Order Code RL33487
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
June 22Updated July 27, 2006
Alfred B. Prados
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Summary
Syria, governed by President Hafiz al-Asad from 1970 until his death in June
2000, is a prominent player in the Middle East scene. Within the region, a number
of border disputes, problems of resource allocation, and political rivalries have
caused frequent tensions between Syria and its neighbors. In particular, disposition
of the Syrian Golan Heights territory, which Israel has occupied since 1967, has been
one of the most intractable issues in the Arab-Israeli dispute. This report supercedes
Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues, and will be updated
as significant developments occur.
An array of bilateral issues continue to affect relations between the United
States and Syria: the course of Arab-Israeli talks; questions of arms proliferation;
Syrian connections with terrorist activity; Syria’s role in Lebanon; and Syria’s
opposition to the U.S. occupation in Iraq. A variety of U.S. legislative provisions and
executive directives prohibit direct aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade relations
between the two countries, due largely to Syria’s designation by the U.S. State
Department as a sponsor of international terrorism. Syria has reportedly cooperated
with the United States in investigating Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks but has been unwilling to sever
connections with some other terrorist organizations. Also, after Operation Iraqi
Freedom began in March 2003, senior U.S. officials warned Syria to stop permitting
transit of military supplies and volunteer fighters through Syria to Iraq. Syria has
denied these allegations, and cited measures it has taken to tighten its borders.
The assassination on February 14, 2005, of former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri, who had become a vocal critic of Syria’s military force presence in
Lebanon, drew widespread suspicions of Syrian involvement among some Lebanese
and within the international community. The initial report of a U.N. Commission on
October 19, 2005, stated “there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and
Syrian involvement” in the Hariri assassination. Investigation by the Commission
continues. Meanwhile, under increasing domestic and international pressure, Syria
withdrew its forces from Lebanon in April 2005 in accordance with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1559.
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed the Syria Accountability Act,
H.R. 1828, as P.L. 108-175. This act imposes additional sanctions against Syria
unless it halts support for terrorism, withdraws troops from Lebanon, ends its
occupation of Lebanon, ceases development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
and ceases support for terrorist activity in Iraq. Subsequently, on May 11, 2004, the
President issued Executive Order 13338 to implement the provisions of this law, and
on May 5, 2005, he extended the order for another year.
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2006, signed by the President
as P.L. 109-102, on November 14, 2005, repeats previous bans on U.S. aid to Syria
but contains a provision authorizing at least $6,550,000 for programs to support
democracy in Syria and Iran. The aid ban appears again in the House version of the
Foreign Operations Appropriation Act, FY2007 (H.R. 5522).
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Syrian Role in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Resolution 1559 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Assassination of Hariri and Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Mehlis Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Further Investigations and Revelations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Withdrawals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Recent Activity Involving the U.N. Security Council:
Resolution 1680 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Relations with Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Trade and Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Infiltrators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Accusations of Syrian Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Arms Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chemical and Biological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Advanced Conventional Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Possible Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Terrorist Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
U.S. Aid and Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Specific Sanctions Against Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Recent Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Foreign Operations Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Syria Accountability Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Most Recent Developments
On June 15, 2006, the Security Council extended the mandate of the
independent commission investigating the assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri for an additional year, until June 14, 2007.
On May 17, 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1680 as a
follow-up to a previous resolution (1559) that had called for withdrawal of Syrian
troops from Lebanon and for disarming militias in Lebanon. Resolution 1680 noted
that some provisions of 1559 had been carried out but others had not, notably the
disarming of militias. The new resolution calls on Syria to prevent movement of
arms into Lebanon, “strongly encourages” Syria to respond positively to a Lebanese
request to delineate their common border and establish full diplomatic relations, and
calls for the disbanding of all militias inside Lebanon. Syrian officials rejected the
resolution, as “an unjustifiable pressure tool and aggravation that complicates matters
rather than solving them.”
Overview
The death of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000 after a 30-year
presidency removed a key figure in the affairs of Syria and the region. His son and
successor President Bashar al-Asad does not yet appear to have acquired the
uncontested power that his father exercised. Although U.S.-Syrian relations improved
somewhat in the 1990s, further strains appeared after the breakdown in Syrian-Israeli
negotiations in 2000, Syria’s opposition to a U.S. military campaign in Iraq, and
disagreements over Syria’s former role in Lebanon. Members of Congress have
periodically introduced legislation to tighten U.S. sanctions against Syria or to
condition relaxation of existing restrictions on further changes in Syrian policy.
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Syrian-Israeli negotiations remain deadlocked over Syria’s demand that Israel
withdraw unconditionally from the Golan Heights, a 450-square mile portion of
southwestern Syria that Israel occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The late
President Hafiz al-Asad said he accepted the principle of “full withdrawal for full
peace” and would establish peaceful, normal relations with Israel in return for
Israeli’s withdrawal from Golan. Israeli leaders either reject withdrawal or accept
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partial withdrawal. The two sides also disagree on what would constitute full
withdrawal because of slightly differing boundary lines defined in the past. Both
sides have suggested a resumption of talks; however, Israel believes talks should
begin without pre-conditions, while Syria has insisted that talks resume where the
most recent U.S.-sponsored discussions left off in 2000. For more information, see
CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz.
Syrian Role in Lebanon
Syria deployed forces to Lebanon in 1976 during the Lebanese civil war of
1975-1990, ostensibly under an Arab League peacekeeping mandate. An Arab
League sponsored agreement reached at Taif, Saudi Arabia in 1989 provided, among
other things, for the redeployment of Syrian troops to eastern Lebanon within two
years followed by further anticipated withdrawals; however, these terms were not
fully implemented. Although Syrian troop strength in Lebanon reportedly declined
from 35,000-40,000 in the late 1970s to approximately 14,000 by early 2005, Syria
continued to exercise controlling influence over Lebanon’s domestic politics and
regional policies. Though supported by some Lebanese including many Shi’ite
Muslims, the Syrian presence was resented by much of the Christian community and
increasingly by the Druze and Sunni Muslim communities as well. Also at issue is
Syrian support for the Shi’ite Muslim militia Hizballah, which has continued to
launch attacks against Israeli troops in the Lebanese border area and in a small
disputed adjacent enclave known as the Shib’a Farms.
Resolution 1559. On September 3, 2004, apparently under pressure from
Syria, the Lebanese parliament adopted an amendment extending Lebanese President
Emile Lahoud’s six-year term by an additional three years. Many Lebanese,
especially from the Christian and Druze religious communities, opposed this step,
which drew criticism from western countries as well. On the day before the
parliamentary vote, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, sponsored
by the United States and France, calling for “a free and fair electoral process in
Lebanon’s upcoming presidential election ... without foreign interference” and calling
upon “all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.” Syria’s U.N.
ambassador maintained that “Syria is not a foreign force in Lebanon, it is there at the
request of the Lebanese government,”1 while Lebanon’s pro-Syrian government
described the resolution as interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon.2
Assassination of Hariri and Aftermath. On February 14, 2005, a powerful
car bomb exploded in Beirut’s hotel district, killing former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri. An opponent of the Syrian-backed extension of President Lahoud’s
term, Hariri had resigned on October 20, 2004 and subsequently joined an opposition
1
U.S. officials and other observers have stated that Syria did in fact enter Lebanon in 1976
at the request of the Lebanese Christian leadership, including then President Suleiman
Frangieh, to forestall a takeover of Lebanon by Palestinian and radical Muslim militia. See,
for example, Yair Efron, War and Intervention in Lebanon, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987, p. 52.
2
On two previous occasions, in 1948 and in 1995, terms of Lebanese presidents have been
extended.
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group calling for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.3 Many Lebanese
opposition groups demonstrated against Syria and the pro-Syrian Lebanese
government, charging its leaders with responsibility for Hariri’s death. Syrian and
Lebanese officials denied involvement and condemned the bombing. Although U.S.
officials said the identity of the perpetrators had not yet been determined, State
Department officials expressed outrage to the Syrian government and on February 15,
2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recalled the U.S. Ambassador to Syria for
urgent consultations. On February 23, President Bush said Syria must pull both its
military forces and its intelligence personnel out of Lebanon.
Investigations. A statement by the President of the U.N. Security Council on
February 25, although it did not mention Syria by name, condemned the assassination
and requested the Secretary General “to report urgently on the circumstances, causes
and consequences of this terrorist act.” In accordance with this request, a U.N. factfinding team visited Lebanon and concluded that “the Lebanese investigation process
suffers from serious flaws and has neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach
a satisfactory and credible conclusion.” Accordingly, on April 7, the U.N. Security
Council adopted Resolution 1595, under which the council decided to”establish an
international independent investigation Commission (“the Commission”) based in
Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this
terrorist act, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and
accomplices.” The resolution requested the Commission to complete its work within
three months from the date it commences operations, authorized the Secretary
General to extend the Commission’s mandate for another period of up to three
months, and requested an oral update every two months while the Commission is
functioning. The U.N. Secretary General informed members of the Security Council
that the Commission, headed by veteran German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, was fully
operational as of June 16, 2005. On September 8, 2005, the Commission requested
a 40-day extension to complete its work.
The Mehlis Report. Tensions mounted as reports circulated that Syrian and
Lebanese officials would be implicated in the findings of the Mehlis Commission.
After encountering initial resistance from Syria, members of the commission visited
Damascus from September 20-23. There they interviewed senior Syrian military and
security officials including the last two Syrian chiefs of intelligence in Lebanon, who
were widely regarded as the effective viceroys of Lebanon during their respective
tenures: Generals Rustom Ghazali and Ghazi Kanaan. Kanaan, who was reassigned
to Syria in 2002 and appointed minister of the interior, apparently committed suicide
in October 2005. Some observers speculate that Kanaan was killed or forced to
commit suicide by Syrian authorities because of what he might reveal — or might
already have revealed — about Syrian involvement in the Hariri assassination or that
he chose to take his own life because he feared that he would become the scapegoat
3
While still prime minister, Hariri had reluctantly voted for the extension of Lahoud’s term
after a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad in late August 2004. According to a
Paris-based newsletter, Intelligence Online, at the meeting Asad used threatening language
that Hariri surreptitiously captured with a “recording pen” and subsequently passed to the
presidents of the United States, France, and Pakistan. Therese Sfeir, “Kuwaiti Paper Claims
Syria Ready to Cut Deal with France over Hariri Investigation,” The Daily Star — Beirut,
Sept. 19, 2005.
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for Syrian actions in Lebanon. Kanaan is not mentioned in the Commission’s report
of October 19 (see below).
The 54-page Mehlis report, submitted to the U.N. Security Council on October
19, did not result in a conclusive finding of culpability. The report did state that
“there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in
this terrorist act.” The report notes a pervasive presence of Syrian military
intelligence in Lebanon at the time, and adds that “[G]iven the infiltration of
Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services
working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a
complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.”
An earlier unpublished version of the Mehlis report is said to have listed the names
of five of the senior officers, including President Asad’s brother, Maher al-Asad, and
the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military intelligence and
widely considered the second most powerful official in the regime. The Commission
also stated that the investigation is not complete and more leads need to be followed.
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan extended the Commission’s mandate until
December 15.
On October 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1636, which requires Syria to cooperate “fully and unconditionally” with
the Mehlis investigation into the assassination of the late Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri or face unspecified “further action.” By dropping a threat of specific
economic sanctions that appeared in earlier drafts, the sponsors of the resolution were
able to attract support from Russia and China while leaving the door open to the
imposition of sanctions at a later date. U.S. officials noted that the resolution was
adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which gives the Council power to
impose penalties, including use of military force.4 After temporizing, Syria acceded
to a request by the Mehlis Commission to make five Syrian officials available for
questioning by the commission at U.N. offices in Vienna, Austria. The Syrians,
whose names were not announced, were reportedly intelligence and security officials,
including former Syrian intelligence chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazali; meetings
took place between December 5 and 7. In the meantime, a former key witness in the
Mehlis report and self-described Syrian intelligence agent — Hussam Tahir Hussam
— recanted his testimony on November 28 on Syrian television, saying that
Lebanese officials had forced him to implicate Syria under a combination of duress
and bribery. Lebanese officials have rejected the revised statement, and Mehlis
expressed doubts about the witness’s veracity.
On December 12, 2005, the Mehlis commission submitted a follow-on report,
which states that “[t]he Commission’s conclusions set out in its previous report ...
remain valid.” According to the follow-on report, the Commission interviewed
additional witnesses (for a total of 500 as of December 12), identified 19 suspects
(reportedly including the five Syrian officers interviewed in Vienna), and reviewed
additional documentation. Statements by two of the suspects indicated that all Syrian
intelligence documents concerning Lebanon had been burned. Also, the head of a
4
Warren Hoge, “U.N. Tells Syria to Stop Impeding Slaying Inquiry,” New York Times, Nov.
1, 2005.
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separate Syrian investigative commission informed the Mehlis Commission that no
material regarding the Hariri assassination had been found in Syrian archives. The
Mehlis follow-on report further expresses the view that Hussam, the witness who
recanted his statement, “is being manipulated by the Syrian authorities.” The report
stated that “[t]he detailed information [from the additional statements and documents
reviewed by the commission] points directly at perpetrators, sponsors and organizers
of an organized operation aiming at killing Mr. Hariri, including the recruitment of
special agents by the Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services.” On December 15,
the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1644, which extended the mandate of
the Independent Commission by another six months until June 15, 2006, as
recommended by the Commission’s report. In January 2006, Mehlis resigned in
order to return to his position in Germany and was succeeded by Serge Brammertz,
a Belgian prosecutor serving with the International Criminal Court.
Further Investigations and Revelations. On March 14, 2006, Brammertz
released his first progress report to the U.N. Security Council. The report
emphasized technical aspects of the investigation and did not contain specific
accusations. Syrian spokesmen put a positive interpretation on the Brammertz report,
describing it as “realistic” and having “a lot of professionalism” (Dow Jones & Co.,
Inc., March 15, 2006). Early in 2006, the Commission met with several Syrian
officials, including newly appointed foreign minister Walid al-Mouallem, who told
a Lebanese TV station on March 5 that “[w]e will cooperate with this commission.”
President Asad, who had temporized for several months over the Commission’s
demand to interview him, agreed to meet Brammertz pursuant to an understanding
that will give the Commission access to individuals, sites, and information, including
the head of state (Paragraphs 91-95 of the Brammertz report). Subsequently, news
media reported that Brammertz met with the Syrian President and Vice President in
Damascus on April 23; however, the news reports did not give details on the course
of the meetings.
Brammertz released his second progress report to the U.N. Security Council on
June 14, 2006. Like its predecessor, the June 14 report did not name suspects;
however, it described the crime as “a targeted assassination.” Brammertz said the
level of assistance provided by Syria to the Commission during the reporting period
“has generally been satisfactory,” with that country responding to all requests in a
timely manner. Brammertz welcomed and endorsed the request of the Lebanese
government for a one-year extension of the Commission’s mandate. On the
following day, June 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1686,
which extended the Commission’s mandate until June 14, 2007 and supported the
extension of the Commission’s mandate to offer further technical assistance to
Lebanese investigation of other possibly related assassinations during the last two
years.
Meanwhile, in an interview in Paris broadcast on December 30 by UAE-based
news channel al-Arabiya TV, former Syrian Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam
made serious accusations against the Syrian regime, recounting threats voiced by
Asad in a conversation with Hariri to “crush whoever acts against our decision” [to
extend Lebanese President Lahoud’s term of office]. Khaddam, a former pillar of the
Syrian regime who resigned his post as Vice President in June 2005 after serving in
that position for 22 years, expressed the view that no security apparatus in Syria
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could make a unilateral decision to conduct an assassination. Syria’s ruling Ba’th
Party voted to expel Khaddam after his al-Arabiya interview, members of Syria’s
loyalist parliament called for Khaddam to be tried for treason, and the Syrian
government reportedly froze Khaddam’s assets. Khaddam further stated that he is
forming a government in exile, but response has been cool, even from anti-Syrian
Lebanese factions and from Syria’s small opposition groups. Khaddam’s defection
helped precipitate a government reshuffle in which former Foreign Minister Farouq
al-Shar’a, generally regarded as a hard liner, became Vice President and was replaced
by Mouallem in his previous position as foreign minister. A leading Beirut
newspaper interpreted the reshuffle as reflecting determination on Asad’s part to
resist international pressures, although the new foreign minister is described as a
moderate.
Withdrawals. After mounting pressures from the United States and key
members of the international community (including France, Germany, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt) and at the urging of U.N. officials, President Asad gradually
began to withdraw his forces. On April 26, 2005, the Syrian foreign minister
informed the U.N. Secretary General and the President of the Security Council that
Syrian forces “have fully withdrawn all their military and security apparatus and
assets to their positions in Syria on April 26, 2005....” In his first semi-annual report
on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, dated April 26, the
Secretary General said he had been unable to confirm the withdrawal and had
dispatched a U.N. mission to verify whether there had been a full and complete
Syrian withdrawal. The Secretary General told reporters on May 23 the team had
verified Syria’s withdrawal of military forces from Lebanon except for one town in
dispute, but could not conclude with certainty that all Syrian intelligence personnel
had left. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Syria must also remove its
intelligence forces. On June 10, following accusations of Syrian involvement in the
murder of prominent anti-Syrian Lebanese personalities, the Secretary General
announced that he was sending the verification team back to Lebanon to see if Syrian
intelligence agents were still in the country.
The team returned on July 11 and subsequently submitted a report to Annan.
In his second semi-annual report on implementation of Resolution 1559, submitted
on October 26, 2005, Annan reported that “[o]verall, the team corroborated its earlier
conclusion that there was no remaining visible or significant Syrian intelligence
presence or activity in Lebanon, though the distinctly close historical and other ties
between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon also had to be taken into account
when assessing a possibly ongoing influence of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon.”
According to the Secretary General, the team acknowledged some credible reports
that Syrian intelligence continued to influence events in Lebanon but that most of
these reports were exaggerated. The Secretary General noted that other requirements
of Resolution 1559 remained to be implemented, particularly disbanding and
disarming Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia (notably Hizballah and several
Palestinian groups) and extension of Lebanese government control throughout all of
the country.5 The third semi-annual report, submitted to the Security Council on
April 19, 2006, came to largely similar conclusions.
5
Text of report is attached to U.N. Security Council document S/2005/673, Oct. 26, 2005.
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Although Syrian forces had departed Lebanon before the Lebanese
parliamentary elections in late May and June, 2005, some observers think Syrian
officials may be trying to circumvent the effect of the withdrawal by maintaining
their influence through contacts they have acquired over the years in the Lebanese
bureaucracy and security services.6 While anti-Syrian candidates secured a
comfortable majority (72 out of 128) in the new parliament, the strong showing by
a largely Shi’ite Muslim bloc in southern Lebanon resulted in the reelection of a proSyrian parliamentary speaker (a Shi’ite post under Lebanon’s unique system), while
the pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud remains in office. Other commentators have
expressed concern that Syria’s withdrawal could leave a security gap in Lebanon,
lead Asad to reinforce his power base by more repressive domestic policies (as he has
reportedly been doing since late 2005), or weaken Asad’s position, possibly leaving
the country vulnerable to some type of Islamist rule.
Recent Activity Involving the U.N. Security Council: Resolution
1680. As concerns continued over a possible Syrian “shadow” presence in Lebanon,
sentiment began to build among some members of the Security Council to consider
further follow-up action. Speaking to reporters on April 26, 2006, U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N. John Bolton suggested that another Security Council resolution might be
appropriate as a means of “highlighting the areas of deficiency in Syria’s
performance under 1559 and possibly under 1595 as well” to show the Council’s
“continuing resolve” on the question of Lebanon. After further consultation among
U.S., British, and French representatives, on May 17, 2006 the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1680 by a vote of 13 to 0. Russia and China, which had favored
a Security Council presidential statement rather than another resolution, abstained.
The resolution noted progress in implementing provisions of Resolution 1559 but
noted with regret that some provisions of Resolution 1559 have not yet been met.
The resolution calls on Syria to prevent movement of arms into Lebanon, “strongly
encourages” Syria to respond positively to the request by Lebanon to delineate their
common border and establish full diplomatic relations, and calls for disbanding all
militias inside Lebanon. Resolution 1680 does not mention Iran by name; however,
the resolution “welcomes” the third semi-annual report of the U.N. Secretary General
(Resolution 1559), which in turn speaks of the “necessary cooperation of all other
relevant parties, including the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of
Iran.” Ambassador Bolton stated that “that reference makes it unambiguously clear
that Iran is referred to” by Resolution 1680.7
Syrian officials and supporters rejected the resolution. Syria’s Foreign Ministry
issued a statement saying that it “constitutes an unjustifiable pressure tool and
aggravation that complicates matters rather than solving them.” A pro-Syrian
Lebanese political party described Resolution 1680 as “a dangerous precedent that
6
Robin Wright, “Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, Mar. 31,
2005.
7
Warren Hoge, “U.N. Council Urges Syria to Set Ties With Lebanon,” The New York
Times, May 18, 2006.
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violates sovereignty of countries.”8 Russia’s U.N. Ambassador said he disagreed
with using the Security Council as a medium for Syrian-Lebanese discussion, while
the Chinese Deputy Ambassador said China does not believe the Security Council
should get involved in bilateral issues., which imposed additional economic sanctions against
Syria. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2006, signed by the President
as P.L. 109-102, on November 14, 2005, repeats previous bans on U.S. aid to Syria
but contains a provision authorizing at least $6,550,000 for programs to support
democracy in Syria and Iran. The aid ban appears again in the House version of the
Foreign Operations Appropriation Act, FY2007 (H.R. 5522).
Since the outbreak of fighting between Israeli military forces and the militant
Lebanese Shi’ite Hezbollah organization on July 12, 2006, U.S. officials have
increased their criticism of Syria’s political and logistical support for Hezbollah.
U.S. officials and Members of Congress have blamed Syria for acting as a conduit
for the transfer of rockets and other arms to Hezballah units, thereby enabling
Hezbollah units to engage in military action against Israeli targets. On July 22,
President Bush commented that “[f]or many years, Syria has been a primary sponsor
of Hezbollah and it has helped provide Hezbollah with shipments of Iranian-made
weapons.” This report supersedes Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Relations and
Bilateral Issues, and will be updated as significant developments occur.
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Syria and Its Role in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Policy Toward Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Relations with Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Trade and Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Infiltrators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Accusations of Syrian Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Arms Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chemical and Biological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Advanced Conventional Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Possible Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Terrorist Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Aid and Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Specific Sanctions Against Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Recent Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Foreign Operations Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Syria Accountability Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Most Recent Developments
Since the outbreak of fighting between Israeli military forces and the militant
Lebanese Shi’ite Hezbollah organization on July 12, 2006, U.S. officials have
increased their criticism of Syria’s political and logistical support for Hezbollah. On
July 22, President Bush commented that “[f]or many years, Syria has been a primary
sponsor of Hezbollah and it has helped provide Hezbollah with shipments of Iranianmade weapons.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, speaking to reporters on July
26, rejected comments that the United States and Syria lack diplomatic channels for
communication, pointing out that there are existing diplomatic channels that can be
used when Syrian leaders are ready to talk. A Syrian official, however, said “Syria
is not going to help while it is being isolated and President Bush is attacking Syria
all the time.” She was quoted by Reuters News Wire on July 26 as saying that Syria
should not be allowed to return to Lebanon and influence events there, and neither
should Iran. Also, on July 26, Secretary Rice warned Syria and Iran not to “torpedo”
any attempts to stop the fighting between Hezbollah and Israeli forces and expressed
the hope that the two countries would “behave responsibly.” Meanwhile, news
reports indicated that Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah met with Syrian
President Bashar al-Asad on July 27, possibly to discuss resupply of Hezbollah.
Overview
The death of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000 after a 30-year
presidency removed a key figure in the affairs of Syria and the region. His son and
successor President Bashar al-Asad does not yet appear to have acquired the
uncontested power that his father exercised. Although U.S.-Syrian relations improved
somewhat in the 1990s, further strains appeared after the breakdown in Syrian-Israeli
negotiations in 2000, Syria’s opposition to a U.S. military campaign in Iraq, and
disagreements over Syria’s former role in Lebanon. Members of Congress have
periodically introduced legislation to tighten U.S. sanctions against Syria or to
condition relaxation of existing restrictions on further changes in Syrian policy. At
present, a number of issues continue to divide the two countries.
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues
Syria and Its Role in Lebanon
Syria has emerged as a key, if indirect, actor in the current crisis, primarily
though its role as a source and conduit for the delivery of rockets and other mainly
CRS-2
Iranian weaponry to Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon; some believe Syria is
shipping weapons from its own inventories to Hezbollah as well. The Lebanese civil
war of 1975-1990 gave Syria an opportunity for the first time to station troops in
Lebanon, ostensibly as part of an Arab League peacekeeping force. Despite a
provision in a 1989 accord (known as the Ta’if Agreement) calling for redeployment
of Syrian forces within two years, these forces remained in Lebanon, albeit at
somewhat reduced levels, until forced to withdraw in April 2005 by international
pressure and by a popular outcry in Lebanon over alleged Syrian complicity in the
murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.1 At the time, many
observers interpreted the Syrian withdrawal and subsequent election of an anti-Syrian
majority in the Lebanese parliament as a major setback for Syria’s ambitions in the
region, and some even predicted that the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Asad
might have been seriously weakened in backing down under external pressure. In
fact, however, Syria retained some assets in Lebanon, particularly the militant Shiite
Muslim organization Hezbollah, which refused to relinquish its arms and continued
to support Syria’s agenda by periodically attacking Israeli military positions near the
Israeli-Lebanese border.
Many commentators believe Syria’s re-supply activity on behalf of Hezbollah
was an important factor in encouraging Hezbollah leaders to initiate large-scale
border and rocket attacks against Israel on July 12. In doing so, Syria achieves two
goals. First, Syria’s actions help forestall any move by the small Lebanese army to
replace Hezbollah units near the Israeli-Lebanese border, thus helping ensure that
Lebanon will be unable to make an independent peace with Israel without Syrian
participation. Second, Syria’s policy strengthens the view in some Lebanese circles
that the departure of Syrian troops has led to stalemate and ultimately to nation-wide
devastation. At the same time, the current situation complicates any effort by the
United States to effect a “regime behavior change” in Syria along the lines of Libya
and increases the possibility that the United States, after shunning Syria for several
years, may have to deal with Damascus at some point in an effort to contain
escalating violence. Observers have noted that “Syria appears anxious to reassert its
claim as a crucial guarantor of stability in the Middle East.” So far, by employing
Hezbollah as a proxy against Israel, Syrian policy has appears to have reaped benefits
without incurring any retaliatory attacks on Syrian territory. Some observers have
suggested, however, that Syria’s leadership is playing a dangerous game that could
lead to reprisals against Syria itself.2
Syrian support for Hezbollah is facilitated by long-standing ties between Syria
and Iran, which helped create Hezbollah in the 1980s. This association has long
troubled U.S. policy makers, who see the two countries as reinforcing each other in
supporting terrorism and interfering in Lebanon. According to news stories,
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah visited Syrian President Bashar al-Asad
on July 27, reportedly to discuss resupply of Hezbollah units. The reports did quote
1
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was one of the terms of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1559. For more information, see CRS Report RL33509, Lebanon, by Alfred B.
Prados.
2
Kim Murphy, “Crisis May Put Syria Back In Political Mix,” Los Angeles Times, July 18,
2006.
CRS-3
Nasrallah as saying that Hezbollah would not accept any “humiliating” conditions for
a cease-fire in Lebanon. Also, according to the reports, a senior Iranian security
official was in Damascus, but it was not clear whether he met with Nasrallah and
Asad.
U.S. Policy Toward Syria. The United States and Syria have long had an
uneasy relationship, and the current fighting in Lebanon has had a further adverse
effect on this relationship. In recent years, Syria has been at the forefront of a
number of important U.S. policy issues in the Middle East, and the two sides have
been increasingly at odds on such issues as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the former
Syrian occupation of Lebanon, the war on terror, and U.S. allegations that Syria has
failed to curb infiltration of foreign fighters across the border into Iraq. Also,
following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Administration efforts to
foster democracy into the Middle East region, U.S. officials have spoken out against
authoritarian regimes like Syria and promoted reform in the “broader Middle East.”
Currently, an array of U.S. legislative provisions and executive directives
prohibit direct aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade between the two countries,
owing in great part to Syria’s designation by the U.S. State Department as a state
sponsor of international terrorism. The most recent restrictions appear in the Syria
Accountability Act of 2003, which reinforces existing bans on aid and restrictions on
trade and contains some additional sanctions (see below). At this time, Syria’s role
in Lebanon is of particular concern to U.S. policy makers.
After the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents, U.S. officials reiterated their demands for a
full Syrian withdrawal of its military forces from Lebanon and recalled U.S.
Ambassador Margaret Scobey to Washington for consultations; she has not returned
and has reportedly been reassigned to Baghdad. Although Syrian forces did
withdraw in April 2005, some observers think Syrian officials have tried to
circumvent the effect of the withdrawal by maintaining their influence through
contacts they have acquired over the years in the Lebanese bureaucracy and security
services.3 In this connection, U.N. teams have said that no visible or significant
Syrian intelligence presence remained in Lebanon but have qualified their statement
by noting that “distinctly close historical and other ties” between Syria and Lebanon
must be considered “when assessing a possibly ongoing influence of Syrian
intelligence in Lebanon.”4
Some believe that Syria’s prompt compliance with demands for its withdrawal
may have concealed a long-term plan to reestablish its influence and possibly its
presence in Lebanon if and when an opportunity arises. Commentators suggest that
Syria appears to be a central player in the present scenario and that U.S. efforts to
resolve the crisis may necessitate dealing with Syria at some stage. At present, they
point out, U.S. dealings with Syria are complicated by U.S. efforts to keep Syria
isolated and by lack of diplomatic contacts. (As noted above, the U.S. Ambassador
3
Robin Wright,”Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 31,
2005.
4
U.N. Security Council document S/2005/673, Paragraph 20.
CRS-4
to Syria has not returned to Damascus, and the U.S. Embassy in Damascus is headed
by a lower level diplomat, although the Syrian Ambassador remains in Washington.)
According to one observer, “After years spent edging Syrian troops out of Lebanon
in a bid to win independence for the beleaguered nation, Western leaders face the
prospect of pressing Damascus to reassert its influence with Islamic militants there
to halt rocket attacks on Israel and free Israeli prisoners.”5
Since the outbreak of fighting between Israeli military forces and the militant
Lebanese Shi’ite Hezbollah organization on July 12, 2006, U.S. officials have
increased their criticism of Syria’s political and logistical support for Hezbollah. On
July 22, President Bush commented that “[f]or many years, Syria has been a primary
sponsor of Hezbollah and it has helped provide Hezbollah with shipments of Iranianmade weapons.”6 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, speaking to reporters on July
26, rejected comments that the United States and Syria lack diplomatic channels for
communication, pointing out that there are existing diplomatic channels that can be
used when Syrian leaders are ready to talk. On his side, Syrian Ambassador to the
United States Imad Moustapha told Associated Press in comments reported on July
27 that there has been “not a single contact” by the U.S. government with Syria since
the fighting began. Another Syrian official commented that “Syria is not going to
help while it is being isolated and President Bush is attacking Syria all the time.” In
another vein, Syrian officials have pointed out that Syria has accommodated the
United States by issuing large numbers of visas to Americans fleeing from Lebanon
via Syria for evacuation to the United States and has opened its doors to other groups
of refugees from Lebanon as well.
More broadly, Secretary Rice has signaled that the United States will not accept
a resumption of Syria’s former influential role in Lebanon. She was quoted by
Reuters News Wire on July 26 as saying that Syria should not be allowed to return
to Lebanon and influence events there, and neither should Iran. She warned Syria
and Iran not to “torpedo” any attempts to stop the fighting between Hezbollah and
Israeli forces and expressed the hope that the two countries would “behave
responsibly.”
Relations with Iraq
Trade and Oil. Syria, though long hostile to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,
improved relations with its erstwhile adversary in the late 1990s and opposed the
U.S. military campaign in Iraq. Numerous reports between 2000 and 2003 indicated
that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was shipping between 120,000 and 200,000 barrels
of oil per day through a reopened pipeline to Syria, technically in violation of U.N.
sanctions. U.S. military forces shut down the pipeline in April 2003 after the war
began. According to officials of the U.S. State Department and the IRS in testimony
before the House International Relations Committee on July 27, 2005, revenues from
the sale of Iraqi oil were placed in trade and cash accounts in the Syrian Commercial
Bank and its affiliates and used by Iraq to purchase goods from Syrian vendors during
5
Kim Murphy, “Crisis May Put Syria Back In Political Mix,” Los Angeles Times, July 18,
2006.
6
“Rice Rejects Cease-Fire As Mideast Quick Fix,” Dow Jones News Wire, July 22, 2006.
CRS-5
the last three years of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Witnesses stated that these
arrangements generated $3.4 billion in funds outside the U.N.-approved oil-for-food
program for Iraq between June 2000 and July 2003.
Money. There have been reports that money withdrawn by Saddam Hussein
or his henchmen from Iraqi banks found its way to Syria. According to a CNN
broadcast on October 13, 2003, criminal investigators from the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service and officials from the Central Bank of Iraq were dispatched to Damascus to
look for these funds. According to a news wire article on January 29, 2004, an Iraqi
official said Syria had agreed to return the funds, which Iraqis estimate at $3 billion.
In his 2004 interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat, however, President Asad said that the
figure was about $200 million and that a process of accounting is under way.
According to press reports, the Bush Administration has accused the state-owned
Commercial Bank of Syria of laundering money for terrorist organizations and
holding $200 million in accounts belonging to former members of Saddam Hussein’s
government.97 In September 2004, a delegation from the U.S. Treasury Department
visited Syria to look into these allegations, which may have prompted subsequent
U.S. punitive actions against the bank (see below). A subsequent press report stated
that wealthy donors were funneling money through Syria to the Iraqi resistance and
added that only half of an estimated $1 billion transferred from the former Iraqi
regime to Syrian banks had been recovered.108
Infiltrators. U.S. officials continue to charge that Syria is allowing proSaddam volunteers from various Arab countries including Syria itself to cross its
8
American Embassy, Damascus, Syria, via LOC Cairo, Damascus Media Reaction, May 29,
2006.
9
Scott Wilson, “U.S. Pressing Syria On Iraq Border Security,” Washington Post, Sept. 20,
2004, p. A16.
10
Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Estimates by U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,”
New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.
CRS-9
375-mile border into Iraq. In its annual publication Country Reports on Terrorism:
2005 (published on April 28, 2006), the U.S. State Department said Syria has made
efforts to limit the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq. In April 2005, U.S.
officers described some Iraqi border guard units patrolling segments of Iraq’s border
with Syria and Jordan as undermanned, under-equipped, and under-motivated or
intimidated.119 With regard to charges that Syria provides a base of operations for
Iraqi Iraqi
insurgents, Syrian officials maintain that it is difficult to monitor the Iraqi
community; there are reportedly 250,000 to 300,000 Iraqis in Syria (some sources
estimate a wider spread of 200,000 to 500,000).
Subsequently there have been mixed signals from Washington and Damascus.
General Abizaid in a Washington Post interview of December 6, 2004, stated that
volunteer fighters from other Arab countries are given plane tickets to Damascus
where they obtain false documentation, enabling them to infiltrate into Iraq.
Previously, then U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B.
Myers said that it is hard to believe Syria is unaware of what is going on, but
7
Scott Wilson, “U.S. Pressing Syria On Iraq Border Security,” Washington Post, Sept. 20,
2004, p. A16.
8
Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Estimates by U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,”
New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.
9
James Janega, “Too Much Border, Not Enough Patrol,” Chicago Tribune, Apr. 19, 2005.
CRS-6
“[w]hether they’re supporting it is another question.”1210 Still, some U.S. commanders
have noted steps by Syrians to tighten their border with Iraq and curtail cross-border
infiltration.1311 At the end of February 2005, press reports citing unnamed Syrian and
Iraqi officials alleged that Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan, Saddam Hussein’s half brother
and former security chief; was captured in Syria and delivered to Iraqi custody, along
with 29 other officials of the former Saddam Hussein regime.1412 Syrian authorities,
however, did not confirm reports of a Syrian role in Sabawi’s capture. Tikriti was
number 36 on the list of wanted former Baathist officials and is suspected of
coordinating insurgent attacks and raising funds for the insurgency in Syria.
In early July 2005, some sources reported that Syria has increased its support for
the Iraqi insurgency, while others stated that Syria has recently gone on the offensive
against foreign fighters seeking to cross the border into Iraq. Those who espouse the
former view quote U.S. officials as describing Syria as a “hub” for foreign recruits
supporting the Iraqi insurgency; the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, for example, has
accused Syria of allowing terrorists to operate training camps within Syria for
insurgents bound for Iraq. Those with a different view point to recent reports of
clashes between Syrian security forces and militants connected to the Iraqi
insurgency. Still others noted a Syrian announcement of the arrest of militants
belonging to a group called the Levant Army, reportedly linked to the Iraqi
insurgency and to perpetrators of a suicide bombing in Qatar. (“Syrians Clash With
Fighters Linked to the Iraqi Insurgency,” New York Times, July 5, 2005; “Syria Seen
Stepping Up Aid to Iraq-Bound Insurgents,” Washington Times, July 6, 2005, “Syria
Clashes Hint at Growing Islamic Extremist Problem,” Associated Press (Dow Jones),
July 5, 2005.) An August 1, 2005, article in Defense News quotes the Syrian deputy
11
James Janega, “Too Much Border, Not Enough Patrol,” Chicago Tribune, Apr. 19, 2005.
12
“Few Foreigners Among Insurgents,” Washington Post, Nov. 16, 2004.
13
Carla Anne Robbins and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Sees Efforts By Syria To Control Border With
Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 10, 2004.
14
John F. Burns, “Syria Turns Over a Top Insurgent, Iraqis Say,” New York Times, Feb.
28, 2005.
CRS-10
foreign minister as citing several recent steps Syria has taken to reduce infiltration:
5,000 Syrian guards staffing posts with 25 rear support positions and conducting 50
moving patrols per day; detention of 1,240 foreign fighters and 4,000 Syrian
nationals trying to enter Iraq to join the insurgency; a survey of Syrian night vision
needs by a British team in 2004. In an October 5, 2005 letter from the Syrian
Ambassador in Washington to a Member of Congress, the Ambassador noted several
recent steps taken by Syria to secure its borders, including the following:1513
!
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10
Increasing border troops from “a few hundred to 10,000 in the last
two years”;
Building sand barriers, raising their height to 12 feet along a 130mile segment of border;
Installing barbed wire, in some cases double-layered; and
“Few Foreigners Among Insurgents,” Washington Post, Nov. 16, 2004.
11
Carla Anne Robbins and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Sees Efforts By Syria To Control Border With
Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 10, 2004.
12
John F. Burns, “Syria Turns Over a Top Insurgent, Iraqis Say,” New York Times, Feb.
28, 2005.
13
The Ambassador’s letter represented a response to an inquiry by 100 Members of
Congress. Available online at [http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/].
Title of item: “Syria is being Set Up to Fail: A Leaked Letter from Washington,” Oct. 23,
2005. Accessed June 10, 2006.
CRS-7
!
Erecting approximately 540 military outposts, at intervals ranging
from 400 to 3,000 meters, depending on the sensitivity of the area.
The Ambassador added that, as a result of these measures, Syria had captured 1,500
individuals trying to cross the border, handed them back to authorities of their
countries, or put them in prison.
Equipment. During the year preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were
reports that Syria had become a conduit for shipments of military equipment from
eastern European countries to Iraq. Most of these shipments allegedly consisted of
anti-aircraft missiles, guidance systems for SCUD surface to surface missiles, antiaircraft guns, radar, and jet and tank engines. During the war, Secretary Rumsfeld
told reporters on March 28, 2003 that military supplies including night vision goggles
were being shipped from Syria to Iraq. Conversely, Israeli sources cited reports that
Iraqi chemical and biological weapons were being shipped from Iraq to Syria for
safekeeping. At the time, U.S. General Richard B. Myers, then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, said there was no evidence so far that Iraqi WMD had been moved
to another country. In September 16, 2003 testimony before the House International
Relations Committee (Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia), then Under
Secretary of State John Bolton mentioned reports that Iraq had moved its WMD to
Syria to hide them from U.N. inspectors but said the United States had been unable
to confirm such transfers.
Accusations of Syrian Interference. U.S. and Iraqi officials have accused
Syria on several occasions since late 2004 of interfering in Iraq and aiding the late
Abu Musab Zarqawi, the head of an Al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq. The Iraqi Ambassador
to Syria, for example, said U.S. and Iraqi troops had captured photos of Syrian
officials during combat operations in an insurgent stronghold in Iraq in November.1614
On December 16, 2004, President Bush warned Syria and Iran that “meddling in the
15
The Ambassador’s letter represented a response to an inquiry by 100 Members of
Congress. Available online at [http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/].
Title of item: “Syria is being Set Up to Fail: A Leaked Letter from Washington,” Oct. 23,
2005. Accessed June 10, 2006.
16
Nicholas Blanford, “More Signs of Syria Turn up in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor,
Dec. 23, 2004.
CRS-11
internal affairs of Iraq is not in their interests.” His warning followed an accusation
by then Iraqi Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan that Syria is aiding Zarqawi and
agents of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The Syrian Foreign Ministry
dismissed Shaalan’s remarks as “baseless accusations” but did not refer to President
Bush’s remarks. Following reports of a secret meeting in Syria held by Zarqawi and
key aides during April 2005, week-long fighting took place along the Syrian border
in mid-May, resulting in hundreds of deaths including nine U.S. Marines. According
to a press report on May 18, an unnamed U.S. official characterized Syria as a main
conduit for pro-Zarqawi fighters entering Iraq. In a meeting with an Iraqi official on
May 20, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice criticized Syria for “allowing its
territory to be used to organize terrorist attacks against innocent Iraqis” and added
that Syria “should not think itself immune from the way that the region is going.”
She pointed to other Syrian policies regarding terrorism, Lebanon, and Palestinian
affairs, and said Syria must realize “that it is clearly out of step with where the region
is going.” On May 20, 2005, the Syrian Ambassador to the United States told the
New York Times that Syria has “severed all links” with U.S. military representatives
14
Nicholas Blanford, “More Signs of Syria Turn up in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor,
Dec. 23, 2004.
CRS-8
and the Central Intelligence Agency during the last 10 days because of what he called
unjust allegations of Syrian support to the Iraqi insurgency.
Arms Proliferation
Over the past three decades, Syria has acquired an arsenal of chemical weapons
(CW) and surface-to-surface missiles, reportedly has conducted research and
development in biological weapons (BW), and may be interested in a nuclear
weapons capability. Its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, however,
are hampered by limited resources and reliance on external sources of supply.
Emphasis has been on the development of CW and missile capabilities — sometimes
described as “poor man’s nuclear weapons.” In the past, there has been little
evidence of intent on Syria’s part to acquire nuclear weapons; rather, Syria has
sought to build up its CW and missile capabilities as a “force equalizer” to counter
Israeli nuclear capabilities. (“Syria Built Arsenal As ‘Equalizer,’” Washington Post,
April 17, 2003.) However, increasing U.S. concerns over an apparent nexus between
terrorism and WMD in the post-September 11 era has brought added attention from
the Bush Administration to possible efforts by states like Syria to pursue a broader
range of WMD programs.
In a speech to the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002, then Under Secretary
Bolton grouped Syria with Libya and Cuba as rogue states that support international
terrorism (see below) and are pursuing the development of WMD. On October 9,
2002, Bolton reportedly told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “[w]e
remain very concerned that nuclear and missile programs of Iran and others,
including Syria, continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and
expertise.” In his briefing for the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
on September 16, 2003, Bolton described a range of Syrian WMD programs and
voiced particular concern over the sharing of Russian technology with Syria.
Following is a brief summary of Syria’s WMD programs from available information,
including Mr. Bolton’s testimony and an unclassified CIA study covering the period
from July through December 2003.
CRS-12
Chemical and Biological. Syria, which has not signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention, reportedly has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and may be
working on a more toxic and persistent nerve agent like VX. Syria is reported to
have three production facilities for chemical weapons but remains dependent on
external sources for key elements of its CW program including precursor chemicals
and key production equipment. Little information is available on Syrian biological
programs; however, the preparers of the 2003 CIA study estimate that “Syria
probably also continued to develop a BW capability.” Syria has signed, but not
ratified, the Biological Weapons Convention.
Nuclear. Syria has one small Chinese-supplied nuclear research reactor, which
is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Syria and Russia
have agreed on a draft program for cooperation on civil nuclear power. According
to the 2003 CIA study, “[b]roader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities
for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are monitoring Syrian nuclear
intentions with concern.” Syria acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1969; however, Under Secretary Bolton expressed concern that Syria, like Iran, has
CRS-9
not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, which provides for short-notice inspections
of nuclear facilities.
Missiles. Syria has one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East,
consisting of several hundred short-to-medium range ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles. Once reliant on the former Soviet Union, Syria has turned more recently
to Iran, North Korea, and China for assistance with its missile programs. According
to the 2003 CIA study, Syria continued to seek help from abroad in establishing a
solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability and is seeking
assistance from North Korea in its liquid propellant missile programs. Bolton, in his
September 2003 testimony, suggests that regional concerns may impel Syria to seek
a longer range missile on the order of the North Korean No Dong medium-range
ballistic missile.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Syria continues to obtain small
amounts of conventional military equipment from Russia and other former Sovietbloc suppliers. Syria reportedly wants to obtain Russian air defense systems (SA10/SA-11), fighter aircraft (MiG-29, Su-27), and tanks (T-80, T-90), as well as
upgrades for weapons already in Syrian inventories; however, Syria’s lack of money
combined with its outstanding debt to Russia (inherited from the former Soviet
Union) have hampered any significant acquisitions.
Possible Acquisitions. In January 2005, Russian media and Israeli sources
reported an impending sale by Russia to Syria of shoulder-fired SA-18 (“Igla”) air
defense missiles and SS-26 (“Iskander-E”) surface to surface missiles. During a visit
to Russia by President Asad at the end of January, officials of both countries denied
these reports. A Russian daily newspaper, however, reported that the deal was put
on hold because of U.S. and Israeli pressure. During a later visit to Israel in April,
2005, however, Putin said that he understood Israeli security concerns but that the
missiles Russia was selling Syria could not be used to target Israeli territory and that
he had vetoed longer range missiles. (“Putin Pushes Summit Proposal on Israeli
Trip,” New York Times, April 28, 2005.) It was not clear if Putin was planning to sell
the SS-26, which with its maximum range of 175 miles would appear able to reach
CRS-13
significant parts of Israel. On October 3, 2005, Agence France-Presse reported a visit
to Moscow by Syrian Armed Forces chief of staff Ali Habib to discuss maintenance
and modernization of Syrian equipment by Russian experts, an increase in Syrian
military personnel undergoing training in Russia (from 30 to 50, according to one
report), and Syrian purchase of ammunition. Habib also reportedly visited a Russian
factory that produces Kornet-E anti-tank missiles.
Debt. Largely as a result of military purchases, Syria incurred a debt of
approximately $13.4 billion to the former Soviet Union, a debt that the successor
Russian Federation has now inherited. Without providing details, both presidents
expressed satisfaction that the two sides had “resolved the problem of Syria’s debts
to the Russian Federation. We have resolved it on a compromise base acceptable for
both parties...” (Putin’s words. Asad commented that “we approached the solution
to a long-standing issue — Syria’s debt to Russia.”) According to several press
CRS-10
articles, Putin agreed to write off $9.8 billion or approximately 73% of the debt.1715
Some speculate that Putin was motivated by prospects of new arms purchases from
Syria, while others suggest that political and strategic benefts that may accrue to
Russia are more important than economic benefits.1816
Terrorist Activity
Since 1979, Syria has appeared regularly on a list of countries — currently five
— that the U.S. State Department identifies as sponsors of international terrorism.
According to the State Department’s most recent annual report on global terrorism
(Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005, published on April 28, 2006), Syria has not
been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986, when Syrian intelligence
was reportedly involved in an abortive attempt to bomb an El Al airliner in London.
The report states, however, that Syria has continued to provide political and material
support for Palestinian groups that have committed terrorist acts, and allows them to
maintain offices in Damascus. The report also notes that Syria continued to permit
Iranian resupply via Damascus of the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim militia HizballahHezbollah in
Lebanon. Syria admits its support for Palestinians pursuing armed struggle in Israeli
occupied territories and for HizballahHezbollah raids against Israeli forces on the Lebanese
border, but insists that these actions represent legitimate resistance activity as
distinguished from terrorism.
Al Qaeda. In some instances, Syria has cooperated with the United States
against terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda. With a few exceptions such as
Hamas and HizballahHezbollah, the generally secular Syrian government tends to regard
Islamic fundamentalist organizations as destabilizing, although there have been
indications since early 2006 that the Syrian regime has been courting Islamists as a
17
Neil King, Jr. and Gregory L. White, “U.S. Reviews Russia Ties Amid Rising Tensions,”
The Asian Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27, 2005. “Russia Writes off $9.8 Billion of Syrian
Debt,” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon), Jan. 26, 2005.
18
“Syria, Russia Might Both Gain By Improved Relationship,” Dow Jones International
News, Jan. 26, 2005.
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counterweight to other internal dissident groups.19
counterweight to other internal dissident groups.17 Since the September 11 attacks,
a number of reports, including the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
2005, indicate that Syria has cooperated with the United States and other foreign
governments against Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in the past, while
discouraging signs of public support for Al Qaeda. Earlier, on June 18, 2002, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State William Burns was quoted as telling a congressional
committee that “the cooperation the Syrians have provided in their own self-interest
on Al Qaeda has saved American lives.” According to a subsequent news report,
Syria helped unravel a plot by an Al Qaeda group in Canada to attack U.S. and
Canadian government installations.2018 Details regarding the type of support provided
by the Syrians, however, have been lacking, and some Members of Congress have
expressed the view that Syrian cooperation against Al Qaeda has waned or has been
exaggerated. According to the 2005 terrorism report (see above), in May 2005 the
Syrian Government ended intelligence cooperation with the United States, citing U.S.
complaints that Syrian cooperation against border crossings into Iraq was inadequate
15
Neil King, Jr. and Gregory L. White, “U.S. Reviews Russia Ties Amid Rising Tensions,”
The Asian Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27, 2005. “Russia Writes off $9.8 Billion of Syrian
Debt,” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon), Jan. 26, 2005.
16
“Syria, Russia Might Both Gain By Improved Relationship,” Dow Jones International
News, Jan. 26, 2005.
17
Christine Spolar, “Syria’s strange political spring,” Chicago Tribune, May 28, 2006.
18
“Syrian Reforms Gain Momentum In Wake Of War,” Washington Post, May 12, 2003.
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Syrian Government ended intelligence cooperation with the United States, citing U.S.
complaints that Syrian cooperation against border crossings into Iraq was inadequate.
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Syrian-Israeli negotiations remain deadlocked over Syria’s demand that Israel
withdraw unconditionally from the Golan Heights, a 450-square mile portion of
southwestern Syria that Israel occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The late
President Hafiz al-Asad said he accepted the principle of “full withdrawal for full
peace” and would establish peaceful, normal relations with Israel in return for
Israeli’s withdrawal from Golan. Israeli leaders either reject withdrawal or accept
partial withdrawal. The two sides also disagree on what would constitute full
withdrawal because of slightly differing boundary lines defined in the past. Both
sides have suggested a resumption of talks; however, Israel believes talks should
begin without pre-conditions, while Syria has insisted that talks resume where the
most recent U.S.-sponsored discussions left off in 2000. For more information, see
CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S.
Policy, by Carol Migdalovitz.
U.S. Aid and Sanctions
Since 1950, the United States has provided a total of $627.5 million in aid to
Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in economic support,
$155.4 million in food assistance, and $61 thousand in military training assistance.
Most of this aid was provided during a brief warming trend in bilateral relations
between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded under U.S. aid included water
supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health and agricultural research.
No aid has been provided to Syria since 1981, when the last aid programs were
closed out. At present, a variety of legislative provisions and executive directives
prohibit U.S. aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade. Principal examples follow.
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976
[P.L. 94-329]. Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of
foreign assistance to countries that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision
was incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC
2371]. (Syria was not affected by this ban until 1979, as explained below.)
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93
Stat. 515] required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify
Congress before licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7
million to countries determined to have supported acts of international terrorism
(Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 re-lettered Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered
the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
19
Christine Spolar, “Syria’s strange political spring,” Chicago Tribune, May 28, 2006.
20
“Syrian Reforms Gain Momentum In Wake Of War,” Washington Post, May 12, 2003.
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A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list.
This list is prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j)
CRS-12
of the Export Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly
have provided support for acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this
list ever since it was first prepared in 1979; it appears most recently in the State
Department’s annual publication Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005, published on
April 28, 2006. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the above-mentioned
aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399].
Section 509(a) of this act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act to prohibit export of items on the munitions list to countries determined
to be supportive of international terrorism, thus banning any U.S. military equipment
sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export
Amendments Act of 1989 — see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans obligation of
U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of
this act [100 Stat. 1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign
tax credits on income or war profits from countries identified by the Secretary of
State as supporting international terrorism. [26 USC 901].
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L.
101- 222]. Section 4 amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to
impose a congressional notification and licensing requirement for export of goods or
technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries on the terrorism list, if such
exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their ability to support
terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribed conditions for removal of a country from the terrorism
list: prior notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the chairmen of two specified committees of the Senate. In
conjunction with the requisite notification, the President must certify that the country
has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no longer involved in supporting
terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45 days in advance
of removal of a country from the terrorist list.)
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale
or lease of U.S. defense articles and services to any country that questions U.S. firms
about their compliance with the Arab boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains
provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver has been exercised in Syria’s
case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other prohibitions
already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132]. This
act requires the President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance
(Section 325) or lethal military equipment (Section 326) to countries on the terrorism
list, but allows the President to waive this provisions on grounds of national interest.
A similar provision banning aid to third countries that sell lethal equipment to
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countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign Operations
CRS-13
Appropriation Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons
(citizens or resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of
countries on the terrorism list, except as provided in regulations issued by the
Department of the Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of State. In the case
of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such transactions “with respect to
which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.” (31
CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall
of 1996, the then Chairman of the House International Relations Committee
reportedly protested to then President Clinton over the Treasury Department’s
implementing regulation, which he described as a “special loophole” for Syria. Since
then, several measures have been introduced in previous Congresses to forbid
virtually all financial transactions with Syria but none were enacted.
Section 531 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7)
bans aid to countries not in compliance with U.N. Security Council sanctions against
Iraq. This ban would be applicable to exports of Iraqi oil through Syria or to reported
shipments of military equipment via Syria to Iraq; however, it may be moot following
the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.
Specific Sanctions Against Syria
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign
assistance appropriations enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from
receiving U.S. aid. The most recent ban appears in H.R. 3057 (P.L. 109-102 — see
below). Section 512 of P.L. 109-102, sometimes known as the Brooke Amendment
after an earlier version of this provision, bans assistance to any country in default to
the United States for over a year. Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
amended by Section 431 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United States to withhold
a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for programs that
benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
Recent Congressional Action
Foreign Operations Appropriations. H.R. 3057, the FY2006 Foreign
Operations Appropriation Act, repeats previous bans on aid to Syria (Section 507);
however, it also contains a provision requiring that not less than $6,550,000 be made
available for programs supporting democracy in Syria and Iran, as well as unspecified
amounts of additional funds under this act to support democracy, governance, human
rights, and rule of law programs for these two countries. President Bush signed the
bill as P.L. 109-102 on November 14, 2005. H.R. 5522, The Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, FY2007, repeats the previous bans on aid to Syria (Section 507)
but does not contain money for democracy programs.
CRS-1714
The Syria Accountability Act. On December 12, 2003, President Bush
signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration
Act, as P.L. 108-175. H.R. 1828 was passed by the House on October 15, 2003, and
the Senate on November 11, 2003. (The House agreed to a Senate amendment
expanding the President’s waiver authority on November 20.) This act requires the
President to impose penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international
terrorist groups, ends its occupation of Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased supporting or facilitating terrorist
activity in Iraq (Section 5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans on the export of
military items (already banned under other legislation) and of dual use items (items
with both civil and military applications) to Syria (Section 5(a)(1)). In addition, the
President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
!
!
!
!
!
!
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian
aircraft;
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (Section 5(a)(2))
Implementation. On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order
13338, implementing the provisions of P.L. 108-175, including the bans on
munitions and dual use items (Section 5(a)(1)) and two sanctions from the menu of
six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban on exports to
Syria other than food and medicine (Section 5(a)(2)(A) and the ban on Syrian aircraft
landing in or overflying the United States (Section 5(a)(2)(D). In issuing his
executive order, the President stated that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete
steps to address the concerns that led to the enactment of the Syria Accountability
Act. The President also imposed two additional sanctions based on other legislation.
!
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Treasury Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial
institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial
Bank of Syria because of
money laundering concerns.
!
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he
he issued instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and
and government entities involved in supporting policies inimical to
the United
States.
Waivers. In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress,
the President cited the waiver authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria
Accountability Act and stated that he is issuing the following waivers on grounds of
national security:
!
Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are
permitted: products in support of activities of the U.S. government;
medicines otherwise banned because of potential dual use; aircraft parts
parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials; telecommunications
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telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information;
certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N.
operations; and certain exports of
a temporary nature.
CRS-18
!
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are
permitted:
takeoff/landing of Syrian aircraft chartered to transport
Syrian officials on
official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and
non-scheduled stops;
takeoff/landing associated with an emergency; and
overflights of
U.S. territory.
Implications. The practical effects of implementing the Syria Accountability
Act are likely to be limited, at least in the short term. First, as noted above, relatively
few U.S. firms operate in Syria, and the trade bans contained in this act do not
prohibit their operating in Syria. Fewer U.S. companies may want to operate in Syria
in view of the new trade restrictions, and firms that continue to do so may have to
rely on foreign suppliers to service their contracts, according to a State Department
official as reported in the press.2119 Second, the volume of U.S.-Syrian trade is already
limited. Syria’s main import from the United States is cereals, which are permitted
under the act. Third, Syrian aircraft do not normally fly to or over United States, and
the President has invoked waivers to permit them to do so under exceptional
circumstances. Fourth, waivers cover several categories of equipment —
telecommunications equipment, aircraft parts; one sanctions specialist believes that
products either permitted under the new legislation or covered by waivers constitute
a large portion of the more-than-$200 million which Syria imports from the United
States.2220
Further Steps. Some U.S. officials favor tightening sanctions against Syria
further in view of reports that it is facilitating or permitting Iraqi insurgents to operate
in Syria. On December 23, 2004, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
reportedly warned Syria that the Administration might impose new sanctions if Syria
failed to clamp down on fugitive Iraqi ex-officials. Press reports in early January
2005 indicate that the Administration is considering further limits on financial
transactions with Syrian banks.2321 During her confirmation hearings on January 18,
2005, then Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice warned that Syria risked
“long-term bad relations” with the United States and additional sanctions because of
its policies regarding terrorism and Iraq. In his State of the Union address on
February 2, 2005, the President stated that “Syria still allows its territory, and parts
of Lebanon to be used by terrorists who seek to destroy every chance of peace in the
region.” He noted that Congress had passed the Syria Accountability Act and that
the Administration is applying it. Syrian Ambassador to the United States Imad
Mustapha expressed disappointment over President Bush’s portrayal of Syria as a
hindrance to peace and added that Syria continues to possess “the will to engage with
the United States.”
Extension. In a notice dated March 5, 2005, the President extended by one
year the national emergency blocking the property of certain individuals and
prohibiting exports to Syria under Executive Order (E.O.) 13338 (see above). He
21
19
Christopher Marquis, “Bush Imposes Sanctions on Syria, Citing Ties to Terrorism,” New
York Times, May 12, 2004.
22
2320
21
Glenn Kessler, “President Imposes Sanctions On Syria,” Washington Post, May 12, 2004.
Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Said to Weigh Sanctions on Syria Over Iraqi Network,” New York
Times, Jan. 5, 2005.
CRS-19
noted that the 16
hindrance to peace and added that Syria continues to possess “the will to engage with
the United States.”
Extension. In a notice dated May 5, 2005, the President extended by one year
the national emergency blocking the property of certain individuals and prohibiting
exports to Syria under Executive Order (E.O.) 13338 (see above). He noted that the
actions and policies of the government of Syria continue to pose an
unusual and
extraordinary threat. Subsequently on June 30, 2005, under the
, in a notice dated May 8, the President extended
the state of emergency for an additional year. Also, in a notice dated June 30, 2005,
under the provisions of E.O. 13338, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior
senior Syrian officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then Interior Minister and its
its head of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali, see above), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any
assets they may have in the United States and banning U.S. transactions with them.
On January 18, 2006, the Treasury Department took the same actions against the
President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military intelligence. Meanwhile
on June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian
company, SES International Corp., and two of its officials under E.O. 13315, which
blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and of his former regime.