Order Code RL33487
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Updated September 14, 2006
Alfred B. Prados
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Summary
An array of bilateral issues continues to affect relations between the United
States and Syria: the course of Arab-Israeli talks; questions of arms proliferation;
Syrian connections with terrorist activity; Syria’s role in Lebanon; and Syria’s
opposition to the U.S. occupation in Iraq. A variety of U.S. legislative provisions and
executive directives prohibit direct aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade relations
between the two countries, largely because of Syria’s designation by the U.S. State
Department as a sponsor of international terrorism. Syria has reportedly cooperated
with the United States in investigating Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks but has been unwilling to sever
connections with some other terrorist organizations. Also, after Operation Iraqi
Freedom began in March 2003, senior U.S. officials warned Syria to stop permitting
transit of military supplies and volunteer fighters through Syria to Iraq. Syria has
denied these allegations and cited measures it has taken to tighten its borders.
The assassination on February 14, 2005, of former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri, who had become a vocal critic of Syria’s military force presence in
Lebanon, drew widespread suspicions of Syrian involvement among some Lebanese
and within the international community. The initial report of a U.N. Commission on
October 19, 2005, stated “there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and
Syrian involvement” in the Hariri assassination. Investigation by the Commission
continues. Meanwhile, under increasing domestic and international pressure, Syria
withdrew its forces from Lebanon in April 2005 in accordance with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1559.
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed the Syria Accountability Act,
H.R. 1828, as P.L. 108-175, which imposed additional economic sanctions against
Syria. The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2006, signed by the President
as P.L. 109-102, on November 14, 2005, repeats previous bans on U.S. aid to Syria
but contains a provision authorizing at least $6,550,000 for programs to support
democracy in Syria and Iran. The aid ban appears again in the House version of the
Foreign Operations Appropriation Act, FY2007 (H.R. 5522).
Since the outbreak of fighting between Israeli military forces and the militant
Lebanese Shi’ite Hezbollah organization on July 12, 2006, U.S. officials have
increased their criticism of Syria’s political and logistical support for Hezbollah.
U.S. officials and Members of Congress have blamed Syria for acting as a conduit
for the transfer of rockets and other arms to Hezbollah units, thereby enabling
Hezbollah units to engage in military action against Israeli targets. After the passage
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for cessation of hostilities
and other measures to bring about peace in the region, the leaders of Syria and Iran
claimed a victory, maintaining that their protege, Hezbollah, had compelled Israel to
accept a partial withdrawal from southern Lebanon. U.S. officials dismissed this
claim as “blustering.” This report supersedes Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S.
Relations and Bilateral Issues
, and will be updated as significant developments
occur.

Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Syria and Its Role in Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Policy Toward Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Syria and the Israel-Hezbollah Fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Relations with Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Trade and Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Infiltrators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Accusations of Syrian Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Arms Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Chemical and Biological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Advanced Conventional Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Possible Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Terrorist Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Attack on U.S. Embassy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
U.S. Aid and Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Specific Sanctions Against Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Recent Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Foreign Operations Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The Syria Accountability Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Most Recent Developments
On August 11, 2006, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1701, which
brought an end to the 34-day fighting between Israel and Hezbollah forces in
Lebanon. After its passage, the leaders of Syria and Iran claimed a victory,
maintaining that their protege, Hezbollah, had compelled Israel to accept a partial
withdrawal from southern Lebanon, and some commentators have agreed that Syria
and Iran may have gained as a result of the war.1 U.S. officials dismissed this claim
as “blustering” on Syria’s part. In further comments, Syrian President Bashar al-
Asad derided U.S. claims of creating a new Middle East and warned that “future
generations in the Arab world will find a way to defeat Israel.”
On September 12, four armed terrorists tried to storm the U.S. Embassy in
Damascus. During the abortive attack, four people were killed including the three
assailants and one Syrian counter-terrorist official endeavoring to fend off the attack;
several were wounded. There was no immediate claim of responsibility. The Syrian
Minister of the Interior described the perpetrators as “takfiris”or Islamic extremists,
and the Syrian Ambassador to the United States voiced suspicions of an Al-Qaeda
offshoot called Jund al-Sham (“Soldiers of Greater Syria”). A U.S. State Department
spokesman described the perpetrators as “unknown assailants.” U.S. officials praised
Syrian security forces for repelling the attack; Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
said “[t]he Syrians reacted to this attack in a way that helped to secure our people,
and we very much appreciate that,” and White House press secretary Tony Snow
made similar comments. Snow cautioned that Syria’s assistance “does not mean they
are an ally, and the Syrian Embassy in Washington added that “[i]t is regrettable that
U.S. policies in the Middle East have fueled extremism, terrorism and anti-U.S.
sentiment.”
Overview
The death of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000 after a 30-year
presidency removed a key figure in the affairs of Syria and the region. His son and
successor President Bashar al-Asad does not yet appear to have acquired the
uncontested power that his father exercised. Although U.S.-Syrian relations improved
somewhat in the 1990s, further strains appeared after the breakdown in Syrian-Israeli
negotiations in 2000, Syria’s opposition to a U.S. military campaign in Iraq, and
disagreements over Syria’s former role in Lebanon. Members of Congress have
1 “Iran And Syria Claim Victory For Hezbollah,” Los Angeles Times, August 16, 2006.

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periodically introduced legislation to tighten U.S. sanctions against Syria or to
condition relaxation of existing restrictions on further changes in Syrian policy.
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues
The United States and Syria have long had an uneasy relationship, and the July-
August 2006 fighting in Lebanon has had a further adverse effect on this relationship.
In recent years, Syria has been at the forefront of a number of important U.S. policy
issues in the Middle East, and the two sides have been increasingly at odds on such
issues as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the former Syrian occupation of Lebanon, the war
on terror, and U.S. allegations that Syria has failed to curb infiltration of foreign
fighters across the border into Iraq. Also, following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, and Administration efforts to foster democracy in the Middle East region,
U.S. officials have spoken out against authoritarian regimes like Syria and promoted
reform in the “broader Middle East.”
Currently, an array of U.S. legislative provisions and executive directives
prohibit direct aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade between the two countries,
owing in great part to Syria’s designation by the U.S. State Department as a state
sponsor of international terrorism. The most recent restrictions appear in the Syria
Accountability Act of 2003, which reinforces existing bans on aid and restrictions on
trade and contains some additional sanctions (see below). At this time, Syria’s role
in Lebanon is of particular concern to U.S. policy makers.
Syria and Its Role in Lebanon
Syria has emerged as a key, if indirect, actor in the Israel-Lebanon-Hezbollah
crisis, primarily though its role as a source and conduit for the delivery of rockets and
other mainly Iranian weaponry to Hezbollah units in southern Lebanon; some believe
Syria is shipping weapons from its own inventories to Hezbollah as well. The
Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990 gave Syria an opportunity for the first time to
station troops in Lebanon, ostensibly as part of an Arab League peacekeeping force.
Despite a provision in a 1989 accord (known as the Ta’if Agreement) calling for
redeployment of Syrian forces within two years, these forces remained in Lebanon,
albeit at somewhat reduced levels, until forced to withdraw in April 2005 by
international pressure and by a popular outcry in Lebanon over alleged Syrian
complicity in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.2 At the
time, many observers interpreted the Syrian withdrawal and subsequent election of
an anti-Syrian majority in the Lebanese parliament as a major setback for Syria’s
ambitions in the region, and some even predicted that the Syrian regime of President
Bashar al-Asad might have been seriously weakened in backing down under external
pressure. In fact, however, Syria retained some assets in Lebanon, particularly the
militant Shiite Muslim organization Hezbollah, which refused to relinquish its arms
2 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was one of the terms of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1559. For more information, see CRS Report RL33509, Lebanon, by Alfred B.
Prados.

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and continued to support Syria’s agenda by periodically attacking Israeli military
positions near the Israeli-Lebanese border.
Many commentators believe Syria’s re-supply activity on behalf of Hezbollah
was an important factor in encouraging Hezbollah leaders to initiate large-scale
border and rocket attacks against Israel on July 12. Syrian motives in supporting the
Hezbollah attacks may have included some of the following:
! First, Syria’s actions could help forestall or at least delay moves by
the small Lebanese army to replace Hezbollah units near the Israeli-
Lebanese border, thereby reducing the likelihood of a separate
Israeli-Lebanese peace settlement bypassing Syria.
! Second, Syria’s policy strengthens the view in some Lebanese
circles that the departure of Syrian troops has led to stalemate and
ultimately to nation-wide devastation.
! Third, the current confrontation helps ward off any effort by the
United States to effect a “regime behavior change” in Syria along the
lines of Libya.
! Fourth, the added prestige that may have accrued to Syria by
supporting Hezbollah increases the possibility that the United States,
after shunning Syria for several years, may have to deal with
Damascus at some point in an effort to contain escalating violence.
Observers have noted that “Syria appears anxious to reassert its claim as a crucial
guarantor of stability in the Middle East.” So far, by employing Hezbollah as a proxy
against Israel, Syrian policy appears to have reaped benefits without incurring any
retaliatory attacks on Syrian territory. Some observers have suggested, however, that
Syria’s leadership is playing a dangerous game that could lead to reprisals against
Syria itself.3
U.S. Policy Toward Syria. After the February 2005 assassination of former
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents, U.S. officials
reiterated their demands for a full Syrian withdrawal of its military forces from
Lebanon. Secretary of State Rice recalled U.S. Ambassador Margaret Scobey to
Washington for consultations; Ambassador Scobey has not returned and has
reportedly been reassigned to Baghdad. Although Syrian forces did withdraw in
April 2005, some observers think Syrian officials have tried to circumvent the effect
of the withdrawal by maintaining their influence through contacts they have acquired
over the years in the Lebanese bureaucracy and security services.4 In this connection,
U.N. teams have said that no visible or significant Syrian intelligence presence
remained in Lebanon but have qualified their statement by noting that “distinctly
close historical and other ties” between Syria and Lebanon must be considered “when
3 Kim Murphy, “Crisis May Put Syria Back In Political Mix,” Los Angeles Times, July 18,
2006.
4 Robin Wright,”Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 31,
2005.

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assessing a possibly ongoing influence of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon.”5
According to a subsequent team report, the government of Lebanon described itself
as “confident that, by and large, Syrian intelligence has withdrawn, although reports
and allegations that there is ongoing Syrian intelligence activity in Lebanon have
continued to surface on occasion.”6
Some believe that Syria’s prompt compliance with demands for its withdrawal
may have concealed a long-term plan to reestablish its influence and possibly its
presence in Lebanon if and when an opportunity arises. Commentators suggest that
Syria appears to be a central player in the present scenario and that U.S. efforts to
resolve the crisis may necessitate dealing with Syria at some stage. At present, they
point out, U.S. dealings with Syria are complicated by U.S. efforts to keep Syria
isolated and by lack of meaningful diplomatic contacts. (As noted above, the U.S.
Ambassador to Syria has not returned to Damascus, and the U.S. Embassy in
Damascus is headed by a lower level diplomat, although the Syrian Ambassador
remains in Washington.) According to one observer, “After years spent edging
Syrian troops out of Lebanon in a bid to win independence for the beleaguered
nation, Western leaders face the prospect of pressing Damascus to reassert its
influence with Islamic militants there to halt rocket attacks on Israel and free Israeli
prisoners.”7
Syria and the Israel-Hezbollah Fighting. Since the outbreak of fighting
between Israeli military forces and the militant Lebanese Shi’ite Hezbollah
organization on July 12, 2006, U.S. officials have increased their criticism of Syria’s
political and logistical support for Hezbollah. On July 22, President Bush
commented that “[f]or many years, Syria has been a primary sponsor of Hezbollah
and it has helped provide Hezbollah with shipments of Iranian-made weapons.”8
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, speaking to reporters on July 26, rejected
comments that the United States and Syria lack diplomatic channels for
communication, pointing out that there are existing diplomatic channels that can be
used when Syrian leaders are ready to talk. On his side, Syrian Ambassador to the
United States Imad Moustapha told Associated Press in comments reported on July
27 that there has been “not a single contact” by the U.S. government with Syria since
the fighting began. In another vein, Syrian officials have pointed out that Syria has
accommodated the United States by issuing large numbers of visas to Americans
fleeing from Lebanon via Syria for evacuation to the United States and has opened
its doors to other groups of refugees from Lebanon as well.
After the passage on August 11 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701,
which called for a cease-fire and other measures to bring about peace in the region,
the leaders of Syria and Iran claimed a victory, maintaining that their protege,
Hezbollah, had compelled Israel to accept a partial withdrawal of its forces from
5 U.N. Security Council document S/2005/673, Paragraph 20.
6 U.N. Security Council document S/2006/248, Paragraph 19.
7 Kim Murphy, “Crisis May Put Syria Back In Political Mix,” Los Angeles Times, July 18,
2006.
8 “Rice Rejects Cease-Fire As Mideast Quick Fix,” Dow Jones News Wire, July 22, 2006.

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southern Lebanon, and some commentators have agreed that Syria and Iran may have
gained as a result of the war.9 In a speech on August 15 celebrating Hezbollah’s
“victory,” Syrian President Bashar al-Asad derided U.S. claims of creating a new
Middle East as an “illusion” and warned Israel that “that “future generations in the
Arab world will find a way to defeat Israel.” U.S. State Department spokesman Sean
McCormack dismissed Syria’s comments as “blustering” and added that Syria is
“quite isolated from the rest of the people in the region.” However, some U.N.
peacekeeping experts and former U.S. ambassadors with experience in the Middle
East expressed the view that failure to involve Syria in the drafting and
implementation of the cease-fire resolution will make it more difficult to carry out
the terms of the agreement. One former U.N. peacekeeping official said it would be
“humanly impossible” to cut off the flow of arms to Hezbollah without Syrian help,10
commenting on the task of interdicting Lebanon’s porous 230-mile border with Syria
and 140-mile Mediterranean coast line.
Relations with Iraq
Trade and Oil. Syria, though long hostile to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,
improved relations with its erstwhile adversary in the late 1990s and opposed the
U.S. military campaign in Iraq. Numerous reports between 2000 and 2003 indicated
that Iraq under Saddam Hussein was shipping between 120,000 and 200,000 barrels
of oil per day through a reopened pipeline to Syria, technically in violation of U.N.
sanctions. U.S. military forces shut down the pipeline in April 2003 after the war
began. According to officials of the U.S. State Department and the IRS in testimony
before the House International Relations Committee on July 27, 2005, revenues from
the sale of Iraqi oil were placed in trade and cash accounts in the Syrian Commercial
Bank and its affiliates and used by Iraq to purchase goods from Syrian vendors during
the last three years of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Witnesses stated that these
arrangements generated $3.4 billion in funds outside the U.N.-approved oil-for-food
program for Iraq between June 2000 and July 2003.
Money. There have been reports that money withdrawn by Saddam Hussein
or his henchmen from Iraqi banks found its way to Syria. According to a CNN
broadcast on October 13, 2003, criminal investigators from the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service and officials from the Central Bank of Iraq were dispatched to Damascus to
look for these funds. According to a news wire article on January 29, 2004, an Iraqi
official said Syria had agreed to return the funds, which Iraqis estimate at $3 billion.
In his 2004 interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat, however, President Asad said that the
figure was about $200 million and that a process of accounting is under way.
According to press reports, the Bush Administration has accused the state-owned
Commercial Bank of Syria of laundering money for terrorist organizations and
holding $200 million in accounts belonging to former members of Saddam Hussein’s
9 “Iran And Syria Claim Victory For Hezbollah,” Los Angeles Times, August 16, 2006.
10 “Emerging UN Force for Lebanon doomed by sidelining Syria: ex-diplomats,” AFP News
Wires, August 17, 2006. The speaker added that “[y]ou cannot control the border with
Syria” [without Syrian cooperation].

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government.11 In September 2004, a delegation from the U.S. Treasury Department
visited Syria to look into these allegations, which may have prompted subsequent
U.S. punitive actions against the bank (see below). A subsequent press report stated
that wealthy donors were funneling money through Syria to the Iraqi resistance and
added that only half of an estimated $1 billion transferred from the former Iraqi
regime to Syrian banks had been recovered.12
Infiltrators. U.S. officials continue to charge that Syria is allowing pro-
Saddam volunteers from various Arab countries including Syria itself to cross its
375-mile border into Iraq. In its annual publication Country Reports on Terrorism:
2005
(published on April 28, 2006), the U.S. State Department said Syria has made
efforts to limit the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq. In April 2005, U.S.
officers described some Iraqi border guard units patrolling segments of Iraq’s border
with Syria and Jordan as undermanned, under-equipped, and under-motivated or
intimidated.13 With regard to charges that Syria provides a base of operations for
Iraqi insurgents, Syrian officials maintain that it is difficult to monitor the Iraqi
community; there are reportedly 250,000 to 300,000 Iraqis in Syria (some sources
estimate a wider spread of 200,000 to 500,000).
Subsequently there have been mixed signals from Washington and Damascus.
General Abizaid in a Washington Post interview of December 6, 2004, stated that
volunteer fighters from other Arab countries are given plane tickets to Damascus
where they obtain false documentation, enabling them to infiltrate into Iraq.
Previously, then U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B.
Myers said that it is hard to believe Syria is unaware of what is going on, but
“[w]hether they’re supporting it is another question.”14 Still, some U.S. commanders
have noted steps by Syrians to tighten their border with Iraq and curtail cross-border
infiltration.15 At the end of February 2005, press reports citing unnamed Syrian and
Iraqi officials alleged that Sabawi Ibrahim al-Hassan, Saddam Hussein’s half brother
and former security chief; was captured in Syria and delivered to Iraqi custody, along
with 29 other officials of the former Saddam Hussein regime.16 Syrian authorities,
however, did not confirm reports of a Syrian role in Sabawi’s capture. Tikriti was
number 36 on the list of wanted former Baathist officials and is suspected of
coordinating insurgent attacks and raising funds for the insurgency in Syria.
11 Scott Wilson, “U.S. Pressing Syria On Iraq Border Security,” Washington Post, Sept. 20,
2004, p. A16.
12 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Estimates by U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds,”
New York Times, Oct. 22, 2004.
13 James Janega, “Too Much Border, Not Enough Patrol,” Chicago Tribune, Apr. 19, 2005.
14 “Few Foreigners Among Insurgents,” Washington Post, Nov. 16, 2004.
15 Carla Anne Robbins and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Sees Efforts By Syria To Control Border With
Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 10, 2004.
16 John F. Burns, “Syria Turns Over a Top Insurgent, Iraqis Say,” New York Times, Feb.
28, 2005.

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In early July 2005, some sources reported that Syria has increased its support for
the Iraqi insurgency, while others stated that Syria has recently gone on the offensive
against foreign fighters seeking to cross the border into Iraq. Those who espouse the
former view quote U.S. officials as describing Syria as a “hub” for foreign recruits
supporting the Iraqi insurgency; the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, for example, has
accused Syria of allowing terrorists to operate training camps within Syria for
insurgents bound for Iraq. Those with a different view point to recent reports of
clashes between Syrian security forces and militants connected to the Iraqi
insurgency. Still others noted a Syrian announcement of the arrest of militants
belonging to a group called the Levant Army, reportedly linked to the Iraqi
insurgency and to perpetrators of a suicide bombing in Qatar. (“Syrians Clash With
Fighters Linked to the Iraqi Insurgency,” New York Times, July 5, 2005; “Syria Seen
Stepping Up Aid to Iraq-Bound Insurgents,” Washington Times, July 6, 2005, “Syria
Clashes Hint at Growing Islamic Extremist Problem,” Associated Press (Dow Jones),
July 5, 2005.) An August 1, 2005, article in Defense News quotes the Syrian deputy
foreign minister as citing several recent steps Syria has taken to reduce infiltration:
5,000 Syrian guards staffing posts with 25 rear support positions and conducting 50
moving patrols per day; detention of 1,240 foreign fighters and 4,000 Syrian
nationals trying to enter Iraq to join the insurgency; a survey of Syrian night vision
needs by a British team in 2004. In an October 5, 2005 letter from the Syrian
Ambassador in Washington to a Member of Congress, the Ambassador noted several
recent steps taken by Syria to secure its borders, including the following:17
! Increasing border troops from “a few hundred to 10,000 in the last
two years”;
! Building sand barriers, raising their height to 12 feet along a 130-
mile segment of border;
! Installing barbed wire, in some cases double-layered; and
! Erecting approximately 540 military outposts, at intervals ranging
from 400 to 3,000 meters, depending on the sensitivity of the area.
The Ambassador added that, as a result of these measures, Syria had captured 1,500
individuals trying to cross the border, handed them back to authorities of their
countries, or put them in prison.
Equipment. During the year preceding Operation Iraqi Freedom, there were
reports that Syria had become a conduit for shipments of military equipment from
eastern European countries to Iraq. Most of these shipments allegedly consisted of
anti-aircraft missiles, guidance systems for SCUD surface to surface missiles, anti-
aircraft guns, radar, and jet and tank engines. During the war, Secretary Rumsfeld
told reporters on March 28, 2003 that military supplies including night vision goggles
were being shipped from Syria to Iraq. Conversely, Israeli sources cited reports that
Iraqi chemical and biological weapons were being shipped from Iraq to Syria for
safekeeping. At the time, U.S. General Richard B. Myers, then Chairman of the Joint
17 The Ambassador’s letter represented a response to an inquiry by 100 Members of
Congress. Available online at [http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/].
Title of item: “Syria is being Set Up to Fail: A Leaked Letter from Washington,” Oct. 23,
2005. Accessed June 10, 2006.

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Chiefs of Staff, said there was no evidence so far that Iraqi WMD had been moved
to another country. In September 16, 2003 testimony before the House International
Relations Committee (Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia), then Under
Secretary of State John Bolton mentioned reports that Iraq had moved its WMD to
Syria to hide them from U.N. inspectors but said the United States had been unable
to confirm such transfers.
Accusations of Syrian Interference. U.S. and Iraqi officials have accused
Syria on several occasions since late 2004 of interfering in Iraq and aiding the late
Abu Musab Zarqawi, the head of an Al Qaeda affiliate in Iraq. The Iraqi Ambassador
to Syria, for example, said U.S. and Iraqi troops had captured photos of Syrian
officials during combat operations in an insurgent stronghold in Iraq in November.18
On December 16, 2004, President Bush warned Syria and Iran that “meddling in the
internal affairs of Iraq is not in their interests.” His warning followed an accusation
by then Iraqi Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan that Syria is aiding Zarqawi and
agents of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. The Syrian Foreign Ministry
dismissed Shaalan’s remarks as “baseless accusations” but did not refer to President
Bush’s remarks. Following reports of a secret meeting in Syria held by Zarqawi and
key aides during April 2005, week-long fighting took place along the Syrian border
in mid-May, resulting in hundreds of deaths including nine U.S. Marines. According
to a press report on May 18, an unnamed U.S. official characterized Syria as a main
conduit for pro-Zarqawi fighters entering Iraq. In a meeting with an Iraqi official on
May 20, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice criticized Syria for “allowing its
territory to be used to organize terrorist attacks against innocent Iraqis” and added
that Syria “should not think itself immune from the way that the region is going.”
She pointed to other Syrian policies regarding terrorism, Lebanon, and Palestinian
affairs, and said Syria must realize “that it is clearly out of step with where the region
is going.” On May 20, 2005, the Syrian Ambassador to the United States told the
New York Times that Syria has “severed all links” with U.S. military representatives
and the Central Intelligence Agency during the last 10 days because of what he called
unjust allegations of Syrian support to the Iraqi insurgency.
Arms Proliferation
Over the past three decades, Syria has acquired an arsenal of chemical weapons
(CW) and surface-to-surface missiles, reportedly has conducted research and
development in biological weapons (BW), and may be interested in a nuclear
weapons capability. Its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, however,
are hampered by limited resources and reliance on external sources of supply.
Emphasis has been on the development of CW and missile capabilities — sometimes
described as “poor man’s nuclear weapons.” In the past, there has been little
evidence of intent on Syria’s part to acquire nuclear weapons; rather, Syria has
sought to build up its CW and missile capabilities as a “force equalizer” to counter
Israeli nuclear capabilities. (“Syria Built Arsenal As ‘Equalizer,’” Washington Post,
April 17, 2003.) However, increasing U.S. concerns over an apparent nexus between
terrorism and WMD in the post-September 11 era has brought added attention from
18 Nicholas Blanford, “More Signs of Syria Turn up in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor,
Dec. 23, 2004.

CRS-9
the Bush Administration to possible efforts by states like Syria to pursue a broader
range of WMD programs.
In a speech to the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002, then Under Secretary
Bolton grouped Syria with Libya and Cuba as rogue states that support international
terrorism (see below) and are pursuing the development of WMD. On October 9,
2002, Bolton reportedly told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “[w]e
remain very concerned that nuclear and missile programs of Iran and others,
including Syria, continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and
expertise.” In his briefing for the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
on September 16, 2003, Bolton described a range of Syrian WMD programs and
voiced particular concern over the sharing of Russian technology with Syria.
Following is a brief summary of Syria’s WMD programs from available information,
including Mr. Bolton’s testimony and an unclassified CIA study covering the period
from July through December 2003.
Chemical and Biological. Syria, which has not signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention, reportedly has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin and may be
working on a more toxic and persistent nerve agent like VX. Syria is reported to
have three production facilities for chemical weapons but remains dependent on
external sources for key elements of its CW program including precursor chemicals
and key production equipment. Little information is available on Syrian biological
programs; however, the preparers of the 2003 CIA study estimate that “Syria
probably also continued to develop a BW capability.” Syria has signed, but not
ratified, the Biological Weapons Convention.
Nuclear. Syria has one small Chinese-supplied nuclear research reactor, which
is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Syria and Russia
have agreed on a draft program for cooperation on civil nuclear power. According
to the 2003 CIA study, “[b]roader access to foreign expertise provides opportunities
for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities and we are monitoring Syrian nuclear
intentions with concern.” Syria acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1969; however, Under Secretary Bolton expressed concern that Syria, like Iran, has
not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol, which provides for short-notice inspections
of nuclear facilities.
Missiles. Syria has one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East,
consisting of several hundred short-to-medium range ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles. Once reliant on the former Soviet Union, Syria has turned more recently
to Iran, North Korea, and China for assistance with its missile programs. According
to the 2003 CIA study, Syria continued to seek help from abroad in establishing a
solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability and is seeking
assistance from North Korea in its liquid propellant missile programs. Bolton, in his
September 2003 testimony, suggests that regional concerns may impel Syria to seek
a longer range missile on the order of the North Korean No Dong medium-range
ballistic missile.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Syria continues to obtain small
amounts of conventional military equipment from Russia and other former Soviet-
bloc suppliers. Syria reportedly wants to obtain Russian air defense systems (SA-

CRS-10
10/SA-11), fighter aircraft (MiG-29, Su-27), and tanks (T-80, T-90), as well as
upgrades for weapons already in Syrian inventories; however, Syria’s lack of money
combined with its outstanding debt to Russia (inherited from the former Soviet
Union) have hampered any significant acquisitions.
Possible Acquisitions. In January 2005, Russian media and Israeli sources
reported an impending sale by Russia to Syria of shoulder-fired SA-18 (“Igla”) air
defense missiles and SS-26 (“Iskander-E”) surface to surface missiles. During a visit
to Russia by President Asad at the end of January, officials of both countries denied
these reports. A Russian daily newspaper, however, reported that the deal was put
on hold because of U.S. and Israeli pressure. During a later visit to Israel in April,
2005, however, Putin said that he understood Israeli security concerns but that the
missiles Russia was selling Syria could not be used to target Israeli territory and that
he had vetoed longer range missiles. (“Putin Pushes Summit Proposal on Israeli
Trip,” New York Times, April 28, 2005.) It was not clear if Putin was planning to sell
the SS-26, which with its maximum range of 175 miles would appear able to reach
significant parts of Israel. On October 3, 2005, Agence France-Presse reported a visit
to Moscow by Syrian Armed Forces chief of staff Ali Habib to discuss maintenance
and modernization of Syrian equipment by Russian experts, an increase in Syrian
military personnel undergoing training in Russia (from 30 to 50, according to one
report), and Syrian purchase of ammunition. Habib also reportedly visited a Russian
factory that produces Kornet-E anti-tank missiles.
Debt. Largely as a result of military purchases, Syria incurred a debt of
approximately $13.4 billion to the former Soviet Union, a debt that the successor
Russian Federation has now inherited. Without providing details, both presidents
expressed satisfaction that the two sides had “resolved the problem of Syria’s debts
to the Russian Federation. We have resolved it on a compromise base acceptable for
both parties...” (Putin’s words. Asad commented that “we approached the solution
to a long-standing issue — Syria’s debt to Russia.”) According to several press
articles, Putin agreed to write off $9.8 billion or approximately 73% of the debt.19
Some speculate that Putin was motivated by prospects of new arms purchases from
Syria, while others suggest that political and strategic benefts that may accrue to
Russia are more important than economic benefits.20
Terrorist Activity
Since 1979, Syria has appeared regularly on a list of countries — currently five
— that the U.S. State Department identifies as sponsors of international terrorism.
According to the State Department’s most recent annual report on global terrorism
(Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005, published on April 28, 2006), Syria has not
been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986, when Syrian intelligence
was reportedly involved in an abortive attempt to bomb an El Al airliner in London.
19 Neil King, Jr. and Gregory L. White, “U.S. Reviews Russia Ties Amid Rising Tensions,”
The Asian Wall Street Journal, Jan. 27, 2005. “Russia Writes off $9.8 Billion of Syrian
Debt,” The Daily Star (Beirut, Lebanon), Jan. 26, 2005.
20 “Syria, Russia Might Both Gain By Improved Relationship,” Dow Jones International
News
, Jan. 26, 2005.

CRS-11
The report states, however, that Syria has continued to provide political and material
support for Palestinian groups that have committed terrorist acts, and allows them to
maintain offices in Damascus. The report also notes that Syria continued to permit
Iranian resupply via Damascus of the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim militia Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Syria admits its support for Palestinians pursuing armed struggle in Israeli
occupied territories and for Hezbollah raids against Israeli forces on the Lebanese
border, but insists that these actions represent legitimate resistance activity as
distinguished from terrorism.
Al Qaeda. In some instances, Syria has cooperated with the United States
against terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda. With a few exceptions such as
Hamas and Hezbollah, the generally secular Syrian government tends to regard
Islamic fundamentalist organizations as destabilizing, although there have been
indications since early 2006 that the Syrian regime has been courting Islamists as a
counterweight to other internal dissident groups.21 Since the September 11 attacks,
a number of reports, including the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism,
2005
, indicate that Syria has cooperated with the United States and other foreign
governments against Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in the past, while
discouraging signs of public support for Al Qaeda. Earlier, on June 18, 2002, U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State William Burns was quoted as telling a congressional
committee that “the cooperation the Syrians have provided in their own self-interest
on Al Qaeda has saved American lives.” According to a subsequent news report,
Syria helped unravel a plot by an Al Qaeda group in Canada to attack U.S. and
Canadian government installations.22 Details regarding the type of support provided
by the Syrians, however, have been lacking, and some Members of Congress have
expressed the view that Syrian cooperation against Al Qaeda has waned or has been
exaggerated. According to the 2005 terrorism report (see above), in May 2005 the
Syrian Government ended intelligence cooperation with the United States, citing U.S.
complaints that Syrian cooperation against border crossings into Iraq was inadequate.
Attack on U.S. Embassy. However, Syria and the United States still appear
to face some common terrorist threats, and Syrian officials seem committed to
protecting U.S. officials in Syria. On September 12, 2006, four armed terrorists tried
to storm the U.S. embassy in Damascus. During the abortive attack, three of the
perpetrators were killed; the fourth died of his wounds the following day. There was
no immediate claim of responsibility. The Syrian Minister of the Interior described
the perpetrators as “takfiris”or Islamic extremists, and the Syrian Ambassador to the
United States voiced suspicions of an Al-Qaeda offshoot called Jund al-Sham
(“Soldiers of Greater Syria”)
, noting that Jund al-Sham has been blamed for several
attacks on Syria in recent years.23 A U.S. State Department spokesman described the
perpetrators as “unknown assailants.” U.S. officials praised Syrian security forces
for repelling the attack, and Secretary of State Rice commented that “t]he Syrians
21 Christine Spolar, “Syria’s strange political spring,” Chicago Tribune, May 28, 2006.
22 “Syrian Reforms Gain Momentum In Wake Of War,” Washington Post, May 12, 2003.
23 The U.S. State Department in the 2005 edition of its annual publication Country Reports
on Terrorism
(released on April 28, 2006) briefly mentions Jund al-Sham as a group
associated with the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the late leader of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda
in Iraq.

CRS-12
reacted to this attack in a way that helped to secure our people, and we very much
appreciate that.” White House press secretary Tony Snow stated that “Syrian
officials came to [the] aid of the Americans ... The U.S. Government is grateful for
the assistance the Syrians provided in going after the attackers ...”24
Snow cautioned, however, that Syrian cooperation in this instance “does not
mean they are an ally,” while expressing the hope that Syria might become one in the
future.25 On its part, the Syrian embassy in Washington added that “[i]t is regrettable
that U.S. policies in the Middle East have fueled extremism, terrorism and anti-U.S.
sentiment.”26
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Syrian-Israeli negotiations remain deadlocked over Syria’s demand that Israel
withdraw unconditionally from the Golan Heights, a 450-square mile portion of
southwestern Syria that Israel occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The late
President Hafiz al-Asad said he accepted the principle of “full withdrawal for full
peace” and would establish peaceful, normal relations with Israel in return for
Israeli’s withdrawal from Golan. Israeli leaders either reject withdrawal or accept
partial withdrawal. The two sides also disagree on what would constitute full
withdrawal because of slightly differing boundary lines defined in the past. Both
sides have suggested a resumption of talks; however, Israel believes talks should
begin without pre-conditions, while Syria has insisted that talks resume where the
most recent U.S.-sponsored discussions left off in 2000. Following the fighting
between Israel and the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militia Hezbollah in July-August
2006, an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman pointed to Asad’s pro-Hezbollah stance
and said “it is difficult to see him [Asad] as a part of negotiations, as a partner in
peace.” For more information, see CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations:
Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
, by Carol Migdalovitz.
U.S. Aid and Sanctions
Since 1950, the United States has provided a total of $627.5 million in aid to
Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in economic support,
$155.4 million in food assistance, and $61 thousand in military training assistance.
Most of this aid was provided during a brief warming trend in bilateral relations
between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded under U.S. aid included water
supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health and agricultural research.
24 Dan Murphy and Rhonda Roumani, “Embassy attack puts Syria on alert,” The Christian
Science Monitor
, September 13, 2006. The authors comment that “[w]hile this was first and
foremost an attack on the US, it is also a major embarrassment for the [secular] government
in Damascus ...”
25 Sam F. Ghattas, “Gunmen Repelled at U.S. Embassy in Syria,” Associated Press,
September 12, 2006.
26 Craig S. Smith, “Gunmen in Syria Hit U.S. Embassy; 3 Attackers Die,” The New York
Tiimes
, September 13, 2006.

CRS-13
No aid has been provided to Syria since 1981, when the last aid programs were
closed out. At present, a variety of legislative provisions and executive directives
prohibit U.S. aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade. Principal examples follow.
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976
[P.L. 94-329]. Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of
foreign assistance to countries that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision
was incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC
2371]. (Syria was not affected by this ban until 1979, as explained below.)
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93
Stat. 515] required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify
Congress before licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7
million to countries determined to have supported acts of international terrorism
(Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 re-lettered Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered
the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list.
This list is prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j)
of the Export Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly
have provided support for acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this
list ever since it was first prepared in 1979; it appears most recently in the State
Department’s annual publication Country Reports on Terrorism, 2005, published on
April 28, 2006. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the above-mentioned
aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399].
Section 509(a) of this act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export
Control Act to prohibit export of items on the munitions list to countries determined
to be supportive of international terrorism, thus banning any U.S. military equipment
sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export
Amendments Act of 1989 — see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans obligation of
U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of
this act [100 Stat. 1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign
tax credits on income or war profits from countries identified by the Secretary of
State as supporting international terrorism. [26 USC 901].
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L.
101- 222]. Section 4 amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to
impose a congressional notification and licensing requirement for export of goods or
technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries on the terrorism list, if such
exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their ability to support
terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribed conditions for removing a country from the terrorism
list: prior notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives

CRS-14
and the chairmen of two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the
requisite notification, the President must certify that the country has met several
conditions that clearly indicate it is no longer involved in supporting terrorist activity.
(In some cases, certification must be provided 45 days in advance of removal of a
country from the terrorist list.)
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale
or lease of U.S. defense articles and services to any country that questions U.S. firms
about their compliance with the Arab boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains
provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver has been exercised in Syria’s
case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other prohibitions
already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132]. This
act requires the President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance
(Section 325) or lethal military equipment (Section 326) to countries on the terrorism
list, but allows the President to waive this provisions on grounds of national interest.
A similar provision banning aid to third countries that sell lethal equipment to
countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign Operations
Appropriation Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons
(citizens or resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of
countries on the terrorism list, except as provided in regulations issued by the
Department of the Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of State. In the case
of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such transactions “with respect to
which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.” (31
CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall
of 1996, the then Chairman of the House International Relations Committee
reportedly protested to then President Clinton over the Treasury Department’s
implementing regulation, which he described as a “special loophole” for Syria. Since
then, several measures have been introduced in previous Congresses to forbid
virtually all financial transactions with Syria but none were enacted.
Section 531 of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (P.L. 108-7)
bans aid to countries not in compliance with U.N. Security Council sanctions against
Iraq. This ban would be applicable to exports of Iraqi oil through Syria or to reported
shipments of military equipment via Syria to Iraq; however, it may be moot following
the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.
Specific Sanctions Against Syria
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign
assistance appropriations enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from
receiving U.S. aid. The most recent ban appears in H.R. 3057 (P.L. 109-102 — see
below). Section 512 of P.L. 109-102, sometimes known as the Brooke Amendment
after an earlier version of this provision, bans assistance to any country in default to

CRS-15
the United States for over a year. Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
amended by Section 431 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United States to withhold
a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for programs that
benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178, was amended by P.L. 109-
112 to make its provisions applicable to Syria as well as Iran. The amended act,
known as the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, requires the President to submit
semi-annual reports to designated congressional committees, identifying any persons
involved in arms transfers to or from Iran or Syria; also, the act authorizes the
President to impose various sanctions against such individuals.
Recent Congressional Action
Foreign Operations Appropriations. H.R. 3057, the FY2006 Foreign
Operations Appropriation Act, repeats previous bans on aid to Syria (Section 507);
however, it also contains a provision requiring that not less than $6,550,000 be made
available for programs supporting democracy in Syria and Iran, as well as unspecified
amounts of additional funds under this act to support democracy, governance, human
rights, and rule of law programs for these two countries. President Bush signed the
bill as P.L. 109-102 on November 14, 2005. H.R. 5522, The Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act, FY2007, repeats the previous bans on aid to Syria (Section 507)
but does not contain money for democracy programs.
The Syria Accountability Act. On December 12, 2003, President Bush
signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration
Act, as P.L. 108-175. H.R. 1828 was passed by the House on October 15, 2003, and
the Senate on November 11, 2003. (The House agreed to a Senate amendment
expanding the President’s waiver authority on November 20.) This act requires the
President to impose penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international
terrorist groups, ends its occupation of Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased supporting or facilitating terrorist
activity in Iraq (Section 5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans on the export of
military items (already banned under other legislation) and of dual use items (items
with both civil and military applications) to Syria (Section 5(a)(1)). In addition, the
President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
! a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
! a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
! a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian
aircraft;
! reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
! restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
! blocking of transactions in Syrian property (Section 5(a)(2))
Implementation. On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order
13338, implementing the provisions of P.L. 108-175, including the bans on
munitions and dual use items (Section 5(a)(1)) and two sanctions from the menu of
six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban on exports to

CRS-16
Syria other than food and medicine (Section 5(a)(2)(A) and the ban on Syrian aircraft
landing in or overflying the United States (Section 5(a)(2)(D). In issuing his
executive order, the President stated that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete
steps to address the concerns that led to the enactment of the Syria Accountability
Act. The President also imposed two additional sanctions based on other legislation.
! Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the
Treasury Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial
institutions to sever correspondent accounts with the Commercial
Bank of Syria because of money laundering concerns.
! Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
he issued instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals
and government entities involved in supporting policies inimical to
the United States.
Waivers. In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress,
the President cited the waiver authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria
Accountability Act and stated that he is issuing the following waivers on grounds of
national security:
! Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are
permitted: products in support of activities of the U.S. government;
medicines otherwise banned because of potential dual use; aircraft
parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information;
certain software and technology; products in support of U.N.
operations; and certain exports of a temporary nature.
! Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are
permitted: takeoff/landing of Syrian aircraft chartered to transport
Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops;
takeoff/landing associated with an emergency; and overflights of
U.S. territory.
Implications. The practical effects of implementing the Syria Accountability
Act are likely to be limited, at least in the short term. First, as noted above, relatively
few U.S. firms operate in Syria, and the trade bans contained in this act do not
prohibit their operating in Syria. Fewer U.S. companies may want to operate in Syria
in view of the new trade restrictions, and firms that continue to do so may have to
rely on foreign suppliers to service their contracts, according to a State Department
official as reported in the press.27 Second, the volume of U.S.-Syrian trade is already
limited. Syria’s main import from the United States is cereals, which are permitted
under the act. Third, Syrian aircraft do not normally fly to or over United States, and
the President has invoked waivers to permit them to do so under exceptional
27 Christopher Marquis, “Bush Imposes Sanctions on Syria, Citing Ties to Terrorism,” New
York Times
, May 12, 2004.

CRS-17
circumstances. Fourth, waivers cover several categories of equipment —
telecommunications equipment, aircraft parts; one sanctions specialist believes that
products either permitted under the new legislation or covered by waivers constitute
a large portion of the more-than-$200 million which Syria imports from the United
States.28
Further Steps. Some U.S. officials favor tightening sanctions against Syria
further in view of reports that it is facilitating or permitting Iraqi insurgents to operate
in Syria. On December 23, 2004, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
reportedly warned Syria that the Administration might impose new sanctions if Syria
failed to clamp down on fugitive Iraqi ex-officials. Press reports in early January
2005 indicate that the Administration is considering further limits on financial
transactions with Syrian banks.29 During her confirmation hearings on January 18,
2005, then Secretary of State-designate Condoleezza Rice warned that Syria risked
“long-term bad relations” with the United States and additional sanctions because of
its policies regarding terrorism and Iraq. In his State of the Union address on
February 2, 2005, the President stated that “Syria still allows its territory, and parts
of Lebanon to be used by terrorists who seek to destroy every chance of peace in the
region.” He noted that Congress had passed the Syria Accountability Act and that
the Administration is applying it. Syrian Ambassador to the United States Imad
Mustapha expressed disappointment over President Bush’s portrayal of Syria as a
hindrance to peace and added that Syria continues to possess “the will to engage with
the United States.”
Extension. In a notice dated May 5, 2005, the President extended by one year
the national emergency blocking the property of certain individuals and prohibiting
exports to Syria under Executive Order (E.O.) 13338 (see above). He noted that the
actions and policies of the government of Syria continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat. Subsequently, in a notice dated May 8, the President extended
the state of emergency for an additional year. Also, in a notice dated June 30, 2005,
under the provisions of E.O. 13338, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two
senior Syrian officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then Interior Minister and
its head of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali, see above), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any
assets they may have in the United States and banning U.S. transactions with them.
On January 18, 2006, the Treasury Department took the same actions against the
President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military intelligence. Meanwhile
on June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian
company, SES International Corp., and two of its officials under E.O. 13315, which
blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and of his former regime.
Subsequently, on August 15, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for contributing to Syria’s
support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and Brigadier General
Jama’a Jama’a, for playing a central part in Syria’s intelligence operations in
Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.
28 Glenn Kessler, “President Imposes Sanctions On Syria,” Washington Post, May 12, 2004.
29 Douglas Jehl, “U.S. Said to Weigh Sanctions on Syria Over Iraqi Network,” New York
Times
, Jan. 5, 2005.