Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the
the Asad Regime
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 9Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 22, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33487
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Summary
This report analyzes the current unrest in Syria and the U.S. response to the Syrian government’s
crackdown against demonstrators. It also provides background information on U.S. sanctions
against the Asad regime and its supporters.
A variety of U.S. legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit direct foreign assistance
funding to Syria and restrict bilateral trade relations, largely because of the U.S. State
Department’s designation of Syria as a sponsor of international terrorism. On December 12, 2003,
President George W. Bush signed the Syria Accountability Act, P.L. 108-175, which imposed additional
additional economic sanctions against Syria. Syrian individuals and government officials are
subject to
targeted financial sanctions pursuant to executive orders relating to terrorism,
proliferation, and
regional security. Successive administrations have designated several Syrian
entities as weapons
proliferators and sanctioned several Russian companies for alleged weapons
of mass destruction
or advanced weapons sales to Syria.
The following legislation introduced in the 112th Congress addresses the current situation in
Syria.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act. Sanctions the development of
petroleum resources of Syria, the production of refined petroleum products in
Syria, and the exportation of refined petroleum products to Syria.
•
H.Res. 296 (S.Res. 180 in the Senate). Expresses support for peaceful
demonstrations and universal freedoms in Syria and condemns the human rights
violations by the Assad Regime.
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and
Modernization Act of 2011. States that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement
and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their proliferation
activities and policies.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011.
Amends the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the
scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or extracted within
North Korea'’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the
transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such
countries'’ weapons of mass destruction programs, support for acts of
international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions
shipping services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011. Denies companies that conduct
business in Syria’s energy sector (investment, oil purchases, and sale of gasoline)
access to U.S. financial institutions and requires federal contractors to certify that
they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Contents
Uprising and Crackdown in Syria.................................................................................................... 1
Overview: Syria’s Changing Political Landscape and Repercussions For U.S. Policy............. 1
Background.Current Status ............................................................................................................................... 1
Timeline: Uprising in Syria ....................................................................................................... 2
Dara’a......................... 1
U.S. Policy and Sanctions ......................................................................................................... 3
March 30: Asad’s Speech ...................2
Select International Responses and Action................................................................................. 5
April 2011: Regime Brutally Suppresses Protests, Makes Limited Reforms...................... 5
May 2011: Syrian Cities and Towns under Siege 4
Possible Trajectories: Where is Syria Heading?................................................................................... 6
June 2011: Protests Spread North, Refugees Flee to Turkey 6
Congressional Action.............................................. 8
July and August 2011: Latest Developments ...................................................................... 8
U.S. Policy Toward Syria: Administration and Congressional Response ............................... 10
Congressional Action Possible Policy Options............................................................................................................. 13
Possible Policy Options.........9
U.S. Sanctions............................................................................................ 14
International Response ...................................... 11
Overview ................................................................ 16
Possible Trajectories: Where is Syria Heading?...................................................................... 18
U.S. Sanctions............. 11
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria ................................................................................................................... 21
Overview ............ 12
Specific Sanctions Against Syria..................................................................................................................... 21
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria 14
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act .................................................................................... 21
Specific Sanctions Against Syria 14
Targeted Financial Sanctions............................................................................................. 24
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act ......................16
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria ............................................................. 24
Targeted Financial Sanctions..................... 18
Effect of U.S. Sanctions on Syria’s Economy........................................................................ 25
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria 18
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Syria............................................................ 28
Effect of U.S. Sanctions on Syria’s Economy................................................................... 28
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Syria................................ 7
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Sanctions against Syria in 2011 ..................................................................................... 3
Tables 3
Table 12. U.S.-Syrian Trade Statistics 2005-2010 ........................................................................... 2919
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 3021
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Uprising and Crackdown in Syria
For a full account of recent events and an assessment of their implications, see “July and August
2011: Latest Developments.”Current Status”.
Overview: Syria’s Changing Political Landscape and Repercussions
For U.S. Policy
The Asad family has ruled Syria since 1970. President Bashar al Asad, like his father Hafez al
Asad before him, has wielded almost total control over domestic politics and has steered the
country’s outsized foreign policy to play key roles in multiple arenas in the Middle East
(Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, Iran, and Iraq) despite Syria’s small size and lack of resources. Now,
with the country in turmoil, many observers are interested in how prolonged Syrian instability (or
a possible changing of the guard there) might affect other U.S. foreign policy priorities in the
region, such as Lebanese stability and countering Hezbollah; limiting Iranian influence; and
solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Unlike in Egypt, where the United States has provided support
to the military and democracy assistance to newly empowered
political groups, the U.S. role in Syria is more limited. Some
As of AugustSeptember 2011, reports suggest
U.S. sanctions are already in place and Syria has been ineligible suggest that over 2,000600 civilians have been
for U.S. aid due to its inclusion on the State Sponsor of
been killed. In addition, Syrian human
Terrorism list. Military and intelligence cooperation is sporadic
human rights groups report that over
over 12,000 Syrian protestors have been
and limited. Thus the role the United States can play in Syria’s
been arrested.
evolving domestic crisis is in question, and policymakers may
be searching for channels of influence in order to preserve U.S.
interests in a rapidly changing political landscape.
Background
In March 2011, the public anger on display in other Arab countries surfaced in Syria, putting
President Bashar al Asad on the defensive for the first time in his 11-year presidency. While
Tunisia and Egypt had overthrown their top leaders and Bahrain, Libya, and Yemen had already
begun to struggle with unprecedented degrees of civil unrest and conflict, Syria had largely been
free of large-scale public protests that had been occurring elsewhere across the Arab world since
December 2010. Syria has long shared many of the socioeconomic and political conditions that
bred deep dissatisfaction with the status quo in other Arab autocracies, including high
unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, rampant corruption, lack of political
freedoms, and repressive security forces. These factors fueled opposition to the Syrian
government. Many observers assumed that Syria’s pervasive police state, lower level of Internet
usage, and deep public sensitivity to potential Sunni-Alawite sectarian tensions would serve as a
bulwark against spreading unrest.
Those assumptions have proven unfounded. Limited calls in February 2011 to organize protests
and gatherings failed, but a violent government response to an isolated incident in the southern
town of Dara’a in March provided a decisive spark for the emergence of protest movements. The
use of force against demonstrators in Dara’a and later in other cities has created a corresponding
swell in public anger and widespread participation in demonstrations. An escalating cycle of
tension has continued to intensify, as the Asad government has paired what it portrayed as
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responsiveness to some public demands for political reform with the use of military force against
some protestors. Demonstrations and crackdowns are exacerbating sectarian divisions among
Syrians, as pro-government Alawis confront predominantly Sunni Muslim demonstrators.
Timeline: Uprising in Syria
On Friday, February 4, activists using social networking sites attempted to launch their own “day
of rage” after prayers, but few demonstrators appeared amidst a heavy presence of security forces.
On February 9, the state unexpectedly granted citizens access to Facebook, YouTube, and other
popular social media websites as part of President Al Asad’s pledge to ease Internet restrictions.
Critics charged that easing access to social media would allow the government to more closely
monitor dissidents, and several Syrian bloggers were subsequently arrested.1 For the next several
weeks, small demonstrations persisted, but no single event was able to spark larger public
protests.
1
Open Source Center, “Syria: Commentators Question Motives in Lifting Social Media Ban,” Document ID#
FEA20110301015070, March 1, 2011.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Figure 1. Map of Syria
Source: CRS Graphics
Dara’a
On Friday, March 18, the first large-scale demonstrations took place in multiple locations across
Syria, most notably in the southern town of Dara’a2 near the Jordanian border (80 miles south of
Damascus). Weeks earlier local police there had arrested 15 youths who had sprayed buildings
with graffiti that contained, among other things, the slogan that drove the revolutions in Tunisia
and Egypt: “The people want the regime to fall.”3 With tensions already high, police opened fire
on the protestors, killing six. The next day, during funeral processions for the slain victims, an
estimated 20,000 people turned the procession into a protest, demanding the resignation of the
town’s mayor and police chief. Instead, Syrian security forces sealed off Dara’a and police
continued to use excessive violence to disperse protestors; the government promised an
2
The town of Dara’a (alt. sp. Dera) is located in Dara’a province, a mostly tribal and rural area of some 300,000
Syrians, many of whom are Sunni Muslims. Before the recent outbreak of violence, it was considered an area
supportive of the regime. Vice President Farouk al Sharaa is from Dara’a province. In recent years, the area has been
hit hard by drought, and like many areas beyond the capital Damascus, it had suffered economically.
3
“Syria's Revolt: How Graffiti Stirred an Uprising,” Time.com, March 22, 2011.
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investigation and sent mediators to calm citizens. On the third day (March 20), crowds chanting
“no fear after today” set fire to the Baath Party’s headquarters and other government buildings,
and police again used live ammunition, killing another demonstrator. Protestors turned a centrally
located mosque in the old quarter of Dara’a into a gathering point and makeshift hospital. Police
units subsequently stormed that mosque on March 22, resulting in additional casualties (including
a prominent local doctor).
By March 24, news reports indicated that between 15 and 50 people had been killed by police, as
the city had been reinforced by soldiers and secret police while crowds as large as 20,000
continued to demonstrate and hold funerals for those slain days earlier. President Asad dismissed
the provincial governor and severed mobile phone access to Dara’a. He also pledged to increase
salaries for public workers and allow more media freedom. He suggested that he was willing to
study “the possibility of lifting the emergency law”4 that had been in place since 1963 (it was
lifted in April 2011, see below).
On Friday, March 25, a day dubbed “Dignity Friday” by protestors in Syria, government forces
reportedly opened fire again on demonstrators, killing an unknown number of civilians. By then,
confrontations were no longer confined to Dara’a and were occurring in several cities, though the
capital, Damascus, was fairly quiet. Protests occurred in the port city of Latakia, where at least 12
people were reportedly killed between March 25 and March 27. Latakia is a mixed Sunni and
Alawite town, and the government has deployed the army there to maintain order.
By March 27, at least 61 people had died during the government crackdown that started in Dara’a
on March 18. Many reports indicate that the government has deployed armed gangs or irregular
militias to intimidate and kill protestors.
Key Members of the Asad Family & Other Elites
Bashar al Asad—The 45-year-old president of Syria. He has ruled Syria since 2000 after the death of his father. He is
married to Asma’ al Akhras, a British-born Syrian Sunni Muslim and formerly an investment banker at J.P. Morgan.
Maher al Asad—The younger brother of Bashar, he heads the Presidential Guard and other military units, such as the
army’s Fourth Division—the Syrian army’s equivalent of special forces.
Bushra al Asad & Assef Shawkat—Bushra is the older sister of Bashar, and she is rumored to be a key decision-maker.
Her husband, Assef Shawkat, is intelligence chief and deputy chief of staff of the Army. He used to be head of military
intelligence and is part of the president’s inner circle.
Fawwaz and Munzer al Asad—Cousins of the president who are reportedly involved in militia-instigated violence.
Rami Makhluf—The 40-year-old cousin of President Bashar al Asad. Makhluf is a powerful Syrian businessman who
serves as an interlocutor between foreign investors and Syrian companies.
Hafiz Makhlouf—A cousin of the president and head of the Damascus branch of general intelligence.
Iyad Makhlouf—Younger brother of Rami and an officer in general intelligence.
Ihab Makhlouf—Younger brother of Rami and vice president of the SyriaTel mobile-phone company
Manaf & Firas Tlass—Both are the sons of former Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. Firas is a wealthy businessman and
head of the MAS Economic Group. Manaf Tlass is a high-ranking officer in the Republican Guard.
Majd Suleiman—The son of Bahjat Suleiman, a former high-ranking General Security Directorate officer. Majd
Suleiman is head of the United Group, a media conglomerate.
4
The law prohibited public congregations and enabled the authorities to detain people without trial. Protestors had
demanded that it be canceled.
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March 30: Asad’s Speech
On March 30, President Asad gave a widely anticipated speech before parliament in which he
blamed the country’s ills on foreigners and accused protestors of advancing “an Israeli agenda”
against Syria, saying they had been “duped” or were conspiring to destroy the nation.5 Asad
dismissed his cabinet, but critics charge that the move was merely “window dressing,” as he
appointed a former agricultural minister and Ba’ath party loyalist as the new prime minister. He
also pledged to form committees to “study” new reforms, including replacing the emergency law.
Some analysts characterized President Asad’s speech as a missed opportunity to stem further
public unrest by offering fundamental political reform, and others interpreted the speech as a clear
signal that his regime intended to use any means necessary to stop further demonstrations. Many
observers had hoped otherwise. According to one Syria analyst, even until recent weeks, “there
was a tendency to see him [Asad] as separate from the regime, that he could step out of his role.”
The ensuing violence suggests to some that President Asad has chosen to protect the interests of
his immediate family and the segment of the Alawite community they represent by any means
necessary. Others note the probable influence of Asad’s family and associates on the
government’s decision to use force to suppress protests as a means of preventing even larger
demonstrations that could threaten the regime.6
April 2011: Regime Brutally Suppresses Protests, Makes Limited Reforms
Throughout the month of April, President Asad suggested that reforms were forthcoming, even as
his regime’s security forces brutally suppressed protestors. On April 11, Syrian state media
carried a statement from the Interior Ministry which declared that:
In recent weeks, groups of citizens gathered in demonstrations in several areas in Syria,
particularly on Fridays, making a number of demands that were met with immediate
response from the leadership…. The Syrian authorities, in order to preserve the security of
the country, citizens and the governmental and services establishments, will confront these
people and those behind them according to the law…. The Ministry of Interior affirms that
there is no more room for leniency or tolerance in enforcing law, preserving security of
country and citizens and protecting general order.7
The violence escalated on Friday, April 22, when an estimated 109 people were killed in a single
day and many other activists and protestors are reported to have disappeared. As demonstrations
increased with each passing Friday after prayers, the regime admitted that unrest in Syria was not
simply a result of foreign meddling. Despite the regime’s warning that it would deal harshly with
all internal dissent, crowds of protestors kept growing. Some observers maintained that despite
the alleged atrocities committed by the security forces, the protests had not reached a critical
mass, as they had in Tunisia and Egypt during each country’s respective revolution.
5
“Syrian Leader Blames ‘Conspiracy’ for Turmoil,” New York Times, March 30, 2011.
According to one report, “Mr. Asad is surrounded by relatives with reputations for ruthlessness, including his brother
Maher al Asad, who commands the army’s Fourth Armored Division, and his brother-in-law Assef Shawkat, an
intelligence chief. The family is said to fear that easing up on protesters could embolden them, bringing much larger
crowds into the streets.” See, “Syrian Crisis Tests the Mettle of Its Autocratic Ruler,” New York Times, April 24, 2011.
7
"Syrian University Protests Violently Suppressed," New York Times, April 11, 2011.
6
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Toward the end of the month, demonstrations were taking place in most Syrian cities, particularly
in Homs, where security services were reportedly particularly harsh in their crackdown on
residents. On April 25, the regime ordered armored army units to enter towns such as Dara’a in a
demonstration of President Asad’s resolve to quash the symbol of where the uprising started.
Limited Reforms
President Asad has coupled the violent suppression of his security forces with some limited
reforms. On April 19, the decades-old Emergency Law was lifted, though many experts believe it
will simply be replaced by an anti-terrorism law which will be equally as restrictive as its legal
predecessor. According to Radwan Ziadeh, a Syrian human rights activist and visiting scholar at
George Washington University in Washington, “The emergency law might be lifted but the state
of emergency that governs every aspect of our lives will be the same.”
President Asad also has pledged to loosen media restrictions, abolish state security courts, release
political prisoners, and allow “approved” demonstrations. He has appointed new governors of
Homs and Dara’a provinces. He also has promised to address long-standing Kurdish grievances
such as finding a solution to the estimated 300,000 Kurdish Syrians who have been denied
citizenship for decades. He also has ordered an investigation of police killings. After a meeting
with the town leaders of Dara’a, President Asad allegedly remarked that “I saw how people from
Dara’a destroyed my father’s statues and my posters, but don’t worry. I will forgive that as a
father forgives his sons.”
The Syrian opposition considers these reforms mere window dressing designed to buy the regime
time in order to stave off even larger protests. In the meantime, numerous media reports suggest
the government has deployed snipers on the rooftops of buildings overlooking street protests, as
well as plain-clothes policemen who have attacked citizens.8 Some reports even suggest that
security forces have attacked ambulances and have entered hospitals to commit further violence.
May 2011: Syrian Cities and Towns under Siege
By May, the Asad regime resorted to the use of overwhelming force to quell nationwide protests
by primarily deploying loyalist security forces, irregular militias, and Alawite-led Army battalions
to garrison and lay siege to urban areas throughout the country. Though the government had
hoped that its encirclement of Dara’a in April using tanks would serve as a deterrent to other
areas, because protests continued, various military units were deployed to neighborhoods in
Homs (Syria’s third-largest city), the port city of Baniyas, and several other smaller cities and
towns. In each case, government forces employed similar tactics. Based on eyewitness accounts
and reporting from various Syrian human rights groups both abroad and on the ground, young
men between the ages of 18 and 45 were arrested and transported by buses to makeshift prisons in
public areas such as soccer stadiums; house-to-house raids were conducted; telephone and
electricity lines were cut; residents were ordered to stay indoors; checkpoints were established
along urban perimeters; protestors were beaten with sticks and hit with tear gas; and when
8
Syrians call plain-clothes security agents, usually distinguishable by their black leather jackets, shabbiha (translated
literally as “ghosts"). According to one report, the Shabbihah (alt. sp. Shabeehah) “pit communities against each other
to create a fear that prompts citizens to turn to the government for stability. Although Shabeeha members are found
across sectarian lines, most are from the Alawite community.” See, “Syrian ‘Shabeeha’ Thugs Are Assad’s Tool in
Protest Crackdown, Groups Say,” Bloomberg, June 1, 2011.
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demonstrators continued, protestors were ultimately shot by security services. Police also
continued a policy of enforced disappearance, as hundreds of activists have gone missing during
the crackdown.
The Syrian government continued to blame Israel, other foreign powers, and Salafi militant
groups for sponsoring an armed insurrection on its soil. One government spokeswoman and
former minister did acknowledge that there are Syrians dissatisfied with the status quo. According
to Bouthaina Shaaban:
There is a difference between peaceful protesters and armed groups.... We don’t crush
peaceful protests by force. Our problem is with armed groups.... Protesters went to the streets
around the country and protested by peaceful means.... There are peaceful protests
demanding legitimate demands, and the government is going to respond to those demands.9
Though the government employed a brutal campaign of repression throughout the month of May,
which it has deemed successful, it also offered to launch a “national dialogue” with opposition
members. Both longtime Syrian dissidents and the younger generation of activists have rejected
the government’s offer, calling it a cynical attempt to brandish its reformist credentials while it
continues to kill civilians. Some opposition members have said that if the regime ends its
crackdown, frees all political prisoners, and promises to open up the political system to new
parties, then a national dialogue process could ensue. It is unclear what impact the reported
announcement of a general amnesty for political opposition groups will have on these
calculations.
In the meantime, it appears that while Syrians have continued their demonstrations, government
repression has somewhat kept unrest from overflowing into a full-fledged revolution. Though
some protest activity has occurred in Damascus and Aleppo, neither city has witnessed the kind of
mass demonstrations seen in Cairo and Tunis months earlier. Damascus and Aleppo are both
home to many of Syria’s elite business families with long-standing monopolies granted by the
regime.10
Funerals for those killed by security forces continue to serve as an outlet for public protest, and it
is clearly evident that while repression has benefitted the regime, its gains are merely temporary,
as the country faces a prolonged period of instability. According to the International Crisis Group:
Even if massive repression were to succeed in the short term, any such victory would at best
be pyrrhic. In the wake of the crackdown, the security services would rule supreme.
President Assad’s domestic and international credibility would be shattered. Few countries
would be willing to lend a hand to redress a devastated economy. Major investments,
development projects and cultural ventures would find few foreign partners. Assad might
well prevent forcible regime change, but the regime will have been fundamentally
transformed all the same.11
9
"Syria Offers ‘Dialogue’ to Opposition as Protests Continue," Washington Post, May 13, 2011.
According to one expert, the business elites with direct ties to the Asad family number approximately 200, and many
of them are shareholders in Souria Holding and Cham Holding, Syria's two largest private holding companies. A
second group is “the merchant families of Damascus and Aleppo, the majority of whom are Sunni but also includes an
important Christian component. This group is part of the Syrian silent majority.” See, Randa Slim, “Where's Syria's
business community?” Foreign Policy.com, August 5, 2011.
11
International Crisis Group, Syria: Quickly Going beyond the Point of No Return, New Media Release, May 3, 2011.
10
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By the end of May, the protest movement gained some momentum after national outrage spread
after images circulated on the Internet of the mutilated body of a 13-year-old boy, Hamza Ali al
Khateeb, who was arrested in Dara’a in late April and then murdered by Syrian security forces.
Secretary of State Clinton remarked that the murder “symbolizes for many Syrians ... the total
collapse of any effort by the Syrian government to work with and listen to their own people.” In
order to deflect public and international anger, President Asad issued a general amnesty on May
31, though in reality, the government appeared to offer prison sentence reductions for some
crimes.
June 2011: Protests Spread North, Refugees Flee to Turkey
Beginning in early June, after the government claimed that 120 of its soldiers were killed by
armed protestors in the largely Sunni Muslim town of Jisr al Shoghour, loyal Syrian army units
were deployed to the North to lay siege to the town and others in the region. Other reports claim
that soldiers stationed in Jisr al Shoghour defected from the army and clashed with loyal units. On
June 12, security forces using tanks and helicopters retook the town and in the process, nearly
12,000 Syrians fled to Turkey, where they were relocated to refugee camps near the border.
Between June 6 and June 21, other northern and far eastern Syrian towns have experienced
protests and subsequent government repression, such as Tal Kalakh (near the border of northern
Lebanon), Maarat al Numan (alt. sp. Ma’arrat an Nu’man), Khan Shaykhoun (alt. sp. Khan
Sheikhun), and Deir el Zour (far east). Throughout the month of June, there were some reports of
rank and file Sunni soldiers defecting from the army, though Syria’s media blackout makes it
difficult to confirm these reports.
July and August 2011: Latest Developments
After six months of popular unrest against the government, the Asad regime’s brutal suppression
of its own people has become well known to the international community despite its attempt to
mask its ongoing crackdown by banning most foreign media from operating inside the country.
As of August 2011, Syrian dissidents claim that an estimated 2,000 people have been killed since
the uprising began in March and over 12,000 citizens have been detained by authorities. One
Syrian human rights group has identified 2,918 Syrians who have been arrested by security forces
and whose whereabouts are unknown.12
In essence, internal security forces occupy a broad swath of rural and urban areas. In Syria’s
third-largest city of Homs, the week of July 17 witnessed sectarian murders after Alawites burned
Sunni-owned businesses and homes in retaliation for the mutilations of three or four Alawite
residents. In Syria’s fourth-largest city, Hama (where in 1982 the government killed at least
10,000 people in a military operation against the now-exiled Muslim Brotherhood), reports
indicate that tanks and army units that had been surrounding the city moved on July 31 against
areas of the inner city controlled by protestors, killing over 70 people. Simultaneous raids on
other cities were reportedly designed to show the government’s ability to suppress nationwide
protests planned for the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which began August 1. In response to
the latest raids, President Obama said:
12
"Almost 3,000 missing in Syria crackdown: NGO," Agence France Presse, July 28, 2011.
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I am appalled by the Syrian government’s use of violence and brutality against its own
people. The reports out of Hama are horrifying and demonstrate the true character of the
Syrian regime. Once again, President Assad has shown that he is completely incapable and
unwilling to respond to the legitimate grievances of the Syrian people. His use of torture,
corruption and terror puts him on the wrong side of history and his people. Through his own
actions, Bashar al-Assad is ensuring that he and his regime will be left in the past, and that
the courageous Syrian people who have demonstrated in the streets will determine its future.
Syria will be a better place when a democratic transition goes forward. In the days ahead, the
United States will continue to increase our pressure on the Syrian regime, and work with
others around the world to isolate the Assad government and stand with the Syrian people.13
A week after Syrian forces stormed Hama, the government deployed tanks and other armored
vehicles to Syria’s fifth-largest city of Deir El Zour in the eastern part of the country. Like
previous crackdowns, security forces killed dozens of residents and surrounded the city
completely, cutting off all communication to the outside world. However, the government may
have been more cautious in dealing with opposition in the eastern part of the country due to the
strength of local tribes.
The capital, Damascus, and Syria’s second-largest city of Aleppo have not experienced serious
mass opposition protests, although a sizeable pro-government demonstration was held in
Damascus in late June. However, the outskirts of the capital and its poorer suburbs have been
hotbeds of public discontent. This could be a reflection of class differences (and perhaps sectarian
differences), as the non-Alawite business elites in Damascus and Aleppo have yet to break with
the regime. Other religious minority communities (Greek Orthodox and Druze among others) also
have, on the whole, refused to join the uprising out of fear that they may be persecuted by the
Sunni Muslim majority should it attain more political power. Some Syrian Christians allude to
their desire to avoid the type of sectarian violence that has plagued neighboring Lebanon and Iraq
as a motivating factor for their loyalty to the regime.
For its part, the Asad regime has proposed its own set of reforms, though these have been quickly
dismissed by protestors. After a nationally televised speech in late June, President Asad called for
a national dialogue, stating that his government distinguishes between those protestors with
legitimate grievances and “the saboteurs who represent a small group which has tried to exploit
the goodwill of the Syrian people for its own ends.” An ensuing three-day national dialogue
conference inside Syria, which was boycotted by most mainstream opposition groups, did issue a
statement calling for the revision of the constitution and the repeal of Article 8, which guarantees
Baath Party dominance in the country’s political system. One opposition leader who refused to
participate in the dialogue called the process “a dialogue between the authority and the authority
itself,” adding that “We decided to boycott the meeting because if we participated we would be
partners in the bloodshed by the regime’s military and security machine.”14 Several weeks after
the dialogue, the cabinet passed a draft law that allows the formation of political parties other
than the ruling Baath party. The new law would permit the formation of political parties provided
they are not “based on religious, tribal or ethnic beliefs and do not discriminate against gender or
race.” Opposition activists charge that these conditions are designed to dissuade Islamists or
Syrian Kurds from forming their own parties.
13
14
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Violence in Syria, July 31, 2011.
"Syrian Opposition Leaders Boycott a Government Dialogue Opening," New York Times, July 10, 2011.
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Who are the Protestors?
As of August 2011, a clearer picture of the Syrian protest movement is evolving, though most
analysts still describe it as nascent and somewhat fractured.15 Most media attention has been
focused on exile groups because of their accessibility to the foreign press. At least two opposition
conferences have been held in Turkey to date, the most recent culminating in the formation of the
National Salvation Council. The council is composed of at least 25 members from various
backgrounds, many of whom have been out of Syria for years, and reports indicate that its
members are divided over declaring a government in exile.
Inside Syria, protests continue to be coordinated at the local level by the tansiqiyat, or
coordination committees. A national organization called the Local Coordination Committees
claims to be the umbrella group for all local protest planning in various cities and towns. On June
12, the group stated that its goal is for a peaceful “regime change.” There are most likely the same
divisions between protestors in Syria (for example, between Islamists and more secular
demonstrators) that have been evident elsewhere during the so-called Arab Spring. And there is a
similar risk of extremists potentially taking advantage of the opening created by peaceful
protestors.
Some protestors have been cautious to portray their movement as nationalist and cross-sectarian.
In one march through the coastal town of Banias, crowds chanted “Not Sunni, not Allawi.
Freedom is what we all want.” However, if majority-Alawite units are found to be committing
atrocities against Sunni protestors, an increase in sectarian tension may be inevitable despite
protestor efforts to the contrary.
In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 2, U.S. Ambassador
to Syria Robert S. Ford remarked that “Asad and his circle will not endure forever, but it is not
entirely clear who or what will follow. An additional focus of my work on the ground, which I do
not advertise widely, is getting to know the leading activists and assessing their needs and
opportunities for the United States to help. They are independent. They do not want American
military involvement.”16
U.S. Policy Toward Syria: Administration and Congressional
Response
The regional political upheaval associated with “the Arab Spring” has brought new urgency to
long-standing questions of human rights, transparency, and political reform in Syria. Persistent
U.S. concerns about human rights in Syria have competed for policy makers’ attention over time
with parallel U.S. concerns about Syria’s regional foreign policy, its support for terrorism, and its
proliferation activities. Overall, the Administration is attempting to balance the need to denounce
15
Other obstacles have prevented the protest movement from transforming into a more established opposition force.
For example, security forces intentionally target any visible protest leader and block efforts of the opposition to
organize. In addition, youth activists are focused on organizing protests and evading arrest rather than debating terms
for a future political transition. According to one Syrian protestor, “The people who are on the streets don’t want a
leader.... Not only the Syrian people, but all the Arab people, are fed up with having a leader. It would create dissent
and fragmentation.” See, “Syrian Revolt still Spontaneous and Leaderless,” Washington Post, July 28, 2011.
16
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Statement of Robert Ford Nominee, Ambassador To The
Syrian Arab Republic, 112th Cong., August 2, 2011.
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the Asad regime’s brutal tactics with the need to develop an international consensus in order to
increase the pressure on the Syrian government.
In the spring of 2011, some critics charged that the Administration was slow to respond to the
unfolding crisis.17 Unlike in Libya, the Obama Administration stated in March that it would not
militarily intervene in Syria at that point to stop the government’s killing of civilians.18 In August
2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen reiterated that the United States
has no plans to militarily intervene in Syria when he said that “There's no indication whatsoever
that the Americans are, that we would get involved directly with respect to this. I think politically
and diplomatically, we want to bring as much pressure as we possibly can to effect the change
that so many countries are calling for.”19
New U.S. Sanctions and Tougher Administration Stance
On April 29, President Obama issued Executive Order (EO) 1357220, which blocked the property
and interests of five high-ranking Syrian officials and entities, including the president’s brother,
Maher al Asad; Ali Mamluk, the director of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate (GID);
Atif Najib, former head of the Syrian Political Security Directorate for Dara’a province and the
president’s cousin; the General Intelligence Directorate; and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps – Quds Force, which is allegedly assisting Syria in its crackdown. Most experts believe
that while the practical effect of U.S. financial sanctions may be limited, U.S. leadership on the
issue may encourage other countries to take action, particularly European countries that have
more extensive banking and trade relationships with Syria.
Even after new sanctions were issued, the Obama Administration continued to issue statements
demanding an end to the violence and indicating the Asad regime still had time to enact real
political reform. In an interview in Italy on May 6, Secretary of State Clinton stated that:
Well, and I think it's fair to say that everyone has the same concerns—the United States,
Italy, our other European and Arab partners—about what's going on in Syria. And we have
been absolutely outspoken on that. We have begun to sanction Syrian leaders. I know the EU
is considering doing the same. But the situation in Syria is even more complex in many,
many eyes. There are deep concerns about what is going on inside Syria, and we are pushing
hard for the Government of Syria to live up to its own stated commitment to reforms.... What
I do know is that they have an opportunity still to bring about a reform agenda.21
17
In an interview published in late March, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton remarked that “There’s a
different leader in Syria now. Many of the members of Congress of both parties who have gone to Syria in recent
months have said they believe he’s a reformer.” Critics assert that the statement implied support for the Asad
government. In response, Secretary Clinton insisted that she “referenced opinions of others” and “was not speaking
either for myself or for the Administration.”
18
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stated in late March that “each of these situations is unique.” She added
that “What’s been happening there [in Libya] the last few weeks is deeply concerning, but there’s a difference between
calling out aircraft and indiscriminately strafing and bombing your own cities than police actions [in Syria] which,
frankly, have exceeded the use of force that any of us would want to see.” "Twelve Killed in Syrian City of Latakia in
Fighting With Security Forces," Bloomberg, March 27, 2011.
19
"U.S. Military Chief Sees No Direct Syria Involvement," Reuters, August 2, 2011.
20
Available online at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13572.pdf
21
U.S. State Department Press Release, Interview With Lucia Annunziata of "In Mezz'Ora", Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton, Rome, Italy, May 6, 2011.
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However, by mid-May, as the Syrian regime expanded its repression, the Administration began to
take a tougher stance toward the Syrian government. On May 18, the President issued a second
Executive Order (EO 13573),22 which sanctioned President Asad himself, together with six other
high-ranking officials, including Farouk al Shara (vice president), Adel Safar (prime minister),
Mohammad Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the interior), Ali Habib Mahmoud (minister of
defense), Abdul Fatah Qudsiya (head of Syrian military intelligence), and Mohammed Dib
Zaitoun (director of political security directorate).
A day later in his address on democracy in the Arab world and the peace process, though the
President refrained from calling for President Asad’s ouster, he more forcefully reiterated calls for
reform and an end to repression, stating:
While Libya has faced violence on the greatest scale, it’s not the only place where leaders
have turned to repression to remain in power. Most recently, the Syrian regime has chosen
the path of murder and the mass arrests of its citizens. The United States has condemned
these actions, and working with the international community we have stepped up our
sanctions on the Syrian regime—including sanctions announced yesterday on President
Assad and those around him.
The Syrian people have shown their courage in demanding a transition to democracy.
President Assad now has a choice: He can lead that transition, or get out of the way. The
Syrian government must stop shooting demonstrators and allow peaceful protests. It must
release political prisoners and stop unjust arrests. It must allow human rights monitors to
have access to cities like Dara’a; and start a serious dialogue to advance a democratic
transition. Otherwise, President Assad and his regime will continue to be challenged from
within and will continue to be isolated abroad.23
On August 4, the Treasury Department added Muhammad Hamsho and his company to its
Specially Designated Nationals List, prohibiting U.S. entities from engaging in any business
dealings with him. According to Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the
U.S. Treasury Department David Cohen, “Muhammad Hamsho earned his fortune through his
connections to regime insiders.... During the current unrest, he has cast his lot with Bashar alAssad, Mahir al-Assad and others responsible for the Syrian government's violence and
intimidation against the Syrian people.”
Ford Visit and Administration Declares that Asad has “Lost Legitimacy”
On July 7 and 8, U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford and French Ambassador to Syria Eric Chevallier
visited the city of Hama for fact-finding purposes and “to show support for the activities that the
Syrians themselves were undertaking to demand their democratic rights.”24 Reports from Hama
suggested that Ambassador Ford was warmly received by crowds of activists and average citizens
at a number of locations. Syrian authorities described the visit as “clear evidence of the U.S.
involvement in the ongoing events in Syria and its bids to aggravate the situations which
destabilize Syria.” Supporters of Ambassador Ford’s approach claim that by showing solidarity
with Syrian citizens facing threats of regime violence, he advanced U.S. interests and
22
Available online at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13573.pdf
The White House, Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa, Office of the Press Secretary, May
19, 2011.
24
State Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, July 8, 2011.
23
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demonstrated U.S. support for human rights in Syria. Critics contend the visit created an
opportunity for the Asad regime to characterize the Hama protestors as U.S.-backed provocateurs
and risked the continued safety and access of U.S. diplomats in Syria. On July 11, a pro-regime
crowd attacked the U.S. Embassy in Damascus while protesting Ambassador Ford’s visit to
Hama.
In the wake of the embassy incident, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made the
strongest declaration yet against the Asad government. In part seeking to respond to speculation
that the United States wants the Asad regime to remain in power, she stated that: “From our
perspective, he has lost legitimacy.... If anyone, including President Assad, thinks the United
States is secretly hoping that the regime will emerge from the turmoil to continue its brutality and
repression, they are wrong. President Assad is not indispensable, and we have absolutely nothing
invested in him remaining in power.”25 Critics of the Administration have said that this rhetoric
should have been employed months earlier, while others welcomed it.
Congressional Action
The Syrian government’s use of lethal force in response to political demonstrations has refocused
attention on the basic tenets of U.S. policy toward Syria. Some Members of Congress and
nongovernmental observers argue that the recent violence demonstrates the futility of expecting
any substantive reform by Syrian authorities and suggests that U.S. policy should shift toward
outright confrontation and embrace regime change as a policy goal. These arguments have been
met by wariness among Administration officials, some regional experts, and elements of the
Syrian population about what the implications of confrontation would be, and what the
implications of regime change would be for regional security, particularly in light of the delicate
sectarian balance in the Levant. Other lawmakers have urged a more cautious approach while
advocating gradual steps to increase international pressure against the Asad regime.
The following legislation introduced in the 112th Congress addresses the current situation in
Syria.
25
Current Status
As of September 2011, popular efforts to overturn the Asad regime have stalled amidst a brutal
regime crackdown. Protests continue in Syria almost daily, but reports indicate that the fractured
opposition is having difficulty maintaining momentum as the conflict wears on. In recent weeks,
some demonstrators have even directly called for international non-military intervention to
support their cause, a sign that that some Syrians may be losing hope due to regime-instigated
violence. Many foreign nations have condemned the regime’s tactics and some, including the
United States, have called on President Bashar al Asad to step down, but no country has indicated
its willingness to militarily intervene on behalf of the opposition as had been the case in Libya.
Moreover, U.N. efforts to further sanction the Syrian Arab Republic Government (or SARG) have
stalled over continued Russian and Chinese opposition to U.N. sanctions. According to U.N.
figures, as of September 2011, at least 2,600 people have been killed since the start of the Syria
uprising in March 2011.
Many opponents of President Asad had hoped by now that his regime would fracture, particularly
the military. That has not happened in any significant way, and the Syrian government has
violently sought to ensure core regime stability. When reports surfaced that demonstrators were
contemplating violent resistance against the SARG, regime-protection forces even more
aggressively pursued opponents, particularly army defectors and former regime officials such as
Hama Attorney General Adnan Bakour, who has been the highest level civilian defector to date.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
The SARG denied that Bakour had resigned in late August, saying he was kidnapped by an armed
group and forced to give a taped statement condemning the regime.
While enduring a violent crackdown, the opposition has undergone a discernible shift in recent
weeks from a tone of confidence to one of frustration and even desperation. Recent Friday protest
slogans include “Your Silence is Killing Us,” a frustrated reference to lack of international
support for Syrian demonstrators. The August 26 slogan for protests was “Patience and
Steadfastness” an acknowledgement that Syria’s revolution could take years instead of months.
Though protests in the key cities of Damascus and Aleppo have slightly increased, many minority
groups, particularly Syrian Christians, continue to at least tepidly support the SARG. Maronite
Christian Patriarch Bshara al Rai expressed his concern over a transitional stage in Syria that
“might threaten the Christians of the East” adding, “I want to be objective. President Asad started
a series of political reforms. More opportunities should be given for internal dialogue and
supporting reforms.” Syrian Christians often allude to avoiding the sectarian violence that has
plagued Lebanon for decades and Iraq since 2003 as a motivating factor for maintaining loyalty
to the regime. Some of Syria’s neighbors have called on the Asad government to implement
reforms while expressing concern that rapid change could lead to sectarian conflict or instability.
U.S. Policy and Sanctions
On August 18, 2011, after five months of gradually increasing its criticism of the Asad regime,
President Obama called on Syrian President Bashar Al Asad to step down. In a statement
accompanying a new round of Administration sanctions, including a U.S. ban on all Syrian oil
imports, President Obama said that
“The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is
standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform have rung hollow while he is
imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his own people. We have consistently said that
President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For
the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.”
Since this change in U.S. policy, the Administration has continued to expand U.S. sanctions on
Syria while advocating for further sanctions at the international level. The State Department has
issued several statements that condemn “in the strongest possible terms the slaughter, arrest, and
torture of peaceful protesters taking place in Syria.” However, recent reports indicate that while
the Administration continues to push for more international condemnation of the SARG,
policymakers are preparing themselves for a prolonged crisis. According to one report, “Few
[U.S. officials] believe the Syrian leader will ever fully regain control of his country, or his
international stature. But they concede the 46-year-old could still hold power in Damascus for the
foreseeable future, while overseeing an increasingly repressive state.”1
The following table summarizes U.S. sanctions activity since the start of the Syria uprising in
March 2011.
1
“U.S., Europe See Syrian Stalemate,” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2011.
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Table 1. U.S. Sanctions against Syria in 2011
(Implemented by Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC])
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction Description
August 30,
2011,
Treasury
Department
Walid Mouallem (Foreign Minister), Ali Abdul Karim
Ali (Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon), Bouthaina
Shaaban (Advisor to the President)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 18,
2011,
Executive
Order 13582
Government of Syria
Freezes all assets of the Government of
Syria, prohibits U.S. persons from engaging
in any transaction involving the
Government of Syria, bans U.S. imports of
Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum
products, prohibits U.S. persons from
having any dealings in or related to Syria’s
petroleum or petroleum products, and
prohibits U.S. persons from operating or
investing in Syria.
August 18,
2011,
Treasury
Department
General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company
For Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian
Petroleum Company, Sytrol
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 10,
2011,
Treasury
Department
Commercial Bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based
subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank,
Syriatel, the country's main mobile phone operator
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 4,
2011,
Treasury
Department
Muhammad Hamsho (businessman with ties to Asad
family), Hamsho International Group
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
June 29, 2011,
Treasury
Department
Jamil Hassan (Head of Air Force Intelligence),
Political Security Directorate (PSD, domestic
intelligence)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
May 18, 2011,
Executive
Order 13573
President Bashar al Asad, Farouk al Shara (vice
president), Adel Safar (prime minister), Mohammad
Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the interior), Ali Habib
Mahmoud (minister of defense), Abdul Fatah Qudsiya
(head of Syrian military intelligence), Mohammed Dib
Zaitoun (director of political security directorate),
Nabil Rafik al Kuzbari, General Mohsen Chizari
(Commander of Iran Revolutionary Guard Corp
Qods Force suspected of human rights abuses in
Syria), Al Mashreq Investment Fund, Bena Properties,
Cham Holding, Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Syrian
Military Intelligence, Syrian National Security Bureau
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
April 29,
2011,
Executive
Order 13572
Maher al Asad, Ali Mamluk (director of the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate GID), Atif Najib
(former head of the Syrian Political Security
Directorate for Dara'a province and the president's
cousin). the General Intelligence Directorate, and
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds
Force (for allegedly assisting Syria in its crackdown)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
Source: U.S. Treasury Department.
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Notes: SDN stands for Specially Designated National. As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list
of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists
individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are
not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called Specially Designated Nationals or
SDNs. Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.
To date, the European Union also has issued sanctions against the SARG. It has sanctioned at
least 50 Syrian regime officials or affiliated businessmen. More importantly, it has banned the
import of Syrian oil. An estimated 95% of Syria’s oil and gas exports had been going to European
markets before sanctions. It is unclear where Syria will find replacement markets for its products.
The EU has not banned its companies from operating or investing in Syria. Royal Dutch/Shell,
among other companies, operates a joint venture with Syria's state oil company and a ChineseIndian firm to produce Syrian Light crude.
Select International Responses and Action
A special session of the U.N. Human Rights Council in April adopted Resolution S-16/1, which
“unequivocally condemns the use of lethal violence against peaceful protestors by the Syrian
authorities” and requested that the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights provide a
preliminary report on the situation of human rights in Syria. On June 14, the High Commissioner
reported that the Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) “has received numerous reports
alleging the excessive use of force by Syrian security forces against civilians, the majority of
whom were peaceful protestors. The most egregious reports concern the use of live ammunition
against unarmed civilians, including from snipers positioned on rooftops of public buildings, and
the deployment of tanks in areas densely populated by civilians.”2 The final report, reviewed at a
special Council session in August, included reports of murder, “disappearance,” and torture by
Syrian security forces and indications that at least 1,900 Syrians had died in the violence through
July 15.3 In response, the Human Rights Council has appointed a three-person independent
commission of inquiry that is tasked with reporting by the end of November about specific abuses
and identifying perpetrators.
The continuing protests and violence are creating increased pressure for international action,
although the positions of some key actors have not changed significantly since June. U.N. leaders
and European leaders have been increasingly vocal in demanding action, and the Arab League
and several Arab governments have called on the Syrian government to implement reforms and
halt the use of force. Opponents of international action, including Russia and China, remain wary
about the use of sanctions to create further pressure on President Asad and his government. Syrian
opposition leaders are calling for international sanctions, but remain vehemently opposed to
international military intervention. As such, most experts and observers see no potential for a
successful initiative to seek United Nations Security Council mandate for a military operation.
At present, attention is focused on competing draft Security Council resolutions, sponsored by the
Russia and the United States, France, Portugal, Germany, and the United Kingdom respectively.
2
U.N. Human Rights Council, Preliminary report of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in the
Syrian Arab Republic, Seventeenth session, June 14, 2011.
3
For a summary, see Statement by Ms. Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Human Rights
Council 17th Special Session on “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic” Geneva, August 22, 2011. For
the full report, see Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on Syria pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-16/1,
August 17, 2011.
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The U.S.-European draft would impose travel and asset sanctions on Syrian leaders and institute
an arms embargo on Syria. The Russian draft would call on opposition and government leaders to
resume dialogue while reforms are implemented. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan
Rice has indicated that the U.S. government has not been encouraged by the positions that
temporary Security Council members Brazil, India, and South Africa have taken on Syria and
similar issues to date.4 Key related recent statements and developments include
•
On September 15, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called on the
international community to take “coherent measures and speak with one voice,”
saying, “for six months, we have seen escalating violence and repression. The
international community has repeatedly appealed to President Assad to stop, most
recently the foreign ministers of the Arab League. He must now listen to such
urgent calls.”5
•
The United Kingdom, France, and the European Union (EU) continue to
condemn the Asad government’s use of force against protestors, and support the
use of sanctions as a means to compel it to cease the repressive use of force. On
September 2, the EU banned the import of Syrian oil and widened the scope of
existing asset freezes and travel bans on Syrian officials in response to what EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton
described as “the appalling and unacceptable escalation of the brutal campaign
the regime has been waging against the Syrian people.”6
•
Russia continues to resist proposals to include U.N. sanctions on Syria in a
Security Council resolution on the crisis. Some Syrian activists reportedly have
organized protests criticizing Russia for its position. On September 12, President
Dmitri Medvedev said, “Russia proceeds from the assumption that it’s necessary
to approve a resolution on Syria that will be tough, but well balanced at the same
time that would address both parties to the conflict—President Bashar Assad’s
government and the opposition. Only in that case could it be successful. …The
resolution must be tough, but it mustn’t automatically involve sanctions. …There
is absolutely no need now for any additional pressure.”7
•
China also has opposed the use of U.N. sanctions on Syria. A spokesperson for
the Chinese Foreign ministry said on September 15, “The Syria issue should be
resolved by relevant parties in Syria through consultations. We hope that Syria
will start a Syria-led political process as soon as possible and resolve the crisis
through dialogue. We believe that the international community should abide by
the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the norms
governing international relations and should fully respect Syria’s sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity. Whether the international community
should take further action on the Syria issue depends on whether the action will
4
Bloomberg News, “U.S. ‘Not Encouraged’ by India, South Africa, Brazil at U.N.,” September 12, 2011.
Massoud A. Derhally and Bill Varner, “Syrian Death Toll Mounts as Uprising Against Assad Enters Seventh Month,”
Bloomberg News, September 15, 2011.
6
Statement by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on the extension of restrictive measures against the Syrian
regime, A 345/11, Brussels, September 2, 2011.
7
Associated Press, “Russian president against Syria sanctions, says U.N. resolution must address both sides,”
September 12, 2011.
5
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help ease tension in Syria, promote the resolution of differences through political
dialogue, and maintain peace and stability in the Middle East.”8
•
The Arab League has taken a more active role in recent weeks. Arab League
Secretary General Nabil al Arabi visited Damascus over the weekend of
September 10 for discussions with President Asad. Reports suggest that Al Arabi
returned to Cairo with a commitment from President Asad to step down in 2014,
to call legislative elections within 6 months, and to name a national unity cabinet
for the transition period.9 The Syrian opposition has widely rejected similar
conditions and has demanded an immediate end to President Asad’s rule. The
subsequent Arab League Ministerial meeting in Cairo issued a statement on
September 13 stating that, “The current situation in Syria is still very serious and
an immediate change has to happen in order to stop the bloodshed and prevent
people facing more violence.”
•
Some Arab Gulf state leaders are publicly criticizing the Asad government as
well. King Abdullah bin Abdelaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia called on President
Asad to stop his “killing machine” and implement reform in early August, and
Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor Al Thani said on September
13 that, “We cannot allow people to be killed this way. …The army must
withdraw from inside the cities so that we can start talking about a dialogue
between the people and the government.”10 Both countries, along with Kuwait
and Bahrain, have withdrawn their ambassadors from Damascus.
•
Ali al Moussawi, an adviser to Iraqi prime minister Nuri Kamal al Maliki, said in
September 2011 that “We believe that the Syrian people should have more
freedom and have the right to experience democracy.... We are against the oneparty rule and the dictatorship that hasn’t allowed for the freedom of expression.”
Several weeks earlier, Iran had harshly criticized Syria as well. According to
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, “Regional nations can assist the
Syrian people and government in the implementation of essential reforms and the
resolution of their problems.... A military solution is never the right solution.”
Possible Trajectories: Where is Syria Heading?
In recent months, many observers and foreign government officials have asserted that the
regime’s crackdown is unsustainable over the long term. While this may prove true, there is no
consensus among experts or officials about the timetable for the regime’s demise. Some suggest
that as long as oil exports continue11 and key security officials commanding regime protection
units remain loyal, the government could hold out for many months if not years. Others believe
that high level defections, particularly from within the Alawite-dominated military and
intelligence apparatuses, are inevitable because Alawite elites will work to ensure their
8
Spokesperson Jiang Yu, OSC Report CPP20110915364001, “Transcript of PRC FM Spokesman News Conference,”
September 15, 2011.
9
Kristen Chick, “Assad can rule Syria until 2014? Protesters reject Arab League proposal,” Christian Science Monitor,
September 11, 2011.
10
Al Arabiyah, “Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah demands an end to violence in Syria,” August 8, 2011; and, Al
Arabiyah, “Qatar’s FM calls on Syria to stop ‘killing machine’ as Arab League meeting ends,” September 13, 2011.
11
See, Economist Intelligence Unit, “Syria economy: Vulnerable?,” June 16th 2011.
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community’s primacy by abandoning the Asad family as their position becomes more untenable.
Another possibility is that more distant members of the greater Asad family overthrow the ruling
family, including President Bashar al Asad himself, his brother Maher who commands several
internal security units, and his sister Bushra and her husband Asef Shawkat who also is a military
official. Decisions to support or oppose the uprising by military personnel, regime officials, and
pro-government social groups are inherently personal and psychological. Should fluid events
dictate changes in individuals’ calculations of their self-interest and the safety of their families,
unexpected shifts in momentum could occur without warning.
Figure 1. Map of Syria
Source: CRS Graphics.
The longer civil unrest lasts in Syria, the more the likelihood of sectarian clashes would seem to
rise. Although the Syrian opposition has condemned sectarianism and has tried to portray itself as
nationalist, the opposition is not strong enough to control all of its diverse members, and some
Sunni Muslims could begin to organize themselves into militias in order to combat irregular progovernment Alawite militias.12 The latter have been accused of many human rights violations
since demonstrations began seven months ago.
12
Syrians call plain-clothes security agents, usually distinguishable by their black leather jackets, shabbiha (translated
(continued...)
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
One major factor that could be decisive in determining how long the domestic crisis in Syria lasts
is the role of the regular army. In late May, opposition groups using social media appealed to the
armed forces to launch a coup against the Asad regime, saying that they would dedicate protests
to honor the “Guardians of the Nation,” a reference to the army. Some unconfirmed reports
suggest that regular army officers have been killed for refusing to fire on protestors and that the
regime has relied exclusively on Alawite-dominated units, including the Fourth Division led by
Maher al Asad. In July, defecting soldiers retreated to the far eastern, mostly tribal town of Abu
Kamal. In response, the military then deployed soldiers to invade the town, though tribal
negotiators brokered a cease-fire. According to one expert, “If a major general decides to defect
he needs to know how many soldiers will obey his orders.... The army chiefs have to much to
lose.... But once there is a very clear sign that the regime is getting close to the edge they will
jump. They will want to salvage the situation.”13 The sectarian divisions within the Syrian
military create the potential for overlap between changes in military loyalty and the likelihood of
sectarian conflict.
A long term concern to U.S. policymakers is the prospect of Syria becoming the locus of a new
regional proxy war between Syria’s ally Iran and Sunni Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and
Jordan, with other neighbors, such as Turkey, Iraq, and Israel, intervening to secure their own
national interests. The rise of a Sunni-led government in Damascus could upset regional
perceptions of the sectarian balance of power and may have significant effects on sectarian
dynamics in neighboring Lebanon. Some observers fear that even non-state actors (such as
Lebanon’s Hezbollah or Salafist Lebanese Sunni militia) could intervene in the Syrian unrest.
Already, there have been unconfirmed reports of Iranian support to Syria, as referenced above
(anti-riot gear, Internet jamming equipment, $5.8 billion in emergency aid, and oil shipments),
raising fears that Syria might become like Lebanon during its fifteen year civil war (1975 to
1990). After Syrian forces attacked several smaller, mostly Sunni Arab towns in the northnorthwest, thousands of residents fled to Turkey, though many have since returned. Perhaps of
greatest concern to Israel is the safety and oversight of Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons.
Syria is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and is widely believed to have
stockpiles of nerve agents such as sarin and VX. On August 30, State Department spokesperson
said, “we do believe that Syria’s chemical stockpile remains under government control and that
there is no change in the lockdown status of those weapons.”
Congressional Action
The Syrian government’s use of lethal force in response to political demonstrations has refocused
attention on the basic tenets of U.S. policy toward Syria. Some Members of Congress and
nongovernmental observers argue that the recent violence demonstrates the futility of expecting
any substantive reform by Syrian authorities and suggests that U.S. policy should shift toward
outright confrontation and embrace regime change as a policy goal. These arguments have been
met by wariness among Administration officials, some regional experts, and elements of the
Syrian population about what the implications of confrontation would be, and what the
(...continued)
literally as “ghosts”). According to one report, the Shabbihah (alt. sp. Shabeehah) “pit communities against each other
to create a fear that prompts citizens to turn to the government for stability. Although Shabeeha members are found
across sectarian lines, most are from the Alawite community.” See, “Syrian ‘Shabeeha’ Thugs Are Assad’s Tool in
Protest Crackdown, Groups Say,” Bloomberg, June 1, 2011.
13
“Assad’s Enemies Pin their Hopes on the Regular Syrian Army,” Guardian, June 15, 2011.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
implications of regime change would be for regional security, particularly in light of the delicate
sectarian balance in the Levant and a lack of established U.S. relationships with government and
non-government actors in Syria. Other lawmakers have urged a more cautious approach while
advocating gradual steps to increase international pressure against the Asad regime.
The following legislation introduced in the 112th Congress addresses the current situation in
Syria.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act—Would, among other things,
sanction the development of petroleum resources of Syria, the production of
refined petroleum products in Syria, and the exportation of refined petroleum
products to Syria.
•
H.Res. 296 (S.Res. 180 in the Senate), A Resolution Expressing support for
peaceful demonstrations and universal freedoms in Syria and condemning the
human rights violations by the Assad Regime—Among other things, it urges the
“President to continue to work with the European Union, the Government of
Turkey, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other allies and
partners to bring an end to human rights abuses in Syria, hold the perpetrators
accountable, and support the aspirations of the people of Syria.”
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and
Modernization Act of 2011—States that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement
and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their proliferation
activities and policies. Would, among other things, prohibit U.S. nuclear
"In Shift, U.S. Turns against Embattled Syrian leader," International Herald Tribune, July 14, 2011.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
cooperation agreements and related export licenses and transfers of materials,
services and goods with a country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran,
North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such
countries.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011—
Amends the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the
scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or extracted within
North Korea'’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the
transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such
countries'’ weapons of mass destruction programs, support for acts of
international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions
shipping services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011—Denies companies that conduct
business in Syria’s energy sector (investment, oil purchases, and sale of gasoline)
access to U.S. financial institutions and requires federal contractors to certify that
they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
Possible Policy Options
Should the Syrian regime continue to use violence against its own people, the Administration or
Congress may come under pressure to take additional punitive measures against the Asad regime.
Some possible policy options include:
•
New U.S. or International Sanctions Against Syria’s Energy Sector: Some
experts have asserted that targeting Syria’s energy sector is the primary way to
deprive the regime of revenue. Policymakers could engage the European Union
and request that it restrict
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
deprive the regime of revenue. The European Union has already agreed to restrict
the sale of Syrian oil in Europe.2614 Another tactic would
be to pressure foreign oil
companies doing business in Syria, namely Royal
Dutch Shell, Total, Croatia's ’s
INA Nafta, Petro-Canada, India’s Oil and Natural
Gas Corp., the China National
Petroleum Corp., and Russia'’s Tatneft.2715 However,
some European countries
could be sensitive to the humanitarian implications of
harsher sanctions, and it is
doubtful that Russia28Russia16 and China, given their
resistance to United Nations
Security Council action against Syria, would allow
sanctions that would require
their energy companies to divest from Syrian
investments.
•
Recall the U.S. Ambassador from Damascus and Restrict Movement of
Syrian Diplomats in Washington, DC: Despite Ambassador Ford’s recent
efforts to support
demonstrate U.S. solidarity with Syrian protestors, some lawmakers wish to see
the U.S.
Ambassador to Syria recalled, as the George W. Bush Administration did
in 2005.
Critics of this approach believe that at this crucial time in U.S.-Syrian relations,
26
France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands are the primary consumers of Syrian oil.
See, Andrew Tabler, “Lights Out,” ForeignPolicy.com, July 19, 2011.
28
One recent Russian state news report indicated that the Russian Embassy in Damascus had held meetings with the
Syrian opposition. The Spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexander Lukashevich said that “We are having
such contacts. Russia’s position on the situation in Syria is being laid down in detail at the meetings. In most cases the
Syrians take it with understanding.” See, “Russia maintains contacts with Syrian opposition,” Itar Tass World Service,
July 27, 2011.
27
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Critics of this approach believe that at this crucial time in U.S.-Syrian
relations, recalling the Ambassador would limit the U.S. ability to understand the rapidly
rapidly evolving situation on the ground. Given the regime’s hostility to recent
U.S.
policy, the Syrian government may attempt to restrict the movement of U.S.
officials there, perhaps creating an opportunity to recall the U.S. Ambassador in
protest.2917 Others have suggested that given the accusations by some Syrian
American activists that the Syrian Embassy in Washington, DC, has attempted to
silence them by threatening their families in Syria, the United States should
restrict the movements of Syrian diplomats.3018 The Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175, does permit the President to
enact an option to “Restrict Syrian diplomats in Washington, D.C., and at the
United Nations in New York City, to travel only within a 25-mile radius of
Washington, D.C., or the United Nations headquarters building, respectively.”3119
In August 2011, Italy recalled its ambassador from Damascus.
•
Charge Syrian Officials with War Crimes or Crimes Against Humanity:
Some reports suggest that the Administration believes that Syrian officials should
be charged with war crimes. According to Stephen Rapp, the U.S. Ambassadorat-Large for War Crimes Issues, the killing of Syrian civilians demanding
democracy is a “crime against humanity.” Ambassador Rapp stated that “We are
watching the situation in Syria very closely.... We see crimes against humanity.
As a former prosecutor [in the special court for Sierra Leone] I can't tell whether
it's … systematic attacks against civilians based on a plan.”
•
Implement Additional Provisions of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175: This law requires the President to
impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six. In 2004, President Bush chose
to ban U.S. exports to Syria other than food and medicine and ban Syrian aircraft
landing in or overflying the United States.32 The Administration could implement
other menu items, such as a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in
Syria, a reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria, restrictions on travel by
Syrian diplomats in the United States, and blocking of transactions in Syrian
property.
•
Require New Reporting on U.S. Policy and Strategy toward Syria: Congress
could require the Administration to report to it concerning the regional security
implications of the ongoing unrest in Syria and the potential implications of
regime change there. Such a report could include requirements to describe the
29
’s … systematic attacks against civilians based on a plan.”20
14
France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands are the primary consumers of Syrian oil.
See, Andrew Tabler, “Lights Out,” ForeignPolicy.com, July 19, 2011.
16
One recent Russian state news report indicated that the Russian Embassy in Damascus had held meetings with the
Syrian opposition. The Spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexander Lukashevich said that “We are having
such contacts. Russia’s position on the situation in Syria is being laid down in detail at the meetings. In most cases the
Syrians take it with understanding.” See, “Russia maintains contacts with Syrian opposition,” Itar Tass World Service,
July 27, 2011.
17
According to one report, Syria warned the U.S. and French ambassadors not to travel outside Damascus without
permission and, if they disobey the order, Syria will ban all diplomats from leaving Damascus. See, “Syria Warns
Diplomats Not to Leave Damascus,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2011.
30
"18
“FBI Agents meet with Syrian Activists,"” Washington Post, July 20, 2011.
31
P.L. 108-175
32
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver authority
contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to issue the following waivers on
grounds of national security: Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products
in support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of potential dual use; aircraft parts
necessary for flight safety; informational materials; telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of
information; certain software and technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a
temporary nature. Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of Syrian
aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States; takeoff/landing for non-traffic
and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.19
P.L. 108-175
20
“Killing of Syrian Civilians ‘Crime against Humanity’, says US Ambassador,” Guardian, July 21, 2011.
15
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
potential need for U.S. financial contributions to support possible international
humanitarian, stabilization, peacekeeping, or advisory efforts in Syria, including
under the auspices of the United Nations. Critics may suggest that such a
reporting requirement would be unduly burdensome to the executive branch or
premature given the fluidity of the current situation.
International Response
Recent United Nations Developments
The United Nations Security Council has remained divided over proposed action in response to
the Syrian government’s crackdown and held consultations in early August to address the matter.
These meetings were the first Security Council action on Syria since the crisis began. The United
States and its European allies reportedly have been pressing for clear condemnation of the Syrian
government’s actions, with wariness from China and Russia preventing action to date. Lebanon,
which sits as a non-permanent Security Council member now, is against a resolution that would
condemn its neighbor. In recent weeks, Russia has shown more flexibility in its position.33 It has
denounced the violence in Hama and one foreign ministry spokesman said that “We are not
categorically against everything.... We are categorically against what doesn’t help bring forward a
peaceful settlement.” Syrian officials have publicly stated that they are “relying on the Russian
position.” China also may be against sanctioning Syria at the United Nations, as one Chinese
government spokesperson said that “The Chinese government supports the efforts made by Syria
to safeguard its national sovereignty and stability and also hopes to see the early restoration of
stability and normalcy in Syria.”
On the other hand, members of the European Union, Canada, and others have joined the United
States in sanctioning the Asad regime.34 On June 6, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said that
Syrian President Bashar al Asad has “lost his legitimacy” to rule Syria amid the crackdown
against his own people. Weeks later, he remarked that President Asad had reached “a point of no
return,” amidst European Union plans to toughen sanctions against Syria. On August 2, the EU
issued another round of targeted sanctions against the Syrian regime.35
On August 3, the Security Council issued a “presidential statement,” not a resolution, that
condemned “widespread violations of human rights and the use of force against civilians by the
Syrian authorities.” Russia opposed issuing a resolution, considering it excessive. Lebanon joined
the 15-members of the Security Council required to pass a presidential statement, but then
“disassociated” itself from the result.
33
Despite growing Russian criticism of Syria, it remains opposed to foreign military intervention in Syria. Russian
officials have promised to veto any UN resolution that could authorize military action. Ambassador to the UN Vitaliy
Churkin remarked that “events in Libya will cast a shadow for a long time on everything that happens at the UN
Security Council.”
34
The European Union (EU) has sanctioned President Asad himself and 23 other members of the Syrian government,
an act that bans them from traveling to the EU and freezes any EU-based assets.
35
The EU sanctioned an additional five people including, Defense Minister Ali Habib Mahmud, Mohammed Mufleh,
head of Syrian military intelligence in Hama, Major General Tawfiq Yunis, head of 'internal security' in the General
Intelligence Directorate, Mohammed Makhlouf, also known as Abu Rami, an uncle of Syrian President Bashar al Asad,
and Ayman Jabir.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Turkey
Other key actors, such as Turkey, have called on the president of Syria to reform but have
refrained from calling for his immediate removal from power.36 Turkey's Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, who had cultivated close relations with Asad over the years and initially
responded to the unrest in Syria by calling for political reform while expressing confidence in
Asad's intention to pursue it, has begun to publicly criticize the regime's violent crackdown as it
intensifies, particularly in northern Syria with its increasingly direct implications for Turkey's
own border security. In a June 9 television interview, Erdogan said, “I heard that around 2,500
Syrians are about to enter Turkey [as refugees]. I spoke with al-Assad four to five days ago about
the situation there. But they are underestimating this. They tell us different things. They are not
acting in a humane fashion.”37 Turkey also allowed a conference of Syrian opposition leaders to
take place in the city of Antalya from May 31 to June 3.
Some experts believe that Turkish pressure on regime officials outside President Asad’s
immediate family and inner circle could help encourage a revolt against Syria’s leaders.
According to Elliott Abrams, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former
National Security Council official, “Messages from Turkish officials to the Alawite military
establishment can help persuade them not to sacrifice their future in a vain effort to save the
Assad mafia.”38
Other Responses
On August 8, as Syrian forces launched a second assault on the restive, mostly Sunni city of Deir
El Zour in eastern Syria, Saudi Arabia responded by recalling its ambassador in protest. King
Abdullah warned the Syrian government that its tactics were self-destructive, saying that “Syria
should think wisely before it's too late and issue and enact reforms that are not merely promises
but actual reforms.... Either it chooses wisdom on its own or it will be pulled down into the depths
of turmoil and loss.”
A special session of the U.N. Human Rights Council on April 29 adopted Resolution S-16/1,
which “unequivocally condemns the use of lethal violence against peaceful protestors by the
Syrian authorities” and requested that the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights provide a
preliminary report on the situation of human rights in Syria. On June 14, the High Commissioner
reported that the Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) “has received numerous reports
alleging the excessive use of force by Syrian security forces against civilians, the majority of
whom were peaceful protestors. The most egregious reports concern the use of live ammunition
against unarmed civilians, including from snipers positioned on rooftops of public buildings, and
the deployment of tanks in areas densely populated by civilians.”39 The High Commissioner
noted reports of arbitrary detentions of women and children, human rights defenders, political
36
In recent years, Turkey has dramatically increased its trade and investment in Syria as part of its outreach strategy to
Arab neighbors. In recent weeks, Turkish officials have expressed their dismay at the crackdown in Syria though it is
unclear how much influence they are able to wield there.
37
Open Source Center, "Turkey Slams Damascus, Refrains From Calling Fleeing Syrians 'Refugees'," Hurriyet Daily
News & Economic Review, June 10, 2011, Document GMP20110611017003.
38
Wall Street Journal, "Preventing Civil War in Syria," August 2, 2011.
39
U.N. Human Rights Council, Preliminary report of the High Commissioner on the situation of human rights in the
Syrian Arab Republic, Seventeenth session, June 14, 2011.
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activists, and journalists, as well as reports of “acts of torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment” by Syrian security forces “against persons detained in connection with the
demonstrations, resulting in deaths in custody in some cases.” Violations with regard to assembly,
speech, food, and health also were noted. An OHCHR fact-finding mission has requested
permission from Syrian authorities to visit Syria and as of mid-June had heard no response and
had not been allowed to visit.40
Possible Trajectories: Where is Syria Heading?
In recent months, many observers and foreign government officials have asserted that the
regime’s crackdown is unsustainable over the long term. Yet, there is no real consensus about the
timetable for the regime’s demise. Some suggest that as long as oil exports continue41 and key
security officials commanding regime protection units remain loyal, the government could hold
out for many months if not years.42 Others believe that high level defections, particularly from
within the Alawite-dominated military and intelligence apparatuses, are inevitable, because
Alawite elites will work to ensure their community’s primacy by abandoning the Asad family as
their position becomes more untenable. Another possibility is that more distant members of the
greater Asad family overthrow the ruling family, including President Bashar al Asad himself; his
brother Maher, who commands several internal security units; and his sister Bushra and her
husband Asef Shawkat, who also is a military official. According to one regional expert, decisions
to support or oppose the uprising by military personnel, regime officials, and pro-government
social groups are inherently personal and psychological. Should fluid events dictate changes in
individuals’ calculations of their self-interest and the safety of their families, unexpected shifts in
loyalty could occur without warning.43
The longer civil unrest lasts in Syria, the more the likelihood of sectarian clashes would seem to
rise. Although the Syrian opposition has condemned sectarianism and has tried to portray itself as
nationalist, as previously mentioned, the opposition is not strong enough to control all of its
diverse members, and some more religious Sunni Muslims could begin to organize themselves
into militias in order to combat irregular pro-government Alawite militias.44 The latter have been
accused of many human rights violations since demonstrations began five months ago.
40
“I regret to report that, despite several official communications requesting the Government of Syria to grant access to
the Fact-Finding Mission, I have received no response from the Government. This lack of responsiveness severely
hampers our work. Due to the impossibility to deploy to Syria, my team is gathering information from outside the
country. Some of its members are now in southern Turkey, close to the border with Syria, which thousands of refugees
have crossed. As the human rights situation on the ground continues to deteriorate, I take this opportunity to strongly
urge the Syrian Government to cooperate with my Office.” Statement of United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights Navi Pillay, Human Rights Council, Geneva, June 15, 2011.
41
See, Economist Intelligence Unit, “Syria economy: Vulnerable?,” June 16th 2011.
42
Nevertheless, the longer unrest continues, the more the economic situation is expected to deteriorate. The tourist
industry already has suffered as well as the textile industry, which employs about 20 % of Syria’s labor force.
43
CRS analyst participation in off-the-record experts’ discussion, Washington, DC, July 2011.
44
Syrians call plain-clothes security agents, usually distinguishable by their black leather jackets, shabbihah (translated
literally as "ghosts"). According to one report, the Shabbihah (alt. sp. Shabeehah) "pit communities against each other
to create a fear that prompts citizens to turn to the government for stability. Although Shabeeha members are found
across sectarian lines, most are from the Alawite community." See, "Syrian 'Shabeeha' Thugs Are Assad's Tool in
Protest Crackdown, Groups Say," Bloomberg, June 1, 2011.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Possibility of a Military Coup?
One major factor that could be decisive in determining how long the domestic crisis in Syria lasts
is the role of the regular army. The Asad regime’s deliberate opacity has shielded its inner
workings from the outside, and some experts believe the possibility of a military coup by Sunni
officers or an intra-Alawite split is remote.45 According to Professor Andrew Terrill at the U.S.
Army War College, the non-elite army units still have Alawite officers in key positions and the
army is
very much under surveillance of the Syrian security forces, which are very, very efficient at
what they do.... This is going to be nothing like Egypt where you had the army start to show
an independent voice and start to tell the regime what to do.... The army and the Alawite
leadership of the army is going to stand behind the Assad regime because they're scared to
death of what's going to happen if Alawite control ends in Syria.46
In late May, opposition groups using social media appealed to the armed forces to launch a coup
against the Asad regime, saying that they would dedicate protests to honor the “Guardians of the
Nation,” a reference to the army. Some unconfirmed reports suggest that regular army officers
have been killed for refusing to fire on protestors and that the regime has relied exclusively on
Alawite-dominated units, including the Fourth Division led by Maher al Asad. Other reports
indicate that the Syrian military uses propaganda, conditioning, and internal security tactics to
enforce discipline over soldiers ordered to use lethal force against civilians and that these
measures have at times failed to prevent defections and internal clashes within the Syrian
military.47 In July, defecting soldiers retreated to the far eastern, mostly tribal town of Abu Kamal.
In response, the military deployed soldiers to invade the town, though tribal negotiators brokered
a cease-fire. According to one expert, “If a major general decides to defect he needs to know how
many soldiers will obey his orders.... The army chiefs have too much to lose.... But once there is a
very clear sign that the regime is getting close to the edge they will jump. They will want to
salvage the situation.”48 The sectarian divisions within the Syrian military create potential overlap
between changes in military loyalty and the likelihood of sectarian conflict.
Appearing in video footage on the Internet and on Al Jazeera, a group calling itself the Free
Officers Movement, composed mostly of defecting officers of lower ranks, has vowed to defend
demonstrators.49
45
According to one report, “The security service, thought to number at least 65,000 full-timers, has been responsible
for most of the violence. Set up by Hafez Assad soon after his coup in 1970, its 15-odd branches fall under four main
intelligence headings: general, political, military and air force. Only tenuously linked to any civilian institution, they
are above the law and sign off on virtually all big decisions. Their heads report directly to Mr Assad. "They provide
security for the regime, not for the state," explains a well-informed local. "They will never defect." They also spy on
each other. On occasions during the current crackdown their members have arrested or shot people from rival branches.
See, “Could the Assad regime fall apart?;” The Economist, April 30, 2011.
46
"Syria's Army is Loyal, but not Fail-Safe: Analysts," Agence France Presse, May 27, 2011.
47
Open Source Center, "Syria -- Defector Accounts Point to Fissures in Military, Allege Iranian Involvement," July 27,
2011.
48
Najib Ghadbian in Ian Black, “Assad's enemies pin their hopes on the regular Syrian army,” The Guardian (UK),
June 15, 2011.
49
Open Source Center, "Syria: Army Defectors Vow to Defend Demonstrators, Reach Out to Fellow Soldiers," Al
Jazeera, August 3, 2011, GMP20110803647002.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
A Regional Proxy War?
A second-order concern to U.S. policymakers is the prospect of Syria becoming the locus of a
new regional proxy war between Syria’s ally Iran and Sunni Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and
Jordan, with other neighbors, such as Turkey, Iraq, and Israel, intervening to secure their own
national interests. The rise of a Sunni-led government in Damascus could upset regional
perceptions of the sectarian balance of power and may have significant effects on sectarian
dynamics in neighboring Lebanon. There is some fear that even non-state actors (such as
Lebanon’s Hezbollah or Salafist Lebanese Sunni militia) could intervene in the Syrian unrest.
However, some reports suggest that Hezbollah has become unpopular in Syria due to its support
of the regime.50 In a May speech, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah encouraged Lebanese
citizens to support Syria saying, “Bashar is serious about carrying out reforms but he has to do
them gradually and in a responsible way; he should be given the chance to implement those
reforms.” Already, there have been unconfirmed reports of Iranian support to Syria, as referenced
above (anti-riot gear, Internet jamming equipment, $5.8 billion in emergency aid, and oil
shipments), raising fears that Syria will become a forum for violence and regional competition
like Lebanon during its 15-year civil war (1975 to 1990). According to one unnamed official,
“There are ‘very strong indications’ that Iran is helping the Syrians crack down on protesters with
advice on how to track or block their Internet use, training on how to put down demonstrations
and the supply of riot control equipment.”51 After Syrian forces attacked several smaller, mostly
Sunni Arab towns in the north-northwest, 15,000 residents fled to Turkey, though about 9,000
have since returned. Perhaps of greatest immediate concern to Israel is the safety and oversight of
Syria’s stockpile of chemical weapons.
Opportunity for the United States?
On the other hand, the possibility of revolution in Syria may present opportunities for the United
States, under some conditions. Few observers expect that a more democratic Syrian government
would abandon long-standing nationalist goals of, for instance, seeking a return of the Golan
Heights. However, if Syrian protestors somehow succeed in toppling the Asad regime in a
peaceful manner, a more democratic Syria may seek to broaden its relationships with Western
democracies and could choose to reduce its dependence on its current alliance with Iran.
However, most experts believe that this scenario is a distant possibility and it depends on the
ability of any Syrian protest movement to overthrow the Asad government without destabilizing
the country and upsetting its ethnic/sectarian balance among Alawites, Christians, Sunni and
Shi’a Muslim Arabs, and Kurds.
Despite fears of sectarian clashes, Syrian public dissatisfaction over economic inequality,
corruption, and dictatorship is driving the protests. In this regard, what is happening in Syria is no
different than what has already transpired in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere. However, because the
Asad regime is so entrenched domestically in the Alawite community and military and so
entangled in various regional relationships/conflicts, the Syrian opposition has a long way to go
before it can uproot the president and his family from power. Nevertheless, the government will
not likely be able to address public grievances in any meaningful manner, which only leaves the
use of repression to hold the state together.
50
51
"New Loyalties and Old Feuds Collide in Syria," New York Times, July 24, 2011.
"Iran said to help Syria track protesters' Web use," Reuters, April 14, 2011.
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To date, despite the heavy-handed actions of the security forces, Syria’s elite have remained either
supportive of the regime or quiescent. In an interview with the New York Times, the president’s
first cousin Rami Makhlouf boldly asserted that the regime would not fold to domestic or
international pressure and threatened chaos should it be destabilized. According to Makhlouf,
If there is no stability here, there’s no way there will be stability in Israel.... No way, and
nobody can guarantee what will happen after, God forbid, anything happens to this regime....
What I’m saying is don’t let us suffer, don’t put a lot of pressure on the president, don’t push
Syria to do anything it is not happy to do.52
U.S. Sanctions
The following section provides background on U.S. sanctions against Syria. It predates the
nation-wide unrest that began in March 2011. For recent information on U.S. sanctions, please
see, “U.S. Policy Toward Syria: Administration and Congressional Response”
Overview
Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is therefore subject to a number
of U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in
1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006 Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued
new executive orders that expanded U.S. sanctions on Syria. At present, a variety of legislative
provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade.53
Principal examples follow.10
Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
•
Implement Additional Provisions of the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175: This law requires the President to
impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six. In 2004, President Bush chose
to ban U.S. exports to Syria other than food and medicine and ban Syrian aircraft
landing in or overflying the United States.21 The Administration could implement
other menu items, such as a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in
Syria, a reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria, restrictions on travel by
Syrian diplomats in the United States, and blocking of transactions in Syrian
property.
•
Require New Reporting on U.S. Policy and Strategy toward Syria: Congress
could require the Administration to report to it concerning the regional security
implications of the ongoing unrest in Syria and the potential implications of
regime change there. A report might also focus on sources of remaining external
support for the Asad government and assess the likely success of various options
for eliminating those sources of support. Such a report could include
requirements to describe the potential need for U.S. financial contributions to
support possible international humanitarian, stabilization, peacekeeping, or
advisory efforts in Syria, including under the auspices of the United Nations.
Critics may suggest that such a reporting requirement would be unduly
burdensome to the executive branch or premature given the fluidity of the current
situation.
U.S. Sanctions
The following section provides background on U.S. sanctions against Syria. It predates the
nation-wide unrest that began in March 2011. For recent information on U.S. sanctions, please
see, Table 1 above.
Overview
Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is therefore subject to a number
of U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in
1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006 Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued
new executive orders that expanded U.S. sanctions on Syria. At present, a variety of legislative
provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade.22
Principal examples follow.
21
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver authority
contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to issue the following waivers on
grounds of national security: Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products
in support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of potential dual use; aircraft parts
necessary for flight safety; informational materials; telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of
information; certain software and technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a
temporary nature. Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of Syrian
aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States; takeoff/landing for non-traffic
and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
22
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s designation as a country
supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and
(continued...)
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General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [P.L. 94-329].
Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC 2371]. (Syria was not affected by this ban until
1979, as explained below.)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 [Title II of P.L. 95-223 (codified at
50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.)]. Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),
the President has broad powers pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a
threat “which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” These powers include the ability to
seize foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction, to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, to
52
"Syrian Elite to Fight Protests to 'the End'," New York Times, May 11, 2011.
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s designation as a country
supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and
1981, the United States provided a total of $627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance,
$438.0 million in economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a brief
warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded under U.S. aid included water
supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to
Syria since 1981, when the last aid programs were closed out.
53
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
prohibit payments between financial institutions involving foreign currency, and to prohibit the
import or export of foreign currency.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93 Stat. 515]
required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress before
licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries determined to
have supported acts of international terrorism. (Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 relettered
Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list. This list is
prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support for
acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first prepared in
1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2009, issued on August 5, 2010. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the
above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399]. Section 509(a) of this
act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit export of
items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of international terrorism,
thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the AntiTerrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989—see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans
obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of this act [100 Stat.
1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on income or war
profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism.
[26 USC 901(j)]. The President was given authority to waive this provision under Section 601 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200, May 18, 2000).
(...continued)
1981, the United States provided a total of $627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance,
$438.0 million in economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a brief
warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded under U.S. aid included water
supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to
Syria since 1981, when the last aid programs were closed out.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L. 101-222]. Section 4
amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional notification and
licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries
on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their
ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribes conditions for removing a country from the terrorism list: prior
notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen of
two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite notification, the
President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no
longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45
days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list).
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver
has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other
prohibitions already in effect.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132]. This act requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (Section 325) or lethal military
equipment (Section 326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President to waive this
provision on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to third countries that
sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens or
resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the terrorism
list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in consultation
with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such
transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.”
(31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996,
the then chairman of the House International Relations Committee reportedly protested to then
President Clinton about the Treasury Department’s implementing regulation, which he described
as a “special loophole” for Syria.
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign assistance
appropriations legislation enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S. aid.
The most recent ban appears in Section 7007 of P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2010, which states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available
pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any
assistance or reparations for the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria: Provided,
That for purposes of this section, the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include
direct loans, credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents.”
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by Section 431 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
States to withhold a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for
programs that benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178, was amended by P.L. 109-112 to make its
provisions applicable to Syria as well as Iran. The amended act, known as the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act, requires the President to submit semi-annual reports to designated
congressional committees, identifying any persons involved in arms transfers to or from Iran or
Syria; also, the act authorizes the President to impose various sanctions against such individuals.
On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed P.L. 109-353 which expanded the scope of the
original law by adding North Korea to its provisions, thereby renaming the law the Iran, North
Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (or INKSNA for short). The list of Syrian entities
designated under INKSNA includes Army Supply Bureau (2008), Syrian Navy (2009), Syrian Air
Force (2009), and Ministry of Defense (2008).5423 On May 24, 2011, the State Department
designated the Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center
(SSRC) under INKSNA.
54
See, State Department Press Releases And Documents “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act: Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Specific Sanctions Against Syria
Specific U.S. sanctions levied against Syria fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions resulting
from the passage of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that,
among other things, prohibit most U.S. exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed by executive order
from the President that specifically deny certain Syrian citizens and entities access to the U.S.
financial system due to their participation in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden; or destabilizing activities in Iraq and
Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from the USA Patriot Act levied specifically against the
Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006.
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act into law, as P.L. 108-175. This law requires the President to impose
penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased
supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq (Section 5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans
on the export of military items (already banned under other legislation, see above55above24) and of dual
use items (items with both civil and military applications) to Syria (Section 5(a)(1)). In addition,
the President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
•
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
•
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
•
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
23
See, State Department Press Releases And Documents “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act: Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
24
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
•
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
•
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
•
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (Section 5(a)(2)).
Implementation
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions of
P.L. 108-175, including the bans on munitions and dual use items (Section 5(a)(1)) and two
sanctions from the menu of six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban
on exports to Syria other than food and medicine (Section 5(a)(2)(A) and the ban on Syrian
aircraft landing in or overflying the United States (Section 5(a)(2)(D). In issuing his executive
order, the President stated that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete steps to address the
concerns that led to the enactment of the Syria Accountability Act. The President also imposed
two additional sanctions based on other legislation.
•
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
55
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.
Waivers
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver
authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to
issue the following waivers on grounds of national security:
Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products in
support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of
potential dual use; aircraft parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information; certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a temporary
nature.5625
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of
Syrian aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an
emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.57 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.58
5625
According to U.S. regulations, any product that contains more than 10% de minimis U.S.-origin content, regardless
of where it is made, is not allowed to be exported to Syria. For U.S. commercial licensing prohibitions on exports and
reexportsre-exports to Syria, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 Supp No. 1. The Department of Commerce reviews license applications on a
case-by-case basis for exports or reexportsre-exports to Syria under a general policy of denial. For a description of items that do
not require export licenses, see, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce, Implementation
of the Syria Accountability Act, available online at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
57
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or reexportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and section
301 of title 3, United States Code.” available online at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/
13338.pdf.
58
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
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at http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
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Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.26 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.27
The following individuals and entities have been targeted by the U.S. Treasury Department
(Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC):
•
On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior Syrian
officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then-Interior Minister and its head
of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively, the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any assets
they may have in the United States and banning any U.S. persons, including U.S.
financial institutions outside of the United States, from conducting transactions
with them.5928 Kanaan allegedly committed suicide in October 2005, though some
have speculated that he may have been murdered.
•
On January 18, 2006, U.S. Treasury Department took the same actions against
the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military intelligence.
•
On April 26, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13399 that authorized
the secretary of the Treasury to freeze the U.S.-based assets of anyone found to
be involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also affects anyone involved in bombings or
assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004, or anyone hindering the
international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The order allows the
United States to comply with UNSCR 1636, which calls on all states to freeze the
assets of those persons designated by the investigating commission or the
government of Lebanon to be involved in the Hariri assassination.
•
On August 15, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for allegedly contributing
to Syria’s support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and
Brigadier General Jama’a Jama’a, for allegedly playing a central part in Syria’s
intelligence operations in Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.6029
26
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and section
301 of title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/13338.pdf.
27
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
28
See http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2617.htm.
29
See http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp60.htm.
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•
On January 4, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three Syrian
entities, the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the
Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory, as
weapons proliferators under an executive order (E.O.13382) based on the
authority vested to the President under IEEPA. The three state-sponsored
institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.61
59
See, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2617.htm.
See, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp60.htm.
61
See, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp216.htm.
60
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•
On August 1, 2007, the President issued E.O. 13441621344131 blocking the property of
persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and
institutions. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
four individuals reportedly affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert
Syrian control over the Lebanese political system, including Assaad Halim
Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab and Hafiz Makhluf (under the authority of E.O.13441)
and Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik (under the authority of E.O.13338).6332
•
On February 13, 2008, President Bush issued another Order (E.O.13460)
blocking the property of senior Syrian officials. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the order “targets individuals and entities determined to be
responsible for or who have benefitted from the public corruption of senior
officials of the Syrian regime. The order also revises a provision in Executive
Order 13338 to block the property of Syrian officials who have undermined U.S.
and international efforts to stabilize Iraq.6433 One week later, under the authority of
E.O.13460, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets and restricted the
financial transactions of Rami Makhluf, the 38-year-old cousin of President
Bashar al Asad. Makhluf is a powerful Syrian businessman who serves as an
interlocutor between foreign investors and Syrian companies. According to one
report, “Since a military coup in 1969, the Asads have controlled politics while
the Makhlufs have been big business players. The tradition continues in the next
generation, with Bashar al-Assad (sic) as president and Rami Makhluf as a
leading force in business.”6534 Makhluf is a major stakeholder in Syriatel, the
country’s largest mobile phone operator. In 2008, the Turkish company Turkcell
was in talks to purchase Syriatel, but, according to Reuters, negotiations over the
sale were taking longer than expected because some Turkcell executives have
U.S. passports.66 Then, in August 2008, Turkcell said it had frozen its plans for a
venture in Syria amid U.S. opposition to the project. Makhluf’s holding
company, Cham, is involved in several other large deals, including an agreement
with Syria’s state airline and a Kuwaiti company to set up a new airline. Several
months ago, Dubai-based real-estate company Emaar Properties announced it had
agreed to set up a $100 million venture with Cham to develop real estate projects
in Syria. Makhluf also is a minority shareholder in Gulfsands Petroleum,67 a
publicly traded, United Kingdom-incorporated energy company. According to the
Wall Street Journal, a Gulfsands executive said the Treasury Department’s
6235 Then, in August 2008, Turkcell said it had frozen its plans for a
30
See, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp216.htm.
On July 29, 2010, President Obama extended that National Emergency with respect to Lebanon for another year,
stating that “While there have been some recent positive developments in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah that include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems serve to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in Lebanon, and continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” See, Notice of July 29, 2010—
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Actions of Certain Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty
of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions, Federal Register, Title 3—The President, [Page 45045].
6332
See, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp666.htm.
6433
A previous executive order, E.O. 13315, blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and members of
his former regime. On June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian company, SES
International Corp., and two of its officials under the authority of E.O.13315.
6534
“Sanctions on Businessman Target Syria’s Inner Sanctum,” Washington Post, February 22, 2008.
6635
“Turkcell Continues Talks on Syriatel Stake,” Reuters, April 14, 2008.
67
Gulfsands’ chief executive and largest shareholder, John Dorrier, is an American citizen, and the company has
offices in Houston.
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31
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venture in Syria amid U.S. opposition to the project. Makhluf’s holding
company, Cham, is involved in several other large deals, including an agreement
with Syria’s state airline and a Kuwaiti company to set up a new airline. Several
months ago, Dubai-based real-estate company Emaar Properties announced it had
agreed to set up a $100 million venture with Cham to develop real estate projects
in Syria. Makhluf also is a minority shareholder in Gulfsands Petroleum,36 a
publicly traded, United Kingdom-incorporated energy company. According to the
Wall Street Journal, a Gulfsands executive said the Treasury Department’s
sanctioning of Makhlouf would have no impact on the company pursuing its
partnership with Cham.6837
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria
As previously mentioned, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush instructed
the Treasury Department in 2004 to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering
concerns. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued a final ruling that imposes a special measure
against the Commercial Bank of Syria as a financial institution of primary money laundering
concern. It bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent
account with the Commercial Bank of Syria, and it also requires banks to conduct due diligence
that ensures the Commercial Bank of Syria is not circumventing sanctions through its business
dealings with them.6938
Effect of U.S. Sanctions on Syria’s Economy
Prior to the recent unrest, U.S. sanctions against Syria havehad clearly dissuaded some U.S. and some
foreign businesses from
investing in Syria. With the exception of certain specified goods, most
U.S. exports to Syria are
prohibited, a policy that has prevented the country’s national air carrier,
Syrian Air, both from
repairing the few Boeing planes in its fleet and from procuring new planes
from Europe, since
Airbus uses certain American content in its planes. In a possible early good-willgoodwill gesture, on
February 9, 2009, the U.S. Department of Commerce approved an export license
for Boeing 747
spare parts70parts39 to Syrian Air.7140 In July 2009, the Obama Administration pledged to
grant more
waivers under the Syria Accountability Act to allow for increased U.S. export to Syria
of goods
related to information technology, telecommunication equipment, and civil aviation components.
However, in December 2009, the United States rejected an Airbus request to sell new planes to
Syria because the average Airbus plane contains an estimated 40% component parts of U.S.
origin—thus making it illegal to export to Syria without an export license under the Department
of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implementing provisions in the Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (P.L. 108-175).72 In October 2010,
Syria’s transport minister suggested that due to U.S. sanctions, Syria would consider buying six
Russian Tupolev Tu-204 planes for Syrian Air.
68
36
Gulfsands’ chief executive and largest shareholder, John Dorrier, is an American citizen, and the company has
offices in Houston.
37
“Syrian Tycoon Bristles At US Sanctions Against Him,” the Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2008.
38
See, “U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria.” Available online at:
at http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctions-syr.html
70sanctionssyr.html
39
In 2008, Syrian Air and European aerospace manufacturer Airbus tentatively agreed to a sale of up to 54 commercial
aircraft; however, the sale was never completed because Airbus planes contain more than 10% U.S. components.
7140
Executive Order 13338, which implements the Syria Accountability Act, states that the Secretary of Commerce shall
not permit the exportation or reexportationre-exportation to Syria of U.S. products “except to the extent provided in regulations,
orders, directives, or licenses issued pursuant to the provisions” of the order. U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of
Industry and Security regulations [Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, Chapter VII, Part 742.9(b)] state U.S. export
licensing policy with regard to Syria. According to the BIS regulations, “applications for export and reexport to all endusers in Syria ... will generally be denied,” including licenses for aircraft, helicopters, engines, and related spare parts
and components, “except that parts and components intended to ensure the safety of civil aviation and the safe
operation of commercial passenger aircraft will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with a presumption of approval.”
72
“US prohibited Airbus selling planes to Syria: Damascus,” Agence France Presse, December 29, 2009.
69
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
According to one report, General Electric, the French power company Alstom, and Japaneseowned Mitsubishi all declined to bid on a Syrian government contract for the construction of
power plants.73 As mentioned above, Turkcell withdrew its bid to purchase Syriatel in August
2008 after the United States sanctioned Syriatel’s primary stakeholder, Rami Makluf. U.S.
sanctions under the Patriot Act against the Commercial Bank of Syria have deterred private
Western banks from opening branches inside Syria. As Syria’s energy production levels decline,
sanctions have prevented major Western energy companies from making new investments there,
though other foreign companies have supplanted U.S. firms. One company, Gulfsands Petroleum,
moved its principle office to London in order to circumvent U.S. sanctions against its local
partner, Rami Makluf.
Syria is still an importer of U.S. agricultural products such as corn and soybeans. According to
the U.S. embassy in Damascus, the United States is Syria’s primary corn supplier, and corn sales
from the United States to Syria increased from $61 million in 2001 to $102 million in 2005.
Soybean exports also increased from approximately $1 million in 2001 to $28 million in 2005.
For the last five years, eastern Syria has experienced a severe drought which has wiped out
significant portions of the livestock industry and curtailed wheat farming. Syria used to export
wheat, and it is now a net importer, mainly from Russia and the Ukraine
Congressional Research Service
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
components. However, in December 2009, the United States rejected an Airbus request to sell
new planes to Syria because the average Airbus plane contains an estimated 40% component parts
of U.S. origin—thus making it illegal to export to Syria without an export license under the
Department of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR) implementing provisions
in the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (P.L. 108-175).41 In
October 2010, Syria’s transport minister suggested that due to U.S. sanctions, Syria would
consider buying six Russian Tupolev Tu-204 planes for Syrian Air.
In 2007, General Electric, the French power company Alstom, and Japanese-owned Mitsubishi all
reportedly declined to bid on a Syrian government contract for the construction of power plants.42
As mentioned above, Turkcell withdrew its bid to purchase Syriatel in August 2008 after the
United States sanctioned Syriatel’s primary stakeholder, Rami Makluf. U.S. sanctions under the
Patriot Act against the Commercial Bank of Syria have deterred private Western banks from
opening branches inside Syria. As Syria’s energy production levels decline, sanctions have
prevented major Western energy companies from making new investments there, though other
foreign companies have supplanted U.S. firms. One company, Gulfsands Petroleum, moved its
principle office to London in order to circumvent U.S. sanctions against its local partner, Rami
Makluf.
Although U.S. sanctions have deterred American and some foreign investment in Syria, other
countries have sought entry into the Syrian market.7443 Foreign investment from the Arab Gulf
States and Iran has been substantial in recent years. Syria'In 2010, Syria’s largest trading partners
within the
Middle East are Saudi Arabia ($1were Iraq ($2.9 billion), Egypt ($1Saudi Arabia ($1.7 billion), Lebanon ($600 300
million), and
Jordan and Egypt ($100($560 million each). Syria'’s primary non-Arab trading partners are Italy ($3.5 billion total
volume), France ($1.
were Russia ($2.3 billion), Germany ($2 billion), China ($1.19 billion), and TurkeyItaly ($1.12 billion).7544
Table 12. U.S.-Syrian Trade Statistics 2005-2010
($ in millions)
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
U.S. Exports to Syria
$155.0
$224.3
$361.4
$408.8
$300.0
$506.2
U.S. Imports from Syria
$323.5
$213.7
$110.5
$352.0
$285.9
$428.7
Totals
$478.5
$438.0
$471.9
$760.8
$585.9
$934.9
Source: TradeStats Express – National Trade Data, Presented by the Office of Trade and Industry Information
(OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Syria’s Need for Economic Growth
Syria is seeking aid, trade, and foreign investment from the international community, particularly
the West, to boost its lackluster, mostly state-controlled economy, which is highly dependent on
73
41
“US prohibited Airbus selling planes to Syria: Damascus,” Agence France Presse, December 29, 2009.
“Tired of Energy Ills, Syrians Doubt the West Is to Blame,” New York Times, August 15, 2007.
43
According to one study by the German Marshall Fund, “From 2000 to 2009, the stock of FDI [foreign direct
investment] in Syria witnessed a sharp increase from $1.244 billion to $7.334 billion. Specifically, in the 2007-2009
period alone, the stock has increased by more than $4 billion.” See, Franco Zallio, “The Future of Syria’s Economic
Reforms between Regional Integration and Relations with the West,” Mediterranean Policy Program—Series on the
Region and the Economic Crisis, German Marshall Fund, November 2010.
7544
U.S. Department of Commerce, Doing Business in Syria: 20092010 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies.
7442
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Syria’s Need for Economic Growth
Syria is seeking aid, trade, and foreign investment from the international community, particularly
the West, to boost its lackluster, mostly state-controlled economy, which is highly dependent on
dwindling oil production45dwindling oil production76 and foreign remittances.7746 To date, the government has enacted some
reforms, such as liberalizing the financial sector, reducing fuel subsidies, opening a stock
exchange, and cutting some import tariffs. Nevertheless, President Asad has yet to tackle the most
difficult reforms, such as reducing the government payroll, combating elite corruption such as
fuel smuggling, liberalizing other sectors of the economy and breaking up family-run business
monopolies, halting tax evasion, modernizing the bureaucracy, and increasing overall economic
transparency. Some observers believe that the regime cannot act boldly in the economic sphere
due to the political backlash and possible unrest it would face from many different parts of Syrian
society. Economic reforms may clash with the vested, status quo interests of Syrian business and
political elites with ties to the Asad family. Others suggest that the opaque nature of Syria’s
authoritarian government inhibits the natural development of a transparent market economy that
is attractive to foreign capital.
Although Syria has attracted more foreign investment from China, Gulf Arab countries, Iran, and
Turkey, Syria also is responsible for the lack of strong economic ties to the West. After years of
stalled negotiations, the European Union finally ratified its Association Agreement with Syria in
2009, only to see Syria refuse to sign the accord at the last minute. The deal, which would loosen
In the wake of the recent
crackdown, the European Union has suspended all further steps with regard to the deal, which
would have loosened bilateral trade restrictions and increaseincreased the flow of European aid to Syria,.
Even prior to the unrest, the proposal had raised concern among
Syrian business elites due towho
expected increased European competition in the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors.
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
76 manufacturing sectors.
In sum, existing economic relationships and long-term Syrian economic needs may provide
points of leverage to parties seeking to influence current developments. However, the effects of
the uprising have added deeper complexity to the foreign and domestic competition that was
ongoing in Syria prior to 2011.
45
According to the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, “Since peaking at 583,000 barrels per
day (bbl/d) in 1996, Syrian crude oil production declined.” Syria produced an estimated 387,000 bbl/d in January 2011,
down from 390,000 bbl/d in 2008.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics, April 28,
2011.
7746
Syria needs electric power generation, as its demand is projected to nearly triple by 2025. Already, during the
summer months, some Syrians experience lengthy power outages. Companies from Russia, China, India, Qatar, and
Iran, among others, have invested in Syria’s electricity sector. Syria also receives natural gas from Egypt and Turkey.
See, “Damascus Turns to Private Sector,” Middle East Economic Digest, May 14, 2010.
Congressional Research Service
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Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime
Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Congressional Research Service
Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
21