Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and
U.S.
U.S. and International Response
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
June 14September 6, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33487
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. U.S. and International Response
Summary
The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion in Syria is in its third year, and seems poised to
continue, with the government and a bewilderingan array of militias locked in a bloody struggle of
attrition. The Obama Administration has signaled a pending expansion of U.S. civilian and
military assistance to the opposition in the wake of the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion
that President Bashar al Asad’s forces used chemical weapons in limited attacks in recent months.
U.S. officials and many analysts have asserted that President Asad and his supporters will be
forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to the crisis. Further
escalation in fighting or swift regime change could jeopardize the security of chemical and
conventional weapons stockpiles, threaten minority groups, attrition.
Members of Congress and Administration officials are debating options for responding militarily
to President Bashar al Asad’s forces’ reported use of chemical weapons in attacks on rebel-held
areas and civilians. After the U.S. intelligence community concluded that Asad’s forces used
weapons in limited attacks earlier this year, the Obama Administration had signaled a pending
expansion of U.S. civilian and military assistance to the opposition.
Earlier in the conflict, U.S. officials and many analysts asserted that President Asad and his
supporters would be forced from power, but had difficulty articulating how that outcome would
take place within the timeframes they set forth. Recent developments suggest that both the
opposition and the Asad regime face considerable challenges in their attempts to assert greater
control over Syria. Increasingly, analysts have focused on the potential for the regime and its
opponents to carve out strongholds and prolong the fighting. Rapid escalation or swift regime
change could deal a decisive blow to actors seeking to advance goals contrary to U.S. interests,
but it could also further jeopardize the security of chemical and conventional weapons stockpiles
and/or lead to wider regional conflict.
Opposition forces are formidable, but regime forces, backed by Hezbollah fighters and Iranian
and Russian material support, have initiated successful tactical counteroffensives in recent weekssome areas.
The Syrian military continues to use air strikes, artillery, and pro-government militias in
punishing attacks on areas where rebels operate. Some members of Syria’s Sunni Arab majority
and of ethnic and sectarian minority groups —including the Alawite minority from which the
Asad family hails—view the conflict in communal, zero-sum terms. U.S.
officials believe that
fighting would likely continue even if Asad were toppled.
Amid extensive damage to major urban areas and reports attributing war crimes to government
both
government and opposition forces, the fightingwar has created a regional humanitarian emergency. Some
estimates suggest more than 90100,000 Syrians have been killed since unrest began in March 2011.
As of June 14 As of
September 6, more than 1,638,1022 million refugees had fled Syria amid United Nations projections the
, and the United Nations projects that
the total may reach 3.5 million by years end. According to U.N. estimates, asyear’s end. As many as 4.25 million
Syrians may be Syrians have been
internally displaced. U.N. agencies have launched their largest ever humanitarian
assistance appeal– seeking $4.4 billion for the Syria crisis in 2013. The United States has
provided more than $513 million in humanitarian assistance to dateS. humanitarian assistance to date totals more than $1.01 billion.
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August
2011, and have pressed the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Syrian government.
The United States has recognized the National Coalition of Revolution and Opposition Forces
(SC) as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and has provided nonlethal assistance to
the Coalition and an affiliated Supreme Military Council (SMC). The Obama Administration
believes that a negotiated political settlement is required and has prepared military plans to secure
Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, if necessary.
Some observers advocate for more robust civil and military aid to the SC and SMC as a means of
forcing the Asad regime to the negotiating table. Opponents of this approach argue that making
opposition groups more formidable could intensify the fighting and risks empowering extremists.
Some armed opposition factions, including powerful Islamist coalitions, reject negotiation.
AfterAlthough the Administration is
seeking congressional authorization for the use of force in Syria, and preparing military plans for
various contingencies, it continues to maintain that there is “no military solution” and that a
negotiated political settlement is essential.
During more than two years of unrest and violence, the central question for policy makers remainshas
been how best to
bring the conflict in Syria to a close before the crisis consigns the region to one of several
destructive and destabilizing scenarios. The human toll of the fighting, and the resulting political,
ethnic, and sectarian polarization, all but guarantee that political, security, humanitarian, and
economic challenges will outlast Asad and keep Syria on the U.S. agenda for years to come.
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Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International without irretrievably destabilizing the
region and/or endangering key U.S. allies or interests. The debate over a potential military
response to reported chemical weapons use adds new complications to this question. Given the
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. Response
human cost and the polarizing effects of the fighting, security, humanitarian, and economic
challenges will beset Syria and probably implicate U.S. interests for years to come.
For the latest on proposed legislation to authorize the use of force against Syria, see CRS Report
R43201, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Jeremy M.
Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. Response
Contents
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Status of Ongoing Armed ConflictConflict Update .................................................................................................. 2
Possible Questions for Congressional Oversight on Recent Events .......................................... 4
Key 2
Alleged Chemical Weapons Attack and Related Developments...................................................... 4
Other Key Developments..................................................................... 8
Debating the Expansion of U.S. Civilian and Military Assistance .............................................. 8
International Conference on Syrian Political Settlement 7
U.S. Lethal Aid to Elements of the Armed Opposition ............................................................. 11
Can the Syria Civil War be Stopped? 7
Prospects for a Political Settlement ........................................................................................... 129
Status of the Syrian Political Opposition ................................................................................. 1211
Al Qaeda, Extremism, and Foreign Fighters ........................................................................... 14
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................ 9
The Syria Uprising and Civil War: U.S. Response, 2011-Present ............................................. 9
Debating U.S. Intervention .................13
U.S. Policy toward Syria: 2011 to Present ..................................................................................... 12
U.S. Assistance ........................................................................................................................ 13
Securing Syrian Weapons Stockpiles ...................................................................................... 15
Outlook and Future Policy Considerations for Congress .............................................................. 18
Possible Appropriations and Authorization Issues ............................................................ 18
Securing Weapons Supplies and Sites ............................................................................... 1915
U.S. Assistance to Syria: Issues for Congress ......................................................................... 19
Possible Appropriations and Authorization Issues ............................................................ 21
Addressing Syria’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Status ...................................................... 2022
Other Questions for Congressional Oversight ......................................................................... 2123
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Syria: Conflict and Basic DataSyria: Mapping the Conflict ............................................................................. 5
Figure 2. Syrian Opposition Groups: Relationships and Factions ................................................. 16
Figure 3. Profiles of Select Opposition Groups and Militias ................ 3
Figure 2. Map of Syria: Conflict and Basic Data.................................................................................. 7 5
Figure 4. Profiles of Select Opposition Groups and Militias 3. Syrian Public Support for Political Settlement .............................................................. 8. 11
Tables
Table D-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2013 ................................................................. 3540
Appendixes
Appendix A. Syria Legislation in the 113th Congress .................................................................... 2325
Appendix B. Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress .................................................................... 2530
Appendix C. Chronology of United Nations Action on Syria ....................................................... 3035
Appendix D. U.S. Sanctions on Syria ............................................................................................ 33
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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 4550
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Assessment
The U.S. intelligence community has assessed “with high confidence” that Syrian government
forces used sarin nerve gas in limited attacks earlier this year and conducted a mass casualty
chemical weapons attack against rebel held areas near Damascus on August 21, 2013.
In June 2013, the Obama Administration stated that reported chemical attacks would lead the
United States to offer more material support to the opposition. Secretary of Defense Hagel and
Secretary of State Kerry have stated that the United States is providing lethal assistance to vetted
members of the Syrian opposition. In response to the alleged chemical attack in August, the
President is seeking congressional authorization for a punitive military response intended to deter
the Asad regime from using chemical weapons in the future. Members of Congress have offered
divergent views concerning the reported use of chemical weapons and proposed responses.
The war in Syria and the debate over possible punitive U.S. military action against the Asad
regime for its alleged use of chemical weapons pose a uniquely challenging series of questions
for policy makers. The overarching questions remain how to define, prioritize, and secure the
core interests of the United States with regard to Syria’s complex civil war. The immediate
questions are whether and how best to respond to the apparent use of chemical weapons in Syria
and how such a response might affect U.S. interests and standing regionally and globally. In
weighing these questions, Members of Congress and Administration officials are seeking both to
protect concrete U.S. national security interests and to preserve abstract international security
principles that may serve those interests.
The August 21 incident was the latest and most deadly of a string of reported instances where
Syrian forces appear to have used chemical weapons despite President Obama’s prior statement
that the transfer or use of chemical weapons is “a red line” that would “change his calculus.” The
president and senior members of his Administration have argued that the United States has a
national security interest in ensuring that “when countries break international norms on chemical
weapons they are held accountable.” Administration officials and some observers believe that by
failing to respond after setting out a so-called “red line,” the United States would risk not only
undermining any international norms against the use of such weapons but would risk
undermining its own credibility. There is also a broader concern about the ramifications of
demonstrating that the international community will no longer take action when its established
norms are flagrantly violated.
By his own account, President Obama believes that extensive, sustained U.S. military
intervention to shape the outcome of Syria’s civil conflict is undesirable. Administration officials
have cited a number of reasons for their skepticism about undertaking direct military involvement
to shift the balance of power in Syria, including fears of exacerbating the violence; inviting
greater regional spillover or intervention; or opening a power vacuum that could benefit the
extremists who are part of the opposition. Other foreign policy priorities also have influenced the
Administration’s position, such as a desire to maintain the limited international consensus on
Iran’s nuclear program and concern that sectarian and strategic competition in Syria could ignite a
regional conflict and threaten U.S. allies and security interests. While condemning Asad as a thug
and a murderer and aiding some of his adversaries, U.S. officials have continued to stress the
need for a negotiated political solution to the conflict in the hopes of keeping the Syrian state
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intact, securing its chemical weapon stockpiles and borders, and combating extremist groups now
active there.
Some critics have argued that the risks that even a limited military response could pose to these
objectives outweigh the potential benefits to the United States of reasserting an international
standard or being seen to have reliably followed through on a commitment to act. These
arguments suggest that if a military strike makes the political solution desired by U.S. officials
less likely or possible, then the destabilizing conflict could continue or worsen. Similarly, this line
of argument suggests that if military operations were to dramatically degrade remaining state
authority—whether intentionally or unintentionally—then undesired outcomes with regard to
terrorism, proliferation, or mass atrocities could occur.
Still other critics of the Administration’s proposals, including some Members of Congress, charge
that U.S. hesitation to intervene militarily to protect Syrian civilians and/or help oust the Asad
government has unnecessarily prolonged the fighting. Over time, these critics argue, the costs of
inaction have grown intolerably as the humanitarian situation has deteriorated, violent extremist
groups have seized the initiative, and Syria’s neighbors, including several U.S. partners, have
been overwhelmed by refugees and threatened with violence. Others have argued that by failing
to halt fighting in Syria, the United States and others are exacerbating already volatile SunniShiite sectarian tensions throughout the Middle East, which poses risks to other strategically
important countries. Finally, some critics argue that U.S. global credibility is being diminished by
Asad’s reluctance to step down or end abuses of civilians despite U.S. demands.
Sorting through these competing perspectives and prescriptions now falls to Members of
Congress as they reconvene to consider the president’s proposed course of action, his request that
Congress authorize the use of force, and the future of U.S. policy with regard to the conflict in
Syria and its regional consequences.
Conflict Update
The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion against the Asad regime is in its third year, and
seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias locked in a
bloody struggle of attrition. Over the course of Syria’s civil war, momentum has shifted between
government and rebel forces. Currently, the support provided by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah
fighters appears to have helped enable the Asad regime to wrest the initiative from the opposition
in central Syria (such as Homs) and to launch counteroffensives on the outskirts of the capital.
The Asad regime retains its advantages in air power, armored equipment, and artillery.
Various opposition forces control areas of northwestern, eastern, and southern Syria (see Figure 1
below). In areas near the northern city of Aleppo, diverse rebel forces have announced limited
tactical successes in recent weeks, including the fall of a key military air base.1 In the meantime,
Kurdish and Arab militia groups have clashed in the predominantly Kurdish areas of northeastern
Syria. Finally, reports from some rebel-held northern areas (such as the provincial capital of
Raqqa) suggest that jihadist rebels, bolstered by an influx of foreign fighters, are continuing to
1
“In Syria, Seized Weapons Caches boost Rebels’ Hopes after Weeks of Setbacks,” Washington Post, August 21,
2013.
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gain strength, as terrorist organizations like the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (formerly
known as Al Qaeda in Iraq) take root.2
Figure 1. Syria: Mapping the Conflict
Sources: Der Spiegel adapted from BBC and Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP), and originally based on
information from the U.S. government compiled from media sources.
According to close observers of the conflict, extremist militia groups are “concentrating their
efforts on consolidating control in the northern, rebel-held areas of the country,” 3 while they and
others among the range of “extraordinarily fractured”4 militia groups continue to battle regime
forces for contested areas. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) to which the United States has
provided assistance reportedly “is still far from a functioning rebel leadership.”5
2
“Al-Qaeda expands in Syria via Islamic State,” Washington Post, August 12, 2013.
Elizabeth O'Bagy, “On the Front Lines of Syria's Civil War,” Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2013.
4
Aron Lund, “The Non-State Militant Landscape in Syria,” United States Military Academy Combatting Terrorism
Center (CTC) Sentinel, August 27, 2013.
5
Ibid.
3
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Rebel-held areas appear to be carved up into numerous autonomous zones where different militia
groups hold power. Some areas are under the control of armed Islamists, some of whom have
begun to govern towns under their control using their interpretation of Islamic teachings as the
rule of law. Kurdish groups have announced plans to form a Kurdish “transitional administration”
in northeastern and northern Syria and conduct parliamentary elections in areas they control.
As of September 2013, United Nations officials have cited estimates that over 100,000 Syrians
have been killed,6 including thousands of regime soldiers, police, and pro-government militia
members and civilians. According to UN agencies, as many as 4.25 million Syrians have been
displaced inside the country and more than 2 million Syrian refugees have fled.
Alleged Chemical Weapons Attack and Related
Developments
On August 30, the Obama Administration presented intelligence analysis suggesting that the
Syrian government was responsible for an August 21 chemical weapons attack against civilians in
rebel-held areas of the suburbs of Damascus. The Syrian government continues to categorically
deny any responsibility for any chemical weapons attack. For more background, see CRS Report
R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
Summary of U.S. Intelligence on August 21 Incident
An unclassified summary of the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment7 released by the White
House concludes, among other things, that:
6
7
•
The United States Government assesses with high confidence that the Syrian
government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on
August 21, 2013.
•
A preliminary U.S. government assessment determined that 1,429 people were
killed in the chemical weapons attack, including at least 426 children.
•
The U.S. intelligence community has intelligence that leads it to assess that
Syrian chemical weapons personnel—including personnel assessed to be
associated with the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC)—the
entity responsible for Syria’s chemical weapons program—were preparing
chemical munitions prior to the attack.
•
The U.S. intelligence community assesses that that the opposition has not used
chemical weapons and the scenario in which the opposition executed the attack
on August 21 is highly unlikely.
•
Satellite detections corroborate that attacks from a regime-controlled area struck
neighborhoods where the chemical attacks reportedly occurred—including Kafr
Batna, Jawbar, 'Ayn Tarma, Darayya, and Mu'addamiyah.
“Syria Death toll tops 100,000: UN,” Agence France Presse, July 25, 2013.
Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013.
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Figure 2. Map of Syria: Conflict and Basic Data
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Assessment
The conflict in Syria poses increasingly complex and difficult policy questions for Congress and
the Obama Administration. The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion against the Asad regime
is in its third year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of
militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. Al Qaeda affiliates and other violent extremists,
including foreign fighters, have assertively demonstrated their presence in Syria. On the other
hand, after suffering a series of setbacks, Syrian government forces, aided by Iran, Hezbollah, and
Russia,1 have reclaimed some territory in the areas around Damascus and the city of Homs. The
Syrian government continues to launch indiscriminate attacks on rebel-held areas and has stated
its willingness to use its unconventional weapons in the event of foreign military intervention. As
of early June 2013, United Nations officials have cited estimates that as many as 4.25 million
Syrians have been displaced inside the country. As of mid-June 2013, there are more than 1.6
million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries.
Recent developments in the conflict, including the U.S. intelligence community’s conclusion that
Syrian government forces have used sarin nerve gas in limited attacks, have led the Obama
Administration to offer more civilian and military support to the opposition. On June 13, a White
House statement relayed the U.S. intelligence community’s judgment that “the Assad regime has
used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition
multiple times in the last year.”2 The statement further said that
the President has augmented the provision of non-lethal assistance to the civilian opposition,
and also authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council
(SMC)… the Assad regime should know that its actions have led us to increase the scope and
scale of assistance that we provide to the opposition, including direct support to the SMC.
These efforts will increase going forward.
Unnamed officials cited in subsequent press reports have indicated that such assistance may be
provided under intelligence authorities by the Central Intelligence Agency and include small
arms, ammunition and the possible provision of anti-tank weapons and training.3 Other reports
further suggest that related plans call for rebels to be armed in Jordan and for a limited no-fly
zone to be enforced from Jordan to create a safe zone where training can occur there and in
southern Syria.4 As of June 14, no official comments or public documents have confirmed those
reports. An ongoing U.S. and allied military exercise in Jordan has brought Patriot missile
batteries, F-16 fighters, F-18 fighters, and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit to Jordan that could
be used to protect Jordanian airspace and territory from attack.5 Some Members of Congress have
1
Section 1295 of H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, required the Administration
to provide a report within 90 days of enactment on Russian military assistance to Syria. For more information, see CRS
Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, coordinated by Jim Nichol.
2
Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian Chemical
Weapons Use, June 13, 2013.
3
Mark Mazzetti, Michael R. Gordon and Mark Landler, “U.S. Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian Rebels,” New
York Times, June 13, 2013.
4
Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Stepping Up ‘Military Support’ to Syrian Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June
13, 2013.
5
Hendrick Simoes, “US participating in international Eager Lion exercise in Jordan,” Stars and Stripes, June 12, 2013.
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been calling for increased support to the opposition, including the provision of arms to vetted
units, while others have opposed and warned of the unpredictable consequences of deeper U.S.
involvement. Proposed legislation before the 113th Congress alternately seeks to authorize or
restrict U.S. actions in Syria (see Appendix A).
The Administration’s decision to offer increased support to the opposition and the regime’s
Hezbollah-backed counteroffensive come in the midst of a diplomatic initiative aimed at bringing
Syrian combatants to the negotiating table. In May 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry renewed
joint U.S.-Russian efforts to broker a political settlement, returning to a Russian-backed proposal
known as the Geneva Final Communiqué, an agreement reached by the five permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council in June 2012. The Geneva Communiqué broadly outlined
a path toward a transitional government with executive authority formed by mutual consent in
negotiations between the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition. This agreement did not
specifically prohibit any member of the Asad regime, including President Asad himself, from
serving in such a transitional government despite U.S. and other repeated calls for his resignation.
The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Syrian Coalition or SC)
has said that it welcomed “all international efforts calling for a political solution, which will
achieve the aspirations of the Syrian people for a democratic state that begins with the removal of
the Asad regime.” However, members of the SC and many armed groups in Syria continue to
demand that President Asad and other senior figures have no role in any transition. SC officials
and armed Syrian opposition groups also have pushed for assurances of foreign military support
before negotiations would begin and have amplified those demands in response to the regime’s
counteroffensives. According to one SC official, “We’re not going to sit at the table while Assad
continues to kill, supported by Russia and Hezbollah.... What we are asking for is arming the Free
Syrian Army (FSA) or SMC—before the talks.”6 SMC commander General Salim Idriss
reportedly submitted a detailed request for ammunition, anti-tank weaponry, and anti-aircraft
weaponry to oppose regime counterattacks in recent days.7
With the Asad regime still entrenched in a number of strongholds and able to use limited but
indiscriminate air, artillery, and missile power against rebel-held areas, the death toll, which may
now exceed 90,000, continues to climb. Recent sectarian atrocities and Hezbollah’s intervention
on the side of the Asad regime are amplifying the risks of broader civil and regional conflict. If
continued, these trends could produce greater regional intervention or result in greater
displacement of Syrian civilians as communities seek to relocate and consolidate for protection.
Status of Ongoing Armed Conflict
As of June 2013, the armed conflict in Syria shows no signs of abating. In fact, recent gains by
government forces appear to have bolstered the regime’s confidence. Although many observers,
including U.S. intelligence officials, predicted that government forces would continue to lose
ground, a change in regime tactics coupled with an infusion of foreign assistance appears for the
time being to have stemmed rebel advances. Some observers have speculated openly about the
potential for the opposition’s defeat if their recent reversals continue. The Asad regime benefits
6
“Syrian rebels demand weapons before talks,” Washington Post, May 16, 2013.
Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “Rebels Plead for Weapons in Face of Syrian Onslaught,” Wall Street Journal,
June 12, 2013.
7
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from advantages in air power, armored equipment, and artillery. It displayed more sophisticated
military tactics and incorporated Hezbollah fighters in its recent campaign to reclaim the
strategically important town of Qusayr (alt.sp. Qusair) located six miles from the LebaneseSyrian border. Qusayr is at a crossroads linking Damascus to the Alawite-controlled
Mediterranean coast.
Regime control of Qusayr may allow government forces to launch a new offensive against the
city of Homs, which is still partially controlled by rebel forces. Opposition control of Qusayr had
been crucial for receiving shipments of weapons from Lebanon. Government forces and
Hezbollah launched their offensive to retake Qusayr on May 19, as various unsubstantiated
claims estimate that the number of Hezbollah fighters now in Syria number anywhere between
2,000-5,000 gunmen. Elsewhere, the regime continues to use irregular Alawite militias to support
military operations, some of which have committed atrocities against mainly Sunni civilians.
Opposition forces still control substantial areas of northwestern, eastern, and southern Syria. The
broad grouping of forces opposing Asad’s regime includes a multitude of local militias; army
defectors; and volunteers fighting in brigades that are organized under the banner of the Free
Syrian Army and various armed Islamist coalitions. Some of these groups include foreign
fighters. Islamist militia groups; Free Syrian Army brigades; and local fighters in different cities,
continue to operate relatively independently. Several leading opposition groups hold divergent
and potentially contradictory goals for the country’s political future. Groups with divergent
priorities now control different areas. Islamist fighters, including the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al
Nusra (Support Front), captured the city of Ar Raqqah (Raqqa) in March 2013. Kurdish forces
control areas of northeastern Syria, and some Kurds have clashed with Arab Islamists.
As death tolls have spiraled, both sides have adopted brutal tactics. In many areas, the regime has
resorted to the use of air power, Scud missile strikes, and indiscriminate shelling of entire
population centers, as part of a strategy to leave rebels with damaged physical infrastructure and a
resentful population. A June 2013 report by a United Nations Human Rights Council Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on Syria found that government forces and regime-affiliated
militia have committed “War crimes and gross violations of international human rights law including summary execution, arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful attack, attacking protected
objects, and pillaging and destruction of property.”8 The report also documents human rights
violations by the opposition, though it notes that “the violations and abuses committed by antiGovernment armed groups did not, however, reach the intensity and scale of those committed by
Government forces and affiliated militia.”
These crimes have intensified as Syria’s civil war has taken on an increasingly sectarian
dimension. In many areas, Alawite-led security forces and allied militia such as Jaysh al Shaabi
(Popular Army) are engaged in combat with predominantly Sunni rebel militias. Some of these
Sunni militias are becoming more radicalized and aligned with extremist groups such as Ahrar al
Sham (the Free Ones of the Levant) or the Nusra Front. The Obama Administration has
designated as terrorist groups both the Popular Army and the Nusra Front pursuant to terrorism
and Syria-related sanctions legislation and executive orders. In early April, the Al Qaeda affiliated
Islamic State of Iraq announced its merger with the Nusra Front, but a Nusra leader reportedly
rejected the claim and pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri in turn
8
U.N. Document A/HRC/23/58, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, June 4, 2013.
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has instructed the groups to refrain from rivalry and continues to encourage foreign fighters to
travel to Syria and calls on Muslims to offer material support to armed jihadist groups in Syria.
Over time, Syria’s conflict has become more complex. Sporadic clashes have broken out within
the ranks of the armed opposition and allegedly within the tight-knit Alawite community.
Violence also has spilled over to varying degrees into neighboring states, such as Israel, Turkey,
Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Many observers are concerned that the country is descending into
anarchy. If current trends hold, fighting may gradually turn from a two-sided war into a contest
involving multiple combatants from armed ethnic/sectarian communities, rebel militias, and
remnants of the old regime. External intervention, including Hezbollah and Iranian support for
Assad and increased U.S. support for select opposition forces, may invite a cycle of counterintervention from other parties.
In sum, the short-to- medium-term security outlook for Syria and its neighbors is not positive.
The United States and other third parties face difficult choices with limited potential to shape the
overall outcome.
Possible Questions for Congressional Oversight on Recent Events
With White House statements and press reports suggesting that U.S. involvement is set to
increase in the Syrian conflict, Members of Congress may wish to explore a range of strategic,
political, military, and fiscal issues as they conduct oversight and authorize and appropriate funds
that support U.S. policy. Possible questions include the following.
•
What specific types of increased support will be provided, with which resources,
and under which authorities? Who is receiving U.S. assistance, who may receive
it in the future, and what mechanisms are in place to ensure that U.S. assistance is
put to its intended use and does not benefit the Asad regime or extremist groups?
Should Congress seek to shape the provision of such assistance now or in the
future by enacting specific authorizing or appropriating language? Why or why
not?
•
What further contributions, if any, should the United States make to international
humanitarian relief efforts in response to the United Nations appeal for billions of
dollars more in funding for 2013 alone? Should the United States seek to expand
the recognition it receives among Syrians for its support? What might the costs of
further humanitarian assistance be under various scenarios and what funding is
currently available to respond?
•
What are the estimated costs of the current deployment of U.S. anti-ballistic
missile batteries and other forces to the region? Over what periods of time might
current operations continue? What would more robust operations cost and what
funds and other resources are available?
•
How might the Asad regime and its allies respond politically and militarily to
increased U.S. support for the Syrian opposition? What degree of support and
protection is the United States prepared to provide to regional allies who may
become involved in facilitating the delivery of increased U.S. support, including
military material and training, to the Syrian opposition? If the Syrian military
were to attack regional U.S. allies, how should the United States respond?
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Figure 1. Map of Syria: Conflict and Basic Data
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Syria’s Neighbors: Implications and Involvement
The Syrian conflict continues to encroach upon Syria’s neighbors. In addition to the issue of refugees entering
neighboring countries, Syrian government forces have exchanged fire with the Turkish and Israeli militaries and have
fired into Lebanon. Armed opposition elements have targeted United Nations peacekeepers in the Golan Heights and
reportedly have fired on Israeli military positions. Sectarian violence in Lebanon and Iraq has increased.
In Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan has adopted a strong stance against the Syrian regime. Turkey has supported and
hosted elements of the Syrian political and military opposition. It has coordinated its efforts closely with other
countries—including the United States, other NATO allies, and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar—that
also provide political, financial, and/or material support to the opposition. As of June 11, 2013, Turkey had 380,650
Syrian refugees registered or awaiting registration. Turkey has established several refugee camps in the provinces of
Hatay, Sanliurfa, and Gaziantep. NATO deployed Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missile defense systems to defend
Turkish territory from attack. Turkish officials have stressed that any missile systems deployed will be used for missile
defense purposes only.
In Lebanon, the war next door is severely straining the political system and fueling sectarian violence. In March 2013,
Sunni Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned in frustration, as tensions over Syria had led to disputes between Mikati
and Hezbollah. His successor, former Minister of Culture Tammam Salam, has pledged to keep Lebanon neutral and
“ward off the risks brought by the tragic situation in the neighboring country.” However, a spate of sectarianmotivated kidnappings has recently taken place, and some Saudi-backed Lebanese Sunnis and Iranian-backed Lebanese
Shiites smuggle weapons to Syrian opposition and Syrian regime forces respectively. Iran and Hezbollah appear to be
working to ensure that Iranian supply routes to Hezbollah remain open regardless of what happens to the Asad
regime. Hezbollah Secretary General said on May 25 that Hezbollah would act to defend its interests in Syria and
challenged those supporting the opposition to fight in Syria rather than in Lebanon. As of June 12, 2013, 525,008,
Syrian refugees had registered or sought to register with the United Nations in Lebanon.
In Israel, the government fears a variety of possible security threats from the fighting in Syria, including: the possible
use of chemical weapons against Israel or their seizure by/transfer to terrorist groups, and fighting spilling over the
border into the Golan Heights. The Syrian-Golan border has recently witnessed increased regime-rebel
confrontations, and Israeli forces have been targeted by mortar shells and machine-gun fire. Israel recently deployed
an Iron Dome anti-rocket system to the northern part of the country. Recent rebel gains along the Golan border
raise questions as to the ideologically diverse groups’ intentions toward Israel should they continue to hold territory.
In Iraq, Sunni and Shiite Arabs and Iraqi Kurds appear to be supporting opposing sides of the Syrian conflict. Iraq’s
government aims to avoid a return to sectarian warfare and avoid ethnic conflict with the Kurdistan Regional
Government, but leaders in Baghdad have refused to call for Asad’s ouster and have been accused by U.S. officials of
allowing Iranian arms shipments to Syria to cross Iraqi territory and airspace. Media accounts report that Iraqi Sunni
Islamists and tribesmen are crossing into Syria to fight alongside various opposition militias, and Iraqi Shiite militias are
joining Asad regime forces. Many analysts fear that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQ-I) also has been active in the Syrian civil war,
supporting and training Sunni extremist groups in Syria, and the U.S. government designated Al Nusra Front as a
terrorist group on the basis of its relationship to AQ-I. In March 2013, dozens of Syrian regime troops who had
crossed into Iraq for medical treatment were attacked by unidentified gunmen who killed at least 40 Syrian soldiers.
As of June 12, 2013, 159,196 Syrian refugees had registered with the United Nations in Iraq,
In Jordan, refugee flows are placing tremendous strains on the government. As of June 13, 2013, approximately
479,429 Syrian refugees had registered or were awaiting registration. Za'atri refugee camp, which is in northern
Jordan east of the town of Mafraq, opened in July 2012. By some estimates, the camp is now the fourth largest urban
area in Jordan with a population of more than 80,000. From a security standpoint, reports indicate that Jordanians
with Salafi-Jihadi beliefs are crossing into Syria to join extremist rebel factions. Just as the violence in Syria is affecting
Jordan, the Jordanian government also may be indirectly aiding certain parties to the conflict. Several European press
reports allege that Jordan is serving as a conduit for weapons purchased by the Gulf countries from Croatia to rebel
factions that are loosely associated with the Free Syrian Army/Supreme Military Council. The government of Jordan
denies any covert involvement either in supplying armaments or training rebel forces. Syrian officials have warned
Jordan concerning support for rebel fighters. U.S. military planners have been deployed to Jordan, and U.S.
cooperative threat reduction assistance is strengthening Jordanian border monitoring capabilities. Any U.S. plans to
provide direct military assistance to Syrian opposition fighters in or through Jordan could require greater U.S. security
guarantees or military protection for Jordan.
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Historical Background and Syria’s Diverse Population
Long before the current uprising, Syrians struggled with many of the challenges that have bred deep dissatisfaction in
other Arab autocracies, including high unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, rampant corruption, lack
of political freedoms, and repressive security forces. These factors have fueled opposition to Syria’s authoritarian
government, which has been dominated by the Baath (Renaissance) Party since 1963, and the Al Asad family since
1970. President Bashar al Asad’s father—Hafiz al Asad—ruled the country from 1970 until his death in 2000.
The Syrian population, like those of several other Middle East countries, includes different ethnic and religious groups.
For years, the Asad regime’s strict political controls prevented these differences from playing a divisive role in political
or social life. A majority of Syrians, roughly 90% of the population, are ethnic Arabs; however, the country contains
small ethnic minorities, notably Kurds, the country’s largest distinct ethnic/linguistic minority (7%-10% of the total
population). Of more importance in Syria are religious sectarian differences. In addition to the majority Sunni Muslims,
who comprise over 70% of the population, Syria contains several religious sectarian minorities, including three smaller
Muslim sects (Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis) and several Christian denominations. The Asad family are members of the
minority Alawite sect (roughly 12% of the population), which has its roots in Shiite Islam.
Despite the secular nature of the ruling Baath party, religious sects have been important to some Syrians as symbols
of group identity and determinants of political orientation. The Asads and the Baath party have cultivated Alawites as
a key base of support, and elite security forces have long been led by Alawites. The government violently suppressed
an armed uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, killing thousands of Sunni Muslims and others.
Religious, ethnic, geographic, and economic identities overlap in influencing the views and choices of Syrians about the
current conflict. Within ethnic and sectarian communities are important tribal and familial groupings that often
provide the underpinning for political alliances and commercial relationships. Socioeconomic differences abound
among farmers, laborers, middle-class wage earners, public sector employees, military officials, and the political and
commercial elite. Many rural, less advantaged Syrians have supported the opposition movement, while urban,
wealthier Syrians appear to have mixed opinions. Local attachments also shape Syrian society, as seen in rivalries
between Syria’s two largest cities of Damascus and Aleppo, in differences between rural agricultural communities and
urban areas, and in the concentration of some sectarian and ethnic communities in discrete areas. Despite being
authoritarian, Syrian leaders over the years often found it necessary to adopt policies that accommodate, to some
degree, various power centers within the country’s diverse population and minimize the potential for communal
identities to create conflict.
That need is likely to remain, if not intensify, after the current conflict. While sectarian considerations cannot fully
explain power relationships in Syria or predict the future dynamics of the uprising, there are indications that as the
fighting continues sectarian and ethnic divisions are growing among Syrians. The Sunni Arab majority has been at the
forefront of the protest movement and armed opposition to the Alawite-led regime, with Syria’s Christians and other
minority groups caught between their parallel fears of violent change and of being associated with Asad’s crackdown.
The Alawite leadership of the Syrian government and its allies in other sects perceive the mostly Sunni Arab uprising
as an existential threat to the Baath party’s nearly five-decade hold on power. At the popular level, some Alawites
may feel caught between the regime’s demands for loyalty and their fears of retribution from other groups in the
event of regime change or a post-Asad civil war.
Some Sunni Arabs may view the conflict as a means to assert their community’s dominance over others, but some
Sunni opposition leaders have sought to assuage these concerns. The opposition Syrian National Council (SNC, see
below) released a statement in February 2012 stating that its members “consider members of the Alawite sect to be
an essential element of Syria’s cultural and ethnic fabric. The Alawites remain an important component of Syria, and
will continue to enjoy the same rights as other citizens as we build one nation of Christians, Muslims, and other
sects.”9 Others have pledged that orderly trials and the rule Others have pledged that orderly trials and the rule
of law will prevail in any post-conflict setting. However,
reports of abuses suggest that rebel leaders at times are
unable or unwilling to ensure that such sentiments prevail.
While some Kurds view the conflict as an opportunity to achieve greater autonomy, others are wary of supporting
Sunni Arab rebels who, should they come to power, may be no less hostile to Kurdish political aspirations than the
Asad government. Some members of Syria’s various Christian communities fear that the uprising will lead to a
sectarian civil war and that they could be subjected to violent repression, given that Muslim extremist groups have
targeted Iraqi Christians since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Other Christians reportedly are assisting the armed
opposition, including locally active militias and elements of the Free Syrian Army.
9
SNC Press Release, “SNC Extends Hand to Alawite Community in Syria,” February 26, 2012.
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Other Key Developments
U.S. Lethal Aid to Elements of the Armed Opposition
Throughout the Syrian civil war, proponents of deeper U.S. involvement in Syria have called on
the Administration to offer lethal support to select armed rebel fighters; a policy the
Administration considered but initially rejected due to concern, among other things, over the
possible transfer of U.S.-supplied equipment to terrorists. Until recently, Obama Administration
officials have acknowledged that the United States is providing non-combatant elements of the
Syrian opposition with non-lethal assistance, such as medical supplies, food, communications
equipment, and training.8
In June 2013, the Administration changed direction, after receiving an intelligence assessment
apparently confirming that Syrian government forces had used chemical weapons in limited
operations several times in the spring of 2013. According to Deputy National Security Advisor for
Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes, President Obama decided to expand U.S. assistance to
the Supreme Military Council (SMC): “Put simply, the Assad regime should know that its actions
have led us to increase the scope and scale of assistance that we provide to the opposition,
including direct support to the SMC. These efforts will increase going forward.”9
The Supreme Military Council (SMC)
Should the Administration ultimately provide covert military assistance to elements of the armed Syrian opposition,
the Supreme Military Council could be one of the primary beneficiaries of U.S. lethal aid. In December 2012, a
number of brigades nominally affiliated themselves under the umbrella of a Supreme Military Council (SMC) headed
by General Salim Idriss, a former Asad regime military commander who defected. The SMC seeks to administer
regional commands with affiliated units nominally reporting through a chain of command to General Idriss, who has
yet to assert operational control over all affiliated units. Many opposition figures argue that only through the provision
of assistance to the SMC will General Idriss be able to assert such control. According to General Idriss, “Fighters go
to where there is money and weapons and if I had the means … within one or two months everyone would join....
They will know that this is a national institution while the brigades and battalions will eventually disappear.”10 In the
ever-changing landscape of the armed Syrian opposition, Western officials have deemed SMC commanders to be
more moderate in their political views than leaders of other armed opposition groups, although the SMC itself
includes Islamist units and commanders. SMC members reportedly coordinate on the battlefield with the Syrian
Islamic Front, a group that includes an extremist militia known as Ahrar al Sham.11 Overall, many observers believe
that while the SMC may be far from an ideal U.S. partner, given the complexity, disunity, and elements of extremism
within the Syrian armed opposition, it may be the only feasible U.S. partner available for now. According to one
unnamed U.S. source, “Idriss says and does the right things.... We believe he is genuine. Are there concerns? Yes, but
what are the options?”12
8
Such aid reportedly includes tools to circumvent Internet censorship, such as anonymizing software and satellite
phones with GPS capabilities. According to another report, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has “supplied
encryption-enabled communications gear to opposition groups, presumably enabling the United States to monitor their
talks.” CRS cannot verify these reports. See “US Provides Communications Aid for Syria Opponents,” Agence France
Presse, June 14, 2012; “In Syria Conflict, U.S. Struggles to Fill Intelligence Gaps,” Washington Post, July 23, 2012.
9
June 13, 2013, Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian
Chemical Weapons Use, available online at: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/13/statementdeputy-national-security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben-]
10
“West pins hopes on Syrian general,” Financial Times, April 22, 2013.
11
“Islamist Rebels Create Dilemma on Syria Policy,” New York Times, April 27, 2013.
12
“Obama bets big on Syrian rebel leader,” Washington Post, May 1, 2013.
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Unnamed officials cited in subsequent press reports have indicated that such assistance would be
provided under intelligence authorities by the Central Intelligence Agency and include small
arms, ammunition and the possible provision of anti-tank weapons and training.13 White House
officials have repeatedly declined to publicly describe the content of any increased assistance to
the opposition, but have confirmed that President Obama “is committed to ramping up that
assistance as necessary because of the circumstances that we find, and because of the need for the
opposition to further strengthen and unify.” In a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on September 3, Defense Secretary Hagel remarked that “We, the Department of
Defense, have not been directly involved in this. This is, as you know, is a covert action.”
General Salim Idriss
General Salim Idriss is currently the Chief of Staff to
the armed opposition Supreme Military Council. The
55-year-old Brigadier General defected from the Syrian
Army in July 2012 after dozens of his family members
reportedly were killed by government forces in the
city of Homs. Educated in East Germany, Idriss had
been the dean of the Aleppo military engineering
academy before his defection. Within the Syrian
opposition, he is considered more of a political figure
than a respected military commander. He routinely
appeals for outside funding and material support to
secure the loyalty of various commanders and militias.
Nevertheless, throughout the summer of 2013,
numerous reports suggested that alleged U.S.
lethal aid to the SMC had stalled. In Congress,
some lawmakers initially expressed concern
over the Administration’s alleged covert
proposal. Both Senate and House intelligence
committees had raised questions over the ability
of intelligence agencies to monitor weapons
flows; the efficacy of covert action to tip the
balance of power in favor of U.S.-supported
groups; and the Administration’s strategy to
avoid further entanglement in Syria’s civil war
while allegedly supplying arms to one side.14
Moreover, implementation of the President’s June policy may have run into other obstacles.
According to one article, “U.S. officials attribute the delay in providing small arms and munitions
from the CIA weapons program to the difficulty of establishing secure delivery ‘pipelines’ to
prevent weapons from falling into the wrong hands, in particular Jihadi militants also battling the
Assad regime.”15 Some observers insist that such concern actually masked continued U.S.
reticence to arm groups like the SMC. According to one member of the Syrian Opposition
Coalition interviewed in mid-August, “nothing has come through yet, and we haven’t been given
a specific date when we'll see them.”16 On August 19, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin E. Dempsey wrote to lawmakers, saying that “Syria today is not about choosing
between two sides but rather about choosing one among many sides. It is my belief that the side
we choose must be ready to promote their interests and ours when the balance shifts in their favor.
Today they are not.”17
After the August 21 incident, some lawmakers are calling on the Administration to jumpstart or
expand reported covert aid to the Supreme Military Council. According to Senator Bob Corker, in
a September 3 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “I want to see us continue to
carry out the strategy that has been stated. And that is building the capacity of the vetted,
moderate opposition.” However, according to one recent Washington Post-ABC News poll, 70%
13
For a description of intelligence authorities, please see, CRS Report R40691, Sensitive Covert Action Notifications:
Oversight Options for Congress, by Marshall C. Erwin.
14
“Congress Delaying U.S. Aid to Syrian Rebels –Sources,” Reuters, July 8, 2013.
15
“Still No Arms to Rebel Groups,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2013.
16
“U.S. has yet to arm Syrian rebels,” Los Angeles Times, August 17, 2013.
17
See, [http://democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/113/Letter_for_Rep_Engel_19_Aug_13.pdf]
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of respondents oppose the United States or its allies supplying weapons to the Syrian rebels.18 In
the meantime, some rebel commanders affiliated with the SMC have grown increasingly
frustrated by the lack of external assistance and have threatened to break ranks and join more
radical rebel groups. On August 22, Colonel Fatih Hasun, a deputy to General Idriss, demanded
better weapons and said that his fellow commanders had tired of “false promises of those who
call themselves Friends of Syria.”19
As part of the ongoing debate on possible U.S. military intervention, press reports claiming to cite
current and former U.S. officials have come into conflict with the public testimony of high-level
Administration policymakers on the question of whether tipping the balance in favor of the
opposition by providing arms might be worse than the current stalemate.20 Given that supplying
arms to Syrian rebels could occur in conjunction with or as an alternative to direct U.S. military
action, public discourse may focus on the relative merits of both options and how they might be
calibrated to serve U.S. interests.
As officials continue to debate the merits of expanded military aid to elements of the armed
opposition, reports continue to surface of arms financed by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
monarchies being supplied to rebel groups. The SMC also is discussing forming a more formal,
unified “army.” According to one report, in southern Syria, where Islamist-oriented armed rebels
are less numerous, the SMC is expanding its presence with the assistance of Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and the United States.21
Prospects for a Political Settlement
How fast-moving current developments may affect prospects for a negotiated political solution to
Syria’s civil war is unclear. Many analysts question the likelihood of the a diplomatic process
succeeding amidst continued fighting, more overt foreign intervention, and the regime’s recent
use of chemical weapons.
On May 7, Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced
that the United States and Russia would cooperate to convene an international conference to reach
a political settlement. The joint U.S.-Russian initiative was based on the June 2012 Geneva Final
Communiqué.22 Since June 2012, Russia has insisted that any internationally-brokered
negotiation be based on this agreement, which did not explicitly ban President Asad’s
participation in a transitional government despite U.S. and others’ assurances that Asad would
have no future role in governance.23 The Syrian opposition has been divided over the question of
18
“On Syria, Obama Faces a Skeptical Public,” Washington Post, September 3, 2013.
“The fragmenting FSA,” ForeignPolicy.com, September 3, 2013.
20
In the September 3 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Senator John McCain and Secretary Kerry had the
following exchange: (McCain) Secretary Kerry, in [a September 3] Wall Street Journal article, [there is a] quote, “The
delay in providing arms to the opposition in part reflects a broader U.S. approach rarely discussed publicly, but that
underpins its decision-making, according to former and current U.S. officials. The current administration doesn't want
to tip the balance in favor of the opposition for fear the outcome may be even worse for U.S. interests than the current
stalemate.” Is that story accurate? (Kerry) No.
21
“Syria's Opposition Considers National Rebel Army, Islamists Angered,” Reuters, August 26, 2013.
22
Available online at: [http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf]
23
Days after the announcement of the U.S.-Russian initiative, Secretary Kerry stated that all sides were working to
“effect a transition government by mutual consent of both sides, which clearly means that in our judgment President
Assad will not be a component of that transitional government.”
19
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accepting Asad’s removal from power as an outcome of a transitional process24 versus insisting
on Asad’s removal as a precondition to any final settlement. Many different opposition leaders
and their foreign backers (such as Turkey and Qatar) endorse Asad’s removal as a precondition.
Moreover, many observers are doubtful that hardline armed Islamist elements of the opposition
would accept a negotiated settlement that included members of the current regime, especially
Asad family members.
Following the joint U.S.-Russian announcement, U.S. policymakers aimed to convene a “Geneva
II” summit in the summer of 2013. However, elements of the armed opposition balked at
participating unless the United States and other donors pledged lethal aid in addition to non-lethal
assistance. According to SMC head General Idriss, “If we don’t receive ammunition and weapons
to change the position on the ground, to change the balance on the ground, very frankly I can say
we will not go to Geneva...There will be no Geneva.”25 As mentioned above, in June 2013
President Obama did pledge to expand assistance to the SMC while also reiterating the need for a
political settlement of the civil war. On June 13, Deputy National Security Advisor Rhodes said:
Any future action we take will be consistent with our national interest, and must advance our
objectives, which include achieving a negotiated political settlement to establish an authority
that can provide basic stability and administer state institutions; protecting the rights of all
Syrians; securing unconventional and advanced conventional weapons; and countering
terrorist activity.
Presently, no formal date for the conference has been set. In addition to the uncertainty caused by
the possibility of external intervention, Syrians remain divided over the idea of forming a new
transitional government as called for in the June 2012 Geneva Final Communiqué. According to a
U.S. State Department July 2013 survey, only in opposition-held areas does a majority support the
establishment of a transitional government.
In the spring and summer of 2013, regime tactical advances and the opposition’s continued
fragmentation and struggles may have bolstered the Asad regime’s confidence in its military
position, making it less willing to negotiate. Many observers assert that the prospects for
negotiations increase only after Syrian government forces suffer significant setbacks on the
battlefield. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 3,
Secretary of State John Kerry stated that “Forcing Assad to change his calculation about his
ability to act with impunity can contribute to his realization that he cannot gas or shoot his way
out of his predicament. And as I think you know, it has been the president's primary goal to
achieve a negotiated resolution, but you got to have parties prepared to negotiate to achieve
that.”26
24
For example, in Yemen’s internationally-brokered 2011-2012 transition, former President Saleh was granted
immunity from prosecution and permitted to retain his role as head former ruling party. He stepped down after a 90-day
transition period after which Yemen then held an election with only one candidate on the ballot, current President Abed
Rabbo Mansour al Hadi.
25
“Syrian Opposition to Sit Out Any Talks Unless Arms Are Sent, General Says,” New York Times, June 8, 2013.
26
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Syria, September 3,
2013.
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Figure 3. Syrian Public Support for Political Settlement
Source: INR/OPN survey, July 2013
Notes: For Official U.S. Government Use Only
Status of the Syrian Political Opposition
The decentralized nature and divided views of key Syrian opposition forces, coupled with
disputes between competing foreign patrons (such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia) have hampered
attempts to create a unified front against the Asad regime. Moreover, lack of opposition unity has
tempered foreign support for the rebel cause and slowed efforts to create an alternative Syrian
government that could receive broad international recognition. Since unrest began in March 2011,
no single leader or group has been able to fully establish itself as a universally supported
representative of Syrians seeking to oust the Asad regime. Rivalries have developed between
local leaders and exiles, among militia commanders on the ground, and between those who seek
accommodation with elements of the existing government and those who seek to bring down the
entire regime structure. Deep differences of opinion about the future of Syria lurk beneath the
surface, with Islamist and secular activists at odds, some Kurds seeking autonomy, and armed
extremist groups empowering themselves on the ground.27
The latest attempt to engineer a united opposition front came in October and November 2012,
when the United States and others helped facilitate the creation of the National Coalition of
27
Yezid Sayigh, “The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem,” Carnegie Middle East Center (Beirut), April 3, 2013.
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Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces28 (Syrian Coalition or SC, see Error! Reference
source not found. below). In pressing for an opposition coalition that would be more inclusive
and legitimate, the United States, the Arab League, and other international actors have now
extended recognition to the SC as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.” The
United States has not recognized the SC as the government of Syria.
From late 2012 through April 2013, 52-year-old Ahmed Mouaz al Khatib, a Sunni Islamist
opposition activist, served as SC President. He finalized his resignation in April, reportedly in
frustration that the United States and others had refused to intervene militarily or overtly provide
weaponry. Khatib’s willingness to negotiate with Syrian government figures was criticized within
the SC, especially from members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.29 George Sabra was
appointed as acting SC president until July 2013, when coalition members elected Ahmad Jarba
as the new SC president. Jarba, a Sunni Muslim from the Shammar tribe in eastern Syria, is
believed to have strong ties to Saudi Arabia. He was imprisoned by the Asad regime for two years
(1996-1998) and was jailed again in 2011 during the start of the uprising. He left Syria after his
release in August 2011. On September 1, 2013, Jarba urged the Arab League to endorse foreign
military intervention in Syria in response to the regime’s use of chemical weapons on August 21.
SC members met in Istanbul in mid-March 2013 and elected a Syrian-born U.S. citizen, Ghassan
Hitto30 to serve as the Interim Prime Minister of a planned opposition government to administer
rebel-held territory. Hitto had attempted to form a provisional Syrian government in rebelcontrolled areas, but his efforts failed, and he resigned in July 2013. The SC has yet to elect his
replacement. Presently, it is unclear how external backers of the SC would respond to the
formation of an alternative Syrian government, given that U.S. policy supports a negotiated
political solution based on the 2012 Geneva Final Communiqué. That document states that the
“sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria must be respected.”
Current policy debates focus on whether the SC is a credible partner and whether and how the
United States should empower the SC to better coordinate humanitarian aid and the delivery of
local services in order to increase its influence inside the country. U.S. officials and international
assistance implementers report that the SC has minimal capacity to deliver assistance inside
Syria, in spite of the establishment of its Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU). Instead, local
revolutionary councils, relief committees, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent often oversee the
delivery of aid by third parties, with local councils taking responsibility for the reestablishment
and provision of services. Persistent SC demands for more forceful intervention and robust lethal
support have sought to increase the pressure on U.S. and European policy makers to revisit the
28
Since the beginning of unrest in Syria in 2011, opponents of Asad regime rule, particularly from those in exile, have
struggled to create a diverse representation of Syrian society. In May 2013, Syrian opposition figures met in Istanbul,
Turkey in attempts to expand SC membership to include more non-Islamist members and strengthen ties between
political figures and the armed opposition. At the conclusion of the six-day meeting, 51 new members were admitted to
the SC, of which 15 are from the armed opposition. The conference was widely viewed as a diplomatic victory of sorts
for Saudi Arabia, which has sought to limit Qatari support for Syrian Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood. Of the 51
new members, at least 10 are political allies of Michel Kilo, a longtime Syrian dissident whose inclusion in the SC was
backed by Saudi Arabia. However, though the SC managed to expand its membership, its days of infighting amidst
military setbacks that the opposition has endured may have damaged its legitimacy in the eyes of some Syrians. The
Syrian Revolution General Commission announced its withdrawal of support for the SC in the wake of the conference,
alleging financial mismanagement and foreign interference.
29
“Syrian Lawmaker Rejects Conditions for Peace Talks,” Associated Press, February 6, 2013.
30
Some opposition sources view Hitto as having been backed by Qatar, which has been accused of supporting Syrian
Islamists at the expense of other Syrian figures.
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limits they imposed on military support to the uprising. In an August 2013 letter to National
Security Advisor Susan Rice, some Members of Congress encouraged the Administration to:
Lead international donors in coordinating with the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s Assistance
Coordination Unit (ACU). Currently, the ACU is struggling to define its role in the overall
humanitarian response and establish realistic expectations among its stakeholders.
Furthermore, it has failed to reach out to many Syrian and diaspora aid providers that have
access to Syria’s interior and are trusted by local communities. The ACU has the potential to
become the effective coordinating body that Syrian aid groups and large international NGOs
need, but it must take steps to engage them.31
Al Qaeda, Extremism, and Foreign Fighters
The armed insurgency against the Asad regime features a complex mix of militant groups bound
by geographic proximity, ideological affinity, kinship-tribal ties, or religious sentiment. There are
hundreds and perhaps over a thousand different brigades or militias, and as the Syrian civil war
has dragged on, many of the most religiously extreme groups have received increasing foreign
attention. The violence and disorder paralyzing Syria has created opportunities for Al Qaeda
operatives and other violent Islamist extremists to infiltrate the country and conduct or plan
attacks. According to one recent study, “At the very least, the current war in Syria can be
considered the third-largest foreign mujahideen mobilization since the early 1980s — falling
short only of Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq during the last decade.... [T]he mobilization has
been stunningly rapid — what took six years to build in Iraq at the height of the U.S. occupation
may have accumulated inside Syria in less than half that time.”32
In early 2012, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),33the Iraqi Sunni terrorist group that attacked coalition
forces during the U.S. occupation of Iraq and that continues to destabilize Iraq today, created a
Syrian off-shoot called Al Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra). In December 2012, the Obama
Administration designated Al Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as an alias of
Al Qaeda in Iraq (which helped create Al Nusra in early 2012) pursuant to Executive Order
13224. The Iraqi government had previously expressed specific concern that individuals
associated with Al Qaeda in Iraq have travelled to Syria and are using the conflict there to their
advantage.34
In April 2013, Al Nusra backers split into two factions: one group maintained its original name
while Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of AQI, transformed the other faction into a new group
called the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda central leader Ayman al Zawahiri
has instructed the groups to refrain from rivalry. He continues to encourage foreign fighters to
travel to Syria and calls on Muslims to offer material support to armed jihadist groups in Syria.
31
Hastings Urges National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Increase Cooperation with Syrian NGOs on Humanitarian
Aid, Available online at: [http://alceehastings.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=346785]
32
“Syria’s Jihadi Migration Emerges as Top Terror Threat in Europe, Beyond,” ProPublica, July 24, 2013. For the
original citation, see: [http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/739377-convoy-of-martyrs-in-the-levant-flashpoint]
33
Also referred to as the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).
34
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyam Zebari said, “We have solid information and intelligence that members of Al
Qaeda’s terrorist network have gone to Syria.” Al Jazeera English, “Iraq says al-Qaeda flowing into Syria,” July 5,
2012. See also, Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu-Bakr al Baghdadi’s remarks in OSC Report GMP20120721586002,
“Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes to ‘Repent,’” July 21, 2012.
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Other prominent armed Salafist groups include members of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF),35 the
Saquour al Sham brigades, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades,36 the Ummah Brigade (Liwa al
Umma),37 and the Islam Brigade (Liwa al Islam).38 The Free Ones of the Levant Battalions
(Kata’ib Ahrar al Sham) and other members of the SIF use jihadist rhetoric in some statements.
Press reports and anecdotal accounts suggest that there may be competition for influence among
extremist groups and that they have lacked overarching coordination or shared leadership. The
formation of the SIF and Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) in late 2012 and early 2013 may
signal increasing cooperation among like-minded Islamist militia groups. Experts consider the
SIF to hold more hard-line views than the SILF about the imposition of sharia law and members
of its constituent militias may hold more hostile views toward the United States and Israel.
The conflict in Syria has provoked a visceral public response in the region and is encouraging
some people to make donations to support the Syrian uprising or travel to Syria to support the
armed opposition. Some conservative Sunni clerics have issued religious edicts characterizing the
fighting as a “defensive jihad” and endorsing the provision of material support to fighters and
direct participation in the fighting.39 The late Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al Libi released a
statement in 2012 urging support for Syrian fighters and Ayman al Zawahiri continues to do so.40
In April and June 2013, Al Qaeda figures released statements from Zawahiri calling for fighters in
Syria to establish a “jihadist Islamic state.”
European and Middle Eastern media have published estimates of the number of volunteers, which
range from the mid-hundreds to low-thousands, along with anecdotal reports about individual
volunteers from Europe, North Africa, Turkey, the Gulf states, and the Levant.41 Northern
Lebanon and the Turkish border with northern Syria appear to be the most popular transit points
for volunteers, presumably because of better regional air-travel linkages with Beirut and Turkish
cities.
Statements from some armed groups indicate that their leaders are cognizant of the risks that
certain tactics and rhetoric (i.e., suicide bombing or attacks against civilians) may pose in
generating discord with other opposition groups or potential supporters. . The underlying
incompatibility of different groups’ motives and intentions could affect prospects to conclusively
establish a cohesive and credible opposition, particularly to the extent that some extremist groups
35
See Aron Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: the Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front, UI Occasional Paper 17, March 2013.
A Saudi-national named Majed al Majed reportedly leads the Azzam Brigades. OSC Report GMP20120626966212,
“Al-Qaeda in Syria: New Leader at the Helm,” Al Akhbar (Lebanon), June 26, 2012.
37
OSC Report GMP20120625125003, “Statement by New Al Ummah Brigade in Syria Promises ‘Jihad’ Until
Victory,” June 18, 2012.
38
OSC Report GMP20120719125001, “Liwa al-Islam Brigades Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings,” July
19, 2012.
39
OSC Report GMP20120618125001, “Al Shinqiti Calls Jihad in Syria ‘Duty,’ Advocates Joining Al Nusrah Front,”
July 6, 2012; OSC Analysis GMF20120706420001, “Syria—Salafis Possibly Eying Larger Role in Post-Al-Asad
Syria,” July 6, 2012.
40
OSC Report GMP20120612405002, “Abu-Yahya al-Libi Urges Iraqi, Jordanian, Turkish Mujahidin ‘To Champion’
Syria,” June 12, 2012.
41
The National (Abu Dhabi) “Syria, Jihad And the Boys From Tunisia’s Ben Guerdane,” July 3, 2012; OSC Report
GMP20120607648001, “Al-Jazirah.net Says Jordan Charges 6 With Trying To Enter Syria To Wage Jihad,” AlJazirah.net (Doha), June 6, 2012; OSC Report EUP20120523029004, “Foreign Jihadis Flock To Syria in Bid To
Overthrow Al Asad,” Le Figaro (Paris) May 22, 2012.
36
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are critical of or openly hostile to other armed groups and may oppose efforts to establish
democracy in any post-Asad Syria. The pro-sharia rhetoric and transnational orientation of some
extremist groups make it possible that they may end up in conflict with secular, nationalist, or
Islamist opposition elements. The prominent Syrian Salafist-Jihadist ideologue Abu Basir al
Tartusi has openly rejected other jihadists’ criticism of the Free Syrian Army and characterized
some of the groups and individuals now active in Syria as “extremists” and “fanatics.”42 This
struggle among opposition groups has raised concerns that a post-Asad Syria might be even
worse than the Asad regime, and that weapons provided to moderate opposition forces could end
up in the hands of extremist groups. On the other hand, some analysts calling for more aid to the
Syria opposition apparently not only seek to help them prevail against the Asad regime, but also
to improve their influence relative to their extremist counterparts.
U.S. Policy toward Syria: 2011 to U.S. and International Response
Key Developments
Debating the Expansion of U.S. Civilian and Military Assistance
Given widespread humanitarian suffering inside Syria, the spillover of the conflict into
neighboring states such as Israel, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, and the Asad regime’s limited use
of chemical weapons, the Administration and Congress are now considering the expansion of
U.S. civilian and military assistance to Syrians in need and to opposition forces. In the 113th
Congress, some Members have introduced proposed legislation that would authorize expanded
humanitarian assistance and could expand the U.S. military role in the conflict.
•
H.R. 1327, the Free Syria Act of 2013, would, among other things, authorize the
President, under certain conditions and with various reporting and certification
requirements, to supply nonlethal and/or lethal support to opposition groups in
Syria. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has not yet proceeded with a markup of the bill.
•
S. 960, the Syria Transition Support Act of 2013, would, among other things,
authorize the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law that restricts
assistance to Syria, to provide assistance, including defense articles, defense
services, and training to vetted opposition forces. S. 960 also would grant broad
authority to provide humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people and authorize
the creation of a $250 million Transition Fund to provide security, transitional
justice, democracy building, and governance capacity building support now in
preparation for a post-Asad transition. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
approved S. 960 as amended by a 15-3 vote in May 2013.
To date, the Administration, in consultation with Congress, has relied upon reprogrammed
appropriated funds and a range of existing emergency contingency authorities to provide
assistance to the unarmed and armed Syrian opposition. A thicket of pre-existing U.S. sanctions
on Syria and the tight prevailing fiscal environment have required the President to seek authority
to provide assistance notwithstanding other provisions of law and to seek congressional approval
for the reallocation of funds appropriated for non-Syria related priorities. A further expansion of
U.S. assistance may require the Administration and Congress to identify dedicated sources of
funding to support Syria-related operations. It may prove more challenging to resolve thorny
questions about sanctions-based restrictions on assistance and the precedents involved in offering
direct support to non-state actors involved in a foreign civil war.
Should Congress authorize and the Administration ultimately provide overt military assistance to
elements of the armed Syrian opposition, the Supreme Military Council could be one of the
primary beneficiaries of U.S. lethal aid. In December 2012, a number of brigades nominally
affiliated themselves under the umbrella of a Supreme Military Council (SMC) headed by
General Salim Idriss, a former Asad regime military commander who defected. The SMC seeks
to administer regional commands with affiliated units nominally reporting through a chain of
command to General Idriss. Idriss has yet to assert operational control over all affiliated units,
and opposition figures argue that only through the provision of assistance and SC/SMC control
over the disposition of such assistance will the SMC be able to assert such control. Many of these
brigades are receiving support from Arab Gulf states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, two
counties that along with the United States played a key role in facilitating the creation of the
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SMC. The availability of multiple sources of support allows units to maintain independence and
play various patrons off against one another.
In the ever-changing landscape of the armed
Syrian opposition, Western officials have
General Salim Idriss is currently the Chief of Staff to
deemed SMC commanders to be more moderate
the armed opposition Supreme Military Council. The
in their political views than their more Islamist
55-year-old Brigadier General defected from the Syrian
counterparts, although the SMC itself includes
Army in July 2012 after dozens of his family members
reportedly were killed by government forces in the
Islamist units and commanders. Although
city of Homs. Educated in East Germany, Idriss had
General Idriss was careful at first not to openly
been the dean of the Aleppo military engineering
distance the SMC from more extreme factions
academy before his defection. Within the Syrian
of the opposition,10 such as Jabhat al Nusra,
opposition, he is considered more of a political figure
recently he stated that “We don’t work with
than a respected military commander. He routinely
appeals for outside funding and material support to
Nusra. We don’t share anything with them.”
secure the loyalty of various commanders and militias.
However, the SMC has incorporated some
members of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front,
an Islamist coalition, into its structure. SMC members also reportedly coordinate on the
battlefield with the Syrian Islamic Front, a group that includes an extremist militia known as
Ahrar al Sham.11
General Salim Idriss
Most observers believe that General Idriss does not exercise daily command and control over all
SMC-affiliated soldiers. Instead, individual commanders who have affiliated with the SMC have
done so on the assumption that their support would be rewarded militarily and financially, but
have maintained control of their own forces. According to General Idriss, “Fighters go to where
there is money and weapons and if I had the means … within one or two months everyone would
join.... They will know that this is a national institution while the brigades and battalions will
eventually disappear.”12
Overall, General Idriss has requested that the United States train elite rebel units for special
operations and chemical weapons security13and provide his forces with advanced weaponry such
as anti-aircraft missiles. With regard to such requests, Israel’s Ambassador to the United States,
Michael Oren, recently advocated for careful vetting any lethal aid to Syrian rebels, saying “If it
were decided to provide lethal assistance, we ask that those groups be carefully vetted.”14 Israel
may fear that man-portable anti-aircraft equipment could fall into terrorist possession and be used
to target Israeli civilian and military aircraft.
Though General Idriss has received the bulk of Western media attention, his role within the
opposition remains unclear. Some experts believe that should the United States and other Western
states send lethal aid to Syrian rebel groups, such assistance should be channeled through the
Syrian political opposition, namely the Syrian Coalition. Recent shipments of U.S. non-lethal and
humanitarian aid, such as “meals ready to eat” (MREs) and combat medical kits, have been
10
See, Open Source Center Report, “Analysis: Syria—Armed Opposition Council Unlikely To Exclude Al-Nusrah,”
Document ID# GMF20121217425001, December 17, 2012.
11
“Islamist Rebels Create Dilemma on Syria Policy,” New York Times, April 27, 2013.
12
“West pins hopes on Syrian general,” Financial Times, April 22, 2013.
13
“What path now for Syria?” Washington Post, February 12, 2013.
14
“Oren: Vet rebel groups before giving them lethal aid,” Jerusalem Post, May 2, 2013.
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delivered to “liberated” areas of northern Syria bearing the SMC symbol on the packaging.15 U.S.
Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford traveled to northern Syria to meet with Idriss and deliver aid to
the SMC and remarked that, “We understand that humanitarian assistance is insufficient. At the
same time, substantive assistance is being given to the Free Syrian Army in its fight against the
regime.”16
Overall, many observers believe that while the SMC may be far from an ideal U.S. partner, given
the complexity, disunity, and elements of extremism within the Syrian armed opposition, the
SMC may be the only potential U.S. partner available for now. According to one unnamed U.S.
source, “Idriss says and does the right things.... We believe he is genuine. Are there concerns?
Yes, but what are the options?”17 In testimony before Congress, Ambassador Ford said that
“Supreme Military Council (SMC) Chief of Staff General Idriss and those under his command
have demonstrated a commitment to a tolerant and inclusive vision of Syria.”18
In recent months, General Idriss has attempted to align his views with what he perceives to be
U.S. priorities in the region. He has said the following:
•
On Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles: “Our future Free Syria will not need
weapons of mass destruction.”19
•
On brokering a political settlement: “Even if an official invitation is sent to us as
rebels and fighters, we might accept to hold negotiations with some of the
representatives of the regime only under specific and clear conditions, namely,
announcing in advance [Asad's] resignation, head of the gang of killing and
crimes and stepping down from presidency; putting all the commanders of the
security agencies on trial; putting the criminal commanders of the army, who
gave orders to shell the Syrian cities and citizens, on trial; immediately halting all
the military operations and withdrawing the military units to their barracks;
halting the air strikes; and halting the firing of surface-to-surface missiles at the
Syrian cities in the north and at our steadfast people in all the areas in Syria.”20
•
On Hezbollah involvement in Syria: “If Hezbollah does not stop shelling the Free
Syrian Army and the Syrian villages from the Lebanese territories, we declare
our right to defend ourselves, and we will reply to the sources of firing,”21 and
“"If the attacks of Hezbollah against Syrian territory do not stop within 24 hours,
we will take all measures to hunt Hezbollah, even in hell. I will no longer be
bound by any commitments I made, if a decision to stop the attacks... is not taken
and implemented.”22
15
“U.S. delivers first aid shipment to Free Syrian Army,” Foreignpolicy.com, May 1, 2013.
“US envoy holds border talks with rebels: US,” Agence France Presse, May 10, 2013.
17
“Obama bets big on Syrian rebel leader,” Washington Post, May 1, 2013.
18
Statement of Robert Ford U.S. Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic U.S. Department of State, Committee on
Senate Foreign Relations, April 11, 2013.
19
Washington Post, May 1, 2013, op. cit.
20
OSC Report GMP20130226644002, “Orient TV: FSA Commander Sets Conditions for Negotiations with Syrian
Regime,” Orient Channel Television (Dubai), February 25, 2013.
21
OSC Report GMP20130222825004, “Free Syrian Army Says It Has Shelled Hizballah’s Positions inside Lebanon”,
Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), February 22, 2013.
22
Naharnet (Beirut), “SA Chief of Staff Gives Lebanon 24-Hour Ultimatum to Stop Hezbollah Intervention in Syria,”
(continued...)
16
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International Conference on Syrian Political Settlement
In parallel with reports of a pending expansion of assistance to the opposition, President Obama
and his Administration have reiterated that U.S. policy toward the Syrian civil war is aimed at
achieving a negotiated outcome to the conflict. On June 13, Deputy National Security Advisor
Rhodes said:
Any future action we take will be consistent with our national interest, and must advance our
objectives, which include achieving a negotiated political settlement to establish an authority that
can provide basic stability and administer state institutions; protecting the rights of all Syrians;
securing unconventional and advanced conventional weapons; and countering terrorist activity.
On May 7, Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced
that the United States and Russia would cooperate to convene an international conference to reach
a political settlement. U.N.-Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi,
who had been rumored to be on the verge of resigning in frustration over the lack of momentum
for negotiations,23 responded favorable to the announcement.
No formal date for the conference has been set, and some reports have suggested it could occur
sometime in July 2013. However, the recent announcements by the Obama Administration, the
lifting of the European Union arms embargo on Syria, Hezbollah’s intervention in support of
Asad, and reports of Russian weapons shipments to Asad forces have created new questions about
talks. Some analysts question the likelihood of the talks succeeding amidst continued fighting and
more overt foreign intervention. Others suggest that clear outside support may give all parties the
confidence they need to negotiate more successfully.
Recent tactical advances and the opposition’s continued fragmentation and struggles appear to be
renewing the Asad regime’s confidence in its military position. Nevertheless, large areas of
northern and eastern provinces, Idlib, Aleppo, Raqqah and Deir al Zour, are not under
government control. The Syrian regime may believe that negotiations leading to potential power
sharing with nationalist elements of the armed Syrian opposition may be an opportunity to regain
at least a partial foothold in these lost provinces without sacrificing overall control over many
state institutions.
As previously mentioned, the joint U.S.-Russian initiative is based on the June 2012 Geneva
Final Communiqué. For the past year, Russia has insisted that any internationally-brokered
negotiation be based on this agreement, which did not explicitly ban President Asad’s
participation in a transitional government despite U.S. and others’ assurances that Asad would
have no future role in governance.24 The Syrian opposition has been divided over the question of
(...continued)
May 28, 2013.
23
In February 2013, then-leader of the SC Mouaz al Khatib made a surprise announcement that he was willing to
conditionally enter into negotiations with the Asad government. Khatib’s initiative was rejected by elements within the
Syrian opposition and was not matched by any serious Syrian government response. Khatib has since resigned his
position.
24
Days after the announcement of the U.S.-Russian initiative, Secretary Kerry stated that all sides were working to
“effect a transition government by mutual consent of both sides, which clearly means that in our judgment President
Assad will not be a component of that transitional government.”
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accepting Asad’s removal from power as an outcome of a transitional process25 versus insisting
on Asad’s removal as a precondition to any final settlement. Many different opposition leaders
and their foreign backers (such as Turkey and Qatar) endorse Asad’s removal as a precondition.
Moreover, many observers are doubtful that hardline armed Islamist elements of the opposition
would accept a negotiated settlement that included members of the current regime, especially
Asad family members.
Can the Syria Civil War be Stopped?
Despite some international momentum to jumpstart peace talks, the situation on the ground may
be too disconnected from outside diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. Even amid the
speculation over possible negotiations, government regular and irregular forces continue to
commit atrocities on the ground; they have not ceased as a good faith gesture. Instead, the Asad
regime continues to paint the war as an existential conflict in which the government, as a
protector of a secular, diverse state, is confronting extremists and foreign fighters bent on turning
Syria into an Al Qaeda-controlled theocracy. In some respects, this strategy has been far more
durable than initially believed, as the rise of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups like Al Nusra front have
reinforced the government’s narrative.
At the same time, armed opposition groups continue to be divided among themselves; various
rebels are fighting for a variety of reasons ranging from protecting their community, to avenging
their loved ones, to advancing a vision of a Sunni Islamist-led Syria. U.S. officials and Syrian
opposition leaders acknowledge the difficulty that bringing these armed groups to a point of
consensus on negotiation may pose (not to mention the challenge of reaching an actual
settlement). They also acknowledge that the continuation of the armed conflict will further
degrade Syrian society, displace and kill civilians, and risk a broader sectarian war, atrocities, and
direct foreign intervention.
Status of the Syrian Political Opposition
The decentralized nature and divided views of key Syrian opposition forces, coupled with
disputes between competing foreign patrons (such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia) of various
opposition groups have hampered attempts to create a unified front against the Asad regime.
Moreover, lack of opposition unity has tempered foreign support for their cause and slowed
efforts to create an alternative Syrian government that could receive broad international
recognition. Since unrest began in March 2011, no single leader or group has been able to fully
establish itself as a universally supported representative of Syrians seeking to oust the Asad
regime. Rivalries have developed between local leaders and exiles, among militia commanders on
the ground, and between those who seek accommodation with elements of the existing
government and those who seek to bring down the entire regime structure. Deep differences of
opinion about the future of Syria lurk beneath the surface, with Islamist and secular activists at
25
For example, in Yemen’s internationally-brokered 2011-2012 transition, former President Saleh was granted
immunity from prosecution and permitted to retain his role as head former ruling party. He stepped down after a 90-day
transition period after which Yemen then held an election with only one candidate on the ballot, current President Abed
Rabbo Mansour al Hadi.
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odds, some Kurds seeking autonomy, and armed extremist groups empowering themselves on the
ground.26
The latest attempt to engineer a united opposition front came in October and November 2012,
when the United States and others helped facilitate the creation of the National Coalition of
Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (Syrian Coalition or SC, see Figure 3 below). In
pressing for an opposition coalition that would be more inclusive and legitimate, the United
States, the Arab League, and other international actors have now extended recognition to the SC
as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.” The United States has not recognized the
SC as the government of Syria.
From late 2012 through April 2013, 52-year-old Ahmed Mouaz al Khatib, a Sunni Islamist
opposition activist, served as SC President. He finalized his resignation in April, reportedly in
frustration that the United States and others refuse to intervene militarily or overtly provide
weaponry. Khatib willingness to negotiate with Syrian government figures was criticized within
the SC, especially from members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.27
SC members met in Istanbul in mid-March 2013 and elected a Syrian-born U.S. citizen, Ghassan
Hitto, to serve as the Interim Prime Minister of an opposition government to administer rebel
held territory. George Sabra has replaced Khatib as SC president. Some opposition sources view
Hitto as having been backed by Qatar, which has been accused of overly supporting Syrian
Islamists at the expense of other Syrian figures.
Current policy debates focus on whether the SC is a credible partner and whether and how the
United States should empower the SC to better coordinate humanitarian aid and the delivery of
local services in order to increase its influence inside the country. U.S. officials and international
assistance implementers report that the SC does not yet have the capacity to deliver assistance
inside Syria, in spite of the recent establishment of its Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU).
Instead, local revolutionary councils, relief committees, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent often
oversee the delivery of aid by third parties, with local councils taking responsibility for the
reestablishment and provision of services. Persistent SC demands for more forceful intervention
and robust lethal support have sought to increase the pressure on U.S. and European policy
makers to revisit the limits they imposed on military support to the uprising.
In May 2013, Syrian opposition figures met in Istanbul, Turkey in attempts to expand SC
membership to include more non-Islamist members and strengthen ties between political figures
and the armed opposition. At the conclusion of the six-day meeting, George Sabra announced that
51 new members would be admitted to the SC, of which 15 are from the armed opposition. The
conference was widely viewed as a diplomatic victory of sorts for Saudi Arabia, which has sought
to limit Qatari support for Syrian Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood. Of the 51 new members,
at least 10 are political allies of Michel Kilo, a longtime Syrian dissident whose inclusion in the
SC was backed by Saudi Arabia. However, though the SC managed to expand its membership, its
days of infighting amidst simultaneous military setbacks on the ground for the opposition may
have damaged its legitimacy in the eyes of some Syrians. The Syrian Revolution General
Commission announced its withdrawal of support for the SC in the wake of the conference,
alleging financial mismanagement and foreign interference.
26
27
Yezid Sayigh, “The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem,” Carnegie Middle East Center (Beirut), April 3, 2013.
“Syrian Lawmaker Rejects Conditions for Peace Talks,” Associated Press, February 6, 2013.
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Al Qaeda, Extremism, and Foreign Fighters
In early 2012, U.S. officials stated that the violence and disorder paralyzing Syria was creating
opportunities for Al Qaeda operatives and other violent Islamist extremists to infiltrate the
country and conduct or plan attacks. According to Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper, “Sunni extremists” had infiltrated Syrian opposition groups, which may be unaware of
the infiltration. As of June 2013, Sunni extremist groups appear to be increasingly active in Syria,
including groups sympathetic to or affiliated with Al Qaeda. In April 2013, Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper said that extremist militias were present in 13 of Syria’s 14 provinces
“and are starting to establish municipal services, provide humanitarian aid, food, hospitals and
sharia law courts.”28
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), released a
statement in April 2013 proclaiming a merger with the Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra li Ahl al
Sham, Support Front for the People of Syria),29 although a reported Nusra leader downplayed any
merger and pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri in turn has
instructed the groups to refrain from rivalry and continues to encourage foreign fighters to travel
to Syria and calls on Muslims to offer material support to armed jihadist groups in Syria.
Other prominent armed Salafist groups include members of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF),30 the
Saquour al Sham brigades, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades,31 the Ummah Brigade (Liwa al
Umma),32 and the Islam Brigade (Liwa al Islam).33 The Free Ones of the Levant Battalions
(Kata’ib Ahrar al Sham) and other members of the SIF use jihadist rhetoric in some statements.
Islamist fighters in the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) rejected the reported merger of ISI
and Al Nusra. The Lebanon-based extremist group Fatah al Islam has released a number of
statements on the conflict and members of the group have been reported to be fighting in Syria.
Press reports and anecdotal accounts suggest that there may be competition for influence among
extremist groups and that they have lacked overarching coordination or shared leadership. The
formation of the SIF and Syrian Islamic Liberation Front in late 2012 and early 2013 may signal
increasing cooperation among like-minded Islamist militia groups. Experts consider the SIF to
hold more hard-line views about the imposition of sharia law and members of its constituent
militias may hold more hostile views toward the United States and Israel.
In December 2012, the Obama Administration designated the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization and as an alias of Al Qaeda in Iraq pursuant to Executive Order 13224. The Iraqi
28
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 18, 2013.
The Nusra Front has claimed responsibility for several high profile attacks, including attacks using suicide bombers
and car bombs. An individual named Abu Mohammed Joulani reportedly leads the group, with strategic guidance from
Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Du’a. OSC Feature FEA20120314027051, “Video Production Announces Establishment
of Jihadist ‘Al Nusrah Front’ in Syria,” January 24, 2012; and, Office of the State Department Spokesperson, “Terrorist
Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq,” Washington, DC, December 11, 2012.
30
See Aron Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: the Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front, UI Occasional Paper 17, March 2013.
31
A Saudi-national named Majed al Majed reportedly leads the Azzam Brigades. OSC Report GMP20120626966212,
“Al-Qaeda in Syria: New Leader at the Helm,” Al Akhbar (Lebanon), June 26, 2012.
32
OSC Report GMP20120625125003, “Statement by New Al Ummah Brigade in Syria Promises ‘Jihad’ Until
Victory,” June 18, 2012.
33
OSC Report GMP20120719125001, “Liwa al-Islam Brigades Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings,” July
19, 2012.
29
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government had previously expressed specific concern that individuals associated with Al Qaeda
in Iraq have travelled to Syria and are using the conflict there to their advantage.34 Reactions from
some Syrian opposition leaders and armed groups were negative. Several armed groups made
statements of solidarity with Al Nusra, and prominent civilian figures, including then-President
Khateeb of the SC, requested that the U.S. government reconsider the designation. According to
the U.S. State Department designation announcement, “Al Nusra has sought to portray itself as
part of the legitimate Syrian opposition while it is, in fact, an attempt by Al Qaeda in Iraq to
hijack the struggles of the Syrian people for its own malign purposes.”
The conflict in Syria has provoked a visceral public response in the region and is encouraging
some people to make donations to support the Syrian uprising or travel to Syria to support the
armed opposition. Some conservative Sunni clerics have issued religious edicts characterizing the
fighting as a “defensive jihad” and endorsing the provision of material support to fighters and
direct participation in the fighting.35 The late Al Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al Libi released a
statement in 2012 urging support for Syrian fighters and Ayman al Zawahiri continues to do so.36
In April and June 2013, Al Qaeda figures released statements from Zawahiri calling for fighters in
Syria to establish a “jihadist Islamic state.”
European and Middle Eastern media have published estimates of the number of volunteers in the
mid-hundreds to low-thousands, along with anecdotal reports about individuals from Europe,
North Africa, Turkey, the Gulf states, and the Levant.37 Northern Lebanon and the Turkish border
with northern Syria appear to be the most popular transit points for volunteers, presumably
because of better regional air-travel linkages with Beirut and Turkish cities.
Statements from some armed groups indicate that their leaders are cognizant of the risks that
certain tactics and rhetoric may pose (i.e., suicide bombing or attacks against civilians). The
underlying incompatibility of different groups’ motives and intentions is difficult to ignore,
particularly to the extent that some extremist groups are critical of other armed groups and may
oppose efforts to establish democracy in any post-Asad Syria. The pro-sharia rhetoric and
transnational orientation of some extremist groups make it possible that they may end up in
conflict with secular, nationalist, or Islamist opposition elements. The prominent Syrian SalafistJihadist ideologue Abu Basir al Tartusi has openly rejected other jihadists’ criticism of the Free
Syrian Army and characterized some of the groups and individuals now active in Syria as
“extremists” and “fanatics.”38
34
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyam Zebari said, “We have solid information and intelligence that members of Al
Qaeda’s terrorist network have gone to Syria.” Al Jazeera English, “Iraq says al-Qaeda flowing into Syria,” July 5,
2012. See also, Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu-Bakr al Baghdadi’s remarks in OSC Report GMP20120721586002,
“Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes to ‘Repent,’” July 21, 2012.
35
OSC Report GMP20120618125001, “Al Shinqiti Calls Jihad in Syria ‘Duty,’ Advocates Joining Al Nusrah Front,”
July 6, 2012; OSC Analysis GMF20120706420001, “Syria—Salafis Possibly Eying Larger Role in Post-Al-Asad
Syria,” July 6, 2012.
36
OSC Report GMP20120612405002, “Abu-Yahya al-Libi Urges Iraqi, Jordanian, Turkish Mujahidin ‘To Champion’
Syria,” June 12, 2012.
37
The National (Abu Dhabi) “Syria, Jihad And the Boys From Tunisia’s Ben Guerdane,” July 3, 2012; OSC Report
GMP20120607648001, “Al-Jazirah.net Says Jordan Charges 6 With Trying To Enter Syria To Wage Jihad,” AlJazirah.net (Doha), June 6, 2012; OSC Report EUP20120523029004, “Foreign Jihadis Flock To Syria in Bid To
Overthrow Al Asad,” Le Figaro (Paris) May 22, 2012.
38
“Abu Basir al Tartusi” is the pen name of Abdel Moneim Mustafa Halimah. For more on this topic, see Aron Lund,
“Holier Than Thou: Rival Clerics in the Syrian Jihad,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 10, Issue:
14, July 16, 2012.
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Figure 2. Syrian Opposition Groups: Relationships and Factions
Source: CRS Graphics, based on Syrian opposition social media and websites.
Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response
Figure 3. Profiles of Select Opposition Groups and Militias
Source: CRS, derived from U.S. government Open Source Center reports, social media, and official statements.
The positions, sizes, platforms, and membership of groups are subject to change.
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Figure 4. Profiles of Select Opposition Groups and Militias
Source: CRS, derived from U.S. government Open Source Center reports, social media, and independent
analyst reports. The positions, sizes, platforms, and membership of groups are subject to change.
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U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
The Syria Uprising and Civil War: U.S. Response, 2011-Present
Since March 2011, U.S. unilateral and multilateral policy initiatives toward the Syrian civil war
have sought to stop the violence, push for the departure of President Asad, and begin a political
transition to a more democratic form of government. During the conflict’s initial phase, when
President Asad met non-violent civil protest with repressive force, the Administration denounced
the regime’s violent measures, expanded existing U.S. sanctions on Syrian government officials,
and insisted that the government enact substantive political reforms to meet protestor demands.
After President Asad continued his strategy of violently suppressing dissent while refusing to
resign, the Administration called for Asad’s resignation in August 2011. For the next year, U.S.
officials attempted to work multilaterally through the United Nations to sanction the regime,
reach a cease-fire, and endorse a political transition plan. All of these efforts were stymied by
Russian and Chinese rejections of such proposals at the Security Council and unabated violence
on the ground inside Syria.
After a year of conflict and without any consensus at the United Nations Security Council on
approaches to end the violence, President Obama continued to pursue primarily non-military
approaches toward the civil war. The White House continued to reject calls for unilateral U.S.
military intervention or lethal support to rebel forces. However, during the summer of 2012,
reports of alleged Asad regime preparation of munitions with chemical agents led President
Obama to remark that the movement or use of such agents would constitute a “red line” and cause
him to change his calculus.
With international attempts having failed at the baseline goal of bringing about a durable ceasefire, U.S. officials focused more intently on unifying the Syrian opposition. From September
2012 to February 2013, U.S. policy concentrated heavily on helping lay the foundation for a more
unified political and armed opposition that could serve as a recipient of potentially greater U.S.
and international support. The United States also took preliminary steps to support the defense of
states bordering Syria, such as Turkey and Jordan, with the deployment of Patriot missile batteries
to the former and small contingents of U.S. military personnel to the latter.
42
“Abu Basir al Tartusi” is the pen name of Abdel Moneim Mustafa Halimah. For more on this topic, see Aron Lund,
“Holier Than Thou: Rival Clerics in the Syrian Jihad,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 10, Issue:
14, July 16, 2012.
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By the spring of 2013, as the death toll from the conflict had surpassed 70,000 and refugee
outflows had reached over a million Syrians, the United States expanded humanitarian aid to
U.N. agencies and neighboring states while providing limited, non-lethal assistance to the newly
formed Syrian Opposition Coalition. By April 2013, reports that the Administration may be
considering lethal assistance also surfaced. Meanwhile, in May 2013, the United States and
Russia agreed to jointly work toward convening a peace conference in Geneva in the hopes of
bringing Syrian combatants to the negotiating table. However, the lifting of the European arms
embargo, reports of new Russian weapons shipments, Hezbollah’s acknowledgement of its
involvement in the conflict, and indications of continued infighting among opposition groups cast
some doubt on the likelihood of successful negotiations.
TheIn June 2013 confirmation by U.S. intelligence of limited chemical weapons use appears to
have created a new inflection point. In the words of White House officials, “The President has
said that the use of chemical weapons would change his calculus, and it has.” Congress and the
Administration may now debate a new direction in U.S. policy as Syria’s war drags on.
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Chronology of U.S. Policy toward Syria and its Neighbors: 2011-2013
Date
Event
April 2011 – led the Obama
Administration to announce an increase in U.S. assistance to non-radical elements of the
opposition. The Administration reportedly notified Congress in July 2012 of its intent to begin
covert U.S. arming of select groups.43 The extent of U.S. lethal aid to elements of the armed
Syrian armed opposition during the summer of 2013 was unclear, as some Syrian rebel
commanders continued to publicly insist that more U.S. assistance was needed.
A mass casualty chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs on August 21 was the latest
and most deadly of a string of reported instances where Syrian forces allegedly have used
chemical weapons despite President Obama’s prior statement that the transfer or use of chemical
weapons is “a red line” that would “change his calculus.” The president and senior members of
his Administration have argued that the United States has a national security interest in ensuring
that “when countries break international norms on chemical weapons they are held accountable.”
Administration officials and some observers believe that by failing to respond after setting out a
so-called “red line,” the United States would risk not only undermining any international norms
against the use of such weapons but would risk undermining its own credibility. On August 31,
the President stated his conclusion that the United States should respond to alleged Syrian
chemical weapons use with limited militarily strikes.
43
“Divided Over Arming Syrian Rebels, Congress Declines to Block Obama's Plan,” CQ News, July 23, 2013.
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Chronology of U.S. Policy toward Syria and its Neighbors: 2011-2013
Date
Event
April 2011—Present
(Sanctions)
Since the beginning of the Syria conflict, the Obama Administration has significantly
expanded U.S. sanctions against the regime and its supporters. The Treasury
Department has designated dozens of individuals and entities, freezing any U.S.based assets of theirs and denying them access to the U.S. financial system. For a
complete list of sanctions, please see Table D-1
August 2011 (President calls
for Asad’s Resignation)
On August 18, 2011, President Obama called for the resignation of Syrian President
Bashar al Asad, saying “We have consistently said that President Asad must lead a
democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the
Syrian people, the time has come for President Asad to step aside.” The President
also issued Executive Order 13582 which freezes all assets of the Government of
Syria, prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in any transaction involving the
Government of Syria, bans U.S. imports of Syrian- origin petroleum or petroleum
products, prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings in or related to Syria’s
petroleum or petroleum products, and prohibits U.S. persons from operating or
investing in Syria.
February 2012 (President
suspends Embassy
Operations)
The United States suspended its Embassy operations in Damascus and withdrew
U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert S. Ford.
April 2012 (U.S. support for
United Nations involvement)
On April 14, 2012, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 2042, which
approved the deployment of a U.N. advance team of 30 military observers to Syria.
It also demanded that the Syrian authorities withdraw security forces from
population centers and begin a dialogue with the opposition. The vote marked the
first time since protests began that the Security Council was united in demanding a
halt to the violence. On April 21, the Security Council passed Resolution 2043,
which established—for a 90-day period—a United Nations Supervision Mission in
Syria (UNSMIS). The resolution also created a civilian team to help implement
elements of the full peace plan, such as the start of a national political dialogue and
the government's granting of the right to demonstrate.
June 2012 (U.S.-Russian
Endorsement of the Geneva
Communiqué)
On June 30 in Geneva, Switzerland, the Action Group on Syria (a group of countries
which included the United States) issued a communiqué endorsing a U.N.-proposed
peace plan and calling for a transitional government of national unity in Syria that
could include members of the opposition and current regime. Such a transitional
government would be charged with overseeing the drafting of a new constitution
and national elections. In order to secure Russian support for the final statement,
the Action Group stated that any transitional government “shall be formed on the
basis of mutual consent,” a phrase that would give supporters of Asad and the
opposition veto power over the selection of unity government leaders.
July 2012 (U.S. support for
United Nations involvement)
On July 19, 2012, the Security Council failed to adopt a proposed resolution that
would have, among other things, threatened sanctions on Syria if demands to end
the violence were not met. Permanent members China and Russia voted against the
resolution and Pakistan and South Africa abstained. The resolution would have had
the Security Council act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to
demand verifiable compliance—within 10 days of the proposed resolution’s
adoption—with its demands in previous resolutions that Syrian authorities pull back
military concentrations from population centers and cease the use of heavy
weaponry against them. Russia prominently vetoed two other U.N. Security Council
resolutions on Syria in October 2011 and February 2012.
Summer 2012 (President’s
reported rejection of lethal
aid)
Various U.S. media sources have reported that in 2012, then- Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton and then-CIA Director David Petraeus proposed a plan to
provide lethal aid (with the assistance of some neighboring countries) to vetted
rebel groups. Subsequent testimony revealed that then-Secretary of Defense Leon
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Panetta also was in favor of this proposal, which reportedly was ultimately rejected
by the President.3944
August 2012 (The President
on Regime Use of Chemical
Weapons)
On August 20, President Obama said, “We have been very clear to the Assad
regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start
seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That
would change my calculus.... We’re monitoring that situation very carefully. We have
put together a range of contingency plans.”
October 2012 (U.S. personnel
to Jordan)
In October 2012, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that the
United States military had sent a task force of “planners and other specialists” to
Jordan.
December 2012 (Recognition
of the Syrian Opposition)
In order to help unify the long divided Syrian opposition, the United States and
others facilitated the formation of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SC) in
November 2012 in Doha, Qatar. The United States extended recognition to the SC
as the “legitimate representative of the Syrian people,” though it has not been legally
recognized as the government of Syria.
December 2012 (Designation
of Al Nusra Front as an FTO)
The United States designated Jabhat al Nusra, a Salafi-Jihadist militia and reported
affiliate of Al Qaeda in Iraq, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, indicating that U.S.
interests are not only threatened in the short term by the effects of the current
fighting but could be threatened over the long term by the empowerment of
extremist groups in Syria.
December 2012 (NATO
approves Patriot Missile
Deployment to Turkey)
On December 4, 2012, NATO announced that it would deploy Patriot missile
defense batteries to areas near the Turkish border, presumably to defend against
potential Syrian Scud missile and/or chemical weapons attacks, as Turkey does not
have a missile defense capability of its own. The United States, Germany, and the
Netherlands have contributed Patriot batteries and operational teams to the
Turkish population centers of Gaziantep, Karamanmaras, and Adana, respectively.
The batteries reportedly became operational in January 2013.
January 2013 (The President
on the prospect of U.S.
military intervention in Syria)
In a January 2013 interview with the New Republic, President Obama responded to a
question on how he views the violence in Syria by saying: “And as I wrestle with
those decisions, I am more mindful probably than most of not only our incredible
strengths and capabilities, but also our limitations. In a situation like Syria, I have to
ask, can we make a difference in that situation? Would a military intervention have
an impact? How would it affect our ability to support troops who are still in
Afghanistan? What would be the aftermath of our involvement on the ground?
Could it trigger even worse violence or the use of chemical weapons? What offers
the best prospect of a stable post-Assad regime? And how do I weigh tens of
thousands who've been killed in Syria versus the tens of thousands who are
currently being killed in the Congo?”
February 2013 (Non-Lethal
Aid to Syrian Opposition)
In February 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry announced an initiative to provide
new U.S. non-lethal support to the SC and local opposition groups inside Syria. U.S.
assistance to the SC and other opposition groups seeks to increase the opposition’s
capacity and credibility. To date, the Obama Administration and Congress have
repurposed $250 million to support opposition groups and provide assistance in
opposition-controlled areas of Syria.
April 2013 (More U.S.
Personnel to Jordan)
In April 2013, the Defense Department announced that it will deploy an Army
headquarters element (est. 200 personnel) to Jordan to help local forces defend
their border with Syria. The Defense Department noted that U.S. troops dispatched
to Jordan would provide training and equipment to Jordanian forces to “detect and
stop chemical weapons transfers along Jordan’s border with Syria, and develop
Jordan’s capacity to identify and secure chemical weapons assets.”
April 2013 (On alleged Syrian
regime chemical weapons
On April 25, 2013, the White House issued a letter to Congress stating that “our
intelligence community does assess with varying degrees of confidence that the
3944
“Backstage Glimpses of Clinton as Dogged Diplomat, Win or Lose,” New York Times, February 2, 2013.
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usage)
Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically the
chemical agent Sarin.”
May 2013 (Return to the
Geneva Communiqué)
On May 7, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov announced that the United States and Russia would cooperate to convene an
international conference aimed at reaching a political settlement.
May 2013 (Humanitarian Aid)
On May 9, Secretary Kerry announced that the United States is contributing an
additional $100 million in humanitarian assistance, bringing total U.S. humanitarian
assistance for those affected by the violence in Syria to nearly $510 million.
June 2013 (Limited Sanctions
Relief)
On June 12, Secretary Kerry announced a partial waiver of preexisting Syrian
Accountability Act sanctions restricting exports to Syria to allow, subject to case-bycase review, the export and reexport of certain items to rebel controlled areas.
The items available to be licensed under the sanctions change are commodities,
software, and technology, including but not limited to those related to water supply
and sanitation; agricultural production and food processing; power generation; oil
and gas production; construction and engineering; transportation; and educational
infrastructure.
June 2013 (Chemical
Weapons Confirmation,
Expanded Assistance)
On June 13, White House officials confirmed the U.S. intelligence community’s
assessment that “the Asad regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve
agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year.” In
response to the assessment, the White House signaled its intent to expand U.S.
assistance to the Syrian opposition, including the provision of unspecified support to
the Supreme Military Council of the armed opposition.
Debating U.S. Intervention
Options for military intervention continue to be debated, with advocates of different options
apparently disagreeing on strategic priorities. Those seeking a rapid end to the current conflict
might favor the use of U.S. airpower to degrade the Syrian military’s remaining capabilities.
However, such an approach would not immediately resolve security issues inside Syria or prevent
fighting among opposition forces and regime remnants. Those seeking a more limited civilian
protection mission might prioritize the establishment and defense of enclaves/buffer zones in
northern or southern Syria where displaced persons can seek shelter and assistance and where
opposition groups can operate, train, and launch continuing operations against the Asad regime. It
is unclear whether such zones could be adequately defended without the use of ground forces or
the placement of air defense equipment inside Syria. Still others with discrete concerns about
Syrian unconventional and conventional weapons stocks or non-state groups active in Syria might
advocate for a limited military operation targeting key weapons- and terrorist-related sites,
entities, or individuals. Such operations might eliminate individual threats but would not alleviate
wider humanitarian concerns or improve general security conditions.
Each of these objectives may have different diplomatic and strategic implications, and each of the
corresponding military approaches may have differing degrees of risk, feasibility, and cost. The
FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) incorporated a Senate amendment (S.Amdt.
3262 amended S. 3254) to require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to congressional
defense committees identifying options to “deny or significantly degrade” the Syrian military’s
ability to use air power against civilians and opposition. Specifically, the report would require an
assessment of the deployment of air defense systems, the establishment of no-fly zones over
Syrian population centers, limited air strikes, or “other military activities.”
President Obama has remained reluctant to endorse military intervention proposals to date and
Administration officials have cited a number of reasons, including fears of exacerbating the
violence and risking regional spillover; the absence of U.N. Security Council authorization for
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intervention; and the Syrian opposition’s continued divisions over the issue. Polling suggests a
lack of U.S. domestic political support for more robust action. Other foreign policy priorities have
also influenced the Administration’s position, including U.S. efforts to address Iran’s nuclear
program. Asad’s departure could be a major set-back for Iran, but the Administration also seeks to
maintain pressure on Iran through sanctions and diplomacy, and may fear that U.S. intervention
would unravel the limited consensus it has built with Russia, China, and others.
In general, critics of U.S. policy toward Syria since 2011, including some Members of Congress,
have decried what they perceive to be the Administration’s passivity toward the Syrian regime’s
violence, asserting that lack of U.S. military involvement, either directly or by proxy, has
demonstrated a lack of American leadership in global affairs, empowered Syria’s undemocratic
allies such as Iran and Hezbollah, enabled Sunni Salafi-Jihadist groups to consolidate powerful
positions within the ranks of the armed opposition, and permitted humanitarian and political
crises and sectarian animus to grow exponentially in a volatile region. Moreover, some critics
argue that U.S. credibility is being diminished by Asad’s refusal to step down or end abuses of
civilians despite U.S. demands. Those who support the Administration’s approach to date argue
that U.S. military intervention in Syria would require a significant commitment of U.S. military
and financial resources over an undefined period of time amidst a general U.S. drawdown from
Afghanistan and earlier from Iraq. In addition, proponents caution that U.S. assistance used to
overthrow the Asad regime would not address a post Asad environment, in which, like Iraq,
sectarian animosities could spark continued civil strife amidst various Syrian communities
affected by the war.
U.S. Assistance
In FY2012 and FY2013 the United States has provided a total of more than $513 million for
humanitarian activities both inside Syria and in neighboring countries.40 The United States has
made humanitarian assistance contributions in response to U.N. appeals and supports projects
outside of the U.N. system.41 U.S. humanitarian assistance has been drawn from global accounts,
including the International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA),
and P.L. 480-Title II accounts. On April 5, the State Department notified Congress of its intent to
repurpose $220 million in FY2012 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funds to increase the
FY2012 IDA and MRA account balances for additional humanitarian assistance for Syrians.
Section 1707(e) of P.L. 113-6, the FY2013 continuing resolution included increased account
totals for the IDA and MRA accounts, which improves the Administration’s ability to meet future
Syria-related needs with August 2013 (Chemical
Weapons Confirmation)
On August 30, the White House released an unclassified summary of the U.S.
intelligence community’s assessment of the Syrian government’s mass use of
chemical weapons on August 21. Among other things, the assessment determined
that 1,429 people were killed in the chemical weapons attack, including at least 426
children.
August 2013 (President’s
Request to Congress for
Authorization of Use of
Force)
On August 31, President Obama submitted a draft resolution requesting that
Congress authorize the use of force for military operations “against Syrian regime
targets” to “hold the Assad regime accountable for their use of chemical weapons,
deter this kind of behavior, and degrade their capacity to carry it out.”
September 2013 (Lethal Aid
to Syrian Opposition
In early September 2013, U.S. officials publicly acknowledged in hearings before
Congress that the Administration had approved a covert program to arm elements
of the Syrian opposition. On September 4, in a hearing before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Secretary of State Kerry said, “we have seen the president take
steps in response to the initial attacks of chemical weapons to increase lethal aid to
the opposition. That is now known.”
U.S. Assistance to Syria: Issues for Congress
Most U.S. foreign aid going to Syria is for humanitarian assistance. To date, the United States has
provided over $1 billion of humanitarian assistance45 both inside Syria and to neighboring
countries affected by the conflict. The United States has made humanitarian assistance
contributions in response to U.N. appeals and supports projects outside of the U.N. system.46 U.S.
humanitarian assistance has been drawn from global accounts, including the International
45
Cited funds have been provided in FY2012 and FY2013 and include previously appropriated funds. For more
information or analysis, contact Rhoda Margesson, CRS Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy, (ext. 7-0425,
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov).
46
For full details, see USAID, Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #22, August 22, 2013. Available online at:
[http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/08.22.13%20%20Syria%20Complex%20Emergency%20Fact%20Sheet%20%2322.pdf]
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Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA), and P.L. 480-Title II
accounts. On April 5, the State Department notified Congress of its intent to repurpose $220
million in FY2012 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funds to increase the FY2012 IDA and
MRA account balances for additional humanitarian assistance for Syrians. Section 1707(e) of P.L.
113-6, the FY2013 continuing resolution included increased account totals for the IDA and MRA
accounts, which improves the Administration’s ability to meet future Syria-related needs with
FY2013 funds.
According to the U.S. State Department, the United States also has committed to providing $250
million in transition support to the SC and SMC. To date, the President has used emergency
authority for unanticipated contingencies in Section 451 of the Foreign Assistance Act to identify
and repurpose Overseas Contingency Operations funds and Pakistan Counterinsurgency
Capability Funds to provide $54 million in nonlethal support to unarmed opposition groups. In
March 2013, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to reprogram an additional $63
million in OCO funds and use Section 451 authority to further enhance the capabilities of the
40
Cited funds have been provided in FY2012 and FY2013 and include previously appropriated funds. For more
information or analysis, contact Rhoda Margesson, CRS Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy, (ext. 7-0425,
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov).
41
For full details, see USAID, Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #17, June 7, 2013.
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Syrian Opposition Coalition and local opposition councils inside Syria. In April 2013, the
President invoked drawdown authority to provide food and medical assistance to armed
opposition elements. The Administration and Congress also have repurposed $300 million for
Syria-related budget support to Jordan’s governmentSyrian Opposition Coalition and local opposition councils inside Syria. In April 2013, the
President invoked drawdown authority to provide food and medical assistance to armed
opposition elements.
The Obama Administration has acknowledged the funding challenges that the Syria crisis
presents and worked with Congress to increase the balances in global humanitarian assistance
accounts in the FY2013 final appropriations bill to better meet Syria related needs. However, the
Administration has not identified specific additional Syria assistance funding requests in its
FY2014 appropriations budget and all indications suggest that the Administration intends to
continue to fund Syria opposition assistance efforts on an ad hoc basis by presenting
reprogramming requests and emergency contingency notifications to Congress.
Policy debates about U.S. humanitarian and opposition assistance have increasingly focused on
whether the United States is receiving adequate political benefit from its assistance efforts.
Anecdotal evidence from field reports and aid implementers suggests that many Syrians who may
be receiving U.S. assistance remain unaware of its origins, and that the general perception among
opposition groups is that the United States remains wary of providing assistance to rebels because
of fears of aiding extremist groups.4247 In response, some Members of Congress and outside
observers have argued that the United States should begin to more aggressively “brand” U.S. aid
to enhance local perception that the people of the United States stand in solidarity with Syrians.
Humanitarian assistance implementers express concern that the so-called branding of aid
delivered into Syria as “American” or “foreign” may make aid personnel and recipients targets of
attacks by hostile extremists or Syrian government forces. Some proposed legislation introduced
in the 113th Congress would require branding of U.S. assistance for Syrians, with some exceptions
for the safety of those delivering assistance and consideration of the successful achievement of
U.S. policy objectives (see Appendix A).
U.S. assistance programs initiated in 2013 seek to create a grant-making mechanism that would
allow the SC to support the local efforts of councils, without creating duplicative arrangements.
The feasibility and political consequences of this approach remain to be determined. Some aid
delivery organizations and outside observers argue that traditional principles of impartiality and
neutrality should continue to govern all humanitarian assistance delivery and programs seeking
the improvement of local services. Some Syrians may regard efforts to channel assistance via the
SC-ACU as an attempt to assert political control over the funds and programs of other groups.
Local opposition groups reportedly are very sensitive to the duplication or manipulation of aid
delivery efforts to boost the political profile of exile opposition groups or foreign governments.
Obama Administration officials have acknowledged that the United States is providing noncombatant elements of the Syrian opposition with non-lethal assistance, such as medical supplies,
food, communications equipment, and training.43 Prior to the most recent discussion of arming
the opposition in response to the regime’s use of chemical weapons, press sources had reported
that President Obama reportedly issued a “Presidential Finding” permitting the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other U.S. government agencies to provide unspecified support to
Syrian rebel groups, including armed fighters.44 Unverified press reports allege that U.S.
intelligence officers located in southern Turkey and Jordan are vetting rebel groups for ties to
known terrorist organizations, helping to coordinate the delivery of lethal aid to select groups,
gathering intelligence on opposition networks, and establishing relationships with fighters likely
42
CRS Specialist’s meetings with U.S. government grantees and Syrian opposition activists, 2013.
Such aid reportedly includes tools to circumvent Internet censorship, such as anonymizing software and satellite
phones with GPS capabilities. According to another report, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has “supplied
encryption-enabled communications gear to opposition groups, presumably enabling the United States to monitor their
talks.” CRS cannot verify these reports. See “US Provides Communications Aid for Syria Opponents,” Agence France
Presse, June 14, 2012; “In Syria Conflict, U.S. Struggles to Fill Intelligence Gaps,” Washington Post, July 23, 2012.
44
Reuters, “Obama Authorizes Secret US Support for Syrian Rebels,” August 1, 2012.
4347
CRS Specialist’s meetings with U.S. government grantees and Syrian opposition activists, 2013.
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to be influential as the conflict continues or in its aftermath.45 One report also states that
Administration has debated whether to provide rebels with satellite imagery and intelligence on
Syrian troop locations and movements.46 CRS cannot verify these reports.
As with debates over possible military intervention, proposals for the expansion of financial aid
or lethal assistance to Syrian groups may raise a number of questions for potential congressional
oversight and engagement. Specific proposals may have implications for long-standing debates
about the respective constitutional and statutory war powers and foreign affairs authorities of
Congress and the President.47 Proposals may also reinvigorate debate over the utility of and/or
moral imperative for military intervention as a means to protect civilians and secure other U.S.
interests.48 Such debates also occurred during the 112th Congress’s consideration of the 2011 U.S.
military intervention in Libya.
Securing Syrian Weapons Stockpiles
Note: For detailed CRS analysis of chemical weapons stockpiles and related questions in Syria,
see CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Mary
Beth Nikitin.
A primary concern for U.S. and other international policymakers is the status of the Syrian
military’s control over large conventional and unconventional weapons stockpiles, including
chemical weapons, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs), surface-to-surface rockets,
armored weapons, explosives, and small arms. As noted above, the recent confirmation of the
U.S. intelligence community’s assessment of the Asad regime’s limited chemical weapons use
signals that the “red line” established by the Administration in 2012 and 2013 has been crossed.49
In December, President Obama said, “I want to make it absolutely clear to Assad and those under
his command: The world is watching. The use of chemical weapons is and would be totally
45
Other reports state that U.S. intelligence officers, in conjunction with foreign governments, also may be helping the
opposition develop logistical routes for moving supplies into Syria. Reuters, “Obama Authorizes Secret US Support for
Syrian Rebels,” August 1, 2012; and, “U. S. Stepping Up Efforts To Organize Syria Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June
14, 2012.
46
“C.I.A. Said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syrian Opposition,” New York Times, June 21, 2012.
47
In August 2012, Congress enacted legislation clearly stating that the legislation was not intended to constitute a
declaration of war on Syria or an authorization of the use of force against Syria. Section 604 of P.L. 112-158 (the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012) states, “Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this
Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.”
48
Debate over protecting civilians reflects differences of opinion between those who embrace the principle of a socalled “responsibility to protect” and those who argue that such protection, while admirable and even desirable in some
contexts, should not be endorsed in general terms because it may conflict with other U.S. interests, such as maintaining
regional stability, avoiding unintended consequences of military action, and avoiding precedents that compromise
future flexibility of action.
49
In December 2012, U.S. officials reiterated public statements warning Syrian officials that the United States
considers any use or transfer of Syrian chemical weapons to be a “red line” and that contingency planning has taken
place for an unspecified response to such a scenario. On August 20, President Obama said, “We have been very clear to
the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of
chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus…. We’re monitoring that situation
very carefully. We have put together a range of contingency plans.” Statement by President Obama, White House,
Washington, DC, August 20, 2012. On December 3, then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and President
Obama reiterated U.S. warnings, with Clinton stating that the use or transfer of chemical weapons is “a red line for the
United States.” Statement by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Prague, Czech Republic, December 3, 2012.
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unacceptable and if you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons there will be
consequences and you will be held accountable.”50 In early December, the Syrian Foreign
Ministry said, “Syria has stressed repeatedly that it will not use these types of weapons, if they
were available, under any circumstances against its people.” In 2012, Syrian officials accused the
United States of “looking for a pretext to intervene militarily”51 and stated chemical weapons
would not be used “unless Syria faces external aggression.”52
The White House identified four specific incidents where it believes chemical weapons were
used: “on March 19 in the Aleppo suburb of Khan al Asal; April 13 in the Aleppo neighborhood
of Sheikh Maksud; May 14, in Qasr Abu Samra, which is north of Homs; and on May 23 in an
attack in eastern Damascus.” These incidents track with a recent round of claims and
counterclaims by the opposition and Syrian government regarding chemical weapons use. On
March 19, 2013, the Syrian government accused rebels of firing a rocket or missile with chemical
agents at government-controlled areas in Aleppo province; Opposition forces in turn asserted that
the Asad regime was lying in order to cover up its own alleged use of “chemical rockets” that day
against rebel forces east of the capital.
In order to ascertain the truth, a team of United Nations experts charged with investigating the
allegations was deployed to Cyprus but was not granted permission by the Syrian government to
enter the country. The Asad regime insisted that the U.N. investigation focus on government
claims of alleged chemical weapons usage by rebels. In response, U.N. Secretary General Ban Kimoon demanded “unfettered access” to all alleged sites. Russia also opposed the investigation of
rebel claims.
Since the crisis began in 2011, U.S. and Israeli officials have publicly communicated their
assessments of and concerns about the extent, security, and potential unrest-related implications
of Syria’s unconventional weapons programs and stockpiles. U.S. officials have expressed
confidence that they have a reliable estimate of the quantities and locations of Syrian chemical
weapons and have indicated that the “extensive network” of related facilities is being monitored
“very closely” via unspecified means.53 Since late 2011, named and unnamed Israeli officials
have voiced similar concerns about “huge stockpiles”54 of chemical weapons in Syria and have
warned that Israel will consider any indication that the Asad regime is transferring WMD
materials to Hezbollah or other non-state actors to be an act of war.55 NATO, Russia, and several
50
Statement by President Obama, National Defense University, Washington, DC, December 3, 2012.
Statement by Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil, August 2012.
52
Statement by Syrian government spokesperson Jihad Maqdisi, July 2012.
53
On July 18, 2012, U.S. State Department spokesperson Patrick Ventrell said, “We’re closely monitoring their
proliferation-sensitive materials. We don’t have any indication that those specific munitions are not under Syrian
Government control at this time, but we’re monitoring it very closely.” In February 2012, Assistant Secretary of State
for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller said, “We have ideas as to quantity. We have
ideas as to where they are.” Quoted in Lachlan Carmichael, “U.S. concerned about Syrian chemical arms, missiles,”
Agence France Presse (AFP), February 15, 2012. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper referred to an
extensive network of Syrian chemical weapons facilities in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
February 16, 2012. See also Jay Solomon and Adam Entous, “U.S. Steps Up Watch of Syria Chemical Weapons,” Wall
Street Journal, February 15, 2012; and, Jay Solomon, “U.S., Israel Monitor Suspected Syrian WMD,” Wall Street
Journal, August 27, 2011.
54
Major-General Amir Eshel, head of the Israeli military’s planning division, quoted in “Israel Fears Syrian ‘Chemical,
Biological’ Weapons,” NOW Lebanon, January 17, 2012.
55
U.S. Open Source Center Report GMP20120201736004, “Israeli Official: Chemical Weapons From Syria to
Hizballah ‘Declaration of War,’” Yisra'el Hayom (Tel Aviv), February 1, 2012.
51
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other countries have underscored their intention to hold the Asad government responsible for its
actions with regard to chemical weapons.
Open source reporting on Syria’s chemical weapons program suggests that nerve gas and mustard
gas production and storage infrastructure is concentrated at facilities in and around Al Safira
(southeast of Aleppo), Damascus, Hamah, Latakia, and Homs.56 Stockpiles also may be dispersed
in other military locations around the country, and some reports suggested that the Syrian
government may have moved or consolidated chemical weapons-related materials in order to
better guarantee their security. As the recent discovery of undeclared chemical weapons material
in Libya has shown, there are limits to the ability of international intelligence agencies and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to understand and verify the
extent of sensitive WMD programs, even when dealing with countries that have ratified
international conventions on WMD—which Syria has not.57
The Asad regime likely places greater emphasis on ensuring the loyalty of military units involved
in guarding elements of WMD programs because of the weapons’ relevance as a potential
deterrent against foreign attack. In the wake of any sudden regime collapse, efforts to find and
secure stockpiles would be both a high priority and a difficult challenge. Neighboring intelligence
services in Turkey, Jordan, and Israel may have useful insight on the extent of these programs and
related security challenges. Elements of the Syrian military may be in a position to aid in securing
materials and sites in the event of regime change, but it remains unclear whether an orderly or
chaotic transition situation might ensue and whether such units would be cooperative or
antagonistic toward outsiders.
Existing U.S. government authorities and funding sources for addressing emergency proliferation
risks are discussed below. According to some press reports, internal U.S. government assessments
estimate that as many as 75,000 military personnel could be required to fully secure various
WMD-related sites in Syria.58 One report suggests that due to the age and probable poor condition
of Syria’s chemical stockpiles, any international effort to dispose of the weapons could take years
and significant numbers of troops for force protection around chemical depots.59 Secretary of
Defense Hagel told the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 18, 2013, that more than $70
million in Cooperative Threat Reduction funds are being used to assist Syria’s neighbors to
bolster border defenses and prevent WMD proliferation from Syria.
56
Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Watching Syrian Chemical Arms Amid Fear of Attack, Diversion,” Global Security Newswire,
December 5, 2011.
57
Syria has signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Syria has not signed or
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
58
Barbara Starr, “Military: Thousands of troops needed to secure Syrian chemical sites,” CNN.com, February 22, 2012.
The President restated established U.S. policy. On July 18, 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, “We’ve
made very clear to [the Syrian government] that they have a responsibility to safeguard their chemical sites and that we
will hold them responsible should anything happen with regards to those sites.” See Secretary Panetta Remarks with
United Kingdom Defense Secretary Philip Hammond, July 18, 2012; and, Remarks by the President to the White
House Press Corps, August 20, 2012.
59
“Seizing Syrian chemical arms could take 75,000 troops,” International Herald Tribune, November 17, 2012.
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Outlook and Future Policy Considerations
for Congress
As the situation in Syria remains fluid and unresolved, U.S. policymakers must simultaneously
plan for a possible political transition and reconstruction or civil war of unpredictable duration.
Ambassador Robert Ford outlined four main concerns that guide current U.S. policy when he
testified before Congress in April 2013:
there are, I think, four key things that we're working towards. First and foremost, we do not
want Syria’s very large stock of chemical weapons to be used or to fall into the hands of
terrorist groups. Second, we do not want Syria to become a base for terrorist operations. In
addition, it needs to be a source of stability in the region more broadly. And the large refugee
flows out of Syria are actually straining the neighboring states now and, in particular,
straining Jordan and Lebanon but to a lesser extent Turkey and Iraq. And we do not think
that these things can be achieved without a political transition, a negotiated political
transition. If we don't have a negotiated transition… our view is that the move towards
fragmentation in Syria will continue.60
Also in April 2013, DNI Clapper stated in testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence that, “The most likely scenario that we see is even after Assad falls,
there’s probably more fractionization (sic), if I can use that word, both geographically and on a
sectarian basis. That for some period of time, we're not sure, but at least a year, year and a half,
there would be continued inter-sectoral competition and fighting, which will be very localized.”61
Regardless of the outcome Syria is likely to face a humanitarian crisis bereft of state services and
security. The prospect of a prolonged security vacuum is of particular concern, as radical Islamist
militias or Iranian proxies could become more firmly entrenched, acquire more sophisticated
weaponry, assert control over territory, and threaten U.S. interests. The potential proliferation or
use of chemical weapons from Syria’s multiple stockpiles also is of major concern to U.S.
officials. Additionally, multiple reports indicate the danger of increased spillover violence along
Syria’s borders with Lebanon, Turkey, Israel, and Jordan. Administration officials and Members
of Congress may choose to discuss alternate scenarios and relevant funding and authorization
needs in anticipation of the prolonged crisis facing Syria and its neighbors.
Possible Appropriations and Authorization Issues6220
Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. Response
neutrality should continue to govern all humanitarian assistance delivery and programs seeking
the improvement of local services. Some Syrians may regard efforts to channel assistance via the
SC-ACU as an attempt to assert political control over the funds and programs of other groups.
Local opposition groups reportedly are very sensitive to the duplication or manipulation of aid
delivery efforts to boost the political profile of exile opposition groups or foreign governments.
Possible Appropriations and Authorization Issues48
In considering and preparing for possible scenarios in Syria, Members of Congress might
consider current and likely future requests for appropriations and authorization from the
Administration. Syria’s economic situation was difficult prior to the conflict, and the Obama
Administration expects that security and reconstruction costs in Syria will be considerable and
will require international contributions.63 International organizations are already identifying
60
Testimony of Ambassador Robert Ford, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 11, 2013.
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
April 11, 2013.
62
CRS Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation Dianne Rennack (ext. 7-7608) contributed to this section.
63
On August 15, 2012, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said, “Syria is not Iraq. It doesn’t have that
great, vast natural wealth. And depending on how long this goes on, we are already seeing a lot of the economic
(continued...)
61
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49 International organizations are already identifying
shortfalls in funding and material to respond to the humanitarian needs of Syrians affected by the
conflict, and those needs, along with reconstruction costs, could drastically increase if fighting
worsens and persists.
Given U.S. national security concerns about terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the
regional security effects of conflict and potential regime change in Syria, it seems likely that
engagement between Congress and the Administration will continue to focus on those areas.
However, as part of a transition or negotiated settlement, the U.S. government could be asked to
financially support the repatriation or resettlement of Syrian refugees or to provide economic
assistance to Syria through contributions at future donors’ conferences and/or through
international financial institutions. The United Nations, NATO, or the Arab League could be
asked to fund, staff, and equip an international peacekeeping or monitoring operation inside
Syria. Congress may choose to define authorization criteria and identify potential funds for U.S.
contributions to such operations, including through reviewing current recurring obligations in the
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) or Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)
accounts.
Existing Restrictions and Authorities
Syria is among those states explicitly designated in the FY2012 foreign operations appropriation
act (Division I of P.L. 112-74; 125 Stat. 1164) as being prohibited from receiving direct aid
(§7007; 125 Stat. 1195). However, a number of provisions in that law could make funds available
“notwithstanding” other provisions within that law or other laws, including funds for
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs (125 Stat. 1185), foreign military
financing as it applies to demining (125 Stat. 1187), contingency funds (§7034(f); 125 Stat.
1214), and democracy promotion (§7034(h); 125 Stat. 1214).
The President also is granted special authority, under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, to “authorize the furnishing of assistance without regard to any provision of this Act, the
Arms Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States,
and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under this Act” if he finds it is “important
to the security interests of the United States” and so notifies Congress. Under this provision, the
President could make available up to $50 million in a given fiscal year to Syria. The President is
currently using this authority to provide assistance to the Syrian opposition. The Administrator of
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also is authorized to provide
agricultural commodities to meet emergency food needs “notwithstanding any other provision of
law” pursuant to Title II of P.L. 480.
Securing Weapons Supplies and Sites64
There are two existing authorities and likely sources of funding for U.S. government programs
that could be used for efforts to secure or dismantle Syrian weapons of mass destruction or
(...continued)48
CRS Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation Dianne Rennack (ext. 7-7608) contributed to this section.
On August 15, 2012, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said, “Syria is not Iraq. It doesn’t have that
great, vast natural wealth. And depending on how long this goes on, we are already seeing a lot of the economic
underpinnings of Syria’s prosperity at risk from this fighting. So there’s going to have to be a serious rebuilding job
that will be Syrian-led obviously, but the international community has to be ready to support, so we’re beginning to
think about those things.”
64
Prepared by CRS Specialist in Nonproliferation Mary Beth Nikitin, ext. 7-7745.49
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Arms Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States,
and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under this Act” if he finds it is “important
to the security interests of the United States” and so notifies Congress. Under this provision, the
President could make available up to $50 million in a given fiscal year to Syria. The President is
currently using this authority to provide assistance to the Syrian opposition. The Administrator of
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also is authorized to provide
agricultural commodities to meet emergency food needs “notwithstanding any other provision of
law” pursuant to Title II of P.L. 480.U.S. and International Response
advanced conventional weapons in an emergency scenario. The State Department’s
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) has authority to spend funds “notwithstanding
any other provision of law” and is authorized to work in states outside the former Soviet Union.65
The Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has
“notwithstanding” authority for use of a limited amount of CTR funds in an emergency situation,
including outside the former Soviet Union.66
Addressing Syria’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Status
The Administration and Congress may wish to discuss ways to address Syria’s legal status as a
state sponsor of international terrorism in anticipation of any need to provide foreign assistance to
a transitional Syrian government. Similarly, the designation of the Al Nusra Front as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization and pursuant to E.O. 13224 may complicate U.S.-funded operations in
areas under Al Nusra influence or control. Syria has long been identified as a sponsor of terrorism
for the purposes of Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979. This status reflects long-standing Syrian government support
for Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups. It remains unclear how any post-Asad government
might relate to those groups and other U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations. Since Syria
has long been identified as a sponsor of terrorism for the purposes of Section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, the President may be required to either issue a national security waiver to
provide certain types of assistance to a post-Asad Syrian government or to remove Syria’s
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in consultation with Congress.
Section 620A affords the President two options to remove a terrorist designation: (1) he may
immediately remove a designation if there is a “fundamental change in the leadership and policies
of the government” of the targeted country, and that government does not support acts of
terrorism and has provided assurances that it will not in the future; or (2) he may remove a
designation for a government after 45 days if that government has not supported international
terrorism for a period of six months and has made assurances to not provide such support in the
future.
The President is also authorized to provide assistance pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 regardless of the terrorism designation in the following instances: He may make assistance
available for health and disease prevention programs, including funding for HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria treatment and prevention efforts (Section 104(c)(4)); he may provide up
to $25 million in any fiscal year for unanticipated contingencies (Section 451); and to some
65
The FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7) authorized the Department of State to use the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) “for such countries other than the Independent States of the former
Soviet Union and international organizations when it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so.”
Appropriated NDF funds remain available until expended.
66
The “notwithstanding” authority has not been exercised since it was first authorized in Section 1305 of the FY2010
Defense Authorization bill (P.L. 111-84). Available funds are limited to ten percent of total CTR appropriations.
Required determination and notification provisions would necessitate the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Energy. Notification of how funds will be spent must be submitted to the foreign affairs, appropriations
and armed services committees. The law requires that funds are used for threats “arising from the proliferation of
chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons or weapons-related materials, technologies, and expertise” that must be
addressed urgently; and that “certain provisions of law would unnecessarily impede the Secretary’s ability to carry out
activities of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense to address such threats” (i.e.,
notwithstanding authority is necessary).
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extent he may fund international narcotics control and anticrime programs (Sections 481, 491,
respectively). Furthermore, he may furnish defense articles or services in exchange for “necessary
or strategic raw material” if he finds it in the U.S. national interest to do so (Section 663).
Under Sections 571 and 582 of the act, the President has broad authority to provide anti-terrorism
and nonproliferation assistance to foreign countries notwithstanding other provisions of law, with
the exception of human rights and terrorism related restrictions in Section 502B and 620A of the
act. Section 620A would restrict the provision of such assistance, in addition to peacekeeping
assistance under Section 551 of the act, without a national security waiver. Given the time and
certification requirements for removing the designation, it is likely the Administration would seek
authorization for the provision of such assistance through such a waiver.
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Given the time and certification requirements for rescinding the designation of a state sponsor of
international terrorism, the President may seek separate, superseding authorization from Congress
for the provision of assistance to Syria, issue a national security waiver of terrorism related
restrictions, or invoke existing notwithstanding authorities included in current foreign operations
appropriations legislation. The Bush Administration sought and Congress granted separate
authorization for Iraq in 2003 for similar reasons: President Bush rescinded Iraq’s status as a state
sponsor of terrorism in May 2003 under authority granted by Congress in supplemental
appropriations legislation.6750
Other Questions for Congressional Oversight
Possible questions that Congress may wish to consider in light of recent developments include the
following.
•
What should be the overarching goals of U.S. policy toward Syria? To protect
civilians? To further the opposition cause of removing President Asad from
power? To secure chemical weapons and prevent extremist groups from taking
hold? Can these aims be separated in principle? On the ground?
•
What might follow Asad’s departure? Would a negotiated solution that preserved
elements of the current government be acceptable to the United States? Why or
why not?
•
What authorities and appropriated funds might the Administration seek under
various scenarios? How can existing authorities and appropriations be used to
respond to various needs? What is the Administration’s view with regard to
addressing Syria’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism in the event of Asad’s
departure?
67•
How are other countries responding to the crisis? Who is willing and able to
implement humanitarian or military intervention proposals? On what authority?
With what specific resources or forces, for what period, and at what cost? How
might direct or indirect military intervention affect ongoing relief and diplomacy
initiatives?
•
What potential risks and unintended consequences may stem from various
intervention proposals? What are the potential risks and consequences of opting
not to intervene? How will regional security be affected?
•
What signals might suggest that a collapse of the Syrian regime is imminent?
What signals might suggest that the current pattern of conflict by attrition will
persist? What developments could trigger direct intervention by regional actors,
and how should the United States respond to intervention?
50
President Bush rescinded Iraq’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to Section 1503 of P.L. 108-11 by
issuing a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Commerce and notifying Congress. Section 1503 states “that the
President may make inapplicable with respect to Iraq Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other
provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism. …provided further that the President shall
submit a notification 5 days prior to exercising any of the authorities described in this section to the Committee on
Appropriations of each House of the Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on International Relations of the House of Representatives.” See President George W. Bush, Message to the Congress
Reporting the Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the Development Fund for Iraq, May 22, 2003.
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•
How are other countries responding to the crisis? Who is willing and able to
implement humanitarian or military intervention proposals? On what authority?
With what specific resources or forces, for what period, and at what cost? How
might direct or indirect military intervention affect ongoing relief and diplomacy
initiatives?
•
What potential risks and unintended consequences may stem from various
intervention proposals? What are the potential risks and consequences of opting
not to intervene? How will regional security be affected?
•
What signals might suggest that a collapse of the Syrian regime is imminent?
What signals might suggest that the current pattern of conflict by attrition will
persist? What developments could trigger direct intervention by regional actors,
and how should the United States respond to intervention?
•
What political and security fault lines exist among Syrian opposition groups and
how might various scenarios affect prospects for conflict or cooperation between
them?
•
What role are extremist groups playing in the violence and what might their
future role be in Syria if the conflict ends? How can the United States best limit
opportunities for violent extremist groups to take advantage of continued conflict
or regime change in Syria?
•
How can the United States prevent the use, theft, or transfer of Syria’s
unconventional weapons? How can the United States and its allies prepare to
secure and limit the proliferation of conventional weapons stockpiles in Syria,
including missiles?
•
How should the United States respond to the humanitarian needs of the Syrian
people and address the impact of Syrian refugees on neighboring countries?
•
What steps should the United States take in its engagement with Syrian
opposition groups and regional actors to increase the likelihood of a post-conflict
transition process that will lead to stability for Syria and the region? Are secular
and Islamist Syrian opposition groups likely to prove hostile to Israel? How
might regime change affect prospects for a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement? How
likely are Syrian Kurds to remain at odds with Turkey and Syrian Arabs?
•
What steps is the Administration taking to ensure that the policies of U.S.
assistance recipients with regard to weapons of mass destruction, weapons
proliferation, terrorism, and human rights are compatible with U.S. goals and
interests? How credible are opposition leaders’ commitments on these issues?
•
What are the risks of additional spillover violence in Lebanon, Turkey, Israel, and
Jordan, and what steps should the United States take to eliminate or minimize
these risks? Would a greater spread of violence across borders change the U.S.
calculus regarding military intervention? If so, please explain how.
Legislation introduced in the 113th Congress related to Syria is summarized in Appendix A.
Legislation introduced in the 112th Congress related to Syria is summarized in Appendix B.
Table D-1 in Appendix D summarizes U.S. sanctions activity since the start of the uprising in
March 2011.
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Appendix A. Syria Legislation in the 113th Congress
For the latest on proposed legislation to authorize the use of force against Syria: see CRS Report
R43201, Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Jeremy M.
Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard.
Bills
•
S. 960, TheBills
•
S. 960, the Syria Transition Support Act of 2013, would. Would, among other things,
authorize the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law that restricts
assistance to Syria, to provide assistance, including defense articles, defense
services, and training to vetted members of the Syrian Supreme Military Council,
units of the Free Syrian Army, and other Syrian entities opposed to the
government of Bashar al Asad. The bill would grant broad authority to provide
humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people and authorize the creation of a $250
million Transition Fund to provide security, transitional justice, democracy
building, and governance capacity building support as part of a post-Asad
transition. The bill would also prohibit U.S. military aid to U.S.-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (such as Jabhat al Nusra) and would prohibit
surface-to-air defense systems including shoulder fired missiles from being
transferred to any armed Syrian group unless the President certifies certain
conditions. Approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as amended by
a 15-3 vote in May 2013.
•
H.R. 1327, the Free Syria Act of 2013, would. Would authorize the President
“notwithstanding any other provision of law, to provide such assistance as may
be necessary for protection of populations affected by the conflict in Syria.”
Section 205 of the bill states that, “Nothing in this Act may be construed to
authorize the use of military force in Syria by the United States Armed Forces.”
The bill would authorize the President “to make available such assistance as may
be necessary to enhance the capacity, performance of Syrian opposition-allied
local coordination committees.” Would authorize the transfer of any nondesignated foreign assistance account funds to “any humanitarian account” in
order “to address needs arising as a result of the conflict in Syria.” Would require
U.S. economic assistance to be marked “From the American People” with some
exceptions.
•
-Would authorize the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to
direct the
drawdown of defense articles, services, education, and training for
eligible groups.
Allows lethal assistance with required certification. Would
prohibit provision of “anti-aircraftantiaircraft defensive systems” unless a “vital national
security interest” waiver,
certification, and report are issued. Would require
notification of obligations to
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate. Would
require the President to certify that military aid
provided is “consistent with the
maintenance of regional stability and with the overall
security and stability of
neighboring friends and allies.” Any anti-aircraft support would
require an
accompanying report detailing recipients, deployment, targets, risks and
benefits.
Entities failing to “demonstrate a commitment” to opposing and defeating Assad
Assad regime; “establishing a democratic, pluralistic, and peaceful Syria”; and securing
and safeguarding WMD would be ineligible as are FTOs and SDGTs. States that
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security assistance should be provided “to the maximum extent practicable” in
accordance with current human rights provisions (22 U.S.C. 2378d).
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•
-Would authorize the President notwithstanding any other provision of law to
establish a
program with “a Syrian entity” to “secure, safeguard, disable,
dismantle, transport out of
Syria, or destroy chemical and biological weapons,
their precursor and constituent parts
and associated equipment, and establish
verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of
such weapons.”
•
-Would authorize the President to provide democracy, economic and political
stabilization, reconstruction, and reconciliation assistance after determining that
the the
regime of Bashar al Assad is no longer in power, the U.S. government has
recognized a
transitional government, and that such a transitional government is
not controlled by an
FTO. Authorization would include “and notwithstanding any
other provision of law.”
•
-Would authorize the President to temporarily suspend for 3 month intervals the
requirements of P.L. 108-75 and “any other provision of law relating to
assistance,
trade, finance, the provision of defense articles and defense services,
and the issuance of
visas to nationals of Syria” following a determination that a
post-Assad government “is
demonstrating a verifiable commitment” to ceasing
terrorist support; preventing missile
and WMD transfer; dismantling WMD
programs, refraining from threatening U.S.
national security, interests, and allies;
respecting boundaries and sovereignty of
neighbors; and upholding human rights.
Would provide for two six month renewals
pending “substantial progress”
determinations. Would provide for additional renewals
upon determination of
achievement of security conditions and substantial progress on
human rights.
•
S. 617, the Syria Democratic Transition Act of 2013, a bill that would state that
. Would state that it is the
policy of the United States – —“to support civilians and innocent victims of
the the
conflict in Syria”; “that the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces (SC) is the sole and legitimate representative of the Syrian
people”; “…to support the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces (SC) efforts to establish a transitional government”; and, “to
affirm that the end of the Assad regime is in the national security interests of the
United States.” The bill would authorize the President, “notwithstanding any
other provision of law” to furnish assistance “on such terms and conditions as the
President may determine” for a series of stated purposes. Would require U.S.
economic assistance to be marked “From the American People” with some
exceptions. Would authorize the President, “notwithstanding any other provision
of law,” to “furnish assistance, and make contributions” to provide training and
nonlethal support to armed elements of the Syrian opposition. Would authorize
the President, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” to “conduct
activities” in support of securing weapons in Syria. States the President should
enact financial sanctions against entities facilitating “significant” arms sales to
the Syrian government. Would require implementation reporting within 60 days.
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H.R. 893, Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Accountability Act of
2013. Directs the President to impose sanctions for not less than two years on any
foreign person who on or after September 1, 2007, transferred to or acquired
from Iran, Syria, or North Korea: (1) certain listed nuclear, dual use, missile,
chemical, biological, toxic, or nonlisted but otherwise prohibited goods, services,
or technology; (2) acquired, mined, or otherwise extracted materials within the
territory or control of Iran, North Korea, or Syria for purposes relating to such
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countries' nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or missile development
programs; (3) transferred to Iran, Syria, or North Korea goods, services, or
technology that could assist such countries' efforts to extract or mill uranium ore;
or (4) provided a vessel, insurance, or any other shipping service for transporting
goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria for purposes relating to such
countries' nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or missile development
programs.
•
H.R. 1922, Foreign Assistance Under Limitation and Transparency Act or the
FAULT Ac. Prohibits funds made available to any federal agency after FY2013
from being used to provide foreign assistance to Iran, North Korea, Syria, Egypt,
and Pakistan. Exempts agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices,
provided that the aggregate value in any fiscal year does not exceed $50 million.
•
H.R. 1960, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014.
Contains Section1205, which would authorize the Secretary of Defense, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide assistance to the military and
civilian response organizations of Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries in the region of Syria in order for
such countries to respond effectively to incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction in Syria and the region. In addition, Section 1249 requires disclosure
of and report on Russian Support of Ballistic Missile Programs of China, Syria,
Iran, and North Korea. Section 1251 includes a sense of Congress on the Conflict
in Syria, which, among other things, states that: the President should fully
consider all courses of action to reinforce his stated `redline' regarding the use of
weapons of mass destruction by the Assad regime in Syria, which could threaten
the credibility of the United States with its allies in the region and embolden the
Assad regime.
•
H.R. 2432. Prohibits funds made available to any federal department or agency
for any fiscal year from being obligated or expended to provide military
assistance to any of the armed combatants in Syria absent express prior statutory
authorization from Congress.
•
H.R. 2492. Would prohibit funds made available to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United
States involved in intelligence activities to be obligated or expended for the
purpose of, or in a manner which would have the effect of, supporting, directly or
indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Syria by any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual.
•
H.R. 2494. Would prohibit funds made available to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United
States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the
purpose of, or in a manner which would have the effect of, supporting, directly or
indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Syria by any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual.
•
H.R. 2501, Congressional Accountability and Oversight in Syria Act. Prohibits
assistance (except for humanitarian assistance) for the purpose, or which would
have the effect, of promoting the capacity of any nation, group, organization,
movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Syria,
unless and until Congress expressly authorizes such assistance by law.
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•
H.R. 2503. Prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds made available to the
Department of Defense (DOD) or any other U.S. government department or
agency for military assistance to opposition forces in Syria.
•
H.R. 2507. Prohibits funds made available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States
involved in intelligence activities from being obligated or expended for the
purpose of, or in a manner which would have the effect of, supporting, directly or
indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Syria by any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual.
•
H.Con.Res. 40. Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) the President is
prohibited under the Constitution from the offensive use of the U.S. Armed
Forces in Syria without prior express authorization by an Act of Congress or
without a prior express appropriation of funds for that purpose by an Act of
Congress; and (2) the President's defiance of those constitutional limitations on
his authority to initiate war would constitute an impeachable high crime and
misdemeanor under article II, section 4 of the Constitution.
•
H.Res. 223. Calls on: (1) the Syrian Opposition Coalition to publicly outline a
detailed vision of inclusion for all of Syria's people, including a guarantee of full
citizenship and equality under the law; and (2) the Obama Administration, in
cooperation with international and regional partners, to continue to support the
Coalition as it develops mechanisms of transitional justice guaranteeing the rights
of all citizens under the law, and to support the Coalition as it forms an inclusive
and democratic provisional government. Urges all parties in the conflict to
respect international humanitarian law, protect minorities, preserve minority
cultural and religious sites, and hold accountable those who violate such norms.
•
H.Res. 229. Condemns the ongoing violence and the systematic human rights
violations carried out by Syrian government forces under President Bashar alAssad's direction, as well as abuses committed by opposition forces. Supports the
people of Syria seeking peaceful democratic change. Calls on the U.N. Security
Council, based on evidence that war crimes and crimes against humanity have
been perpetrated in Syria, to refer the situation to the International Criminal
Court.
•
H.R. 2397, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014. Includes Section
10034, which states that none of the funds made available by this Act may be
used with respect to Syria in contravention of the War Powers Resolution (50
U.S.C. 1541 et seq.), including for the introduction of United States forces into
hostilities in Syria, into situations in Syria where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, or into Syrian territory,
airspace, or waters while equipped for combat, in contravention of the
Congressional consultation and reporting requirements of sections 3 and 4 of that
law (50 U.S.C. 1542 and 1543).
•
S. 856, Syria Stabilization Act of 2013. Among other things, would authorize the
President, notwithstanding any other provision of law and using funds made
available for foreign assistance, to provide assistance, including defense articles,
defense services, and training to members of the Syrian Supreme Military
Council, units of the Free Syrian Army, and other Syrian entities opposed to the
government of Bashar al-Assad.
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•
S. 1201, Protecting Americans from the Proliferation of Weapons to Terrorists
Act of 2013. Would prohibit funds made available to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United
States involved in intelligence activities from being obligated or expended for the
purpose of, or in a manner which would have the effect of, supporting, directly or
indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Syria by any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual.
•
S. 1372, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2014. Would, among other things, make
appropriations available for assistance for Syria under titles III and IV of this Act,
notwithstanding any other provision of law. In addition, funds appropriated under
for programs in Syria may only be made available after the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the heads of relevant United States Government agencies,
submits, in classified form if necessary, a comprehensive strategy to the
appropriate congressional committees, which shall include a clear mission
statement, achievable objectives and timelines, and a description of inter-agency
and donor coordination and implementation of such strategy: Provided, That such
strategy shall also include a description of oversight mechanism and vetting
procedures to prevent the misuse of funds.
•
S. 1429, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2014. Would, among other
things, prohibit funds made available by this Act to be used with respect to Syria
in contravention of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541 et seq.),
including for the introduction of United States armed or military forces into
hostilities in Syria, into situations in Syria where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, or into Syrian territory,
airspace, or waters while equipped for combat, in contravention of the
congressional consultation and reporting requirements of sections 3 and 4 of that
law (50 U.S.C. 1542 and 1543).
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Appendix B. Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L.
112-158)
•
P.L. 112-158/H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
of 2012, codifies the sanctions on Syria contained in E.O.13606 and includes in
Title VII, “Sanctions with Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria.” This
section directs the President to identify and impose specified sanctions on: (1)
Syrian government officials or persons acting on behalf of that government who
are responsible for or complicit in the commission of serious human rights abuses
against Syrian citizens or their family members, regardless of whether such
abuses occurred in Syria; (2) persons who knowingly transfer or facilitate the
transfer of goods or technologies (weapons, surveillance technology, or
technology to restrict free speech or the flow of information) that are likely to be
used by Syria to commit human rights abuses against the Syrian people; and (3)
persons who engage in censorship that prohibits, limits, or penalizes freedom of
expression by Syrian citizens. Section 604 states, “Nothing in this Act or the
amendments made by this Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an
authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.”
FY2013 Appropriations and Authorization Legislation
•
In report language accompanying H.R. 5857, the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2013, appropriators note
under the heading “Global and Regional Programs/ Middle East Response” that
“The Committee is troubled by the ongoing violence in Syria and notes that
funds under this heading should continue to be made available to assist the
Syrian people. All funds for Syria are subject to the notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations, pursuant to section 7015(f) of this Act.”
•
In report language accompanying the Senate version of the bill, S. 3241,
appropriators recommended $2 million for the National Endowment for
Democracy programs in Syria. According to the report, “The Committee
recognizes the comparative advantages of the NED in the promotion of
democracy and human rights abroad, particularly given its status as an NGO,
unparalleled experience in promoting freedom during the cold war, and continued
ability to conduct programs in the most hostile political environments.”
•
House and Senate Amendments to H.R. 4310 and S. 3254, the House and
Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
See Amendments below.
Bills
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and
Modernization Act of 2011—Stated that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement
and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their proliferation
activities and policies. Would have, among other things, prohibited U.S. nuclear
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cooperation agreements and related export licenses and transfers of materials,
services, and goods with a country that assists the nuclear program of Iran, North
Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such
countries.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act—Would have, among other things,
sanctioned the development of petroleum resources of Syria, the production of
refined petroleum products in Syria, and the exportation of refined petroleum
products to Syria.
•
H.R. 5993, The Syria Non-Intervention Act of 2012—Would have prohibited the
use of funds available to the Department of Defense or an element of the
intelligence community for the purpose of, or which would have the effect of
supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Syria by
any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011—
Amends the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the
scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or extracted within
North Korea’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the
transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such
countries’ weapons of mass destruction programs, support for acts of
international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions
shipping services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011—would have denied companies that
conduct business in Syria’s energy sector (investment, oil purchases, and sale of
gasoline) access to U.S. financial institutions and required federal contractors to
certify that they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
•
S. 2034, Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012—Would have imposed
sanctions on persons who are responsible for or complicit in certain human rights
abuses. Also would have prohibited procurement contracts with persons that
export sensitive technology to Syria.
•
S. 2101, Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act of 2012—Would
have imposed, among other things, sanctions with respect to certain persons who
are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against
citizens of Syria or their family members.
•
S. 2152, Syria Democracy Transition Act of 2012—Would have imposed, among
other things, sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct transactions
with the central bank of Syria.
•
S. 2224, Would have required the President to report to Congress on issues
related to Syria—Directed the President to report to Congress regarding (1)
opposition groups operating inside or outside of Syria to oppose the Syrian
government, and (2) the size and security of conventional and non-conventional
weapons stockpiles in Syria.
•
S. 3498, Syria Humanitarian Support and Democratic Transition Assistance Act
of 2012—Made several statements of policy regarding human rights violations,
assistance to the Syrian people, weapons security, and support for transitional
governance in Syria. Would have directed the President to appoint a Special
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Envoy for Syria. Encouraged the President to provide bilateral assistance in the
form of relief and transition support and would have authorized “such sums as
may be necessary … for bilateral assistance programs in Syria” for FY2013 and
FY2014. Would have authorized increased funding to countries “that have
experienced an influx of refugees from Syria.” Encouraged the development of a
transition and security plan for Syria and would have required reporting on
implementation.
Resolutions
•
H.Res. 296/S.Res. 180, A resolution expressing support for peaceful
demonstrations and universal freedoms in Syria and condemning the human
rights violations by the Asad Regime—Among other things, it urged the
“President to continue to work with the European Union, the Government of
Turkey, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other allies and
partners to bring an end to human rights abuses in Syria, hold the perpetrators
accountable, and support the aspirations of the people of Syria.”
•
H.Res. 632, A resolution that, among other things, commended the leadership of
the Government of Turkey in calling for an end to the violence in Syria and for
its responsiveness to the humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees.
•
H.Res. 687, A resolution that, among other things, called on the United Nations
Security Council, based on evidence that crimes against humanity have been
perpetrated by Syrian government forces, to refer the situation of Syria to the
International Criminal Court.
•
H.Res. 763, A resolution that, among other things, called on all parties in the
conflict in Syria to respect the human rights and religious freedom of Syrian
citizens.
•
H.Res. 770, Expressed the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) only
Congress has the constitutional authority to declare war, (2) President Obama
should set clear objectives for the U.S. Armed Forces before sending them into
battle, (3) President Obama should indicate a direct national security interest in
placing the U.S. Armed Forces in harm’s way, and (4) the government of Syria
has surrendered all claims of legitimacy by massacring its own people and should
peacefully transfer power to a democratically elected government.
•
S.Res. 370/H.Res. 549, A resolution calling for democratic change in Syria,
would state the Senate’s condemnation of “ongoing, widespread, and systemic
violations of human rights conducted by authorities in Syria” and calling on
Bashar al Asad to step down. The non-binding resolution would have urged the
President to support a democratic transition in Syria, establish a Friends of Syria
Contact Group, develop a strategy to encourage further military defections, and
“develop a plan to identify weapons stockpiles and prevent the proliferation of
conventional, biological, chemical, and other types of weapons in Syria.”
•
S.Res. 379, A resolution that, among other things, expressed strong
disappointment with the Governments of the Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China for their veto of the United Nations Security Council
resolution condemning Bashar al Asad and the violence in Syria and urged them
to reconsider their votes.
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•
S.Res. 391/H.Res. 629, A resolution that, among other things, called on Syria to
(1) open the country to independent and foreign journalists; and (2) release all
detained journalists, videographers, and bloggers.
•
S.Res. 424, A resolution that, among other things, supported calls by Arab leaders
to provide the people of Syria with the means to defend themselves against
Bashar al-Assad and his forces, including through the provision of weapons and
other material support, and called on the President to work closely with regional
partners to implement these efforts effectively; urged the President to take all
necessary precautions to ensure that any support for the Syrian opposition does
not benefit individuals in Syria who are aligned with al Qaeda or associated
movements, or who have committed human rights abuses; and affirmed that the
establishment of safe havens for people from Syria, as contemplated by
governments in the Middle East, would be an important step to save Syrian lives
and to help bring an end to Mr. Assad’s killing of civilians in Syria, and called on
the President to consult urgently and thoroughly with regional allies on whether,
how, and where to create such safe havens.
•
S.Res. 428, A resolution that, among other things, urged the President to formally
establish the Atrocities Prevention Board established by Presidential Study
Directive-10 in August 2011, and for the Board to provide recommendations to
the President concerning the prevention of mass atrocities in Syria.
•
S.Res. 435, A resolution that, among other things, strongly urged all
Governments, including the Republic of Belarus and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, to refrain from providing any additional military or security
assistance to the Government of Syria.
•
S.Res. 494, A resolution that, among other things, condemned the Government of
the Russian Federation for its long-standing and ongoing support for the criminal
regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Amendments
•
H.Amdt. 1131 to H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013, agreed in the House of Representatives May 18, 2012, an amendment
to limit the availability of funds for Cooperative Threat Reduction activities with
Russia until the Secretary of Defense can certify that Russia is no longer
supporting the Syrian regime and is not providing to Syria, North Korea, or Iran
any equipment or technology that contributes to weapons of mass destruction
programs.
•
S.Amdt. 3262 to S. 3254, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, agreed to in the Senate December 4, 2012, and incorporated in the
conference bill H.R. 4310, an amendment to require the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report to congressional defense committees identifying options to “deny
or significantly degrade” the Syrian military’s ability to use air power against
civilians and the opposition. Specifically, the report would require an assessment
of the deployment of air defense systems, the establishment of no-fly zones,
limited air strikes, or “other military activities.”
•
Section 1295 of H.R. 4310, the conference version of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, requires the Administration to provide a
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report within 90 days of enactment on military assistance provided by the
Russian Federation to Syria.
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Appendix C. Chronology of United Nations
Action on Syria
Date
Action
August 3, 2011
The Security Council issued a presidential statement that expressed profound regret
over hundreds of deaths in Syria, condemned widespread violations of human rights
against civilians by Syrian authorities, and called for an immediate end to violence in
Syria, urging all sides to act with utmost restraint. It also called for access for
humanitarian workers for Syrian authorities to follow through on commitments they
had made to reform. Lebanon disassociated itself from the statement after its
release.
October 4, 2011
The Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have, among other
things, voiced deep concern over violence in Syria and strongly condemned “the
continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against
civilians by the Syrian authorities.” It called for “an inclusive Syrian-led political
process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and
extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and
concerns of Syria’s population.” Russia and China voted against the resolution, and
Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained.
February 4, 2012
The Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have, among other
things, adopted an Arab League plan outlining a Syrian-led political transition to a
democratic, plural political system. The resolution had called on the Syrian
government to cease violence against civilians, withdraw its armed forces from cities
and towns and return them to their barracks, guarantee the freedom of peaceful
demonstrations, and allow unhindered access for all Arab League institutions to
“determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents
taking place." Russia and China voted against the resolution.
February 23, 2012
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States Nabil Elaraby appointed Kofi Annan as United Nations-League
of Arab States Joint Special Envoy for Syria.
April 5, 2012
The Security Council issued another presidential statement that, among other
things, noted the Syrian government commitment on March 25, 2012, to implement
Kofi Annan’s six-point peace proposal. The statement also called upon the Syrian
government to implement an U.N.-brokered cease-fire by withdrawing troops from
population centers by April 10, 2012. It also called upon all parties, including the
Syrian opposition, to cease all armed violence no later than April 12, 2012.
April 14, 2012
The Security Council passed Resolution 2042, which approved the deployment of a
U.N. advance team of 30 military observers to Syria. It also demanded that the
Syrian authorities withdraw security forces from population centers and begin a
dialogue with the opposition. The vote marked the first time since protests began
that the Security Council was united in demanding a halt to the violence.
April 21, 2012
The Security Council passed Resolution 2043, which established—for a 90-day
period—a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with an initial
deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers under the command of a Chief
Military Observer. The resolution also created a civilian team to help implement
elements of the full peace plan, such as the start of a national political dialogue and
the government’s granting of the right to demonstrate.
June 16, 2012
UNSMIS Commander Norwegian Major General Robert Mood suspended
observation patrols due to increased violence.
July 19, 2012
The Security Council failed to adopt a proposed resolution that would have, among
other things, threatened sanctions on Syria if demands to end the violence were not
met. Permanent members China and Russia voted against the resolution and
Pakistan and South Africa abstained. The resolution would have had the Security
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Council act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to demand verifiable
compliance—within 10 days of the adoption—with its demands in previous
resolutions that Syrian authorities pull back military concentrations from population
centers and cease the use of heavy weaponry against them.
July 20, 2012
The Security Council passed UNSCR 2059 which extended the UNSMIS mission for
an additional 30 days. It also conditioned any further renewal of UNSMIS on the
cessation of the use of heavy weapons by the government and a reduction in
violence by all sides.
August-September 2012
United Nations-League of Arab States Joint Special Envoy for Syria, Kofi Annan
announced his intention to resign upon the expiration of his mandate on August 31,
2012. Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi replaces Annan as Joint Special Envoy and
begins diplomatic engagement with international parties and the Asad government.
October 2012
Brahimi proposes a ceasefire linked to the Islamic holiday of Eid al Adha that is
considered and adopted by the government and some opposition groups, but
quickly breaks down.
November-December 2012
Brahimi warns that state failure may result from continued fighting in Syria and
renews calls for a negotiated political solution based on the July 2012 communique
of the Action Group on Syria.6851 U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reports his
concern “that the presence of armed members of the opposition and the ongoing
military activities of the Syrian security forces [in the Golan Heights area] have the
potential to ignite a larger conflict between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic with
grave consequences.” The United Nations suspends operations in Syria on
December 3, citing deteriorating security conditions.
On December 19, the United Nations, humanitarian organizations, and the
government of Syria released estimates and appeals for assistance for Syrian
refugees as well as those displaced or otherwise in need in Syria. A U.N. Syria
Regional Response Plan seeks $1 billion for Syrian refugees through the first half of
2013. A U.N. Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan for Syria, prepared in part by the
government of Syria, seeks $519 million to support Syrians affected by the conflict
through the first half of 2013.
January-April 2013
On January 30, U.N. member states, agencies, and non-governmental organizations
convened an International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria held in
Kuwait. At the conference, several countries made new pledges of funding to
support humanitarian assistance for Syrians. Several of the largest donors included
Kuwait, the UAE, United States, and European Commission.
In February 2013, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report noting
that large parts of the country are scenes of “continuous combat, involving more
brutal tactics and new military capabilities on all sides.”
In March 2013, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and described the Syrian
humanitarian crisis “dramatic beyond description.” He also warned that the refugee
flows into neighboring countries will have an “unimaginable impact on the economy,
the society and the security of these countries.”
In April 2013, various U.N. officials published an OpEd in the New York Times in
which they called on “political leaders involved” to reach a political solution to the
Syrian civil war, writing that “We ask that they use their collective influence to insist
on a political solution to this horrendous crisis before hundreds of thousands more
people lose their homes and lives and futures—in a region already at the tipping
point.”
6851
Available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.
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June 2013 (Limited Sanctions
Relief)
On June 12, Secretary Kerry announced a partial waiver of preexisting Syrian
Accountability Act sanctions restricting exports to Syria to allow, subject to case-bycase review, the export and reexport of certain items to rebel controlled areas.
The items available to be licensed under the sanctions change are commodities,
software, and technology, including but not limited to those related to water supply
and sanitation; agricultural production and food processing; power generation; oil
and gas production; construction and engineering; transportation; and educational
infrastructure.
August 2013
A team of United Nations (UN) chemical weapons inspectors went to Syria to
examine several sites where attacks were alleged to occur. The inspectors collected
samples from the sites, including the site of the August 21 attack, and those samples
are being studied. The team’s mandate is not to assess who used the weapons, but
rather to determine to the extent possible whether or not chemical weapons were
used and what type. The inspectors were invited to Syria by the Syrian government,
but they only arrived in the country on August 18—just before the apparent August
21 attack—after months of negotiating terms of access for the inspections.
In late August, the Security Council met to discuss a draft resolution proposed by
the United Kingdom regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Russia opposed
the draft asserting that UN investigators must finish their investigation into claims of
chemical weapons use before discussing any resolution.
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Appendix D. U.S. Sanctions on Syria
Overview
At present, a variety of legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria
and restrict bilateral trade. Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is
therefore subject to a number of general U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State
Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in 1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006
Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued new executive orders that expanded U.S.
sanctions specifically on Syria.
•
The table below reviews sanctions introduced since early 2011 in response to
Syria’s uprising.
•
Syria-specific sanctions and general sanctions applicable to Syria are also
summarized below.
Background on U.S. Assistance to Syria and Restrictions
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s
designation as a country supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to
receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and 1981, the United States provided a total of
$627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in
economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a
brief warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded
with U.S. assistance included water supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health
and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to Syria since 1981, when the last aid
programs were closed out. In the event of regime change, the Obama Administration and
Congress would need to reevaluate any successor government’s policies with regard to support
for international terrorism in order to determine Syria’s potential eligibility for U.S. assistance.
Syria’s Economy and Sanctions
Reports indicate that the Syrian economy and national budget are suffering due to a steep drop in
oil exports resulting from sanctions; over a year of domestic unrest and the loss of tourism
revenues; and new social and military spending aimed at quelling public anger. Estimates vary on
the degree of contraction in 2011, ranging between 5% and 15%.6952 The Economist Intelligence
Unit predicted that the Syrian economy would contract by 8.1% in 2012.
Urban areas are now experiencing daily power outages and fuel shortages; inflation is rising; and
the value of the Syrian pound has plummeted, forcing the government to spend resources
propping it up. Foreign exchange reserves held by the Syrian Central Bank have reportedly fallen
considerably. With the loss of European export markets due to a European Union oil import ban,
Syria has been denied a major source of revenue and hard currency (25%-30% of total
government revenue or $4 billion a year).
6952
“Cracks Widen in Syrian Economy,” IPS, January 24, 2012.
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Before sanctions, the main buyers of approximately 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of exported
Syrian oil were Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, and Turkey. Prior to the
conflict, Syria produced about 380,000 bpd total.7053 Foreign oil companies that have suspended
operations in Syria include Tatneft (Russia), Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Total (France), Gulfsands
(UK), Suncor (Canada), and INA (Croatia). In March 2012, Syrian officials announced that the
Russian energy company Gazprom would take over INA’s oil and gas operations in Syria. The
operating status of two Chinese companies with investments in Syria, CNPC and Sinopec, is
unknown.7154 Western countries also have banned non-licensed investment in Syria’s oil and gas
sector, and energy traders and shipping firms also report changes to their engagement with Syria.
European sanctions do not ban the export of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to Syria, since it is
widely used by ordinary households for heating and cooking.
Since new sanctions were enacted, many analysts have speculated about whether new investors
and new foreign markets would arise for Syrian oil exports, albeit at lower prices due to sanctions
and increased shipping, insurance, and financing costs. Some experts believe that both India and
China are in a position to refine the heavy crude that Syria exports. However, others assert that
some Asian buyers would find the prospect of purchasing Syrian oil too risky or politically
problematic. Venezuela has supplied Syria with shipments of diesel fuel in exchange for Syrian
naphtha, a refined petroleum product. In 2012, Venezuelan Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez
referred to “a high level of cooperation with Syria, a besieged nation, whom the transnational
interests want to bring down.” Other reports have suggested that Russia and Iran export gasoil
and diesel to Syria.7255 Syrian officials have referenced negotiations for fuel import deals with
Russia, Iran, and Algeria.73
7056
53
Though oil production declined in 2011, natural gas production increased by 8% due to investment in gas
infrastructure made before unrest began.
7154
“Syria: Voting with their feet,” Economist Intelligence Unit—Business Middle East, January 16, 2012.
7255
“How Russia, Iran keep fuel flowing to Syria,” Reuters, April 26, 2012.
7356
“Syria, Russia Negotiating Long-Term Gas, Diesel Fuel Contracts,” ITAR-TASS World Service, May 25, 2012.
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Table D-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2013
(Implemented by Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC])
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
July 11,
2013
Jaysh al Sha’bi (Army of the People), Adib Mayaleh
(Governor of Central Bank of Syria).
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
June 12,
2013
OFAC issued regulatory guidance on a favorable
licensing policy regime through which U.S. persons
can request from OFAC specific authorization to
engage in transactions involving the
telecommunications and agricultural sectors of
Syria, as well as transactions related to petroleum
or petroleum products of Syrian origin for the
benefit of the National Coalition of Syrian
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces or its
supporters.
Syria General License 11A Issued
OFAC also issued Syria General License 11A
authorizing additional services in support of
nongovernmental organizations' activities to support
the preservation and protection of cultural heritage
sites in Syria. Syria General License 11A replaces
and supersedes Syria General License 11, dated
September 26, 2011.
May 16,
2013
May 16,
2013
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Najm Hamad al Ahmad, Minister of Justice, Fahd
Jassem al Freij, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and the Armed Forces and Minister of
Defense, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, Sa'ad AbdelSalam al Nayef, Minister of Health, and Adnan Abdo
al Sukhni, Minister of Industry.
Sanction or Related Activity Description
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
OFAC also added dozens of Syrian aircraft to its
SDN list.
April 18,
2013
Removed Nabil Rafik Al Kuzbari from the SDN list.
Syria Designation Removal
March 15,
2013
Authorizes U.S. persons to provide to the National
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces certain services, including transfers of funds,
otherwise prohibited by Executive Order 13582
Syria General License No. 16 Issued
December
11, 2012
Two senior leaders of the Syria-based Al Nusra
Front, Maysar Ali Musa Abdallah al-Juburi and Anas
Hasan Khattab, for acting on behalf of al-Qa'ida in
Iraq (AQI).
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List pursuant to Executive
Order 13224
December
11, 2012
Jaysh al-Sha'bi and Shabiha (two armed militia
groups that operate under the control of the Syrian
government) and two Shabiha commanders Ayman
Jaber and Mohammed Jaber
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List pursuant to Executive
Orders 13572 and 13582 variously
September
19, 2012
Amr Armanazi, director of Syria’s Scientific Studies
Research Center, Army Supply Bureau, involved in
missile procurement, and Belarus-based
Belvneshpromservice
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
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Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
September
14, 2012
Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, is
being designated pursuant to Executive Order
(E.O.) 13582, for providing support to the Syrian
government.
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List, pursuant to E.O.13582
August 14,
2012
Riyad Hijab, former Prime Minister
Post-defection removal from OFAC’s Specially
Designated Nationals (SDN) List
August 10,
2012
Hezbollah, SYTROL
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List, pursuant to E.O.13582
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Date
July 18,
2012
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
July 18,
2012
Omran Ahed Al-Zoubi, Minister of Information;
Subhi Ahmad Al-Abdullah, Minister of Agriculture
and Agrarian Reform; Safwan Al-Assaf, Minister of
Housing and Urban Development; Wael Nader AlHalqi, Minister of Health; Mohammad Al-Jleilati,
Minister of Finance; Hala Al Nasser, Minister of
Tourism; Mohammad Abdul-Sattar Al-Sayyed,
Minister of Religious Endowments; Yasser Al-Sibaei,
Minister of Public Works; Hazwan Al Wazz,
Minister of Education; Mansour Fadlallah Azzam,
Minister of Presidential Affairs; Nazira Farah Sarkis,
Minister of State for Environmental Affairs; Hussein
Mahmoud Farzat, Minister of State; Omar Ibrahim
Ghalawanji, Deputy Prime Minister for Services
Affairs; Radwan Habib, Minister of Justice; Ali
Haidar, Minister of State for National Reconciliation
Affairs; Bassam Hanna, Minister of Water
Resources; Riyad Hijab, Prime Minister; Mahmoud
Ibrahim Said, Minister of Transport; Qadri Jamil,
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs; Imad
Mohammad Deeb Khamis, Minister of Electricity;
Adib Mayaleh, Governor of Central Bank of Syria;
Jassim Mohammad Zakarya, Minister of Social
Affairs and Labor; Lubanah Mshaweh, Minister of
Culture; Said Mu’zi Hneidi, Minister of Oil and
Mineral Resources; Imad Abdul-Ghani Sabouni,
Minister of Communications and Technology; Fuad
Shukri Kurdi, Minister of Industry; Joseph Jurji
Sweid, Minister of State; Mohammad Yehya Moalla,
Minister of Higher Education; Mohammad Zafer
Mihbek, Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade
Sanction or Related Activity Description
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
Business Lab, Drex Technologies(Virgin Islands)a,
Handasieh, Industrial Solutions, Mechanical
Construction Factory, Syronics
May 30,
2012
Syria International Islamic Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
May 1, 2012
Foreign Persons/Foreign Entities that have violated,
attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or
caused a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran or
Syria, or that have facilitated deceptive transactions
for persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning
Syria or Iran.
Executive Order 13608—Authorizes the
Department of the Treasury to publicly identify
foreign individuals and entities that have violated
U.S. sanctions against Iran and Syria and
generally bars their access to U.S. financial and
commercial systems.
April 27,
2012
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Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
April 27,
2012
Sanction or Related Activity Description
OFAC issued General License 4A, which
authorizes the exports or re-exports to Syria of
items licensed or otherwise authorized by the
Department of Commerce and of exports and
reexports of certain services. General License
4A replaces and supersedes General License 4,
dated August 18, 2011.
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Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
April 23,
2012
Governments of Syria and Iran, Ali Mamluk
(Director of the Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate), Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate, Syriatel, Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security,
Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Datak Telecom
Executive Order 13606—Blocks the property
and suspends entry into the United States of
certain persons with respect to grave human
rights abuses by the governments of Iran and
Syria via information technology.
March 30,
2012
General Munir Adanov (Deputy Chief of General
Staff of the Syrian Army), General Dawood Rajiha
(Minister of Defense)
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
March 5,
2012
General Organization of Radio and TV
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
February 23,
2012
OFAC issued General License 15 related to
Syria to authorize transactions in connection
with patent, trademark, copyright, or other
intellectual property protection that would
otherwise be prohibited by Executive Order
13582.
February 16,
2012
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
December
1, 2011
Muhammad Makhluf, Military Housing Establishment,
Real Estate Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
October 3,
2011
OFAC issued two general licenses related to
Syria to authorize payments in connection with
overflight or emergency landing and transactions
with respect to telecommunications
September
27, 2011
OFAC issued a general license related to Syria
to authorize third-country diplomatic and
consular funds transfers and to authorize certain
services in support of nongovernmental
organizations’ activities.
September
9, 2011
OFAC issued four general licenses related to
Syria to authorize wind down transactions,
certain official activities of international
organizations, incidental transactions related to
U.S. persons residing in Syria and operation of
accounts.
August 30,
2011
Walid Mouallem (Foreign Minister), Ali Abdul Karim
Ali (Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon), Bouthaina
Shaaban (Advisor to the President)
Congressional Research Service
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
42
Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. Response
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
August 18,
2011
Government of Syria
Executive Order 13582—Freezes all assets of
the Government of Syria, prohibits U.S. persons
from engaging in any transaction involving the
Government of Syria, bans U.S. imports of
Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products,
prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings
in or related to Syria’s petroleum or petroleum
products, and prohibits U.S. persons from
operating or investing in Syria.
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Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
August 18,
2011
General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company
For Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian
Petroleum Company, Sytrol
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 10,
2011
Commercial Bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based
subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank,
Syriatel, the country’s main mobile phone operator
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 4,
2011
Muhammad Hamsho (businessman with ties to Asad
family), Hamsho International Group
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
June 29,
2011
Jamil Hassan (Head of Air Force Intelligence),
Political Security Directorate (PSD, domestic
intelligence)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
May 18,
2011
President Bashar al Asad, Farouk al Shara (vice
president), Adel Safar (prime minister), Mohammad
Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the interior), Ali Habib
Mahmoud (minister of defense), Abdul Fatah
Qudsiya (head of Syrian military intelligence),
Mohammed Dib Zaitoun (director of political
security directorate), Nabil Rafik al Kuzbari,
General Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corp Qods Force suspected
of human rights abuses in Syria), Al Mashreq
Investment Fund, Bena Properties, Cham Holding,
Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Syrian Military
Intelligence, Syrian National Security Bureau
Executive Order 13573 adds listed individuals
and entities to OFAC’s SDN List
April 29,
2011
Maher al Asad, Ali Mamluk (director of the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate GID), Atif Najib
(former head of the Syrian Political Security
Directorate for Dara'a province and the president’s
cousin). the General Intelligence Directorate, and
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds
Force (for allegedly assisting Syria in its crackdown)
Executive Order 13572 adds listed individuals
and entities to OFAC’s SDN List
Source: U.S. Treasury Department.
Notes: As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such
as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such
individuals and companies are called Specially Designated Nationals or SDNs. Their assets are blocked and U.S.
persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.
a.
According to the Treasury Department, Drex Technologies, “belongs to Assad’s billionaire cousin and
government insider, Rami Makhluf, who was designated by the Treasury Department in February 2008
under E.O. 13460 for improperly benefiting from and aiding the public corruption of Syrian regime officials.
Drex Technologies was designated pursuant to E.O. 13572, which authorizes the United States to sanction
any entities owned or controlled by persons designated under E.O. 13460.”
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Specific Sanctions Against Syria
Specific U.S. sanctions levied against Syria fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions resulting
from the passage of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that,
among other things, prohibit most U.S. exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed by executive order
from the President that specifically deny certain Syrian citizens and entities access to the U.S.
financial system due to their participation in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden; or destabilizing activities in Iraq and
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Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from the USA PATRIOT Act levied specifically against the
Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006.
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act into law, as P.L. 108-175. This law requires the President to impose
penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased
supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq (§§5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans on the
export of military items (already banned under other legislation, see above)7457 and of dual use
items (items with both civil and military applications) to Syria (§5(a)(1)). In addition, the
President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
•
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
•
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
•
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
•
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
•
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
•
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (§5(a)(2)).
Implementation
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions of
P.L. 108-175, including the bans on munitions and dual use items (§5(a)(1)) and two sanctions
from the menu of six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban on
exports to Syria other than food and medicine (§5(a)(2)(A)) and the ban on Syrian aircraft landing
in or overflying the United States (§5(a)(2)(D)). In issuing his executive order, the President
stated that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete steps to address the concerns that led to
the enactment of the Syria Accountability Act. The President also imposed two additional
sanctions based on other legislation.
•
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.
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57
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
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correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.U.S. and International Response
Waivers
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver
authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to
issue the following waivers on grounds of national security.
Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products in
support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of
potential dual use; aircraft parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information; certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a temporary
nature.7558
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of
Syrian aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an
emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
On June 12, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry cited Section 5(b) in order to authorize:
the export and re-export, subject to case-by-case review, of certain U.S.-origin items to
liberated areas of Syria for the benefit of the Syrian people. The waiver will authorize the
Department of Commerce to process license applications for export and re-exports of
commodities, software, and technology, including but not limited to those related to water
supply and sanitation; agricultural production and food processing; power generation; oil and
gas production; construction and engineering; transportation; and educational infrastructure.
These items are intended to help address the critical needs of the Syrian people and facilitate
reconstruction in liberated areas.
Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.7659 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
75
58
According to U.S. regulations, any product that contains more than 10% de minimis U.S.-origin content, regardless
of where it is made, is not allowed to be exported to Syria. For U.S. commercial licensing prohibitions on exports and
re-exports to Syria, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 Supp No. 1. The Department of Commerce reviews license applications on a
case-by-case basis for exports or re-exports to Syria under a general policy of denial. For a description of items that do
not require export licenses, see Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce, Implementation
of the Syria Accountability Act, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
7659
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/
13338.pdf.
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continued...)
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authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.7760
The following individuals and entities have been targeted by the U.S. Treasury Department
(Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC):
•
On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior Syrian
officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then-interior minister and its head
of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively, the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any assets
they may have in the United States and banning any U.S. persons, including U.S.
financial institutions outside of the United States, from conducting transactions
with them.7861 Kanaan allegedly committed suicide in October 2005, though some
have speculated that he may have been murdered.
•
On January 18, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department took the same actions
against the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military
intelligence.
•
On April 26, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13399 that authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the U.S.-based assets of anyone found to
be involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also affects anyone involved in bombings or
assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004, or anyone hindering the
international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The order allows the
United States to comply with UNSCR 1636, which calls on all states to freeze the
assets of those persons designated by the investigating commission or the
government of Lebanon to be involved in the Hariri assassination.
•
On August 15, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for allegedly contributing
to Syria’s support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and
Brigadier General Jama’a Jama’a, for allegedly playing a central part in Syria’s
intelligence operations in Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.7962
•
On January 4, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three Syrian
entities, the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the
Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory, as
weapons proliferators under an executive order (E.O. 13382) based on the
authority vested to the President under IEEPA. The three state-sponsored
institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.80
77
(...continued)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/
13338.pdf.
60
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
61
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2617.aspx.
7962
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp60.aspx.
80
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp216.aspx.
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institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.63
U.S. and International Response
•
On August 1, 2007, the President issued E.O. 13441811344164 blocking the property of
persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and
institutions. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
four individuals reportedly affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert
Syrian control over the Lebanese political system, including Assaad Halim
Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab, and Hafiz Makhluf (under the authority of E.O. 13441)
and Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik (under the authority of E.O. 13338).8265
•
On February 13, 2008, President Bush issued another order (E.O.13460) blocking
the property of senior Syrian officials. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the order “targets individuals and entities determined to be
responsible for or who have benefitted from the public corruption of senior
officials of the Syrian regime.” The order also revises a provision in Executive
Order 13338 to block the property of Syrian officials who have undermined U.S.
and international efforts to stabilize Iraq.8366 One week later, under the authority of
E.O. 13460, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets and restricted the
financial transactions of Rami Makhluf, a powerful cousin of President Bashar al
Asad.
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria
As previously mentioned, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush instructed
the Treasury Department in 2004 to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering
concerns. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued a final ruling that imposes a special measure
against the Commercial Bank of Syria as a financial institution of primary money laundering
concern. It bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent
account with the Commercial Bank of Syria, and it also requires banks to conduct due diligence
that ensures the Commercial Bank of Syria is not circumventing sanctions through its business
dealings with them.84
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329).
Section 303 of this act (90 Stat. 753-754) required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
8167
63
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp216.aspx.
On July 29, 2010, President Obama extended that National Emergency with respect to Lebanon for another year,
stating that “While there have been some recent positive developments in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah that include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems serve to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in Lebanon, and continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” See Notice of July 29, 2010—
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Actions of Certain Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty
of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions, Federal Register, Title 3—The President, p. 45045.
8265
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp666.aspx.
8366
A previous executive order, E.O. 13315, blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and members of
his former regime. On June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian company, SES
International Corp., and two of its officials under the authority of E.O.13315.
8467
See “U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria.” Available at http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctionssyr.html.
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General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329).
Section 303 of this act (90 Stat. 753-754) required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
U.S. and International Response
Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A (22 USC 2371). (Syria was not affected by this ban until
1979, as explained below.)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (Title II of P.L. 95-223, codified at
50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.) Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the
President has broad powers pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a
threat “which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” These powers include the ability to
seize foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction, to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, to
prohibit payments between financial institutions involving foreign currency, and to prohibit the
import or export of foreign currency.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72). Section 6(i) of this act (93 Stat. 515)
required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress before
licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries determined to
have supported acts of international terrorism. (Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 relettered
Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list. This list is
prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support for
acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first prepared in
1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2009, issued on August 5, 2010. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the
above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399). Section 509(a) of this
act (100 Stat. 853) amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit export of
items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of international terrorism,
thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the AntiTerrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989—see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans
obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-509). Section 8041(a) of this act (100 Stat.
1962) amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on income or war
profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism.
(26 USC 901(j)). The President was given authority to waive this provision under Section 601 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200, May 18, 2000).
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-222). Section 4
amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional notification and
licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries
on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their
ability to support terrorism.
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Section 4 also prescribes conditions for removing a country from the terrorism list: prior
notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen of
two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite notification, the
President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no
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longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45
days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list).
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 (Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY1994-1995). Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver
has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other
prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). This act requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (§325) or lethal military
equipment (§326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President to waive this
provision on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to third countries that
sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens or
resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the terrorism
list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in consultation
with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such
transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.”
(31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996,
the then chairman of the House International Relations Committee reportedly protested to then
President Clinton about the Treasury Department’s implementing regulation, which he described
as a “special loophole” for Syria.
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign assistance
appropriations legislation enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S. aid.
The most recent ban appears in Section 7007 of P.L. 112-74, Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012, which states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to
titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance
or reparations for the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria: Provided, That for
purposes of this section, the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include direct loans,
credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents.”
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by Section 431 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United
States to withhold a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for
programs that benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178, was amended by P.L. 109-112 to make its
provisions applicable to Syria as well as Iran. The amended act, known as the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act, requires the President to submit semi-annual reports to designated
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congressional committees, identifying any persons involved in arms transfers to or from Iran or
Syria; also, the act authorizes the President to impose various sanctions against such individuals.
On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed P.L. 109-353 which expanded the scope of the
original law by adding North Korea to its provisions, thereby renaming the law the Iran, North
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Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (or INKSNA for short). The list of Syrian entities
designated under INKSNA includes Army Supply Bureau (2008), Syrian Navy (2009), Syrian Air
Force (2009), and Ministry of Defense (2008).8568 On May 24, 2011, the State Department
designated the Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center
(SSRC) under INKSNA.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
8568
See State Department Press Releases and Documents, “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act:
Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
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