Armed Conflict in Syria:
Overview and U.S. Response
Christopher M. Blanchard, Coordinator
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
June 27September 11, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33487
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
Summary
Fighting continues acrossThe summer 2014 offensive in neighboring Iraq by the insurgent terrorist group known as the
Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL/ISIS) has reshaped
longstanding debates over U.S. policy toward the three-year old conflict in Syria. The Islamic
State controls large areas of northeastern Syria, where it continues to clash with forces opposed to
and aligned with the government of Bashar al Asad. Meanwhile, fighting continues in other parts
of Syria, pitting government forces and their foreign allies against a range
of anti-government
insurgents, somemany of whom also are fighting amongst themselves. Since March
engaged in battles with IS forces.
Since March 2011, the conflict has driven more than 2.83 million Syrians into neighboring countries
as refugees
(out of a total population of more than 22 million). Millions more Syrians are
internally displaced
and in need of humanitarian assistance, of which the United States remains
the largest bilateral
provider, with more than $2.4 billion in funding identified to date. The United
States also has
allocated a total of $287 million to date to providefor nonlethal assistance to select
opposition groups. Prior to the Islamic State’s mid-2014 advances in Iraq, the Administration had
requested $2.75 billion in funding for the Syria crisis for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015.
Neither pro-Asad forces nor their opponents appear capable of achieving outright victory in the
short term. However, the prospect of international intervention to degrade the capabilities of the
Islamic State appears to be driving speculation among many parties to the conflict that dramatic
changes in the dynamics of what has remained a grinding war of attrition could soon be possible.
Some opposition forces seek to cast themselves as potential allies to outsiders who are opposed to
both the Islamic State and the Syrian government, while others reject the idea of foreign
intervention outright or demand that foreigners focus solely on toppling President Asad. Syrian
officials have stated their conditional willingness to serve as partners with the international
community in counterterrorism operations in Syria, a position that reflects their desire to create an
image and role for the Asad government as a bulwark against Sunni Islamist extremism.
For the United States and others examining options for weakening the Islamic State, these
conditions raise questions about how best to pursue new counterterrorism and regional security
goals without strengthening the Syrian government relative to the opposition groups and civilians
it has brutalized during the conflict. Similar questions arise in relation to options for countering
the Islamic State without bolstering other anti-U.S. Islamist groups. At present, anti-Asad armed
forces and their activist counterparts remain divided over tactics, strategy, and their long-term
political goals for Syria, with some powerful Islamist forces seeking outcomes that are contrary in
significant ways to stated U.S. preferences for Syria’s political future. The United Nations
Security Council also seeks continued Syrian government cooperation with efforts to verifiably
end Syria’s chemical weapons program. As of September 2014, all declared chemical weapons
had been removed from Syria, and all declared materials of priority concern had been destroyed.
Related facilities are set for destruction by March 2015.
Congress is considering FY2015 appropriations legislation (H.R. 5013/S. 2499) that would
reauthorize the provision of nonlethal assistance in Syria for certain purposes notwithstanding
other provisions of law and prohibit the use of defense funds to provide man-portable air defense
weapons (MANPADs) to entities in Syria (H.R. 4870). Senate committees have endorsed
FY2015 defense appropriations and authorization legislation (H.R. 4870/S. 2410) that would
support arming and training of vetted opposition forces for select purposes. Congress also may
Congressional Research Service
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
consider measures to authorize or restrict the use of force against the Islamic State in Syria and
beyond groups.
Neither pro-Asad forces nor their opponents appear capable of achieving outright victory in the
short term. Improved coordination among some anti-government forces and attrition in
government ranks make a swift reassertion of state control over all of Syria unlikely. Conflict
between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, a.k.a. ISIS) and other anti-Asad forces has
intensified. The war in Syria is exacerbating local sectarian and political conflicts within Lebanon
and Iraq, threatening national stability.
In spite of an apparent shared antipathy toward ISIL’s brutality among opposition groups, many
anti-Asad armed forces and their activist counterparts remain divided over tactics, strategy, and
their long-term political goals for Syria. At present, the most powerful and numerous anti-Asad
armed forces seek outcomes that are contrary in significant ways to stated U.S. preferences for
Syria’s political future. Islamist militias seeking to impose varying degrees of Sunni Islamic law
on Syrian society, including members of the Islamic Front, ISIL, and Jabhat al Nusra, have
marginalized others who had received U.S. assistance.
The United States and other members of the United Nations Security Council seek continued
Syrian government cooperation with efforts to verifiably end Syria’s chemical weapons program
and provide relief. As of June 23, 2014, all of Syria’s declared chemical weapons had been
removed from the country. The Security Council also has endorsed principles for a negotiated
settlement of the conflict that could leave members of the current Syrian government in power as
members of a transitional governing body, an outcome that some opposition groups reject.
Congress is considering FY2015 appropriations legislation (S. 2499) that would authorize the
Administration to provide nonlethal assistance in Syria for certain purposes notwithstanding other
provisions of law and prohibit the use of defense funds to provide man-portable air defense
weapons (MANPADs) to entities in Syria (H.R. 4870). The Administration is seeking $2.75
billion in funding for the Syria crisis in FY2015, including $1.1 billion for humanitarian
programs, $1 billion for regional stabilization, and $500 million for DOD-led arming and training
of vetted opposition forces for select purposes. The Senate Armed Services Committee-reported
FY2015 defense authorization bill (Section 1209 of S. 2410) would authorize such support.
The humanitarian and regional security crises emanating from Syria now appear to be beyond the
power of any single actor, including the United States, to contain or fully address. Large numbers
of Syrian refugees, the growth of powerful armed extremist groups in Syria, and the assertive
involvement of Iran, Turkey, and Sunni Arab governments in Syria’s civil war are all negatively
affecting the regional security environment in the Middle East. In light of these conditions and
trends, Congress is likely to face choices about the investment of U.S. relief and security
assistance funding in relation to the crisis in Syria and its effects on the region for years to come.
For more analysis and information, see CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues
Congressional Research Service
Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
for Congress, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin, and CRS Report R43119, Syria: Overview of
the Humanitarian Response, by Rhoda Margesson and Susan G. Chesser.
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Anti-Asad Forces ............................................................................................................................. 4
Syrian Opposition Coalition and Select Armed Elements ......................................................... 4
Armed Islamist Groups.............................................................................................................. 5
Terrorist 6
Threats Posed by Syria- and Iraq-Based Sunni Extremists ............................................ 7
........... 7
The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, a.k.a. , ISIL/ISIS) ...................................................... 8
Potential Effects of ISILIslamic State Operations in Iraq on Syria ....................................................... 10 12
Pro-Asad Forces............................................................................................................................. 1112
Shia Armed Groups and Iranian Support for the Syrian Government ..................................... 1314
Hezbollah .......................................................................................................................... 1314
Iraqi Militias ...................................................................................................................... 1415
Iranian Support .................................................................................................................. 1415
Chemical Weapons and Disarmament: Background ............................................................................. 15.............. 16
Removal of Chemicals ............................................................................................................ 1617
Destruction of Chemical Weapons Outside of Syria ............................................................... 18
Destruction of Production Facilities ........................................................................................ 18
U.S. and International Funding for CW Elimination Efforts 19
Completeness of the Declaration ............................................................................................. 20
Funding for CW Elimination Efforts ........................................................................ 18............... 20
U.S. Policy and Assistance ............................................................................................................ 1921
FY2015 Budget Request for Syria........................................................................................... 2124
Proposed Expansion or Restriction of Lethal and Nonlethal Assistance .................................................... 22.... 24
Congressional Proposals ................................................................................................... 22
Executive Branch Proposal—Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative ............................... 22
Potential Questions for Congress 24
Administration “Train and Equip” Proposal and Congressional Responses ..................... 25
Potential Operations against the Islamic State and Issues Shaping Future U.S. Policy
toward Syria .............................................................................................. 23
Issues Shaping Future U.S. Assistance .......................................... 27
Possible Questions for Congressional Oversight..................................................................... 2429
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 2531
Figures
Figure 1. Conflict Map and Regional Humanitarian Situation ........................................................ 2
Figure 2. Evolution of Select Extremist Forces in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014 ................................ 9 10
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Syria, FY2013-FY2015 Request ....Original Request..................................... 21 24
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 2732
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
Overview
Fighting continues across Syria, pitting government forces and their foreign allies against a range
of anti-government insurgents, some of whom also are fighting amongst themselves. Government
forces are fighting on multiple fronts and have lost or ceded control of large areas of the country
since 2011, but hold most major cities and have advanced in key areas in recent months. The
in the western part of the country. The Asad government
continues to receive support from Russia and, Iran, and, contrary to some
observers’ predictions, Hezbollah. Contrary to some observers’
predictions, it has shown no indication of an imminent collapse. Opposition forces are
or an intention to leave power.
Recent regime losses in confrontations with forces of the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL/ISIS) in northeastern Syria may create new public pressure on the
government to improve military performance and leadership.
Opposition forces are formidable but lack unity of purpose, unity of command, and unified
international support.
Various opposition groups have, depending on the circumstances,
cooperated and competed. At
present, significant elements of the opposition are engaged in
outright conflict against one
another. Much of the armed opposition seeks to replace the Asad
government with a state ruled
according to some form of Sunni Islamic law, which non-Sunni
minority groups oppose. Kurdish
groups control some areas of northeastern Syria and may seek autonomy or independence in the future.
Meanwhile, chemical weapons inspectors work to oversee and implement the terms of the
September 2013 chemical disarmament agreement endorsed by the United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council in Resolution 2118. Some rebel groups and regional governments have
criticized the U.S. decision to forego a threatened military strike against Syrian government
forces in response to the Syrian military’s alleged use of chemical weapons in August. Members
of Congress expressed a broad range of views regarding the potential use of force in Syria during
intense debate in September, and Obama Administration officials have stated that they believe
that the threat of the use of force by the United States was instrumental in convincing Syrian
President Bashar al Asad to commit to the disarmament plan. Recent allegations of the use of
chlorine gas by government forces have revived debates about appropriate responses.
With internationally supervised disarmament proceeding, U.S. diplomatic efforts remain
committed to shaping the terms and conditions for negotiation to end the fighting and establish a
transitional governing body as called for by a communiqué agreed to in Geneva in June 2012.
That communiqué was further endorsed in Resolutions 2118 and 2139, and served as the basis for
the January-February 2014 “Geneva II” talks in Switzerland involving some members of the
Syrian opposition, representatives of the Syrian government, and delegates from dozens of
countries. Those talks failed to address the establishment of a transitional body, based largely on
Syrian government insistence that terrorism concerns be resolved first.
Several unarmed and armed groups rejected the Geneva II talks outright, and opposition forces
remain divided over questions of whether and under what conditions to participate in negotiations
with the Asad government. Advances by pro-Asad forces and opposition forces in the subsequent
months have led some supporters of each side to argue for continued fighting rather than
negotiation. However, neither pro-Asad forces nor their opponents appear capable of achieving
outright victory in the short term. Combat between Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka
ISIS)1 and other anti-Asad forces across northern and eastern Syria has intensified since late
December 2013, and in June 2014, ISIL launched a major offensive in north-central Iraq. ISIL’s
operations have reinvigorated U.S. debate about policy responses to conflict in both countries.
1
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also is commonly referred to in English language reports as the
Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS). Al Sham is an Arabic term for the Levant. Some Syrians and others in the
region refer to ISIL as “Daesh,” the acronym for its name in Arabic Ad Dawla al Islamiyya fil Iraq wa-ash Sham.
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1
Figure 1. Conflict Map and Regional Humanitarian Situation
(As of June 2014)
Note: Clash symbols in Syria and Iraq denote areas where recent clashes have occurred, not areas of current control.
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
In spite of an apparent shared antipathy among opposition groups toward ISIL’s brutality, many
anti-Asad armed forces and their activist counterparts remain divided over tactics, strategy, and
their long-term political goals for Syria. U.S. intelligence estimates the strength of the insurgency
in Syria at “somewhere between 75,000 or 80,000 or up to 110,000 to 115,000 insurgents, who
are organized into more than 1,500 groups of widely varying political leanings.”
As of May 2014, the most powerful and numerous anti-Asad armed forces seek outcomes that are
contrary in significant ways to stated U.S. preferences for Syria’s political future. Islamist militias
seeking to enforce varying degrees of what they recognize as Sunni Islamic law in Syrian
society—among them members of the Islamic Front (see below), ISIL, and Jabhat al Nusra—
have marginalized other armed groups, including some that received U.S. assistance. U.S.
intelligence community leaders have identified the approximately 26,000 members of ISIL,
Jabhat al Nusra, and Ahrar al Sham (a key component of the Islamic Front) both as extremists and
as the most effective opposition forces in the field. U.S. officials believe that as many as “7,500
foreign fighters from some 50 countries” have travelled to Syria, including Al Qaeda-linked
veterans of previous conflicts and Western nationals.2
In its 2014 threat assessment testimony, the U.S. intelligence community judged that Asad
“remains unwilling to negotiate himself out of power” and “almost certainly intends to remain the
ruler of Syria.”3 Iran and Hezbollah share that objective and continue to invest heavily in Syria on
Asad’s behalf. That testimony noted that infighting among anti-Asad groups has given
government forces and their supporters an advantage in some areas, but that an overall stalemate
is likely to prevail in the conflict for the foreseeable future.4
As clashes and diplomatic discussions continue, Syrian civilians continue to suffer in what U.S.
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has described as an “apocalyptic disaster.” U.N.
sources report that since March 2011, the conflict has driven more than 2.8
autonomy or independence in the future.
The Islamic State also controls large areas of the northeast, including most of the Euphrates River
valley and some areas adjacent to Syria’s borders with Turkey and Iraq. In conjunction with its
high-profile mid-2014 military offensive in Iraq, the Islamic State has worked to consolidate
control over its territory in Syria. Intensifying international and domestic debates now focus on
the Islamic State, the threats it may pose to regional and global security, and appropriate
international responses.
Meanwhile, chemical weapons inspectors work to oversee and implement the final requirements
associated with the September 2013 chemical disarmament agreement endorsed by the United
Nations (U.N.) Security Council in Resolution 2118. All of Syria’s declared chemical weapons
materials have been removed from the country and nearly completely destroyed. However, work
remains to be done to destroy specific chemical weapons-related facilities, amid ongoing
allegations of the use of chlorine gas by government forces. For more information on Syria’s
chemical weapons and U.S. and international participation in the disarmament process, see CRS
Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Mary Beth D.
Nikitin.
For the moment, U.S. diplomatic efforts appear to be shifting away from efforts to achieve a
negotiated end to fighting and the establishment of a transitional governing body in Syria and
toward efforts to build regional and international consensus concerning responses to the rise of
the Islamic State. Some members of the Syrian opposition have expressed concern that
international efforts to combat the Islamic State will benefit the Asad government or undermine
international commitments to provide assistance to opposition groups seeking Asad’s ouster.
In Congress, Members are weighing the relative risks and rewards of direct action in Syria against
the Islamic State while considering a series of appropriations and authorization proposals that
could facilitate the potential provision of overt lethal security assistance to some vetted members
of select opposition groups, to include arms and training. Congress also may consider proposed
legislation to authorize, set conditions on, or prohibit the use of military force in Syria.
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1
Figure 1. Conflict Map and Regional Humanitarian Situation
(As of September 2014)
Note: Clash symbols in Syria and Iraq denote areas where recent clashes have occurred, not areas of current control.
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
In February 2014, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper estimated the strength of the
insurgency in Syria at “somewhere between 75,000 or 80,000 or up to 110,000 to 115,000
insurgents, who are organized into more than 1,500 groups of widely varying political leanings.”1
In spite of an apparent shared antipathy among opposition groups toward the brutality of the
Islamic State and the Asad government, many anti-Asad armed forces and their activist
counterparts remain divided over tactics, strategy, and their long-term political goals for Syria. As
of September 2014, the most powerful and numerous anti-Asad armed forces seek outcomes that
are contrary in significant ways to stated U.S. preferences for Syria’s political future.
Islamist militias seeking to enforce varying degrees of what they recognize as Sunni Islamic law
in Syrian society—among them members of the Islamic Front (see below), the Islamic State, and
Jabhat al Nusra (the Support Front)—have marginalized other armed groups, including some that
received U.S. nonlethal assistance. Earlier this year, U.S. intelligence community leaders
identified the approximately 26,000 members of ISIL, Jabhat al Nusra, and Ahrar al Sham
(Freemen of the Levant, a key component of the Islamic Front) both as extremists and as the most
effective opposition forces in the field. On September 3, National Counterterrorism Center
Director Matthew Olsen stated that as many as 12,000 foreign fighters have travelled to Syria,
including more than 1,000 Europeans, and more than 100 U.S. citizens.2 Previous U.S.
government assessments suggest that these fighters hail from more than 50 countries and that
among them are Al Qaeda-linked veterans of previous conflicts.
As clashes and diplomatic discussions continue, Syrian civilians continue to suffer in what U.S.
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has described as an “apocalyptic disaster.” U.N.
sources report that since March 2011, the conflict has driven more than 3 million Syrians into
neighboring countries as refugees (out of a total population of more than 22 million; see Figure
1). According to U.S. officials, more than 6.5 million Syrians are internally displaced. The United
States is the largest bilateral provider of humanitarian assistance, with more than $2.4 billion
allocated to date.53 In December 2013, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Assistance (UNOCHA) appealed for an additional $6.5 billion in humanitarian assistance funding
to respond to the crisisfunding to
respond in 2014.64 For more information on humanitarian issues, see CRS Report
R43119, Syria:
Overview of the Humanitarian Response, by Rhoda Margesson and Susan G.
Chesser.
The negative effects of the humanitarian and regional security crises emanating from Syria now
appear to be beyond the power of any single actor, including the United States, to independently
2
Remarks by James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February
11, 2014.
3
Office of the Director for National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014.
4
Office of the Director for National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2014.
5
For details on U.S. humanitarian assistance see USAID, Syria Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #17, Fiscal Year (FY)
2014, June 19, 2014.
6
For more information, see UNOCHA Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) 2014 and 2014
Regional Response Plan (RRP).
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
contain or fully address. The region-wide flood of Syrian refugees, the growth of armed extremist
groups in Syria, and the assertive involvement of Iran, Turkey, and Sunni Arab governments in
Syria’s civil warspread of conflict to neighboring Lebanon and Iraq are negatively
affecting overall regional stability. The war in Syria also is
exacerbating local sectarian and political conflicts within Lebanon and Iraq, where violence is
escalating and threatens national stability.
PolicyTo date, policy makers in the United States and other countries appear
have appeared to feel both compelled to respond
to these crises and cautious in considering
options for doing so that may have political and
security risks such as the commitment of military
forces to combat or the provision of large-scale
material assistance to armed elements of the
opposition. In light of these conditions and trends,
Congress may face tough choices about U.S.
policy toward Syria and the related expenditure of
U.S. relief and security assistance funds for years to come.
years to come.
1
Remarks by DNI James R. Clapper to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 11, 2014.
Remarks at the Brookings Institution by NCTC Director Matthew G. Olsen, September 3, 2014.
3
For details on U.S. humanitarian assistance see USAID, Syria Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #20, Fiscal Year (FY)
2014, July 30, 2014.
4
UNOCHA Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) 2014 and 2014 Regional Response Plan (RRP).
2
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
Anti-Asad Forces
Syrian Opposition Coalition and Select Armed Elements
Anti-Asad forces have been engaged in a series of realignments and internal conflicts since mid2013, creating complications for external parties seeking to provide support. To date, the United
States has sought to build the capacity of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and local
activists. Many armed Sunni groups disavowed the SOC’s participation in the January-February 2014
2014 “Geneva II” talks with the Asad government in Switzerland. The U.S. government has
recognized the SOC as
the legitimate representative of the Syrian opposition and in May 2014
determined that the SOC’s
representative office in the United States would be considered a
foreign mission pursuant to the
Foreign Missions Act (22 U.S.C. 4301-4316).75
In July, the SOC elected Hadi Bahra, a Syrian businessman reportedly with close ties to Saudi
Arabia, as its new leader. Bahra served as a negotiator at the U.S.-backed peace talks in early
2014, and has been an outspoken critic of U.S. suggestions that the opposition’s disorganization
and infighting have contributed to its lack of success. In June 2014, Bahra argued, “The
expansion of cross-border extremism is a result of the reluctance of our friendly countries,
including the United States, to give sufficient support for the Syrian people and the mainstream
rebels to curb the rise of extremist groups and terrorist organizations that are being imported from
Syria’s neighboring countries.”6 Under Bahra’s leadership, the SOC continues to advocate for an
expansion of U.S. and other third-party support to opposition groups as a means of combating
extremist groups in Syria and pressuring the Asad government to agree to a negotiated settlement
to the conflict.
The other major component of U.S. assistance has been the provision of nonlethal and lethal
support to armed groups, nominally in coordination with a Supreme Military Command Council
(SMC),
whose leadership has been in flux for much of 2014. In June 2014, several military officers
officers reportedly resigned from the SMC, and SMC leader Brigadier General Abdul-Ilah al
Bashir al Noemi warned
that U.S. support for individual armed groups risked creating
“warlords.”87 General Salim Idris,
the former leader of the SMC, and other commanders rejected
leadership changes earlier in 2014
and have and distanced themselves from the SMC’s general staff and the SOC
SOC’s then-defense minister. On
June 26, an interim government decision disbanding the SMC reportedly was issued and was
rejected by Bashir and others.
Some reports suggest the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) and one of its prominent
commanders, Jamal Maarouf, or individual elements formerly associated with the SMC may be
emerging as focal points for new external assistance from the United States and others seeking to
back relatively moderate armed opposition forces. In April 2014, a coalition of militia forces
known as Harakat Hazm (Resoluteness Movement) released a video of their operatives loading
7
June 26, the opposition’s interim government reportedly issued
a decision disbanding the SMC, a move rejected by Bashir and others. In July, the SOC voted to
dissolve the opposition’s interim government, and subsequent reports suggest that efforts to
reorganize the military command and its liaison mechanisms with the SOC are under way. SOC
President Bahra said in July 2014 that the SOC leadership had,
“begun studying the absorption of the active rebel battalions within the SMC as a step
towards organizing the military efforts under one banner to counter to the growing threat of
extremist groups. It has become clear that Asad will not be forced to sit at the negotiating
5
According to an unnamed Administration official, the determination will not grant personnel of the office diplomatic
immunity or convey control or ownership of Syrian state property under U.S. jurisdiction to the SOC. As of June 2014,
the United States government had not formally withdrawn diplomatic recognition from the government of Bashar al
Asad, although the State Department had expelled some Syrian diplomats from the United States.
86
Syrian Opposition Coalition, “Obama’s Remarks Cast Greater Responsibility on his Administration,” June 24, 2014.
7
Dasha Afanasieva, “U.S. arms could create Syria ‘warlords’, rebel commander says,” Reuters, June 9, 2014.
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
and firing what appeared to be U.S.-origin anti-tank weaponry in Syria.9 Estimates of the
coalition’s size range from the hundreds to low thousands, and its leaders have made statements
supporting secular and inclusive policy goals for a post-conflict Syria. Specific public
information is lacking about which units or personnel within the coalition may have access to
U.S.-origin weaponry, and several other armed groups have since posted social media material
purporting to demonstrate their access to the same weaponry. An official affiliated with Harakat
Hazm told the New York Times that “friendly states” had provided “modest numbers” of the
weapons.10table unless the military situation on the ground is changed in favor of the revolutionary
forces, a thing that can only be achieved through organizing the rebel factions into a unified
body.”8
Some reports suggest the Syrian Revolutionaries Front (SRF) and one of its prominent
commanders, Jamal Maarouf, or individual elements formerly associated with the SMC may be
emerging as focal points for new external assistance from the United States and others seeking to
back relatively moderate armed opposition forces. In August 2014, the SRF and other groups
announced the formation of a new Revolutionary Command Council to coordinate their efforts. It
remains to be seen how effective the new coordination body may be or how it may relate to
SOC/SMC related efforts to provide command and control over opposition forces. Since April
2014, a coalition of militia forces known as Harakat Hazm (Resoluteness Movement) and several
other groups have released videos of their operatives loading and firing what appears to be U.S.origin anti-tank weaponry in Syria.9 Specific public information is lacking about sources of
weaponry and which units or personnel may have continuing access to U.S.-origin weaponry.10 In
August, the Islamist militia coalition known as the Ansar al Islam Front posted similar videos that
purport to depict their personnel firing U.S.-origin anti-tank weapons.11 An official affiliated with
Harakat Hazm told the New York Times that “friendly states” had provided “modest numbers” of
the weapons.12 The commander of the group told the Washington Post that those who supplied the
missiles had U.S. government approval and said the shipment “suggests a change in the U.S.
attitude toward allowing Syria’s friends to support the Syrian people.”1113
Asked about the reported shipments and use of U.S. origin weaponry by Syrian rebels, U.S.
National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan said, “The United States is
committed to building the capacity of the moderate opposition, including through the provision of
assistance to vetted members of the moderate armed opposition. As we have consistently said, we
are not going to detail every single type of our assistance.”1214 On May 5, an unnamed senior
Administration official reiterated that formulation to members of the press in a background
briefing, while stating that “asymmetry which exists on the ground militarily, unfortunately,
between the regime and the moderate opposition is problematic for the emergence of the kinds of
political conditions necessary for a serious political process. And we and others are focused on
that.”13 On May 28, President Obama said, “I will work with Congress to ramp up support for
those in the Syrian opposition who offer the best alternative to terrorists and brutal dictators.”14 In
June, the Administration requested funding and authority to arm and train vetted opposition forces
for select purposes after endorsing a Senate Armed Services Committee proposal contained in
Section 1209 of S. 2410.15 In June, the Administration requested funding and authority to arm and train vetted
opposition forces after endorsing a Senate Armed Services Committee proposal contained in
Section 1209 of S. 2410. As discussed below (see “Proposed Expansion of Lethal and Nonlethal
8
Syrian Opposition Coalition, “Syrian Coalition Works To Absorb New Rebel Battalions Within FSA,” July 19, 2014.
See Harakat Hazm YouTube Channel, April 15, 2014, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5x5Q4aTGvu0.
10
Section 3(a)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753 (a)(2)) applies obligations,
restrictions, and possible
penalties for misuse of U.S.-origin equipment to any retransfer by
foreign recipients of U.S.-supplied defense articles,
defense services, and related technical data to
another nation. If such a retransfer occurred in the absence of prior U.S.
approval, then the nation
making such a transfer could be determined to be in violation of its agreement with the United
States not to take such an action without prior consent from the U.S. government, with possible
penalties as described in the act.
Armed Islamist Groups
In late 2013, a number of powerful Islamist militia groups—some of which formerly recognized
the leadership of Idris and the SMC—announced the formation of a new Islamic Front.15 The
9
See Harakat Hazm.
11
See Ansar al Islam Front YouTube Channel, April 15August 10, 2014, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5x5Q4aTGvu0.k9pxIFUKEZg
and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1QclDMPQkPw.
12
Ben Hubbard, “Syrian Election Announced; Rebels Report New Weapons,” New York Times, April 21, 2014.
1113
Liz Sly, “Syrian rebels who received first U.S. missiles of war see shipment as ‘an important first step,’” Washington
Post, April 27, 2014.
1214
Tom Bowman and Alice Fordham, “CIA Is Quietly Ramping Up Aid To Syrian Rebels, Sources Say,” National
Public Radio (Online), April 23, 2014
1315
Transcript of Background Briefing on Syria by Senior Administration Official, U.S. State Department, May 5, 2014.
14
Transcript of President Obama’s Commencement Address, U.S. Military Academy, May 28, 2014.
15
The following armed groups constitute the core of the Islamic Front and were the original signatories of its charter:
Ahrar al Sham Islamic Movement; Suqur al Sham Brigades; Ansar al Sham Battalions; Jaysh al Islam; Liwa al Tawhid;
(continued...)
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Islamic Front and other recently created opposition coalitions active in northern Syria moved to
evict ISIL from areas of northern and western Syria in January 2014 and remain engaged in
hostilities with ISIL forces in some areas. Prior to the outbreak of the confrontation with ISIL,
many expert observers considered the 9
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Assistance”), President Obama has signaled his intention to expand assistance to select opposition
groups in Syria as a component of new efforts to combat the Islamic State.
Armed Islamist Groups
In late 2013, a number of powerful Islamist militias—some of which formerly participated in the
structure of the SMC—announced the formation of a new Islamic Front.16 In early 2014, the
Islamic Front and other opposition coalitions active in northern Syria moved to evict Islamic State
fighters from areas of northern and western Syria, and they remain engaged in hostilities with IS
forces in many areas. Prior to the outbreak of the confrontation with the Islamic State, many
expert observers considered the Islamic Front to be the most powerful element of the armed
opposition in northern Syria. The pressures of confrontation between members of the Islamic
Front and ISIL may be underminingthe Islamic State appear to have undermined the cohesion of the groupFront, as differences in
ideology,
strategy, priorities, and preferred tactics encouragehave encouraged individuals, units, and groups
within the Front
to reconsider their positions.
The Front’s November 2013 charter declared its goals to include “the full overthrow of the Al
it to reconsider their positions. In July 2014, Islamic Front member groups in Aleppo
announced their complete merger under the leadership of former Liwa al Tawhid (Monotheism
Brigade) leader Abdelaziz Salameh. Zahran Alloush, the military commander of the Islamic
Front-affiliated Jaysh al Islam (Army of Islam), continues to lead anti-regime operations in the
eastern suburbs of Damascus, where a coalition of armed Islamist groups recently agreed to form
a separate Unified Military Command. On September 9, an explosion and fire killed many of the
leaders of the powerful Ahrar al Sham Islamic Movement at a meeting in Idlib province, leading
many observers to speculate about the group’s future, in spite of its size and capabilities.
The Islamic Front’s November 2013 charter declared its goals to include “the full overthrow of
the Al Asad regime in Syria and for building an Islamic state ruled by the sharia of God Almighty
alone.”1617 In that document, the Front explicitly rejected the concepts of secularism and a civil
state, rejected “foreign dictates,” and stated its commitment to maintaining the territorial integrity
of Syria. Front leaders have rejected the SOC and issued a statement on January 20 in conjunction
with the Mujahedin Army and another group rejecting the Geneva II talks and setting a series of
conditions that must be achieved before they will contemplate a settlement.1718 The statement callscalled
for “the entire regime, including its head and all its criminal figures” to step down and callscalled for
security bodies to be held legally accountable. The Front and its allies further demanddemanded that there
be “no interference in the form of the future state after the regime [steps down] and no imposition
of any matter that conflicts with the Islamic identity of the masses or which takes away the rights
of any section of society.” A “Revolutionary Code of Honor” issued by the Front and other groups
in May 2014 drew criticism from some hard-line Islamist figures for not explicitly calling for an
Islamic state for post-Asad Syria. The Islamic Front sought to forbid its supporters from
participating in the June 2014 presidential election, but also forbid attacks on polling stations and
encouraged its supporters not to consider voters to be infidels.
16
The following armed groups were the original signatories of the Islamic Front charter: Ahrar al Sham Islamic
Movement; Suqur al Sham Brigades; Ansar al Sham Battalions; Jaysh al Islam; Liwa al Tawhid; and Liwa al Haqq.
17
Charter of the Islamic Front. For translation, see U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) Document
TRR2013112671951889, Syria: New ‘Islamic Front’ Formation Releases Charter, November 26, 2013.
18
The signatories—The Islamic Front, the Mujahedin Army, and the Islamic Union for the Soldiers of the Levant—
refer to themselves as the “forces active on the ground” in contrast to “those who only represent themselves.” OSC
Document TRR2014012066474330, “Syria: IF, Others Reject Regime Presence at Geneva 2, Issue Conditions for
Political Solution,” January 20, 2014.
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Jabhat al Nusra, an Al Qaeda-affiliated militia and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization, first sought to mediate between ISILthe Islamic State and its adversaries, but is now in outright
outright conflict with ISILthe group (see Figure 2 for a timeline of the emergence of the groups). Their
confrontation is sendingIslamic State
and Jabhat al Nusra). Their confrontation has sent shockwaves through the global jihadist
community as different clerics,
armed group leaders, and individual supporters declare have declared
their respective views on the infighting. In
general, other Syrian opposition forces have viewed Al
Jabhat al Nusra as more accommodating and
cooperative than ISILthe Islamic State, including some
groups who oppose AlJabhat al Nusra’s ideology. Some members
of the Islamic Front and other
non-Islamist opposition groups coordinate their operations with
Jabhat al Nusra in different areas.
The pressures of combat against ISILthe Islamic State and the incompatibility of
political goals among
the groups produce pressure for and against such coordination.
Secretary Kerry has accused the Asad government of “funding some of those extremists—even
purposely ceding some territory to them in order to make them more of a problem so he can make
the argument that he is somehow the protector against them.”18 Several press reports allege that
(...continued)
and Liwa al Haqq.
16
Charter of the Islamic Front. For translation, see U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) Document
TRR2013112671951889, Syria: New ‘Islamic Front’ Formation Releases Charter, November 26, 2013.
17
The signatories—The Islamic Front, the Mujahedin Army, and the Islamic Union for the Soldiers of the Levant—
refer to themselves as the “forces active on the ground” in contrast to “those who only represent themselves.” OSC
Document TRR2014012066474330, “Syria: IF, Others Reject Regime Presence at Geneva 2, Issue Conditions for
Political Solution,” January 20, 2014.
18
Ben Hubbard, “Syria Proposes Aleppo Cease-Fire…” New York Times, January 17, 2014.
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19 Several press reports allege that
opposition groups have sold oil and petroleum products from areas under their control to agents
of the Syrian government. The Asad government’s past permissiveness toward anti-U.S. Sunni
extremist groups during the U.S. presence in Iraq and Asad’s release of several prominent
extremists from prison in 2011 raise further questions about the regime’s strategy.
The intra-opposition battles and the mid-2014 offensive launched by the Islamic State have drawn
have drawn increased global attention to the composition and
direction of the Syrian opposition and the
provision of external support to its armed elements. The
formation of the Islamic Front in
November 2013 raised questions about which forces actually
remained affiliated with the SMC
and whether they are credible partners for the United States and
others. Then, in December,
Islamic Front fighters took control of facilities and equipment
belonging to the U.S.-backed SMC,
including some U.S.-supplied materiel. The incident, the
Front’s continued rejection of the U.S.-preferred
strategy of negotiation, and the group’s longtermlong-term goal of establishing an Islamic state in Syria
raise fundamental questions about whether and
how the United States should engage with the Front and its alliesthem.
In a January 2014 communiqué from their meeting in Paris, the United States and other members
of the “Friends of Syria core group of countries” (aka the “London 11” or “Core Group”)1920 stated
that “all armed groups must respect democratic and pluralistic values, recognize the political
authority of the National Coalition [SOC] and accept the prospect of a democratic transition
negotiated in Geneva.... ”2021 It remains to be seen whether statements by the Islamic Front and
others rejecting secular democracy, the political authority of the SOC, and negotiations with the
Asad government will preclude engagement by outsiders with the Front and its allies against Al
Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria the
Islamic State, Al Qaeda-affiliated groups, and/or against pro-Asad forces.
Terrorist Threats Posed by Syria- and Iraq-Based Sunni Extremists
Since January 2014, U.S. officials have made several public statements describing the potential
for Syria-based extremists to pose a direct terrorist threatthreats to the United States. In particular, U.S. and
19
Ben Hubbard, “Syria Proposes Aleppo Cease-Fire…” New York Times, January 17, 2014.
The group consists of Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
21
Foreign Ministry of France, Declaration of the Core Group Ministerial Meeting on Syria, Paris, January 12, 2014.
20
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European U.S. and European
officials have highlighted the particular threatthreat that may be posed by foreign fighters, some of
whom hold U.S.
and European passports. Central Intelligence Agency Director John Brennan said
in testimony
before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2014 that
there are three groups of people that are a concern, from an extremist standpoint; Ahrar al
Sham, Jabhat al Nusra, which is the Al Qaeda element within Syria, and the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It’s those latter two I think are most dedicated to the terrorist
agenda. We are concerned about the use of Syrian territory by the Al Qaeda organization to
recruit individuals and develop the capability to be able not just to carry out attacks inside of
Syria, but also to use Syria as a launching pad. So it’s those elements—Al Qaeda and ISIL that I’m concerned about, especially the ability of these groups to attract individuals from
other countries, both from the West, as well as throughout the Middle East and South Asia,
and with some experienced operatives there who have had experience in carrying out a
global jihad.... There are camps inside of both Iraq and Syria that are used by Al Qaeda to
develop capabilities that are applicable, both in the theater, as well as beyond.21
19
The group consists of Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
20
Foreign Ministry of France, Declaration of the Core Group Ministerial Meeting on Syria, Paris, January 12, 2014.
21
Testimony of CIA Director John Brennan, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2014.
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Brennan called the threat posed by these groups “a near-term concern, as well as a long-term
concern,” and said that “the intelligence community, including CIA, is working very closely with
our partners internationally to try to address the terrorist challenge.” In press reports, unnamed
intelligence officials have described the foreign fighter problem as “one of the most significant
threats we’re dealing with,” and the Federal Bureau of Investigation reportedly is monitoring
several returnees from Syria. Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has called the terrorist
threat from Syria “a matter of homeland security.”
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, a.k.a. ISIS)
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also referred to as ISIS) is a transnational Sunni
Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over areas of northwestern Iraq
and northeastern Syria since 2013, threatening the security of both countries and drawing
increased attention from the international community. The group’s ideological and organizational
roots lie in the forces built and led by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through
2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers
(aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June
2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a coalition known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).
ISI lost its two top leaders in 2010 and was weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S.
withdrawal in 2011.
Under the leadership of Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al
Baghdadi),22 ISI rebuilt its capabilities. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of
deadly attacks a month inside Iraq. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders
from 2006 onward is unclear. In recent months, ISIL leaders have stated their view that “the ISIL
is not and has never been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”23 and that, given that they view themselves as
a state and a sovereign political entity, they have given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization
deference rather than pledges of obedience.
In April 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria
with those of the Syria-based Nusra Front, under the name ISIL. Nusra Front and Al Qaeda
leaders rejected the merger, underscoring growing tensions among Sunni extremists in the region.
In July 2013, ISIL attacked prisons at Abu Ghraib and Taji in Iraq, reportedly freeing several
hundred detained members and shaking international confidence in Iraq’s security forces. ISIL
continued a fierce wave of attacks across northern, western, and central Iraq, while in Syria the
group consolidated control over the city and province of Raqqa and expanded its presence in
northwestern areas then-controlled by other rebel forces.
Late 2013 saw the Iraqi government seeking expanded counterterrorism and military assistance
from the United States, ostensibly to meet the growing ISIL threat. Inside Syria, ISIL alienated its
rebel counterparts further, and an anti-ISIL campaign erupted there in early 2014, expelling the
group from some areas it had controlled and unleashing a cycle of ongoing infighting. ISIL
remains strongest in Raqqah and Syria’s eastern provinces of Dayr az Zawr and Hasakah,
adjacent to western Iraq.
22
Al Baghdadi was arrested and detained by U.S. forces in Iraq at Camp Bucca, until his release in 2009.
OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, “Al-Furqan Releases ISIL Al-Adnani’s Message Criticizing Al-Zawahiri,
Refusing To Leave Syria,” Twitter, May 11-2, 2014.
23
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Figure 2. Evolution of Select Extremist Forces in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014
Source: U.S. government reporting and U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) reports.
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ISIL’s attempts to assert control over the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in Iraq’s Al Anbar
province and its June 2014 offensive in northern Iraq underscored the group’s lethality and ability
to conduct combat operations and manage partnerships with local groups in multiple areas over
large geographic distances. The durability of ISIL’s partnerships is questionable given its conflicts
in Syria and past opposition from tribal, Islamist, and Baathist armed groups in Iraq.22
Brennan called the threat posed by these groups “a near-term concern, as well as a long-term
concern,” and said that “the intelligence community, including CIA, is working very closely with
our partners internationally to try to address the terrorist challenge.”
In August 2014, the U.S. government supported the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution
2170, which strengthened international sanctions measures designed to combat the Islamic State,
Jabhat al Nusra, and Al Qaeda-affiliated entities. The resolution calls upon all Member States “to
take national measures to suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to, and bring to justice, in
accordance with applicable international law, foreign terrorist fighters of, ISIL, ANF and all other
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaida,” and reiterates Member
States’ obligation to prevent terrorist travel, limit supplies of weapons and financing, and
exchange information on the groups. On September 5, Secretary of State John Kerry and
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced plans to “form a multinational task force to share
more information about the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and from Syria into Iraq,” saying,
“These foreign fighters represent an acute threat to our NATO allies.”23
The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS)
The Islamic State is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded
its control over areas of northwestern Iraq and northeastern Syria since 2013, threatening the
security of both countries and drawing increased attention from the international community.
In September 2014, National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew Olsen stated that the
group poses “a direct and significant threat to us—and to Iraqi and Syrian civilians—in the region
and potentially to us here at home.”24 Olsen reported that the Islamic State “has more than 10,000
fighters …And its strategic goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate through armed conflict with
governments it considers apostate—including Iraq, Syria, and the United States.” Olsen stated
that “we have no credible information that ISIL is planning to attack the U.S.,” and highlighted
potential threats posed by foreign fighters with Western passports. According to Olsen, U.S.
22
Testimony of CIA Director John Brennan, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 5, 2014.
Joint Statement by Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel on the ISIL Meeting, September 5, 2014.
24
Remarks at the Brookings Institution by NCTC Director Matthew G. Olsen, September 3, 2014.
23
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counterterrorism officials “remain mindful of the possibility that an ISIL-sympathizer—perhaps
motivated by online propaganda—could conduct a limited, self-directed attack here at home with
no warning.” However, Olsen noted that, “In our view, any threat to the U.S. homeland from
these types of extremists is likely to be limited in scope and scale.”
In Syria, the Islamic State remains strongest in the province of Al Raqqah and in the eastern
provinces of Dayr az Zawr and Hasakah, adjacent to western Iraq. Its recent military operations in
Syria have focused on seizing control of Syrian government military bases in Al Raqqah
province, specifically the 93rd Brigade north of Al Raqqa city and the Taqba airbase. The
government-controlled Al Kuwayris airfield east of Aleppo also remained under siege. Islamic
State fighters continue to clash with other Syrian opposition forces in areas northeast of Aleppo
and remain engaged in combat with Syrian Kurdish militias and Arab tribal militias in Hasakah
and Dayr az Zawr provinces.
In Iraq, the Islamic State’s attempts to assert control over the cities of Fallujah and Ramadi in Al
Anbar province and its mid-2014 offensive across northern and western Iraq have underscored
the group’s lethality and ability to conduct combat operations and manage partnerships with local
groups in multiple areas over large geographic distances. Reports suggest that the Islamic State’s
possession of military weaponry and its willingness to use brutal tactics against its adversaries
contribute to the group’s ability to leverage its relatively limited size to control communities
through intimidation across a wide area. As of early September 2014, the Islamic State controlled
Mosul and areas west to the Syrian border, exercised control over areas of the Euphrates River
valley from the Syrian border to Abu Ghraib on the outskirts of Baghdad, and was conducting
intense military operations in communities along the Tigris River valley, including in Tikrit and
Sammara. The durability of the Islamic State’s partnerships is questionable given ongoing clashes
with other armed groups in Syria and past opposition to the Islamic State’s antecedents from Arab
tribes, other Islamists, Kurdish groups, and Baathists in Iraq.
Background
The group’s ideological and organizational roots (Figure 2) lie in the forces built and led by the
late Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and
Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Following
Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a
coalition known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI lost its two top leaders in 2010 and was
weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. Under the leadership of
Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi),25 ISI rebuilt its
capabilities. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of deadly attacks a month inside
Iraq. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders from 2006 onward is unclear. In
recent months, Islamic State leaders have stated their view that their group “is not and has never
been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,”26 and that, given that they view themselves as a state and a
sovereign political entity, they have given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference rather
than pledges of obedience.
25
Al Baghdadi was arrested and detained by U.S. forces in Iraq at Camp Bucca, until his release in 2009.
OSC Report TRN2014051234500562, “Al-Furqan Releases ISIL Al-Adnani’s Message Criticizing Al-Zawahiri,
Refusing To Leave Syria,” Twitter, May 11-2, 2014.
26
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Figure 2. Evolution of Select Extremist Forces in Iraq and Syria, 2002-2014
Source: U.S. government reporting and U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC) reports.
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In April 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria
with those of the Syria-based Jabhat al Nusra, under the name the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL/ISIS). Jabhat al Nusra and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger, underscoring
growing tensions among Sunni extremists in the region. In July 2013, ISIL attacked prisons at
Abu Ghraib and Taji in Iraq, reportedly freeing several hundred detained members and shaking
international confidence in Iraq’s security forces. ISIL continued a fierce wave of attacks across
northern, western, and central Iraq, while in Syria the group consolidated control over the city and
province of Raqqa and expanded its presence in northwestern areas then-controlled by other rebel
forces.
Late 2013 saw the Iraqi government seeking expanded counterterrorism and military assistance
from the United States, ostensibly to meet the growing Islamic State threat. Inside Syria, the
Islamic State alienated its rebel counterparts further, and an anti-IS campaign erupted there in
early 2014, expelling the group from some areas it had controlled and unleashing a cycle of
ongoing infighting. Following the launch of its mid-2014 assault in northern Iraq, ISIL changed
its name yet again to “the Islamic State” and announced the formation of a caliphate bridging
areas in its control in Iraq and Syria under the leadership of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi.
Ideology
Statements and media materials released by ISIL reflect an uncompromising, exclusionary
worldview and a relentless ambition. Statements by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and ISIL’s spokesman
Abu Mohammed al Adnani feature sectarian calls for violence and identify Shiites, non-Muslims,
and unsupportive Sunnis as enemies in the group’s struggle to establish “the Islamic State” and to
revive their vision of “the caliphate.”2427 The group describes Iraqi Shiites derogatorily as
“rejectionists” and “polytheists” and paints the Iraqi government of Nuri al Maliki as a puppet of
Iran. Similar ire is
aimed at Syrian Alawites and the Asad government, although some sources
allege that ISILIslamic
State operatives have benefitted from evolving financial and security arrangements
with Damascus dating back to the time of the U.S. presence in Iraq.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq Brett McGurk told the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in February 2014 that ISIL’s objective is “to cause the collapse of the Iraqi state and
carve out a zone of governing control in the western regions of Iraq and eastern Syria.” ISIL has
since built upon what McGurk described then as its “unprecedented” resources in terms of funds,
weapons, and personnel. Senior U.S. officials have stated that ISIL poses a serious threat to the
United States and maintains training camps in Iraq and Syria, but presently lacks the capability to
carry out operations on U.S. territory.25 with
Damascus dating back to the time of the U.S. presence in Iraq.
In July 2012, ISIL leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi warned
U.S. leaders that “the mujahidin have set
out to chase the affiliates of your armies that have
fled.... You will see them in your own country,
God willing. The war with you has just begun.”26
28 In January 2014, Al Baghdadi threatened the
United States directly, saying, “Know, O defender of
the Cross, that a proxy war will not help you
in the Levant, just as it will not help you in Iraq.
Soon, you will be in direct conflict—God permitting—against your will.”27
Potential Effects of ISIL Operations in Iraq on Syria28
ISIL gains in Iraq are likely to facilitate the flow of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria to
ISIL and other groups, and may increase bilateral cooperation between the Maliki and Asad
governments. Captured U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces already
has appeared in photos reportedly taken in Syria and posted on social media outlets. ISIL
advances in Iraq could weaken the Syrian government’s ability to hold ground in contested areas,
as some Iraqi Shia militants who had previously fought alongside Asad forces return home to
combat ISIL.29 Syrian forces in mid-June conducted air strikes against ISIL-held areas of Raqqah
24
OSC Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant,’” Translated from Ansar al Mujahideen Network, April 9, 2013.
25
Statements by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey,
and Secretary of State John Kerry, June 2014. See also Testimony of Central Intelligence Agency Director John
Brennan before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2014.
26
permitting—against your will.”29 English language propaganda and recruiting material released
by the group in connection with its recent executions of U.S. citizens James Foley and Stephen
Sotloff suggest the group is attempting to portray itself as responding to U.S. aggression, a
posture adopted by its predecessors and now rivals in Al Qaeda.
27
OSC Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant,’” Translated from Ansar al Mujahideen Network, April 9, 2013.
28
OSC Report GMP20120721586002, “Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes To ‘Repent,’” July 21, 2012.
2729
OSC Report TRR2014011980831299, “Al-Furqan Establishment Releases Audio Statement by ISIL Emir
Condemning ‘War’ Against Group,” Translated from Al Minbar al I’lami Jihadist Forum, January 19, 2014.
28
Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs.
29
“Seeing their gains at risk, Shiites flock to join militias, New York Times, June 13, 2014.
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Potential Effects of Islamic State Operations in Iraq on Syria30
IS gains in Iraq are likely to facilitate the flow of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria to the
Islamic State and other groups, and may increase bilateral cooperation between the Iraqi and
Syrian governments. Captured U.S.-origin military equipment provided to Iraqi security forces
has appeared in photos reportedly taken in Syria and posted on social media outlets. Islamic State
advances in Iraq could weaken the Syrian government’s ability to hold ground in contested areas,
as some Iraqi Shia militants who had previously fought alongside Asad forces return home to
combat IS forces.31 Syrian forces reportedly conducted air strikes against IS-held areas of Raqqah
and Hasakah in coordination with the Iraqi government, according to the London-based Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights.3032 Increased cooperation between Damascus and Baghdad could
alter the dynamics in both conflicts. It could undermine ongoing U.S. efforts to encourage Iraqi
leaders to press Asad to step down in favor of a transitional government. Increased Iraqi-Syrian
cooperation could also make Baghdad less likely to comply with U.S. requests to crack down on
Iranian overflights of weapons and equipment to Damascus.
It is unclear what impact ISILIS gains in Iraq would have outside of eastern Syria. At least half of
Syria-based ISILIS fighters are Syrian or Iraqi tribesmen, according to a Syrian ISILIS defector.31
Like 33 Like
other segments of the Syrian opposition, Syrian tribes have at times been reluctant to expand
engagement with government forces beyond their own local areas. Since early 2014, ISIL has
the Islamic
State has concentrated its forces in Syria’s northeast, and has largely avoided regular
confrontations in the
country’s main urban areas in Syria’s western half. Any Iraqi or U.S. efforts
to disrupt or sever
ISIL IS supply lines linking eastern Syria and western Iraq could benefit Syrian
military and Al
Qaeda-affiliated Nusra FrontJabhat al Nusra forces also operating in the area.
Pro-Asad Forces32Forces34
The Syrian government has continued military and security operations against insurgents while
pursuing political measures intended to boost Asad’s domestic and international legitimacy.
Government forces continued operations in Aleppo and Damascusthroughout Western Syria in an effort to isolate rebels
and sever their supply lines.3335 The government since the beginning of the year has also conducted
more than 40 local truces with rebel groups in besieged areas of Damascus, the Damascus
Countryside, and Homs that have allowed it to gain greater control in some contested areas.34
Syria in early June held presidential elections—the first since 1955 in which there has been more
than one candidate.35 Elections were held in all provinces except Raqqah in northern Syria, which
remains under the control of ISIL.36 Syrian government officials reported that Asad won with
88.7% of the vote—falling short of the 97% victory he claimed in the 2007 presidential
referendum—giving him a third seven-year term in office.37 Opposition leaders were effectively
disqualified from running by Syria’s revised election law, which stipulates that candidates must
have maintained continuous residence in Syria for 10 years prior to nomination and hold no other
nationality or prior criminal convictions.38 Syria’s Supreme Constitutional court put voter turnout
30
countryside, and Homs that have allowed it to gain greater control in some contested areas.36
On August 25,Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al Muallem at a news conference in Damascus
emphasized the regional threat from terrorist groups such as the Islamic State, and stated that
30
Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs.
“Seeing their gains at risk, Shiites flock to join militias, New York Times, June 13, 2014.
32
“Syria pounds ISIS bases in coordination with Iraq,” Daily Star, June 15, 2014.
33
“Sunni fighters gain as they battle 2 governments, and other rebels,” New York Times, June 11, 2014. See also,
Jamestown Foundation, “The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria,”
Terrorism Monitor Vol. 11, Issue 13, June 27, 2013, and, Nicholas Heras, “The Battle for Syria’s Al-Hasakah
Province,” U.S. Military Academy Combatting Terrorism Center, CTC Sentinel, October 24, 2013.
3234
Prepared by Carla Humud, Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs.
3335
“Syria: military bombards Aleppo,” Associated Press, June 16, 2014.
3436
OSC Report LIR2014061158407788, “Syria: regime exploiting humanitarian crisis to win truce deals, gain ground,”
June 11, 2014,
35
“Aftershocks of the Egypt Spring on Syria,” Asia Times, April 25, 2012.
36
“Syria plans presidential elections in summer; minister says Assad will likely be one of several candidates,” Wall
Street Journal, March 16, 2014.
37
“Assad re-elected in wartime election,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2014.
38
“Syrian presidential election law excludes most opposition leaders,” Reuters, March 14, 2014.
31
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at 73.4%, although some Asad opponents stated that they voted primarily to avoid retribution.39
Syrian oppositionists, as well as the United States and the European Union, condemned the vote
as illegitimate.40
The United States and other members of the Core Group on Syria had previously rejected Asad’s
candidacy, noting that a decision to hold presidential elections was inconsistent with the Geneva
Communique’s call for the establishment of a transitional governing body.41 Although the Syrian
government participated in the Geneva II negotiations, its representatives insisted that
counterterrorism issues be addressed before any discussion of a potential transition. Asad appears
disinclined to make concessions that would significantly undermine his hold on power,
particularly if he assesses that his military ultimately can prevail over insurgents or at least hold
them at bay. Asad may judge that his move to declare and destroy his government’s chemical
weapons has eased international pressure on his government, and that peace talks will further
expose opposition divisions—perhaps thereby demonstrating that his government lacks a credible
negotiating partner.
The Geneva II Talks
The January-February 2014 Geneva II talks brought many of the internal and external fault lines in the conflict into
sharp relief. Divergent perspectives among Syrian parties to the conflict were reflected among their respective
international backers. The negotiations failed to make progress toward the establishment of a transitional governing
body (TGB), but provided an opportunity for some members of the U.S.-recognized National Coalition of Syrian
Revolution and Opposition Forces (or Syrian Opposition Coalition, SOC) to demonstrate their capability to
represent the interests of Syrians and potentially improve their standing with some of the disparate opposition forces
engaged in fighting inside Syria. Nevertheless, other opposition groups, including several powerful Islamist militias,
rejected the negotiations and stated their intention to keep fighting until their demands are met.
According to U.N. officials, the Syrian government delegation refused to engage in discussions aimed at establishing a
TGB and sought to focus on the question of combatting terrorism. Syrian military operations, including attacks on
rebel held areas of Aleppo using barrel bombs and other indiscriminate means, continued during the talks and killed
hundreds of civilians. Prior to the talks, President Asad stated that the government had already laid out its peace
initiative in January 2013.42 Under the first stage of this plan, the Syrian armed forces would halt military operations as
soon as regional countries stopped funding and arming the opposition and when the opposition itself ceased attacks.43
The United States and other members of the Core Group have reiterated their support for negotiations on the terms
of the Geneva communiqué, while criticizing the Asad government for “obstruction” and praising the SOC delegation
for its participation in the talks.44 Syrian government representatives criticized what they viewed as the opposition
delegation’s unwillingness to fully discuss terrorism and its inability to make firm commitments on the actions of
armed groups.45 The Asad government appears unwilling to open discussions regarding any transitional arrangements
until its concerns with regard to terrorism and anti-state violence are addressed. Opposition representatives
acknowledge the threats posed by extremist groups, but view the establishment of transitional arrangements as
necessary for undermining the legitimacy of violent extremist groups.
The potential for future talks is uncertain, although participants and international supporters on both sides
characterized the end of the January-February round of discussions as a recess and agreed to a four point agenda to
guide talks if they resume. The four agenda items, as described by Joint Special Representative for Syria (JSRS) Lakhdar
39
“After Assad’s election triumph, fear grips stay-at-home Syrians,” Reuters, June 5, 2014.
“Assad re-elected in wartime election,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2014.
41
Joint Statement by the London 11 Countries, April 3, 2014.
42
President Asad, interview with Agence France Press, Syrian Arab News Agency, January 21, 2014.
43
Asad, speech at the Damascus Opera House, Syrian Arab News Agency, January 6, 2013.
44
Secretary of State John Kerry, Geneva Conference and Situation in Syria, Washington, DC, February 16, 2014.
45
Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), “Al-Jaafari: we will spare no efforts to make Geneva rounds of talks a success
with open-mindedness and a positive spirit,” Damascus, Syria, February 16, 2014.
40
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Brahimi, are (1) violence and terrorism; (2) the TGB; (3) national institutions; and (4) national reconciliation and
debate.46 Obama Administration officials have reiterated their shared view that once a Transitional Governing Body
[TGB] called for by the Geneva communiqué is established by mutual consent and has full control over state security
services, “Asad and his close associates with blood on their hands will have no role in Syria.” United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2139 reiterated the Council’s endorsement of the Geneva communiqué and demanded that
parties support its implementation “leading to a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people
and enables them independently and democratically to determine their own future.”
Shia Armed Groups and Iranian Support for the
Syrian Government
The involvement of Shia militias and Iran in the Syrian conflict has evolved since 2011 from an
advisory to an operational role, with forces in some cases now31
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Damascus was open to counterterrorism cooperation with the West as long as any operations were
coordinated with the Syrian government. Muallem added that coordination would also serve to
“prevent a misunderstanding. This is because we have air defense systems. Unless there is
coordination, we might get to this point.”37 However, some observers contend that Syria’s air
defense network provides uneven coverage—heaviest in areas around Damascus and minimal in
the sparsely populated northeast where the Islamic State is most prevalent.38
Prior to the Islamic State’s rapid territorial advance in the summer, some observers suggested that
the Asad government had not devoted significant resources to countering the group—in part
because its presence supported the government’s characterization of the opposition as dominated
by extremists. The government also appeared to see some benefit in the Islamic State’s tendency
to combat other Syrian opposition groups.39 However, as the Islamic State increased attacks on
isolated military outposts in the northeast, Syrian forces in August stepped up airstrikes against IS
positions in Aleppo, Raqqah, Dayr az Zawr, and Hasakah provinces.40 Despite its use of airpower
against the Islamic State, the military’s concentration of ground forces in western Syria appears to
have significantly limited its ability to recover territory in the country’s northeast.
Asad in July was sworn in for a third seven-year term as president after winning elections
condemned as illegitimate by Syrian oppositionists, the United States, and the European Union. 41
Elections were held in all provinces except Raqqah in northern Syria, which remains under the
control of the Islamic State.42 Syrian government officials reported that Asad won with 88.7% of
the vote—falling short of the 97% victory he claimed in the 2007 presidential referendum.43
Opposition leaders were effectively disqualified from running by Syria’s revised election law,
which stipulates that candidates must have maintained continuous residence in Syria for 10 years
prior to nomination and hold no other nationality or prior criminal convictions.44 Syria’s Supreme
Constitutional court put voter turnout at 73.4%, although some Asad opponents stated that they
voted primarily to avoid retribution.45 Syrian oppositionists, as well as the United States and the
European Union, condemned the vote as illegitimate.46
The United States and other members of the Core Group on Syria had previously rejected Asad’s
candidacy, noting that a decision to hold presidential elections was inconsistent with the Geneva
Communique’s call for the establishment of a transitional governing body.47 Although the Syrian
government participated in the Geneva II negotiations in early 2014, its representatives insisted
that counterterrorism issues be addressed before any discussion of a potential transition. Asad
appears disinclined to make concessions that would significantly undermine his hold on power,
37
OSC Report LIN2014082555835404.
“Syrian Air-Defense Capabilities and the Threat to Potential U.S. Air Operations,” Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, May 23, 2014.
39
“Blamed for Rise of ISIS, Syrian Leader Is Pushed to Escalate Fight,” New York Times, August 22, 2014.
40
“Syria Update: August 16-22,” Institute for the Study of War; and OSC Report LIR2014082584348354.
41
“Assad re-elected in wartime election,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2014.
42
“Syria plans presidential elections in summer; minister says Assad will likely be one of several candidates,” Wall
Street Journal, March 16, 2014.
43
“Assad re-elected in wartime election,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2014.
44
“Syrian presidential election law excludes most opposition leaders,” Reuters, March 14, 2014.
45
“After Assad’s election triumph, fear grips stay-at-home Syrians,” Reuters, June 5, 2014.
46
“Assad re-elected in wartime election,” Al Jazeera, June 5, 2014.
47
Joint Statement by the London 11 Countries, April 3, 2014.
38
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particularly if he assesses that his military ultimately can prevail over insurgents or at least hold
them at bay. Asad may judge that his move to declare and destroy his government’s chemical
weapons has eased international pressure on his government. Syrian officials may also hope that
Western fears of Islamic State expansion in the region could lead to renewed cooperation with the
Asad government, bolstering its legitimacy.
Shia Armed Groups and Iranian Support for the
Syrian Government
The involvement of Shia militias and Iran in the Syrian conflict has evolved since 2011 from an
advisory to an operational role, with forces in some cases fighting alongside Syrian troops.
Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran have traditionally depended on the presence of a friendly
government in Damascus to facilitate the transit of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah and to
preserve their ability to challenge Israel. Hezbollah and Iranian roles in Syria appear designed to
bolster Asad’s ability to suppress the opposition but also to secure their interests in Syria in the
event that the Asad government does not survive.4748
Hezbollah
In August 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Hezbollah for providing training,
advice, and logistical support to the Syrian government.4849 U.S. officials also noted that Hezbollah
has helped the Syrian government push rebel forces out of some areas in Syria. Hezbollah
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who was personally sanctioned for his role in overseeing
Hezbollah’s assistance to Damascus, publicly acknowledged Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria in
May 2013. Nasrallah also recently expressed confidence that the risk of the Asad regime’s defeat
and the partition of Syria had passed even if a war of attrition may persist.4950 He further referred to
the need for reconciliation initiatives to bolster the Asad government’s support among Syrians.
As of JuneSeptember 2014, Hezbollah fighters remained engaged in operations in the Qalamoun region
region northwest of Damascus, where the departure of some Iraqi paramilitary forces could place
additional pressure on the group.50 A 51 The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights in
August reported that at least 561 Hezbollah fighters had been killed in Syria since early 2013.52 A
senior Israeli military official in March 2014 stated that
Hezbollah currently maintains 4,000 to
5,000 fighters in Syria.5153
Over the past year, Hezbollah has worked with the Syrian military to protect regime supply lines
by helping to clear rebel-held towns along the Damascus-Homs stretch of the M-5 highway.5254
Hezbollah personnel in 2013 played significant roles in battles around Al Qusayr and the
46
Press Conference, Joint Special Representative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi, Geneva, Switzerland, February 15, 2014.
48
“Iran and Hezbollah build militia networks in Syria in event that Asad falls,” Washington Post, February 10, 2013.
48
E.O. 13582, U.S. Department of Treasury, August 10, 2012.
4950
“Hezbollah leader Nasrallah vows to keep fighters in Syria,” BBC, February 16, 2014; and, OSC Report
LIR2014040766062493, “Lebanon’s Nasrallah to Al-Safir: Risk of Bombings Drops, Danger of Syrian Regime’s Fall
Ends,” Al Safir Online (Beirut), April 7, 2014.
5051
“ISIS’ Iraq offensive could trigger Hezbollah to fill gap left in Syria,” Daily Star, June 16, 2014.
5152
OSC Report LIR2014082258507908.
53
“Israel watches warily as Hezbollah gains battle skills in Syria,” New York Times, March 10, 2014.
5254
“Syrian Army goes all-in to take back strategic highway,” Christian Science Monitor, December 2, 2013.
4749
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Qalamoun Mountains region, in which rebel presence along the highway threatened the
government’s ability to move forces and to access predominantly Alawite strongholds on the
coast.5355 Hezbollah forces on the Lebanese side of the border reportedly monitor and target rebel
positions near the border that facilitate attacks in Syria and Lebanon.
Last year saw an uptick in violence against Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, and the militia’s
support for the Asad government appears to be contributing to the rise in sectarian violence and
tension in Lebanon. Jabhat al Nusra and ISIL have claimed responsibility for attacks on
Hezbollah-controlled areas of Beirut and eastern Lebanon, describing the attacks as retaliation for
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria.5456
Iraqi Militias
Analysts estimate that there are between 2,000 and 5,000 Iraqi Shia fighting in Syria on behalf of
the Syrian government.5557 Many hail from Iraqi Shia political and militia groups including Asa’ib
Ahl al Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah. Members identify their objective as the defense of Shia holy
sites such as the tomb of Sayyida Zeinab, the granddaughter of the Prophet Mohammad, in
southern Damascus. Other reports describe these groups as assuming a broad operational role,
noting that militias have formed sniper teams, led ambushes, established checkpoints, and
provided infantry support for Syrian armored units.5658
It is difficult to assess the motivations of individual Iraqi fighters in Syria or determine whether
Asad’s survival is their primary goal. Some of the fighters appear to be young volunteers driven
by a desire to protect Shia holy sites, while others are trained militiamen who previously fought
coalition forces in Iraq. Reports suggest that Iraqi fighters receive training in Iran before being
flown in small batches into Syria, and that they work closely with Lebanese Hezbollah.5759
However, it is unclear who ultimately exercises command and control over these militias. Clashes
between Iraqi and local Syrian militias in mid-2013 resulted in some Iraqi combatants refusing to
fight under Syrian command.5860 Recent gains by ISIL in Iraq have prompted some Iraqi fighters in
Syria to return home and join local militias.5961
Iranian Support
Since 2011, Iran has provided technical, training, and financial assistance both to the Syrian
government and to pro-regime Shia militias operating in Syria. In February 2012, the U.S.
Treasury Department sanctioned the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) for
providing substantial technical assistance to Syrian intelligence, noting that MOIS also
participated in multiple joint projects with Hezbollah.6062 Treasury also designated the Islamic
5355
“Hezbollah and the fight for control in Qalamoun,” Institute for the Study of War, November 26, 2013.
“Hezbollah undeterred by ISIS claim, threats,” Daily Star, January 6, 2014.
5557
“Leaked video: Iran guiding thousands of Shiite fighters to Syria,” Christian Science Monitor, September 23, 2013;
“From Qusair to Yabrud: Shiite foreign fighters in Syria,” Al Monitor, March 6, 2014.
5658
“From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias,” CTC Sentinel, August 27, 2013.
5759
“From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias,” CTC Sentinel, August 27, 2013.
5860
“Iraqi Shi’ites flock to Assad’s side as sectarian split widens,” Reuters, June 19, 2013.
5961
“Seeing their gains at risk, shiites flock to join militias, New York Times, June 13, 2014.
6062
Department of the Treasury, Press Release, February 16, 2012.
5456
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Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) for training Syrian forces, and Iraqi Shia
militias fighting in Syria have credited Iran for providing training and coordinating their travel
into the country. Mohammad Ali Jafari, head of the IRGC, acknowledged in September 2012 that
some members of the Quds Force were present in Syria,6163 and U.S. officials have described them
as also working closely with Hezbollah. Regional observers in March 2014 estimated that
between 1,000 and 1,500 IRGC members were present in Syria.6264 In terms of non-lethalnonlethal aid, Iran
has provided Syria with billions of dollars in credit to purchase oil, food, and import goods
from Iran.6365
Chemical Weapons and Disarmament: Background64Disarmament66
A major policy concern of the United States has been the use or loss of control of chemical
weapons stocks in Syria during that country’sthe ongoing civil war. The United States and other
countries have
assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons repeatedly
against opposition
forces and civilians in the country. The largest-scale use to date was reportedly
on August 21, 2013. The U.N. Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic released its report on September 16, 2013, concluding that
surface-to-surface rockets containing the chemical weapons nerve agent sarin were used in the
Ghouta area of Damascus against civilians on a “relatively large scale.” The U.N. investigative
mission was not tasked with assigning culpability for the attacks. Reports of attacks using
chlorine gas in Hama province surfaced in mid-April 2014. The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission to
investigate the allegations came under armed attack during an attempt to examine the site on May
27. The investigators concluded that the evidence they have been able to examine thus far “lends
credence to the view that toxic chemicals, most likely pulmonary irritating agents such as
chlorine, have been used in a systematic manner in a number of attacks.”65
In August 2013, the Obama Administration threatened military action against Syria in response to
chemical weapons use in Syria. In a diplomatic solution that resulted in the Administration
withdrawing the threat, Syria agreed to join the international Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which requires Syria to destroy all of its chemical weapons stocks and production
facilities and bans the use of any toxic chemicals in warfare. Based on a joint U.S.-Russian
proposal, the Executive Council of the OPCW,66 an intergovernmental body tasked with
implementation of the CWC, approved a destruction plan under which Syria is required to destroy
all chemical weapons by June 30, 2014. According to the Director General, Syria will not meet
the June 30 deadline for destruction of all chemical weapons and production facilities,67 but all
declared chemical weapons agents have been removed from the country as of June 23, 2014.
Syria is required to declare and destroy all of its chemical weapons stocks and production
facilities under international supervision. Syria is believed to have possessed more than 1,000
61Syria is believed to have possessed more than 1,000 metric
tons of chemical warfare agents and precursor chemicals. This stockpile included several hundred
metric tons of the nerve agent sarin, which represented the bulk of Syria’s chemical weapons
stockpile. Damascus also had several hundred metric tons of mustard agent in ready-to-use form
and several metric tons of the nerve agent VX.67
The largest-scale use to date was reportedly an attack using nerve gas on August 21, 2013, which
the U.S. government estimated killed over 1,400 people.68 The U.N. Mission to Investigate
Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic released its report on
September 16, 2013, concluding that surface-to-surface rockets containing the chemical weapons
nerve agent sarin were used in the Ghouta area of Damascus against civilians on a “relatively
large scale.” The U.N. investigative mission was not tasked with assigning culpability for the
attacks.
Chlorine gas attacks in northern Syria have been repeatedly reported since mid-April 2014. The
OPCW established a Fact-Finding Mission to investigate these allegations. In their second report
released on September 10, the investigators concluded they have “compelling confirmation” that
a toxic chemical was used “systematically and repeatedly” as a weapon against villages in
northern Syria.69 The Fact-Finding Mission concludes that “chlorine, either pure or in mixture”
was used in attacks on the villages of Talmanes, Al Tamanah and Kafr Zeta. The report’s findings
are based on interviews and other evidence. The mission came under attack gathering evidence
onsite in May. Chlorine is not required to be declared or destroyed under the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), although its use in warfare is still prohibited under the Convention.
63
“Elite Iranian unit’s commander says his forces are in Syria,” Washington Post, September 16, 2012.
“From Qusair to Yabrud: Shiite foreign fighters in Syria,” Al Monitor, March 6, 2014.
6365
“Iranians dial up presence in Syria,” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2013.
6466
Prepared by Mary Beth Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation.
65
OPCW Office of the Director General, “Summary Report of the Work of the Fact Finding Mission in Syria Covering
the Period from 3 to 31 May,” June 16, 2014.
66
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, http://www.opcw.org.
67
OPCW, “8% of Syrian Chemicals Still Remain to be Removed; Fact-Finding Mission in Syria; Some Progress on
Syrian Production Facilities,” June 17, 2014.
62
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metric tons of chemical warfare agents and precursor chemicals. This stockpile included several
hundred metric tons of the nerve agent sarin, which represented the bulk of Syria’s chemical
weapons stockpile. Damascus also had several hundred metric tons of mustard agent in ready-touse form and several metric tons of the nerve agent VX.68
A joint mission of U.N. and OPCW personnel was created to monitor and facilitate Syrian
chemical weapons disarmament.6967
See CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea;
and Center for Disease Control, “Facts about Sarin,” May 20, 2013. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp.
68
Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013, White House
Office of the Press Secretary, August 30, 2013.
69
“OPCW Fact Finding Mission: ‘Compelling Confirmation’ that Chlorine Gas Used as Weapon in Syria,” OPCW
Press Release, September 10, 2014.
64
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By mid-August 2014, the international community had removed and destroyed Syrian declared
chemical weapons stocks, including nerve agents. A year earlier, in August 2013, the Obama
Administration had threatened military action against Syria in response to alleged nerve gas
attacks by Syrian government forces. As part of a diplomatic solution to the crisis based on a
U.S.-Russian joint proposal, the Administration withdrew the threat of military force and Syria
agreed to give up its chemical weapons and join the international Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), which bans the use of any toxic chemicals in warfare and requires Syria to destroy all of
its chemical weapons stocks and production facilities under international supervision. The
Executive Council of the OPCW, an intergovernmental body tasked with implementation of the
CWC, approved a destruction plan under which Syria was required to destroy all chemical
weapons by June 30, 2014. According to the Director General, Syria did not meet the June 30
deadline for destruction of all chemical weapons and production facilities,70 but all declared
chemical weapons agents had been removed from the country as of June 23, 2014. One hundred
percent of the most dangerous “priority” chemical weapons agents declared by Syria had been
destroyed by August 8, 2014, and 96% of all other chemicals.71 However, despite this progress,
destruction of facilities is still underway, and the United States has raised questions over whether
Syria has declared all of its chemical weapons.
Removal of Chemicals
A joint mission of U.N. and OPCW personnel was created to monitor and facilitate Syrian
chemical weapons disarmament.72 OPCW-U.N. experts arrived in Damascus on October 1, 2013,
and began to inspect Syria’s declared chemical weapons facilities. The first stage of destruction
activities focused on destroying “critical equipment” at chemical weapons production facilities.
The OPCW spokesman told reporters on October 31, 2013 that the Syrian government met the
November 1, 2013, destruction deadline for disabling production equipment, and that all chemical
weapons stocks and agents in
Syria were under “tamper-proof” seal.
Removal of Chemicals
The second stage of the chemical weapons destruction process involved transportation and
removal of chemical weapons agents from the country. These arewere liquid chemicals that have not
been loaded into delivery vehicles. The OPCW Executive Council on November 14, 2013,
approved the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons agents (“priority 1” chemicals) outside of
Syria due to the security situation in the country. The United States and others have provided
equipment to the OPCW-U.N. Joint Mission to help safely transfer these chemicals from storage
facilities to the Syrian port of Latakia. Once the chemicals arrived at the port, Danish and
Norwegian ships picked up the chemicals and removed them from Syria. The first quantity of
priority chemicals was moved to the port of Latakia in early January 2014, and the last shipment
was on June 23, 2014. This iswas the first time all of a country’s declared chemical weapons agents
have been removed from its territory.
No country had agreed to conduct destruction operations on its territory due to public concerns
about the dangers of the material, but also due to the short timeline for destruction which in some
cases would not have allowed for the required environmental and health impact assessments.
Therefore, the United States offered to neutralize the liquid chemical weapons agents on board
the Maritime Administration’s Motor Vessel (MV) Cape Ray using newly installed field
deployable hydrolysis systems (FDHS). This ship is expected to receive 700 metric tons of both
mustard agent and DF compound, a key component in sarin.70 U.S. personnel, including 64 Army
chemical specialists, will run the operation. Once removed from Latakia, the most dangerous
compounds in approximately 60 containers will be transferred to the Cape Ray at the Italian port
of Gioia Tauro for destruction at sea in international waters. NATO has canceled cooperation with
the Russian Federation on guarding the Cape Ray during chemical weapons destruction activities
because of Russia’s actions in Ukraine.71 Less sensitive chemicals will be shipped to commercial
68
See CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by Dana A. Shea;
and Center for Disease Control, “Facts about Sarin,” May 20, 2013. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/facts.asp.
69
See http://opcw.unmissions.org/.
70
“Army to Destroy Syrian Chemical Weapons Aboard Ship,” Army News Service, January 3, 2014.
71
“NATO to cancel activities with Russia, step up military cooperation with Ukraine,” Stars and Stripes, March 6,
2014.
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processing facilities, for example in the United Kingdom. Companies in Finland and the United
States were awarded contracts for processing the liquid waste from the destruction process.72
Syria did not meet the original deadline of December 31, 2013, for removal of these agents from
its territory. According to the OPCW Director General, the delays were caused by “security
concerns, the procurement and delivery of large quantities of packaging and transportation
materials and equipment, and adverse weather conditions.”73 Reports in early January quoted a
Syrian government official as saying two CW storage sites have been under attack.74 The Syrian
government also missed a February 5, 2014, deadline, raisingWhile this task was completed in six months, Syria had repeatedly missed several previous
deadlines. According to the OPCW Director General, the delays were caused by “security
concerns, the procurement and delivery of large quantities of packaging and transportation
70
“8% of Syrian chemicals still remain to be removed; Fact-Finding Mission in Syria; Some progress on Syrian
production facilities,” OPCW Press Release, June 17, 2014.
71
“Ninety-six percent of Syria’s declared chemical weapons destroyed – UN-OPCW mission chief,” UN-OPCW Joint
Mission Press Release, September 4, 2014.
72
See http://opcw.unmissions.org/.
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materials and equipment, and adverse weather conditions.”73 There was active military
engagement in the areas near storage sites. These delays raised questions about the intentions of
the Syrian government. In February, the U.N. Security Council called upon Syria to expedite
removal of the chemicals. The United States in particular had been critical of the slow progress by
the Syrian government. As U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW Robert Mikulak said,
The international community has put into place everything that is necessary for transport and
destruction of these chemicals. Sufficient equipment and material has been provided to Syria.
The ships to carry the chemicals away from Syria are waiting. The U.S. ship to destroy CW
agent and precursors is now in the region and waiting. Commercial facilities to destroy other
chemicals have been selected and contracts awarded; they are waiting. And yet Syria
continues to drag its feet.7574
In March, OPCW-U.N. Joint Mission Special Coordinator Sigrid Kaag described “important
progress” in efforts to expedite the transfer and destruction of chemicals and encouraged the
Syrian government “to sustain the current pace.”76 As of75 On April 29, the Joint Mission estimated that
the Syrian government had moved 18 shipments of chemicals to the port of Latakia, representing
around 92.5% of total stocks to be removed (up from 53.6% in mid-March).7776 Ambassador
Mikulak on April 29, 2014, said that “almost 100 tons of Priority 1 and Priority 2 chemicals still
remain in Syria.” He also said that the storage site where the remaining stocks were located was
occupied by Syrian government forces and therefore packing and preparation for transport should
have started immediately.7877 Fighting in the region of the site, which is northeast of Damascus, had
raised concerns about the overland transportation of the materials. The Syrian government said
the material could not be moved due to security concerns in the surrounding area. However, on
June 23, 2014, the OPCW announced that it had supervised the removal of the final shipment of
chemicals to the port of Latakia and they were successfully transferred and removed from the
port.79
72
“OPCW awards contracts to two companies for destruction of Syrian chemical and effluents,” OPCW-U.N. Joint
Mission Press Release February 14, 2014, http://opcw.unmissions.org/AboutOPCWUNJointMission/tabid/54/ctl/
Details/mid/651/ItemID/182/Default.aspx.
73
“Director General says Removal of Priority Chemicals in Syria Marks Important New Phase in Work of Joint
Mission,” OPCW press release, January 8, 2014.
74
Nick Cumming-Bruce and Rick Gladstone, “Syrian Government Reports 2 Attacks on Chemical Arms Sites,” New
York Times, January 8, 2014.
7578
Destruction of Chemical Weapons Outside of Syria
No country had agreed to conduct destruction operations on its territory due to public concerns
about the dangers of the material, but also due to the short timeline for destruction which in some
cases would not have allowed for the required environmental and health impact assessments.
Therefore, the United States offered to neutralize the liquid chemical weapons agents on board
the Maritime Administration’s Motor Vessel (MV) Cape Ray using newly installed field
deployable hydrolysis systems (FDHS). This ship received 600 metric tons of both mustard agent
and DF compound, a key component in sarin.79 U.S. personnel, including 64 Army chemical
73
“Director General says removal of priority chemicals in Syria marks important new phase in work of Joint Mission,”
OPCW press release, January 8, 2014.
74
Robert P. Mikulak, “Statement to the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the Executive Council,” The Hague, Netherlands,
February 21, 2014. http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/221891.htm.
7675
“Over half of Syria’s chemical weapons removed or destroyed, says joint OPCW-UN mission,” UN News Centre,
March 20, 2014.
77
Ibid.; 76
Secretary of State John Kerry Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 8, 2014; and, Robert
P. Mikulak, “Statement to the Fortieth Meeting of the Executive Council,” The Hague, Netherlands, April 29, 2014.
77.
78
Robert P. Mikulak, “Statement to the Fortieth Meeting of the Executive Council,” The Hague, Netherlands, April 29,
2014.
7978
“Announcement to the media on last consignment of chemical leaving Syria,” OPCW Press Release, June 24, 2014.
(continued...)79
“Army to destroy Syrian chemical weapons aboard Ship,” Army News Service, January 3, 2014.
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Destruction of Production Facilities
The Syrian government also did not meet the deadline of March 15, 2014, for destruction of its 12
chemical weapons production facilities, and has proposed that the facilities not be completely
destroyed but instead made inaccessible.80 The CWC requires that production facilities be
“physically destroyed.” U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW Robert Mikulak said in a February
statement that the Executive Council should require Syria to physically destroy the facilities in
line with the Convention.81 The OPCW has been developing a destruction plan for these facilities
with Syria. Ambassador Mikulak said in a statement on April 29, 2014, that 12 chemical weapons
production facilities declared by Syria remain “structurally intact,” and Syria was not cooperating
with the Technical Secretariat to resolve the issue. Mikulak noted that Syria should be held to the
same standards as other countries that have destroyed their chemical weapons facilities, such as
the United States. As of June 17, 2014, Syria has agreed to comply with the methodology for
destroying the above-ground chemical weapons productions facilities in hangars, according to the
Director General. There has been no resolution on destruction of the underground structures.82
U.S. and International Funding for CW Elimination Efforts
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Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response
specialists, ran the operation. Once removed from Latakia, the most dangerous compounds in
approximately 60 containers were transferred to the Cape Ray at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro
for destruction at sea in international waters. Less sensitive chemicals will be shipped to
commercial processing facilities in the Finland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Companies in Finland and the United States were awarded contracts for processing the liquid
waste from the destruction process.80
As of July 24, 2014 all 1300 metric tons of chemicals removed from the Syrian Arab Republic
had been successfully delivered to destruction facilities outside of Syria.81 On July 2, 2014, 600
metric tons of Priority 1 chemical weapons were successfully loaded onto the U.S. vessel MV
Cape Ray in the port of Gioia Tauro, Italy. The destruction of the chemical weapons onboard was
completed on August 18, 2014. This included 581 metric tons of DF, and 19 metric tons of sulfur
mustard.82
The remaining 700 metric tons of chemicals have been successfully delivered to Riihimaki,
Ellesmere Port, and Port Arthur, Texas—commercial land-based facility locations in Finland, the
United Kingdom and United States respectively. On August 7, 2014, the United Kingdom
announced that it destroyed its consignment of chemical weapons from Syria—190 metric tons of
Priority 1 chemicals—at Ellesmere Port.83
Destruction of Production Facilities
The Syrian government did not meet the deadline of March 15, 2014, for destruction of its 12
declared chemical weapons production facilities, and has proposed that the underground facilities
not be completely destroyed but instead made inaccessible.84 The CWC requires that production
facilities be “physically destroyed.” U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW Robert Mikulak said in a
February statement that the Executive Council should require Syria to physically destroy the
facilities in line with the Convention.85 The OPCW has been developing a destruction plan for
these facilities with Syria. Ambassador Mikulak said in a statement on April 29, 2014, that 12
chemical weapons production facilities declared by Syria remain “structurally intact.” Syria had
first requested that the facilities be converted for other military purposes. Mikulak noted that
Syria should be held to the same standards as other countries that have destroyed their chemical
weapons facilities, such as the United States. After negotiations with the OPCW technical
secretariat, Syria has agreed to comply with the methodology for destroying the above-ground
chemical weapons productions facilities in hangars, according to the Director General.86 On July
24, 2014 the OPCW Executive Council decided that seven of the twelve hangers will be “razed to
80
“OPCW awards contracts to two companies for destruction of Syrian chemical and effluents,” OPCW-U.N. Joint
Mission Press Release February 14, 2014.
81
“OPCW maritime operation completes delivers of Syrian chemicals to commercial destruction facilities,” OPCW
Press Release, July 28, 2014.
82
“Hagel Congratulates Cape Ray for Syria Mission,” Defense News, August 18, 2014.
83
“UK Completes Incineration of Syrian Chemicals,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office Press Release, August 6,
2014.
84
“Syria to miss deadline to destroy 12 chemical arms sites,” Reuters, March 6, 2014.
85
Statement of Robert Mikulak to the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the Executive Council, The Hague, Netherlands,
February 21, 2014.
86
“8% of Syrian Chemicals Still Remain to be Removed; Fact-Finding Mission in Syria; Some Progress on Syrian
Production Facilities,” OPCW Press Release, June 17, 2014.
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the ground” while the remaining five hangars will be “sealed permanently to make them
inaccessible.”87 Special Coordinator Kaag said that on October 1, the OPCW would “begin
destroying the 12 remaining chemical weapons facilities – seven so-called hangars and five
tunnels.”88 This work is expected to be completed in March 2015.
Completeness of the Declaration
Another area of ongoing concern is whether or not Syria has declared all of its chemical weapons
stocks to the OPCW as required by the CWC. U.S. Ambassador Mikulak said in a July 8
statement that “Syria must respond to all outstanding questions and requests for information and
demonstrate that it has fully declared all aspects of its chemical weapons arsenal and program.”89
A White House statement on August 18 marking the end of destruction operations on the MV
Cape Ray said that “serious questions remain with respect to the omissions and discrepancies in
Syria’s declaration to the OPCW and about continued allegations of use.”90 U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations Samantha Power said on September 4 that, “The United States is concerned
about all discrepancies, also the potential that there are real omissions in the declaration.”91 On
September 4, Special Coordinator Kaag said that dialogue continues with the Syrian government
about discrepancies in the declaration. According to press reports, the OPCW-UN Joint Mission
will return to Syria in September to further verify that Syria has declared all stocks. As noted
above, chlorine is not required to be declared or destroyed under the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), although its use in warfare is still prohibited under the Convention.
Funding for CW Elimination Efforts
The international community, including the United States, has contributed both technical and
financial assistance to the OPCW-U.N. Joint Mission. In-kind technical assistance to date
includes specialized packaging from the United States for transporting chemical weapons in
Syria, security-related support from Russia for Syrian ground movement of the materials, and
cargo ships and naval vessels from Denmark and Norway.8392 Italy has volunteered to provide a
port for transferring the agent from the cargo ships to the Cape Ray; the United Kingdom and
Germany have provided a chemical processing facility for the destruction of some of the chemical
materials.
According to the State Department, the United States has given approximately $6 million in
financial assistance to the OPCW and U.N. joint mission through the State DepartmentadministeredDepartment87
“OPCW Maritime Operation Completes Delivers of Syrian Chemicals to Commercial Destruction Facilities,” OPCW
Press Release, July 28, 2014.
88
“Ninety-six percent of Syria’s declared chemical weapons destroyed – UN-OPCW mission chief,” UN-OPCW Joint
Mission Press Release, September 4, 2014.
89
Statement by Robert Mikulak to the Seventy-sixth Session of the Executive Council, The Hague, Netherlands, July 8,
2014.
90
“Statement by the President on the Completion of M/V Cape Ray Destruction of Syria’s Declared Chemical
Weapons,” White House Statement, August 18, 2014.
91
“Remarks at the Security Council Stakeout Following Consultations on Syria; U.S. Permanent Representative to the
United Nations Samantha Power,” September 4, 2014.
92
“Frequently Asked Questions,” OPCW website, http://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria-and-the-opcw/
frequently-asked-questions/.
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administered Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. The United States has also given
significant in-kind assistance to international inspectors. The largest contribution to the
international effort has come from the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) Program. On April 8, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction Rebecca K.C. Hersman said that the CTR program had allocated $160 million
to support the CW elimination effort. DOD CTR also accepted $19 million in contributions from
Germany, the UK, and Canada to assist with CTR programs, including the effort in Syria. Since
the bulk of this funding was spent preparing the MV Cape Ray and equipping inspectors, the
(...continued)
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/announcement-to-media-on-last-consignment-of-chemicals-leaving-syria/.
80
“Syria to miss deadline to destroy 12 chemical arms sites,” Reuters, March 6, 2014.
81
Robert Mikulak, “Statement to the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the Executive Council,” The Hague Netherlands,
February 21, 2014. http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/221891.htm.
82
OPCW, “8% of Syrian Chemicals Still Remain to be Removed; Fact-Finding Mission in Syria; Some Progress on
Syrian Production Facilities,” June 17, 2014. https://www.opcw.org/news/article/8-of-syrian-chemicals-still-remain-tobe-removed-fact-finding-mission-in-syria-some-progress-on-s/.
83
“Frequently Asked Questions,” OPCW website, http://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria-and-the-opcw/
frequently-asked-questions/.
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M/V Cape Ray and equipping inspectors, the
budget request for FY2015 is less than what was spent this past year—$15.7 million for technical
expertise and resources to support the U.N.-OPCW Joint Mission in FY2015.
For more information on Syria’s chemical weapons and U.S. and international participation in the
disarmament process, see CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress,
coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
U.S. Policy and Assistance
Debates over U.S. policy toward Syria since 2011 have repeatedly returned to the question of
questions of
assistance for the opposition and potential U.S. military intervention, whether to protect civilians,
target terrorist groups, or punish Syrian
forces suspected of involvement in chemical weapons
attacks or other attacks on opposition-held
areas. To date, areas. The contours of these debates are shifting amid
intensifying discussion of the wisdom, scope, costs, and risks of potential participation in newly
proposed multilateral efforts to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and/or Syria. To date,
Administration officials have stated that U.S. military intervention to shape the
outcome of
Syria’s civil conflict or to change the Syrian regime may not achieve U.S. objectives,
and may
lead to unintended negative consequences. Administration officials have cited a number
of reasons for their reluctance to undertake direct military intervention or provide large-scale
assistance to shift the balance of power in Syria, including fears of exacerbating the violence;
inviting greater regional spillover or intervention; or opening a power vacuum that could benefit
the extremists who are part of the opposition.84 Uncertain costs, military constraints, and domestic
political opposition to such involvement also are likely factors
In more recent comments about the threats posed by the Islamic State, U.S. officials have
announced new multifaceted and multilateral efforts to combat the organization. President Obama
said on September 10 that he “will not hesitate to take action against ISIL, in Syria, as well as
Iraq.” As of early September 2014, no significant changes in stated U.S. policy objectives toward
the broader conflict in Syria had been announced, and President Obama had reiterated his June
2014 request to Congress for authority and funding to establish an overt, Department of Defenseimplemented training and equipment program for vetted Syrians (see the “Administration “Train
and Equip” Proposal and Congressional Responses” section).
U.S. officials had rejected Syrian government demands for cooperation in the fight against the
Islamic State organization, saying that the United States would not “ask for permission from the
Syrian regime” in pursuit of its anti-IS objectives. On August 25, White House spokesman Josh
Earnest told reporters that, in the view of the Administration, there was not a “lesser of two evils”
between the Islamic State and the government of Bashar al Asad. Earnest said:
In the judgment of this Administration, the people of Syria should have the opportunity to
determine the future of their country; they should have the opportunity to exercise some
influence over what kind of country they want to live in. That is a basic fundamental human
right, a basic fundamental value that this administration supports. It’s why we have weighed
in heavily in support of the moderate opposition in Syria. It’s why we urged President Asad
to leave power. And it is why we do not believe that ISIL would be acting in the best interest
of the people of Syria if they were to take over leadership of that country. …We’re not
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interested in trying to help the Asad regime. In fact, we have been calling for a number of
years now for the Asad regime to step down.
While condemning Asad as a thug and a murderer and aiding some of his adversaries,
Administration officials have continued to stress the need for a negotiated political solution to the
conflict in the hopes of keeping the Syrian state intact, securing its weapon stockpiles and
borders, and combating extremist groups now active there. Administration officials have cited a
number of reasons for their reluctance to undertake direct military intervention in Syria or provide
large-scale assistance to shift the balance of power there, including fears of exacerbating the
violence; inviting greater regional spillover or intervention; or opening a power vacuum that
could benefit extremists.93 Uncertain costs, military constraints, and domestic political opposition
to such involvement also have been likely factors shaping Administration considerations.
Some critics of the Administration’s policy argue that many of these negative outcomes are
occurring even in the absence of U.S. intervention and suggest that the image and influence of the
United States are weakened by a refusal to intervene to protect civilians or respond to
provocations by Asad or extremist forces. Others express concern that military intervention will
exacerbate negative
conditions prevailing on the ground and suggest that the United States cannot
ensure that
such intervention or support provided to opposition groups will not benefit extremists.
Recent Administration official statements concerning potential terrorist threats emanating from
Syria Syria
have led to a reconsideration of many of these questions by some Members of Congress and
the the
public. The Administration’s June 2014 request for funding and authority to arm and train
vetted Syrian opposition forces signaled that such a reconsideration indeed has taken place.
However, Administration officials maintain that U.S. policy goals and the contours of the United
States’ declared policy goals and preferred means have not fundamentally changed.
While condemning Asad as a thug and a murderer and aiding some of his adversaries,
Administration officials have continued to stress the need for a negotiated political solution to the
conflict in the hopes of keeping the Syrian state intact, securing its weapon stockpiles and
borders, and combating extremist groups now active there. vetted
Syrian opposition forces signaled that such reconsideration had taken place, and consideration of
a broader anti-Islamic State campaign appears to be driving further reconsideration.
The implementation of U.S. strategy
in Syria to date has included the provision of both nonlethal
and lethal assistance to select Syrian
opposition groups, a sustained international diplomatic effort
to establish a negotiated transition,
and the provision of humanitarian assistance in Syria and
neighboring countries. Through 2013,
these initiatives were implemented under the auspices of an
ad hoc series of assistance
notifications to Congress providing for the waiver of certain restrictions on the use of U.S. funds
84
Other competing foreign policy priorities also have influenced the Administration’s position, such as a desire to
maintain Russian and Chinese support for international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and concern that sectarian
and strategic competition in Syria could ignite a regional conflict and threaten U.S. allies and global security interests.
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for assistance in Syria and the assertion of emergency contingency authorities to reprogram and
allocate funds for use in response to the crisis. In 2014, a shift toward independently authorized
and funded assistance programs appeared to be underway. Cumulatively, the notifications and
requests submitted to date illustrate an evolution of U.S. involvement in the direction of seeking
deeper partnership with select opposition actors on the ground in Syria, while seeking to bolster
and unify opposition figures based outside of Syria.
As of June 2014, the United States had allocated more than $287 million in support of the nonarmed opposition (including the SOC and local activists), more than half of which had been
delivered as of late March.85
restrictions on the use of U.S. funds for assistance in Syria and the assertion of emergency
contingency authorities to reprogram and allocate funds for use in response to the crisis.
In 2014, a shift toward independently authorized and funded assistance programs appeared to be
underway when the terms of the debate began shifting in response to the Islamic State’s offensive
in Iraq. Cumulatively, congressional notifications and requests submitted to date illustrate an
evolution of U.S. involvement in the direction of seeking deeper partnership with select
opposition actors on the ground in Syria, while seeking to bolster and unify opposition figures
based outside of Syria. The stated goal of these efforts has been to place greater pressure on
President Asad and his supporters to negotiate a transition agreement that will bring conflict in
Syria to an end. If current trends continue, the focus of these efforts could increasingly include
supporting entities in Syria that can assist in multilateral counterterrorism operations or assume
control of Islamic State-held territory and resources in the wake of any coalition military
operations targeting the group.
93
Other competing foreign policy priorities also have influenced the Administration’s position, such as a desire to
maintain Russian and Chinese support for international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and concern that sectarian
and strategic competition in Syria could ignite a regional conflict and threaten U.S. allies and global security interests.
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As of September 2014, the United States had allocated more than $287 million in support of the
non-armed opposition (including the SOC and local activists), more than half of which had been
delivered as of late March.94 The delivery of some assistance to select groups resumed after
having been suspended as a result of the Islamic Front’s seizure of SOC/SMC-controlled
warehouse facilities and intra-opposition fighting in northern Syria.8695 The FY2014 Consolidated
Appropriations bill (H.R. 3547, P.L. 113-76) provided new authority for the Administration to use
use FY2014 and previously appropriated monies in the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account to
provide nonlethal assistance for certain purposes in Syria.
(see textbox).
FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act and Nonlethal Assistance in Syria
Section 7041(i) of Division K of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 3547, P.L. 113-76) significantly
significantly expands the Administration’s authority to provide nonlethal assistance in Syria for certain purposes using the
the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. Such assistance had been restricted by a series of preexisting provisions of law
law (including some terrorism-related provisions) that required the President to assert emergency and contingency
authorities to provide such assistance to the Syrian opposition and communities in Syria. The new authority makes
FY2014 and prior year ESF funding available “notwithstanding any other provision of law for non-lethalnonlethal assistance for
programs to address the needs of civilians affected by conflict in Syria, and for programs that seek to—
(A) establish governance in Syria that is representative, inclusive, and accountable;
(B) develop and implement political processes that are democratic, transparent, and adhere to the rule of law;
(C) further the legitimacy of the Syrian opposition through cross-border programs;
(D) develop civil society and an independent media in Syria;
(E) promote economic development in Syria;
(F) document, investigate, and prosecute human rights violations in Syria, including through transitional justice
programs and support for nongovernmental organizations; and
(G) counter extremist ideologies.”
The act requires the Secretary of State to “take all appropriate steps to ensure that mechanisms are in place for the
adequate monitoring, oversight, and control of such assistance inside Syria,” and requires the Secretary of State to
“promptly inform the appropriate congressional committees of each significant instance in which assistance provided
pursuant to the authority of this subsection has been compromised, to include the type and amount of assistance
affected, a description of the incident and parties involved, and an explanation of the Department of State’s response.”
The act further requires the Obama Administration to submit a comprehensive interagency strategy prior to using
the authority that would include a “mission statement, achievable objectives and timelines, and a description of interagency and donor coordination and implementation of such strategy.” The strategy, which may be classified, must also
85
See U.S. State Department Fact Sheet
include “a description of oversight and vetting procedures to prevent the misuse of funds.” All funds obligated
pursuant to the new authority are subject to established congressional notification procedures.
94
U.S. State Department, U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition, January 17, 2014; and
Assistant Secretary of
State for Near East Affairs Anne Patterson Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, March 26, 2014.
8695
The State Department has reported that lines of supply for nonlethal support to armed opposition elements are
“periodically contested by the regime or extremist fighters.” In the wake of the incident the Obama Administration
“decided that it was a risk to be providing that assistance if it’s going to the extremists.” See Secretary of State Kerry,
Remarks with Qatari Foreign Minister Khalid bin Muhammad al Atiyah, Paris, France, January 12, 2014; and,
Secretary of State Kerry, Press Availability at the Geneva II International Conference on Syria, January 22, 2014.
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include “a description of oversight and vetting procedures to prevent the misuse of funds.” All funds obligated
pursuant to the new authority are subject to established congressional notification procedures.
FY2015 Budget Request for Syria
The FY2015 basic foreign assistance request for Syria reflects the two main elements of the
Obama Administration’s policy response: (1) humanitarian assistance to meet the needs of
internally displaced Syrians and refugees in neighboring countries, and (2) political, economic,
and non-lethalnonlethal military support for national and local opposition groups. Funds provided since
2011 in Syria and in neighboring countries for these combined purposes exceed $2.6 billion to date.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Syria, FY2013-FY2015
date.
Of the total $1.26 billion in FY2015 funding requested specifically for Syria in the basic foreign
operations budget request, $1.1 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations funds would support
humanitarian response needs from the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA-OCO) and
International Disaster Assistance (IDA-OCO) accounts. A further $155 million from the
Economic Support Fund-Overseas Contingency Operations (ESF-OCO), International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement-Overseas Contingency Operations (INCLE-OCO), and
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs (NADR) accounts would
support the Syrian opposition and transition related initiatives. Specific proposals for the use of
those funds are not yet available. The House (H.R. 5013) and Senate (S. 2499) versions of the
FY2015 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill would extend “notwithstanding” assistance
authority for FY2015 funds, contingent on an update of a strategy required under P.L. 113-76.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Syria, FY2013-FY2015 Original Request
(In thousands of current dollars; fiscal year denotes source of funds)
FY2013
(Actual)
FY2014
(Estimate)
20,780 (OCO)
n.a.
125,000 (OCO)
INCLE
0
n.a.
10,000 (OCO)
NADR
0
n.a.
20,000
38,620 (OCO)
n.a.
0
FFP
18,338
n.a.
0
Totala
77,738
n.a.
155,000
Account
ESF
PKO
FY2015
(Request)
Source: State Department and Foreign Operations, Congressional Budget Justification, FY2015.
Notes: FY2014 estimates for Syria spending were not available as of April 2014. Funds appropriated in fiscal
years prior to FY2013 have supported U.S. assistance programs since 2011. n.a. = not available.
a.
The FY2013 total figure does not reflect all of the $287 million allocated for support to the Syrian
opposition to date. The FY2015 Syria request includes, but the table does not show, $1.1 billion within
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA-OCO) and International Disaster Assistance (IDA-OCO) accounts
expected to be used for humanitarian assistance related to the Syria conflict.
Of the total $1.26 billion in FY2015 funding requested specifically for Syria in the basic foreign
operations budget request, $1.1 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations funds would support
humanitarian response needs from the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA-OCO) and
International Disaster Assistance (IDA-OCO) accounts. A further $155 million from the
Economic Support Fund-Overseas Contingency Operations (ESF-OCO), International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement-Overseas Contingency Operations (INCLE-OCO), and
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs (NADR) accounts would
support the Syrian opposition and transition related initiatives. If a transition should occur,
FY2015 funds would support a political transition toward democracy, as well as reconstruction
and recovery efforts. Specific proposals for the use of those funds are not yet available. The
House version of the FY2015 State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill
would extend “notwithstanding” assistance authority for FY2015 funds, contingent on an update
of the strategy required under P.L. 113-76.
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Proposed Expansion or RestrictionProposed Expansion of Lethal and Nonlethal
Assistance
Congressional Proposals
In the 113th Congress, proposals to authorize the expanded provision of nonlethal and lethal
assistance in Syria with various provisos have been introduced or considered in committees, and
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would place various conditions on assistance, establish reporting requirements, grant diverse
authorities, and set different time limitations. Most recently, the
•
The Senate Armed Services
Committee reported version of the FY2015 National
Defense Authorization Act (Section 1209 of
S. 2410) would authorize the
Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the State
Department, to train
and equip vetted members of select Syrian opposition forces for limited
purposes purposes
through the year 2018.
•
S. 960, the Syria Transition Support Act of 2013, was approved
by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee as amended by a 15-3 vote in May 2013.
•
H.R. 1327,
the Free Syria Act of 2013, was introduced in March 2013.
•
As noted above, House and Senate Foreign Operations
Appropriations bills under
consideration for FY2015 would extend FY2014 authorities to provide
non-lethal nonlethal
assistance in Syria for select purposes (H.R. 5013 and S. 2499).
•
Section 10010 of the House-passed Defense Department appropriations bill for
FY2015 (H.R.
4870) would prohibit the use of defense funds “to transfer man-portablemanportable air defense systems
(MANPADS) to any entity in Syria.”
•
Other proposals, such as H.R. 2503 and H.R. 2432, seek to
prohibit any military assistance to combatants in Syria.
Executive Branch Proposal—Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative
On June 26, 2014, the Administration released its request for FY2015 Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) funds for the Department of Defense as well as additional requested funds for
State Department programs. Included in the request were requested funds that would be
designated for a proposed $1.5 billion Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative (RSI).87 According
to the RSI request, the Administration is seeking funding and authorization from Congress to do
the following:
•
Notwithstanding other provisions of law, through December 2018, “
military assistance to combatants in Syria.
Administration “Train and Equip” Proposal and Congressional Responses
President Obama’s requests to Congress for authority and resources to train and equip vetted
members of the Syrian opposition in support of U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State
organization have reinvigorated congressional debate on the subject. The Administration’s June
2014 request for FY2015 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds included a request for
funds and authorities for a proposed $1.5 billion Syria Regional Stabilization Initiative (RSI),
$500 million of which would support an overt training and equipment program for select
Syrians.96 According to the RSI request, the Administration sought funding and authorization
from Congress to do the following:
Notwithstanding other provisions of law, through December 2018, to provide assistance,
including the provision of defense articles and defense services, to appropriately vetted
elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups or
individuals individuals
for the following purposes:
(1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime, facilitating the
provision provision
of essential services, and stabilizing territory controlled by the opposition;
(2) Defending the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from the
threats threats
posed by terrorists in Syria; and
87
96
Estimate #2—FY 2015 Budget Amendments: Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State and Other
International Programs (State/OIP) to update the FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations funding levels; for both
DOD and State/OIP to implement the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund and the European Reassurance Initiative; and
for State/OIP peacekeeping costs in the Central African Republic. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget_amendments.
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(3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”
If approved by Congress as requested, the train and equip authority would be supported by $500 million
million in FY2015 funding, presumably with requests in future years to follow. The requested
authority would allow the U.S. government to accept foreign contributions to authorized
efforts to
provide such assistance.
•
The request also seeks funding and authority for expanded efforts to
“build the capacity
of the Syrian opposition and of neighboring countries including Jordan,
Lebanon, Turkey,
and Iraq to manage the growing spillover effects of the Syrian conflict.”
According to the
request, the Administration intends to use any funds provided by Congress for
the RSI to
“leverage existing security cooperation and assistance programs, expand training and
related infrastructure, and tailor support packages to meet identified regional needs for
areas contending with refugees and other destabilizing effects from the Syrian conflict.”
Potential Questions for Congress
Potential questions of interest for congressional consideration and oversight of the RSI request
may include the following:
•
What effects might the provision of overt military assistance to non-state armed
groups and individual combatants in Syria’s non-international armed conflict
have on U.S. efforts to discourage other actors from providing military assistance
to the Syrian government or providing similar assistance to actors in other
conflicts? What precedents, if any, would Congress be setting if it authorized and
funded such an overt program?
•
To which groups, entities, and individuals does the Administration intend to
provide expanded assistance, including defense articles and services? What are
their political goals for the future of Syria? What types of weaponry or training
may be provided to recipients? What may not be provided? Why?
•
What mechanisms will be put in place to monitor the disposition of any provided
U.S. defense articles? What specific vetting criteria will be used to assess the
worthiness of intended recipients? What conditions or criteria might prevent a
group or individual from being eligible for U.S. assistance?
•
Where will such training and equipping efforts take place? With what
implications for the host country or countries? How does the Administration
expect the current Syrian government and its allies to respond to those assisting
any such U.S. efforts?
•
How might the provision of overt military assistance to the Syrian opposition
affect the willingness of the Asad government to cooperate on issues of
importance to the United States, including counterterrorism, regional security,
and the conflict in Iraq? How might the provision of U.S. military assistance to
select groups affect the balance of power and political relations among different
Syrian opposition groups?
•
What countries are likely to contribute financially to potential U.S. efforts
described the proposed request?
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•
How might the Administration intend to report to Congress on the status,
achievements, and outstanding goals of such a program? What additional
administrative and program management costs, if any, might be associated with
the proposal?
Issues Shaping Future U.S. Assistance
As with humanitarian assistance, U.S. efforts to support local security and service delivery efforts
to date have been hindered by a lack of regular access to areas in need. According to
Administration officials, border closures, ongoing fighting, and risks from extremist groups have
presented unique challenges. The infighting among opposition forces and the empowerment of
ISIL in eastern Syria and north and western Iraq creates further complications. With the
Administration now requesting funding and authority to provide overt lethal assistance to vetted
elements of the Syrian opposition, the debate over the future nature and direction of U.S.
engagement in Syria appears set to intensify.
To date, advocates of continued U.S. support for select opposition groups areas
contending with refugees and other destabilizing effects from the Syrian conflict.”
As of early September, congressional consideration of this request had merged with congressional
consideration of a proposed continuing resolution to fund government operations after September
30, 2014. It remains to be seen whether a version of the Administration’s requested authority and
funding will be included in a proposed continuing resolution, whether it may be considered as an
amendment to such a continuing resolution, or whether Congress might act on the proposal
independently.
•
As noted above, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported version of the
FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1209 of S. 2410) would
authorize the Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the State
Department, to train and equip vetted members of select Syrian opposition forces
for limited purposes through the year 2018.
•
Section 9015 of the Senate Appropriation Committee’s version of the FY2015
Defense Appropriations bill (H.R. 4870) would authorize assistance, including
the provision of defense articles and defense services, to appropriately vetted
elements of the Syrian opposition, for, among other purposes, “protecting the
United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from threats posed by
terrorists in Syria.” Under this section, the committee specifies that up to $500
million from the Defense Department’s Operation and Maintenance (O&M), a
Defense-wide account, may be used for a support program. The Senate
Appropriations Defense subcommittee considered and rejected a proposed
amendment that would have stripped the authority and funding for the Syria
program from the bill.
•
In addition, the Senate Appropriation Committee’s version of H.R. 4870 includes
O&M appropriations that may be used to “reimburse the government of Jordan,
in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine, to maintain the
ability of the Jordanian armed forces to maintain security along the border
between Jordan and Syria.” Finally, the Senate Appropriations Committee’s
version of H.R. 4870 includes $1 billion in OCO funding for the Department of
State’s Complex Crises Fund (CCF) that may be made available for the purposes
of “undertaking counterterrorism partnership efforts, responding to crises, and
addressing regional instability resulting from the conflict in Syria.”
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Potential Operations against the Islamic State and Issues Shaping
Future U.S. Policy toward Syria
President Obama has stated that the United States seeks to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the
Islamic State.97 U.S. counterterrorism, defense, and diplomatic officials have referred to several
elements of an Administration strategy to achieve those objectives in public remarks. In general
terms, the Administration seeks to leverage the combined, but as yet undetermined efforts of a
multilateral global coalition to use diplomatic, military, intelligence, and law enforcement
mechanisms to “defeat” the Islamic State. It remains to be seen whether the President will take
military action against IS targets inside Syria. For discussion of related war powers and
authorities questions related to potential military action, see CRS Report IN10147,
Considerations for Possible Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State, by
Matthew C. Weed, and CRS Report R43720, U.S. Military Action Against the Islamic State:
Answers to Frequently Asked Legal Questions, by Michael John Garcia and Jennifer K. Elsea.
On September 5, President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry suggested that local and regional
actors would be expected to continue to bear the burden of conducting ground combat operations
with the potential future backing of such a coalition, whose members may provide training,
equipment, advice, assistance, and/or conduct supportive military operations.98 President Obama
said,
…With respect to the situation on the ground in Syria, we will not be placing U.S. ground
troops to try to control the areas that are part of the conflict inside of Syria. I don’t think
that’s necessary for us to accomplish our goal. We are going to have to find effective
partners on the ground to push back against ISIL. And the moderate coalition there is one
that we can work with. We have experience working with many of them. They have been, to
some degree, outgunned and outmanned, and that’s why it’s important for us to work with
our friends and allies to support them more effectively.99
As noted above, in his address to the nation on September 10, President Obama reiterated his
request to Congress for “additional authorities and resources to equip these [vetted Syrian
opposition] fighters.”
To date, Iraqi security forces, Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish militias, Iraqi Shiite militias, Syrian
government forces, and a broad range of Syrian opposition militias remain the principal military
forces engaged in active ground combat against the forces of the Islamic State. It remains to be
determined what types of support these entities may be eligible to receive from an emergent antiIslamic State coalition and on what terms.
Advocates of continued U.S. support for select opposition groups in Syria have argued that the
withdrawal or reduction of such assistance would bolster less cooperative or friendly groups.
Advocates have further argued that if the United States withdraws or reduces its support, then it
may “force” moderate groups to turn to extremist groups for funding and support—thereby
increasing the influence of extremists while reducing U.S. leverage. On the other hand, critics of
97
Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference, September 5, 2014.
Remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry prior to Meeting on Building an Anti-ISIL Coalition, September 5, 2014.
99
Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference, September 5, 2014.
98
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Critics of continued or expanded U.S. support have argued that such assistance risks exacerbating rivalry
rivalry among opposition groups and reducing the credibility of groups and individuals seen to be
aligned with the United States. Critics of support proposals also have pointed to problems in
ensuring the
identity identity and intentions of end users of provided support and the uses of U.S.-provided support.
The provision of overt military assistance would represent a significant evolution in U.S. efforts
to support armed opposition elements. In June 2013, Deputy National Security Adviser for
Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes said that the President had “authorized the expansion of
our assistance to the Supreme Military Council,” and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said in a
September 2013 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administration
was taking steps to provide arms to some Syrian rebels under covert action authorities.88 Press
reports have cited unidentified U.S. officials suggesting that as of early October 2013, very little
lethal equipment had been delivered and fewer than 1,000 opposition fighters had received U.S.
supervised training in Jordan. CRS cannot confirm these reports. Press reports further suggested
that the program was being enlarged to produce “a few hundred trained fighters each month,”89
but it is unclear what effect, if any, recent developments, including infighting among opposition
groups, have had on any such plans or programs.
88
Secretary Hagel said, “it was June of this year that the president made the decision to support lethal assistance to the
opposition. As you all know, we have been very supportive with hundreds of millions of dollars of non-lethal
assistance. The vetting process that Secretary Kerry noted has been significant, but—I'll ask General Dempsey if he
wants to add anything—but we, the Department of Defense, have not been directly involved in this. This is, as you
know, a covert action. And, as Secretary Kerry noted, probably to [go] into much more detail would—would require a
closed or classified hearing.”
89
Greg Miller, “CIA ramping up covert training program for moderate Syrian rebels,” Washington Post, October 2,
2013; and, Adam Entous and Nour Malas, “U.S. Still Hasn't Armed Syrian Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, September 4,
2013.
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To date, U.S. officials have not publicly described in detail which elements of the opposition may
be receiving training, what such training may entail, what types of weaponry may be provided in
the program, and what safeguards may be in place to monitor the disposition of equipment and
the actions of any U.S.-trained personnel. In late September, the Administration notified Congress
of its intent to use emergency authorities available to the President under the Foreign Assistance
Act to provide additional “nonlethal commodities and services” to the SMC. In January, the State
Department referred to completed deliveries of food, medical equipment, and vehicles and
“planned deliveries of satellite access equipment, laptops, radio communication equipment, and
medical kits to moderate SMC elements” in a summary of its nonlethal support efforts to date.90
On October 22, 2013, Secretary Kerry said that the “London 11” group had “agreed to direct
military aid exclusively through the Supreme Military Council ... to curtail the influence of
extremists, to isolate the extremists, and to change the balance on the ground.”91 However, as
noted above, several prominent Islamist militia groups now coordinate their operations
independent of the SMC and have rejected the political and military leadership of the SOC/SMC.
Disputes among former SMC commanders over its leadership also may complicate international
efforts to engage with the SMC leadership as a conduit for support to moderate armed elements.
It remains to be seen whether these realignments, disputes, and policy statements have decisively
changed the context in which the United States and its allies are providing support to the armed
opposition, or whether or how such support may change in the near future. On April 8, 2014,
Secretary Kerry told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “the fact is we are doing more
than we've ever been doing.” As noted above, the appearance of new weaponry in the hands of
forces affiliated with SMC figures has raised speculation about changes in U.S. policy that may
feature prominently in debate over the Administration’s request to expand assistance further.
Outlook
Looking ahead, U.S. policy makers face a series of difficult choices as they seek to balance their
demands that Asad ultimately leave power on the one hand, and their desire for the Syrian
government to remain cooperative with implementation of the OPCW Executive Council
decision, participate in negotiations with the opposition, and facilitate humanitarian access on the
other. By seeking a negotiated rather than a military solution, U.S. policy apparently seeks to
bring the conflict to a close while maintaining the security benefits associated with the
preservation of some Syrian state institutions. However, recent statements by U.S. officials and
other members of the Core Group envision negotiations that will end with the leaders of the
current regime having no part in transitional governance in Syria.
In April, Secretary of State Kerry acknowledged that President Asad felt more confident in his
position and alluded to a need to change the calculus of the Asad government and the opposition
in order to bolster chances for successful negotiations. In testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on April 8, Secretary Kerry said:
90
Office of the State Department Spokesperson, “The Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition,”
January 17, 2014.
91
Remarks of Secretary of State John Kerry, London, United Kingdom, October 22, 2013.
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Today, Assad feels fairly secure in Damascus and in some of the corridor going north to the
ports. And that’s been his strategy. But around him in the south, particularly, in the east and
in the north, there is not that kind of security. In fact, the opposition has made some gains
recently. And so the key here is - how do you get the parties to a place where they both
understand that there isn't going to be a military solution that doesn't destroy the country
absolutely and totally, but which ultimately could be negotiated? There has to be a
recognition by both of the ripeness of that moment. It’s not now. We all understand that. So
the question is: Can you do something in order to create that? And that’s a legitimate
question for the Congress; a legitimate question for the Administration.
In May 2014, an unnamed senior Administration official reiterated the challenges posed to U.S.
preferences by the prevailing military asymmetry in Syria and said, “while we continue to push
for a genuine political solution, we also are focusing on doing what we can, together with the
opposition, to try to address that asymmetry in various ways, to strengthen the opposition, and
also to try to bring increased pressure of various types on the Asad regime.”92 The
Administration’s request for FY2015 OCO funding and authority to provide new military
assistance to elements of Syria’s opposition reflects these goals and perspectivesmateriel.
The purposes of any expanded U.S. or coalition assistance to armed opposition groups also may
be controversial among Syrians. President Obama has suggested that U.S. engagement will
remain focused “narrowly” on assisting Syrians in combatting the Islamic State, while continuing
“to look for opportunities” to support a political resolution to Syria’s conflict.100 Some Syrian
political and military opposition forces may resent such a narrow focus and insist on broader
support for their anti-Asad goals as a condition of working with a U.S.-backed coalition against
the Islamic State.
Significant political and strategic questions may be raised by proposals that would further benefit
certain non-state actors relative to national governments (such as Kurdish groups) or that might
unpredictably alter prevailing dynamics among adversaries in Syria. As noted above, the prospect
of potential international cooperation or coordination with the Asad government has already
become controversial. The timing and duration of any anti-Islamic State military operations may
also be influenced by calculations of the likely relative benefit of such operations for opposition
and government forces in Syria. Operations that seriously degrade Islamic State capabilities prior
to improvements in the organization and capabilities of U.S.-preferred armed groups could result
in substantial military gains for pro-Asad forces or other extremist groups, particularly Jabhat al
Nusra. U.S. officials have not publicly estimated how long it may take to train and equip Syrian
partner forces.
From a practical perspective, as with humanitarian assistance, U.S. efforts to directly support
security and service delivery efforts inside Syria to date have been hindered by a lack of regular
access to areas in need. According to Administration officials, border closures, ongoing fighting,
and risks from extremist groups have presented unique challenges. The infighting among
opposition forces and the empowerment of the Islamic State in eastern Syria and north and
western Iraq creates further complications. Presumably, similar access issues could hinder efforts
to expand support to forces fighting the Islamic State.
The provision of overt military assistance to anti-Islamic State or anti-Asad forces would
represent a significant evolution in U.S. efforts to support armed opposition elements. President
Obama said on September 6, that “in terms of controlling territory, we're going to have to develop
a moderate Sunni opposition that can control territory and that we can work with.”101 To date,
U.S. officials have not publicly described which elements of the Syrian opposition may already
have received U.S. training, what any training may have entailed, what types of weaponry may
have been provided, or what safeguards may be in place to monitor the disposition of equipment
and the actions of any U.S.-trained personnel.102
100
The President said, “our attitude towards Asad continues to be that you know, through his actions, through using
chemical weapons on his own people, dropping barrel bombs that killed innocent children that he—he has foregone
legitimacy. But when it comes to our policy and the coalition that we're putting together, our focus specifically is on
ISIL. It’s narrowly on ISIL.” President Obama interview with NBC News Meet the Press, September 6, 2014.
101
President Barack Obama, Interview with Meet the Press, NBC News, September 6, 2014.
102
In June 2013, Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes said that the President
(continued...)
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Overt U.S. assistance to opposition military forces has remained restricted to nonlethal items. In
late September 2013, the Administration notified Congress of its intent to use emergency
authorities available to the President under the Foreign Assistance Act to provide additional
“nonlethal commodities and services” to the SMC. On October 22, 2013, Secretary Kerry said
that the “London 11” group had “agreed to direct military aid exclusively through the Supreme
Military Council ... to curtail the influence of extremists, to isolate the extremists, and to change
the balance on the ground.”103 In January 2014, the State Department referred to completed
deliveries of food, medical equipment, and vehicles and “planned deliveries of satellite access
equipment, laptops, radio communication equipment, and medical kits to moderate SMC
elements” in a summary of its nonlethal support efforts to date.104
As discussed above, several prominent Islamist militia groups continue to coordinate their
operations independently and have rejected the political and military leadership of the SOC/SMC.
Other non-Islamist groups also are acting independently to consolidate their operations, and
emergent coalitions seek to unite some Islamist and non-Islamist armed groups. Disputes among
former SMC commanders over leadership also may complicate international efforts to engage
with the SMC as a conduit for support to moderate armed elements, whether to increase pressure
on President Asad or to combat the Islamic State and other extremist groups. It remains to be seen
whether these realignments, disputes, and policy statements have decisively changed the context
in which the United States and its allies are providing support to the armed opposition, or whether
or how such support may change in the near future. In recent months, Administration officials,
including President Obama, have referred to the disorganization of the armed opposition as a
liability, while describing U.S. plans to increase support to select opposition elements in pursuit
of U.S. objectives.
Possible Questions for Congressional Oversight
•
What international and domestic authority might the Administration seek or
assert in order to carry out military operations against the Islamic State or other
extremist groups in Syria? How much might such operations cost? How long
might they last? What geographic, durational, financial, or tactical guidance or
restrictions might Congress wish to enact, if any?
•
What metrics might be used to gauge the relative success of operations against
the Islamic State? How should parallel U.S. concerns about Syria’s broader
stability and the future of its democratic opposition shape any U.S. or coalition
operations against the Islamic State in Syria?
(...continued)
had “authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council,” and Secretary of Defense Chuck
Hagel said in a September 2013 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administration was
taking steps to provide arms to some Syrian rebels under covert action authorities. Secretary Hagel said, “it was June of
this year that the president made the decision to support lethal assistance to the opposition. As you all know, we have
been very supportive with hundreds of millions of dollars of nonlethal assistance. The vetting process that Secretary
Kerry noted has been significant, but—I'll ask General Dempsey if he wants to add anything—but we, the Department
of Defense, have not been directly involved in this. This is, as you know, a covert action. And, as Secretary Kerry
noted, probably to [go] into much more detail would—would require a closed or classified hearing.”
103
Remarks of Secretary of State John Kerry, London, United Kingdom, October 22, 2013.
104
Office of the State Department Spokesperson, “The Syrian Crisis: U.S. Assistance and Support for the Transition,”
January 17, 2014.
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•
How might Islamic State forces respond to expanded U.S. or coalition military
operations against them in Syria? How likely are Islamic State operatives to
target countries contributing or hosting military forces? In the short term, what
forces in Syria would benefit from efforts to degrade Islamic State capabilities?
•
What effects might the provision of overt military assistance to non-state armed
groups and individual combatants in Syria’s non-international armed conflict
have on U.S. efforts to discourage other actors from providing military assistance
to the Syrian government or providing similar assistance to actors in other
conflicts? What precedents, if any, would Congress be setting if it authorized and
funded such an overt program under current circumstances?
•
To which groups, entities, and individuals does the Administration intend to
provide expanded assistance, including defense articles and services? For what
specific purposes? What are their political goals for the future of Syria? What
types of weaponry or training may be provided to recipients? What may not be
provided? Why? How soon could a force that meets U.S. objectives be created?
•
What mechanisms will be put in place to monitor the disposition of any provided
U.S. defense articles? What specific vetting criteria will be used to assess the
worthiness of intended recipients? What conditions or criteria might prevent a
group or individual from being eligible for U.S. assistance?
•
Where will such training and equipping efforts take place? With what
implications for the host country or countries? How does the Administration
expect the current Syrian government and its allies to respond to those assisting
any such U.S. efforts?
•
How might the provision of overt military assistance to the Syrian opposition or
the conduct of military operations in Syria against Islamic State targets without
Syrian government permission or cooperation affect the willingness of the Asad
government to cooperate on issues of importance to the United States, including
counterterrorism, regional security, and the conflict in Iraq? How might the
provision of U.S. military assistance to select groups affect the balance of power
and political relations among different Syrian opposition groups?
•
What countries are likely to contribute financially or militarily to potential U.S.
or coalition efforts against the Islamic State in Syria? How might the United
States respond if other governments pursue anti-Islamic State or anti-Asad
operations outside the framework of a U.S.-led coalition? Will the United States
welcome the support of Iran or Hezbollah for anti-Islamic State operations in
Syria?
•
On what basis and terms should the Administration report to Congress on the
status, achievements, and outstanding goals of anti-Islamic State operations in
Syria? What additional administrative, program management, and oversight
costs, if any, might be associated with proposals to expand support for armed
groups in Syria in relation to new anti-Islamic State goals?
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Outlook
Looking ahead, U.S. policy makers face a series of difficult choices as they maintain their
demands that Asad ultimately leave power; express their desire for the Syrian government to
remain cooperative with implementation of its chemical weapons-related commitments,
participate in negotiations with the opposition, and facilitate humanitarian access; and pursue new
initiatives to degrade and defeat the Islamic State. By seeking a negotiated rather than a military
solution to the conflict in Syria, U.S. policy makers have sought to bring the conflict to a close
while maintaining the security benefits associated with the preservation of some Syrian state
institutions. Those security concerns appear to be reflected in President Obama’s recent
statements suggesting expanded U.S. engagement in Syria would remain “narrowly” focused on
the Islamic State. Nevertheless, as recently as April, Secretary of State John Kerry alluded to a
need to make the Asad government feel less secure and to expand support to the opposition in
order to bolster chances for successful negotiations. It could prove difficult to manage those
efforts while taking new action against Islamic State operatives and other extremists in Syria.
Absent a change in conditions that compels Asad’s departure or empowers opposition groups to
fully depose Asad, current U.S. demands for a negotiated settlement leading to the establishment
of a transitional governing body would appear to require the leaders of the current government to
agree to leave power voluntarily, which they may continue to resist doing without guarantees of
their safety and/or immunity. Opposition members may be unable or unwilling to make such
guarantees. U.S. officials have raised the prospect of international peacekeeping arrangements to
guarantee elements of a negotiated settlement, but such arrangements could require an
international mandate, military forces, and financial contributions that may prove difficult to
procure. Meanwhile, powerful armed Islamist opposition forces reject negotiation, seek the
creation of an Islamic state, and have vowed to continue fighting until the entire Syrian
government is toppled.
Reconciling the current U.S. diplomatic strategy and desire for cooperation on chemical weapons
facility destruction with the simultaneous provision of U.S. assistance to select elements of the
opposition may become more difficult in the event that negotiations begin and show promise, or
in the event that anti-U.S. Islamist forces or Al Qaeda affiliates make further gains at the expense
of their counterparts. The Obama Administration has yet to signal that ISIL’s advances in
neighboring Iraq have changed its calculus vis-à-vis the conflict in Syria.
In light of these conditions, responding to the humanitarian needs generated by the crisis and
working to prevent the further destabilization of Syria’s neighbors will remain key agenda items
for U.S. decision makers for the foreseeable future.
92
Transcript of Background Briefing on Syria by Senior Administration Official, U.S. State Department, May 5, 2014.
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Author Contact Information
Christopher M. Blanchard, Coordinator
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
Mary Beth D. Nikitin
Specialist in Nonproliferation
mnikitin@crs.loc.gov, 7-7745
Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314
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