanese-Syrian tensions. The outsized role that Syria
plays in Lebanon’s affairs and its role as a lifeline for Hezbollah further raises the stakes of the
unrest both for Lebanon and for Israel. Hezbollah has stated its support for the Asad government
and both have warned that third-party intervention in Syria’s crisis could lead to regional
conflagration, widely interpreted as a threat to Israel.
Syria’s other neighbors also have their concerns over instability there. In Iraq, Shiites including
Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, may be concerned over the possibility of Syrian Sunni Muslims
toppling the Asad regime, and therefore the Prime Minister has supported Asad’s promises for
reform. In Jordan, the monarchy may be concerned that violence in Syria may lead many Syrians
to take refuge in Jordan, though to date fewer than a thousand Syrians are said to have sought
refuge in the kingdom. Of all of the neighbors, Syrian unrest places Israel in the most precarious
position. The Syrian regime has been a stable and predictable Israeli adversary for decades. If the
Syrian regime fears its downfall may be imminent, Israelis fear that the Asad government could
try to instigate a conflict with Israel in order to distract opposition to its rule. Should the Syrian
regime fall, Israelis are concerned over its replacement with a more radical Sunni-Islamist
government.
Regional and Global Actors
The Asad government has positioned Syria as a pivot point in a number of regional rivalries,
complicating efforts by other Middle Eastern governments to take a unified and decisive
approach to the current crisis. Syria’s role as a facilitator of Iranian support to Hezbollah while
serving as host to Hamas and other Sunni terrorist groups is perhaps the most important example
of this dynamic. Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah has vigorously criticized the Asad government’s
use of force against civilians, but many observers believe this may stem more from an interest in
countering Iranian regional influence than from genuine concern for the well-being of Syrian
nationals. Arab League diplomacy has focused on setting terms for a ceasefire and a resumption
of dialogue between the opposition and the government, and the conditions of the agreement
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
announced on November 2 reflect this approach, but they have been met by criticism from Syrian
opposition forces and a continuing use of force by Syrian security personnel and some armed
opposition groups.
Action at the U.N. Security Council reflects shared concerns among the permanent members of
the Security Council about the crisis and its potential spillover effects, along with deep divisions
about the way forward. Russia and China jointly vetoed a proposed Security Council resolution in
early October, citing concern that a resolution could pave the way for one-sided intervention in
the Syrian unrest, and warning of the risks of repeating a scenario like the NATO-led intervention
in Libya in the more fragile and geopolitically important environment of the Levant. Critics of the
veto point to Russian and Chinese interests in preserving their long-standing arms sales
relationships with Syria, protecting the principle of non-intervention, and gaining access to
potential energy resources. On November 1, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen
categorically ruled out the possibility of a NATO-led military intervention in Syria. The European
Union has prohibited the purchase of Syrian oil exports, dealing a potentially crippling blow to
Syrian state export revenues unless alternatives are found (see below).
U.S. Policy and Sanctions
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August.
On November 2, after reports surfaced that Syria had agreed to an Arab League-proposed plan to
end its crackdown, a State Department spokesperson reiterated the Administration position,
stating that “Syria’s made a lot of promises to the international community in the past.... Our
position remains that President Assad has lost his legitimacy to rule and should step down.”6
When asked whether or not the United States would intervene militarily in Syria to protect
demonstrators, a State Department spokesperson responded that “The vast majority of the Syrian
opposition continues to speak in favor of peaceful, nonviolent protests and against foreign
intervention of any kind, and particularly foreign military intervention into the situation in Syria,
and we respect that.”7 Some U.S. officials have publicly indicated their belief that President Asad
will not be able to remain in office over time. According to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta,
“While he continues to resist, I think it’s very clear that it’s a matter of time before that (exit) in
fact happens. When it does, we don’t know.”8 In response to unspecified threats against the
recently confirmed U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Robert S. Ford, the Ambassador returned to
Washington, D.C. in October. Ford had been previously targeted by pro-government
demonstrators who obstructed a meeting he conducted with opposition activists in September
2011.
6
"U.S. Cautions on Syria Deal, Says Assad Must Go," Reuters, November 2, 2011.
"US Doubts Military Option on Syria," Agence France Presse, October 24, 2011.
8
"Fall of Syrian Regime a 'matter of time': US," Agence France Presse, October 3, 2011.
7
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Table A-1. U.S.-Syrian Trade Statistics 2005-2010
($ in millions)
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
U.S. Exports to Syria
$155.0
$224.3
$361.4
$408.8
$300.0
$506.2
U.S. Imports from Syria
$323.5
$213.7
$110.5
$352.0
$285.9
$428.7
Totals
$478.5
$438.0
$471.9
$760.8
$585.9
$934.9
Source: TradeStats Express – National Trade Data, Presented by the Office of Trade and Industry
Information (OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce.
The Administration has continued to expand U.S. sanctions on Syria while advocating further
multilateral sanctions. Table 1 (below) summarizes U.S. sanctions activity since the start of the
Syria uprising in March 2011.
Table 1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011
(Implemented by Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC])
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
October 3,
2011,
Treasury
Department
OFAC issued two general licenses related to
Syria to authorize payments in connection
with overflight or emergency landing and
transactions with respect to
telecommunications
September 27,
2011,
Treasury
Department
OFAC issued a General Licenses related to
Syria to authorize third-country diplomatic and
consular funds transfers and to authorize
certain services in support of
nongovernmental organizations' activities.
September 9,
2011,
Treasury
Department
August 30,
2011,
Treasury
Department
August 18,
2011,
Executive
Order 13582
Sanction or Related Activity Description
OFAC issued four general licenses related to
Syria to authorize wind down transactions,
certain official activities of international
organizations, incidental transactions related
to U.S. persons residing in Syria and operation
of accounts.
Walid Mouallem (Foreign Minister), Ali Abdul
Karim Ali (Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon),
Bouthaina Shaaban (Advisor to the President)
Government of Syria
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Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
Freezes all assets of the Government of Syria,
prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any
transaction involving the Government of Syria,
bans U.S. imports of Syrian-origin petroleum
or petroleum products, prohibits U.S. persons
from having any dealings in or related to
Syria’s petroleum or petroleum products, and
prohibits U.S. persons from operating or
investing in Syria.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
August 18,
2011,
Treasury
Department
General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company
For Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian
Petroleum Company, Sytrol
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 10,
2011,
Treasury
Department
Commercial Bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based
subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank,
Syriatel, the country's main mobile phone
operator
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 4,
2011,
Treasury
Department
Muhammad Hamsho (businessman with ties to
Asad family), Hamsho International Group
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
June 29, 2011,
Treasury
Department
Jamil Hassan (Head of Air Force Intelligence),
Political Security Directorate (PSD, domestic
intelligence)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
May 18, 2011,
Executive
Order 13573
President Bashar al Asad, Farouk al Shara (vice
president), Adel Safar (prime minister),
Mohammad Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the
interior), Ali Habib Mahmoud (minister of
defense), Abdul Fatah Qudsiya (head of Syrian
military intelligence), Mohammed Dib Zaitoun
(director of political security directorate), Nabil
Rafik al Kuzbari, General Mohsen Chizari
(Commander of Iran Revolutionary Guard Corp
Qods Force suspected of human rights abuses in
Syria), Al Mashreq Investment Fund, Bena
Properties, Cham Holding, Syrian Air Force
Intelligence, Syrian Military Intelligence, Syrian
National Security Bureau
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
April 29,
2011,
Executive
Order 13572
Maher al Asad, Ali Mamluk (director of the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate GID), Atif Najib
(former head of the Syrian Political Security
Directorate for Dara'a province and the
president's cousin). the General Intelligence
Directorate, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps – Quds Force (for allegedly assisting
Syria in its crackdown)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
Source: U.S. Treasury Department.
Notes: As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies
owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals,
groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are
not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called Specially
Designated Nationals or SDNs. Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited
from dealing with them.
Congressional Action
The Syrian government’s use of lethal force in response to political demonstrations has refocused
attention on the basic tenets of U.S. policy toward Syria. Some Members of Congress and
nongovernmental observers argue that the recent violence demonstrates the futility of expecting
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
any substantive reform by Syrian authorities and suggests that U.S. policy should shift toward
outright confrontation and embrace regime change as a policy goal. While the Administration has
called for President Asad to step down, arguments in favor of regime change have been
accompanied by wariness about what the implications of confrontation would be, and what the
implications of regime change would be for regional security, particularly in light of the delicate
sectarian balance in the Levant and a lack of established U.S. relationships with government and
non-government actors in Syria. Other lawmakers have urged a gradual approach of increasing
multilateral political condemnation and economic pressure against the Asad regime.
The following legislation introduced in the 112th Congress addresses the current situation in
Syria.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act—Would, among other things,
sanction the development of petroleum resources of Syria, the production of
refined petroleum products in Syria, and the exportation of refined petroleum
products to Syria.
•
H.Res. 296 (S.Res. 180 in the Senate), A Resolution Expressing support for
peaceful demonstrations and universal freedoms in Syria and condemning the
human rights violations by the Assad Regime—Among other things, it urges the
“President to continue to work with the European Union, the Government of
Turkey, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other allies and
partners to bring an end to human rights abuses in Syria, hold the perpetrators
accountable, and support the aspirations of the people of Syria.”
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and
Modernization Act of 2011—States that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement
and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their proliferation
activities and policies. Would, among other things, prohibit U.S. nuclear
cooperation agreements and related export licenses and transfers of materials,
services and goods with a country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran,
North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such
countries.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011—
Amends the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the
scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or extracted within
North Korea’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the
transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such
countries’ weapons of mass destruction programs, support for acts of
international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions
shipping services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011—Denies companies that conduct
business in Syria’s energy sector (investment, oil purchases, and sale of gasoline)
access to U.S. financial institutions and requires federal contractors to certify that
they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
Syria’s Economy Under Strain
Though more robust Western sanctions on Syria have only recently been enacted, early reports
indicate that the Syrian economy and national budget are suffering due to a drop in oil exports
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
resulting from sanctions, months of domestic unrest and the loss of international tourism
revenues, and new social and military spending aimed at quelling public anger. In September, the
International Monetary Fund indicated that it expects Syria’s economy to contract by 2% this
year.
The Syrian government has responded somewhat erratically to its negative economic outlook. In
order to preserve hard currency, the government initially banned almost all imported goods,
leading to price hikes, inflation, and shortages of many basic items. After 12 days, it rescinded the
ban, concerned about angering the private sector in Damascus and Aleppo, which has largely
been supportive of the regime. The Central Bank of Syria says that it has $18 billion in foreign
exchange reserves and can cover import costs for up to a year. In addition, in late September the
Syrian government surprised many when it announced a massive increase in domestic spending,
precisely at the same time as new international sanctions were taking effect. The government
approved a 58% increase in the state budget, bringing it to $26.5 billion according to official
estimates. Food and energy subsidies account for 30% of the total budget.
Sanctions and Syria’s Oil and Gas Sector
With the loss of European markets due to an oil export ban, Western countries have denied Syria
a major source of revenue and hard currency (25%-30% of total government revenue or $4 billion
a year). Before sanctions, the main buyers of approximately 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of
exported Syrian oil were Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Turkey.
Syria produces about 380,000 bpd total. Existing foreign producers inside Syria are still able to
maintain operations, though many foreign companies, including Gulfsands Petroleum (UK),
Royal Dutch Shell, Total (France), CNPC (China), and ONGC (India), have cut back production
because alternative buyers have yet to surface and Syria has limited domestic refining and storage
capacity. Western countries also have banned new investment in Syria’s oil and gas sector. These
include Canada, which announced a new investment ban in October. The Calgary-based Suncor
Energy Inc. already is an existing partner with Syria's General Petroleum Corp in a $1.2 billion
Ebla natural gas project. In mid October, another Canadian company, Mena Hydrocarbons Inc,
said that it had suspended drilling in Syria due to political turmoil in the country. Sanctions also
are having an impact on other aspects of Syria’s energy sector, including financing and shipping.
According to one oil products trader based in the Middle East, “I don't do Syria anymore.
Sanctions appeared tougher, so I gave up.... The problem is getting a bank to finance it and a ship
owner to go there.”9
Since new sanctions were enacted, many analysts have speculated about whether new investors
and foreign markets would arise for Syrian oil exports, albeit at lower prices due to sanctions and
increased shipping costs. Some experts believe that both India and China are in a position to
refine the heavy crude that Syria exports, and some reports suggest that India’s ONGC is
considering importing oil it currently produces in Syria to India, instead of shutting down its field
operations.10 According to one energy expert, “There is almost certainly someone who will buy
it.... In the past there have been trading companies that would launder oil for Iraq or Iran, for
example. Some countries will buy gasoline from Caribbean refiners without knowing the origin
of the oil.’’11 However, others assert that some Asian buyers would find the prospect of
9
"Syria Cancels Fuel Export Tender, Sanctions Deter," Reuters, November 3, 2011.
"Syrian Oil Exports Paralysed as Sanctions Bite," Reuters, September 22, 2011.
11
"Syria looking for buyers after West rejects its oil," International Herald Tribune, September 29, 2011.
10
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purchasing Syrian oil too risky. According to one report, “As far as Chinese and the Indians are
concerned, they could of course try to buy some volumes. But the economics don't make any
sense for them and volumes are too small to take the risks.”12
Options and Uncertainty
At present, all eyes are fixed on the Syrian government and opposition’s possible responses to the
Arab League ceasefire and dialogue proposal. Fighting in and around the city of Homs appears to
signal the Asad government’s determination to quell resistance with force, and many in the region
and internationally are interpreting the siege of Homs as a rejection of the Arab League
agreement. Should the government follow through on its commitments to withdraw military
forces from cities and reengage in dialogue with opposition, prolonged violence and potential
sectarian escalation may be avoided. If opposition forces halt attacks on government personnel
and are able to engage in dialogue with the government in a unified fashion, then prospects for a
smoother transition to more open political competition could improve.
It appears unlikely that international diplomacy focused on a new round of Security Councilbacked sanctions or the possible referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) will resume in earnest until the response of both sides to the Arab League initiative
becomes clearer. Russia and China appear adamant that further sanctions targeting the Syrian
government are unwarranted and argue that the international community should not overlook the
use of force by Syrian opposition groups. The Security Council’s response to the Libyan conflict
revived a broad international debate over the effect of referrals to the ICC on the decisions of
indicted leaders and officials facing calls for their resignation. Intransigence by the Asad
government and disunity among Syrian opposition forces could alter regional and global policy
calculations on these issues.
President Asad has taken a number of opportunities recently to warn of a regional “earthquake”
and prolonged, destabilizing chaos in the event of intervention or the fall of his government.
While these warnings have an obvious self-serving purpose, they mirror concerns being
expressed by many observers and officials in the region who fear that the types of complications
now on display in Libya could have far more dire consequences if they emerge in the more
volatile context of the eastern Mediterranean.
12
Reuters, September 22, 2011, op.cit.
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Appendix. Previous U.S. Sanctions and Legislation
The following section provides background on U.S. sanctions against Syria. It predates the
nation-wide unrest that began in March 2011. For recent information on U.S. sanctions, please
see, Table 1 above.
Overview
Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is therefore subject to a number
of U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in
1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006 Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued
new executive orders that expanded U.S. sanctions on Syria. At present, a variety of legislative
provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade.13
Principal examples follow.
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [P.L. 94-329].
Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC 2371]. (Syria was not affected by this ban until
1979, as explained below.)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 [Title II of P.L. 95-223 (codified at
50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.)]. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
the President has broad powers pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a
threat “which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” These powers include the ability to
seize foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction, to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, to
prohibit payments between financial institutions involving foreign currency, and to prohibit the
import or export of foreign currency.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93 Stat. 515]
required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress before
licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries determined to
have supported acts of international terrorism. (Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 relettered
Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list. This list is
prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
13
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s designation as a country
supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and
1981, the United States provided a total of $627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance,
$438.0 million in economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a brief
warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded under U.S. aid included water
supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to
Syria since 1981, when the last aid programs were closed out.
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Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support for
acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first prepared in
1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2009, issued on August 5, 2010. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the
above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399]. Section 509(a) of this
act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit export of
items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of international terrorism,
thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the AntiTerrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989—see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans
obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of this act [100 Stat.
1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on income or war
profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism.
[26 USC 901(j)]. The President was given authority to waive this provision under Section 601 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200, May 18, 2000).
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L. 101-222]. Section 4
amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional notification and
licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries
on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their
ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribes conditions for removing a country from the terrorism list: prior
notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen of
two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite notification, the
President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no
longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45
days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list).
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver
has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other
prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132]. This act requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (Section 325) or lethal military
equipment (Section 326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President to waive this
provision on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to third countries that
sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens or
resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the terrorism
list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in consultation
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with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such
transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.”
(31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996,
the then chairman of the House International Relations Committee reportedly protested to then
President Clinton about the Treasury Department’s implementing regulation, which he described
as a “special loophole” for Syria.
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign assistance
appropriations legislation enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S. aid.
The most recent ban appears in Section 7007 of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2010, which states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available
pursuant to Titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any
assistance or reparations for the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria: Provided,
That for purposes of this section, the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include
direct loans, credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents.”
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by Section 431 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United
States to withhold a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for
programs that benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178, was amended by P.L. 109-112 to make its
provisions applicable to Syria as well as Iran. The amended act, known as the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act, requires the President to submit semi-annual reports to designated
congressional committees, identifying any persons involved in arms transfers to or from Iran or
Syria; also, the act authorizes the President to impose various sanctions against such individuals.
On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed P.L. 109-353 which expanded the scope of the
original law by adding North Korea to its provisions, thereby renaming the law the Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (or INKSNA for short). The list of Syrian entities
designated under INKSNA includes Army Supply Bureau (2008), Syrian Navy (2009), Syrian Air
Force (2009), and Ministry of Defense (2008).14 On May 24, 2011, the State Department
designated the Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center
(SSRC) under INKSNA.
Specific Sanctions Against Syria
Specific U.S. sanctions levied against Syria fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions resulting
from the passage of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that,
among other things, prohibit most U.S. exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed by executive order
from the President that specifically deny certain Syrian citizens and entities access to the U.S.
financial system due to their participation in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden; or destabilizing activities in Iraq and
Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from the USA Patriot Act levied specifically against the
Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006.
14
See, State Department Press Releases And Documents “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act: Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
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The 2003 Syria Accountability Act
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act into law, as P.L. 108-175. This law requires the President to impose
penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased
supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq (Section 5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans
on the export of military items (already banned under other legislation, see above15) and of dual
use items (items with both civil and military applications) to Syria (Section 5(a)(1)). In addition,
the President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
•
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
•
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
•
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
•
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
•
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
•
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (Section 5(a)(2)).
Implementation
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions of
P.L. 108-175, including the bans on munitions and dual use items (Section 5(a)(1)) and two
sanctions from the menu of six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban
on exports to Syria other than food and medicine (Section 5(a)(2)(A) and the ban on Syrian
aircraft landing in or overflying the United States (Section 5(a)(2)(D). In issuing his executive
order, the President stated that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete steps to address the
concerns that led to the enactment of the Syria Accountability Act. The President also imposed
two additional sanctions based on other legislation.
•
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.
Waivers
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver
authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to
issue the following waivers on grounds of national security:
15
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
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Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products in
support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of
potential dual use; aircraft parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information; certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a temporary
nature.16
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of
Syrian aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an
emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.17 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.18
The following individuals and entities have been targeted by the U.S. Treasury Department
(Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC):
•
On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior Syrian
officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then-Interior Minister and its head
of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively, the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any assets
they may have in the United States and banning any U.S. persons, including U.S.
financial institutions outside of the United States, from conducting transactions
with them.19 Kanaan allegedly committed suicide in October 2005, though some
have speculated that he may have been murdered.
•
On January 18, 2006, U.S. Treasury Department took the same actions against
the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military intelligence.
16
According to U.S. regulations, any product that contains more than 10% de minimis U.S.-origin content, regardless
of where it is made, is not allowed to be exported to Syria. For U.S. commercial licensing prohibitions on exports and
re-exports to Syria, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 Supp No. 1. The Department of Commerce reviews license applications on a
case-by-case basis for exports or re-exports to Syria under a general policy of denial. For a description of items that do
not require export licenses, see, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce, Implementation
of the Syria Accountability Act, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
17
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/13338.pdf.
18
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
19
See http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2617.htm.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
•
On April 26, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13399 that authorized
the secretary of the Treasury to freeze the U.S.-based assets of anyone found to
be involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also affects anyone involved in bombings or
assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004, or anyone hindering the
international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The order allows the
United States to comply with UNSCR 1636, which calls on all states to freeze the
assets of those persons designated by the investigating commission or the
government of Lebanon to be involved in the Hariri assassination.
•
On August 15, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for allegedly contributing
to Syria’s support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and
Brigadier General Jama’a Jama’a, for allegedly playing a central part in Syria’s
intelligence operations in Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.20
•
On January 4, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three Syrian
entities, the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the
Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory, as
weapons proliferators under an executive order (E.O.13382) based on the
authority vested to the President under IEEPA. The three state-sponsored
institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.21
•
On August 1, 2007, the President issued E.O. 1344122 blocking the property of
persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and
institutions. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
four individuals reportedly affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert
Syrian control over the Lebanese political system, including Assaad Halim
Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab and Hafiz Makhluf (under the authority of E.O.13441)
and Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik (under the authority of E.O.13338).23
•
On February 13, 2008, President Bush issued another Order (E.O.13460)
blocking the property of senior Syrian officials. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the order “targets individuals and entities determined to be
responsible for or who have benefitted from the public corruption of senior
officials of the Syrian regime. The order also revises a provision in Executive
Order 13338 to block the property of Syrian officials who have undermined U.S.
and international efforts to stabilize Iraq.24 One week later, under the authority of
20
See http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp60.htm.
See, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp216.htm.
22
On July 29, 2010, President Obama extended that National Emergency with respect to Lebanon for another year,
stating that “While there have been some recent positive developments in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah that include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems serve to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in Lebanon, and continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” See, Notice of July 29, 2010—
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Actions of Certain Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty
of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions, Federal Register, Title 3—The President, [Page 45045].
23
See, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp666.htm.
24
A previous executive order, E.O. 13315, blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and members of
(continued...)
21
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
E.O.13460, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets and restricted the
financial transactions of Rami Makhluf, the 38-year-old cousin of President
Bashar al Asad. Makhluf is a powerful Syrian businessman who serves as an
interlocutor between foreign investors and Syrian companies. According to one
report, “Since a military coup in 1969, the Asads have controlled politics while
the Makhlufs have been big business players. The tradition continues in the next
generation, with Bashar al-Assad (sic) as president and Rami Makhluf as a
leading force in business.”25 Makhluf is a major stakeholder in Syriatel, the
country’s largest mobile phone operator. In 2008, the Turkish company Turkcell
was in talks to purchase Syriatel, but, according to Reuters, negotiations over the
sale were taking longer than expected because some Turkcell executives have
U.S. passports.26 Then, in August 2008, Turkcell said it had frozen its plans for a
venture in Syria amid U.S. opposition to the project. Makhluf’s holding
company, Cham, is involved in several other large deals, including an agreement
with Syria’s state airline and a Kuwaiti company to set up a new airline. Several
months ago, Dubai-based real-estate company Emaar Properties announced it had
agreed to set up a $100 million venture with Cham to develop real estate projects
in Syria. Makhluf also is a minority shareholder in Gulfsands Petroleum,27 a
publicly traded, United Kingdom-incorporated energy company. According to the
Wall Street Journal, a Gulfsands executive said the Treasury Department’s
sanctioning of Makhlouf would have no impact on the company pursuing its
partnership with Cham.28
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria
As previously mentioned, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush instructed
the Treasury Department in 2004 to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering
concerns. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued a final ruling that imposes a special measure
against the Commercial Bank of Syria as a financial institution of primary money laundering
concern. It bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent
account with the Commercial Bank of Syria, and it also requires banks to conduct due diligence
that ensures the Commercial Bank of Syria is not circumventing sanctions through its business
dealings with them.29
(...continued)
his former regime. On June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian company, SES
International Corp., and two of its officials under the authority of E.O.13315.
25
“Sanctions on Businessman Target Syria’s Inner Sanctum,” Washington Post, February 22, 2008.
26
“Turkcell Continues Talks on Syriatel Stake,” Reuters, April 14, 2008.
27
Gulfsands’ chief executive and largest shareholder, John Dorrier, is an American citizen, and the company has
offices in Houston.
28
“Syrian Tycoon Bristles At US Sanctions Against Him,” the Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2008.
29
See, “U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria.” Available at http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctionssyr.html
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Congressional Research Service
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
19The confrontations and violence that swept through Syria in 2011 have escalated to the edge of
civil war in early 2012. President Bashar al Asad and his family members refuse to leave power,
despite internal demands and intense international pressure calling for political change and an end
to violence against civilians. Instead, the regime has offered limited reforms and is meeting
popular protests and armed opposition attacks with overwhelming force.
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August
2011 and have been vocal advocates for United Nations Security Council action to facilitate his
removal. However, with the council deadlocked and Russia and China showing no public
willingness to endorse a military intervention in Syria, the Administration may be searching for
new ways to accelerate Asad’s departure.
Some Members of Congress and nongovernmental observers argue that the recent violence
demonstrates the futility of expecting any substantive reform by Syrian authorities and suggests
that U.S. policy should shift toward outright confrontation and embrace regime change as a policy
goal. While the Administration has called for President Asad to step down, arguments in favor of
regime change have been accompanied by wariness about what the implications of confrontation
would be, and what the implications of regime change would be for regional security, particularly
in light of the delicate sectarian balance in the Levant and a lack of established U.S. relationships
with government and nongovernment actors in Syria. Other lawmakers have urged a gradual
approach of increasing multilateral political condemnation and economic pressure against the
Asad regime.
For now, the major question before concerned international actors is how to support Syria’s
opposition in a supportive manner that circumvents the United Nations Security Council veto of
Russia and China, assuming both nations do not change their position on Syria. Even a recent
Arab League-approved resolution continued to seek U.N. approval by calling on the Security
Council to authorize a joint Arab-United Nations force to “supervise the execution of a ceasefire.”
Congressional Research Service
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Contents
Toward a Syrian Civil War?............................................................................................................. 1
Opposition and Armed Groups ........................................................................................................ 3
U.S. Policy and Sanctions................................................................................................................ 5
Congressional Action................................................................................................................. 6
The Effect of Sanctions: Syria’s Economy Under Strain .......................................................... 6
Options and Implications........................................................................................................... 7
Specific Sanctions Against Syria............................................................................................. 12
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act ................................................................................... 13
Targeted Financial Sanctions............................................................................................. 14
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria ............................................................ 16
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria .................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Syria..................................................................................................................... 3
Tables
Table A-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2012 ................................................................. 10
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Sanctions and Legislation ...................................................................................... 9
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
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Toward a Syrian Civil War?
The confrontations and violence that swept through Syria in 2011 have escalated to the edge of
civil war in early 2012. President Bashar al Asad and his family members refuse to leave power,
despite internal demands and intense international pressure calling for political change and an end
to violence against civilians. Instead, the regime has offered limited reforms and is meeting
popular protests and armed opposition attacks with overwhelming force. Nonviolent resistance
and protests continue, but their apparent futility has created frustration and anger within the
opposition ranks. Press coverage and anecdotal reports suggest that thousands of mostly Sunni
military soldiers (perhaps as many as 20,000 to 30,000) have defected or deserted rather than
continue following orders to enforce the crackdown. Armed opposition fighters are becoming
more lethal in their attacks on loyal state security forces and institutions, and some high-ranking
officers are reported to have joined the opposition cause. The government accuses rebel fighters
of bombings and assassinations targeting security infrastructure and personnel in and around the
key cities of Damascus and Aleppo. As of mid-February, the number of defecting military
personnel and armed opposition volunteers does not appear to have reached a decisive point, and
fighting may continue to escalate toward a nationwide civil war.
As the Syrian conflict has intensified in early 2012, external actors have thus far failed in their
attempts to end the bloodshed. An Arab League-sponsored monitoring mission inside Syria and
transition plan put before the United Nations Security Council have both been obstructed by the
Syrian government and opposed by permanent Security Council members Russia and China.1 In
early February, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution that would have
adopted an Arab League transition plan that calls for a transfer of power to Syria's vice president,
followed by the establishment of a unity government and early elections. Prior to the vote, other
Security Council members reportedly had agreed to remove punitive measures such as
multilateral sanctions from the proposed resolution to sway Russia.2 The measure ultimately
failed, leaving members of the international community that are opposed to the Asad regime and
seeking to provide assistance to the Syrian people without a U.N.-mandate for collective action.
In the meantime, the Syrian government appears to sense that it has a free hand to crush dissent:
the military has unleashed a torrent of attacks against centers of opposition, most recently in
Homs where the armed forces have shelled neighborhoods. Government forces also continue to
besiege areas of Idlib, the east Damascus suburbs, and Homs. Reports suggest the government
has deployed snipers, cut off water and electricity to civilian areas, and used heavy weapons such
as tanks and artillery to bombard residential areas. In January 2012, the United Nations estimated
that over 5,400 Syrians have been killed since the unrest began in March 2011. The actual figure
1
On December 26, 2011, 165 Arab League monitors arrived in Syria to verify Syria’s compliance with an Arab peace
plan. Killings continued. Syria opposition activists argued that the monitoring plan gave the regime cover. Monitors
began to quit, and the Arab League suspended its mission and then formally ended it by mid-February.
2
Russia did not veto the U.N. Resolutions that authorized military intervention in Libya, but its leaders have criticized
what they feel was U.S. and European pursuit of a tacit policy of regime change under the guise of humanitarian
intervention. Russia values Syrian support for Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean region at the Syrian
coastal town of Tartus. Russian arms sales to Syria are a strategic and lucrative component of the long-time partnership
between Moscow and Damascus, which date to the Soviet era. From a diplomatic perspective, Russian leaders also may
be reluctant to be seen as abandoning a close ally by supporting international intervention.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
is probably much higher, and U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has urged
intervention while warning that a humanitarian crisis may be imminent.
The Asad family and the Alawite elite that supports it appear unwilling to peacefully abdicate
power and may choose to fight on as long as their command of the military and intelligence
apparatus allows. Defections continue among mostly Sunni Muslim soldiers and officers. The
minority Alawite community has shown few signs of public discord, although some of its
members have joined the opposition3 and others may feel caught between the regime’s demands
for loyalty and their fears of the consequences of that loyalty in the event of regime change or
civil war. Many foreign observers are debating the logic of Alawite loyalty in this context. Some
analysts suggest that fear of the military-intelligence apparatus has kept the Alawite community
politically quiet if not loyal, while others posit that the growing sectarian nature of the conflict
only reinforces confessional loyalties. The Asad family maintains command of the military and
intelligence apparatus, although defections continue among mostly Sunni soldiers and officers.
With Russia and China having effectively blocked United Nations involvement, there is concern
that, left with no choice, foreign nations, either working together or unilaterally, will intervene
(either directly or indirectly) in Syria’s civil war. To some extent, this may already be occurring.
Russia has opposed calls for an international arms embargo and may have sent arms shipments to
Syrian security forces.4 Syria’s other main ally, Iran, has reportedly sent military advisors,5 cash,
and weapons to Syria to aid in the government’s crackdown. It also has assisted Syria in
circumventing sanctions by selling its oil abroad.6 At present, Lebanon’s Hezbollah has stated its
support for the Asad government and has warned that third-party intervention in Syria’s crisis
could lead to regional conflagration, widely interpreted as a threat to Israel and regional peace.
The Emir of Qatar has called for Arab troops to be dispatched to Syria as part of a peacekeeping
force and, on February 12, the Arab League asked the United Nations Security Council to send a
peacekeeping mission to Syria. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahri and other violent extremists
have called on Muslims to support the uprising.
U.S. concerns about regional security and state-sponsored terrorism are directly implicated by the
potential for inconclusive unrest or drastic political change in Syria. The potential spillover
effects of continued or more intense violence raise unique questions with regard to Turkey,
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel. Refugee flows, sectarian conflict, or transnational violence by
non-state actors are among the contingencies that policy makers are considering in relation to
these countries. A host of concerns could emerge if developments create opportunities for other
violent Islamist groups to operate in Syria. The security of Syrian conventional and chemical
weapons stockpiles has already become a regional security concern, which would grow if civil
war or a security vacuum emerge. Many observers worry that an escalation in fighting or swift
regime change could generate new pressures on minority groups or lead to wider civil conflict.
3
In January 2012, a group of Alawite intellectuals issued a statement urging “Alawite Syrians, religious and ethic
minorities afraid of the consequences of a possible fall of the regime, to participate in efforts to overturn the oppressive
government and participate in the construction of a new Syrian republic based on the rule of law and citizenship.” See,
“Alawite intellectuals reject sectarianism in Syria,” Agence France Presse, January 19, 2012.
4
See, “Russia/Syria politics: Supporting Syria,” Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, February 9, 2012.
5
In December 2011, the FSA captured five Iranians who the Iranian government claimed were engineers. The
detainees later admitted they were military advisers sent to Syria to assist in the crackdown. See, U.S. government
Open Source Center (OSC), “Syria: YouTube Video Purportedly Shows Captured Iranian IRGC Members,” YouTube
in Arabic, January 26, 2012, Document ID# GMP20120126835007.
6
“New Bid To Stifle Iran Aid To Syria,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2012.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Figure 1. Map of Syria
Source: CRS Graphics.
Opposition and Armed Groups
Syrian opposition groups have grown more organized as the uprising has unfolded, but remain
divided over strategy, tactics, coordination, and leadership. During the protest stage of the
uprising, Local Coordinating Councils active in many areas created an informal network linking
activists around the country. As the unrest has moved toward greater violence and confrontation,
the focus of attention has shifted to armed opposition activists operating as part of the Free Syrian
Army. Two opposition coalition groups, one based in Syria and the other based in neighboring
Turkey, continue to compete for political leadership. Overall, the opposition movement remains
loosely coordinated, with agreements for cooperation existing amid periodic discord.
•
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) consists of dissident military personnel and
officers who have defected and are targeting government security forces in armed
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attacks. FSA forces are rumored to number in the low hundreds with possibly
thousands of loosely affiliated supporters. Precise and verifiable estimates are not
available. Public accounts further suggest that thousands of Syrian military and
security personnel have deserted or otherwise defected to non-FSA activities
during the uprising as forces have been increasingly stretched geographically and
logistically and as individuals have rejected orders to crack down on civilian
protestors. In spite of a November 2011 coordination agreement with the Syrian
National Council (see below), the FSA and its activities have remained the
subject of controversy. In early 2012, the FSA announced that it would escalate
its activities in response to continued regime violence. Some opposition activists
opposed the move and argued that an increased use of force could spark a broad
civil war. On February 10, FSA Commander Colonel Riyadh al Asad said that the
FSA “must attack all the regime's military and security centers that are used for
attacking the Syrian people and repressing them.” Media reports and video
footage posted by FSA members depict widespread, direct combat between
FSA/FSA-affiliated forces and Syrian security forces. Sub-units active in combat
include the Hamzah Bin Abdelmuttalib Brigade, the Dhi al Nurayn Brigade, and
the Al Faruq Brigade. The FSA’s deputy commander is Colonel Malik al Kurdi.
•
The Syrian National Council (SNC) was formally organized in Turkey in
October 2011 and brings together a range of external activists, along with
representatives of the Damascus Declaration Forces for National and Democratic
Change, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and the Syrian Revolution General
Commission (SRGC). The National Council distinguished itself in late 2011 by
calling for "immediate protection for civilians," in contrast to some of its
domestic counterparts who defined themselves in part by their opposition to any
external intervention. The Council rejected the Arab League agreement with the
Syrian government on November 2 (see below), and called on the Arab League
"to freeze Syria's membership, ensure the protection of civilians and recognize
the SNC as the representative of the Syrian revolution." Prominent leaders of the
SNC include Council chairman Burhan Ghalyun, a France-based Syrian
academic, and Muhammad Riyad al Shaqfah, the Controller General of the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.
•
The National Coordination Commission of the Forces of Democratic Change
(NCC) is a Syria-based alliance of leftist groups, Kurdish activists, and
individuals associated with the 2005 Damascus Declaration on political reform.
The NCC has criticized calls for any civilian protection measures that might
invite external military intervention and had left open the prospect of dialogue
with the Syrian government, predicated on an end to the use of force against
civilians. Prominent leaders of the NCC include general coordinator Hassan Abd
al Azim and long-time domestic opposition activists such as Michel Kilo. The
NCC has been critical of FSA activities and has argued in favor of preserving the
unity of the national military.
The use of force by Syrian opposition groups raises fundamental questions about the nature and
future of the Syrian uprising. It also is complicating internal opposition debates over strategy and
tactics. Some groups view force as a necessary and appropriate response to the violently
repressive tactics being used by government personnel. Others argue that the use of force opens
the opposition to criticism, undercuts its international legitimacy, and could increase fear among
"fence sitting" supporters of the government about the likelihood of violent chaos in the wake of
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regime change. The debate over the use of force is an extension of the broader political debate
that earlier divided the leading opposition groups over the possibility of dialogue with the Asad
government. Those who view the government as disingenuous in its offers of reform and dialogue
may be more likely to support or acquiesce to the use of force as the political confrontation
continues. The Syrian government has condemned the use of force against state security
personnel and attributes the growing number of attacks on military and police forces to
"terrorists" and armed Islamists. Opposition activists have accused the Syrian authorities of
staging several prominent bomb attacks in urban areas as a means of discrediting the opposition.
U.S. Policy and Sanctions
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August
2011 and have been vocal advocates for United Nations Security Council action to facilitate his
removal. However, with the council deadlocked and Russia and China showing no public
willingness to endorse a military intervention in Syria, the Administration may be searching for
new ways to accelerate Asad’s departure. U.S. diplomats are reportedly working to organize a
“Friends of Syria” international conference in order to increase diplomatic pressure both on the
regime and its foreign backers.
There has been no public indication that the Administration is planning to become militarily
involved in the conflict there, either directly or indirectly. When asked if the Administration
would consider arming the Syrian opposition, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria
Nuland said that “We never take anything off the table. The President does (or) doesn't. However,
as the president himself made absolutely clear and as the secretary has continued to say, we don't
think more arms into Syria is the answer.”7
Many experts assert that direct military involvement that does not involve ground troops would
be extremely difficult given the nature of the conflict. Syria’s civil war is being fought mostly in
urban environments amidst the civilian population making the use of air power to strike at regime
units more difficult. According to one unnamed high level U.S. official, “What frustrates . . . us is
that there are no silver bullets here....There are no good options.”8
The United States has closed its embassy in Damascus. On February 6, the State Department
suspended operations there and Ambassador Robert Ford left the country. Ambassador Ford wrote
after his departure that “I left Damascus with immense sadness and regret—I wish our departure
had not been necessary, but our Embassy, along with several other diplomatic missions in the
area, was not sufficiently protected, given the new security concerns in the capital.”9
The Administration has continued to expand U.S. sanctions on Syria while advocating further
multilateral sanctions. Table A-1 in the Appendix summarizes U.S. sanctions activity since the
start of the Syria uprising in March 2011.
7
Daily Press Briefing - February 7, 2012, State Department Press Releases And Documents.
"U.S. sees few good options in Syria," Washington Post, February 11, 2012.
9
"US envoy posts satellite image as proof of Syria violence," Reuters, February 10, 2012.
8
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Congressional Action
The Syrian government’s use of lethal force in response to political demonstrations has refocused
attention on the basic tenets of U.S. policy toward Syria. Some Members of Congress and
nongovernmental observers argue that the recent violence demonstrates the futility of expecting
any substantive reform by Syrian authorities and suggests that U.S. policy should shift toward
outright confrontation and embrace regime change as a policy goal. While the Administration has
called for President Asad to step down, arguments in favor of regime change have been
accompanied by wariness about what the implications of confrontation would be, and what the
implications of regime change would be for regional security, particularly in light of the delicate
sectarian balance in the Levant and a lack of established U.S. relationships with government and
nongovernment actors in Syria. Other lawmakers have urged a gradual approach of increasing
multilateral political condemnation and economic pressure against the Asad regime. The second
table in the Appendix summarizes legislation introduced in the 112th Congress that seeks to
address the unrest and conflict in Syria.
The Effect of Sanctions: Syria’s Economy Under Strain
Reports indicate that the Syrian economy and national budget are suffering due to a steep drop in
oil exports resulting from sanctions, almost a year of domestic unrest and the loss of international
tourism revenues, and new social and military spending aimed at quelling public anger. Estimates
vary on the degree of contraction in 2011, ranging between 5 to as high as 15 percent. 10 Urban
areas are now experiencing daily power outages, inflation is rising, and the value of the Syrian
pound has plummeted on the black market, forcing the government to spend resources propping it
up.
With the loss of European markets due to an oil export ban, Western countries have denied Syria
a major source of revenue and hard currency (25%-30% of total government revenue or $4 billion
a year). According to Syrian Oil Minister Sufian Alao, Western sanctions on Syrian oil exports
have cost the country $2 billion since September 2011.
Before sanctions, the main buyers of approximately 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of exported
Syrian oil were Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Turkey. Syria
produces about 380,000 bpd total. Foreign oil companies which have suspended operations in
Syria include: Tatneft (Russia), Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Total (France), Gulfsands (UK),
Suncor (Canada), and INA (Croatia). The operating status of two Chinese companies with
investments in Syria, CNPC and Sinopec is unknown.11 Western countries also have banned new
investment in Syria's oil and gas sector. Sanctions also are having an impact on other aspects of
Syria's energy sector, including financing and shipping. According to one oil products trader
based in the Middle East, "I don't do Syria anymore. Sanctions appeared tougher, so I gave up....
The problem is getting a bank to finance it and a ship owner to go there."12
Since new sanctions were enacted, many analysts have speculated about whether new investors
and foreign markets would arise for Syrian oil exports, albeit at lower prices due to sanctions and
10
"Cracks Widen in Syrian Economy," IPS, January 24, 2012.
“Syria: Voting with their feet,” Economist Intelligence Unit - Business Middle East, January 16, 2012.
12
"Syria Cancels Fuel Export Tender, Sanctions Deter," Reuters, November 3, 2011.
11
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increased shipping costs. Some experts believe that both India and China are in a position to
refine the heavy crude that Syria exports, and some reports suggest that India’s ONGC is
considering importing oil it currently produces in Syria to India, instead of shutting down its field
operations.13 According to one energy expert, “There is almost certainly someone who will buy
it.... In the past there have been trading companies that would launder oil for Iraq or Iran, for
example. Some countries will buy gasoline from Caribbean refiners without knowing the origin
of the oil.’’14 However, others assert that some Asian buyers would find the prospect of
purchasing Syrian oil too risky. According to one report, “As far as Chinese and the Indians are
concerned, they could of course try to buy some volumes. But the economics don't make any
sense for them and volumes are too small to take the risks.”15
Options and Implications
The mounting civilian death toll in Syria has continued to garner calls for international
intervention in the conflict. However, at this time, there continues to be no strong consensus on
whether the international community should or could aid the Syrian opposition in removing the
Asad regime from power. Various experts have offered several military options, including:
deploying ground troops, employing air power, sending international peacekeepers to Syria,
establishing No-Fly-Zones, creating buffer zones or safe havens inside Syria, providing logistical
support to rebels such as satellite imagery, and training and equipping rebel soldiers.
However, Syrians themselves, even those who may be in favor of some degree of international
intervention, may be divided over the extent of any international mission. Furthermore, no
Western military power has publicly indicated its desire to intervene militarily inside Syria.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in late 2011 that NATO has “no intention
whatsoever to intervene in Syria.” Many experts have asserted that “Syria is not Libya,” referring
to the different terrain, the nature of the conflict there, the lack of physical protection for
opposition forces, and the general volatile regional environment.
For now, the major question before concerned international actors is how to support Syria’s
opposition in a supportive manner that circumvents the United Nations Security Council veto of
Russia and China, assuming both nations do not change their position on Syria. Even a recent
Arab League-approved resolution continued to seek U.N. approval by calling on the Security
Council to authorize a joint Arab-United Nations force to “supervise the execution of a ceasefire.”
Diplomatic options may hold symbolic significance, but are not expected to change military
circumstances on the ground. Observers have suggested that interested parties form an
international contact group to coordinate action on Syria or that willing nations begin to recognize
the Syrian opposition as the legitimate government by appointing special diplomatic
representatives to groups such as the Syrian National Council or the Free Syrian Army.
U.S. policy toward Syria since the 1980s has ranged from confrontation and containment to
cautious engagement, as successive Congresses and Administrations have sought to end Syria’s
13
"Syrian Oil Exports Paralysed as Sanctions Bite," Reuters, September 22, 2011.
"Syria looking for buyers after West rejects its oil," International Herald Tribune, September 29, 2011.
15
Reuters, September 22, 2011, op.cit.
14
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support for terrorism, encourage regional peace talks, and prevent proliferation of missiles and
weapons of mass destruction. In the event of a swift regime change or other political transition in
Syria, U.S. officials and Members of Congress will face a series of complex decisions regarding
the timing and scope of potential changes to existing policy and sanctions to facilitate or further
restrict relations with a successor government.
In the interim, Congress and the Administration could seek to increase the pressure on the Asad
regime through the sanctioning of third-party entities engaged in financial transactions with Syria
or through the pursuit of greater multilateral sanctions enforcement. The provision of material
support to political and armed opposition activists also remains an option, if a controversial one.
Prior to such an effort, initiatives to develop stronger relationships with newly prominent and
influential Syrian actors may also be considered.16 In any regime collapse scenario, the United
States or others may consider some form of rapid response to secure stockpiles of missiles and
unconventional weapons, as is being done in Libya.
16
To date, robust U.S. sanctions have limited official and nongovernmental contacts between the two countries leaving
the U.S. government with few well-established relationships with influential Syrians or the broader Syrian population.
Bilateral security cooperation has been limited to reported intelligence coordination on counterterrorism issues of
shared concern: the absence of regular U.S. engagement with Syrian military officers limits U.S. insight into current
and future developments involving Syrian military personnel whose defections are now important factors in the
ongoing unrest.
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Appendix. U.S. Sanctions and Legislation
Overview
At present, a variety of legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria
and restrict bilateral trade. Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is
therefore subject to a number of general U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State
Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in 1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006
Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued new executive orders that expanded U.S.
sanctions specifically on Syria.
•
The first table below reviews sanctions introduced since early 2011 in response
to Syria’s uprising.
•
The second table below summarizes legislation introduced in the 112th Congress
regarding the Syrian uprising, sanctions, and U.S. policy.
•
Syria-specific sanctions and general sanctions applicable to Syria are also
summarized below.
Background on U.S. Assistance to Syria and Restrictions
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s
designation as a country supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to
receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and 1981, the United States provided a total of
$627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in
economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a
brief warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded
with U.S. assistance included water supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health
and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to Syria since 1981, when the last aid
programs were closed out. In the event of regime change, the Obama Administration and
Congress would need to reevaluate any successor government’s policies with regard to support
for international terrorism in order to determine Syria’s potential eligibility for U.S. assistance.
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Table A-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2012
(Implemented by Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC])
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
February 16,
2012
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
December
1, 2011
Muhammad Makhluf, Military Housing
Establishment, Real Estate Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
October 3,
2011
OFAC issued two general licenses related to
Syria to authorize payments in connection with
overflight or emergency landing and transactions
with respect to telecommunications
September
27, 2011
OFAC issued a General License related to Syria
to authorize third-country diplomatic and
consular funds transfers and to authorize certain
services in support of nongovernmental
organizations' activities.
September
9, 2011
OFAC issued four general licenses related to
Syria to authorize wind down transactions,
certain official activities of international
organizations, incidental transactions related to
U.S. persons residing in Syria and operation of
accounts.
August 30,
2011
Walid Mouallem (Foreign Minister), Ali Abdul
Karim Ali (Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon),
Bouthaina Shaaban (Advisor to the President)
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
August 18,
2011
Government of Syria
Executive Order 13582 - Freezes all assets of the
Government of Syria, prohibits U.S. persons from
engaging in any transaction involving the
Government of Syria, bans U.S. imports of Syrianorigin petroleum or petroleum products,
prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings in
or related to Syria’s petroleum or petroleum
products, and prohibits U.S. persons from
operating or investing in Syria.
August 18,
2011
General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company
For Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian
Petroleum Company, Sytrol
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 10,
2011
Commercial Bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based
subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank,
Syriatel, the country's main mobile phone operator
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 4,
2011
Muhammad Hamsho (businessman with ties to
Asad family), Hamsho International Group
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
June 29,
2011
Jamil Hassan (Head of Air Force Intelligence),
Political Security Directorate (PSD, domestic
intelligence)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
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Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
May 18,
2011
President Bashar al Asad, Farouk al Shara (vice
president), Adel Safar (prime minister), Mohammad
Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the interior), Ali
Habib Mahmoud (minister of defense), Abdul Fatah
Qudsiya (head of Syrian military intelligence),
Mohammed Dib Zaitoun (director of political
security directorate), Nabil Rafik al Kuzbari,
General Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corp Qods Force suspected
of human rights abuses in Syria), Al Mashreq
Investment Fund, Bena Properties, Cham Holding,
Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Syrian Military
Intelligence, Syrian National Security Bureau
Executive Order 13573 adds listed individuals and
entities to OFAC’s SDN List
April 29,
2011
Maher al Asad, Ali Mamluk (director of the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate GID), Atif Najib
(former head of the Syrian Political Security
Directorate for Dara'a province and the
president's cousin). the General Intelligence
Directorate, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps – Quds Force (for allegedly assisting
Syria in its crackdown)
Executive Order 13572 adds listed individuals and
entities to OFAC’s SDN List
Source: U.S. Treasury Department.
Notes: As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such
as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such
individuals and companies are called Specially Designated Nationals or SDNs. Their assets are blocked and U.S.
persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.
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Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress
The following legislation introduced in the 112th Congress addresses the current situation in Syria.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act—Would, among other things, sanction the development of
petroleum resources of Syria, the production of refined petroleum products in Syria, and the exportation of
refined petroleum products to Syria.
•
H.Res. 296 (S.Res. 180 in the Senate), A Resolution Expressing support for peaceful demonstrations and
universal freedoms in Syria and condemning the human rights violations by the Assad Regime—Among other
things, it urges the “President to continue to work with the European Union, the Government of Turkey, the
Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other allies and partners to bring an end to human rights abuses
in Syria, hold the perpetrators accountable, and support the aspirations of the people of Syria.”
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act of 2011—States
that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their
proliferation activities and policies. Would, among other things, prohibit U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements
and related export licenses and transfers of materials, services and goods with a country that is assisting the
nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such
countries.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011—Amends the Iran, North Korea,
and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or
extracted within North Korea’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the transportation of
goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such countries’ weapons of mass destruction programs,
support for acts of international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions shipping
services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011—Denies companies that conduct business in Syria’s energy sector
(investment, oil purchases, and sale of gasoline) access to U.S. financial institutions and requires federal
contractors to certify that they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
•
S. 2034, Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012 —Imposes sanctions on persons who are responsible for
or complicit in certain human rights abuses. Also prohibits procurement contracts with persons that export
sensitive technology to Syria.
•
S.Res. 370, calling for democratic change in Syria, would state the Senate’s condemnation of “ongoing,
widespread, and systemic violations of human rights conducted by authorities in Syria” and calls on Bashar al
Asad to step down. The non-binding resolution would urge the President to support a democratic transition in
Syria, establish a Friends of Syria Contact Group, develop a strategy to encourage further military defections, and
“develop a plan to identify weapons stockpiles and prevent the proliferation of conventional, biological, chemical,
and other types of weapons in Syria.”
Specific Sanctions Against Syria
Specific U.S. sanctions levied against Syria fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions resulting
from the passage of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that,
among other things, prohibit most U.S. exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed by executive order
from the President that specifically deny certain Syrian citizens and entities access to the U.S.
financial system due to their participation in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden; or destabilizing activities in Iraq and
Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from the USA PATRIOT Act levied specifically against the
Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006.
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The 2003 Syria Accountability Act
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act into law, as P.L. 108-175. This law requires the President to impose
penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased
supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq (§§5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans on the
export of military items (already banned under other legislation, see above17) and of dual use
items (items with both civil and military applications) to Syria (§5(a)(1)). In addition, the
President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
•
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
•
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
•
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
•
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
•
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
•
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (§ 5(a)(2)).
Implementation
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions of
P.L. 108-175, including the bans on munitions and dual use items (§5(a)(1)) and two sanctions
from the menu of six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban on
exports to Syria other than food and medicine (§5(a)(2)(A) and the ban on Syrian aircraft landing
in or overflying the United States (§5(a)(2)(D). In issuing his executive order, the President stated
that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete steps to address the concerns that led to the
enactment of the Syria Accountability Act. The President also imposed two additional sanctions
based on other legislation.
•
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.
Waivers
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver
authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to
issue the following waivers on grounds of national security:
17
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
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Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products in
support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of
potential dual use; aircraft parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information; certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a temporary
nature.18
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of
Syrian aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an
emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.19 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.20
The following individuals and entities have been targeted by the U.S. Treasury Department
(Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC):
•
On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior Syrian
officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then-Interior Minister and its head
of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively, the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any assets
they may have in the United States and banning any U.S. persons, including U.S.
financial institutions outside of the United States, from conducting transactions
with them.21 Kanaan allegedly committed suicide in October 2005, though some
have speculated that he may have been murdered.
18
According to U.S. regulations, any product that contains more than 10% de minimis U.S.-origin content, regardless
of where it is made, is not allowed to be exported to Syria. For U.S. commercial licensing prohibitions on exports and
re-exports to Syria, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 Supp No. 1. The Department of Commerce reviews license applications on a
case-by-case basis for exports or re-exports to Syria under a general policy of denial. For a description of items that do
not require export licenses, see, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce, Implementation
of the Syria Accountability Act, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
19
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documents/13338.pdf.
20
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
21
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2617.aspx.
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•
On January 18, 2006, U.S. Treasury Department took the same actions against
the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military intelligence.
•
On April 26, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13399 that authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the U.S.-based assets of anyone found to
be involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also affects anyone involved in bombings or
assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004, or anyone hindering the
international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The order allows the
United States to comply with UNSCR 1636, which calls on all states to freeze the
assets of those persons designated by the investigating commission or the
government of Lebanon to be involved in the Hariri assassination.
•
On August 15, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for allegedly contributing
to Syria’s support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and
Brigadier General Jama’a Jama’a, for allegedly playing a central part in Syria’s
intelligence operations in Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.22
•
On January 4, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three Syrian
entities, the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the
Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory, as
weapons proliferators under an executive order (E.O.13382) based on the
authority vested to the President under IEEPA. The three state-sponsored
institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.23
•
On August 1, 2007, the President issued E.O. 1344124 blocking the property of
persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and
institutions. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
four individuals reportedly affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert
Syrian control over the Lebanese political system, including Assaad Halim
Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab and Hafiz Makhluf (under the authority of E.O.13441)
and Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik (under the authority of E.O.13338).25
•
On February 13, 2008, President Bush issued another Order (E.O.13460)
blocking the property of senior Syrian officials. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the order “targets individuals and entities determined to be
responsible for or who have benefitted from the public corruption of senior
officials of the Syrian regime. The order also revises a provision in Executive
22
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp60.aspx.
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp216.aspx.
24
On July 29, 2010, President Obama extended that National Emergency with respect to Lebanon for another year,
stating that “While there have been some recent positive developments in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah that include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems serve to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in Lebanon, and continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” See, Notice of July 29, 2010—
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Actions of Certain Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty
of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions, Federal Register, Title 3—The President, [Page 45045].
25
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp666.aspx.
23
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Order 13338 to block the property of Syrian officials who have undermined U.S.
and international efforts to stabilize Iraq.26 One week later, under the authority of
E.O.13460, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets and restricted the
financial transactions of Rami Makhluf, a powerful cousin of President Bashar al
Asad.
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria
As previously mentioned, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush instructed
the Treasury Department in 2004 to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering
concerns. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued a final ruling that imposes a special measure
against the Commercial Bank of Syria as a financial institution of primary money laundering
concern. It bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent
account with the Commercial Bank of Syria, and it also requires banks to conduct due diligence
that ensures the Commercial Bank of Syria is not circumventing sanctions through its business
dealings with them.27
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [P.L. 94-329].
Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC 2371]. (Syria was not affected by this ban until
1979, as explained below.)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 [Title II of P.L. 95-223 (codified at
50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.)]. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
the President has broad powers pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a
threat “which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” These powers include the ability to
seize foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction, to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, to
prohibit payments between financial institutions involving foreign currency, and to prohibit the
import or export of foreign currency.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93 Stat. 515]
required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress before
licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries determined to
have supported acts of international terrorism. (Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 relettered
Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list. This list is
prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
26
A previous executive order, E.O. 13315, blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and members of
his former regime. On June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian company, SES
International Corp., and two of its officials under the authority of E.O.13315.
27
See, “U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria.” Available at http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctionssyr.html.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support for
acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first prepared in
1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2009, issued on August 5, 2010. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the
above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399]. Section 509(a) of this
act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit export of
items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of international terrorism,
thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the AntiTerrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989—see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans
obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of this act [100 Stat.
1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on income or war
profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism.
[26 USC 901(j)]. The President was given authority to waive this provision under Section 601 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200, May 18, 2000).
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L. 101-222]. Section 4
amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional notification and
licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries
on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their
ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribes conditions for removing a country from the terrorism list: prior
notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen of
two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite notification, the
President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no
longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45
days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list).
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver
has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other
prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132]. This act requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (§325) or lethal military
equipment (§326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President to waive this
provision on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to third countries that
sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens or
resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the terrorism
list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in consultation
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with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such
transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.”
(31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996,
the then chairman of the House International Relations Committee reportedly protested to then
President Clinton about the Treasury Department’s implementing regulation, which he described
as a “special loophole” for Syria.
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign assistance
appropriations legislation enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S. aid.
The most recent ban appears in Section 7007 of P.L. 112-74, Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012, which states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to
titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance
or reparations for the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria: Provided, That for
purposes of this section, the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include direct loans,
credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents.”
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by Section 431 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United
States to withhold a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for
programs that benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178, was amended by P.L. 109-112 to make its
provisions applicable to Syria as well as Iran. The amended act, known as the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act, requires the President to submit semi-annual reports to designated
congressional committees, identifying any persons involved in arms transfers to or from Iran or
Syria; also, the act authorizes the President to impose various sanctions against such individuals.
On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed P.L. 109-353 which expanded the scope of the
original law by adding North Korea to its provisions, thereby renaming the law the Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (or INKSNA for short). The list of Syrian entities
designated under INKSNA includes Army Supply Bureau (2008), Syrian Navy (2009), Syrian Air
Force (2009), and Ministry of Defense (2008).28 On May 24, 2011, the State Department
designated the Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center
(SSRC) under INKSNA.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
28
See, State Department Press Releases And Documents “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act: Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
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