Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against
the Asad RegimeSyria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
AnalystSpecialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 16May 24, 2012
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33487
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Summary
This report analyzes the current unrest in Syria and the U.S. response to the Syrian government’s
crackdown against demonstrators. It also provides background information on U.S. sanctions
against the Asad regime and its supporters.
The confrontations and violence that swept through Syria in 2011 have escalated to the edge of
civil war in early 2012. President Bashar al Asad and his family members refuse to leave power,
despite internal demands and intense international pressure calling for political change and an end
to violence against civilians. Instead, the regime has offered limited reforms and is meeting
popular protests and armed opposition attacks with overwhelming force.
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August
2011 and have been vocal advocates for United Nations Security Council action to facilitate his
removal. However, with the council deadlocked and Russia and China showing no public
willingness to endorse a military intervention in Syria, the Administration may be searching for
new ways to accelerate Asad’s departure.
Some Members of Congress and nongovernmental observers argue that the recent violence
demonstrates the futility of expecting any substantive reform by Syrian authorities and suggests
that U.S. policy should shift toward outright confrontation and embrace regime change as a policy
goal. While the Administration has called for President Asad to step down, arguments in favor of
regime change have been accompanied by wariness about what the implications of confrontation
would be, and what the implications of regime change would be for regional security, particularly
in light of the delicate sectarian balance in the Levant and a lack of established U.S. relationships
with government and nongovernment actors in Syria. Other lawmakers have urged a gradual
approach of increasing multilateral political condemnation and economic pressure against the
Asad regime.
For now, the major question before concerned international actors is how to support Syria’s
opposition in a supportive manner that circumvents the United Nations Security Council veto of
Russia and China, assuming both nations do not change their position on Syria. Even a recent
Arab League-approved resolution continued to seek U.N. approval by calling on the Security
Council to authorize a joint Arab-United Nations force to “supervise the execution of a ceasefire.”
Congressional Research Service
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Contents
Toward a Syrian Civil War?............................................................................................................. 1
Opposition and Armed Groups ........................................................................................................ 3
U.S. Policy and Sanctions................................................................................................................ 5
Congressional Action................................................................................................................. 6
The Effect of Sanctions: Syria’s Economy Under Strain .......................................................... 6
Options and Implications........................................................................................................... 7
Specific Sanctions Against Syria............................................................................................. 12
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act ................................................................................... 13
Targeted Financial Sanctions............................................................................................. 14
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria ............................................................ 16
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria .................................................................................... 16
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Syria..................................................................................................................... 3
Tables
Table A-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2012 ................................................................. 10
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Sanctions and Legislation ...................................................................................... 9
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18
Congressional Research Service
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Toward a Syrian Civil War?
The confrontations and violence that swept through Syria in 2011 have escalated to the edge of
civil war in early 2012. President Bashar al Asad and his family members refuse to leave power,
despite internal demands and intense international pressure calling for political change and an end
to violence against civilians. Instead, the regime has offered limited reforms and is meeting
popular protests and armed opposition attacks with overwhelming force. Nonviolent resistance
and protests continue, but their apparent futility has created frustration and anger within the
opposition ranks. Press coverage and anecdotal reports suggest that thousands of mostly Sunni
military soldiers (perhaps as many as 20,000 to 30,000) have defected or deserted rather than
continue following orders to enforce the crackdown. Armed opposition fighters are becoming
more lethal in their attacks on loyal state security forces and institutions, and some high-ranking
officers are reported to have joined the opposition cause. The government accuses rebel fighters
of bombings and assassinations targeting security infrastructure and personnel in and around the
key cities of Damascus and Aleppo. As of mid-February, the number of defecting military
personnel and armed opposition volunteers does not appear to have reached a decisive point, and
fighting may continue to escalate toward a nationwide civil war.
As the Syrian conflict has intensified in early 2012, external actors have thus far failed in their
attempts to end the bloodshed. An Arab League-sponsored monitoring mission inside Syria and
transition plan put before the United Nations Security Council have both been obstructed by the
Syrian government and opposed by permanent Security Council members Russia and China.1 In
early February, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution that would have
adopted an Arab League transition plan that calls for a transfer of power to Syria's vice president,
followed by the establishment of a unity government and early elections. Prior to the vote, other
Security Council members reportedly had agreed to remove punitive measures such as
multilateral sanctions from the proposed resolution to sway Russia.2 The measure ultimately
failed, leaving members of the international community that are opposed to the Asad regime and
seeking to provide assistance to the Syrian people without a U.N.-mandate for collective action.
In the meantime, the Syrian government appears to sense that it has a free hand to crush dissent:
the military has unleashed a torrent of attacks against centers of opposition, most recently in
Homs where the armed forces have shelled neighborhoods. Government forces also continue to
besiege areas of Idlib, the east Damascus suburbs, and Homs. Reports suggest the government
has deployed snipers, cut off water and electricity to civilian areas, and used heavy weapons such
as tanks and artillery to bombard residential areas. In January 2012, the United Nations estimated
that over 5,400 Syrians have been killed since the unrest began in March 2011. The actual figure
1
On December 26, 2011, 165 Arab League monitors arrived in Syria to verify Syria’s compliance with an Arab peace
plan. Killings continued. Syria opposition activists argued that the monitoring plan gave the regime cover. Monitors
began to quit, and the Arab League suspended its mission and then formally ended it by mid-February.
2
Russia did not veto the U.N. Resolutions that authorized military intervention in Libya, but its leaders have criticized
what they feel was U.S. and European pursuit of a tacit policy of regime change under the guise of humanitarian
intervention. Russia values Syrian support for Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean region at the Syrian
coastal town of Tartus. Russian arms sales to Syria are a strategic and lucrative component of the long-time partnership
between Moscow and Damascus, which date to the Soviet era. From a diplomatic perspective, Russian leaders also may
be reluctant to be seen as abandoning a close ally by supporting international intervention.
Congressional Research Service
1
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
is probably much higher, and U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay has urged
intervention while warning that a humanitarian crisis may be imminent.
The Asad family and the Alawite elite that supports it appear unwilling to peacefully abdicate
power and may choose to fight on as long as their command of the military and intelligence
apparatus allows. Defections continue among mostly Sunni Muslim soldiers and officers. The
minority Alawite community has shown few signs of public discord, although some of its
members have joined the opposition3 and others may feel caught between the regime’s demands
for loyalty and their fears of the consequences of that loyalty in the event of regime change or
civil war. Many foreign observers are debating the logic of Alawite loyalty in this context. Some
analysts suggest that fear of the military-intelligence apparatus has kept the Alawite community
politically quiet if not loyal, while others posit that the growing sectarian nature of the conflict
only reinforces confessional loyalties. The Asad family maintains command of the military and
intelligence apparatus, although defections continue among mostly Sunni soldiers and officers.
With Russia and China having effectively blocked United Nations involvement, there is concern
that, left with no choice, foreign nations, either working together or unilaterally, will intervene
(either directly or indirectly) in Syria’s civil war. To some extent, this may already be occurring.
Russia has opposed calls for an international arms embargo and may have sent arms shipments to
Syrian security forces.4 Syria’s other main ally, Iran, has reportedly sent military advisors,5 cash,
and weapons to Syria to aid in the government’s crackdown. It also has assisted Syria in
circumventing sanctions by selling its oil abroad.6 At present, Lebanon’s Hezbollah has stated its
support for the Asad government and has warned that third-party intervention in Syria’s crisis
could lead to regional conflagration, widely interpreted as a threat to Israel and regional peace.
The Emir of Qatar has called for Arab troops to be dispatched to Syria as part of a peacekeeping
force and, on February 12, the Arab League asked the United Nations Security Council to send a
peacekeeping mission to Syria. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahri and other violent extremists
have called on Muslims to support the uprising.
U.S. concerns about regional security and state-sponsored terrorism are directly implicated by the
potential for inconclusive unrest or drastic political change in Syria. The potential spillover
effects of continued or more intense violence raise unique questions with regard to Turkey,
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel. Refugee flows, sectarian conflict, or transnational violence by
non-state actors are among the contingencies that policy makers are considering in relation to
these countries. A host of concerns could emerge if developments create opportunities for other
violent Islamist groups to operate in Syria. The security of Syrian conventional and chemical
weapons stockpiles has already become a regional security concern, which would grow if civil
war or a security vacuum emerge. Many observers worry that an escalation in fighting or swift
regime change could generate new pressures on minority groups or lead to wider civil conflict.
3
In January 2012, a group of Alawite intellectuals issued a statement urging “Alawite Syrians, religious and ethic
minorities afraid of the consequences of a possible fall of the regime, to participate in efforts to overturn the oppressive
government and participate in the construction of a new Syrian republic based on the rule of law and citizenship.” See,
“Alawite intellectuals reject sectarianism in Syria,” Agence France Presse, January 19, 2012.
4
See, “Russia/Syria politics: Supporting Syria,” Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, February 9, 2012.
5
In December 2011, the FSA captured five Iranians who the Iranian government claimed were engineers. The
detainees later admitted they were military advisers sent to Syria to assist in the crackdown. See, U.S. government
Open Source Center (OSC), “Syria: YouTube Video Purportedly Shows Captured Iranian IRGC Members,” YouTube
in Arabic, January 26, 2012, Document ID# GMP20120126835007.
6
“New Bid To Stifle Iran Aid To Syria,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
2
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Figure 1. Map of Syria
Source: CRS Graphics.
Opposition and Armed Groups
Syrian opposition groups have grown more organized as the uprising has unfolded, but remain
divided over strategy, tactics, coordination, and leadership. During the protest stage of the
uprising, Local Coordinating Councils active in many areas created an informal network linking
activists around the country. As the unrest has moved toward greater violence and confrontation,
the focus of attention has shifted to armed opposition activists operating as part of the Free Syrian
Army. Two opposition coalition groups, one based in Syria and the other based in neighboring
Turkey, continue to compete for political leadership. Overall, the opposition movement remains
loosely coordinated, with agreements for cooperation existing amid periodic discord.
•
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) consists of dissident military personnel and
officers who have defected and are targeting government security forces in armed
Congressional Research Service
3
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
attacks. FSA forces are rumored to number in the low hundreds with possibly
thousands of loosely affiliated supporters. Precise and verifiable estimates are not
available. Public accounts further suggest that thousands of Syrian military and
security personnel have deserted or otherwise defected to non-FSA activities
during the uprising as forces have been increasingly stretched geographically and
logistically and as individuals have rejected orders to crack down on civilian
protestors. In spite of a November 2011 coordination agreement with the Syrian
National Council (see below), the FSA and its activities have remained the
subject of controversy. In early 2012, the FSA announced that it would escalate
its activities in response to continued regime violence. Some opposition activists
opposed the move and argued that an increased use of force could spark a broad
civil war. On February 10, FSA Commander Colonel Riyadh al Asad said that the
FSA “must attack all the regime's military and security centers that are used for
attacking the Syrian people and repressing them.” Media reports and video
footage posted by FSA members depict widespread, direct combat between
FSA/FSA-affiliated forces and Syrian security forces. Sub-units active in combat
include the Hamzah Bin Abdelmuttalib Brigade, the Dhi al Nurayn Brigade, and
the Al Faruq Brigade. The FSA’s deputy commander is Colonel Malik al Kurdi.
•
The Syrian National Council (SNC) was formally organized in Turkey in
October 2011 and brings together a range of external activists, along with
representatives of the Damascus Declaration Forces for National and Democratic
Change, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and the Syrian Revolution General
Commission (SRGC). The National Council distinguished itself in late 2011 by
calling for "immediate protection for civilians," in contrast to some of its
domestic counterparts who defined themselves in part by their opposition to any
external intervention. The Council rejected the Arab League agreement with the
Syrian government on November 2 (see below), and called on the Arab League
"to freeze Syria's membership, ensure the protection of civilians and recognize
the SNC as the representative of the Syrian revolution." Prominent leaders of the
SNC include Council chairman Burhan Ghalyun, a France-based Syrian
academic, and Muhammad Riyad al Shaqfah, the Controller General of the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.
•
The National Coordination Commission of the Forces of Democratic Change
(NCC) is a Syria-based alliance of leftist groups, Kurdish activists, and
individuals associated with the 2005 Damascus Declaration on political reform.
The NCC has criticized calls for any civilian protection measures that might
invite external military intervention and had left open the prospect of dialogue
with the Syrian government, predicated on an end to the use of force against
civilians. Prominent leaders of the NCC include general coordinator Hassan Abd
al Azim and long-time domestic opposition activists such as Michel Kilo. The
NCC has been critical of FSA activities and has argued in favor of preserving the
unity of the national military.
The use of force by Syrian opposition groups raises fundamental questions about the nature and
future of the Syrian uprising. It also is complicating internal opposition debates over strategy and
tactics. Some groups view force as a necessary and appropriate response to the violently
repressive tactics being used by government personnel. Others argue that the use of force opens
the opposition to criticism, undercuts its international legitimacy, and could increase fear among
"fence sitting" supporters of the government about the likelihood of violent chaos in the wake of
Congressional Research Service
4
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
regime change. The debate over the use of force is an extension of the broader political debate
that earlier divided the leading opposition groups over the possibility of dialogue with the Asad
government. Those who view the government as disingenuous in its offers of reform and dialogue
may be more likely to support or acquiesce to the use of force as the political confrontation
continues. The Syrian government has condemned the use of force against state security
personnel and attributes the growing number of attacks on military and police forces to
"terrorists" and armed Islamists. Opposition activists have accused the Syrian authorities of
staging several prominent bomb attacks in urban areas as a means of discrediting the opposition.
U.S. Policy and Sanctions
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August
2011 and have been vocal advocates for United Nations Security Council action to facilitate his
removal. However, with the council deadlocked and Russia and China showing no public
willingness to endorse a military intervention in Syria, the Administration may be searching for
new ways to accelerate Asad’s departure. U.S. diplomats are reportedly working to organize a
“Friends of Syria” international conference in order to increase diplomatic pressure both on the
regime and its foreign backers.
There has been no public indication that the Administration is planning to become militarily
involved in the conflict there, either directly or indirectly. When asked if the Administration
would consider arming the Syrian opposition, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria
Nuland said that “We never take anything off the table. The President does (or) doesn't. However,
as the president himself made absolutely clear and as the secretary has continued to say, we don't
think more arms into Syria is the answer.”7
Many experts assert that direct military involvement that does not involve ground troops would
be extremely difficult given the nature of the conflict. Syria’s civil war is being fought mostly in
urban environments amidst the civilian population making the use of air power to strike at regime
units more difficult. According to one unnamed high level U.S. official, “What frustrates . . . us is
that there are no silver bullets here....There are no good options.”8
The United States has closed its embassy in Damascus. On February 6, the State Department
suspended operations there and Ambassador Robert Ford left the country. Ambassador Ford wrote
after his departure that “I left Damascus with immense sadness and regret—I wish our departure
had not been necessary, but our Embassy, along with several other diplomatic missions in the
area, was not sufficiently protected, given the new security concerns in the capital.”9
The Administration has continued to expand U.S. sanctions on Syria while advocating further
multilateral sanctions. Table A-1 in the Appendix summarizes U.S. sanctions activity since the
start of the Syria uprising in March 2011.
7
Daily Press Briefing - February 7, 2012, State Department Press Releases And Documents.
"U.S. sees few good options in Syria," Washington Post, February 11, 2012.
9
"US envoy posts satellite image as proof of Syria violence," Reuters, February 10, 2012.
8
Congressional Research Service
5
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Congressional Action
The Syrian government’s use of lethal force in response to political demonstrations has refocused
attention on the basic tenets of U.S. policy toward Syria. Some Members of Congress and
nongovernmental observers argue that the recent violence demonstrates the futility of expecting
any substantive reform by Syrian authorities and suggests that U.S. policy should shift toward
outright confrontation and embrace regime change as a policy goal. While the Administration has
called for President Asad to step down, arguments in favor of regime change have been
accompanied by wariness about what the implications of confrontation would be, and what the
implications of regime change would be for regional security, particularly in light of the delicate
sectarian balance in the Levant and a lack of established U.S. relationships with government and
nongovernment actors in Syria. Other lawmakers have urged a gradual approach of increasing
multilateral political condemnation and economic pressure against the Asad regime. The second
table in the Appendix summarizes legislation introduced in the 112th Congress that seeks to
address the unrest and conflict in Syria.
The Effect of Sanctions: Syria’s Economy Under Strain
Reports indicate that the Syrian economy and national budget are suffering due to a steep drop in
oil exports resulting from sanctions, almost a year of domestic unrest and the loss of international
tourism revenues, and new social and military spending aimed at quelling public anger. Estimates
vary on the degree of contraction in 2011, ranging between 5 to as high as 15 percent. 10 Urban
areas are now experiencing daily power outages, inflation is rising, and the value of the Syrian
pound has plummeted on the black market, forcing the government to spend resources propping it
up.
With the loss of European markets due to an oil export ban, Western countries have denied Syria
a major source of revenue and hard currency (25%-30% of total government revenue or $4 billion
a year). According to Syrian Oil Minister Sufian Alao, Western sanctions on Syrian oil exports
have cost the country $2 billion since September 2011.
Before sanctions, the main buyers of approximately 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of exported
Syrian oil were Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain and Turkey. Syria
produces about 380,000 bpd total. Foreign oil companies which have suspended operations in
Syria include: Tatneft (Russia), Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Total (France), Gulfsands (UK),
Suncor (Canada), and INA (Croatia). The operating status of two Chinese companies with
investments in Syria, CNPC and Sinopec is unknown.11 Western countries also have banned new
investment in Syria's oil and gas sector. Sanctions also are having an impact on other aspects of
Syria's energy sector, including financing and shipping. According to one oil products trader
based in the Middle East, "I don't do Syria anymore. Sanctions appeared tougher, so I gave up....
The problem is getting a bank to finance it and a ship owner to go there."12
Since new sanctions were enacted, many analysts have speculated about whether new investors
and foreign markets would arise for Syrian oil exports, albeit at lower prices due to sanctions and
10
"Cracks Widen in Syrian Economy," IPS, January 24, 2012.
“Syria: Voting with their feet,” Economist Intelligence Unit - Business Middle East, January 16, 2012.
12
"Syria Cancels Fuel Export Tender, Sanctions Deter," Reuters, November 3, 2011.
11
Congressional Research Service
6
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
increased shipping costs. Some experts believe that both India and China are in a position to
refine the heavy crude that Syria exports, and some reports suggest that India’s ONGC is
considering importing oil it currently produces in Syria to India, instead of shutting down its field
operations.13 According to one energy expert, “There is almost certainly someone who will buy
it.... In the past there have been trading companies that would launder oil for Iraq or Iran, for
example. Some countries will buy gasoline from Caribbean refiners without knowing the origin
of the oil.’’14 However, others assert that some Asian buyers would find the prospect of
purchasing Syrian oil too risky. According to one report, “As far as Chinese and the Indians are
concerned, they could of course try to buy some volumes. But the economics don't make any
sense for them and volumes are too small to take the risks.”15
Options and Implications
The mounting civilian death toll in Syria has continued to garner calls for international
intervention in the conflict. However, at this time, there continues to be no strong consensus on
whether the international community should or could aid the Syrian opposition in removing the
Asad regime from power. Various experts have offered several military options, including:
deploying ground troops, employing air power, sending international peacekeepers to Syria,
establishing No-Fly-Zones, creating buffer zones or safe havens inside Syria, providing logistical
support to rebels such as satellite imagery, and training and equipping rebel soldiers.
However, Syrians themselves, even those who may be in favor of some degree of international
intervention, may be divided over the extent of any international mission. Furthermore, no
Western military power has publicly indicated its desire to intervene militarily inside Syria.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in late 2011 that NATO has “no intention
whatsoever to intervene in Syria.” Many experts have asserted that “Syria is not Libya,” referring
to the different terrain, the nature of the conflict there, the lack of physical protection for
opposition forces, and the general volatile regional environment.
For now, the major question before concerned international actors is how to support Syria’s
opposition in a supportive manner that circumvents the United Nations Security Council veto of
Russia and China, assuming both nations do not change their position on Syria. Even a recent
Arab League-approved resolution continued to seek U.N. approval by calling on the Security
Council to authorize a joint Arab-United Nations force to “supervise the execution of a ceasefire.”
Diplomatic options may hold symbolic significance, but are not expected to change military
circumstances on the ground. Observers have suggested that interested parties form an
international contact group to coordinate action on Syria or that willing nations begin to recognize
the Syrian opposition as the legitimate government by appointing special diplomatic
representatives to groups such as the Syrian National Council or the Free Syrian Army.
U.S. policy toward Syria since the 1980s has ranged from confrontation and containment to
cautious engagement, as successive Congresses and Administrations have sought to end Syria’s
13
"Syrian Oil Exports Paralysed as Sanctions Bite," Reuters, September 22, 2011.
"Syria looking for buyers after West rejects its oil," International Herald Tribune, September 29, 2011.
15
Reuters, September 22, 2011, op.cit.
14
Congressional Research Service
7
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
support for terrorism, encourage regional peace talks, and prevent proliferation of missiles and
weapons of mass destruction. In the event of a swift regime change or other political transition in
Syria, U.S. officials and Members of Congress will face a series of complex decisions regarding
the timing and scope of potential changes to existing policy and sanctions to facilitate or further
restrict relations with a successor government.
In the interim, Congress and the Administration could seek to increase the pressure on the Asad
regime through the sanctioning of third-party entities engaged in financial transactions with Syria
or through the pursuit of greater multilateral sanctions enforcement. The provision of material
support to political and armed opposition activists also remains an option, if a controversial one.
Prior to such an effort, initiatives to develop stronger relationships with newly prominent and
influential Syrian actors may also be considered.16 In any regime collapse scenario, the United
States or others may consider some form of rapid response to secure stockpiles of missiles and
unconventional weapons, as is being done in Libya.
16
To date, robust U.S. sanctions have limited official and nongovernmental contacts between the two countries leaving
the U.S. government with few well-established relationships with influential Syrians or the broader Syrian population.
Bilateral security cooperation has been limited to reported intelligence coordination on counterterrorism issues of
shared concern: the absence of regular U.S. engagement with Syrian military officers limits U.S. insight into current
and future developments involving Syrian military personnel whose defections are now important factors in the
ongoing unrest.
Congressional Research Service
8
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Appendix. U.S. Sanctions and Legislation
Overview
At present, a variety of legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria
and restrict bilateral trade. Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is
therefore subject to a number of general U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State
Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in 1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006
Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued new executive orders that expanded U.S.
sanctions specifically on Syria.
•
The first table below reviews sanctions introduced since early 2011 in response
to Syria’s uprising.
•
The second table below summarizes legislation introduced in the 112th Congress
regarding the Syrian uprising, sanctions, and U.S. policy.
•
Syria-specific sanctions and general sanctions applicable to Syria are also
summarized below.
Background on U.S. Assistance to Syria and Restrictions
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s
designation as a country supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to
receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and 1981, the United States provided a total of
$627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in
economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a
brief warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded
with U.S. assistance included water supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health
and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to Syria since 1981, when the last aid
programs were closed out. In the event of regime change, the Obama Administration and
Congress would need to reevaluate any successor government’s policies with regard to support
for international terrorism in order to determine Syria’s potential eligibility for U.S. assistance.
Congressional Research Service
9
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Table A-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2012
(Implemented by Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC])
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
February 16,
2012
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
December
1, 2011
Muhammad Makhluf, Military Housing
Establishment, Real Estate Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
October 3,
2011
OFAC issued two general licenses related to
Syria to authorize payments in connection with
overflight or emergency landing and transactions
with respect to telecommunications
September
27, 2011
OFAC issued a General License related to Syria
to authorize third-country diplomatic and
consular funds transfers and to authorize certain
services in support of nongovernmental
organizations' activities.
September
9, 2011
OFAC issued four general licenses related to
Syria to authorize wind down transactions,
certain official activities of international
organizations, incidental transactions related to
U.S. persons residing in Syria and operation of
accounts.
August 30,
2011
Walid Mouallem (Foreign Minister), Ali Abdul
Karim Ali (Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon),
Bouthaina Shaaban (Advisor to the President)
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
August 18,
2011
Government of Syria
Executive Order 13582 - Freezes all assets of the
Government of Syria, prohibits U.S. persons from
engaging in any transaction involving the
Government of Syria, bans U.S. imports of Syrianorigin petroleum or petroleum products,
prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings in
or related to Syria’s petroleum or petroleum
products, and prohibits U.S. persons from
operating or investing in Syria.
August 18,
2011
General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company
For Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian
Petroleum Company, Sytrol
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 10,
2011
Commercial Bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based
subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank,
Syriatel, the country's main mobile phone operator
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 4,
2011
Muhammad Hamsho (businessman with ties to
Asad family), Hamsho International Group
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
June 29,
2011
Jamil Hassan (Head of Air Force Intelligence),
Political Security Directorate (PSD, domestic
intelligence)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
Congressional Research Service
10
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
May 18,
2011
President Bashar al Asad, Farouk al Shara (vice
president), Adel Safar (prime minister), Mohammad
Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the interior), Ali
Habib Mahmoud (minister of defense), Abdul Fatah
Qudsiya (head of Syrian military intelligence),
Mohammed Dib Zaitoun (director of political
security directorate), Nabil Rafik al Kuzbari,
General Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corp Qods Force suspected
of human rights abuses in Syria), Al Mashreq
Investment Fund, Bena Properties, Cham Holding,
Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Syrian Military
Intelligence, Syrian National Security Bureau
Executive Order 13573 adds listed individuals and
entities to OFAC’s SDN List
April 29,
2011
Maher al Asad, Ali Mamluk (director of the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate GID), Atif Najib
(former head of the Syrian Political Security
Directorate for Dara'a province and the
president's cousin). the General Intelligence
Directorate, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps – Quds Force (for allegedly assisting
Syria in its crackdown)
Executive Order 13572 adds listed individuals and
entities to OFAC’s SDN List
Source: U.S. Treasury Department.
Notes: As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such
as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such
individuals and companies are called Specially Designated Nationals or SDNs. Their assets are blocked and U.S.
persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.
Congressional Research Service
11
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress
The following legislation introduced in the 112th Congress addresses the current situation in Syria.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act—Would, among other things, sanction the development of
petroleum resources of Syria, the production of refined petroleum products in Syria, and the exportation of
refined petroleum products to Syria.
•
H.Res. 296 (S.Res. 180 in the Senate), A Resolution Expressing support for peaceful demonstrations and
universal freedoms in Syria and condemning the human rights violations by the Assad Regime—Among other
things, it urges the “President to continue to work with the European Union, the Government of Turkey, the
Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other allies and partners to bring an end to human rights abuses
in Syria, hold the perpetrators accountable, and support the aspirations of the people of Syria.”
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act of 2011—States
that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their
proliferation activities and policies. Would, among other things, prohibit U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements
and related export licenses and transfers of materials, services and goods with a country that is assisting the
nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such
countries.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011—Amends the Iran, North Korea,
and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or
extracted within North Korea’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the transportation of
goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such countries’ weapons of mass destruction programs,
support for acts of international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions shipping
services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011—Denies companies that conduct business in Syria’s energy sector
(investment, oil purchases, and sale of gasoline) access to U.S. financial institutions and requires federal
contractors to certify that they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
•
S. 2034, Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012 —Imposes sanctions on persons who are responsible for
or complicit in certain human rights abuses. Also prohibits procurement contracts with persons that export
sensitive technology to Syria.
•
S.Res. 370, calling for democratic change in Syria, would state the Senate’s condemnation of “ongoing,
widespread, and systemic violations of human rights conducted by authorities in Syria” and calls on Bashar al
Asad to step down. The non-binding resolution would urge the President to support a democratic transition in
Syria, establish a Friends of Syria Contact Group, develop a strategy to encourage further military defections, and
“develop a plan to identify weapons stockpiles and prevent the proliferation of conventional, biological, chemical,
and other types of weapons in Syria.”
Specific Sanctions Against Syria
Specific U.S. sanctions levied against Syria fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions resulting
from the passage of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that,
among other things, prohibit most U.S. exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed by executive order
from the President that specifically deny certain Syrian citizens and entities access to the U.S.
financial system due to their participation in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden; or destabilizing activities in Iraq and
Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from the USA PATRIOT Act levied specifically against the
Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006.
Congressional Research Service
12
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act into law, as P.L. 108-175. This law requires the President to impose
penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased
supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq (§§5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans on the
export of military items (already banned under other legislation, see above17) and of dual use
items (items with both civil and military applications) to Syria (§5(a)(1)). In addition, the
President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
•
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
•
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
•
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
•
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
•
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
•
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (§ 5(a)(2)).
Implementation
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions of
P.L. 108-175, including the bans on munitions and dual use items (§5(a)(1)) and two sanctions
from the menu of six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban on
exports to Syria other than food and medicine (§5(a)(2)(A) and the ban on Syrian aircraft landing
in or overflying the United States (§5(a)(2)(D). In issuing his executive order, the President stated
that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete steps to address the concerns that led to the
enactment of the Syria Accountability Act. The President also imposed two additional sanctions
based on other legislation.
•
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.
Waivers
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver
authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to
issue the following waivers on grounds of national security:
17
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
Congressional Research Service
13
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products in
support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of
potential dual use; aircraft parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information; certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a temporary
nature.18
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of
Syrian aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an
emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.19 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.20
The following individuals and entities have been targeted by the U.S. Treasury Department
(Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC):
•
On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior Syrian
officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then-Interior Minister and its head
of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively, the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any assets
they may have in the United States and banning any U.S. persons, including U.S.
financial institutions outside of the United States, from conducting transactions
with them.21 Kanaan allegedly committed suicide in October 2005, though some
have speculated that he may have been murdered.
18
According to U.S. regulations, any product that contains more than 10% de minimis U.S.-origin content, regardless
of where it is made, is not allowed to be exported to Syria. For U.S. commercial licensing prohibitions on exports and
re-exports to Syria, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 Supp No. 1. The Department of Commerce reviews license applications on a
case-by-case basis for exports or re-exports to Syria under a general policy of denial. For a description of items that do
not require export licenses, see, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce, Implementation
of the Syria Accountability Act, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
19
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Documents/13338.pdf.
20
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
21
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2617.aspx.
Congressional Research Service
14
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
•
On January 18, 2006, U.S. Treasury Department took the same actions against
the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military intelligence.
•
On April 26, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13399 that authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the U.S.-based assets of anyone found to
be involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also affects anyone involved in bombings or
assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004, or anyone hindering the
international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The order allows the
United States to comply with UNSCR 1636, which calls on all states to freeze the
assets of those persons designated by the investigating commission or the
government of Lebanon to be involved in the Hariri assassination.
•
On August 15, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for allegedly contributing
to Syria’s support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and
Brigadier General Jama’a Jama’a, for allegedly playing a central part in Syria’s
intelligence operations in Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.22
•
On January 4, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three Syrian
entities, the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the
Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory, as
weapons proliferators under an executive order (E.O.13382) based on the
authority vested to the President under IEEPA. The three state-sponsored
institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.23
•
On August 1, 2007, the President issued E.O. 1344124 blocking the property of
persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and
institutions. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
four individuals reportedly affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert
Syrian control over the Lebanese political system, including Assaad Halim
Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab and Hafiz Makhluf (under the authority of E.O.13441)
and Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik (under the authority of E.O.13338).25
•
On February 13, 2008, President Bush issued another Order (E.O.13460)
blocking the property of senior Syrian officials. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the order “targets individuals and entities determined to be
responsible for or who have benefitted from the public corruption of senior
officials of the Syrian regime. The order also revises a provision in Executive
22
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp60.aspx.
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp216.aspx.
24
On July 29, 2010, President Obama extended that National Emergency with respect to Lebanon for another year,
stating that “While there have been some recent positive developments in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah that include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems serve to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in Lebanon, and continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” See, Notice of July 29, 2010—
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Actions of Certain Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty
of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions, Federal Register, Title 3—The President, [Page 45045].
25
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp666.aspx.
23
Congressional Research Service
15
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Order 13338 to block the property of Syrian officials who have undermined U.S.
and international efforts to stabilize Iraq.26 One week later, under the authority of
E.O.13460, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets and restricted the
financial transactions of Rami Makhluf, a powerful cousin of President Bashar al
Asad.
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria
As previously mentioned, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush instructed
the Treasury Department in 2004 to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering
concerns. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued a final ruling that imposes a special measure
against the Commercial Bank of Syria as a financial institution of primary money laundering
concern. It bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent
account with the Commercial Bank of Syria, and it also requires banks to conduct due diligence
that ensures the Commercial Bank of Syria is not circumventing sanctions through its business
dealings with them.27
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [P.L. 94-329].
Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC 2371]. (Syria was not affected by this ban until
1979, as explained below.)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 [Title II of P.L. 95-223 (codified at
50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.)]. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
the President has broad powers pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a
threat “which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” These powers include the ability to
seize foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction, to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, to
prohibit payments between financial institutions involving foreign currency, and to prohibit the
import or export of foreign currency.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93 Stat. 515]
required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress before
licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries determined to
have supported acts of international terrorism. (Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 relettered
Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list. This list is
prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
26
A previous executive order, E.O. 13315, blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and members of
his former regime. On June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian company, SES
International Corp., and two of its officials under the authority of E.O.13315.
27
See, “U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria.” Available at http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctionssyr.html.
Congressional Research Service
16
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support for
acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first prepared in
1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2009, issued on August 5, 2010. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the
above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399]. Section 509(a) of this
act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit export of
items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of international terrorism,
thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the AntiTerrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989—see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans
obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of this act [100 Stat.
1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on income or war
profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism.
[26 USC 901(j)]. The President was given authority to waive this provision under Section 601 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200, May 18, 2000).
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L. 101-222]. Section 4
amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional notification and
licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries
on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their
ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribes conditions for removing a country from the terrorism list: prior
notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen of
two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite notification, the
President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no
longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45
days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list).
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver
has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other
prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132]. This act requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (§325) or lethal military
equipment (§326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President to waive this
provision on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to third countries that
sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens or
resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the terrorism
list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in consultation
Congressional Research Service
17
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such
transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.”
(31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996,
the then chairman of the House International Relations Committee reportedly protested to then
President Clinton about the Treasury Department’s implementing regulation, which he described
as a “special loophole” for Syria.
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign assistance
appropriations legislation enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S. aid.
The most recent ban appears in Section 7007 of P.L. 112-74, Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012, which states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to
titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance
or reparations for the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria: Provided, That for
purposes of this section, the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include direct loans,
credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents.”
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by Section 431 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United
States to withhold a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for
programs that benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178, was amended by P.L. 109-112 to make its
provisions applicable to Syria as well as Iran. The amended act, known as the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act, requires the President to submit semi-annual reports to designated
congressional committees, identifying any persons involved in arms transfers to or from Iran or
Syria; also, the act authorizes the President to impose various sanctions against such individuals.
On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed P.L. 109-353 which expanded the scope of the
original law by adding North Korea to its provisions, thereby renaming the law the Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (or INKSNA for short). The list of Syrian entities
designated under INKSNA includes Army Supply Bureau (2008), Syrian Navy (2009), Syrian Air
Force (2009), and Ministry of Defense (2008).28 On May 24, 2011, the State Department
designated the Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center
(SSRC) under INKSNA.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
28
See, State Department Press Releases And Documents “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act: Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
18Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Summary
Syria remains mired in political confrontation and violence, and is perched on the edge of civil
war. U.S. officials and many analysts believe that President Bashar al Asad, his family members,
and his supporters will ultimately be forced from power, but few observers offer specific, credible
timetables for a resolution to Syria’s ongoing political crisis. Some observers warn that the
regime’s staying power may be underrated. Intense violence generated demands from some
international actors for an immediate mutual ceasefire and from others for military intervention to
protect civilians or support opposition forces. The United Nations Security Council has endorsed
a ceasefire and dialogue plan and granted a limited mandate to 300 military observers. Their
presence in Syria has coincided with a lessening of the scope and pace of violence. However,
continuing clashes and attacks on civilians and government forces suggest the ceasefire at the
heart of the plan may remain elusive. The potential risks and rewards of other options for
responding to the crisis are difficult to assess and are evolving with conditions on the ground.
In the face of intense domestic and international pressure calling for political change and for an
end to violence against civilians, the Asad government has offered limited reforms while also
meeting protests and armed attacks with overwhelming force. Nonviolent protests continue, but
their apparent futility has created frustration and anger within the opposition ranks. An increasing
number of Syrian civilians have taken up arms in self-defense, although armed rebel attacks
alienate some potential supporters. The government accuses the opposition of carrying out
bombings and assassinations targeting security infrastructure, security personnel, and civilians in
Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and other areas. Accounts of human rights abuses by both sides
persist, with the majority attributed to security forces and military units.
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August
2011, and have been vocal advocates for United Nations Security Council action to condemn the
Syrian government and end the bloodshed. The United States has closed its embassy in
Damascus, and Ambassador Robert Ford has left Syria. U.S. officials are actively participating in
efforts to improve international policy coordination on Syria, such as the Friends of Syria forum
that met in Tunis in February and in Istanbul in April. The Administration has given no indication
that it intends to pursue any form of military intervention. U.S. officials and some in Congress
continue to debate various proposals for ending the violence and accelerating Asad’s departure.
After a year of unrest and violence, Syria’s political crisis is characterized by dilemmas and
contradictions. A menu of imperfect choices confronts U.S. policymakers, amid fears of
continued violence, a humanitarian crisis, and regional instability. The potential spillover effects
of continued fighting raise questions with regard to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel.
Larger refugee flows, sectarian conflict, or transnational violence by non-state actors are among
the contingencies that policy makers are concerned about in relation to these countries. The unrest
also is creating new opportunities for Al Qaeda or other violent extremist groups to operate in
Syria. The security of Syrian conventional and chemical weapons stockpiles has become a
regional security concern, which will grow if a security vacuum emerges. Many observers worry
that an escalation in fighting or swift regime change could generate new pressures on minority
groups or lead to wider civil or regional conflict.
Members of Congress are weighing these issues as they debate U.S. policy and the Syrian crisis.
Congressional Research Service
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 2
The International Dimension of the Syria Conflict.......................................................................... 4
What Role for Turkey in Syria?................................................................................................. 5
The U.N.-Brokered Cease-Fire and Monitoring Mission (UNSMIS) ....................................... 7
U.S. Policy Toward Syria .......................................................................................................... 9
Issues Before Congress.................................................................................................................. 10
Humanitarian Conditions and Refugees .................................................................................. 11
Security of Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction Questioned ................................................ 12
Al Qaeda and Violent Extremists: New Opportunities in Syria?............................................. 13
Potential Next Steps? ..................................................................................................................... 13
Congressional Views of the Syria Conflict.................................................................................... 15
Debating Intervention and other Options ................................................................................ 15
Possible Questions................................................................................................................... 17
Background and Key Developments ............................................................................................. 18
Demographic Profile and Political Dynamics ......................................................................... 18
The Asad Government and its Supporters ............................................................................... 18
The Alawite Community ................................................................................................... 19
Opposition and Armed Groups................................................................................................ 20
Non-Alawite Minority Communities....................................................................................... 23
Syria’s Economy and Sanctions..................................................................................................... 24
Specific Sanctions Against Syria............................................................................................. 29
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act ................................................................................... 29
Targeted Financial Sanctions............................................................................................. 30
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria ............................................................ 32
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria .................................................................................... 32
Figures
Figure 1. Syria at a Glance............................................................................................................... 2
Tables
Table A-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2012 ................................................................. 27
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Sanctions and Legislation .................................................................................... 26
Congressional Research Service
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 35
Congressional Research Service
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Overview
Syrians have long struggled with many of the same challenges that have bred deep dissatisfaction
in other Arab autocracies, including high unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility,
rampant corruption, lack of political freedoms, and repressive security forces. These factors have
fueled persistent opposition to Syria’s authoritarian government, which has been dominated by
the Baath (Renaissance) Party since 1963, and the Al Asad family since 1970. President Bashar al
Asad’s father—Hafiz al Asad—ruled the country from 1970 until his death in 2000. The Asad
family are members of the minority Alawite sect (estimated 12% of the population), which has its
roots in Shiite Islam. They and the Baath party have cultivated Alawites as a key base of support,
and elite security forces have long been led by Alawites. The government violently suppressed an
armed uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, killing thousands from the
majority Sunni Muslim community.
Since taking office in 2000, President Asad has offered and retracted the prospect of limited
political reform, while aligning his government with Iran and non-state actors such as Hamas and
Hezbollah in a complex rivalry with the United States and its Arab and non-Arab allies (including
Israel). Syria’s long-standing partnership with Russia has remained intact and is now the focus of
intense diplomatic attention aimed at resolving the current crisis.
As unrest emerged in other Arab countries in early 2011, President Asad and many observers
mistakenly believed that Syria’s pervasive police state and the population’s fear of sectarian
violence would serve as a bulwark against the outbreak of turmoil. Limited calls in February 2011
to organize reform protests failed, but the government’s torture of children involved in an isolated
incident in the southern town of Dara’a in March provided a decisive spark for the emergence of
demonstrations. The government’s use of force against demonstrators in Dara’a and later in other
cities created a corresponding swell in public anger and public participation in protests. The
government organized large counterdemonstrations.
The Sunni Muslim majority has been at the forefront of the recent protests and armed opposition
to the Alawite-led regime, with Syria’s Christians and other minority groups caught between their
parallel fears of violent change and of being associated with Asad’s crackdown. Economic class
dynamics also are influencing the choices of Syrians about the uprising: many rural, less
advantaged Syrians have supported the opposition movement, while urban, wealthier Syrians
appear to have more divided loyalties.
For much of 2011 and early 2012, a cycle of tension and violence intensified, as President Asad
and his government paired limited reform gestures with the use of military force against
protestors and armed opposition groups. Violence was initially limited to certain locations but
now has affected most major cities, including Damascus. Key events in the escalation include:
•
the emergence of opposition coalition groups such as the Syrian National Council
and the Free Syrian Army;
•
the veto by Russia and China of two U.N. Security Council resolutions seeking to
condemn and sanction the Asad government and calling for a ceasefire;
Congressional Research Service
1
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
•
the introduction and withdrawal of Arab League monitors seeking to verify
compliance with a failed peace plan; and
•
the Security Council’s passage of Resolutions 2042 and 2043, which approved
the deployment of U.N. observers to Syria and demanded that the Syrian
authorities withdraw security forces from population centers and begin a dialogue
with the opposition.
Figure 1. Syria at a Glance
Source: CRS Graphics.
Assessment
Now in its second year, the popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion against the Asad regime
seems poised to continue in the absence of a political agreement or decisive military solution.
Congressional Research Service
2
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Close to 10,000 Syrians have been killed since protests started in March 2011. Pro-Asad forces
have met the mostly Sunni-Arab resistance with force and brutality in what seems to be a
deliberate attempt to fuel sectarian tensions, instill fear in the population, and confront ordinary
Syrians with an unappealing choice: either continue to acquiesce to Alawite-minority rule or face
the prospect of civil war and possible state collapse. This strategy, which also has included some
limited political reforms, has so far generally kept middle class Syrians in Damascus and Aleppo
and most religious and ethnic minorities from openly joining the rebellion. However, by
exacerbating sectarian tensions, the government’s strategy undermines the prospects for a viable
political settlement and an eventual return to calm. While thousands of military personnel,
including some senior officers, have defected, the number of defections and armed opposition
volunteers to date does not appear to have reached a decisive point. Though defections continue
from the army, the leadership of the regime is mostly intact, and many analysts believe that it can
last as long as the military and political opposition arrayed against it remains divided and
decentralized.
Opposition forces are united mainly by their shared desire to remove Asad and his supporters
from power, and many have foresworn any compromise with the regime. The opposition
continues to struggle to build strategic and organizational unity,1 and the use of force by some
opposition elements has alienated some potential supporters. To date, armed opposition groups
have appeared too disorganized to defeat the regime’s security forces on their own. Volunteer
fighters have lacked a central command-and-control structure, funding, and heavy weaponry,
although in recent weeks reports suggest that some rebel groups have “begun receiving
significantly more and better weapons ... paid for by Persian Gulf nations and coordinated in part
by the United States.”2 The United States government remains committed to providing nonlethal
assistance to opposition groups and has confirmed that “others are pursuing different types of
support.”3
It is unclear whether the Obama Administration views such support as contradicting the will of
the United Nations Security Council, which has called for “all parties in Syria, including the
opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms.” In April 2012, the Syrian
government accepted a U.N.-brokered cease-fire agreement and the Security Council’s passage of
Resolutions 2042 and 2043 established and deployed an observer mission. The observers’
presence has coincided with a reduction in the worst types of violence, but few analysts expect
the U.N.-endorsed process to end either the uprising or the Syrian regime’s efforts to squelch it.
In essence, the Syrian regime perceives the conflict as a zero-sum game in which it is fighting for
its survival. Many observers consider the regime’s acceptance of concessions such as the cease1
According to one U.S. Open Source Center (OSC) analysis, “Syria's internal opposition is comprised of local
councils, which may represent anything from one neighborhood to an entire governorate. There are often multiple local
groups within a neighborhood or governorate, but their websites often link to each other and to other councils
throughout Syria, suggesting possible coordination among the disparate groups. Various overarching ‘umbrella’
organizations have attempted coordination among these groups at the national level, but no single group has yet
emerged as a successful domestic representative.” See, OSC Report GMP20120319442001, “Syria -- Guide to Local
Opposition Groups and Activists,” March 19, 2012.
2
“Syrian Rebels get Influx of Arms with Gulf Neighbors’ Money, U.S. Coordination,” Washington Post, May 16,
2012.
3
On May 16, State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland said, “We are providing our own nonlethal support. We
are coordinating broadly with all the Friends of the Syrian People, including those who have made other decisions,
about how we can best assure that maximum support goes to the civilian opposition that is preparing itself for a
peaceful democratic transition when we can get to that point, and we hope that point is as soon as possible, and we
hope Assad will get out of the way so it can happen.”
Congressional Research Service
3
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
fire to be tactical, and few expect the Asad family and its inner circle to reform themselves out of
power. Similarly, opposition elements that have taken up arms may resist and fear submitting to a
government that retains Asad or reflects his supporters’ priorities.
As such, Syrians remain locked in a conflict driven by the logic of political and military attrition:
the intensity, duration, and possible outcome of the conflict are likely to be determined by the
capabilities and will of each side and the degree of international support each receives. Questions
abound regarding the ability of local fighters to sustain their attacks, the ability of protestors to
persist amid a brutal crackdown, and the ability of the opposition’s leaders—both internal and in
exile—to develop a common strategy and weaken the government’s external benefactors. The
Asad regime seeks to hold its forces together, overcome the economic effects of sanctions, and
discredit the opposition and their international backers.
According to U.N. Chief Military Observer Major-General Robert Mood, “no volume of
observers can achieve a progressive drop and a permanent end to the violence, if the commitment
to give dialogue a chance is not genuine from all internal and external actors.”4 Such commitment
appears to be lacking, both within Syria and among the interested parties seeking to shape the
course of the Syrian uprising. For the Obama Administration and Congress, these conditions raise
fundamental questions about potential next steps and a return to the menu of imperfect choices
that has confronted decision makers since the uprising began.
The International Dimension of the Syria Conflict
Beyond the conflict’s internal combatants, there are many international and regional dimensions
to the fighting in Syria. At the United
Could Russia Broker a Solution in Syria?
Nations Security Council, Russia and
Some observers suggest that while Russia has obstructed tougher
China have opposed foreign military
international measures against the Syrian government, its policy
intervention in Syria. Both apparently
toward Syria may be more flexible than initially thought,
fear that authorizing another
particularly if it perceives that the Asad regime may be at risk of
intervention along the lines of the
falling.5 In recent months, Russia has hosted both Syrian leaders
2011 NATO operation against the
and opposition delegations and is one of the few countries with
open diplomatic channels to both sides of the Syrian conflict.
Qadhafi regime in Libya—which they
According to one commentator, “The Russian objective is still to
view as having exceeded its initial
control regime change without the collapse of the state while
U.N. mandate—could expand the
preserving Russian interests via a new government composed of
scope of legal justification for future
the opposition and a part of the current regime whose hands are
Western-led action in areas Russia and
not yet tainted with blood.”6 However, if Russia were to attempt
to foster a “managed transition” in Syria (if that is even now
China view as lying within their
respective spheres of influence. Russia possible), its prestige could suffer should Russian diplomacy be
stymied by Syrian actors on the ground, particularly those who
and China argue that in Libya, the
would seek to spoil such a deal.
West pursued regime change under the
4
U.N. News Center, “Presence of observers in Syria has ‘calming effect’ in areas deployed,” May 18, 2012.
According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, “Any outcome of the political reform suitable for the
people of Syria will be absolutely suitable for Russia. We are nobody’s advocates in that process....If the Damascus
administration is transformed without bloodshed, foreign interference, arms supplies, incitement to the use of force and
so on and so forth, an alternative will satisfy us irrespective of the outcome.” See, “Russia Doesn’t Mind Change Of
Administration In Syria Without Bloodshed, Foreign Interference,” ITAR-TASS World Service, May 20, 2012.
6
“Russia Talks to Syrian Dissident, Looks Beyond Assad,” AlMonitor.com, April 30, 2012.
5
Congressional Research Service
4
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
guise of humanitarian intervention, a precedent they view as dangerous to their own national
security. Moreover, for Russia, Syria is a longtime Arab client dating back to the Cold War, and
Russian leaders would likely view the downfall of the regime as a serious blow to their
diplomatic prestige and Middle Eastern/Mediterranean influence and military access. Although
Russia has supported the recent U.N. cease-fire, it has blamed Syrian rebels for escalating the
violence and has called on them to disarm and participate in a regime-led reform process.
The fighting in Syria also reflects the regional tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, Arabs
and Kurds, and Arabs and Iranians that have shaped events in Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain in
recent years. Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar have advocated openly for armed
support to Syrian rebels, hoping that the overthrow of the Syrian government will empower
Syrian Sunnis and break Syria’s alliance with their rivals in Iran. On the other side, Iran, in an
attempt to maintain its alliance with its strongest Arab ally, has reportedly given the Asad
government ample support over the past year, including weapons, cash, training, Internet
surveillance equipment, and assistance in evading oil sanctions.7 Hezbollah in Lebanon also may
be aiding the Asad government, and the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq may be purposely
turning a blind eye to Iranian arms shipments crossing its territory or air space into Syria.8
The United States and members of the European Union have placed strong sanctions on the
Syrian government, but have stopped short of offering direct lethal assistance to opposition
groups out of fear that more weaponry will only exacerbate the violence. Overarching concerns
about ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran and about regional stability also are shaping U.S.
and European calculations. The United States and the European Union supported the U.N.-backed
Annan plan, but now appear to lack confidence in its ability to bring an end to violence in Syria.
U.S. and European officials also appear divided with regard to potential next steps. The U.S.
government appears to be acquiescing to the arming of Syrian rebels by other governments while
remaining fearful of the consequences of a full civil war in Syria. Two paths lead toward the U.S.endorsed goal of regime change in Syria, although the chances for negotiation may be
jeopardized by the violence that continues to drive Syrians toward confrontation.
What Role for Turkey in Syria?
Turkey is another important external player in Syria. Before the Arab Spring, Turkish-Syrian ties
were strong, but over the course of several months in 2011, Turkey gradually turned against the
Asad regime because its leaders perceived that Asad was essentially uncooperative with Turkish
and other international efforts to help broker an end to violence through political reform.9 Turkey
also appears to have calculated that continued support for a regime perceived throughout the
7
“Tanker with Syrian oil passes through Egypt's Suez,” Reuters, April 3, 2012.
According to one report, the Iraqi government has refused U.S. requests to stop Iranian cargo flights to Syria, despite
being aware of credible intelligence that the planes are transporting weapons. See, “Iraq resists U.S. prod, lets Iran fly
arms to Syria,” The Washington Times, March 16, 2012.
9
Like the European Union and others, Turkey has imposed sanctions on Syria. In November 2011, Turkey suspended
the Turkish-Syrian High Level Strategic Cooperation Council; introduced travel bans on several Syrian officials and
businessmen and froze their assets in Turkey. It also canceled the sale of arms and military equipment to the Syrian
military. Turkey suspended its ties with the Central Bank of Syria and the Commercial Bank of Syria, froze the
financial assets of the Syrian Government in Turkey, and abolished a Turkish Ex-imbank loan agreement for the
financing of infrastructure projects in Syria. In March 2012, Turkey recalled its ambassador to Syria and suspended all
diplomatic work and services at the Turkish Embassy in Damascus. See, Open Source Center, “OSC Report: Annan
Plan Dampens Turkey's Hopes of Syrian Regime Change,” April 30, 2012, Document ID# GMP20120430744001.
8
Congressional Research Service
5
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
region as brazenly repressing the will of its people could have harmed its regional prestige.
Turkish leaders have approached Arab countries in transition by marketing Turkey as a possible
model for democracy and liberal values in the Muslim Middle East.10
Although Turkey’s leaders insist that they do not have sectarian interests in Syria and outwardly
seek to counter sectarianism among other regional actors, many analysts assert that the stance of
Turkey—a Sunni-majority country—is affected by the Asad regime’s disproportionate targeting
of Sunni Muslims.11 Turkey currently hosts the leadership of the dissident Free Syrian Army as
well as an estimated 23,000 Syrian refugees who have fled the fighting, primarily from Idlib
governorate. Turkey hosted a Friends of Syria conference in early April 2012 (see inset) and
reportedly favors the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood over other Syrian political opposition groups.12
Some reports now suggest that Turkey-based opposition fighters may be receiving weapons and
training, allegedly with the support of Turkish officials.13 As of May 23, the Turkish government
had not confirmed or denied the reports.
Some clashes between rebels and regime soldiers have spilled over the Turkish-Syrian border,
leading Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to warn Syria that his government was
considering taking certain steps, including measures they [the Asad government] “don't want to
think about.” As a NATO member, Turkey, if attacked by Syria, could invoke Article 5 of the
NATO treaty, which relates to (but does not require) collective self defense by NATO members,
including the United States. However, Turkey may be unwilling to initiate a military operation
against Syria unless the violence there becomes so destabilizing that it feels compelled to act. A
unilateral Turkish invasion of Syria, either to establish a safe zone/humanitarian corridor or to
overthrow the Asad government, would present extremely complicated political and military
questions regarding the scope and goals of the operation, its motives, and its potential
justification. Such an operation could endanger Turkey’s domestic security and economic wellbeing and further polarize its politics, while also damaging its regional and international profile.
Military intervention in Syria could necessitate a massive commitment of resources to an openended operation, including a possible long-term occupation by ground forces. Turkey would not
want to bear that burden alone.
Turkey may continue to support Syrian opposition groups, though some secular Syrian dissidents
are wary of Turkish support of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, Turkish leaders fear that the
Syria uprising, no matter how it is resolved, may stir up feelings of Kurdish nationalism in
Turkey—a major potential problem given the significant population of Kurds in Turkey’s
southeastern region and major urban centers (Kurds make up 15%-20% of Turkey's population).
The Erdogan government has worked on and off over the past nine years to accommodate
Kurdish cultural, political, and economic demands and alleviate separatist sentiment, and hopes to
resolve Kurds’ grievances further within the next year through a new national constitution. It
10
See CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
In Turkey’s Hatay province bordering Syria, there are hundreds of thousands of Arabic-speaking Alawi Muslims, a
Turkish offshoot Shiite sect similar to the Alawite sect in Syria. Some fear that sectarian conflict in Syria could spill
over into Turkey. Turkey also has millions of Turkish and Kurdish-speaking Alevi Muslims, another distant branch of
Shiism with a mix of Sufi Muslim traditions. See, “Turmoil in Syria: Border Clashes Lift Turk Minority Fears,” Wall
Street Journal Europe, April 10, 2012.
12
Bayram Balci, “Turkey’s Relations with the Syrian Opposition,” Carnegie Endowment, Commentary, April 13,
2012.
13
Michael Weiss, “Syrian rebels say Turkey is arming and training them,” Daily Telegraph Blog (UK), May 22, 2012.
11
Congressional Research Service
6
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
would not want to see those efforts permanently unravel should Syria’s Kurds, believed to be
aided by the Asad regime in response to Turkey’s support of the Syrian opposition, become more
instrumental in rallying Kurdish separatist sentiment in Turkey.14
Finally, if Turkey were to act more aggressively toward Syria and violate its territorial integrity,
President Asad could openly retaliate by hosting fighters from the PKK (Kurdistan Workers'
Party, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization)—as his father did during the 1980s and 1990s—
thus providing an additional safe haven (another is in northern Iraq) from which they could
launch cross-border attacks into Turkey.15 On May 23, Turkish Interior Minister İdris Naim Şahin
said, “Syria is turning a blind eye to terrorist groupings in areas close to the border to put Turkey
in difficulty and perhaps as a way to take revenge on Turkey.”16
The U.N.-Brokered Cease-Fire and Monitoring Mission (UNSMIS)
With the United States, NATO, and the Arab League unwilling to militarily intervene in Syria and
unable to force President Asad to step down through diplomatic pressure, many countries have
somewhat skeptically backed a plan brokered by U.N. and Arab League joint Special Envoy Kofi
Annan. The plan seeks to supply humanitarian relief to embattled population centers and establish
a long-term cease-fire, monitored by an international observer mission. These measures would
support the opening of a national dialogue on Syria’s political future. On March 21, 2012, the
Security Council endorsed Annan’s Six-Point-Plan for Syria, which specifically calls for
•
A Syrian-led political process to address the aspirations and concerns of the
Syrian people;
•
A U.N.-supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to
protect civilians;
•
All parties to ensure provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by
the fighting, and to implement a daily two-hour humanitarian pause;
•
Authorities to intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained
persons;
•
Authorities to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for
journalists; and
•
Authorities to respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate
peacefully.
In mid-April, the Syrian government accepted the cease-fire, but reserved the right to respond to
what it described as “terrorist attacks” and began withdrawing some heavy weapons from urban
conflict zones. On April 14, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 2042, which approved
the deployment of a U.N. advance team of 30 military observers to Syria. It also demanded that
the Syrian authorities withdraw security forces from population centers and begin a dialogue with
the opposition. The vote marked the first time since protests began that the Security Council was
14
Soner Cagaptay, “Syria and Turkey: The PKK Dimension,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch
#1919, April 5, 2012.
15
Ibid.
16
Associated Press, “Turkey says Syria is helping PKK terrorists,” May 23, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
7
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
united in demanding a halt to the violence. The limited size of the advance mission made it
impossible to verify full compliance by the government or the rebel forces.
On April 19, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon reported that “levels of violence dropped
markedly” after the cease-fire went into effect, but added that the Syrian Government had “yet to
fully implement its initial obligations regarding the actions and deployments of its troops and
heavy weapons, or to return them to barracks…. The Government reports violent actions by
armed groups. The cessation of armed violence in all its forms is therefore clearly incomplete.”
The advance team of U.N. observers was initially banned by the government from visiting the
war-torn city of Homs, but was given access on April 21.
The same day, the Security Council passed Resolution 2043, which established—for a 90-day
period—a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with an initial deployment of
up to 300 unarmed military observers under the command of a Chief Military Observer. The
resolution also created a civilian team to help implement elements of the full peace plan, such as
the start of a national political dialogue and the government's granting of the right to demonstrate.
While Chief Military Observer Major-General Robert Mood (of Norway) observed that the
deployment of the expanded UNSMIS teams has had “an immediate calming effect” in some
areas, Special Envoy Annan has expressed alarm about continuing government attacks,
opposition attacks on government forces, and bombings of government sites by unknown entities
that U.N. officials are now characterizing as a “third force” in the Syrian conflict. Since the ceasefire nominally took effect, hundreds17 of civilian and military casualties have been reported in
engagements between government and opposition forces. As of May 24, the UNSMIS team was
nearing its full strength of 300 unarmed observers, some of whom already have found themselves
caught up in violence in different areas of the country since their deployment.
Some Syrian opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, are dissatisfied with the
Annan plan, asserting that it should not be open-ended, but should require a timetable for the
political transition it envisions. Most observers believe that President Asad has little to lose from
a lull in the fighting. Adherence to the U.N. plan gains him favor with Russia and China, which
support it, and the concessions the regime made (humanitarian access, permitting demonstrations)
can be easily reversed. Furthermore, President Asad may be willing to host U.N. observers in the
hopes that they hold the opposition partially responsible for any resumption of violence or
breaking of the cease-fire. As referenced above, Resolution 2043 “calls upon all parties in Syria,
including the opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms.”
The Obama Administration has been cautious in its reaction to the passage of the resolutions.
Reports suggest that the United States had sought to include punitive measures in either
resolution should the Syrian government obstruct the observer mission or fail to adhere to the
Annan plan. Ultimately, U.S. officials acceded to Russian drafts of the resolutions that excluded
such measures. With Russia and China continuing to threaten a Security Council veto over any
resolution that they perceive as unduly pressuring or punishing the Asad regime, the Obama
Administration has pointed blame at Russia and China for allowing regime-instigated violence
against Syrian civilians to continue. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said,
17
According to one report, more than 200 people have been killed in Syria since the ceasefire went into effect. See, “11
killed in Syria violence,” Agence France Presse, April 21, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
8
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
I think we have to do more to take tougher actions against the Assad regime. We need to
start moving very vigorously in the Security Council for a Chapter 7 sanctions resolution,
including travel, financial sanctions, an arms embargo, and the pressure that that will give us
on the regime to push for compliance with Kofi Annan’s six-point plan. Now, I’m well
aware that at this point such an effort is still likely to be vetoed, but we need to look for a
way to keep pressing forward.18
After passage of Resolution 2043, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice threatened
to withdraw U.S. support from future monitoring missions if the Syrian government fails to
cooperate with UNSMIS, saying that “The Syrian people, like us, know that the deployment of
300 or even 3,000 unarmed observers cannot on its own stop the Assad regime.... What can bring
a halt to this murderous rampage is continued and intensified external pressure.”19
U.S. Policy Toward Syria
U.S. policy toward Syria since the 1980s has ranged from confrontation and containment to
cautious engagement. Successive Congresses and
Friends of Syria
Administrations have sought to end Syria’s
In 2012, dozens of countries and multilateral
support for Hezbollah and Palestinian extremists;
organizations formed a contact group officially
encourage peace talks with Israel (which captured
called the Group of Friends of the Syrian People.
the Golan Heights from Syria in 1967); and
Their first meeting was held on February 24 in
address Syria’s missile stockpiles, chemical
Tunis, where members pronounced the Syrian
weapons, and clandestine nuclear activities.
National Council (SNC) “a legitimate representative
President Obama and his Administration attempted of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change.”
During their second meeting in Istanbul on April 1,
limited rapprochement with Syria in 2009 and
Arab nations pledged $100 million to pay the
2010 without lasting results.
salaries of opposition fighters. In addition to that
pledge, the SNC claimed that they had received
U.S. officials have been calling for Asad’s
$176 million in humanitarian assistance pledges,
resignation since August 2011 and have been vocal including $12 million from the United States
(bringing the total U.S. pledge for Syria humanitarian
advocates for U.N. Security Council action to
aid to $25 million).
condemn the Syrian government and end the
bloodshed. Although the United States has closed
its embassy in Damascus and Ambassador Robert Ford has left Syria, U.S. officials are
participating in efforts to improve international policy coordination and support the Syrian
people, such as the Friends of Syria forum that met in Tunis in February and Istanbul in April.
The Administration has given no indication that it is planning to intervene militarily, although the
U.S. government has offered nonlethal communications and medical support to some opposition
groups, and acknowledges that other countries are offering lethal aid.
It is unclear how the United States or other parties can hasten an end to the violence in Syria. A
commitment of major military and economic resources could prove decisive or could prolong the
confrontation by leading others to offer counter-support for the Asad government. According to a
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press poll released in March, almost two-thirds of
Americans oppose any form of U.S. military intervention in Syria.20 Critics of intervention
18
Remarks at the Ad Hoc Ministerial Meeting on Syria, Remarks, Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Paris,
France, April 19, 2012.
19
“Security Council Approves More Monitors of Cease-Fire in Syria,” New York Times, April 22, 2012.
20
Pew Research Center, “Little Support for U.S. Intervention in Syrian Conflict,” Released: March 15, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
9
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
highlight the potential risks of becoming engulfed in another Middle Eastern conflict with no
definitive time frame for the duration of U.S. operations. Other challenges could include
uncertainty over the political goals of the opposition movement and understanding what might
follow the Asad regime should it fall. Some U.S. officials believe that military intervention risks
arming or otherwise empowering extremist groups. Some also are concerned about potentially
unleashing a scenario that could jeopardize the Syrian military’s control over large conventional
and unconventional weapons stockpiles, including chemical weapons, surface-to-surface rockets,
and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs).
Officials may view the Syria conflict as more of a humanitarian problem than as a direct threat to
U.S. security as long as fighting in Syria remains somewhat contained. If fighting were to spill
over into neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, or Jordan on a sustained or widespread basis, this
perception could change rapidly. Violence in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli and in Beirut
in May 2012 amplified fears that Syria’s conflict could lead to sectarian confrontation in
Lebanon. Similarly, the trading of accusations between Turkish and Syrian officials over
relationships with Syrian rebels and Kurdish PKK fighters highlights the danger of cross-border
conflict.
Issues Before Congress
U.S. officials have described the choices they face with regard to Syria as “extremely
challenging.”21 U.S. concerns about regional security and state-sponsored terrorism are
exacerbated by the potential for inconclusive unrest or drastic political change in Syria. The
continued spillover effects of the violence raise unique questions with regard to Turkey, Lebanon,
Jordan, Iraq, and Israel. Larger refugee flows, sectarian conflict, and transnational violence by
non-state actors are among the contingencies that concern policy makers in relation to these
countries. A host of concerns stem from reports by U.S. officials that violent extremist groups are
operating in Syria and seeking to benefit from the crisis. The security of Syrian conventional and
chemical weapons stockpiles has already become a regional concern, which would grow if a
security vacuum emerges. Many observers also worry that an escalation in fighting or swift
regime change could generate new pressures on minority groups or lead to wider civil or regional
conflict.
Members of Congress and Administration officials are now considering these issues as they
debate U.S. policy options regarding the Syrian crisis. At the strategic level, the United States has
faced the choice of seeking an immediate end to violence to protect civilians or embracing the
opposition’s calls for regime change in Syria as a guarantee of longer-term stability. The prospect
of weakening Iran’s regional influence also makes regime change attractive to some policy
makers. The Obama Administration and some in Congress have already made the strategic choice
to call for Asad’s resignation and a political transition in Syria. While regime change in Syria may
benefit the United States and its allies by weakening Iran, seeking it also may complicate efforts
to achieve an immediate ceasefire and protect Syrian civilians, because it could encourage Syrian
authorities and their allies to take a zero-sum approach to the crisis. However, the Asad
government’s rule in Syria has long been based on the actual or implied use of violence to
suppress political opposition. As such, seeking an immediate end to the conflict may not defuse
21
U.S. Central Command Commander General James Mattis, Statement before Senate Armed Services Committee,
March 6, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
10
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
the domestic political crisis or end the threat of violence against Syrian civilians. Key policy
questions at present concern how best to minimize threats to Syrian civilians while achieving
political change conducive to stability in Syria and security in the region.
Humanitarian Conditions and Refugees
In cities and governorates where fighting has been the most intense—namely Homs, Idlib,
Hamah, and Dara’a (see Figure 1 above)—numerous eyewitness accounts described besieged
urban areas as humanitarian disaster zones, in which residents of entire neighborhoods have
periodically been cut off from food, fuel, medical care, and water. Reports suggest that the
government has deployed snipers, severed utilities and access to civilian areas, and used heavy
weapons such as tanks and artillery to bombard residential areas. A three-member U.N.
Commission of Inquiry reported to the U.N. Human Rights Council in February 2012 that Syria’s
top military commanders and officials have committed “widespread, systematic” rights violations
that constituted crimes against humanity. The commission provided the Council with a sealed list
of individuals and military units suspected of bearing the greatest responsibility for atrocities.
On March 14, Amnesty International released a report documenting the widespread practice of
torture employed by pro-government forces against protestors in the last year. Human Rights
Watch subsequently released an open letter to the opposition warning of kidnappings and torture
by opposition forces. In a May 2012 update, the Human Rights Council Independent Commission
noted the “increasingly militarized” situation in the country and described “large scale, military
attacks” on areas hosting defectors and armed fighters. It further noted that armed opposition
groups are carrying out extra-judicial executions of security force personnel and using improvised
explosive devices on an increased basis.
As of May 21, 2012, there were approximately 61,000 Syrian refugees in neighboring countries
registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and
approximately 20,000 more Syrian refugees who are unregistered. The UNHCR named Panos
Moumtzis as Regional Refugee Coordinator for Syria and has launched an appeal for $84 million
to support operations for Syrian refugees.
Turkey now hosts nearly 23,000 registered refugees, including thousands who have fled there in
the past few months. Most Syrians in Turkey are housed in camps in the southern provinces of
Hatay and Gaziantep and in Kilis province. In Lebanon, more than 80% of the over 15,000
registered Syrian refugees are from Homs, the epicenter of the armed uprising against the
government.22 To date, some 200,000 Syrians reportedly have been internally displaced, and the
World Food Program (WFP) estimates that 1.4 million people lack secure access to food as a
result of the violence. Civilians continue to flee their homes and relocate within Syria and abroad.
To date, the United States has pledged a total of nearly $40 million in humanitarian aid to
international organizations seeking to provide relief to Syrians. This aid includes $16.5 million to
the World Food Program (WFP); $8.5 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR); $7.8 million to non-governmental organizations (NGOs); $3 million to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); $3 million to the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); and $500,000 to the United
22
“Factbox-Syrian refugee exodus grows,” Reuters, April 10, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
11
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.23 It also includes $12 million in
assistance pledged by the United States to the Group of Friends of the Syrian People.
Security of Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction Questioned
U.S. and Israeli officials are publicly communicating their assessments of and concerns about the
extent, security, and potential unrest-related implications of Syria’s reported WMD programs and
stockpiles. U.S. officials have expressed confidence that they have a reliable estimate of the
quantities and locations of Syrian chemical weapons and have indicated that the “extensive
network” of related facilities is being monitored via unspecified means.24 Since late 2011, named
and unnamed Israeli officials have voiced similar concerns about “huge stockpiles”25 of chemical
weapons in Syria and have warned that Israel will consider any indication that the Asad regime is
transferring WMD materials to Hezbollah or other non-state actors to be an act of war.26
Open source reporting on Syria’s chemical weapons program suggests that nerve gas and mustard
gas production and storage infrastructure is concentrated at facilities in and around Al Safira
(southeast of Aleppo), Damascus, Hamah, Latakia, and Homs.27 Stockpiles also may be dispersed
in other military locations around the country. As the recent discovery of undeclared chemical
weapons material in Libya has shown, there are limits to the ability of international intelligence
agencies and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to understand
and verify the extent of sensitive WMD programs, even when dealing with countries that have
ratified international conventions on WMD—which Syria has not.28
The Asad regime likely places greater emphasis on ensuring the loyalty of military units involved
in guarding elements of WMD programs because of the weapons’ relevance as a potential
deterrent against foreign attack. In the wake of any sudden regime collapse, efforts to find and
secure stockpiles would be both a high priority and a difficult challenge. Neighboring intelligence
services in Turkey, Jordan, and Israel may have more insight on the extent of these programs and
related security challenges than the U.S. government. Elements of the Syrian military may be in a
position to aid in securing materials and sites in the event of civil war or regime change, but it
remains unclear whether an orderly or chaotic transition situation might ensue and whether such
units would be cooperative or antagonistic toward outsiders. According to some press reports,
23
“Additional Humanitarian Assistance to Syria: Fact Sheet,” Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State,
May 10, 2012.
24
In February, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller said,
“We have ideas as to quantity. We have ideas as to where they are.” Quoted in Lachlan Carmichael, “U.S. concerned
about Syrian chemical arms, missiles,” Agence France Presse (AFP), February 15, 2012. Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper referred to an extensive network of Syrian chemical weapons facilities in testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 16, 2012. See also Jay Solomon and Adam Entous, “U.S. Steps Up
Watch of Syria Chemical Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2012; and, Jay Solomon, “U.S., Israel Monitor
Suspected Syrian WMD,” Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2011.
25
Major-General Amir Eshel, head of the Israeli military’s planning division, quoted in “Israel Fears Syrian ‘Chemical,
Biological’ Weapons,” NOW Lebanon, January 17, 2012.
26
U.S. Open Source Center Report GMP20120201736004, “Israeli Official: Chemical Weapons From Syria to
Hizballah ‘Declaration of War,’” Yisra'el Hayom (Tel Aviv), February 1, 2012.
27
Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Watching Syrian Chemical Arms Amid Fear of Attack, Diversion,” Global Security Newswire,
December 5, 2011.
28
Syria has signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Syria has not signed or
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Congressional Research Service
12
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
internal U.S. government assessments estimate that as many as 75,000 military personnel could
be required to fully secure various WMD-related sites in Syria.29
Al Qaeda and Violent Extremists: New Opportunities in Syria?
U.S. officials state that the violence and disorder paralyzing Syria appears to be creating
opportunities for Al Qaeda operatives or other violent Islamist extremists to infiltrate the country
and conduct or plan attacks.30 According to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper,
“Sunni extremists” have infiltrated Syrian opposition groups, which may be unaware of the
infiltration. These extremists may or may not be affiliated with Al Qaeda in Iraq, where reports
suggest that violent extremist operations have declined in some areas, a trend which some Iraqi
officials attribute to personnel moving from Iraq to Syria. Although Al Qaeda leaders have issued
calls for Muslims to support the uprising against the Asad government, U.S. officials have stated
that they have not yet seen evidence of major recruitment and travel by extremists. U.S. officials
have warned that there is no readily identifiable successor or alternative to the Asad government
and that violent extremist organizations could exploit a power vacuum in Syria. On May 10,
2012, near-simultaneous double suicide attacks outside a military intelligence building killed 55
people. A Sunni Jihadist group calling itself Jabhat al Nusra li ahl al Sham (The Front to Protect
the Syrian People) claimed responsibility for the bombings. The same group has claimed
responsibility for three other attacks in Damascus and Aleppo this year.
Potential Next Steps?
As the strengths and weakness of the Annan plan and the United Nations Supervision Mission in
Syria (UNSMIS) are becoming apparent, Congress, the Obama Administration, and their
international counterparts are considering next steps. The U.N. Security Council endorsement of
the plan and mission demonstrated a baseline consensus for international action to bring an end to
the fighting. Should the plan and mission fail, such consensus may be difficult to resurrect,
especially in light of strong differences of opinion about potential military intervention. The next
round of international diplomacy regarding Syria may center on various proposals for
strengthening the observer mission or creating penalties for failure to abide by the plan’s calls for
ceasefire and political negotiations. Addressing the issue of arms shipments to both the Syrian
government and rebel groups may prove particularly difficult.
Some U.S. analysts have argued that the United States and others should begin “concerted
planning for more forceful measures, including military assistance to elements of the armed
opposition and contingency preparations for armed intervention.”31 Other observers counsel
patience, suggesting that time is needed for sanctions to further isolate the Asad regime. One
expert, Tamara Coffman Wittes of the Brookings Institution, also asserts that Russia may be
willing over time and with sufficient international engagement to “acquiesce in efforts to move
29
Barbara Starr, “Military: Thousands of troops needed to secure Syrian chemical sites,” CNN.com, February 22, 2012.
In April 2012, Abdel Ghani Jawhar, a leader of the Lebanese Sunni fundamentalist terror group Fatah al-Islam, died
in the Syrian city of Qsair. Jawhar, who had recently traveled to Syria from Lebanon, had been preparing an explosive
device to be used against the Syrian army. See, “In Syria, Lebanon’s Most Wanted Sunni Terrorist Blows Himself Up,”
Time.com, April 23, 2012.
31
Andrew J. Tabler, Assad Must Be Forced To Allow Peaceful Assembly, Policy Alert From The Washington Institute
For Near East Policy, April 18, 2012.
30
Congressional Research Service
13
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
toward a Syria without Assad. This shift would dramatically increase pressure on the Syrian
regime, and itself might help induce key Syrian actors to seek a way out, and make political
change possible.”32 The Administration continues to stand adamantly against full scale military
intervention in Syria. In April testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense
Secretary Leon E. Panetta told lawmakers:
We must also be mindful, as Secretary Clinton has noted, of the possibility that outside
military intervention will make a volatile situation even worse, and place even more innocent
civilians at risk. The United States has made clear that we are on the side of the Syrian
people. They must know that the international community has not underestimated either their
suffering or their impatience. The Defense Department has reviewed and is continuing to
plan for a variety of possible scenarios should the President determine that further steps are
necessary. In the meantime, our only clear path is to keep moving diplomatically in a
resolute and deliberate manner with the international community to find a way to return
Syria to the Syrian people.33
Select Options in Focus
Arming the Opposition: Reports suggest that some countries already have begun arming Syrian opposition groups.
U.S. officials spoke out against this option in 2011 and early 2012, fearing that the introduction of new weapons to the
uprising would exacerbate and prolong the violence, rather than decisively ending it. By all accounts, Syrian military
forces retain an advantage in heavy weaponry that is unlikely to be overcome by the introduction of small arms to the
opposition side. If these conditions persist, the Syria conflict could devolve into a protracted battle between
government forces and an array of militias. Some analysts fear that governance inside the country could erode to such
an extent that Syria could become a failed state. According to Georgetown University Professor Daniel Byman, “A
failed Syria would not be the world's only humanitarian tragedy, but it would be among the world's most
dangerous.”34 Some analysts also have suggested that rebel groups may form clandestine terrorist or insurgent cells
and use tactics such as car bombings and improvised explosive devices to escalate the level of violence against betterarmed government forces and civilians.35
New Sanctions or Arms Embargo in Support of the Annan Plan: Some governments have expressed their
belief that the Annan Plan has failed to stem the violence and usher in political negotiations to resolve the conflict. In
response, some observers suggest that the addition of conditions-based deadlines and specific sanctions could help
make the plan more attractive and effective. Challenges associated with this proposal include Security Council
members identifying agreed-upon measures that would increase pressure on both the government and opposition
groups to halt fighting. An arms embargo similar to that placed on Libya during its uprising could limit the availability
of resupply to combatants. However, opposition supporters could insist on an exception for the protection of
civilians, while backers of Asad could insist on the Syrian government’s sovereignty and right to self defense.
Direct Negotiation with Regime Members: U.S. rhetoric regarding the irredeemable nature of the Asad
government makes it difficult to envision a return to engagement or negotiation. This in turn may make the U.S.
government ill-placed to convince disaffected members of the regime to defect or push for an inside coup. Officials in
Moscow and Tehran may have more leverage in this regard, but it is unclear what events or factors might lead them
to conclude that a change in the regime is the best means of preserving their interests.36 Proposals for a negotiated
solution such as those contained in the Annan plan could preserve a political role for some elements of the Asad
regime and limit the strategic benefit of change to the United States by failing to fully disrupt the Iranian-Syrian
alliance. However, leadership change in Damascus does not guarantee stability in Syria or a reorientation of Syrian
foreign policy in a direction favorable to the United States.
32
Options for U.S. Policy in Syria, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 19, 2012.
33
Statement of Leon E. Panetta Secretary Department of Defense, House Armed Services Committee, April 19, 2012.
34
Daniel Byman, “Preparing for Failure in Syria, How to Stave Off Catastrophe,” Foreign Affairs, March 20, 2012.
35
For example, General Mattis argued: “the longer this goes on, the more potential there is for Al Qaeda and for
basically a full scale civil war.” Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012.
36
Geoffrey Aronson, “Time for a rethink of U.S. policy towards Syria,” ForeignPolicy.com, April 26, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
14
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Congressional Views of the Syria Conflict
The Syrian government’s continuing use of lethal force against civilians refocused congressional
attention on the basic tenets of U.S. policy toward Syria. This policy has traditionally shifted
between confrontation and limited engagement, and now appears committed—at least
rhetorically—to regime change. Some Members of Congress and nongovernmental observers
argue that recent violence demonstrates the futility of expecting any substantive reform by Syrian
authorities and suggests that U.S. policy should more aggressively move toward confrontation in
pursuit of the stated U.S. goal of regime change. Others have expressed wariness about the
potential implications of regime change for regional security, particularly in light of the delicate
sectarian balance in the Levant and a lack of established U.S. relationships with government and
nongovernment actors in Syria. Proponents and skeptics of regime change have urged a
continuation of efforts to increase multilateral political condemnation of and economic pressure
on the Asad regime, for example through U.N.-backed sanctions or arms embargoes. The
Administration has continued to expand U.S. sanctions on Syria while advocating further
multilateral sanctions.
Debating Intervention and other Options
Members of Congress have outlined differing positions on the Syrian crisis, related U.S. interests,
and preferred courses of action. Current debate focuses on the potential risks and benefits of
various humanitarian or military intervention proposals and those of maintaining current
sanctions and diplomacy policies. Some in Congress now argue that the United States should
intervene militarily in the Syrian crisis in order to protect civilians and/or to bring about the stated
U.S. goal of removing President Asad from power. Specific proposals from nongovernmental
observers and Members of Congress variously call for conditionally providing weapons or other
assistance to the armed Syrian opposition, carrying out air strikes to protect safe zones for
civilians or armed groups, and/or establishing corridors to allow the delivery of relief.
Critics of intervention and arms supply proposals highlight potential risks related to arming
opposition forces that are not unified and may include groups with extremist views or individuals
who have committed human rights abuses. Others suggest that the establishment of “safe-havens”
or “no-kill zones” may be viewed by the Asad government as a violation of sovereignty
tantamount to a declaration of war, and thus would require the commitment of air assets and
protective ground forces for an undetermined amount of time. Some organizations argue that
military intervention could jeopardize the delivery of humanitarian relief by conflating relief
operations with the political aims of the opposition.37 Some in Congress oppose offering military
support to opposition groups, but may favor targeting the Syrian government and its supporters
with new U.S. or multilateral sanctions tied to progress toward the ceasefire and negotiated
solution called for under the U.N.-backed Annan plan. Providing greater humanitarian support to
Syrian civilians through neutral channels also remains an option, but may do little to change basic
conditions in Syria or shape the calculations of combatants. The textbox below summarizes
legislation introduced in the 112th Congress that seeks to address the unrest and conflict in Syria.
Table A-1 in the Appendix summarizes U.S. sanctions activity since the start of the Syria
uprising in March 2011.
37
For a summary of these views, see Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “Briefing: Why humanitarians
wary of ‘humanitarian corridors,’” March 19, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
15
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress
The following legislation introduced in the 112th Congress addresses the current situation in Syria.
Bills
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act of 2011—States
that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their
proliferation activities and policies. Would, among other things, prohibit U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements
and related export licenses and transfers of materials, services, and goods with a country that is assisting the
nuclear program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such
countries.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act—Would, among other things, sanction the development of
petroleum resources of Syria, the production of refined petroleum products in Syria, and the exportation of
refined petroleum products to Syria.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011—Amends the Iran, North Korea,
and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or
extracted within North Korea’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the transportation of
goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such countries’ weapons of mass destruction programs,
support for acts of international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions shipping
services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011—Denies companies that conduct business in Syria’s energy sector
(investment, oil purchases, and sale of gasoline) access to U.S. financial institutions and requires federal
contractors to certify that they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
•
S. 2034, Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012—Imposes sanctions on persons who are responsible for
or complicit in certain human rights abuses. Also prohibits procurement contracts with persons that export
sensitive technology to Syria.
•
S. 2101, Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act of 2012—Imposes, among other things, sanctions
with respect to certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against
citizens of Syria or their family members.
•
S. 2152, Syria Democracy Transition Act of 2012—Imposes, among other things, sanctions on foreign financial
institutions that conduct transactions with the central bank of Syria.
•
S. 2224, To require the President to report to Congress on issues related to Syria — Directs the President to
report to Congress regarding (1) opposition groups operating inside or outside of Syria to oppose the Syrian
government, and (2) the size and security of conventional and non-conventional weapons stockpiles in Syria.
Resolutions
•
H.Res. 296 (S.Res. 180 in the Senate), A Resolution Expressing support for peaceful demonstrations and
universal freedoms in Syria and condemning the human rights violations by the Asad Regime—Among other
things, it urges the “President to continue to work with the European Union, the Government of Turkey, the
Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other allies and partners to bring an end to human rights abuses
in Syria, hold the perpetrators accountable, and support the aspirations of the people of Syria.”
•
H.Res. 632, A Resolution that, among other things, commends the leadership of the Government of Turkey in
calling for an end to the violence in Syria and for its responsiveness to the humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees.
•
S.Res. 370 (H.Res. 549 in the House), calling for democratic change in Syria, would state the Senate’s
condemnation of “ongoing, widespread, and systemic violations of human rights conducted by authorities in
Syria” and calls on Bashar al Asad to step down. The non-binding resolution would urge the President to support
a democratic transition in Syria, establish a Friends of Syria Contact Group, develop a strategy to encourage
further military defections, and “develop a plan to identify weapons stockpiles and prevent the proliferation of
conventional, biological, chemical, and other types of weapons in Syria.”
•
S.Res. 379, A resolution that, among other things, expresses strong disappointment with the Governments of the
Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China for their veto of the United Nations Security Council
resolution condemning Bashar al Asad and the violence in Syria and urges them to reconsider their votes.
Congressional Research Service
16
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
•
S.Res. 391 (H.Res. 629 in the House), A resolution that, among other things, calls on Syria to (1) open the
country to independent and foreign journalists and end its media blackout; and (2) release all detained journalists,
videographers, and bloggers.
•
S.Res. 424, A Resolution that, among other things, supports calls by Arab leaders to provide the people of Syria
with the means to defend themselves against Bashar al-Assad and his forces, including through the provision of
weapons and other material support, and calls on the President to work closely with regional partners to
implement these efforts effectively; urges the President to take all necessary precautions to ensure that any
support for the Syrian opposition does not benefit individuals in Syria who are aligned with al Qaeda or
associated movements, or who have committed human rights abuses; and affirms that the establishment of safe
havens for people from Syria, as contemplated by governments in the Middle East, would be an important step to
save Syrian lives and to help bring an end to Mr. Assad's killing of civilians in Syria, and calls on the President to
consult urgently and thoroughly with regional allies on whether, how, and where to create such safe havens.
•
S.Res. 428, A Resolution that, among other things, urges the President to formally establish the Atrocities
Prevention Board established by Presidential Study Directive-10 in August 2011, and for the Board to provide
recommendations to the President concerning the prevention of mass atrocities in Syria.
Amendments
•
H.Amdt. 1131 to H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, an Amendment to
limit the availability of funds for Cooperative Threat Reduction activities with Russia until the Secretary of
Defense can certify that Russia is no longer supporting the Syrian regime and is not providing to Syria, North
Korea, or Iran any equipment or technology that contributes to the development of weapons of mass
destruction.
Underlying the debate over Syria policy is a broader debate about the utility of military
intervention as a means to protect civilians and whether or not such protection should be a
consistent tenet of U.S. foreign policy. In broad terms, this debate reflects differences of opinion
between those who embrace the principle of a so-called “responsibility to protect” and those who
argue that such protection, while admirable and even desirable in some contexts, should not be
endorsed in general terms because of the commitments it implies and the often unpredictable
consequences of military intervention. Other broad debates concern the relative war powers and
foreign affairs authorities of Congress and the President. All of these debates emerged during
congressional consideration of the recent U.S. intervention in Libya and are now informed by the
outcome of that conflict and the complexities of its aftermath.
Possible Questions
•
What are the ultimate goals of U.S. policy toward Syria? To protect civilians? To
further the opposition cause of removing President Asad from power? Can these
aims be separated in principle? On the ground? What might follow Asad’s
departure? Would a negotiated solution that preserved elements of the current
government be acceptable to the United States? Why or why not?
•
How are other countries responding to the crisis? Who is willing and able to
implement various humanitarian or military intervention proposals? On what
authority? With what specific resources or forces, for what period, and at what
cost? How might direct or indirect military intervention affect ongoing relief and
diplomacy initiatives?
•
What potential risks and unintended consequences may stem from various
proposals? What are the potential risks and consequences of refusing to
intervene? How will regional security be affected?
Congressional Research Service
17
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Background and Key Developments
Demographic Profile and Political Dynamics38
The Syrian population, like those of several other Middle East countries, includes different ethnic
and religious groups. Under the Asad regime strict political controls have prevented these
differences from playing a divisive role in political or social life. A majority of Syrians, roughly
90% of the population, are ethnic Arabs; however, the country contains small ethnic minorities,
notably Kurds. Of more importance in Syria are religious sectarian differences. In addition to the
majority Sunni Muslims, who comprise over 70% of the population, Syria contains several
religious sectarian minorities, including three smaller Muslim sects (Alawites, Druze, and
Ismailis) and several Christian denominations. Despite the secular nature of the ruling Baath
party, religious sects have been important in Syria as symbols of group identity and determinants
of political orientation.
Within ethnic and sectarian communities are important tribal and familial groupings that often
provide the underpinning for political alliances and commercial relationships. Socioeconomic
differences abound among farmers, laborers, middle-class wage earners, public sector employees,
military officials, and the political and commercial elite. Finally, geographic differences and local
attachments divide Syrian society; for example, rivalries between Syria’s two largest cities of
Damascus and Aleppo, differences between rural agricultural communities and urban areas, and
the isolation of Alawite communities beyond Syria’s Mediterranean coast have had effects on
political life. Despite being authoritarian, Syrian leaders have often found it necessary to adopt
policies that accommodate, to some degree, the various power centers within the country’s
diverse population.
The Asad Government and its Supporters
President Bashar al Asad was ushered into power in the wake of his father’s death in 2000, and
was the unopposed candidate of the ruling Baath party for seven-year terms in 2000 and 2007.39
Prior to his time in office, he had no government experience and had trained as an
ophthalmologist. Until 2011, his tenure was characterized by what some observers described as a
“China-style” reform strategy; Asad’s government promoted some economic liberalization while
offering only fleeting political reforms and cracking down on all outspoken or organized
opposition. The Asads sought with some success to attract support from beyond their traditional
bases in the Alawite community and the Baath party. Nevertheless, most key positions,
particularly in the security sector, have remained in Alawite hands.
President Asad’s approach during the uprising has been to offer limited reforms that correspond to
political grievances raised prior to the uprising. These include:
38
This material draws from the work of Alfred Prados, former CRS Specialist in Middle East Affairs.
The Syrian Constitution of 1973, as amended in 1984, provided for a republican government consisting of a
president, up to three vice presidents appointed by the president, a cabinet, and a 250-member one-house legislature
elected by adult citizens including women. Under this system, the president has been nominated by the decisionmaking branch of the ruling Baath Party, agreed to by the legislature, and proposed to the electorate in a referendum. In
practice, power has remained concentrated in the office of the presidency and key aides, particularly with regard to all
security and defense issues. “Syrians Vote For Assad in Uncontested Referendum,” Associated Press, May 28, 2007.
39
Congressional Research Service
18
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
•
In April 2011, President Asad lifted the formal State of Emergency declaration
that had been in place since 1963. The emergency rule had been used to suppress
domestic dissent and was widely criticized by Syrians and external observers. In
the wake of the decision, the regime continued and expanded the raids, arrests,
and detentions that had been common under the emergency rules, leading to
criticism that the move was cynically designed to weaken public pressure rather
than to implement real change.
•
In February 2012, the government held a national referendum on a new
constitution designed to open the political system to competition beyond the
confines of the Baath party. The exercise was widely denounced by the
opposition. The constitution was approved by 89.4% of voters who cast ballots,
which the government claims was 57.4% of some 14.5 million eligible voters
among Syria’s 23 million people. It limits the president’s tenure to a maximum of
two terms of seven years, but is not applied retroactively, meaning that President
Asad could run for reelection when his current term expires in 2014, and, if reelected, he could serve until 2028.
•
The new constitution provided the basis for May 2012 parliamentary elections,
the first that were not restricted to the Baath Party and its National Unity List
allies. Syrian officials reported that turnout among eligible voters was 51%.40
However, most opposition groups and figures boycotted the election, and
supporters of President Asad won over 90% of the 250 seats. A handful of
opposition figures were elected, and one new party gained a seat in Aleppo.
The government’s use of force against protestors, armed opposition groups, and civilians has
galvanized some opposition groups’ demands for steps beyond the limited reforms offered to
date—namely for the ouster of Asad and a comprehensive transition to a new political order.
However, the Asad family and the Alawite elite that supports it have shown themselves to be
unwilling to peacefully abdicate power, and may believe they have no alternative but to fight as
long as their command of the military and intelligence apparatus allows.
The Alawite Community
The minority Alawite community has shown few signs of public discord, although some of its
members have joined the opposition.41 Some Alawites may feel caught between the regime’s
demands for loyalty and their fears of retribution from other groups in the event of regime change
or civil war. Many foreign observers are debating the motivations for Alawite loyalty in this
context. Some analysts suggest that fear of the military-intelligence apparatus has kept the
Alawite community politically quiet if not loyal, while others posit that the growing sectarian
nature of the conflict only reinforces confessional loyalties and fears. According to one Syria
analyst, Professor Josh Landis at the University of Oklahoma,
40
OSC Report GMP20120515693006, “Syrian TV Announces People's Assembly's Election Results,” Damascus
Syrian Satellite Television, May 15, 2012.
41
In January 2012, a group of Alawite intellectuals issued a statement urging “Alawite Syrians, religious and ethic
minorities afraid of the consequences of a possible fall of the regime, to participate in efforts to overturn the oppressive
government and participate in the construction of a new Syrian republic based on the rule of law and citizenship.” See,
“Alawite intellectuals reject sectarianism in Syria,” Agence France Presse, January 19, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
19
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
The broader Alawi community is also likely to remain loyal to the regime, even as the
economy deteriorates. Almost all Alawi families have at least one member in the security
forces as well as additional members working in civilian ministries, such as education or
agriculture. Most fear collective punishment for the sins of the Baathist era. Not only do they
assume that they will suffer from wide-scale purges once the opposition wins; many also
suspect that they will face prison or worse.… Many do not expect an orderly transition of
power, just as many remain convinced that a spirit of revenge may guide the opposition,
which has been so badly abused. In short, because the Syrian military remains able and
willing to stand by the president, whether out of loyalty, self-interest or fear, the regime is
likely to endure for some time.42
The opposition Syrian National Council (SNC, see below) released a statement in late February
stating that its members “consider members of the Alawite sect to be an essential element of
Syria’s cultural and ethnic fabric. The Alawites remain an important component of Syria, and will
continue to enjoy the same rights as other citizens as we build one nation of Christians, Muslims,
and other sects.”43 Others have pledged that orderly trials and the rule of law will prevail in any
post-conflict setting. However, the opposition leadership’s capacity to ensure that such sentiment
guides its members’ actions is uncertain. According to Landis, “such assurances only go so far in
calming Alawi anxieties.”
Opposition and Armed Groups
Syrian opposition groups have grown more organized as the uprising has unfolded, but they
remain divided over strategy, tactics, coordination, and leadership. In February, Director of
National Intelligence James Clapper stated that “there is not a national movement … there is not a
unitary connected opposition force. It’s very local … on a community by community basis.”
According to one report:
The picture that emerges — partial and anecdotal — is of a highly decentralized, proudly
local movement, distrustful of the expatriate opposition. Many activists said they wanted
both Sunni empowerment and equal rights for all. If there was unanimity, it was in the fierce
conviction that future leaders should come from their own ... not from exile groups, like the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and secular movements.44
During the protest stage of the uprising, “Local Coordinating Councils” active in many areas
inside Syria created an informal network linking activists around the country. At present, two
opposition coalition groups continue to compete for political leadership (see below).
As the unrest has moved toward greater violence and confrontation, the focus of international
attention has shifted to armed opposition activists. Press coverage and anecdotal reports suggest
that thousands of mostly Sunni military soldiers (perhaps as many as 60,000) have defected or
deserted rather than continue following orders to enforce the crackdown. Not all of these
defectors have taken up arms. As of mid-March, a total of seven Syrian generals had defected
from Syria to opposition groups based in Turkey.45
42
Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to Survive to 2013,” Middle East Policy,
January 2012.
43
SNC Press Release, “SNC Extends Hand to Alawite Community in Syria,” February 26, 2012.
44
“Though Disparate, Syria Rebels Tenacious Against Crackdown,” New York Times, May 9, 2012
45
“Syrian Armed Forces Desertion Said to Surge to 60,000,” Bloomberg, March 15, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
20
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Divisions between internal and external opposition politicians parallel divisions between internal
and external armed groups. On the ground, many volunteer fighters have organized themselves
into neighborhood militias and nominally claim allegiance to the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
However, it remains unclear whether FSA commanders outside Syria are able to command the
loyalty of the many disparate and local resistance groups that have emerged.
More broadly, it also is unclear whether the armed resistance and the political opposition remain
unified. The Asad government’s assault on locally organized volunteers has led to angry
recriminations by some activists inside Syria that external opposition leaders have abandoned
them or are not delivering on promised assistance.46 Some experts doubt whether either element
of the opposition exerts any authority over the other.47 Strong differences of opinion over the
desirability of outside support also persist. This uncertainty complicates efforts by third parties to
identify potential partners and plan a way forward.
•
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) consists of lightly armed, dissident military
personnel and officers who have defected and are targeting government security
forces in armed attacks. It also represents a broader coalition of locally organized
volunteer fighting groups who seek to affiliate themselves with the national
opposition movement but lack integrated command structure, logistics, and
intelligence.48 Formal FSA forces are rumored to number in the low hundreds
with possibly thousands of loosely affiliated supporters. Precise and verifiable
estimates are not available. To date, the FSA’s equipment has been mostly locally
financed with fighters buying small arms and ammunition on the black market,
and local supporters selling household valuables to raise money for the
rebellion.49 The FSA is nominally headed by a former colonel in the Syrian Air
Force, Riyad al Asad (not related to the president), who defected to the
opposition in mid-March 2011. FSA’s military leadership is based in Turkey’s
Hatay province where Turkish forces maintain tight control over any cross-border
activities for fear of Syrian retribution. Some observers believe that if FSA
fighters were trained and equipped with more sophisticated equipment (portable
and guided anti-tank rockets, Stinger missiles), they would prove to be a more
formidable opponent against more heavily equipped pro-government forces.50
46
In Homs, where armed fighters had been under government siege for almost a month, one local commander of Homs
Revolutionary Committee appeared in a YouTube video angrily criticizing the SNC for its insufficient support saying,
“We gave you legitimacy, and we can take it away.”
47
For example, Peter Harling, a Syria analyst for the International Crisis Group, has said, “I don't think the Syrian
National Council has much leverage over the Free Syrian Army, and I don't think the Free Syrian Army has much
leverage itself over what is happening on the ground.”
48
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recently referred to the FSA as “a blanket, generic name that’s sort
of applied to the collection of oppositionists.” Open source reporting based on interviews with Syrian opposition
activists, including FSA commanders and FSA affiliates, suggests that no central FSA command structure exists that
encompasses the majority of armed groups in Syria, although the mostly Sunni, locally organized volunteers in Syria’s
armed resistance share similar immediate goals of ending the Asad government’s assaults on them and civilians. See
Emile Hokayem, IISS-US Roundtable Discussion - The Syrian Uprising Seen From The Arab World, January 24,
2012; and, Al Jazeera English, “Q&A: Nir Rosen on Syria’s armed opposition,” February 13, 2012.
49
Derek Henry Flood, “Inside the Free Syrian Army,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, February 24, 2012.
50
One local militia calling itself the Farouq Brigade and fighting under the broader banner of the Free Syrian Army
claims that it has been more effective in engaging government forces. According to a report, “What the Farouq fighters
have found is that the Syrian army, as a force built for a potential conflict with Israel, is poorly equipped for the type of
asymmetrical combat the guerillas engage in. That allows the guerillas to inflict heavy casualties on the military when
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service
21
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
•
The Syrian National Council (SNC) was formally organized in Turkey in
October 2011 and brings together a range of mostly external activists, consisting
of members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,51 secular elites, intellectuals, and
independents. The Council has a general 270- to 310-person body and an
executive committee made up of approximately 10 to 13 members. Although he
recently submitted his resignation, the leader of the executive committee has
been Burhan Ghalioun, a secular Sunni who teaches at the Sorbonne university in
Paris.52 On February 24, Western and Arab countries convened a “Friends of
Syria” conference in Tunis, where they pronounced the SNC “a legitimate
representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change.” However, the
international community has been frustrated by infighting within the SNC, its
inability to attract more members of Syrian minority communities (especially
Christians, Kurds, and Alawites), its inability to convince rival opposition groups
to merge with it, and its perceived lack of legitimacy among Syrian protestors on
the ground who remain subject to regime violence. In March 2012, several
activists resigned from the SNC in protest of its decision making and a perceived
lack of effectiveness. Turkey and Qatar are attempting to facilitate a new attempt
at unifying the opposition. Unlike other opposition coalitions, the SNC has
openly called for international intervention, though until recently it had not
clearly defined what type of assistance it was seeking. This hesitation raised
suspicions among some Syrians that the SNC is a tool of other regional players,
such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Although the SNC had resisted calls to
turn the protest movement into an armed struggle, it has endorsed the imposition
of a no-fly zone; the establishment of humanitarian safe corridors and buffer
zones; and “an organized and speedy operation to arm the Free Syrian Army.”
The SNC leadership is scheduled to meet in early June to select a new leader.
•
The National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB) was formed
in the summer of 2011 and is a Syria-based alliance of leftist groups, Kurdish
activists, and individuals associated with the 2005 Damascus Declaration on
political reform. The NCB has stated a willingness to negotiate with the Asad
regime (predicated on an end to the use of force against civilians) and opposes
foreign intervention. The SNC has criticized the NCB for these positions, and
repeated attempts to merge the two coalitions have failed. According to one
report, “The group is well positioned to play an important role going forward,
since it has also invested in keeping channels of communication open with
Russia, visiting Moscow as recently as April 17.”53 The NCB is also referred to in
(...continued)
the two sides engage in close combat. It is one reason the Syrian military prefers launching artillery attacks on rebelheld cities from long distances.” See, “Rare inside view of Syria’s rebels finds a force vowing to fight on,” McClatchy,
April 23, 2012.
51
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has remained in exile since the Hama massacre of 1982. Since then, membership in
the group has been, according to Syrian law, a capital offense. Within the Syrian National Council, members of the
Brotherhood hold 25% of the seats. Some Syrian opposition activists have accused the Brotherhood of funding its own
militias on the ground. See, Yezid Sayigh, “The Coming Tests of the Syrian Opposition,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, April 19, 2012.
52
In response to anger over his reelection to a third term as leader of the SNC, Ghalioun stated on May 17 that “I will
not allow myself to be the candidate of division, I am not attached to a position, so I announce that I will step down
after a new candidate has been chosen, either by consensus or through new elections.”
53
Yezid Sayigh, op.cit.
Congressional Research Service
22
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
some press reports as the Syrian National Coordination Committee for
Democratic Change.
•
The Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) were formed after the uprising in
Dara’a in March 2011 and continue to organize daily protests. They also track
opposition activity and try to disseminate information to the international media.
There is some overlap between LCC and SNC membership. The international
NGO Reporters Without Borders awarded its annual “Netizen Prize” for Internet
activism in March 2012 to the LCC movement for its members’ role in spreading
news of Syria around the world.
Non-Alawite Minority Communities
The Kurds—Although there are Kurdish members within the opposition coalitions noted above,
by and large Kurdish areas in northeastern Syria have remained fairly quiet amidst the unrest.
Since its independence in 1946, Syria has defined itself as an Arab state, despite the presence of a
large, ethnically distinct Kurdish population in Damascus and in several non-contiguous areas
along Syria’s border with Turkey and Iraq. Syria’s Kurds are the largest distinct ethnic/linguistic
minority in Syria (7%-10% of the total population). They inhabit agriculturally rich areas, which
also contain several of Syria’s most valuable oil and natural gas fields. In an attempt to curb
Kurdish demands for greater autonomy, successive Syrian governments since the 1950s have
periodically arrested Kurdish political leaders and have co-opted certain Kurdish tribal leaders.
They also have confiscated some Kurdish land and redistributed it to Syrian Arabs to try to
“Arabize” Kurdish regions.
For the past year, the regime has resorted to these divide-and-rule tactics to keep Kurdish areas
under control. According to Denise Natali, an expert on Kurdish politics at National Defense
University, “to repress the Kurds violently would be another nail in the coffin.... It is one of the
communities the regime is trying to co-opt.”54 Despite their problems under the Asad regime,
Kurds are wary of supporting a potential Sunni Arab resistance movement that, should it come to
power, may be no less hostile to Kurdish aspirations than the Alawite-led Asad government.
According to Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliament, ‘‘the Kurds in Syria
have their own problems.... They are against the Asad regime. They have been for years. They
have no rights. But they are not sure about which people will come after.’’55
In May 2012, a delegation from the Syrian-Kurdish National Council (KNC), an umbrella
organization consisting of several smaller Kurdish political parties, traveled to the United States
for meetings with the U.S. State Department. The KNC has called for the creation of an
autonomous Kurdish region within a federated Syria, a position that has put it at odds with the
main Syrian opposition exile group, the Syrian National Council. It also has demanded
compensation for historical Kurdish suffering and the removal of the word ‘‘Arab’’ from Syria’s
official name: the Syrian Arab Republic.
The Christian Community—Syria’s various Christian communities fear that the uprising will
lead to a sectarian civil war and that they could be subjected to violent repression, just as Islamist
extremist groups have targeted Iraqi Christians since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Syria’s
54
55
“Syrian Kurds seen as revolt’s wild card,” Washington Post, March 8, 2012.
“Syrian Kurds, facing tough options, flee into Iraq,” International Herald Tribune, March 10, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
23
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Christians, consisting primarily of Greek Orthodox along with some smaller sects, comprise
approximately 10% of the Syrian population. Most Syrian Christians speak Arabic and
traditionally have identified with Arab nationalist movements, which they see as an alternative to
Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, like other Christians in the Middle East, many Syrian
Christians feel some affinity for Europe and the United States on religious and cultural grounds.
Christians have been well represented in Syrian government organizations under the Asad regime.
At present, Christians appear to be taking a cautious approach to the uprising. While some have
remained supportive of the Asad regime and grown more so as sectarian violence has increased,
others are rumored to be assisting opposition movements, including local armed elements and the
Free Syrian Army. Syria’s Greek Orthodox Patriarch, Ignatius IV Hazim, patriarch of Antioch and
All the East, has taken a cautious approach, recently arguing that “the harmful effects of any
foreign intervention in our affairs would touch Christians and Muslims alike.”56
Syria’s Economy and Sanctions
Reports indicate that the Syrian economy and national budget are suffering due to a steep drop in
oil exports resulting from sanctions; a year of domestic unrest and the loss of tourism revenues;
and new social and military spending aimed at quelling public anger. Estimates vary on the
degree of contraction in 2011, ranging between 5% and 15%.57 Urban areas are now experiencing
daily power outages and fuel shortages;58 inflation is rising; and the value of the Syrian pound has
plummeted on the black market (from 54 pounds against the dollar to over 103 pounds as of early
March), forcing the government to spend resources propping it up. Syria’s stock market is down
40% since the unrest began in March 2011. Foreign exchange reserves held by the Syrian Central
Bank have reportedly fallen from $18 billion in the fall of 2011 to between $5 billion and $10
billion, and now lose about $1 billion a month.59 With the loss of European export markets due to
a European Union oil import ban, Syria has been denied a major source of revenue and hard
currency (25%-30% of total government revenue or $4 billion a year). According to Syrian Oil
Minister Sufian Alao, sanctions on Syrian oil exports have cost the country $3 billion.
Before sanctions, the main buyers of approximately 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of exported
Syrian oil were Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, and Turkey. Syria
produces about 380,000 bpd total. Foreign oil companies that have suspended operations in Syria
include Tatneft (Russia), Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Total (France), Gulfsands (UK), Suncor
(Canada), and INA (Croatia). In March 2012, Syrian officials announced that the Russian energy
company Gazprom would take over INA’s oil and gas operations in Syria. The operating status of
two Chinese companies with investments in Syria, CNPC and Sinopec, is unknown.60 Western
countries also have banned new investment in Syria’s oil and gas sector. Sanctions are having an
impact on other aspects of Syria’s energy sector as well, including financing and shipping.61
56
“Syria’s Greek patriarch opposes foreign intervention,” Agence France Presse, March 1, 2012.
“Cracks Widen in Syrian Economy,” IPS, January 24, 2012.
58
In May 2012, the Syrian government raised the price of subsidized fuel by 25%, just weeks after doubling electricity
prices.
59
“Syria Running out of Cash as Sanctions take toll, but Assad avoids Economic Pain,” Washington Post, April 24,
2012.
60
“Syria: Voting with their feet,” Economist Intelligence Unit - Business Middle East, January 16, 2012.
61
According to one oil products trader based in the Middle East, “I don't do Syria anymore. Sanctions appeared
tougher, so I gave up.... The problem is getting a bank to finance it and a ship owner to go there.” “Syria Cancels Fuel
(continued...)
57
Congressional Research Service
24
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
European sanctions do not ban the export of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to Syria, since it is
widely used by ordinary households for heating and cooking.
Since new sanctions were enacted, many analysts have speculated about whether new investors
and new foreign markets would arise for Syrian oil exports, albeit at lower prices due to sanctions
and increased shipping costs. Some experts believe that both India and China are in a position to
refine the heavy crude that Syria exports. However, others assert that some Asian buyers would
find the prospect of purchasing Syrian oil too risky or politically problematic. In recent months,
Venezuela has supplied Syria with at least three shipments of diesel fuel in exchange for Syrian
naphtha, a refined petroleum product. According to Venezuelan Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez,
“We have a high level of cooperation with Syria, a besieged nation, whom the transnational
interests want to bring down.” Other reports suggest that Russia and Iran are exporting gasoil and
diesel to Syria.62
(...continued)
Export Tender, Sanctions Deter,” Reuters, November 3, 2011.
62
“How Russia, Iran keep fuel flowing to Syria,” Reuters, April 26, 2012.
Congressional Research Service
25
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Appendix. U.S. Sanctions and Legislation
Overview
At present, a variety of legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria
and restrict bilateral trade. Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is
therefore subject to a number of general U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State
Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in 1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006
Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued new executive orders that expanded U.S.
sanctions specifically on Syria.
•
The table below reviews sanctions introduced since early 2011 in response to
Syria’s uprising.
•
Syria-specific sanctions and general sanctions applicable to Syria are also
summarized below.
Background on U.S. Assistance to Syria and Restrictions
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s
designation as a country supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to
receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and 1981, the United States provided a total of
$627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in
economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a
brief warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded
with U.S. assistance included water supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health
and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to Syria since 1981, when the last aid
programs were closed out. In the event of regime change, the Obama Administration and
Congress would need to reevaluate any successor government’s policies with regard to support
for international terrorism in order to determine Syria’s potential eligibility for U.S. assistance.
Congressional Research Service
26
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Table A-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2012
(Implemented by Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC])
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
May 1, 2012
Foreign Persons/Foreign Entities that have violated,
attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or
caused a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran or
Syria, or that have facilitated deceptive transactions
for persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning
Syria or Iran.
Executive Order 13608—Authorizes the
Department of the Treasury to publicly identify
foreign individuals and entities that have violated
U.S. sanctions against Iran and Syria and generally
bars their access to U.S. financial and commercial
systems.
April 27,
2012
OFAC issued General License 4A, which
authorizes the exports or re-exports to Syria of
items licensed or otherwise authorized by the
Department of Commerce and of exports and
reexports of certain services. General License 4A
replaces and supersedes General License 4, dated
August 18, 2011.
April 23,
2012
Governments of Syria and Iran, Ali Mamluk
(Director of the Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate), Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate, Syriatel, Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security,
Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Datak Telecom
Executive Order 13606—Blocks the property and
suspends entry into the United States of certain
persons with respect to grave human rights
abuses by the governments of Iran and Syria via
information technology.
March 30,
2012
General Munir Adanov (Deputy Chief of General
Staff of the Syrian Army), General Dawood Rajiha
(Minister of Defense)
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
March 5,
2012
General Organization of Radio and TV
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
February 23,
2012
OFAC issued General License 15 related to Syria
to authorize transactions in connection with
patent, trademark, copyright, or other intellectual
property protection that would otherwise be
prohibited by Executive Order 13582.
February 16,
2012
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
December
1, 2011
Muhammad Makhluf, Military Housing
Establishment, Real Estate Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
October 3,
2011
OFAC issued two general licenses related to
Syria to authorize payments in connection with
overflight or emergency landing and transactions
with respect to telecommunications
September
27, 2011
OFAC issued a General License related to Syria
to authorize third-country diplomatic and
consular funds transfers and to authorize certain
services in support of nongovernmental
organizations’ activities.
Congressional Research Service
27
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
September
9, 2011
Sanction or Related Activity Description
OFAC issued four general licenses related to
Syria to authorize wind down transactions,
certain official activities of international
organizations, incidental transactions related to
U.S. persons residing in Syria and operation of
accounts.
August 30,
2011
Walid Mouallem (Foreign Minister), Ali Abdul
Karim Ali (Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon),
Bouthaina Shaaban (Advisor to the President)
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
August 18,
2011
Government of Syria
Executive Order 13582—Freezes all assets of the
Government of Syria, prohibits U.S. persons from
engaging in any transaction involving the
Government of Syria, bans U.S. imports of Syrianorigin petroleum or petroleum products,
prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings in
or related to Syria’s petroleum or petroleum
products, and prohibits U.S. persons from
operating or investing in Syria.
August 18,
2011
General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company
For Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian
Petroleum Company, Sytrol
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 10,
2011
Commercial Bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based
subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank,
Syriatel, the country’s main mobile phone operator
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 4,
2011
Muhammad Hamsho (businessman with ties to
Asad family), Hamsho International Group
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
June 29,
2011
Jamil Hassan (Head of Air Force Intelligence),
Political Security Directorate (PSD, domestic
intelligence)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
May 18,
2011
President Bashar al Asad, Farouk al Shara (vice
president), Adel Safar (prime minister), Mohammad
Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the interior), Ali
Habib Mahmoud (minister of defense), Abdul Fatah
Qudsiya (head of Syrian military intelligence),
Mohammed Dib Zaitoun (director of political
security directorate), Nabil Rafik al Kuzbari,
General Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corp Qods Force suspected
of human rights abuses in Syria), Al Mashreq
Investment Fund, Bena Properties, Cham Holding,
Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Syrian Military
Intelligence, Syrian National Security Bureau
Executive Order 13573 adds listed individuals and
entities to OFAC’s SDN List
April 29,
2011
Maher al Asad, Ali Mamluk (director of the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate GID), Atif Najib
(former head of the Syrian Political Security
Directorate for Dara'a province and the
president’s cousin). the General Intelligence
Directorate, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps – Quds Force (for allegedly assisting
Syria in its crackdown)
Executive Order 13572 adds listed individuals and
entities to OFAC’s SDN List
Source: U.S. Treasury Department.
Congressional Research Service
28
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Notes: As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such
as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such
individuals and companies are called Specially Designated Nationals or SDNs. Their assets are blocked and U.S.
persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.
Specific Sanctions Against Syria
Specific U.S. sanctions levied against Syria fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions resulting
from the passage of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that,
among other things, prohibit most U.S. exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed by executive order
from the President that specifically deny certain Syrian citizens and entities access to the U.S.
financial system due to their participation in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden; or destabilizing activities in Iraq and
Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from the USA PATRIOT Act levied specifically against the
Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006.
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act into law, as P.L. 108-175. This law requires the President to impose
penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased
supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq (§§5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans on the
export of military items (already banned under other legislation, see above)63 and of dual use
items (items with both civil and military applications) to Syria (§5(a)(1)). In addition, the
President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
•
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
•
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
•
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
•
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
•
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
•
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (§5(a)(2)).
Implementation
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions of
P.L. 108-175, including the bans on munitions and dual use items (§5(a)(1)) and two sanctions
from the menu of six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban on
exports to Syria other than food and medicine (§5(a)(2)(A) and the ban on Syrian aircraft landing
in or overflying the United States (§5(a)(2)(D). In issuing his executive order, the President stated
that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete steps to address the concerns that led to the
63
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
Congressional Research Service
29
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
enactment of the Syria Accountability Act. The President also imposed two additional sanctions
based on other legislation.
•
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.
Waivers
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver
authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to
issue the following waivers on grounds of national security:
Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products in
support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of
potential dual use; aircraft parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information; certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a temporary
nature.64
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of
Syrian aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an
emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.65 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
64
According to U.S. regulations, any product that contains more than 10% de minimis U.S.-origin content, regardless
of where it is made, is not allowed to be exported to Syria. For U.S. commercial licensing prohibitions on exports and
re-exports to Syria, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 Supp No. 1. The Department of Commerce reviews license applications on a
case-by-case basis for exports or re-exports to Syria under a general policy of denial. For a description of items that do
not require export licenses, see, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce, Implementation
of the Syria Accountability Act, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
65
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/
13338.pdf.
Congressional Research Service
30
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.66
The following individuals and entities have been targeted by the U.S. Treasury Department
(Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC):
•
On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior Syrian
officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then-interior minister and its head
of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively, the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any assets
they may have in the United States and banning any U.S. persons, including U.S.
financial institutions outside of the United States, from conducting transactions
with them.67 Kanaan allegedly committed suicide in October 2005, though some
have speculated that he may have been murdered.
•
On January 18, 2006, U.S. Treasury Department took the same actions against
the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military intelligence.
•
On April 26, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13399 that authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the U.S.-based assets of anyone found to
be involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also affects anyone involved in bombings or
assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004, or anyone hindering the
international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The order allows the
United States to comply with UNSCR 1636, which calls on all states to freeze the
assets of those persons designated by the investigating commission or the
government of Lebanon to be involved in the Hariri assassination.
•
On August 15, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for allegedly contributing
to Syria’s support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and
Brigadier General Jama’a Jama’a, for allegedly playing a central part in Syria’s
intelligence operations in Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.68
•
On January 4, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three Syrian
entities, the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the
Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory, as
weapons proliferators under an executive order (E.O.13382) based on the
authority vested to the President under IEEPA. The three state-sponsored
institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.69
66
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2617.aspx.
68
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp60.aspx.
69
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp216.aspx.
67
Congressional Research Service
31
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
•
On August 1, 2007, the President issued E.O. 1344170 blocking the property of
persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and
institutions. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
four individuals reportedly affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert
Syrian control over the Lebanese political system, including Assaad Halim
Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab, and Hafiz Makhluf (under the authority of E.O.13441)
and Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik (under the authority of E.O.13338).71
•
On February 13, 2008, President Bush issued another Order (E.O.13460)
blocking the property of senior Syrian officials. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the order “targets individuals and entities determined to be
responsible for or who have benefitted from the public corruption of senior
officials of the Syrian regime.” The order also revises a provision in Executive
Order 13338 to block the property of Syrian officials who have undermined U.S.
and international efforts to stabilize Iraq.72 One week later, under the authority of
E.O. 13460, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets and restricted the
financial transactions of Rami Makhluf, a powerful cousin of President Bashar al
Asad.
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria
As previously mentioned, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush instructed
the Treasury Department in 2004 to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering
concerns. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued a final ruling that imposes a special measure
against the Commercial Bank of Syria as a financial institution of primary money laundering
concern. It bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent
account with the Commercial Bank of Syria, and it also requires banks to conduct due diligence
that ensures the Commercial Bank of Syria is not circumventing sanctions through its business
dealings with them.73
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [P.L. 94-329].
Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
70
On July 29, 2010, President Obama extended that National Emergency with respect to Lebanon for another year,
stating that “While there have been some recent positive developments in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah that include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems serve to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in Lebanon, and continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” See, Notice of July 29, 2010—
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Actions of Certain Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty
of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions, Federal Register, Title 3—The President, [Page 45045].
71
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp666.aspx.
72
A previous executive order, E.O. 13315, blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and members of
his former regime. On June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian company, SES
International Corp., and two of its officials under the authority of E.O.13315.
73
See, “U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria.” Available at http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctionssyr.html.
Congressional Research Service
32
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC 2371]. (Syria was not affected by this ban until
1979, as explained below.)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 [Title II of P.L. 95-223 (codified at
50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.)]. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
the President has broad powers pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a
threat “which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” These powers include the ability to
seize foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction, to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, to
prohibit payments between financial institutions involving foreign currency, and to prohibit the
import or export of foreign currency.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93 Stat. 515]
required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress before
licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries determined to
have supported acts of international terrorism. (Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 relettered
Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list. This list is
prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support for
acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first prepared in
1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2009, issued on August 5, 2010. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the
above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399]. Section 509(a) of this
act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit export of
items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of international terrorism,
thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the AntiTerrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989—see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans
obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of this act [100 Stat.
1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on income or war
profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism.
[26 USC 901(j)]. The President was given authority to waive this provision under Section 601 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200, May 18, 2000).
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L. 101-222]. Section 4
amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional notification and
licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries
on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their
ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribes conditions for removing a country from the terrorism list: prior
notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen of
two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite notification, the
President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no
Congressional Research Service
33
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45
days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list).
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver
has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other
prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132]. This act requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (§325) or lethal military
equipment (§326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President to waive this
provision on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to third countries that
sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens or
resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the terrorism
list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in consultation
with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such
transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.”
(31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996,
the then chairman of the House International Relations Committee reportedly protested to then
President Clinton about the Treasury Department’s implementing regulation, which he described
as a “special loophole” for Syria.
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign assistance
appropriations legislation enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S. aid.
The most recent ban appears in Section 7007 of P.L. 112-74, Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012, which states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to
titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance
or reparations for the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria: Provided, That for
purposes of this section, the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include direct loans,
credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents.”
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by Section 431 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United
States to withhold a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for
programs that benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178, was amended by P.L. 109-112 to make its
provisions applicable to Syria as well as Iran. The amended act, known as the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act, requires the President to submit semi-annual reports to designated
congressional committees, identifying any persons involved in arms transfers to or from Iran or
Syria; also, the act authorizes the President to impose various sanctions against such individuals.
On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed P.L. 109-353 which expanded the scope of the
original law by adding North Korea to its provisions, thereby renaming the law the Iran, North
Congressional Research Service
34
Syria: Unrest and U.S. Policy
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (or INKSNA for short). The list of Syrian entities
designated under INKSNA includes Army Supply Bureau (2008), Syrian Navy (2009), Syrian Air
Force (2009), and Ministry of Defense (2008).74 On May 24, 2011, the State Department
designated the Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center
(SSRC) under INKSNA.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
74
See, State Department Press Releases And Documents “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act: Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
35