Armed Conflict in Syria:
U.S. and International Response
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
August 21, 2012April 22, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL33487
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response
Summary
Syria is now mired in an armed conflict between forces loyal to President Bashar al Asad and
rebel fighters opposed to his rule. Since major unrest began in March 2011, various reports
suggest that between 22,000 and 25,000 Syrians have been killed. U.S. officials and many
analysts believe that President Bashar al Asad, his family members, and his other supporters will
ultimately be forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to
Syria’s ongoing crisis.
In the face of intense domestic and international pressure calling for political change and for an
end to violence against civilians, the Asad government offered limited reforms while also meeting
protests and armed attacks with overwhelming force. Nonviolent protests continued, but their
apparent futility created frustration and anger within the opposition ranks. An increasing number
of Syrian civilians have taken up arms in self-defense, although armed rebel attacks alienate some
potential supporters. The government accuses the opposition of carrying out bombings and
assassinations targeting security infrastructure, security personnel, and civilians in Damascus,
Aleppo, Homs, and other areas. Accounts of human rights abuses by both sides persist, with the
majority attributed to security forces and military units.
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August
2011, and have been vocal advocates for United Nations Security Council action to condemn the
Syrian government and end the bloodshed. The United States closed its embassy in Damascus,
and Ambassador Robert Ford left Syria. U.S. officials are actively participating in efforts to
improve international policy coordination on Syria. The Administration has given no indication
that it intends to pursue any form of military intervention. U.S. officials and some in Congress
continue to debate various proposals for ending the violence and accelerating Asad’s departure.
After over a year of unrest and violence, Syria’s crisis is characterized by dilemmas and
contradictions. A menu of imperfect choices confronts U.S. policymakers, amid fears of
continued violence, a humanitarian crisis, and regional instability. The potential spillover effects
of continued fighting raise questions with regard to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel.
Larger refugee flows, sectarian conflict, or transnational violence by non-state actors are among
the contingencies that policy makers are concerned about in relation to these countries. The unrest
also is creating new opportunities for Al Qaeda or other violent extremist groups to operate in
Syria. The security of Syrian conventional and chemical weapons stockpiles has become a
regional security concern, which will grow if a security vacuum emerges. Many observers worry
that an escalation in fighting or swift regime change could generate new pressures on minority
groups or lead to wider civil or regional conflict.
Members of Congress are weighing these issues as they debate U.S. policy and the Syrian crisis.
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Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response
Contents
Background...................................................................................................................................... 1
Conflict Overview ..................................................................................................................... 2
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 3
Possible Scenarios ..................................................................................................................... 5
Key Security Issues ................................................................................................................... 7
Al Qaeda, Extremism, and Foreign Fighters....................................................................... 7
Security of Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction Questioned............................................ 8
Issues and Possible Options for Congress ..................................................................................... 11
U.S. Policy Toward Syria ........................................................................................................ 11
Debating Intervention.............................................................................................................. 14
Possible Appropriations and Authorization Issues .................................................................. 15
Existing Restrictions and Authorities................................................................................ 15
Securing Weapons Supplies and Sites............................................................................... 16
Addressing Syria’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Status ...................................................... 16
Requested Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA-IF) ............................ 17
Possible Questions for Oversight ............................................................................................ 17
Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress ................................................................................... 18
Figures
Figure 1. Syria at a Glance............................................................................................................... 4
Tables
Table B-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2012 ................................................................. 30
Appendixes
Appendix A. Background and Profiles of Key Actors................................................................... 22
Appendix B. U.S. Sanctions and Legislation................................................................................. 28
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 39
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Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response
Background1
Syrians have long struggled with many of the same challenges that have bred deep dissatisfaction
in other Arab autocracies, including high unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility,
rampant corruption, lack of political freedoms, and repressive security forces. These factors have
fueled opposition to Syria’s authoritarian government, which has been dominated by the Baath
(Renaissance) Party since 1963, and the Al Asad family since 1970. President Bashar al Asad’s
father—Hafiz al Asad—ruled the country from 1970 until his death in 2000.
The Syrian population, like those of several other Middle East countries, includes different ethnic
and religious groups. Under the Asad regime strict political controls have prevented these
differences from playing a divisive role in political or social life. A majority of Syrians, roughly
90% of the population, are ethnic Arabs; however, the country contains small ethnic minorities,
notably Kurds. Of more importance in Syria are religious sectarian differences. In addition to the
majority Sunni Muslims, who comprise over 70% of the population, Syria contains several
religious sectarian minorities, including three smaller Muslim sects (Alawites, Druze, and
Ismailis) and several Christian denominations.
Despite the secular nature of the ruling Baath party, religious sects have been important to some
Syrians as symbols of group identity and determinants of political orientation. The Asad family
are members of the minority Alawite sect (estimated 12% of the population), which has its roots
in Shiite Islam. They and the Baath party have cultivated Alawites as a key base of support, and
elite security forces have long been led by Alawites. The government violently suppressed an
armed uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, killing thousands from the
majority Sunni Muslim community.
Within ethnic and sectarian communities are important tribal and familial groupings that often
provide the underpinning for political alliances and commercial relationships. Socioeconomic
differences abound among farmers, laborers, middle-class wage earners, public sector employees,
military officials, and the political and commercial elite. Finally, local attachments shape Syrian
society, as seen in rivalries between Syria’s two largest cities of Damascus and Aleppo, in
differences between rural agricultural communities and urban areas, and in the concentration of
some sectarian and ethnic communities in discrete areas. Despite being authoritarian, Syrian
leaders have often found it necessary to adopt policies that accommodate, to some degree, various
power centers within the country’s diverse population and minimize the potential for communal
identities to create conflict.
Since taking office in 2000, President Asad has offered and retracted the prospect of limited
political reform, while aligning his government with Iran and non-state actors such as Hamas and
Hezbollah in a complex rivalry with the United States and its Arab and non-Arab allies (including
Israel). Syria’s long-standing partnership with Russia has remained intact and is now the focus of
intense diplomatic attention because Russia is one of the regime’s only remaining defenders.
As unrest emerged in other Arab countries in early 2011, Asad and many observers mistakenly
believed that Syria’s pervasive police state and the population’s fear of sectarian violence would
serve as a bulwark against the outbreak of turmoil. Limited calls in February 2011 to organize
1
This material draws from the work of Alfred Prados, former CRS Specialist in Middle East Affairs.
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reform protests failed, but the government’s torture of children involved in an isolated incident in
the southern town of Dara’a in March provided a decisive spark for the emergence of
demonstrations. The use of force against demonstrators in Dara’a and later in other cities created
a corresponding swell in public anger and public participation in protests. The government
organized large counterdemonstrations.
The Sunni Muslim majority has been at the forefront of the protest movement and armed
opposition to the Alawite-led regime, with Syria’s Christians and other minority groups caught
between their parallel fears of violent change and of being associated with Asad’s crackdown.
Economic class dynamics also are influencing the choices of Syrians about the uprising: many
rural, less advantaged Syrians have supported the opposition movement, while urban, wealthier
Syrians appear to have more divided loyalties.
Sectarian considerations cannot fully explain power relationships in Syria or the dynamics of the
conflict. The Alawite leadership of the Syrian government and its allies in other sects perceive the
mostly Sunni Arab uprising as an existential threat to the Baath party’s nearly five-decade hold on
power. At the popular level, some Alawites may see their community’s fate as tied to that of the
current government. Some Sunni Arabs may view the conflict as a means to assert their
community’s dominance over others. Some Kurds may view the conflict as an opportunity to
achieve greater autonomy. And, some Christians and other minorities may fear that their place in
a future Syria is not guaranteed.
Conflict Overview
For much of 2011 and early 2012, a cycle of tension and violence intensified, as President Asad
and his government paired limited reform gestures with the use of military force against
protestors and armed opposition groups. Violence was initially limited to certain locations but
now has affected most major cities, including Damascus and Aleppo. Members of different elites
may seek compromise with the opposition, but there has been little public dissent from top regime
figures. Defections from the armed forces and from the political and business elites continue, and
international sanctions and the disruptions of the conflict are creating hardship for ordinary
Syrians. As the conflict has dragged on, protestors and opposition fighters have defiantly resisted
government crackdowns, in spite of the arrest of thousands of citizens and documented cases of
torture and regime-instigated massacres. The regime argues that opposition violence and abuses
make a negotiated solution impossible, and President Asad refuses to leave power.
In an August 2012 report, the United Nations Human Rights Council commission of inquiry on
Syria found:2
reasonable grounds to believe that Government forces and the Shabbiha had committed the
crimes against humanity of murder and of torture, war crimes and gross violations of
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including unlawful
killing, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual violence, indiscriminate attack,
pillaging and destruction of property …The commission found reasonable grounds to believe
that war crimes, including murder, extrajudicial execution and torture, had been perpetrated
by organized anti-Government armed groups …The violations and abuses committed by
2
U.N. Document A/HRC/21/50, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab
Republic, August 15, 2012.
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anti-Government armed groups did not reach the gravity, frequency and scale of those
committed by Government forces and the Shabbiha.
The Asad government believes it can prevail, but many analysts have observed that, over time,
the regime appears to be gradually losing its ability to control the country and respond to
opposition provocations. Opposition forces remain relatively disorganized, but their resilience
and adoption of new tactics, including the use of improvised explosive devices, have denied the
government access to some regions and extended the fighting to urban areas of Damascus and
Aleppo. Ongoing fighting in Aleppo and the high-profile July 18 bomb attack that killed the
Syrian Defense Minister and three other senior officials have shaken Asad’s supporters, but the
regime’s ferocious response and the subsequent standoffs between the Syrian military and
opposition forces in Damascus and Aleppo suggest the end may not yet be in sight. The Syrian
military’s use of fixed-wing aircraft to bomb rebel positions marks a new escalation, and may
produce greater international outrage. International efforts to broker a cease-fire have faltered,
and government and opposition forces remain engaged in all-out armed conflict with no
immediate prospect of an end to fighting or a political solution.
The Costs of Conflict: Casualties, Refugees, and Internally Displaced Persons
Precise official casualty figures are not available. The Strategic Research and Communication Centre, a research
organization on Syria, reports that as of August 13, 2012, more than 25,000 Syrians had been killed since the revolt
began in March 2011. The United Kingdom-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on August 10 that
at least 22,242 people have been killed since March 2011, including 15,578 civilians, 5,658 regime soldiers and police,
and 1,006 army defectors. Intense fighting in recent months has driven an increasing number of Syrians out of their
homes as internally displaced persons or outside of Syria as refugees. As of August 15, 155,226 refugees have
registered with the United Nations (U.N.) in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, and up to 1 million Syrians may be
internally displaced.
On August 11, the State Department announced that the United States has provided $82 million during FY2012 to
address humanitarian needs in Syria and neighboring countries.3 This includes: $27.5 million to the World Food
Program (WFP); $23.1 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); $15.1 million to
non-governmental organizations (NGOs); $8 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); $3
million to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); $2.75 million to the
U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF); $500,000 to the International Organization for Migration (IOM); $300,000 to the
U.N. Department of Safety and Security for support of humanitarian operations; and $500,000 to the U.N. Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). UNOCHA warned in July that underfunding “has placed
humanitarian operations both in Syria and in neighboring countries in serious jeopardy.”4 On August 16, U.N. Under
Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos stated that a lack of
funding “is holding us back,” and appealed “to our international partners to contribute more generously.”5
Assessment
The escalating conflict in Syria poses increasingly complex and difficult challenges for U.S.
policymakers. The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion against the Asad regime is now in its
second year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of
3
U.S. State Department, Additional Humanitarian Assistance for Those Fleeing the Violence in Syria, August 11,
2012.
4
U.N. OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin: Syria, Issue 4, July 6-19, 2012.
5
U.N. OCHA Statement, August 16, 2012.
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militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. Violent extremist groups, including foreign
fighters, have assertively demonstrated their presence in Syria, and the Syrian government has
stated its willingness to use its unconventional weapons in the event of foreign military
intervention. The Syrian opposition’s political divisions persist, even as the resilience and tactics
of its armed elements are making the limitations of the Syrian security forces more and more
apparent. Tens of thousands of new refugees have crossed into neighboring countries, as regional
actors express alarm, offer support to proxies, and seek to define their respective “red lines.”
These factors add new complications to the ongoing debates over U.S. national interests and
potential policy responses. To date, debate has largely focused on the humanitarian and regional
balance of power implications of the uprising, and U.S. officials and Members of Congress have
weighed various policy proposals in the hope of catalyzing and assisting a relatively orderly
transition. Looking ahead, the prospects for such a transition appear to be fading, and the focus of
debate is shifting toward assessing the likelihood and mitigating the negative consequences of a
series of less orderly contingencies.
Figure 1. Syria at a Glance
Source: CRS Graphics.
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Possible Scenarios
Recent events have renewed international debate about how rapidly President Asad’s government
could be forced from power. Some observers initially believed in 2011 that the Asad regime
would fall quickly, but many subsequent projections have warned against underestimating the
regime’s staying power. Some experts note that neighboring Lebanon’s sectarian civil war lasted
15 years before warring parties reached a political solution. In Iraq between 1991 and 2003, the
late Saddam Hussein retained control over a war-ravaged country despite widespread Kurdish and
Shiite opposition to his rule and a Western-imposed no-fly zone covering significant swaths of the
country. A number of factors are shaping the relative prospects of the Asad government and the
opposition, including:
•
The performance of the armed opposition on the battlefield, particularly in
Aleppo and Damascus, and its ability to eliminate or attract members of
President Asad’s inner circle;
•
The ability of various armed and political opposition groups to cooperate, agree
on a common program, and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of Syrians and third
parties;
•
The ability of the government to pay public sector salaries, ensure supplies of
basic goods, and deliver services and utilities amidst economic sanctions and
conflict;
•
The willingness of minority groups that so far have been either neutral or
supportive of the government to join the ranks of the opposition;
•
The availability of outside military and financial assistance for the Syrian
government and the opposition; and
•
The morale of the armed forces in the face of ongoing fighting and their brutal
suppression campaign against civilians.
In this context, a range of scenarios and outcomes are possible, and are not mutually exclusive:
Imminent Regime Defeat? The rapid escalation of fighting in Damascus beginning on July 14
and 15 and in Aleppo starting on July 21 fueled speculation that rebel fighters could force the
collapse of the Asad government by seizing significant parts of these key cities and/or
assassinating or kidnapping additional high-level officials. The July 18 bombing that killed four
high-level regime figures, including the President’s brother-in-law, dealt a major blow to the
government and may have psychologically changed the narrative of the conflict in favor of the
opposition. However, as of mid-August, the opposition’s withdrawal from neighborhoods in
Damascus and the government’s ongoing assault on rebel-held areas of Aleppo indicate that the
Asad regime has been wounded but not defeated.
An Enduring Conflict and State Collapse? Both sides could remain locked in armed conflict,
unable to prevail, and unwilling to negotiate over power sharing. This scenario could lead to tens
of thousands more casualties and mass civilian displacement before exhaustion settles in and
negotiation ensues. Some observers have speculated that if conflict persists and state authority
weakens further, Syria could splinter into Alawite, Sunni, Christian, and Kurdish enclaves, with
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mixed populations in urban areas divided by sectarian neighborhoods.6 Others have questioned
whether ethnic and sectarian divisions will be the principal driver of state collapse, or whether
local authority and organization will predominate, continuing the trend started by local opposition
groups that have self-organized politically, economically, and even militarily. The prospect of
partial or total state collapse poses serious security risks. Syrian weapon stockpiles could
proliferate and security vacuums could present opportunities for transnational violent extremist
groups to take root.
Rebel Versus Rebel? If the opposition fails to unify politically around either a civilian-led
authority, military-led council, or both, competing rebel fighters may turn against each other prior
to or after regime change. Should this occur, Syria’s civil war could devolve into a multi-faceted
conflict, with competing groups prolonging the violence. Rebel militias could splinter along
secular/Islamist divides or as rivalries develop between competing leaders.
A Military Coup? The Asad regime is known for its intricate system of control over commanders
in the military and intelligence apparatus, and many military leaders are linked by kinship ties. As
of mid-August 2012, no members of the core Alawite leadership of the Asad regime had defected.
Nevertheless, a military coup remains a remote possibility. Some military commanders, when
faced with mounting battlefield losses and the prospect of defeat, may calculate that a move
against the Asad family could be enough to salvage a place at the negotiating table during a
transition process. The defection of General Manaf Tlass—one of the most senior officials to
defect thus far— is already being hailed as a significant blow to the regime, and Tlass appears to
be seeking to create a more unified military-led opposition council comprised of FSA leaders and
newly defected military leaders.
A Negotiated Solution? As long as both the regime and its opponents seek total victory and
envision a future Syrian government that excludes the other, a political settlement will remain
elusive. On June 30, the Action Group on Syria endorsed the concept of a compromise agreement
“formed on the basis of mutual consent” to create a national unity government, though what role
the ruling Baath party would play in such a transition is uncertain.
Regional Spill-over or War? The conflict in Syria has already created regional security risks that
could grow more serious. Fighting among Syrians has spilled over into Lebanon in isolated
incidents, and tensions among Syrians are mirrored among Lebanon’s sectarian communities.
According to press reports, outside powers, such as the Arab Gulf states, Turkey, and Iran, are
supporting proxies inside Syria. Syria’s neighbors or other outside actors also could choose more
direct military intervention if they calculate that the conflict in Syria poses an unacceptable threat
to their national security. For example, Israel, Jordan, or the United States could intervene in
Syria in order to secure or destroy stockpiles of Syrian chemical weapons or missiles. Turkey
could intervene if PKK Kurdish guerillas based there expanded their operations against the
Turkish military.
6
For example, Frank Salameh, a professor at Boston College, wrote “And so today’s strings of wanton murders, sexual
assaults, torture, arbitrary detentions, targeted bombings and destruction of neighborhoods—and what they entail in
terms of displacements, deportations and population movements—are nothing if not the groundwork of a future
Alawite entity; the grafting of new facts on the ground and the drafting of new frontiers. No longer able to rule in the
name of Arab unity (and in the process preserve their own ethnic and sectarian autonomy), the Alawites may retreat
into the Levantine highlands overlooking the Mediterranean.” See, “An Alawite State in Syria?” The National Interest,
July 10, 2012.
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Key Security Issues
Al Qaeda, Extremism, and Foreign Fighters
In early 2012, U.S. officials stated that the violence and disorder paralyzing Syria was creating
opportunities for Al Qaeda operatives and other violent Islamist extremists to infiltrate the
country and conduct or plan attacks. According to Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper, “Sunni extremists” had infiltrated Syrian opposition groups, which may be unaware of
the infiltration. As of July 2012, Sunni extremist groups appear to be increasingly active in Syria,
and some observers and officials fear that more groups may be sympathetic to or directly
affiliated with Al Qaeda.7 Among these groups, the most prominent are the Nusra Front (Jabhat al
Nusra li-Ahl al Sham, Support Front for the Syrian People),8 the Abdullah Azzam Brigades,9 the
Ummah Brigade (Liwa al Umma),10 and the Islam Brigade (Liwa al Islam).11 Other groups such
as the Free Ones of the Levant Brigades (Ahrar al Sham) use jihadist rhetoric in some statements
although their overall orientation is unclear. The Lebanon-based extremist group Fatah al Islam
has released a number of statements on the conflict and members of the group are reported to be
fighting (and dying) in Syria. Press reports and anecdotal accounts suggest that there may be
competition for influence among extremist groups and that they lack overarching coordination or
shared leadership at present.
The conflict in Syria has provoked a visceral public response in the region and is encouraging
some people to make donations to support the Syrian uprising or travel to Syria to support the
armed opposition. Some conservative Sunni clerics have issued religious edicts characterizing the
fighting as a “defensive jihad” and endorsing the provision of material support to fighters and
direct participation in the fighting.12 Al Qaeda leaders Ayman al Zawahiri and the late Abu Yahya
al Libi also released statements in 2012 urging support for Syrian fighters.13 European and Middle
Eastern media have published estimates of the number of volunteers in the low to mid-hundreds,
along with anecdotal reports about individuals from Europe, North Africa, Turkey, the Gulf states,
and the Levant.14 Northern Lebanon and the Turkish border with northern Syria appear to be the
7
Rod Nordland et al., “Al Qaeda Taking Deadly New Role In Syria Conflict,” New York Times, July 25, 2012; Hala
Jaber and Lucy Fisher, “Jihadists Pour Into Syrian Slaughter,” Sunday Times (London), June 17, 2012; Rania
Abouzeid, “The Syria Crisis: Is al-Qaeda Intervening in the Conflict?” Time Magazine, May 14, 2012.
8
The Nusra Front has claimed responsibility for several high profile attacks, including attacks using suicide bombers
and car bombs. An individual named Abu Mohammed Joulani reportedly leads the group. OSC Feature
FEA20120314027051, “Video Production Announces Establishment of Jihadist ‘Al Nusrah Front’ in Syria,” January
24, 2012.
9
A Saudi-national named Majed al Majed reportedly leads the Azzam Brigades. OSC Report GMP20120626966212,
“Al-Qaeda in Syria: New Leader at the Helm,” Al Akhbar (Lebanon), June 26, 2012.
10
OSC Report GMP20120625125003, “Statement by New Al Ummah Brigade in Syria Promises ‘Jihad’ Until
Victory,” June 18, 2012.
11
OSC Report GMP20120719125001, “Liwa al-Islam Brigades Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings,” July
19, 2012.
12
OSC Report GMP20120618125001, “Al Shinqiti Calls Jihad in Syria ‘Duty,’ Advocates Joining Al Nusrah Front,”
July 6, 2012; OSC Analysis GMF20120706420001, “Syria -- Salafis Possibly Eying Larger Role in Post-Al-Asad
Syria,” July 6, 2012.
13
OSC Report GMP20120612405002, “Abu-Yahya al-Libi Urges Iraqi, Jordanian, Turkish Mujahidin 'To Champion'
Syria,” June 12, 2012.
14
The National (Abu Dhabi) “Syria, Jihad And the Boys From Tunisia's Ben Guerdane,” July 3, 2012; OSC Report
GMP20120607648001, “Al-Jazirah.net Says Jordan Charges 6 With Trying To Enter Syria To Wage Jihad,” Al(continued...)
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most popular transit points for volunteers, presumably because of better regional air-travel
linkages with Beirut and Turkish cities. The Iraqi government has expressed specific concern that
individuals associated with Al Qaeda in Iraq have travelled to Syria and are using the conflict
there to their advantage.15
Statements from some armed groups indicate that their leaders are cognizant of the risks that
certain tactics and rhetoric may pose (i.e., suicide bombing or attacks against civilians). The
underlying incompatibility of different groups’ motives and intentions is difficult to ignore,
particularly to the extent that some extremist groups are critical of other armed groups and may
oppose efforts to establish democracy in any post-Asad Syria. The pro-sharia rhetoric and
transnational orientation of some extremist groups make it possible that they may end up in
conflict with secular, nationalist, or Islamist opposition elements. The prominent Syrian SalafistJihadist ideologue Abu Basir al Tartusi has openly rejected other jihadists’ criticism of the Free
Syrian Army. While he is known for his own extremist views, even he has characterized some of
the groups and individuals now active in Syria as “extremists” and “fanatics.”16
Security of Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction Questioned
Recent controversy has followed a July 23 statement by Syrian government spokesperson Jihad
Maqdisi that some have characterized as a threat to use weapons of mass destruction. Maqdisi
said, in English, “any chemical or bacterial weapon will never be used - and I repeat will never be
used - during the crisis in Syria regardless of the developments. These weapons are stored and
secured by Syrian military forces and under its direct supervision and will never be used unless
Syria faces external aggression.” The United States, Russia, and several other countries have
condemned the statement, and underscored their intention to hold the Asad government
responsible for its actions with regard to the weapons. On August 20, President Obama said, “We
have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line
for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.
That would change my calculus. …We’re monitoring that situation very carefully. We have put
together a range of contingency plans.” Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil rejected
President Obama’s statement and accused Western powers of “looking for a pretext to intervene
militarily.”
Since the crisis began last year, U.S. and Israeli officials have publicly communicated their
assessments of and concerns about the extent, security, and potential unrest-related implications
(...continued)
Jazirah.net (Doha), June 6, 2012; OSC Report EUP20120523029004, “Foreign Jihadis Flock To Syria in Bid To
Overthrow Al Asad,” Le Figaro (Paris) May 22, 2012.
15
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyam Zebari said, “We have solid information and intelligence that members of Al
Qaeda’s terrorist network have gone to Syria.” Al Jazeera English, “Iraq says al-Qaeda flowing into Syria,” July 5,
2012. On July 21, Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu-Bakr al Baghdadi released an audiotape expressing support for the
Syrian “jihad” and arguing for the importance of “applying the sharia, uniting the umma by demolishing the borders
implemented by the Sykes-Picot [agreement], eradicating filthy nationalism and hated patriotism, and bringing back the
Islamic state, the state that does not recognize artificial boundaries and does not believe in any nationality other than
Islam.” OSC Report GMP20120721586002, “Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes To ‘Repent,’” July 21,
2012.
16
“Abu Basir al Tartusi” is the pen name of Abdel Moneim Mustafa Halimah. For more on this topic, see Aron Lund,
“Holier Than Thou: Rival Clerics in the Syrian Jihad,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 10, Issue:
14 July 16, 2012.
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of Syria’s unconventional weapons programs and stockpiles. U.S. officials have expressed
confidence that they have a reliable estimate of the quantities and locations of Syrian chemical
weapons and have indicated that the “extensive network” of related facilities is being monitored
“very closely” via unspecified means.17 Since late 2011, named and unnamed Israeli officials
have voiced similar concerns about “huge stockpiles”18 of chemical weapons in Syria and have
warned that Israel will consider any indication that the Asad regime is transferring WMD
materials to Hezbollah or other non-state actors to be an act of war.19
Open source reporting on Syria’s chemical weapons program suggests that nerve gas and mustard
gas production and storage infrastructure is concentrated at facilities in and around Al Safira
(southeast of Aleppo), Damascus, Hamah, Latakia, and Homs.20 Stockpiles also may be dispersed
in other military locations around the country, and some reports suggested that the Syrian
government may have moved or consolidated chemical weapons-related materials in order to
better guarantee their security. As the recent discovery of undeclared chemical weapons material
in Libya has shown, there are limits to the ability of international intelligence agencies and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to understand and verify the
extent of sensitive WMD programs, even when dealing with countries that have ratified
international conventions on WMD—which Syria has not.21
The Asad regime likely places greater emphasis on ensuring the loyalty of military units involved
in guarding elements of WMD programs because of the weapons’ relevance as a potential
deterrent against foreign attack. In the wake of any sudden regime collapse, efforts to find and
secure stockpiles would be both a high priority and a difficult challenge. Neighboring intelligence
services in Turkey, Jordan, and Israel may have more insight on the extent of these programs and
related security challenges than the U.S. government. Elements of the Syrian military may be in a
position to aid in securing materials and sites in the event of regime change, but it remains
unclear whether an orderly or chaotic transition situation might ensue and whether such units
would be cooperative or antagonistic toward outsiders.
Existing U.S. government authorities and funding sources for addressing emergency proliferation
risks are discussed below (see “Securing Weapons Supplies and Sites”). According to some press
17
On July 18, 2012, U.S. State Department spokesperson Patrick Ventrell said, “We’re closely monitoring their
proliferation-sensitive materials. We don’t have any indication that those specific munitions are not under Syrian
Government control at this time, but we’re monitoring it very closely.” In February 2012, Assistant Secretary of State
for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller said, “We have ideas as to quantity. We have
ideas as to where they are.” Quoted in Lachlan Carmichael, “U.S. concerned about Syrian chemical arms, missiles,”
Agence France Presse (AFP), February 15, 2012. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper referred to an
extensive network of Syrian chemical weapons facilities in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
February 16, 2012. See also Jay Solomon and Adam Entous, “U.S. Steps Up Watch of Syria Chemical Weapons,” Wall
Street Journal, February 15, 2012; and, Jay Solomon, “U.S., Israel Monitor Suspected Syrian WMD,” Wall Street
Journal, August 27, 2011.
18
Major-General Amir Eshel, head of the Israeli military’s planning division, quoted in “Israel Fears Syrian ‘Chemical,
Biological’ Weapons,” NOW Lebanon, January 17, 2012.
19
U.S. Open Source Center Report GMP20120201736004, “Israeli Official: Chemical Weapons From Syria to
Hizballah ‘Declaration of War,’” Yisra'el Hayom (Tel Aviv), February 1, 2012.
20
Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Watching Syrian Chemical Arms Amid Fear of Attack, Diversion,” Global Security Newswire,
December 5, 2011.
21
Syria has signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Syria has not signed or
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
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reports, internal U.S. government assessments estimate that as many as 75,000 military personnel
could be required to fully secure various WMD-related sites in Syria.2223
Chronology of United Nations Security Council Actions on Syria
August 3, 2011
The Security Council issued a presidential statement that expressed profound regret
over the hundreds of deaths in Syria, condemned widespread violations of human
rights against civilians by Syrian authorities, and called for an immediate end to
violence in Syria, urging all sides to act with utmost restraint. It also called for access
for humanitarian workers for Syrian authorities to follow through on commitments
they had made to reform. Lebanon disassociated itself from the statement after its
release.
October 4, 2011
The Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have, among other
things, voiced deep concern over violence in Syria and strongly condemned “the
continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against
civilians by the Syrian authorities.” It called for “an inclusive Syrian-led political
process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and
extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and
concerns of Syria’s population.” Russia and China voted against the resolution, and
Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained.
February 4, 2012
The Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have, among other
things, adopted an Arab League plan outlining a Syrian-led political transition to a
democratic, plural political system. The resolution had called on the Syrian
government to cease violence against civilians, withdraw its armed forces from cities
and towns and return them to their barracks, guarantee the freedom of peaceful
demonstrations, and allow unhindered access for all Arab League institutions to
"determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents
taking place." Russia and China voted against the resolution.
February 23, 2012
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States Nabil Elaraby appointed Kofi Annan as United Nations-League
of Arab States Joint Special Envoy for Syria.
April 5, 2012
The Security Council issued another presidential statement that, among other
things, noted the Syrian government commitment on March 25, 2012 to implement
Kofi Annan’s six-point peace proposal. The statement also called upon the Syrian
government to implement an U.N.-brokered cease-fire by withdrawing troops from
population centers by April 10, 2012. It also called upon all parties, including the
Syrian opposition, to cease all armed violence no later than April 12, 2012.
April 14, 2012
The Security Council passed Resolution 2042, which approved the deployment of a
U.N. advance team of 30 military observers to Syria. It also demanded that the
Syrian authorities withdraw security forces from population centers and begin a
dialogue with the opposition. The vote marked the first time since protests began
that the Security Council was united in demanding a halt to the violence.
April 21, 2012
The Security Council passed Resolution 2043, which established—for a 90-day
period—a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with an initial
deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers under the command of a Chief
Military Observer. The resolution also created a civilian team to help implement
22
Barbara Starr, “Military: Thousands of troops needed to secure Syrian chemical sites,” CNN.com, February 22, 2012.
The President restated established U.S. policy. On July 18, 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said,
“We’ve made very clear to [the Syrian government] that they have a responsibility to safeguard their chemical sites and
that we will hold them responsible should anything happen with regards to those sites.” See Secretary Panetta Remarks
with United Kingdom Defense Secretary Philip Hammond, July 18, 2012; and, Remarks by the President to the White
House Press Corps, August 20, 2012.
23
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elements of the full peace plan, such as the start of a national political dialogue and
the government's granting of the right to demonstrate.
June 16, 2012
UNSMIS Commander Norwegian Major General Robert Mood suspended
observation patrols due to increased violence.
July 19, 2012
The Security Council failed to adopt a proposed resolution that would have, among
other things, threatened sanctions on Syria if demands to end the violence were not
met. Permanent members China and Russia voted against the resolution and
Pakistan and South Africa abstained. The resolution would have had the Security
Council act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to demand verifiable
compliance—within 10 days of the adoption—with its demands in previous
resolutions that Syrian authorities pull back military concentrations from population
centers and cease the use of heavy weaponry against them.
July 20, 2012
The Security Council passed UNSCR 2059 which extended the UNSMIS mission for
an additional 30 days. It also conditioned any further renewal of UNSMIS on the
cessation of the use of heavy weapons by the government and a reduction in
violence by all sides.
August 2, 2012
United Nations-League of Arab States Joint Special Envoy for Syria, Kofi Annan
announced his intention to resign when his mandate expires on August 31, 2012.
Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi reportedly will replace Annan under an as yet
undetermined mandate.
Source: UN.org and U.N. News Center reports.
Issues and Possible Options for Congress
Since 2011, some Members of Congress and nongovernmental observers have argued that the
violence used by Syrian forces suggests that U.S. policy should more aggressively move toward
confrontation in pursuit of the stated U.S. goal of regime change. Others have expressed wariness
about the potential implications of regime change for regional security, particularly in light of the
delicate sectarian balance in the Levant and a lack of established U.S. relationships with
government and nongovernment actors in Syria.
The intensification of the conflict in recent months is driving a renewed round of debate over
possible policy responses. Some proponents of intervention or arming of opposition groups argue
that by failing to protect or arm the opposition, the United States is losing opportunities to
establish relationships with influential groups and is thus less able to prevent problematic or
hostile actors from shaping developments in Syria. Proponents and skeptics of regime change
have urged a continuation of efforts to increase multilateral political condemnation of and
economic and military pressure on the Asad regime, for example through U.N.-backed sanctions
or arms embargoes. The Obama Administration has continued to expand U.S. sanctions on Syria
and supporters of the Asad government, while advocating further multilateral sanctions and more
overtly engaging with regional actors and opposition groups on post-conflict planning.
Legislation introduced in the 112th Congress related to Syria is summarized below. Table B-1 in
Appendix B summarizes U.S. sanctions activity since the start of the uprising in March 2011.
U.S. Policy Toward Syria
U.S. policy toward Syria since the 1980s has ranged from confrontation and containment to
cautious engagement. Successive Congresses and Administrations have sought to end Syria’s
support for Hezbollah and Palestinian extremists; to encourage peace talks with Israel (which
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captured the Golan Heights from Syria in 1967); and to address Syria’s missile stockpiles,
chemical weapons, and clandestine nuclear activities. President Obama and his Administration
attempted limited rapprochement with Syria in 2009 and 2010 without lasting results.
The Obama Administration has pursued the following policies toward Syria since the uprising
against the Asad regime began in March 2011:
•
Demanding a Political Transition. On August 18, 2011, President Obama called
for the resignation of Syrian President Bashar al Asad, saying “We have
consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out
of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come
for President Assad to step aside.” The President also stated that the United States
will not impose a transition upon Syria, saying “What the United States will
support is an effort to bring about a Syria that is democratic, just, and inclusive
for all Syrians.... We will support this outcome by pressuring President Assad to
get out of the way of this transition, and standing up for the universal rights of
the Syrian people along with others in the international community.”
•
International Diplomacy. U.S. officials have been vocal advocates for U.N.
Security Council action to condemn the Syrian government and end the
bloodshed. The United States closed its embassy in Damascus and Ambassador
Robert Ford left Syria. U.S. officials are participating in efforts to improve
international policy coordination and support the Syrian people, such as the
Friends of Syria forum that met in Tunis in February, Istanbul in April, and Paris
in July. U.S. officials have cautiously supported the Annan plan at the United
Nations Security Council; the United States reportedly sought more robust
measures that were obstructed by Russia and China. With Russia and China
continuing to threaten a Security Council veto over any resolution that they
perceive as unduly pressuring or punishing the Asad regime, the Obama
Administration has pointed blame at those two countries for allowing regimeinstigated violence against Syrian civilians to continue.
•
U.S. Sanctions. Since the beginning of the uprising, the Obama Administration
has significantly expanded U.S. sanctions against the regime and its supporters.
The Treasury Department has designated dozens of individuals and entities,
freezing any U.S.-based assets of theirs and denying them access to the U.S.
financial system.
•
Humanitarian Aid. As detailed above, on August 11, 2012, the State Department
announced that the United States has provided $82 million during FY2012 to
address humanitarian needs in Syria and neighboring countries. 24
•
Non-lethal Aid. In 2012, Obama Administration officials have acknowledged
that the United States is providing peaceful elements of the Syrian opposition
with non-lethal assistance, such as medical supplies, night-vision goggles, and
communications equipment. According to one report, such aid includes tools to
circumvent regime Internet censorship, such as anonymizing software and
24
U.S. State Department, Additional Humanitarian Assistance for Those Fleeing the Violence in Syria, August 11,
2012.
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satellite phones with GPS capabilities.25 A recent Time article reports that the
Administration has been providing media-technology training to Syrian
dissidents who have received U.S. State Department-administered Internet
Freedom Grants.26 According to another report, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) has “supplied encryption-enabled communications gear to opposition
groups, presumably enabling the United States to monitor their talks.”27 CRS
cannot verify these reports.
•
Intelligence Coordination. According to press reports, U.S. intelligence officers
are helping to coordinate the delivery of lethal aid to elements of the armed
Syrian opposition not affiliated with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and its
affiliates. One such report states that Central Intelligence Agency officers located
in southern Turkey are vetting rebel groups for ties to known terrorist
organizations in order to “learn more about a growing, changing opposition
network inside of Syria and to establish new ties.”28 Other press reports state that
U.S. intelligence officers, in conjunction with foreign governments, also may be
helping the opposition develop logistical routes for moving supplies into Syria.29
Multiple press reports have suggested that the U.S. government lacks on-theground intelligence and has relied too much on regional governments for
information and as interlocutors, particularly after the closure of the U.S.
Embassy in Damascus.30 CRS cannot verify these reports.
•
Disruption of Arms Shipments to Syria. The United States, in conjunction with
regional partners, has been attempting to disrupt the resupply of Asad’s forces.
Earlier in 2012 when Russia quietly attempted to ship MI-25 helicopters to Syria
that had either been upgraded or newly built, the Administration released
information on the shipment, and the British ship insurer covering the delivery
canceled coverage on the transporting ship. In addition, according to one report,
the Administration pressured Iraqi leaders to close Iraqi air space to Iran-to-Syria
cargo flights clandestinely carrying weapons.31
•
Contingency Planning. Though the Administration has not indicated its
readiness to intervene militarily in Syria anytime soon, press reports suggest that
the U.S. military has developed contingency plans for various types of
interventions. Reportedly, such planning includes implementing a no-fly zone
and protecting “proliferation-sensitive” sites should Syrian forces protecting
them dissipate.32
25
“US Provides Communications Aid for Syria Opponents,” Agence France Presse, June 14, 2012.
“Hillary’s Little Startup: How the U.S. Is Using Technology to Aid Syria’s Rebels,” Time.com, June 13, 2012.
27
“ In Syria Conflict, U.S. Struggles to Fill Intelligence Gaps,” Washington Post, July 23, 2012.
28
The report also noted that Administration was deciding whether to provide rebels with satellite imagery and
intelligence on Syrian troop locations and movements. See, “C.I.A. Said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syrian
Opposition,” New York Times, June 21, 2012.
29
“U. S. Stepping Up Efforts To Organize Syria Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2012.
30
“U.S. Has A Big Blind Spot In Syria,” Los Angeles Times, July 25, 2012. See also, “In Syria Conflict, U.S. Struggles
to fill Intelligence Gaps,” Washington Post, July 23, 2012.
31
“U.S. Mounts Quiet Effort To Weaken Assad's Rule,” Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2012.
32
“U.S. Military Completes Planning For Syria,” Security Clearance (CNN.com), June 14, 2012.
26
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•
Preparing for a Transition. According to one unnamed U.S. official, the
Administration is supporting preparation for a political transition in Syria even as
fighting continues on the ground. This reportedly involves bringing opposition
groups together, including representatives of Alawite communities.33 The U.S.funded U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) also has been convening a series of
unofficial meetings in Germany with opposition groups in an effort “to define a
transition process for a post-Assad Syria.”34
Debating Intervention
Members of Congress have outlined differing positions on the Syrian crisis, related U.S. interests,
and preferred courses of action. Current debate focuses on the potential risks and benefits of
various humanitarian or military intervention proposals and those of maintaining current
sanctions and diplomacy policies. Some in Congress now argue that the United States should
intervene militarily in the Syrian crisis in order to protect civilians and/or to bring about the stated
U.S. goal of removing President Asad from power. Specific proposals from nongovernmental
observers and Members of Congress variously call for conditionally providing weapons or other
assistance to the armed Syrian opposition, carrying out air strikes to protect safe zones for
civilians or armed groups, and/or establishing corridors to allow the delivery of relief.
Critics of intervention and arms supply proposals highlight potential risks related to arming
opposition forces that are not unified and may include groups with extremist views or individuals
who have committed human rights abuses. Others suggest that the establishment of “safe-havens”
or “no-kill zones” may be viewed by the Asad government as a violation of sovereignty
tantamount to a declaration of war, and thus would require the commitment of air assets and
protective ground forces for an undetermined amount of time. Some organizations argue that
military intervention could jeopardize the delivery of humanitarian relief by conflating relief
operations with the political aims of the opposition.35 And other officials and observers also are
concerned about potentially unleashing a scenario that could jeopardize the Syrian military’s
control over large conventional and unconventional weapons stockpiles, including chemical
weapons, surface-to-surface rockets, and shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs).
Underlying the debate over Syria policy are a broader debates about the relative war powers and
foreign affairs authorities of Congress and the President, the utility of military intervention as a
means to protect civilians, and whether or not civilian protection should be a consistent tenet of
U.S. foreign policy. Similar debates emerged during congressional consideration of the 2011 U.S.
military intervention in Libya, and discussions of Syria policy are now informed by the outcome
of Libya’s conflict and the complexities of its aftermath. In recently enacted legislation, Congress
has underscored that it has not authorized the President to use force in Syria or declared war on
Syria.36 Debate over civilian protection reflects differences of opinion between those who
embrace the principle of a so-called “responsibility to protect” and those who argue that such
protection, while admirable and even desirable in some contexts, should not be endorsed in
33
“Stymied at U.N., U.S. Refines Plan to Remove Assad,” New York Times, July 21, 2012.
Josh Rogin, “Inside the Quiet Effort to Plan for a Post-Assad Syria,” ForeignPolicy.com – The Cable, July 20, 2012.
35
For a summary of these views, see Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), “Briefing: Why humanitarians
wary of ‘humanitarian corridors,’” March 19, 2012.
36
Section 604 of P.L. 112-158 states, “Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed as a
declaration of war or an authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.”
34
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general terms because of the commitments it implies and the often unpredictable consequences of
military intervention.
Possible Appropriations and Authorization Issues37
In considering and preparing for possible scenarios in Syria, Members of Congress may wish to
consider current and likely future requests for appropriations and authorization from the
Administration, in addition to reviewing current oversight topics and others that may arise.
Syria’s economic situation was difficult prior to the conflict, and the Obama Administration
expects that security and reconstruction costs in Syria will be considerable and will require
international contributions.38 International organizations are already identifying shortfalls in
funding and material to respond to the humanitarian needs of Syrians affected by the conflict, and
those needs, along with reconstruction costs, could drastically increase if fighting worsens and
persists.
Given U.S. national security concerns about terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the
regional security effects of conflict and potential regime change in Syria, it seems likely that
engagement between Congress and the Administration will continue to focus on those areas.
However, as part of a settlement or transition, the U.S. government could be asked to financially
support the repatriation or resettlement of Syrian refugees or to provide economic assistance to
Syria through contributions at future donors’ conferences and/or through international financial
institutions. The United Nations, NATO, or the Arab League could be asked to fund, staff, and
equip an international peacekeeping or monitoring operation inside Syria. Congress may choose
to define authorization criteria and identify potential funds for U.S. contributions to such
operations, including through reviewing current recurring obligations in the Peacekeeping
Operations (PKO) or Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) accounts.
Existing Restrictions and Authorities
Syria is among those states explicitly designated in the FY2012 foreign operations appropriation
act (Division I of P.L. 112-74; 125 Stat. 1164) as being prohibited from receiving direct aid
(§7007; 125 Stat. 1195). However, a number of provisions in that law could make funds available
“notwithstanding” other provisions within that law or other laws, including funds for
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs (125 Stat. 1185), foreign military
financing as it applies to demining (125 Stat. 1187), contingency funds (§7034(f); 125 Stat.
1214), and democracy promotion (§7034(h); 125 Stat. 1214).
The President also is granted special authority, under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, to “authorize the furnishing of assistance without regard to any provision of this Act, the
Arms Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States,
and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under this Act…” if he finds it is
“important to the security interests of the United States” and so notifies Congress. Under this
37
CRS Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation Dianne Rennack (ext. 7-7608) contributed to this section.
On August 15, 2012, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said, “Syria is not Iraq. It doesn’t have that
great, vast natural wealth. And depending on how long this goes on, we are already seeing a lot of the economic
underpinnings of Syria’s prosperity at risk from this fighting. So there’s going to have to be a serious rebuilding job
that will be Syrian-led obviously, but the international community has to be ready to support, so we’re beginning to
think about those things.”
38
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provision, the President could make available up to $50 million in a given fiscal year to Syria.
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development also is authorized to provide
agricultural commodities to meet emergency food needs “notwithstanding any other provision of
law" pursuant to Title II of P.L. 480.”
Securing Weapons Supplies and Sites39
There are two existing authorities and likely sources of funding for U.S. government programs
that could be used for efforts to secure or dismantle Syrian weapons of mass destruction or
advanced conventional weapons in an emergency scenario. The State Department’s
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) has authority to spend funds “notwithstanding
any other provision of law” and is authorized to work in states outside the former Soviet Union.40
The Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has
“notwithstanding” authority for use of a limited amount of CTR funds in an emergency situation,
including outside the former Soviet Union.41
Addressing Syria’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Status
The Administration and Congress may wish to discuss ways to address Syria’s legal status as a
state sponsor of terrorism in anticipation of any need to provide foreign assistance to a
transitional Syrian government. Syria has long been identified as a sponsor of terrorism for the
purposes of Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This status reflects longstanding Syrian government support for Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups. It remains
unclear how any post-Asad government might relate to those groups and other U.S.-designated
foreign terrorist organizations. This could complicate efforts to promptly remove the statesponsor designation in the case of a change in government, since the Act allows the Secretary of
State to rescind a state sponsor designation through a report to Congress only when there has been
a change in government and a change in policy.42
Under Sections 571 and 582 of the act, the President has broad authority to provide anti-terrorism
and nonproliferation assistance to foreign countries notwithstanding other provisions of law, with
39
Prepared by CRS Specialist in Nonproliferation Mary Beth Nikitin, ext. 7-7745.
The FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7) authorized the Department of State to use the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) “for such countries other than the Independent States of the former
Soviet Union and international organizations when it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so.”
Appropriated NDF funds remain available until expended.
41
The “notwithstanding” authority has not been exercised since it was first authorized in Section 1305 of the FY2010
Defense Authorization bill (P.L. 111-84). Available funds are limited to ten percent of total CTR appropriations.
Required determination and notification provisions would necessitate the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Energy. Notification of how funds will be spent must be submitted to the foreign affairs, appropriations
and armed services committees. The law requires that funds are used for threats “arising from the proliferation of
chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons or weapons-related materials, technologies, and expertise” that must be
addressed urgently; and that “certain provisions of law would unnecessarily impede the Secretary's ability to carry out
activities of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense to address such threats” (i.e.,
notwithstanding authority is necessary).
42
Section 620(A)(c)(1) specifies that the Secretary must certify that “there has been a fundamental change in the
leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned; that the government is not supporting acts of
international terrorism; that the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future.”
40
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the exception of human rights and terrorism related restrictions in Section 502B and 620A of the
act. Section 620A would restrict the provision of such assistance, in addition to peacekeeping
assistance under Section 551 of the act, without a national security waiver or a rescission. The
President is authorized to provide assistance pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
regardless of the terrorism designation in the following instances: He may make assistance
available for health and disease prevention programs (Section 104(c)(4)); he may provide up to
$25 million in any fiscal year for unanticipated contingencies (§451); and to some extent he may
fund international narcotics control and anticrime programs (§§481 and 491, respectively).
Furthermore, he may furnish defense articles or services in exchange for "necessary or strategic
raw material" if he finds it in the U.S. national interest to do so (§663).
Given the time and certification requirements for rescinding the status of a state sponsor of
terrorism, it seems likely the President would seek separate authorization from Congress for the
provision of assistance to Syria, issue a national security waiver of terrorism related restrictions,
or invoke existing notwithstanding authorities included in current foreign operations
appropriations legislation. The Bush Administration sought and Congress granted separate
authorization for Iraq in 2003 for similar reasons: President Bush rescinded Iraq’s status as a state
sponsor of terrorism in May 2003 under authority granted by Congress in supplemental
appropriations legislation.43
Requested Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA-IF)
The Administration also has asked Congress for “notwithstanding” authorities and funds to create
a Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund (MENA-IF) for responding to Arab countries in
transition through FY2017. The Administration originally requested $770 million in the fund in
its FY2013 budget request. The Senate Appropriations Committee has approved $1 billion for the
account, while the House Appropriations Committee has opposed it and offered instead to provide
$200 million for regional stabilization efforts.44 Administration officials indicated during
congressional briefings on the proposed fund that among the potential uses of the authorities and
money would be responding to peacekeeping, nonproliferation, or transition needs in Syria. The
availability or lack of MENA-IF funds and authorities may significantly affect the
Administration’s approach to various contingencies in Syria.
Possible Questions for Oversight
Possible questions that Congress may wish to consider in light of recent developments include:
43
President Bush rescinded Iraq’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to Section 1503 of P.L. 108-11 by
issuing a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Commerce and notifying Congress. Section 1503 states “that the
President may make inapplicable with respect to Iraq section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other
provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism. …provided further that the President shall
submit a notification 5 days prior to exercising any of the authorities described in this section to the Committee on
Appropriations of each House of the Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on International Relations of the House of Representatives.” See President George W. Bush, Message to the Congress
Reporting the Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the Development Fund for Iraq, May 22, 2003.
44
Of which, $70 million is for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), $5 million is for USAID's Office of
Middle East Partnerships, and $50 million is for Jordan.
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•
What are the ultimate goals of U.S. policy toward Syria? To protect civilians? To
further the opposition cause of removing President Asad from power? Can these
aims be separated in principle? On the ground? What might follow Asad’s
departure? Would a negotiated solution that preserved elements of the current
government be acceptable to the United States? Why or why not?
•
What authorities and appropriated funds might the Administration seek under
various scenarios? How can existing authorities and appropriations be used to
respond to various needs? What is the Administration’s view with regard to
Syria’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism?
•
How are other countries responding to the crisis? Who is willing and able to
implement various humanitarian or military intervention proposals? On what
authority? With what specific resources or forces, for what period, and at what
cost? How might direct or indirect military intervention affect ongoing relief and
diplomacy initiatives?
•
What potential risks and unintended consequences may stem from various
intervention proposals? What are the potential risks and consequences of refusing
to intervene? How will regional security be affected?
•
What signals might suggest that an abrupt collapse of the Syrian regime is
imminent? What signals might suggest that the current pattern of conflict by
attrition will persist? What developments could trigger direct intervention by
regional actors and how should the United States respond?
•
What political and security fault-lines exist among Syrian opposition groups and
how might various scenarios affect prospects for conflict or cooperation between
them?
•
What role are extremist groups playing in the violence and what might their
future role be in Syria if the conflict ends? How can the United States best limit
opportunities for violent extremist groups to take advantage of continued conflict
or regime change in Syria?
•
How can the United States prevent the use, theft, or transfer of Syria’s
unconventional weapons? How can the United States and its allies prepare to
secure and limit the proliferation of conventional weapons stockpiles in Syria,
including missiles?
•
How should the United States respond to the humanitarian needs of the Syrian
people and address the impact of Syrian refugees on neighboring countries?
•
What steps should the United States take in its engagement with Syrian
opposition groups and regional actors to increase the likelihood of a post-conflict
transition process that will lead to stability for Syria and the region?
Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158)
•
P.L. 112-158/H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, codifies the sanctions on
Syria contained in E.O.13606 and includes in Title VII, “Sanctions with Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria.”
This section directs the President to identify and impose specified sanctions on: (1) Syrian government officials or
persons acting on behalf of that government who are responsible for or complicit in the commission of serious
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human rights abuses against Syrian citizens or their family members, regardless of whether such abuses occurred
in Syria; (2) persons who knowingly transfer or facilitate the transfer of goods or technologies (weapons,
surveillance technology, or technology to restrict free speech or the flow of information) that are likely to be
used by Syria to commit human rights abuses against the Syrian people; and (3) persons who engage in
censorship that prohibits, limits, or penalizes freedom of expression by Syrian citizens. Section 604 states,
“Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an
authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.”
FY2013 Appropriations Legislation
•
In report language accompanying H.R. 5857, the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2013, appropriators note under the heading “Global and Regional Programs/ Middle East
Response” that “The Committee is troubled by the ongoing violence in Syria and notes that funds under this
heading should continue to be made available to assist the Syrian people. All funds for Syria are subject to the
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations, pursuant to section 7015(f) of this Act.”
•
In report language accompanying the Senate version of the bill, S. 3241, appropriators recommend $2 million for
the National Endowment for Democracy programs in Syria. According to the report, “The Committee
recognizes the comparative advantages of the NED in the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad,
particularly given its status as an NGO, unparalleled experience in promoting freedom during the cold war, and
continued ability to conduct programs in the most hostile political environments.”
Bills
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act of 2011—States
that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their
proliferation activities and policies. Would, among other things, prohibit U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements
and related export licenses and transfers of materials, services, and goods with a country that assists the nuclear
program of Iran, North Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such countries.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act—Would, among other things, sanction the development of
petroleum resources of Syria, the production of refined petroleum products in Syria, and the exportation of
refined petroleum products to Syria.
•
H.R. 5993, The Syria Non-Intervention Act of 2012—Would prohibit the use of funds available to the
Department of Defense or an element of the intelligence community for the purpose of, or which would have
the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Syria by any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011—Amends the Iran, North Korea,
and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or
extracted within North Korea’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the transportation of
goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such countries’ weapons of mass destruction programs,
support for acts of international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions shipping
services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011—Denies companies that conduct business in Syria’s energy sector
(investment, oil purchases, and sale of gasoline) access to U.S. financial institutions and requires federal
contractors to certify that they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
•
S. 2034, Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012—Imposes sanctions on persons who are responsible for
or complicit in certain human rights abuses. Also prohibits procurement contracts with persons that export
sensitive technology to Syria.
•
S. 2101, Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act of 2012—Imposes, among other things, sanctions
with respect to certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against
citizens of Syria or their family members.
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•
S. 2152, Syria Democracy Transition Act of 2012—Imposes, among other things, sanctions on foreign financial
institutions that conduct transactions with the central bank of Syria.
•
S. 2224, To require the President to report to Congress on issues related to Syria—Directs the President to
report to Congress regarding (1) opposition groups operating inside or outside of Syria to oppose the Syrian
government, and (2) the size and security of conventional and non-conventional weapons stockpiles in Syria.
•
S. 3498. Syria Humanitarian Support and Democratic Transition Assistance Act of 2012—Makes several
statements of policy regarding human rights violations, assistance to the Syrian people, weapons security, and
support for transitional governance in Syria. Directs the President to appoint a Special Envoy for Syria.
Encourages the President to provide bilateral assistance in the form of relief and transition support and
authorizes “such sums as may be necessary …for bilateral assistance programs in Syria” for FY2013 and FY2014.
Authorizes increased funding to countries “that have experienced an influx of refugees from Syria.” Encourages
the development of a transition and security plan for Syria and requires reporting on implementation.
Resolutions
•
H.Res. 296/S.Res. 180, A resolution expressing support for peaceful demonstrations and universal freedoms in
Syria and condemning the human rights violations by the Asad Regime—Among other things, it urges the
“President to continue to work with the European Union, the Government of Turkey, the Arab League, the Gulf
Cooperation Council, and other allies and partners to bring an end to human rights abuses in Syria, hold the
perpetrators accountable, and support the aspirations of the people of Syria.”
•
H.Res. 632, A resolution that, among other things, commends the leadership of the Government of Turkey in
calling for an end to the violence in Syria and for its responsiveness to the humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees.
•
H.Res. 687, A resolution that, among other things, calls on the United Nations Security Council, based on
evidence that crimes against humanity have been perpetrated by Syrian government forces, to refer the situation
of Syria to the International Criminal Court.
•
S.Res. 370/H.Res. 549, calling for democratic change in Syria, would state the Senate’s condemnation of “ongoing,
widespread, and systemic violations of human rights conducted by authorities in Syria” and calls on Bashar al
Asad to step down. The non-binding resolution would urge the President to support a democratic transition in
Syria, establish a Friends of Syria Contact Group, develop a strategy to encourage further military defections, and
“develop a plan to identify weapons stockpiles and prevent the proliferation of conventional, biological, chemical,
and other types of weapons in Syria.”
•
S.Res. 379, A resolution that, among other things, expresses strong disappointment with the Governments of the
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China for their veto of the United Nations Security Council
resolution condemning Bashar al Asad and the violence in Syria and urges them to reconsider their votes.
•
S.Res. 391/H.Res. 629, A resolution that, among other things, calls on Syria to (1) open the country to
independent and foreign journalists; and (2) release all detained journalists, videographers, and bloggers.
•
S.Res. 424, A resolution that, among other things, supports calls by Arab leaders to provide the people of Syria
with the means to defend themselves against Bashar al-Assad and his forces, including through the provision of
weapons and other material support, and calls on the President to work closely with regional partners to
implement these efforts effectively; urges the President to take all necessary precautions to ensure that any
support for the Syrian opposition does not benefit individuals in Syria who are aligned with al Qaeda or
associated movements, or who have committed human rights abuses; and affirms that the establishment of safe
havens for people from Syria, as contemplated by governments in the Middle East, would be an important step to
save Syrian lives and to help bring an end to Mr. Assad’s killing of civilians in Syria, and calls on the President to
consult urgently and thoroughly with regional allies on whether, how, and where to create such safe havens.
•
S.Res. 428, A resolution that, among other things, urges the President to formally establish the Atrocities
Prevention Board established by Presidential Study Directive-10 in August 2011, and for the Board to provide
recommendations to the President concerning the prevention of mass atrocities in Syria.
•
S.Res. 435, A resolution that, among other things, strongly urges all Governments, including the Republic of
Belarus and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, to refrain from providing any additional military or
security assistance to the Government of Syria.
•
S.Res. 494, A resolution that, among other things, condemns the Government of the Russian Federation for its
longstanding and ongoing support for the criminal regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Amendments
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•
H.Amdt. 1131 to H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, an amendment to
limit the availability of funds for Cooperative Threat Reduction activities with Russia until the Secretary of
Defense can certify that Russia is no longer supporting the Syrian regime and is not providing to Syria, North
Korea, or Iran any equipment or technology that contributes to weapons of mass destruction programs.
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Appendix A. Background and Profiles of Key Actors
The Asad Government and its Supporters
President Bashar al Asad was ushered into power in the wake of his father’s death in 2000, and
was the unopposed candidate of the ruling Baath party for seven-year terms in 2000 and 2007.45
Prior to his time in office, he had no government experience and had trained as an
ophthalmologist. Until 2011, his tenure was characterized by what some observers described as a
“China-style” reform strategy; Asad’s government promoted some economic liberalization while
offering only fleeting political reforms and cracking down on all outspoken or organized
opposition. The Asads sought with some success to attract support from beyond their traditional
bases in the Alawite community and the Baath party. Nevertheless, most key positions,
particularly in the security sector, have remained in Alawite hands.
President Asad’s approach during the uprising has been to offer limited reforms that correspond to
political grievances raised prior to the uprising. These include:
•
In April 2011, President Asad lifted the formal State of Emergency declaration
that had been in place since 1963. The emergency rule had been used to suppress
domestic dissent and was widely criticized by Syrians and external observers. In
the wake of the decision, the regime continued and expanded the raids, arrests,
and detentions that had been common under the emergency rules, leading to
criticism that the move was cynically designed to weaken public pressure rather
than to implement real change.
•
In February 2012, the government held a national referendum on a new
constitution designed to open the political system to competition beyond the
confines of the Baath party. The exercise was widely denounced by the
opposition. The constitution was approved by 89.4% of voters who cast ballots,
which the government claims was 57.4% of some 14.5 million eligible voters
among Syria’s 23 million people. It limits the president’s tenure to a maximum of
two terms of seven years, but is not applied retroactively, meaning that President
Asad could run for reelection when his current term expires in 2014, and, if reelected, he could serve until 2028.
•
The new constitution provided the basis for May 2012 parliamentary elections,
the first that were not restricted to the Baath Party and its National Unity List
allies. Syrian officials reported that turnout among eligible voters was 51%.46
However, most opposition groups and figures boycotted the election, and
supporters of President Asad won over 90% of the 250 seats. A handful of
opposition figures were elected, and one new party gained a seat in Aleppo.
45
The Syrian Constitution of 1973, as amended in 1984, provided for a republican government consisting of a
president, up to three vice presidents appointed by the president, a cabinet, and a 250-member one-house legislature
elected by adult citizens including women. Under this system, the president has been nominated by the decisionmaking branch of the ruling Baath Party, agreed to by the legislature, and proposed to the electorate in a referendum. In
practice, power has remained concentrated in the office of the presidency and key aides, particularly with regard to all
security and defense issues. “Syrians Vote For Assad in Uncontested Referendum,” Associated Press, May 28, 2007.
46
OSC Report GMP20120515693006, “Syrian TV Announces People’s Assembly’s Election Results,” Damascus
Syrian Satellite Television, May 15, 2012.
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The government’s use of force against protestors, armed opposition groups, and civilians has
galvanized some opposition groups’ demands for steps beyond the limited reforms offered to
date—namely for the ouster of Asad and a comprehensive transition to a new political order.
However, the Asad family and the Alawite elite that supports it have shown themselves to be
unwilling to peacefully abdicate power, and may believe they have no alternative but to fight as
long as their command of the military and intelligence apparatus allows.
The Alawite Community
The minority Alawite community has shown few signs of public discord, although some of its
members have joined the opposition.47 Some Alawites may feel caught between the regime’s
demands for loyalty and their fears of retribution from other groups in the event of regime change
or civil war. Many foreign observers are debating the motivations for Alawite loyalty in this
context. Some analysts suggest that fear of the military-intelligence apparatus has kept the
Alawite community politically quiet if not loyal, while others posit that the growing sectarian
nature of the conflict only reinforces confessional loyalties and fears. According to one Syria
analyst, Professor Josh Landis at the University of Oklahoma,
The broader Alawi community is also likely to remain loyal to the regime, even as the
economy deteriorates. Almost all Alawi families have at least one member in the security
forces as well as additional members working in civilian ministries, such as education or
agriculture. Most fear collective punishment for the sins of the Baathist era. Not only do they
assume that they will suffer from wide-scale purges once the opposition wins; many also
suspect that they will face prison or worse.… Many do not expect an orderly transition of
power, just as many remain convinced that a spirit of revenge may guide the opposition,
which has been so badly abused. In short, because the Syrian military remains able and
willing to stand by the president, whether out of loyalty, self-interest or fear, the regime is
likely to endure for some time.48
The opposition Syrian National Council (SNC, see below) released a statement in late February
stating that its members “consider members of the Alawite sect to be an essential element of
Syria’s cultural and ethnic fabric. The Alawites remain an important component of Syria, and will
continue to enjoy the same rights as other citizens as we build one nation of Christians, Muslims,
and other sects.”49 Others have pledged that orderly trials and the rule of law will prevail in any
post-conflict setting. However, the opposition leadership’s capacity to ensure that such sentiment
guides its members’ actions is uncertain. According to Landis, “such assurances only go so far in
calming Alawi anxieties.”
47
In January 2012, a group of Alawite intellectuals issued a statement urging “Alawite Syrians, religious and ethic
minorities afraid of the consequences of a possible fall of the regime, to participate in efforts to overturn the oppressive
government and participate in the construction of a new Syrian republic based on the rule of law and citizenship.” See,
“Alawite intellectuals reject sectarianism in Syria,” Agence France Presse, January 19, 2012.
48
Landis, “The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to Survive to 2013,” Middle East Policy,
January 2012.
49
SNC Press Release, “SNC Extends Hand to Alawite Community in Syria,” February 26, 2012.
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Opposition and Armed Groups
Syrian opposition groups have grown more organized as the uprising has unfolded, but they
remain divided over strategy, tactics, coordination, and leadership. During the protest stage of the
uprising, “Local Coordinating Councils” (LCCs) active in many areas inside Syria created an
informal network linking activists around the country. That network withstood persistent
government attacks and formed the basis for the limited national coordination that exists at
present. The LCCs continue to report on developments across the country, organize protests, and
coordinate relief efforts in conflict-affected areas. Nevertheless, as late as February 2012,
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated that the Syrian opposition was “not a
national movement” or “a unitary connected opposition force,” describing the opposition as “very
local” with organization “on a community by community basis.” An internal versus external
rivalry also has characterized the development of the opposition, with some internal activists
resisting attempts by expatriates and exiles to assert leadership in the movement.50 Both
dynamics—local organization and internal/external rivalry—could seriously complicate any postconflict political settlement.
At present, two opposition coalition groups continue to compete for political leadership.
•
The Syrian National Council (SNC) was formally organized in Turkey in
October 2011 and brings together a range of mostly external activists, consisting
of members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,51 secular elites, intellectuals, and
independents. The Council has a general 310-person body and an executive
committee made up of eight members.52 Abdulbaset Sieda replaced Burhan
Ghalioun as chairman of the SNC in mid-2012.53 The February 2012 “Friends of
Syria” conference in Tunis referred to the SNC “a legitimate representative of
Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change.” The international community has
been frustrated by infighting within the SNC, its inability to attract more
members of Syrian minority communities (especially Christians, Kurds, and
Alawites), its inability to convince rival opposition groups to merge with it, and
its perceived lack of legitimacy among Syrian protestors on the ground who
remain subject to regime violence. In March 2012, several activists resigned from
the SNC in protest of its decision making and a perceived lack of effectiveness.
Unlike other opposition coalitions, the SNC has openly called for international
military intervention in the crisis, which led other Syrians to allege that the SNC
is a tool of regional powers, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Although
50
According to one report: “The picture that emerges—partial and anecdotal—is of a highly decentralized, proudly
local movement, distrustful of the expatriate opposition. Many activists said they wanted both Sunni empowerment and
equal rights for all. If there was unanimity, it was in the fierce conviction that future leaders should come from their
own ... not from exile groups, like the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and secular movements.” Anne Barnard and Hwaida
Saad, “Though Disparate, Syria Rebels Tenacious Against Crackdown,” New York Times, May 9, 2012
51
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has remained in exile since the Hama massacre of 1982. Since then, membership in
the group has been, according to Syrian law, a capital offense. Within the Syrian National Council, members of the
Brotherhood hold 25% of the seats. Some Syrian opposition activists have accused the Brotherhood of funding its own
militias on the ground. See, Yezid Sayigh, “The Coming Tests of the Syrian Opposition,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, April 19, 2012.
52
See the SNC website at http://www.syriancouncil.org/en/structure/executive-commitee.html.
53
Ghalioun’s reelection to a third term as leader of the SNC was criticized by some opposition members, and he
resigned. He remains a member of the executive committee.
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the SNC had resisted calls to turn the protest movement into an armed struggle, it
has endorsed the imposition of a no-fly zone; the establishment of humanitarian
safe corridors and buffer zones; and “an organized and speedy operation to arm
the Free Syrian Army.”
•
The National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCB) was formed
in the summer of 2011 and is a Syria-based alliance of leftist groups, Kurdish
activists, and individuals associated with the 2005 Damascus Declaration on
political reform. The NCB has stated a willingness to negotiate with the Asad
regime (predicated on an end to the use of force against civilians) and opposes
foreign intervention. The SNC has criticized the NCB for these positions, and
repeated attempts to merge the two coalitions have failed. According to one
report, “The group is well positioned to play an important role going forward,
since it has also invested in keeping channels of communication open with
Russia, visiting Moscow as recently as April 17.”54 The NCB is also referred to in
some press reports as the Syrian National Coordination Committee for
Democratic Change.
As the unrest has moved toward greater violence and confrontation, the focus of international
attention has shifted to armed opposition activists. Press coverage and anecdotal reports suggest
that thousands of mostly Sunni military soldiers have defected or deserted rather than continue
following orders to enforce the crackdown. Not all of these defectors have taken up arms. Several
Syrian general staff officers have defected to opposition groups based in Turkey, and some are
now playing a leadership role in the armed campaign against the Syrian government.55 On the
ground, many volunteer fighters have organized themselves into neighborhood militias and
nominally claim allegiance to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). However, it remains unclear whether
FSA commanders outside Syria are able to command the loyalty of the many disparate and local
resistance groups that have emerged.
•
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) consists of lightly armed, dissident military
personnel and officers who have defected and are targeting government security
forces in armed attacks. It also represents a broader coalition of locally organized
volunteer fighting groups who seek to affiliate themselves with the national
opposition movement but lack integrated command structure, logistics, and
intelligence.56 FSA forces are rumored to number in the low hundreds with
possibly thousands of loosely affiliated supporters. Precise and verifiable
estimates are not available. To date, the FSA’s equipment has been mostly locally
financed with fighters buying small arms and ammunition on the black market,
and local supporters selling household valuables to raise money for the
rebellion.57 The FSA is nominally headed by a former colonel in the Syrian Air
54
Yezid Sayigh, op.cit.
“Syrian Armed Forces Desertion Said to Surge to 60,000,” Bloomberg, March 15, 2012.
56
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recently referred to the FSA as “a blanket, generic name that’s sort
of applied to the collection of oppositionists.” Open source reporting based on interviews with Syrian opposition
activists, including FSA commanders and FSA affiliates, suggests that no central FSA command structure exists that
encompasses the majority of armed groups in Syria, although the mostly Sunni, locally organized volunteers in Syria’s
armed resistance share similar immediate goals of ending the Asad government’s assaults on them and civilians. See
Emile Hokayem, IISS-US Roundtable Discussion—The Syrian Uprising Seen From The Arab World, January 24,
2012; and, Al Jazeera English, “Q&A: Nir Rosen on Syria’s armed opposition,” February 13, 2012.
57
Derek Henry Flood, “Inside the Free Syrian Army,” Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, February 24, 2012.
55
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Force, Riyad al Asad (not related to the president), who defected to the
opposition in mid-March 2011. FSA’s military leadership is based in Turkey’s
Hatay province, where Turkish forces maintain tight control over any crossborder activities for fear of Syrian retribution. Some observers believe that if
FSA fighters were trained and equipped with more sophisticated equipment
(portable and guided anti-tank rockets, Stinger missiles), they would prove to be
a more formidable opponent against more heavily equipped pro-government
forces.58
The armed resistance and the political opposition have had an ambiguous relationship to date.
The Asad government’s assault on locally organized volunteers led to angry recriminations by
some activists inside Syria that external opposition leaders had abandoned them or were not
delivering on promised assistance.59 While the SNC has established a Military Bureau to
coordinate with and among different armed groups, some experts doubt whether either element of
the opposition exerts true authority over the other.60 Strong differences of opinion over the
desirability of outside support persist, and some armed groups may resist accepting political
leadership from Islamist members of the political opposition and vice versa. This uncertainty
complicates efforts by third parties to identify potential partners and plan a way forward.
Non-Alawite Minority Communities
The Kurds. Although there are Kurdish members within the opposition coalitions noted above,
by and large Kurdish areas in northeastern Syria have remained fairly quiet amidst the unrest.
Since its independence in 1946, Syria has defined itself as an Arab state, despite the presence of a
large, ethnically distinct Kurdish population in Damascus and in several non-contiguous areas
along Syria’s border with Turkey and Iraq. Syria’s Kurds are the largest distinct ethnic/linguistic
minority in Syria (7%-10% of the total population). They inhabit agriculturally rich areas, which
also contain several of Syria’s most valuable oil and natural gas fields. In an attempt to curb
Kurdish demands for greater autonomy, successive Syrian governments since the 1950s have
periodically arrested Kurdish political leaders and have co-opted certain Kurdish tribal leaders.
They also have confiscated some Kurdish land and redistributed it to Syrian Arabs to try to
“Arabize” Kurdish regions.
For the past year, the regime has resorted to these divide-and-rule tactics to keep Kurdish areas
under control. According to Denise Natali, an expert on Kurdish politics at National Defense
University, “to repress the Kurds violently would be another nail in the coffin.... It is one of the
58
One local militia calling itself the Farouq Brigade and fighting under the broader banner of the Free Syrian Army
claims that it has been more effective in engaging government forces. According to a report, “What the Farouq fighters
have found is that the Syrian army, as a force built for a potential conflict with Israel, is poorly equipped for the type of
asymmetrical combat the guerillas engage in. That allows the guerillas to inflict heavy casualties on the military when
the two sides engage in close combat. It is one reason the Syrian military prefers launching artillery attacks on rebelheld cities from long distances.” See, “Rare inside view of Syria’s rebels finds a force vowing to fight on,” McClatchy,
April 23, 2012.
59
In Homs, where armed fighters had been under government siege for almost a month, one local commander of Homs
Revolutionary Committee appeared in a YouTube video angrily criticizing the SNC for its insufficient support saying,
“We gave you legitimacy, and we can take it away.”
60
For example, Peter Harling, a Syria analyst for the International Crisis Group, has said, “I don't think the Syrian
National Council has much leverage over the Free Syrian Army, and I don't think the Free Syrian Army has much
leverage itself over what is happening on the ground.”
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communities the regime is trying to co-opt.”61 Despite their problems under the Asad regime,
Kurds are wary of supporting a potential Sunni Arab resistance movement that, should it come to
power, may be no less hostile to Kurdish aspirations than the Alawite-led Asad government.
According to Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliament, ‘‘the Kurds in Syria
have their own problems.... They are against the Asad regime. They have been for years. They
have no rights. But they are not sure about which people will come after.’’62
In May 2012, a delegation from the Syrian-Kurdish National Council (KNC), an umbrella
organization consisting of several smaller Kurdish political parties, traveled to the United States
for meetings with the U.S. State Department. The KNC has called for the creation of an
autonomous Kurdish region within a federated Syria, a position that has put it at odds with the
main Syrian opposition exile group, the Syrian National Council. It also has demanded
compensation for historical Kurdish suffering and the removal of the word ‘‘Arab’’ from Syria’s
official name: the Syrian Arab Republic.
The Christian Community. Syria’s various Christian communities fear that the uprising will
lead to a sectarian civil war and that they could be subjected to violent repression, just as Islamist
extremist groups have targeted Iraqi Christians since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Syria’s
Christians, consisting primarily of Greek Orthodox along with some smaller sects, comprise
approximately 10% of the Syrian population. Most Syrian Christians speak Arabic and
traditionally have identified with Arab nationalist movements, which they see as an alternative to
Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, like other Christians in the Middle East, many Syrian
Christians feel some affinity for Europe and the United States on religious and cultural grounds.
Christians have been well represented in Syrian government organizations under the Asad regime.
At present, Christians appear to be taking a cautious approach to the uprising. While some have
remained supportive of the Asad regime and grown more so as sectarian violence has increased,
others are rumored to be assisting opposition movements, including local armed elements and the
Free Syrian Army. Syria’s Greek Orthodox Patriarch, Ignatius IV Hazim, patriarch of Antioch and
All the East, has taken a cautious approach, recently arguing that “the harmful effects of any
foreign intervention in our affairs would touch Christians and Muslims alike.”63
61
“Syrian Kurds seen as revolt’s wild card,” Washington Post, March 8, 2012.
“Syrian Kurds, facing tough options, flee into Iraq,” International Herald Tribune, March 10, 2012.
63
“Syria’s Greek patriarch opposes foreign intervention,” Agence France Presse, March 1, 2012.
62
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Appendix B. U.S. Sanctions and Legislation
Overview
At present, a variety of legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria
and restrict bilateral trade. Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is
therefore subject to a number of general U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State
Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in 1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006
Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued new executive orders that expanded U.S.
sanctions specifically on Syria.
•
The table below reviews sanctions introduced since early 2011 in response to
Syria’s uprising.
•
Syria-specific sanctions and general sanctions applicable to Syria are also
summarized below.
Background on U.S. Assistance to Syria and Restrictions
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s
designation as a country supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to
receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and 1981, the United States provided a total of
$627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in
economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a
brief warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded
with U.S. assistance included water supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health
and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to Syria since 1981, when the last aid
programs were closed out. In the event of regime change, the Obama Administration and
Congress would need to reevaluate any successor government’s policies with regard to support
for international terrorism in order to determine Syria’s potential eligibility for U.S. assistance.
Syria’s Economy and Sanctions
Reports indicate that the Syrian economy and national budget are suffering due to a steep drop in
oil exports resulting from sanctions; over a year of domestic unrest and the loss of tourism
revenues; and new social and military spending aimed at quelling public anger. Estimates vary on
the degree of contraction in 2011, ranging between 5% and 15%.64 The Economist Intelligence
Unit predicts that the Syrian economy will contract by 8.1% in 2012.
64
“Cracks Widen in Syrian Economy,” IPS, January 24, 2012.
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Urban areas are now experiencing daily power outages and fuel shortages;65 inflation is rising66;
and the value of the Syrian pound has plummeted on the black market (from 54 pounds against
the dollar to over 103 pounds as of early March), forcing the government to spend resources
propping it up. Syria’s stock market is down 40% since the unrest began in March 2011. Foreign
exchange reserves held by the Syrian Central Bank have reportedly fallen from $18 billion in the
fall of 2011 to between $5 billion and $10 billion, and now lose about $1 billion a month.67 With
the loss of European export markets due to a European Union oil import ban, Syria has been
denied a major source of revenue and hard currency (25%-30% of total government revenue or
$4 billion a year). According to Syrian Oil Minister Sufian Alao, sanctions on Syrian oil exports
have cost the country $4 billion.
Before sanctions, the main buyers of approximately 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of exported
Syrian oil were Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, and Turkey. Syria
produces about 380,000 bpd total, though 2011 total production fell to around 320,000 bpd due to
sanctions.68 Foreign oil companies that have suspended operations in Syria include Tatneft
(Russia), Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Total (France), Gulfsands (UK), Suncor (Canada), and INA
(Croatia). In March 2012, Syrian officials announced that the Russian energy company Gazprom
would take over INA’s oil and gas operations in Syria. The operating status of two Chinese
companies with investments in Syria, CNPC and Sinopec, is unknown.69 Western countries also
have banned new investment in Syria’s oil and gas sector, and energy traders and shipping firms
also report changes to their engagement with Syria. European sanctions do not ban the export of
liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to Syria, since it is widely used by ordinary households for heating
and cooking.
Since new sanctions were enacted, many analysts have speculated about whether new investors
and new foreign markets would arise for Syrian oil exports, albeit at lower prices due to sanctions
and increased shipping, insurance, and financing costs. Some experts believe that both India and
China are in a position to refine the heavy crude that Syria exports. However, others assert that
some Asian buyers would find the prospect of purchasing Syrian oil too risky or politically
problematic. In recent months, Venezuela has supplied Syria with at least three shipments of
diesel fuel in exchange for Syrian naphtha, a refined petroleum product. According to Venezuelan
Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez, “We have a high level of cooperation with Syria, a besieged
nation, whom the transnational interests want to bring down.” Other reports suggest that Russia
and Iran are exporting gasoil and diesel to Syria.70 Syrian officials also claim to be negotiating
fuel import deals with Russia, Iran, and Algeria.71
65
In May 2012, the Syrian government raised the price of subsidized fuel by 25%, just weeks after doubling electricity
prices.
66
Inflation may be as high as 30% in Syria. According to a June 2012 report, the Syrian government has recently
circulated new currency printed in Russia in order to pay public sector salaries amidst a ballooning fiscal deficit. See,
“Syria Prints New Money as Deficit Grows-Bankers,” Reuters, June 13, 2012.
67
“Syria Running out of Cash as Sanctions take toll, but Assad avoids Economic Pain,” Washington Post, April 24,
2012.
68
Though oil production declined in 2011, natural gas production increased by 8% due to investment in gas
infrastructure made before unrest began.
69
“Syria: Voting with their feet,” Economist Intelligence Unit—Business Middle East, January 16, 2012.
70
“How Russia, Iran keep fuel flowing to Syria,” Reuters, April 26, 2012.
71
“Syria, Russia Negotiating Long-Term Gas, Diesel Fuel Contracts,” ITAR-TASS World Service, May 25, 2012.
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Table B-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2012
(Implemented by Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC])
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
August 14,
2012
Riyad Hijab, former Prime Minister
Post-defection removal from OFAC’s Specially
Designated Nationals (SDN) List
August 10,
2012
Hezbollah, SYTROL
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List, pursuant to E.O.13582
July 18,
2012
Omran Ahed Al-Zoubi, Minister of Information, ,
Subhi Ahmad Al-Abdullah, Minister of Agriculture
and Agrarian Reform, Safwan Al-Assaf, Minister of
Housing and Urban Development, Wael Nader AlHalqi, Minister of Health, Mohammad Al-Jleilati,
Minister of Finance, Hala Al Nasser, Minister of
Tourism, Mohammad Abdul-Sattar Al-Sayyed,
Minister of Religious Endowments, Yasser Al-Sibaei,
Minister of Public Works, Hazwan Al Wazz,
Minister of Education, Mansour Fadlallah Azzam,
Minister of Presidential Affairs, Nazira Farah Sarkis,
Minister of State for Environmental Affairs, Hussein
Mahmoud Farzat, Minister of State, Omar Ibrahim
Ghalawanji, Deputy Prime Minister for Services
Affairs, Radwan Habib, Minister of Justice, Ali
Haidar, Minister of State for National
Reconciliation Affairs, Bassam Hanna, Minister of
Water Resources, Riyad Hijab, Prime Minister,
Mahmoud Ibrahim Said, Minister of Transport,
Qadri Jamil, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic
Affairs, Imad Mohammad Deeb Khamis, Minister of
Electricity, Adib Mayaleh, Governor of Central
Bank of Syria, Jassim Mohammad Zakarya, Minister
of Social Affairs and Labor, Lubanah Mshaweh,
Minister of Culture, Said Mu’zi Hneidi, Minister of
Oil and Mineral Resources, Imad Abdul-Ghani
Sabouni, Minister of Communications and
Technology, Fuad Shukri Kurdi, Minister of
Industry, Joseph Jurji Sweid, Minister of State,
Mohammad Yehya Moalla, Minister of Higher
Education, Mohammad Zafer Mihbek, Minister of
Economy and Foreign Trade
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
Business Lab, Drex Technologies(Virgin Islands)a,
Handasieh, Industrial Solutions, Mechanical
Construction Factory, Syronics
May 30,
2012
Syria International Islamic Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
May 1, 2012
Foreign Persons/Foreign Entities that have violated,
attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or
caused a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran or
Syria, or that have facilitated deceptive transactions
for persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning
Syria or Iran.
Executive Order 13608—Authorizes the
Department of the Treasury to publicly identify
foreign individuals and entities that have violated
U.S. sanctions against Iran and Syria and generally
bars their access to U.S. financial and commercial
systems.
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Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
April 27,
2012
Sanction or Related Activity Description
OFAC issued General License 4A, which
authorizes the exports or re-exports to Syria of
items licensed or otherwise authorized by the
Department of Commerce and of exports and
reexports of certain services. General License 4A
replaces and supersedes General License 4, dated
August 18, 2011.
April 23,
2012
Governments of Syria and Iran, Ali Mamluk
(Director of the Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate), Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate, Syriatel, Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security,
Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Datak Telecom
Executive Order 13606—Blocks the property
and suspends entry into the United States of
certain persons with respect to grave human
rights abuses by the governments of Iran and
Syria via information technology.
March 30,
2012
General Munir Adanov (Deputy Chief of General
Staff of the Syrian Army), General Dawood Rajiha
(Minister of Defense)
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
March 5,
2012
General Organization of Radio and TV
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
February 23,
2012
OFAC issued General License 15 related to Syria
to authorize transactions in connection with
patent, trademark, copyright, or other
intellectual property protection that would
otherwise be prohibited by Executive Order
13582.
February 16,
2012
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
December
1, 2011
Muhammad Makhluf, Military Housing
Establishment, Real Estate Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
October 3,
2011
OFAC issued two general licenses related to
Syria to authorize payments in connection with
overflight or emergency landing and transactions
with respect to telecommunications
September
27, 2011
OFAC issued a general license related to Syria to
authorize third-country diplomatic and consular
funds transfers and to authorize certain services
in support of nongovernmental organizations’
activities.
September
9, 2011
OFAC issued four general licenses related to
Syria to authorize wind down transactions,
certain official activities of international
organizations, incidental transactions related to
U.S. persons residing in Syria and operation of
accounts.
August 30,
2011
Walid Mouallem (Foreign Minister), Ali Abdul
Karim Ali (Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon),
Bouthaina Shaaban (Advisor to the President)
Congressional Research Service
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals
(SDN) List
31
Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
August 18,
2011
Government of Syria
Executive Order 13582—Freezes all assets of the
Government of Syria, prohibits U.S. persons from
engaging in any transaction involving the
Government of Syria, bans U.S. imports of
Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products,
prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings in
or related to Syria’s petroleum or petroleum
products, and prohibits U.S. persons from
operating or investing in Syria.
August 18,
2011
General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company
For Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian
Petroleum Company, Sytrol
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 10,
2011
Commercial Bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based
subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank,
Syriatel, the country’s main mobile phone operator
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 4,
2011
Muhammad Hamsho (businessman with ties to
Asad family), Hamsho International Group
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
June 29,
2011
Jamil Hassan (Head of Air Force Intelligence),
Political Security Directorate (PSD, domestic
intelligence)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
May 18,
2011
President Bashar al Asad, Farouk al Shara (vice
president), Adel Safar (prime minister), Mohammad
Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the interior), Ali Habib
Mahmoud (minister of defense), Abdul Fatah
Qudsiya (head of Syrian military intelligence),
Mohammed Dib Zaitoun (director of political
security directorate), Nabil Rafik al Kuzbari,
General Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corp Qods Force suspected
of human rights abuses in Syria), Al Mashreq
Investment Fund, Bena Properties, Cham Holding,
Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Syrian Military
Intelligence, Syrian National Security Bureau
Executive Order 13573 adds listed individuals
and entities to OFAC’s SDN List
April 29,
2011
Maher al Asad, Ali Mamluk (director of the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate GID), Atif Najib
(former head of the Syrian Political Security
Directorate for Dara'a province and the president’s
cousin). the General Intelligence Directorate, and
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Quds
Force (for allegedly assisting Syria in its crackdown)
Executive Order 13572 adds listed individuals
and entities to OFAC’s SDN List
Source: U.S. Treasury Department.
Notes: As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such
as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such
individuals and companies are called Specially Designated Nationals or SDNs. Their assets are blocked and U.S.
persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.
a.
According to the Treasury Department, Drex Technologies, “belongs to Assad’s billionaire cousin and
government insider, Rami Makhluf, who was designated by the Treasury Department in February 2008
under E.O. 13460 for improperly benefiting from and aiding the public corruption of Syrian regime officials.
Drex Technologies was designated pursuant to E.O. 13572, which authorizes the United States to sanction
any entities owned or controlled by persons designated under E.O. 13460.”
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Specific Sanctions Against Syria
Specific U.S. sanctions levied against Syria fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions resulting
from the passage of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that,
among other things, prohibit most U.S. exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed by executive order
from the President that specifically deny certain Syrian citizens and entities access to the U.S.
financial system due to their participation in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden; or destabilizing activities in Iraq and
Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from the USA PATRIOT Act levied specifically against the
Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006.
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act into law, as P.L. 108-175. This law requires the President to impose
penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased
supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq (§§5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans on the
export of military items (already banned under other legislation, see above)72 and of dual use
items (items with both civil and military applications) to Syria (§5(a)(1)). In addition, the
President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
•
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
•
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
•
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
•
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
•
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
•
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (§5(a)(2)).
Implementation
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions of
P.L. 108-175, including the bans on munitions and dual use items (§5(a)(1)) and two sanctions
from the menu of six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban on
exports to Syria other than food and medicine (§5(a)(2)(A)) and the ban on Syrian aircraft landing
in or overflying the United States (§5(a)(2)(D)). In issuing his executive order, the President
stated that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete steps to address the concerns that led to
the enactment of the Syria Accountability Act. The President also imposed two additional
sanctions based on other legislation.
•
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
72
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
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correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.
Waivers
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver
authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to
issue the following waivers on grounds of national security.
Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products in
support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of
potential dual use; aircraft parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information; certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a temporary
nature.73
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of
Syrian aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an
emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.74 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.75
73
According to U.S. regulations, any product that contains more than 10% de minimis U.S.-origin content, regardless
of where it is made, is not allowed to be exported to Syria. For U.S. commercial licensing prohibitions on exports and
re-exports to Syria, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 Supp No. 1. The Department of Commerce reviews license applications on a
case-by-case basis for exports or re-exports to Syria under a general policy of denial. For a description of items that do
not require export licenses, see, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce, Implementation
of the Syria Accountability Act, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
74
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/
13338.pdf.
75
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
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The following individuals and entities have been targeted by the U.S. Treasury Department
(Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC):
•
On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior Syrian
officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then-interior minister and its head
of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively, the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any assets
they may have in the United States and banning any U.S. persons, including U.S.
financial institutions outside of the United States, from conducting transactions
with them.76 Kanaan allegedly committed suicide in October 2005, though some
have speculated that he may have been murdered.
•
On January 18, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department took the same actions
against the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military
intelligence.
•
On April 26, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13399 that authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the U.S.-based assets of anyone found to
be involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also affects anyone involved in bombings or
assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004, or anyone hindering the
international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The order allows the
United States to comply with UNSCR 1636, which calls on all states to freeze the
assets of those persons designated by the investigating commission or the
government of Lebanon to be involved in the Hariri assassination.
•
On August 15, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for allegedly contributing
to Syria’s support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and
Brigadier General Jama’a Jama’a, for allegedly playing a central part in Syria’s
intelligence operations in Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.77
•
On January 4, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three Syrian
entities, the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the
Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory, as
weapons proliferators under an executive order (E.O. 13382) based on the
authority vested to the President under IEEPA. The three state-sponsored
institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.78
76
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2617.aspx.
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp60.aspx.
78
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp216.aspx.
77
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•
On August 1, 2007, the President issued E.O. 1344179 blocking the property of
persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and
institutions. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
four individuals reportedly affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert
Syrian control over the Lebanese political system, including Assaad Halim
Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab, and Hafiz Makhluf (under the authority of E.O. 13441)
and Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik (under the authority of E.O. 13338).80
•
On February 13, 2008, President Bush issued another order (E.O.13460) blocking
the property of senior Syrian officials. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the order “targets individuals and entities determined to be
responsible for or who have benefitted from the public corruption of senior
officials of the Syrian regime.” The order also revises a provision in Executive
Order 13338 to block the property of Syrian officials who have undermined U.S.
and international efforts to stabilize Iraq.81 One week later, under the authority of
E.O. 13460, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets and restricted the
financial transactions of Rami Makhluf, a powerful cousin of President Bashar al
Asad.
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria
As previously mentioned, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush instructed
the Treasury Department in 2004 to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering
concerns. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued a final ruling that imposes a special measure
against the Commercial Bank of Syria as a financial institution of primary money laundering
concern. It bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent
account with the Commercial Bank of Syria, and it also requires banks to conduct due diligence
that ensures the Commercial Bank of Syria is not circumventing sanctions through its business
dealings with them.82
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329).
Section 303 of this act (90 Stat. 753-754) required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
79
On July 29, 2010, President Obama extended that National Emergency with respect to Lebanon for another year,
stating that “While there have been some recent positive developments in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah that include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems serve to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in Lebanon, and continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” See, Notice of July 29, 2010—
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Actions of Certain Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty
of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions, Federal Register, Title 3—The President, [Page 45045].
80
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp666.aspx.
81
A previous executive order, E.O. 13315, blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and members of
his former regime. On June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian company, SES
International Corp., and two of its officials under the authority of E.O.13315.
82
See, “U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria.” Available at http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctionssyr.html.
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Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A (22 USC 2371). (Syria was not affected by this ban until
1979, as explained below.)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (Title II of P.L. 95-223, codified at
50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.) Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the
President has broad powers pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a
threat “which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” These powers include the ability to
seize foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction, to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, to
prohibit payments between financial institutions involving foreign currency, and to prohibit the
import or export of foreign currency.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72). Section 6(i) of this act (93 Stat. 515)
required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress before
licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries determined to
have supported acts of international terrorism. (Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 relettered
Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list. This list is
prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support for
acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first prepared in
1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2009, issued on August 5, 2010. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the
above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399). Section 509(a) of this
act (100 Stat. 853) amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit export of
items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of international terrorism,
thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the AntiTerrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989—see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans
obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-509). Section 8041(a) of this act (100 Stat.
1962) amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on income or war
profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism.
(26 USC 901(j)). The President was given authority to waive this provision under Section 601 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200, May 18, 2000).
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-222). Section 4
amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional notification and
licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries
on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their
ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribes conditions for removing a country from the terrorism list: prior
notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen of
two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite notification, the
President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no
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longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45
days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list).
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 (Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY1994-1995). Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver
has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other
prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). This act requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (§325) or lethal military
equipment (§326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President to waive this
provision on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to third countries that
sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign
The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion in Syria has entered its third year, and seems poised
to continue, with the government and a bewildering array of militias locked in a bloody struggle
of attrition. U.S. officials and many analysts believe that Asad and his supporters will ultimately
be forced from power, but few offer specific, credible timetables for a resolution to the crisis.
Opposition forces are formidable, but forces loyal to President Bashar al Asad continue to resist,
using air strikes, artillery, and pro-government militias in punishing counterattacks. U.S. officials
believe that the capacity of government forces is eroding but also believe that fighting would
likely continue even if opposition groups achieve their objective of toppling Asad. Some
members of the Sunni Arab majority and of ethnic and sectarian minority groups view the conflict
in communal, zero-sum terms. Many observers worry that a further escalation in fighting or swift
regime change could jeopardize the security of chemical and conventional weapons stockpiles,
threaten minority groups, or lead to wider civil or regional conflict.
Amid extensive damage to major urban areas and reports attributing war crimes to government
and opposition forces, the fighting has created a regional humanitarian emergency. Some
estimates suggest more than 70,000 Syrians have been killed since unrest began in March 2011.
As of April 22, more than 1,380,406 refugees had fled the country, more than 1.1 million of them
since September 2012. According to the United Nations, as many as 3.6 million Syrians may be
internally displaced. United Nations appeals for $1.5 billion for Syrians through June 2013
remain mostly underfunded, with U.N officials warning of a potential collapse of their ability to
support the growing number of those displaced and in need. The United States has provided $409
million in humanitarian assistance to date.
President Obama and his Administration have been calling for Asad’s resignation since August
2011, and have pressed the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Syrian government.
The United States has recognized the National Coalition of Revolution and Opposition Forces
(SOC) as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people and is providing nonlethal assistance
to the Coalition and an affiliated Supreme Military Command Council (SMC). The Obama
Administration believes that a negotiated political settlement is required and has prepared military
plans to secure Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, if necessary.
Members of Congress and Obama Administration officials are weighing these issues as they
continue to debate U.S. policy. Some observers advocate for more robust nonlethal and lethal aid
to the SOC and SMC as a means of forcing the Asad regime to the negotiating table. Opponents
of this approach argue that making opposition groups more formidable could intensify the
fighting and risks empowering extremists. Meanwhile, Asad refuses to step down and warns his
supporters that “victory is the only option.” Some armed opposition factions, including powerful
Islamist coalitions, reject negotiation outright and prefer a military solution to the conflict.
After two years of unrest and violence, the central question for policy makers remains how best to
bring the conflict in Syria to a close before the crisis consigns the region to one of several
destructive and destabilizing scenarios. The human toll of the fighting, and the resulting political,
ethnic, and sectarian polarization, all but guarantee that political, security, humanitarian, and
economic challenges will outlast Asad and keep Syria on the U.S. agenda for years to come.
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Contents
Assessment ...................................................................................................................................... 1
Status of Ongoing Armed Conflict ............................................................................................ 1
Status of the Syrian Opposition ................................................................................................. 6
U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................ 9
U.S. Assistance ........................................................................................................................ 10
Arms, Intervention, and Syria’s Opposition: Changes in U.S. Policy? ................................... 11
Key Security Issues ................................................................................................................. 12
Al Qaeda, Extremism, and Foreign Fighters ..................................................................... 12
Securing Syrian Weapons Stockpiles ................................................................................ 14
Outlook and Future Policy Considerations for Congress ........................................................ 17
Possible Appropriations and Authorization Issues ............................................................ 18
Securing Weapons Supplies and Sites ............................................................................... 19
Addressing Syria’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Status ...................................................... 19
Possible Questions for Oversight ...................................................................................... 20
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Syria: Conflict and Basic Data............................................................................. 4
Figure 2. Syrian Opposition Groups: Relationships and Factions ................................................... 9
Figure 3. Profiles of Select Opposition Groups and Militias ........................................................... 7
Figure 4. Profiles of Select Opposition Groups and Militias ........................................................... 8
Tables
Table D-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2013 ................................................................. 35
Appendixes
Appendix A. Syria Legislation in the 113th Congress .................................................................... 23
Appendix B. Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress .................................................................... 25
Appendix C. Chronology of United Nations Action on Syria ....................................................... 30
Appendix D. U.S. Sanctions on Syria ............................................................................................ 33
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 45
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Assessment
The escalating conflict in Syria poses increasingly complex and difficult policy questions for
Congress and the Obama Administration. The popular-uprising-turned-armed-rebellion against
the Asad regime has entered its third year, and seems poised to continue, with the government and
a bewildering array of militias locked in a bloody struggle of attrition. Al Qaeda affiliates and
other violent extremists, including foreign fighters, have assertively demonstrated their presence
in Syria. Syria’s armed forces remain under tremendous strain,1 and reportedly continue to
receive significant outside assistance from Iran, Russia,2 and Hezbollah. The Syrian government
has resorted to indiscriminate attacks on rebel-held areas and has stated its willingness to use its
unconventional weapons in the event of foreign military intervention. The Syrian opposition’s
political divisions persist, even as the resilience and tactics of armed rebels make the limitations
of the Syrian security forces more and more apparent. United Nations officials have cited
estimates that as many as 3.6 million Syrians have been displaced inside the country. As of April
22, there are an estimated 1.38 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries.
These factors complicate ongoing debates over U.S. national interests in Syria and potential
policy responses. To date, debate has largely focused on the humanitarian and regional balance of
power implications of the uprising, and Members of Congress have weighed various policy
proposals in the hope of catalyzing and facilitating a relatively orderly negotiated transition.
Looking ahead, the prospects for such a transition appear to be all but nonexistent, and the focus
of debate is shifting toward identifying and mitigating the negative consequences of a series of
less orderly contingencies. Issues of particular concern include the potential for prolonged
sectarian or ethnic conflict, threats to Syria’s territorial integrity, potential insecurity of chemical
weapons and conventional arms stockpiles, regional refugee flows, the future of violent extremist
groups, and the future costs of establishing security and rebuilding the country.
Status of Ongoing Armed Conflict
As of April 2013, the armed conflict in Syria shows no signs of abating. Opposition forces have
strengthened their capabilities and broadened their control over areas of northwestern, eastern,
and southern Syria, but they have been unable to deal a decisive blow against the Alawitedominated security forces of President Bashar al Asad. The broad grouping of forces opposing
Asad’s regime includes a multitude of local militias; army defectors; and volunteers fighting in
brigades that are organized under the banner of the Free Syrian Army and various armed Islamist
coalitions. Some of these groups include foreign fighters. Various rebel forces have gradually
seized territory in an arc along the Syria-Turkey border, along the Euphrates River, in the eastern
suburbs of Damascus, and along the Syria-Jordan border.
1
U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper recently stated in testimony that, “After more than two years of
conflict in Syria, the erosion of the regime's capabilities is accelerating. We see this in its territorial losses, military
manpower and logistics shortages. The opposition is slowly but surely gaining the upper hand.”
2
Section 1295 of H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, required the Administration
to provide a report within 90 days of enactment on Russian military assistance to Syria. For more information, see CRS
Report RL33407, Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests, coordinated by Jim Nichol.
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Islamist militia groups; Free Syrian Army brigades; and local fighters in different cities, continue
to operate relatively independently. Several leading opposition groups hold divergent and
potentially contradictory goals for the country’s political future. Groups with divergent priorities
now control different areas of the country. Islamist fighters, including the Al Qaeda-affiliated
Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front), captured the city of Ar Raqqah (Raqqa) in March 2013. Kurdish
forces control areas of northeastern Syria, and some Kurds have clashed with Arab Islamists.
Bombings and clashes occur daily near and inside the capital, Damascus, and the contest
continues for control over military bases near Aleppo, Syria’s commercial hub and second-largest
city. Intense fighting in the south is ongoing, while government forces apparently are
consolidating in strongholds in the center of the capital and its western suburbs. Media reports
and online videos indicate that rebel forces have taken over several military bases outside Aleppo,
along with strategic towns and checkpoints along the main highway that links Aleppo to
Damascus. These rebel gains have created a major obstacle for the government’s resupply of its
forces in northern Syria. The government is widely presumed to prioritize maintaining control
over its strongholds in Damascus and parts of Aleppo, along with the arc linking Damascus north
and west along the Lebanese border to the Alawite-populated areas of the coast.
As death tolls have spiraled, both sides have adopted brutal tactics. In many areas, the regime has
resorted to the use of air power, Scud missile strikes, and indiscriminate shelling of entire
population centers, as part of a strategy to leave rebels with damaged physical infrastructure and a
resentful population. A February 2013 report by a United Nations Human Rights Council
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria found that “grave human rights
violations, war crimes, and crimes against humanity” continue to occur in Syria.3 The report
attributes war crimes to both government and opposition forces.
These crimes have intensified as Syria’s civil war has taken on an increasingly sectarian
dimension. In many areas, Alawite-led security forces and allied militia such as Jaysh al Shaabi
(Popular Army) are engaged in combat with predominantly Sunni rebel militias. Some of these
Sunni militias are becoming more radicalized and aligned with extremist groups such as Ahrar al
Sham (the Free Ones of the Levant) or the Nusra Front. The Obama Administration has
designated as terrorist groups both the Popular Army and the Nusra Front pursuant to terrorism
and Syria-related sanctions legislation and executive orders. In early April, the Al Qaeda affiliated
Islamic State of Iraq announced its merger with the Nusra Front, but a Nusra leader reportedly
rejected the claim and pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
Over time, Syria’s conflict has become more complex. Sporadic clashes have broken out within
the ranks of the armed opposition and allegedly within the tight-knit Alawite community.
Violence also has spilled over to varying degrees into neighboring states, such as Israel, Turkey,
Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Many observers are concerned that the country is descending into
anarchy. If current trends hold, fighting may gradually turn from a two-sided war into a contest
involving multiple combatants from armed ethnic/sectarian communities, rebel militias, and
remnants of the old regime. Cross-border violence is growing in parallel to Asad’s desperation.
In November 2012, Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations and Arab League Special Envoy to
Syria, warned that “if this issue is not dealt with correctly, the danger is ‘Somalisation’ and not
partition—the collapse of the state and the emergence of warlords, militias and fighting groups.”
3
U.N. Document A/HRC/22/595, Fourth Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, February 2013.
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President Asad routinely warns that state failure in Syria will destabilize the region. U.S. officials
and some Members of Congress have expressed similar concerns about fragmentation and
extremism, while also demanding Asad’s departure and increasing support to the opposition.
In sum, the short-to- medium-term security outlook for Syria and its neighbors is not positive.
The United States and other third parties face difficult choices with limited potential to shape the
overall outcome.
Prospects for a Negotiated Settlement
During 2013, Syrian government and opposition leaders and their international backers have
weighed negotiations for either a cease-fire or a political settlement. However, as of April, these
efforts had yet to bear fruit, and conflicting statements from opposition leaders cast doubt on the
opposition’s unity and continued openness to considering a negotiated settlement. In February
2013, then-leader of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces
(hereafter referred to as the Syrian Opposition Coalition or SOC) Mouaz al Khatib made a
surprise announcement that he was willing to conditionally enter into negotiations with the Asad
government. Khatib’s resignation and replacement by Syrian National Council leader George
Sabra signaled a potential change in approach. In February, Sabra said there would be “no formal
and informal talks with the Syrian regime if Bashar al Asad and his team is still in power. They
have to leave power. Then we can start the dialogue, with the others which didn't give any orders
to kill people, to damage the country.” Opposition Interim Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto stated in
his inaugural speech that “there will be no dialogue with the Asad regime.” Defining a consensus
list of regime officials to negotiate with continues to prove difficult for the fractious opposition.
Although Asad has rejected calls for his resignation since January, he also has called for a mutual
cease-fire, which if adhered to could lead to a “national dialogue.” Negotiations, involving U.S.,
Russian, Arab League, and U.N. officials have explored the potential for national dialogue in line
with the Geneva Accord of mid-2012, which called for dialogue as the basis for a transition to a
new government. In the meantime, the Obama Administration continues to call for Asad’s
resignation while providing humanitarian aid to international organizations supporting Syrian
civilians and nonlethal support to unarmed and armed elements of the Syrian opposition.
Secretary of State John Kerry has indicated that the U.S. “goal is to see us have a negotiated
outcome and minimize the violence.” In the interim, the Obama Administration has worked with
Congress to increase the provision of support to the political opposition and shift toward the overt
provision of nonlethal support to armed opposition elements.
The central question for policy makers remains how best to bring the conflict in Syria to a close
before the crisis consigns the region to one of several destructive and destabilizing scenarios. The
SOC recently demanded the imposition of a no-fly zone near Syria’s borders and called for
targeted strikes on missile and chemical weapons sites. Some observers have advocated more
robust nonlethal and lethal aid to the SOC and the opposition’s Supreme Military Command
Council (SMC). Supporters of this approach argue that increasing aid to the opposition will force
the Asad regime to the negotiating table. Opponents argue that making opposition groups more
formidable could intensify the fighting. Some armed opposition factions, including powerful
Islamist coalitions, reject negotiation outright and prefer a military solution to the conflict.
As noted above, the Obama Administration and U.N. officials continue to call for a political
settlement. However, as of April, such a settlement remained elusive, and continued conflict
appeared likely.
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Figure 1. Map of Syria: Conflict and Basic Data
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Status of the Syrian Opposition
The decentralized nature and divided views of key Syrian opposition forces have tempered
foreign support for some components of the opposition movement. Since unrest began in March
2011, no single leader or group has been able to fully establish itself as a universally supported
representative of Syrians seeking to oust the Asad regime. Third parties have been forced to
manage relationships with a complex and diverse set of Syrian opposition figures, as rivalries
have developed between local leaders and exiles, among militia commanders on the ground, and
between those who seek accommodation with elements of the existing government and those who
seek to bring down the entire regime structure. Deep differences of opinion about the future of
Syria lurk beneath the surface, with Islamist and secular activists at odds, some Kurds seeking
autonomy, and armed extremist groups empowering themselves on the ground.5
The latest attempt to engineer a united opposition front came in October and November 2012, and
saw the Syrian National Council (SNC, see Figure 3 below) incorporated into a broader umbrella
group known as the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (Syrian
Opposition Coalition or SOC, see Figure 3 below). The SNC had previously been recognized by
some outsiders as “a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change.”
However, the United States and others in the international community grew frustrated with the
SNC because of its infighting; its inability to attract more members of Syrian minority
communities; its inability to reconcile with rival opposition groups; and its perceived lack of
legitimacy inside Syria.6 In pressing for an opposition coalition that would be more inclusive and
legitimate, the United States, the Arab League, and other international actors have now extended
recognition to the SOC as “the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.” Qatar has opened a
representative office for the SOC and the Arab League has transferred Syria’s seat to an SOC
representative. The United States has not recognized the SOC as the government of Syria.
From late 2012 through April 2013, 52-year-old Ahmed Mouaz al Khatib, a Sunni Islamist
opposition activist, served as SOC President. He finalized his resignation in April, reportedly in
frustration that the United States and others refuse to intervene militarily or overtly provide
weaponry. Khatib willingness to negotiate with Syrian government figures was criticized within
the SOC, especially from members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.7 Khatib also drew
criticism from some foreign observers after he questioned the U.S. designation of Jabhat al Nusra
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.8 In comments since, he has repeated his criticism of what he
regards as the use of terrorism fears as an excuse for international passivity while simultaneously
rejecting extremist violence and criticizing unnamed countries for exporting extremism to Syria.
SOC members met in Istanbul in mid-March 2013 and elected a Syrian-born U.S. citizen,
Ghassan Hitto, to serve as the Interim Prime Minister of an opposition government to administer
5
See Yezid Sayigh, “The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem,” Carnegie Middle East Center (Beirut), April 3,
2013.
6
In late October, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton denounced the SNC, stating that “There has to be
representation of those who are on the front lines, fighting and dying today to obtain their freedom.... This cannot be an
opposition represented by people who have many good attributes, but have, in many instances, have not been inside
Syria for 20, 30 or 40 years.”
7
“Syrian Lawmaker Rejects Conditions for Peace Talks,” Associated Press, February 6, 2013.
8
Khatib said, “The logic under which we consider one of the parts that fights against the Assad regime as a terrorist
organization is a logic one must reconsider.” See, “Head of new U.S.-backed Syrian coalition endorses al Qaida-linked
rebel faction,” McClatchy, December 12, 2012.
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rebel held territory. Concerns within the opposition about Hitto and his election reflected some
longstanding divisions.9 According to SOC sources, Hitto is now presiding over plans to create an
11-ministry interim cabinet. George Sabra has replaced Khatib as SOC president until elections
can be held.
To date, several key groups, including powerful Kurdish factions and the anti-intervention
National Coordination Body for Democratic Change, have refused to offer their support to the
SOC and its leaders. Some observers suggest that, in political terms, the National Coalition does
not differ substantially from the SNC, since Coalition representatives include many SNC
members, and few non-SNC groups. State Department officials report that in spite of persistent
differences of opinion, the members and leaders of the SOC have demonstrated some ability to
overcome disputes and forge consensus. Whether or not the SOC will maintain unity, attract new
supporters, and establish its authority in Syria remains to be seen.
The Supreme Military Command Council (SMC) has endorsed the SOC, but some reports
suggest that its leadership may have rejected Hitto’s election. Units fighting under the SMC
banner inside Syria appear to hold varying views on the SOC initiative and leadership.10 At
present, the exact nature of the relationship between the leadership of the SMC and the civilianled SOC is unclear and civilian oversight of opposition military activities appears far from
certain. Several non-SMC armed groups have not backed the SOC, and some Islamist groups may
be directly hostile to efforts to further empower the Coalition. Many Syria analysts report that
Islamist militia groups, especially members of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front and Syrian
Islamic Front, remain the most capable armed groups on the ground.
In February and April 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry pledged new U.S. support to the SOC
and local opposition groups inside Syria as a means of increasing the opposition’s capacity and
credibility. Through early April, the Obama Administration and Congress had repurposed $117
million to support opposition groups and provide assistance in opposition-controlled areas of
Syria, with a further $123 million pledged on April 21 (See “U.S. Assistance” below).
Current policy debates focus on whether the SOC is a credible partner and whether and how the
United States should empower the SOC to better coordinate humanitarian aid and the delivery of
local services in order to increase its influence inside the country. U.S. officials and international
assistance implementers report that the SOC does not yet have the capacity to deliver assistance
inside Syria, in spite of the recent establishment of its Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU).
Instead, local revolutionary councils, relief committees, and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent often
oversee the delivery of aid by third parties, with local councils taking responsibility for the
reestablishment and provision of services. Persistent SOC demands for more forceful intervention
and robust lethal support may increase the pressure on U.S. and European policy makers to revisit
the limits they have imposed on military support to the uprising.
9
Hitto is regarded as an Islamist by some secular opposition members and, while he is of Kurdish descent, the leading
Kurdish rebel faction in northeastern Syria has rejected his election and remains outside the SOC framework. Ten
members of the SOC, including secular female activist and SOC Vice President Suhair Atassi, temporarily suspended
their membership in the SOC in response to Hitto’s election.
10
In December, a number of brigades unified under the umbrella of a Supreme Military Command Council (SMC)
headed by General Salim Idriss, a former Asad regime military commander who defected. The SMC administers
regional commands with affiliated units nominally reporting through a chain of command to General Idriss. For more
background and analysis, see Elizabeth O'Bagy, The Free Syrian Army, Institute for the Study of War, March 24, 2013;
and, Koert Debeuf and Aron Lund, “The Free Syrian Army Does Exist,” Syria Comment (blog), March 19, 2013.
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Figure 2. Syrian Opposition Groups: Relationships and Factions
Source: CRS Graphics, Syrian opposition social media and websites.
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Figure 3. Profiles of Select Opposition Groups and Militias
Source: CRS. Derived from U.S. government Open Source Center reports, social media, and official statements.
The positions, sizes, platforms, and membership of groups are subject to change.
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Figure 4. Profiles of Select Opposition Groups and Militias
Source: CRS. Derived from U.S. government Open Source Center reports, social media, and independent
analyst reports. The positions, sizes, platforms, and membership of groups are subject to change.
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U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
U.S.-Syrian relations have been contentious for decades, but traditional U.S. concerns are now
being amplified and overshadowed by the pressing need to address new threats. Since the
uprising began, the Obama Administration has pursued a strategy that actively seeks President
Asad’s resignation or removal; relies on partnership with regional and international actors to
achieve that goal; and is buttressed by U.S. diplomatic, financial and humanitarian support to
opposition groups and civilians. Members of Congress have debated the relative merits of the
Administration’s approach alongside recurring proposals for direct U.S. military intervention or
the expansion of U.S. support to opposition groups to include direct provision of weapons,
ammunition, and training. Some proposed legislation introduced in the 113th Congress (S.
617/H.R. 1327) would authorize the President, under certain conditions and with various
reporting and certification requirements, to supply nonlethal and/or lethal support to opposition
groups in Syria. (see Appendix A).
Options for military intervention continue to be debated, with advocates of different options
apparently disagreeing on strategic priorities. Those seeking a rapid end to the current conflict
might favor the use of U.S. airpower to degrade the Syrian military’s remaining capabilities.
However, such an approach would not immediately resolve security issues inside Syria or prevent
fighting among opposition forces and regime remnants. Those seeking a more limited civilian
protection mission might prioritize the establishment and defense of enclaves/buffer zones in
northern or southern Syria where displaced persons can seek shelter and assistance and where
opposition groups can operate, train, and launch continuing operations against the Asad regime. It
is unclear whether such zones could be adequately defended without the use of ground forces or
the placement of air defense equipment inside Syria. Still others with discrete concerns about
Syrian unconventional and conventional weapons stocks or non-state groups active in Syria might
advocate for a limited military operation targeting key weapons- and terrorist-related sites,
entities, or individuals. Such operations might eliminate individual threats but would not alleviate
wider humanitarian concerns or improve general security conditions.
Each of these objectives may have different diplomatic and strategic implications, and each of the
corresponding military approaches may have differing degrees of risk, feasibility, and cost. The
FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) incorporated a Senate amendment (S.Amdt.
3262 amended S. 3254) to require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to congressional
defense committees identifying options to “deny or significantly degrade” the Syrian military’s
ability to use air power against civilians and opposition. Specifically, the report would require an
assessment of the deployment of air defense systems, the establishment of no-fly zones over
Syrian population centers, limited air strikes, or “other military activities.”
President Obama has remained reluctant to endorse military intervention proposals to date and
Administration officials have cited a number of reasons, including fears of exacerbating the
violence and risking regional spillover; the absence of U.N. Security Council authorization for
intervention; and the Syrian opposition’s continued divisions over the issue. Polling suggests a
lack of U.S. domestic political support for more robust action. Other foreign policy priorities have
also influenced the Administration’s position, including U.S. efforts to address Iran’s nuclear
program. Asad’s departure could be a major set-back for Iran, but the Administration also seeks to
maintain pressure on Iran through sanctions and diplomacy, and may fear that U.S. intervention
would unravel the limited consensus it has built with Russia, China, and others.
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Critics of the Administration, including some Members of Congress, charge that U.S. hesitation
to intervene militarily to protect Syrian civilians and/or help oust the Asad government has
unnecessarily prolonged the fighting. Over time, critics argue, the humanitarian situation has
deteriorated, violent extremist groups have seized the initiative, and Syria’s neighbors, including
several U.S. partners, have been threatened. Others have argued that by failing to halt fighting in
Syria, the United States and others are exacerbating already volatile Sunni-Shiite sectarian
tensions throughout Middle East, which poses risks to other strategically important countries.
Finally, some critics argue that U.S. credibility is being diminished by Asad’s refusal to step down
or end abuses of civilians despite U.S. demands.
U.S. Assistance
In FY2012 and FY2013 the United States has provided a total of more than $384.5 million for
humanitarian activities both inside Syria and in neighboring countries.11 The United States has
made humanitarian assistance contributions in response to U.N. appeals and supports projects
outside of the U.N. system.12 U.S. humanitarian assistance has been drawn from global accounts,
including the International Disaster Assistance (IDA), Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA),
and P.L. 480-Title II accounts. On April 5, the State Department notified Congress of its intent to
repurpose $220 million in FY2012 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funds to increase the
FY2012 IDA and MRA account balances for additional humanitarian assistance for Syrians.
Section 1707(e) of P.L. 113-6, the FY2013 continuing resolution included increased account
totals for the IDA and MRA accounts, which improves the Administration’s ability to meet future
Syria-related needs with FY2013 funds.
To date, the President has used emergency authority for unanticipated contingencies in Section
451 of the Foreign Assistance Act to identify and repurpose Overseas Contingency Operations
funds and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Funds to provide $54 million in nonlethal
support to unarmed opposition groups. Most recently, the Administration notified Congress in
March 2013 of its intent to reprogram an additional $63 million in OCO funds and use Section
451 authority to further enhance the capabilities of the Syrian Opposition Coalition and local
opposition councils inside Syria. In April 2013, the President invoked drawdown authority to
provide food and medical assistance to armed opposition elements. The Administration and
Congress have repurposed $300 million for Syria-related budget support to Jordan’s government.
Policy debates about U.S. humanitarian and opposition assistance have increasingly focused on
whether the United States is receiving adequate political benefit from its assistance efforts.
Anecdotal evidence from field reports and aid implementers suggests that many Syrians who may
be receiving U.S. assistance remain unaware of its origins, and that the general perception among
opposition groups is that the United States remains wary of providing assistance to rebels because
of fears of aiding extremist groups.13 In response, some Members of Congress and outside
observers have argued that the United States should begin to more aggressively “brand” U.S. aid
to enhance local perception that the people of the United States stand in solidarity with Syrians.
11
Cited funds have been provided in FY2012 and FY2013 and include previously appropriated funds. For more
information or analysis, contact Rhoda Margesson, CRS Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy, (ext. 7-0425,
rmargesson@crs.loc.gov).
12
For full details, see USAID, Syria–Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #12, March 28, 2013.
13
CRS Specialist’s meetings with U.S. government grantees and Syrian opposition activists, 2013.
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Humanitarian assistance implementers express concern that the so-called branding of aid
delivered into Syria as “American” or “foreign” may make aid personnel and recipients targets of
attacks by hostile extremists or Syrian government forces. Some proposed legislation introduced
in the 113th Congress would require branding of U.S. assistance for Syrians, with some exceptions
for the safety of those delivering assistance and consideration of the successful achievement of
U.S. policy objectives (see Appendix A).
Newly notified U.S. assistance programs seek to create a grant-making mechanism that would
allow the SOC to support the local efforts of councils, without creating duplicative arrangements.
The feasibility and political consequences of this approach remain to be determined. Some aid
delivery organizations and outside observers argue that traditional principles of impartiality and
neutrality should continue to govern all humanitarian assistance delivery and programs seeking
the improvement of local services. Some Syrians may regard efforts to channel assistance via the
SOC-ACU as an attempt to assert political control over the funds and programs of other groups.
Local opposition groups reportedly are very sensitive to the duplication or manipulation of aid
delivery efforts to boost the political profile of exile opposition groups or foreign governments.
Arms, Intervention, and Syria’s Opposition: Changes in U.S.
Policy?
As of April 2013, several factors reportedly are motivating the Obama Administration to consider
further changes to its Syria policy, in the wake of recent increases in financial and material
support to the political and armed opposition.14 These factors include recent rebel gains on the
ground, the establishment of an interim governing authority under the auspices of the Syrian
Opposition Coalition, fears about chemical weapons proliferation, and the conflict’s spiraling
humanitarian toll. To date, the U.S. government has remained reluctant to directly arm Syrian
rebel fighters due to concerns that doing so might undermine U.S. interests by exacerbating the
conflict, risking arms transfers to terrorist groups, or creating opportunities for the illegal or
morally objectionable use of U.S. weaponry. Critics of intervention and arms supply proposals
highlight potential risks of a security vacuum in Syria as well as risks related to arming fractious
opposition forces that may include groups with extremist views or individuals who have
committed human rights abuses.
Obama Administration officials have acknowledged that the United States is providing noncombatant elements of the Syrian opposition with non-lethal assistance, such as medical supplies,
food, communications equipment, and training.15 Press sources subsequently reported that
President Obama reportedly issued a “Presidential Finding” permitting the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and other U.S. government agencies to provide unspecified support to Syrian rebel
groups, including armed fighters.16 Unverified press reports allege that U.S. intelligence officers
located in southern Turkey and Jordan are vetting rebel groups for ties to known terrorist
14
In late November 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton commented on recent U.S. support for the
opposition, stating “we’re going to carefully consider what more we can do.”
15
Such aid reportedly includes tools to circumvent Internet censorship, such as anonymizing software and satellite
phones with GPS capabilities. According to another report, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has “supplied
encryption-enabled communications gear to opposition groups, presumably enabling the United States to monitor their
talks.” CRS cannot verify these reports. See, “US Provides Communications Aid for Syria Opponents,” Agence France
Presse, June 14, 2012; “In Syria Conflict, U.S. Struggles to Fill Intelligence Gaps,” Washington Post, July 23, 2012.
16
Reuters, “Obama Authorizes Secret US Support for Syrian Rebels,” August 1, 2012.
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organizations, helping to coordinate the delivery of lethal aid to select groups, gathering
intelligence on opposition networks, and establishing relationships with fighters likely to be
influential as the conflict continues or in its aftermath.17 One report also states that Administration
has debated whether to provide rebels with satellite imagery and intelligence on Syrian troop
locations and movements.18 CRS cannot verify these reports.
As with debates over possible military intervention, proposals for the expansion of financial aid
or lethal assistance to Syrian groups may raise a number of questions for potential congressional
oversight and engagement. Specific proposals may have implications for long-standing debates
about the respective constitutional and statutory war powers and foreign affairs authorities of
Congress and the President.19 Proposals may also reinvigorate debate over the utility of and/or
moral imperative for military intervention as a means to protect civilians and secure other U.S.
interests.20 Such debates also occurred during the 112th Congress’s consideration of the 2011 U.S.
military intervention in Libya.
Key Security Issues
Al Qaeda, Extremism, and Foreign Fighters
In early 2012, U.S. officials stated that the violence and disorder paralyzing Syria was creating
opportunities for Al Qaeda operatives and other violent Islamist extremists to infiltrate the
country and conduct or plan attacks. According to Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper, “Sunni extremists” had infiltrated Syrian opposition groups, which may be unaware of
the infiltration. As of April 2013, Sunni extremist groups appear to be increasingly active in Syria,
including groups sympathetic to or affiliated with Al Qaeda. According to Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper, extremist militias are present in 13 of Syria’s 14 provinces “and are
starting to establish municipal services, provide humanitarian aid, food, hospitals and sharia law
courts.”21 Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI),
released a statement in April 2013 proclaiming a merger with the Nusra Front (Jabhat al Nusra li
Ahl al Sham, Support Front for the People of Syria),22 although a reported Nusra leader
downplayed any merger and pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
17
Other reports state that U.S. intelligence officers, in conjunction with foreign governments, also may be helping the
opposition develop logistical routes for moving supplies into Syria. Reuters, “Obama Authorizes Secret US Support for
Syrian Rebels,” August 1, 2012; and, “U. S. Stepping Up Efforts To Organize Syria Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, June
14, 2012.
18
“C.I.A. Said to Aid in Steering Arms to Syrian Opposition,” New York Times, June 21, 2012.
19
In August 2012, Congress enacted legislation clearly stating that the legislation was not intended to constitute a
declaration of war on Syria or an authorization of the use of force against Syria. Section 604 of P.L. 112-158 (the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012) states, “Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this
Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.”
20
Debate over protecting civilians reflects differences of opinion between those who embrace the principle of a socalled “responsibility to protect” and those who argue that such protection, while admirable and even desirable in some
contexts, should not be endorsed in general terms because it may conflict with other U.S. interests, such as maintaining
regional stability, avoiding unintended consequences of military action, and avoiding precedents that compromise
future flexibility of action.
21
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, Senate Armed Services Committee, April 18, 2013.
22
The Nusra Front has claimed responsibility for several high profile attacks, including attacks using suicide bombers
and car bombs. An individual named Abu Mohammed Joulani reportedly leads the group, with strategic guidance from
(continued...)
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Other prominent armed Salafist groups include members of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF),23 the
Saquour al Sham brigades, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades,24 the Ummah Brigade (Liwa al
Umma),25 and the Islam Brigade (Liwa al Islam).26 The Free Ones of the Levant Battalions
(Kata’ib Ahrar al Sham) and other members of the SIF use jihadist rhetoric in some statements.
Islamist fighters in the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF) rejected the reported merger of ISI
and Al Nusra. The Lebanon-based extremist group Fatah al Islam has released a number of
statements on the conflict and members of the group have been reported to be fighting in Syria.
Fighters from Hezbollah in Lebanon also are reportedly fighting in Syria on behalf of the Asad
government.
Press reports and anecdotal accounts suggest that there may be competition for influence among
extremist groups and that they have lacked overarching coordination or shared leadership. The
formation of the SIF and Syrian Islamic Liberation Front in late 2012 and early 2013 may signal
increasing cooperation among like-minded Islamist militia groups. Experts consider the SIF to
hold more hard-line views about the imposition of sharia law and members of its constituent
militias may hold more hostile views toward the United States and Israel.
In December 2012, the Obama Administration designated the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization and as an alias of Al Qaeda in Iraq pursuant to Executive Order 13224. The Iraqi
government had previously expressed specific concern that individuals associated with Al Qaeda
in Iraq have travelled to Syria and are using the conflict there to their advantage.27 Reactions from
some Syrian opposition leaders and armed groups were negative. Several armed groups made
statements of solidarity with Al Nusra, and prominent civilian figures, including then-President
Khateeb of the SOC, requested that the U.S. government reconsider the designation. According to
the U.S. State Department designation announcement, “Al Nusra has sought to portray itself as
part of the legitimate Syrian opposition while it is, in fact, an attempt by Al Qaeda in Iraq to
hijack the struggles of the Syrian people for its own malign purposes.”
The conflict in Syria has provoked a visceral public response in the region and is encouraging
some people to make donations to support the Syrian uprising or travel to Syria to support the
armed opposition. Some conservative Sunni clerics have issued religious edicts characterizing the
(...continued)
Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Du’a. OSC Feature FEA20120314027051, “Video Production Announces Establishment
of Jihadist ‘Al Nusrah Front’ in Syria,” January 24, 2012; and, Office of the State Department Spokesperson, “Terrorist
Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa'ida in Iraq,” Washington, DC, December 11, 2012.
23
See Aron Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: the Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front, UI Occasional Paper 17, March 2013.
24
A Saudi-national named Majed al Majed reportedly leads the Azzam Brigades. OSC Report GMP20120626966212,
“Al-Qaeda in Syria: New Leader at the Helm,” Al Akhbar (Lebanon), June 26, 2012.
25
OSC Report GMP20120625125003, “Statement by New Al Ummah Brigade in Syria Promises ‘Jihad’ Until
Victory,” June 18, 2012.
26
OSC Report GMP20120719125001, “Liwa al-Islam Brigades Claims Responsibility for Damascus Bombings,” July
19, 2012.
27
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyam Zebari said, “We have solid information and intelligence that members of Al
Qaeda’s terrorist network have gone to Syria.” Al Jazeera English, “Iraq says al-Qaeda flowing into Syria,” July 5,
2012. On July 21, Al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu-Bakr al Baghdadi released an audiotape expressing support for the
Syrian “jihad” and arguing for the importance of “applying the sharia, uniting the umma by demolishing the borders
implemented by the Sykes-Picot [agreement], eradicating filthy nationalism and hated patriotism, and bringing back the
Islamic state, the state that does not recognize artificial boundaries and does not believe in any nationality other than
Islam.” OSC Report GMP20120721586002, “Islamic State of Iraq Amir Calls on Sunni Tribes To ‘Repent,’” July 21,
2012.
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fighting as a “defensive jihad” and endorsing the provision of material support to fighters and
direct participation in the fighting.28 Al Qaeda leaders Ayman al Zawahiri and the late Abu Yahya
al Libi also released statements in 2012 urging support for Syrian fighters.29 In April 2013, Al
Qaeda figures released a statement from Zawahiri calling for fighters in Syria to establish a
“jihadist Islamic state.”
European and Middle Eastern media have published estimates of the number of volunteers in the
low to mid-hundreds, along with anecdotal reports about individuals from Europe, North Africa,
Turkey, the Gulf states, and the Levant.30 Northern Lebanon and the Turkish border with northern
Syria appear to be the most popular transit points for volunteers, presumably because of better
regional air-travel linkages with Beirut and Turkish cities.
Statements from some armed groups indicate that their leaders are cognizant of the risks that
certain tactics and rhetoric may pose (i.e., suicide bombing or attacks against civilians). The
underlying incompatibility of different groups’ motives and intentions is difficult to ignore,
particularly to the extent that some extremist groups are critical of other armed groups and may
oppose efforts to establish democracy in any post-Asad Syria. The pro-sharia rhetoric and
transnational orientation of some extremist groups make it possible that they may end up in
conflict with secular, nationalist, or Islamist opposition elements. The prominent Syrian SalafistJihadist ideologue Abu Basir al Tartusi has openly rejected other jihadists’ criticism of the Free
Syrian Army. While he is known for his own extremist views, even he has characterized some of
the groups and individuals now active in Syria as “extremists” and “fanatics.”31 As noted above,
reports from Syria suggest that fighters in some Salafist groups have heeded warnings about an
overly divisive approach and are improving coordination with potential rivals.
Securing Syrian Weapons Stockpiles
Note: For detailed CRS analysis of chemical weapons stockpiles and related questions in Syria,
see CRS Report R42848, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, coordinated by Mary
Beth Nikitin.
A primary concern for U.S. and other international policymakers is the Syrian military’s
apparently waning control over large conventional and unconventional weapons stockpiles,
including chemical weapons, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (MANPADs), surface-tosurface rockets, armored weapons, explosives, and small arms. In December 2012, U.S. officials
reiterated public statements warning Syrian officials that the United States considers any use or
28
OSC Report GMP20120618125001, “Al Shinqiti Calls Jihad in Syria ‘Duty,’ Advocates Joining Al Nusrah Front,”
July 6, 2012; OSC Analysis GMF20120706420001, “Syria—Salafis Possibly Eying Larger Role in Post-Al-Asad
Syria,” July 6, 2012.
29
OSC Report GMP20120612405002, “Abu-Yahya al-Libi Urges Iraqi, Jordanian, Turkish Mujahidin ‘To Champion’
Syria,” June 12, 2012.
30
The National (Abu Dhabi) “Syria, Jihad And the Boys From Tunisia’s Ben Guerdane,” July 3, 2012; OSC Report
GMP20120607648001, “Al-Jazirah.net Says Jordan Charges 6 With Trying To Enter Syria To Wage Jihad,” AlJazirah.net (Doha), June 6, 2012; OSC Report EUP20120523029004, “Foreign Jihadis Flock To Syria in Bid To
Overthrow Al Asad,” Le Figaro (Paris) May 22, 2012.
31
“Abu Basir al Tartusi” is the pen name of Abdel Moneim Mustafa Halimah. For more on this topic, see Aron Lund,
“Holier Than Thou: Rival Clerics in the Syrian Jihad,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 10, Issue:
14 July 16, 2012.
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transfer of Syrian chemical weapons to be a “red line” and that contingency planning has taken
place for an unspecified response to such a scenario. On August 20, President Obama said,
We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a
red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being
utilized. That would change my calculus…. We’re monitoring that situation very carefully.
We have put together a range of contingency plans.32
On December 3, then-Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and President Obama reiterated
U.S. warnings, with Clinton stating that the use or transfer of chemical weapons is “a red line for
the United States,”33 and President Obama saying, “I want to make it absolutely clear to Assad
and those under his command: The world is watching. The use of chemical weapons is and would
be totally unacceptable and if you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons there will be
consequences and you will be held accountable.”34 Secretary of Defense Hagel told the Senate
Armed Services Committee on April 18, 2013, that more than $70 million in Cooperative Threat
Reduction funds are being used to assist Syria's neighbors to bolster border defenses and prevent
WMD proliferation from Syria.
In July 2012, Syrian government spokesperson Jihad Maqdisi—who has since defected—said
“any chemical or bacterial weapon will never be used—and I repeat will never be used—during
the crisis in Syria regardless of the developments. These weapons are stored and secured by
Syrian military forces and under its direct supervision and will never be used unless Syria faces
external aggression.” Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil rejected President Obama’s
August statement and has accused Western powers of “looking for a pretext to intervene
militarily.” In early December, the Syrian Foreign Ministry said, “Syria has stressed repeatedly
that it will not use these types of weapons, if they were available, under any circumstances
against its people.”
On March 19, 2013, the Syrian government accused rebels of firing a rocket or missile with
chemical agents at government-controlled areas in Aleppo province; Opposition forces in turn
asserted that the Asad regime was lying in order to cover up its own alleged use of “chemical
rockets” that day against rebel forces east of the capital. There have been numerous
unsubstantiated rebel accusations against alleged Syrian government usage of chemical agents in
the war.
In order to ascertain the truth, a team of United Nations experts charged with investigating these
allegations was deployed to Cyprus and is awaiting Syrian government permission to enter the
country. However, the Asad regime only wants a U.N. investigation to focus on government
claims of alleged chemical weapons usage. In response, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has
demanded “unfettered access” to all alleged sites, saying, “I urge the Syrian government to be
more flexible, so that this mission can be deployed as fast as possible.... We are ready, it is a
matter of time.” Russia opposes the investigation of rebel claims.
Since the crisis began in 2011, U.S. and Israeli officials have publicly communicated their
assessments of and concerns about the extent, security, and potential unrest-related implications
32
Statement by President Obama, White House, Washington, DC, August 20, 2012.
Statement by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Prague, Czech Republic, December 3, 2012.
34
Statement by President Obama, National Defense University, Washington, DC, December 3, 2012.
33
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of Syria’s unconventional weapons programs and stockpiles. U.S. officials have expressed
confidence that they have a reliable estimate of the quantities and locations of Syrian chemical
weapons and have indicated that the “extensive network” of related facilities is being monitored
“very closely” via unspecified means.35 Since late 2011, named and unnamed Israeli officials
have voiced similar concerns about “huge stockpiles”36 of chemical weapons in Syria and have
warned that Israel will consider any indication that the Asad regime is transferring WMD
materials to Hezbollah or other non-state actors to be an act of war.37 NATO, Russia, and several
other countries have underscored their intention to hold the Asad government responsible for its
actions with regard to chemical weapons.
Open source reporting on Syria’s chemical weapons program suggests that nerve gas and mustard
gas production and storage infrastructure is concentrated at facilities in and around Al Safira
(southeast of Aleppo), Damascus, Hamah, Latakia, and Homs.38 Stockpiles also may be dispersed
in other military locations around the country, and some reports suggested that the Syrian
government may have moved or consolidated chemical weapons-related materials in order to
better guarantee their security. As the recent discovery of undeclared chemical weapons material
in Libya has shown, there are limits to the ability of international intelligence agencies and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to understand and verify the
extent of sensitive WMD programs, even when dealing with countries that have ratified
international conventions on WMD—which Syria has not.39
The Asad regime likely places greater emphasis on ensuring the loyalty of military units involved
in guarding elements of WMD programs because of the weapons’ relevance as a potential
deterrent against foreign attack. In the wake of any sudden regime collapse, efforts to find and
secure stockpiles would be both a high priority and a difficult challenge. Neighboring intelligence
services in Turkey, Jordan, and Israel may have useful insight on the extent of these programs and
related security challenges. Elements of the Syrian military may be in a position to aid in securing
materials and sites in the event of regime change, but it remains unclear whether an orderly or
chaotic transition situation might ensue and whether such units would be cooperative or
antagonistic toward outsiders.
35
On July 18, 2012, U.S. State Department spokesperson Patrick Ventrell said, “We’re closely monitoring their
proliferation-sensitive materials. We don’t have any indication that those specific munitions are not under Syrian
Government control at this time, but we’re monitoring it very closely.” In February 2012, Assistant Secretary of State
for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller said, “We have ideas as to quantity. We have
ideas as to where they are.” Quoted in Lachlan Carmichael, “U.S. concerned about Syrian chemical arms, missiles,”
Agence France Presse (AFP), February 15, 2012. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper referred to an
extensive network of Syrian chemical weapons facilities in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
February 16, 2012. See also Jay Solomon and Adam Entous, “U.S. Steps Up Watch of Syria Chemical Weapons,” Wall
Street Journal, February 15, 2012; and, Jay Solomon, “U.S., Israel Monitor Suspected Syrian WMD,” Wall Street
Journal, August 27, 2011.
36
Major-General Amir Eshel, head of the Israeli military’s planning division, quoted in “Israel Fears Syrian ‘Chemical,
Biological’ Weapons,” NOW Lebanon, January 17, 2012.
37
U.S. Open Source Center Report GMP20120201736004, “Israeli Official: Chemical Weapons From Syria to
Hizballah ‘Declaration of War,’” Yisra'el Hayom (Tel Aviv), February 1, 2012.
38
Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Watching Syrian Chemical Arms Amid Fear of Attack, Diversion,” Global Security Newswire,
December 5, 2011.
39
Syria has signed but not ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Syria has not signed or
ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
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Existing U.S. government authorities and funding sources for addressing emergency proliferation
risks are discussed below. According to some press reports, internal U.S. government assessments
estimate that as many as 75,000 military personnel could be required to fully secure various
WMD-related sites in Syria.40 One report suggests that due to the age and probable poor condition
of Syria’s chemical stockpiles, any international effort to dispose of the weapons could take years
and significant numbers of troops for force protection around chemical depots.41
Outlook and Future Policy Considerations for Congress
As the situation in Syria remains fluid and unresolved, U.S. policymakers must simultaneously
plan for a possible political transition and reconstruction or civil war of unpredictable duration.
Ambassador Robert Ford outlined four main concerns that guide current U.S. policy when he
testified before Congress in April 2013:
“…there are, I think, four key things that we're working towards. First and foremost, we do
not want Syria's very large stock of chemical weapons to be used or to fall into the hands of
terrorist groups. Second, we do not want Syria to become a base for terrorist operations. In
addition, it needs to be a source of stability in the region more broadly. And the large refugee
flows out of Syria are actually straining the neighboring states now and, in particular,
straining Jordan and Lebanon but to a lesser extent Turkey and Iraq. And we do not think
that these things can be achieved without a political transition, a negotiated political
transition. If we don't have a negotiated transition, Senator, our view is that the move
towards fragmentation in Syria will continue…”42
Also in April 2013, DNI Clapper stated in testimony before the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence that, “The most likely scenario that we see is even after Assad falls,
there's probably more fractionization (sic), if I can use that word, both geographically and on a
sectarian basis. That for some period of time, we're not sure, but at least a year, year and a half,
there would be continued inter-sectoral competition and fighting, which will be very localized.”43
Regardless of the outcome Syria is likely to face a humanitarian crisis bereft of state services and
security. The prospect of a prolonged security vacuum is of particular concern, as radical Islamist
militias or Iranian proxies could become more firmly entrenched, acquire more sophisticated
weaponry, assert control over territory, and threaten U.S. interests. The potential proliferation or
use of chemical weapons from Syria’s multiple stockpiles also is of major concern to U.S.
officials. Additionally, multiple reports indicate the danger of increased spillover violence along
Syria’s borders with Lebanon, Turkey, Israel, and Jordan. Administration officials and Members
of Congress may choose to discuss alternate scenarios and relevant funding and authorization
needs in anticipation of the prolonged crisis facing Syria and its neighbors.
40
Barbara Starr, “Military: Thousands of troops needed to secure Syrian chemical sites,” CNN.com, February 22, 2012.
The President restated established U.S. policy. On July 18, 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, “We’ve
made very clear to [the Syrian government] that they have a responsibility to safeguard their chemical sites and that we
will hold them responsible should anything happen with regards to those sites.” See Secretary Panetta Remarks with
United Kingdom Defense Secretary Philip Hammond, July 18, 2012; and, Remarks by the President to the White
House Press Corps, August 20, 2012.
41
“Seizing Syrian chemical arms could take 75,000 troops,” International Herald Tribune, November 17, 2012.
42
Testimony of Ambassador Robert Ford, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 11, 2013.
43
Testimony of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
April 11, 2013.
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Possible Appropriations and Authorization Issues44
In considering and preparing for possible scenarios in Syria, Members of Congress might
consider current and likely future requests for appropriations and authorization from the
Administration. Syria’s economic situation was difficult prior to the conflict, and the Obama
Administration expects that security and reconstruction costs in Syria will be considerable and
will require international contributions.45 International organizations are already identifying
shortfalls in funding and material to respond to the humanitarian needs of Syrians affected by the
conflict, and those needs, along with reconstruction costs, could drastically increase if fighting
worsens and persists.
Given U.S. national security concerns about terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the
regional security effects of conflict and potential regime change in Syria, it seems likely that
engagement between Congress and the Administration will continue to focus on those areas.
However, as part of a transition or negotiated settlement, the U.S. government could be asked to
financially support the repatriation or resettlement of Syrian refugees or to provide economic
assistance to Syria through contributions at future donors’ conferences and/or through
international financial institutions. The United Nations, NATO, or the Arab League could be
asked to fund, staff, and equip an international peacekeeping or monitoring operation inside
Syria. Congress may choose to define authorization criteria and identify potential funds for U.S.
contributions to such operations, including through reviewing current recurring obligations in the
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) or Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)
accounts.
Existing Restrictions and Authorities
Syria is among those states explicitly designated in the FY2012 foreign operations appropriation
act (Division I of P.L. 112-74; 125 Stat. 1164) as being prohibited from receiving direct aid
(§7007; 125 Stat. 1195). However, a number of provisions in that law could make funds available
“notwithstanding” other provisions within that law or other laws, including funds for
nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and related programs (125 Stat. 1185), foreign military
financing as it applies to demining (125 Stat. 1187), contingency funds (§7034(f); 125 Stat.
1214), and democracy promotion (§7034(h); 125 Stat. 1214).
The President also is granted special authority, under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, to “authorize the furnishing of assistance without regard to any provision of this Act, the
Arms Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits accruing to the United States,
and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under this Act” if he finds it is “important
to the security interests of the United States” and so notifies Congress. Under this provision, the
President could make available up to $50 million in a given fiscal year to Syria. The
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also is authorized to
44
CRS Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation Dianne Rennack (ext. 7-7608) contributed to this section.
On August 15, 2012, State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said, “Syria is not Iraq. It doesn’t have that
great, vast natural wealth. And depending on how long this goes on, we are already seeing a lot of the economic
underpinnings of Syria’s prosperity at risk from this fighting. So there’s going to have to be a serious rebuilding job
that will be Syrian-led obviously, but the international community has to be ready to support, so we’re beginning to
think about those things.”
45
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provide agricultural commodities to meet emergency food needs “notwithstanding any other
provision of law” pursuant to Title II of P.L. 480.
Securing Weapons Supplies and Sites46
There are two existing authorities and likely sources of funding for U.S. government programs
that could be used for efforts to secure or dismantle Syrian weapons of mass destruction or
advanced conventional weapons in an emergency scenario. The State Department’s
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) has authority to spend funds “notwithstanding
any other provision of law” and is authorized to work in states outside the former Soviet Union.47
The Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has
“notwithstanding” authority for use of a limited amount of CTR funds in an emergency situation,
including outside the former Soviet Union.48
Addressing Syria’s State Sponsor of Terrorism Status
The Administration and Congress may wish to discuss ways to address Syria’s legal status as a
state sponsor of international terrorism in anticipation of any need to provide foreign assistance to
a transitional Syrian government. Similarly, the designation of the Al Nusra Front as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization and pursuant to E.O. 13224 may complicate U.S.-funded operations in
areas under Al Nusra influence or control. Syria has long been identified as a sponsor of terrorism
for the purposes of Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979. This status reflects long-standing Syrian government support
for Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups. It remains unclear how any post-Asad government
might relate to those groups and other U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations. Since Syria
has long been identified as a sponsor of terrorism for the purposes of Section 620A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, the President may be required to either issue a national security waiver to
provide certain types of assistance to a post-Asad Syrian government or to remove Syria’s
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in consultation with Congress.
Section 620A affords the President two options to remove a terrorist designation: (1) he may
immediately remove a designation if there is a “fundamental change in the leadership and policies
of the government” of the targeted country, and that government does not support acts of
terrorism and has provided assurances that it will not in the future; or (2) he may remove a
designation for a government after 45 days if that government has not supported international
46
Prepared by CRS Specialist in Nonproliferation Mary Beth Nikitin, ext. 7-7745.
The FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 108-7) authorized the Department of State to use the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) “for such countries other than the Independent States of the former
Soviet Union and international organizations when it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so.”
Appropriated NDF funds remain available until expended.
48
The “notwithstanding” authority has not been exercised since it was first authorized in Section 1305 of the FY2010
Defense Authorization bill (P.L. 111-84). Available funds are limited to ten percent of total CTR appropriations.
Required determination and notification provisions would necessitate the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Energy. Notification of how funds will be spent must be submitted to the foreign affairs, appropriations
and armed services committees. The law requires that funds are used for threats “arising from the proliferation of
chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons or weapons-related materials, technologies, and expertise” that must be
addressed urgently; and that “certain provisions of law would unnecessarily impede the Secretary’s ability to carry out
activities of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense to address such threats” (i.e.,
notwithstanding authority is necessary).
47
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terrorism for a period of six months and has made assurances to not provide such support in the
future.
The President is also authorized to provide assistance pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 regardless of the terrorism designation in the following instances: He may make assistance
available for health and disease prevention programs, including funding for HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria treatment and prevention efforts (Section 104(c)(4)); he may provide up
to $25 million in any fiscal year for unanticipated contingencies (Section 451); and to some
extent he may fund international narcotics control and anticrime programs (Sections 481, 491,
respectively). Furthermore, he may furnish defense articles or services in exchange for “necessary
or strategic raw material” if he finds it in the U.S. national interest to do so (Section 663).
Under Sections 571 and 582 of the act, the President has broad authority to provide anti-terrorism
and nonproliferation assistance to foreign countries notwithstanding other provisions of law, with
the exception of human rights and terrorism related restrictions in Section 502B and 620A of the
act. Section 620A would restrict the provision of such assistance, in addition to peacekeeping
assistance under Section 551 of the act, without a national security waiver. Given the time and
certification requirements for removing the designation, it is likely the Administration would seek
authorization for the provision of such assistance through such a waiver.
Given the time and certification requirements for rescinding the designation of a state sponsor of
international terrorism, the President may seek separate, superseding authorization from Congress
for the provision of assistance to Syria, issue a national security waiver of terrorism related
restrictions, or invoke existing notwithstanding authorities included in current foreign operations
appropriations legislation. The Bush Administration sought and Congress granted separate
authorization for Iraq in 2003 for similar reasons: President Bush rescinded Iraq’s status as a state
sponsor of terrorism in May 2003 under authority granted by Congress in supplemental
appropriations legislation.49
Possible Questions for Oversight
Possible questions that Congress may wish to consider in light of recent developments include:
•
What should be the overarching goals of U.S. policy toward Syria? To protect
civilians? To further the opposition cause of removing President Asad from
power? To secure chemical weapons and prevent extremist groups from taking
hold? Can these aims be separated in principle? On the ground?
•
What might follow Asad’s departure? Would a negotiated solution that preserved
elements of the current government be acceptable to the United States? Why or
why not?
49
President Bush rescinded Iraq’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to Section 1503 of P.L. 108-11 by
issuing a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Commerce and notifying Congress. Section 1503 states “that the
President may make inapplicable with respect to Iraq Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other
provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism. …provided further that the President shall
submit a notification 5 days prior to exercising any of the authorities described in this section to the Committee on
Appropriations of each House of the Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on International Relations of the House of Representatives.” See President George W. Bush, Message to the Congress
Reporting the Declaration of a National Emergency With Respect to the Development Fund for Iraq, May 22, 2003.
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•
What authorities and appropriated funds might the Administration seek under
various scenarios? How can existing authorities and appropriations be used to
respond to various needs? What is the Administration’s view with regard to
addressing Syria’s status as a state sponsor of terrorism in the event of Asad’s
departure?
•
How are other countries responding to the crisis? Who is willing and able to
implement humanitarian or military intervention proposals? On what authority?
With what specific resources or forces, for what period, and at what cost? How
might direct or indirect military intervention affect ongoing relief and diplomacy
initiatives?
•
What potential risks and unintended consequences may stem from various
intervention proposals? What are the potential risks and consequences of opting
not to intervene? How will regional security be affected?
•
What signals might suggest that a collapse of the Syrian regime is imminent?
What signals might suggest that the current pattern of conflict by attrition will
persist? What developments could trigger direct intervention by regional actors,
and how should the United States respond to intervention?
•
What political and security fault lines exist among Syrian opposition groups and
how might various scenarios affect prospects for conflict or cooperation between
them?
•
What role are extremist groups playing in the violence and what might their
future role be in Syria if the conflict ends? How can the United States best limit
opportunities for violent extremist groups to take advantage of continued conflict
or regime change in Syria?
•
How can the United States prevent the use, theft, or transfer of Syria’s
unconventional weapons? How can the United States and its allies prepare to
secure and limit the proliferation of conventional weapons stockpiles in Syria,
including missiles?
•
How should the United States respond to the humanitarian needs of the Syrian
people and address the impact of Syrian refugees on neighboring countries?
•
What steps should the United States take in its engagement with Syrian
opposition groups and regional actors to increase the likelihood of a post-conflict
transition process that will lead to stability for Syria and the region? Are secular
and Islamist Syrian opposition groups likely to prove hostile to Israel? How
might regime change affect prospects for a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement? How
likely are Syrian Kurds to remain at odds with Turkey and Syrian Arabs?
•
What steps is the Administration taking to ensure that the policies of U.S.
assistance recipients with regard to weapons of mass destruction, weapons
proliferation, terrorism, and human rights are compatible with U.S. goals and
interests? How credible are opposition leaders’ commitments on these issues?
•
What are the risks of additional spillover violence in Lebanon, Turkey, Israel, and
Jordan, and what steps should the United States take to eliminate or minimize
these risks? Would a greater spread of violence across borders change the U.S.
calculus regarding military intervention? If so, please explain how.
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Legislation introduced in the 113th Congress related to Syria is summarized in Appendix A.
Legislation introduced in the 113th Congress related to Syria is summarized in Appendix B.
Table D-1 in Appendix D summarizes U.S. sanctions activity since the start of the uprising in
March 2011.
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Appendix A. Syria Legislation in the 113th Congress
Bills
•
S. 617, the Syria Democratic Transition Act of 2013, a bill that would state that it
is the policy of the United States – “to support civilians and innocent victims of
the conflict in Syria”; “that the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces (SOC) is the sole and legitimate representative of the Syrian
people”; “…to support the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces (SOC) efforts to establish a transitional government”; and, “to
affirm that the end of the Assad regime is in the national security interests of the
United States.” The bill would authorize the President, "notwithstanding any
other provision of law" to furnish assistance “on such terms and conditions as the
President may determine” for a series of stated purposes. Would require U.S.
economic assistance to be marked “From the American People” with some
exceptions. Would authorize the President, “notwithstanding any other provision
of law,” to “furnish assistance, and make contributions” to provide training and
nonlethal support to armed elements of the Syrian opposition. Would authorize
the President, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” to “conduct
activities” in support of securing weapons in Syria. States the President should
enact financial sanctions against entities facilitating “significant” arms sales to
the Syrian government. Would require implementation reporting within 60 days.
•
H.R. 1327, the Free Syria Act of 2013, would authorize the President
“notwithstanding any other provision of law, to provide such assistance as may
be necessary for protection of populations affected by the conflict in Syria.”
Section 205 of the bill states that, “Nothing in this Act may be construed to
authorize the use of military force in Syria by the United States Armed Forces.”
The bill would authorize the President “to make available such assistance as may
be necessary to enhance the capacity, performance of Syrian opposition-allied
local coordination committees.” Would authorize the transfer of any nondesignated foreign assistance account funds to “any humanitarian account” in
order “to address needs arising as a result of the conflict in Syria.” Would require
U.S. economic assistance to be marked “From the American People” with some
exceptions.
•
Would authorize the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to
direct the drawdown of defense articles, services, education, and training for
eligible groups. Allows lethal assistance with required certification. Would
prohibit provision of “anti-aircraft defensive systems” unless a “vital national
security interest” waiver, certification, and report are issued. Would require
notification of obligations to Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Would
require the President to certify that military aid provided is “consistent with the
maintenance of regional stability and with the overall security and stability of
neighboring friends and allies.” Any anti-aircraft support would require an
accompanying report detailing recipients, deployment, targets, risks and benefits.
Entities failing to “demonstrate a commitment” to opposing and defeating Assad
regime; “establishing a democratic, pluralistic, and peaceful Syria”; and securing
and safeguarding WMD would be ineligible as are FTOs and SDGTs. States that
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security assistance should be provided “to the maximum extent practicable” in
accordance with current human rights provisions (22 U.S.C. 2378d).
•
Would authorize the President notwithstanding any other provision of law to
establish a program with “a Syrian entity” to “secure, safeguard, disable,
dismantle, transport out of Syria, or destroy chemical and biological weapons,
their precursor and constituent parts and associated equipment, and establish
verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.”
•
Would authorize the President to provide democracy, economic and political
stabilization, reconstruction, and reconciliation assistance after determining that
the regime of Bashar al Assad is no longer in power, the U.S. government has
recognized a transitional government, and that such a transitional government is
not controlled by an FTO. Authorization would include “and notwithstanding any
other provision of law.”
•
Would authorize the President to temporarily suspend for 3 month intervals the
requirements of P.L. 108-75 and “any other provision of law relating to
assistance, trade, finance, the provision of defense articles and defense services,
and the issuance of visas to nationals of Syria” following a determination that a
post-Assad government “is demonstrating a verifiable commitment” to ceasing
terrorist support; preventing missile and WMD transfer; dismantling WMD
programs, refraining from threatening U.S. national security, interests, and allies;
respecting boundaries and sovereignty of neighbors; and upholding human rights.
Would provide for two six month renewals pending “substantial progress”
determinations. Would provide for additional renewals upon determination of
achievement of security conditions and substantial progress on human rights
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Appendix B. Syria Legislation in the 112th Congress
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L.
112-158)
•
P.L. 112-158/H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act
of 2012, codifies the sanctions on Syria contained in E.O.13606 and includes in
Title VII, “Sanctions with Respect to Human Rights Abuses in Syria.” This
section directs the President to identify and impose specified sanctions on: (1)
Syrian government officials or persons acting on behalf of that government who
are responsible for or complicit in the commission of serious human rights abuses
against Syrian citizens or their family members, regardless of whether such
abuses occurred in Syria; (2) persons who knowingly transfer or facilitate the
transfer of goods or technologies (weapons, surveillance technology, or
technology to restrict free speech or the flow of information) that are likely to be
used by Syria to commit human rights abuses against the Syrian people; and (3)
persons who engage in censorship that prohibits, limits, or penalizes freedom of
expression by Syrian citizens. Section 604 states, “Nothing in this Act or the
amendments made by this Act shall be construed as a declaration of war or an
authorization of the use of force against Iran or Syria.”
FY2013 Appropriations and Authorization Legislation
•
In report language accompanying H.R. 5857, the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2013, appropriators note
under the heading “Global and Regional Programs/ Middle East Response” that
“The Committee is troubled by the ongoing violence in Syria and notes that
funds under this heading should continue to be made available to assist the
Syrian people. All funds for Syria are subject to the notification procedures of the
Committees on Appropriations, pursuant to section 7015(f) of this Act.”
•
In report language accompanying the Senate version of the bill, S. 3241,
appropriators recommended $2 million for the National Endowment for
Democracy programs in Syria. According to the report, “The Committee
recognizes the comparative advantages of the NED in the promotion of
democracy and human rights abroad, particularly given its status as an NGO,
unparalleled experience in promoting freedom during the cold war, and continued
ability to conduct programs in the most hostile political environments.”
•
House and Senate Amendments to H.R. 4310 and S. 3254, the House and
Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.
See Amendments below.
Bills
•
H.R. 2105, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reform and
Modernization Act of 2011—Stated that it shall be U.S. policy to fully implement
and enforce sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and Syria for their proliferation
activities and policies. Would have, among other things, prohibited U.S. nuclear
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cooperation agreements and related export licenses and transfers of materials,
services, and goods with a country that assists the nuclear program of Iran, North
Korea, or Syria, or is transferring advanced conventional weapons to such
countries.
•
H.R. 2106, The Syria Freedom Support Act—Would have, among other things,
sanctioned the development of petroleum resources of Syria, the production of
refined petroleum products in Syria, and the exportation of refined petroleum
products to Syria.
•
H.R. 5993, The Syria Non-Intervention Act of 2012—Would have prohibited the
use of funds available to the Department of Defense or an element of the
intelligence community for the purpose of, or which would have the effect of
supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Syria by
any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.
•
S. 1048, The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Sanctions Consolidation Act of 2011—
Amends the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act to include in the
scope of such act a person that (1) acquired materials mined or extracted within
North Korea’s territory or control; or (2) provided shipping services for the
transportation of goods to or from Iran, North Korea, or Syria relating to such
countries’ weapons of mass destruction programs, support for acts of
international terrorism, or human rights abuses. Excludes from such provisions
shipping services for emergency or humanitarian purposes.
•
S. 1472, The Syria Sanctions Act of 2011—would have denied companies that
conduct business in Syria’s energy sector (investment, oil purchases, and sale of
gasoline) access to U.S. financial institutions and required federal contractors to
certify that they are not engaged in sanctionable activity.
•
S. 2034, Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012—Would have imposed
sanctions on persons who are responsible for or complicit in certain human rights
abuses. Also would have prohibited procurement contracts with persons that
export sensitive technology to Syria.
•
S. 2101, Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act of 2012—Would
have imposed, among other things, sanctions with respect to certain persons who
are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against
citizens of Syria or their family members.
•
S. 2152, Syria Democracy Transition Act of 2012—Would have imposed, among
other things, sanctions on foreign financial institutions that conduct transactions
with the central bank of Syria.
•
S. 2224, Would have required the President to report to Congress on issues
related to Syria—Directed the President to report to Congress regarding (1)
opposition groups operating inside or outside of Syria to oppose the Syrian
government, and (2) the size and security of conventional and non-conventional
weapons stockpiles in Syria.
•
S. 3498, Syria Humanitarian Support and Democratic Transition Assistance Act
of 2012—Made several statements of policy regarding human rights violations,
assistance to the Syrian people, weapons security, and support for transitional
governance in Syria. Would have directed the President to appoint a Special
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Envoy for Syria. Encouraged the President to provide bilateral assistance in the
form of relief and transition support and would have authorized “such sums as
may be necessary … for bilateral assistance programs in Syria” for FY2013 and
FY2014. Would have authorized increased funding to countries “that have
experienced an influx of refugees from Syria.” Encouraged the development of a
transition and security plan for Syria and would have required reporting on
implementation.
Resolutions
•
H.Res. 296/S.Res. 180, A resolution expressing support for peaceful
demonstrations and universal freedoms in Syria and condemning the human
rights violations by the Asad Regime—Among other things, it urged the
“President to continue to work with the European Union, the Government of
Turkey, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and other allies and
partners to bring an end to human rights abuses in Syria, hold the perpetrators
accountable, and support the aspirations of the people of Syria.”
•
H.Res. 632, A resolution that, among other things, commended the leadership of
the Government of Turkey in calling for an end to the violence in Syria and for
its responsiveness to the humanitarian needs of Syrian refugees.
•
H.Res. 687, A resolution that, among other things, called on the United Nations
Security Council, based on evidence that crimes against humanity have been
perpetrated by Syrian government forces, to refer the situation of Syria to the
International Criminal Court.
•
H.Res. 763, A resolution that, among other things, called on all parties in the
conflict in Syria to respect the human rights and religious freedom of Syrian
citizens.
•
H.Res. 770, Expressed the sense of the House of Representatives that (1) only
Congress has the constitutional authority to declare war, (2) President Obama
should set clear objectives for the U.S. Armed Forces before sending them into
battle, (3) President Obama should indicate a direct national security interest in
placing the U.S. Armed Forces in harm’s way, and (4) the government of Syria
has surrendered all claims of legitimacy by massacring its own people and should
peacefully transfer power to a democratically elected government.
•
S.Res. 370/H.Res. 549, A resolution calling for democratic change in Syria,
would state the Senate’s condemnation of “ongoing, widespread, and systemic
violations of human rights conducted by authorities in Syria” and calling on
Bashar al Asad to step down. The non-binding resolution would have urged the
President to support a democratic transition in Syria, establish a Friends of Syria
Contact Group, develop a strategy to encourage further military defections, and
“develop a plan to identify weapons stockpiles and prevent the proliferation of
conventional, biological, chemical, and other types of weapons in Syria.”
•
S.Res. 379, A resolution that, among other things, expressed strong
disappointment with the Governments of the Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China for their veto of the United Nations Security Council
resolution condemning Bashar al Asad and the violence in Syria and urged them
to reconsider their votes.
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•
S.Res. 391/H.Res. 629, A resolution that, among other things, called on Syria to
(1) open the country to independent and foreign journalists; and (2) release all
detained journalists, videographers, and bloggers.
•
S.Res. 424, A resolution that, among other things, supported calls by Arab leaders
to provide the people of Syria with the means to defend themselves against
Bashar al-Assad and his forces, including through the provision of weapons and
other material support, and called on the President to work closely with regional
partners to implement these efforts effectively; urged the President to take all
necessary precautions to ensure that any support for the Syrian opposition does
not benefit individuals in Syria who are aligned with al Qaeda or associated
movements, or who have committed human rights abuses; and affirmed that the
establishment of safe havens for people from Syria, as contemplated by
governments in the Middle East, would be an important step to save Syrian lives
and to help bring an end to Mr. Assad’s killing of civilians in Syria, and called on
the President to consult urgently and thoroughly with regional allies on whether,
how, and where to create such safe havens.
•
S.Res. 428, A resolution that, among other things, urged the President to formally
establish the Atrocities Prevention Board established by Presidential Study
Directive-10 in August 2011, and for the Board to provide recommendations to
the President concerning the prevention of mass atrocities in Syria.
•
S.Res. 435, A resolution that, among other things, strongly urged all
Governments, including the Republic of Belarus and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, to refrain from providing any additional military or security
assistance to the Government of Syria.
•
S.Res. 494, A resolution that, among other things, condemned the Government of
the Russian Federation for its long-standing and ongoing support for the criminal
regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Amendments
•
H.Amdt. 1131 to H.R. 4310, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2013, agreed in the House of Representatives May 18, 2012, an amendment
to limit the availability of funds for Cooperative Threat Reduction activities with
Russia until the Secretary of Defense can certify that Russia is no longer
supporting the Syrian regime and is not providing to Syria, North Korea, or Iran
any equipment or technology that contributes to weapons of mass destruction
programs.
•
S.Amdt. 3262 to S. 3254, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, agreed to in the Senate December 4, 2012, and incorporated in the
conference bill H.R. 4310, an amendment to require the Secretary of Defense to
submit a report to congressional defense committees identifying options to “deny
or significantly degrade” the Syrian military’s ability to use air power against
civilians and the opposition. Specifically, the report would require an assessment
of the deployment of air defense systems, the establishment of no-fly zones,
limited air strikes, or “other military activities.”
•
Section 1295 of H.R. 4310, the conference version of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, requires the Administration to provide a
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report within 90 days of enactment on military assistance provided by the
Russian Federation to Syria.
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Appendix C. Chronology of United Nations Action
on Syria
Date
Action
August 3, 2011
The Security Council issued a presidential statement that expressed profound regret
over hundreds of deaths in Syria, condemned widespread violations of human rights
against civilians by Syrian authorities, and called for an immediate end to violence in
Syria, urging all sides to act with utmost restraint. It also called for access for
humanitarian workers for Syrian authorities to follow through on commitments they
had made to reform. Lebanon disassociated itself from the statement after its
release.
October 4, 2011
The Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have, among other
things, voiced deep concern over violence in Syria and strongly condemned “the
continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of force against
civilians by the Syrian authorities.” It called for “an inclusive Syrian-led political
process conducted in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation and
extremism, and aimed at effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and
concerns of Syria’s population.” Russia and China voted against the resolution, and
Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa abstained.
February 4, 2012
The Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have, among other
things, adopted an Arab League plan outlining a Syrian-led political transition to a
democratic, plural political system. The resolution had called on the Syrian
government to cease violence against civilians, withdraw its armed forces from cities
and towns and return them to their barracks, guarantee the freedom of peaceful
demonstrations, and allow unhindered access for all Arab League institutions to
“determine the truth about the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents
taking place." Russia and China voted against the resolution.
February 23, 2012
United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States Nabil Elaraby appointed Kofi Annan as United Nations-League
of Arab States Joint Special Envoy for Syria.
April 5, 2012
The Security Council issued another presidential statement that, among other
things, noted the Syrian government commitment on March 25, 2012, to implement
Kofi Annan’s six-point peace proposal. The statement also called upon the Syrian
government to implement an U.N.-brokered cease-fire by withdrawing troops from
population centers by April 10, 2012. It also called upon all parties, including the
Syrian opposition, to cease all armed violence no later than April 12, 2012.
April 14, 2012
The Security Council passed Resolution 2042, which approved the deployment of a
U.N. advance team of 30 military observers to Syria. It also demanded that the
Syrian authorities withdraw security forces from population centers and begin a
dialogue with the opposition. The vote marked the first time since protests began
that the Security Council was united in demanding a halt to the violence.
April 21, 2012
The Security Council passed Resolution 2043, which established—for a 90-day
period—a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with an initial
deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers under the command of a Chief
Military Observer. The resolution also created a civilian team to help implement
elements of the full peace plan, such as the start of a national political dialogue and
the government’s granting of the right to demonstrate.
June 16, 2012
UNSMIS Commander Norwegian Major General Robert Mood suspended
observation patrols due to increased violence.
July 19, 2012
The Security Council failed to adopt a proposed resolution that would have, among
other things, threatened sanctions on Syria if demands to end the violence were not
met. Permanent members China and Russia voted against the resolution and
Pakistan and South Africa abstained. The resolution would have had the Security
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Council act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to demand verifiable
compliance—within 10 days of the adoption—with its demands in previous
resolutions that Syrian authorities pull back military concentrations from population
centers and cease the use of heavy weaponry against them.
July 20, 2012
The Security Council passed UNSCR 2059 which extended the UNSMIS mission for
an additional 30 days. It also conditioned any further renewal of UNSMIS on the
cessation of the use of heavy weapons by the government and a reduction in
violence by all sides.
August-September 2012
United Nations-League of Arab States Joint Special Envoy for Syria, Kofi Annan
announced his intention to resign upon the expiration of his mandate on August 31,
2012. Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi replaces Annan as Joint Special Envoy and
begins diplomatic engagement with international parties and the Asad government.
October 2012
Brahimi proposes a ceasefire linked to the Islamic holiday of Eid al Adha that is
considered and adopted by the government and some opposition groups, but
quickly breaks down.
November-December 2012
Brahimi warns that state failure may result from continued fighting in Syria and
renews calls for a negotiated political solution based on the July 2012 communique
of the Action Group on Syria.50 U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reports his
concern “that the presence of armed members of the opposition and the ongoing
military activities of the Syrian security forces [in the Golan Heights area] have the
potential to ignite a larger conflict between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic with
grave consequences.” The United Nations suspends operations in Syria on
December 3, citing deteriorating security conditions.
On December 19, the United Nations, humanitarian organizations, and the
government of Syria released estimates and appeals for assistance for Syrian
refugees as well as those displaced or otherwise in need in Syria. A U.N. Syria
Regional Response Plan seeks $1 billion for Syrian refugees through the first half of
2013. A U.N. Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan for Syria, prepared in part by the
government of Syria, seeks $519 million to support Syrians affected by the conflict
through the first half of 2013.
January-April 2013
On January 30, U.N. member states, agencies, and non-governmental organizations
convened an International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria held in
Kuwait. At the conference, several countries made new pledges of funding to
support humanitarian assistance for Syrians. Several of the largest donors included
Kuwait, the UAE, United States, and European Commission.
In February 2013, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report noting
that large parts of the country are scenes of “continuous combat, involving more
brutal tactics and new military capabilities on all sides.”
In March 2013, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and described the Syrian
humanitarian crisis “dramatic beyond description.” He also warned that the refugee
flows into neighboring countries will have an “unimaginable impact on the economy,
the society and the security of these countries.”
In April 2013, various U.N. officials published an OpEd in the New York Times in
which they called on “political leaders involved” to reach a political solution to the
Syrian civil war, writing that “We ask that they use their collective influence to insist
on a political solution to this horrendous crisis before hundreds of thousands more
people lose their homes and lives and futures — in a region already at the tipping
point.”
50
Available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.
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Appendix D. U.S. Sanctions on Syria
Overview
At present, a variety of legislative provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria
and restrict bilateral trade. Syria remains a U.S.-designated State Sponsor of Terrorism and is
therefore subject to a number of general U.S. sanctions. Syria was placed on the State
Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism List in 1979. Moreover, between 2003 and 2006
Congress passed legislation and President Bush issued new executive orders that expanded U.S.
sanctions specifically on Syria.
•
The table below reviews sanctions introduced since early 2011 in response to
Syria’s uprising.
•
Syria-specific sanctions and general sanctions applicable to Syria are also
summarized below.
Background on U.S. Assistance to Syria and Restrictions
Because of a number of legal restrictions and U.S. sanctions, many resulting from Syria’s
designation as a country supportive of international terrorism, Syria is no longer eligible to
receive U.S. foreign assistance. Between 1950 and 1981, the United States provided a total of
$627.4 million in aid to Syria: $34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in
economic support, and $155.4 million in food assistance. Most of this aid was provided during a
brief warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979. Significant projects funded
with U.S. assistance included water supply, irrigation, rural roads and electrification, and health
and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to Syria since 1981, when the last aid
programs were closed out. In the event of regime change, the Obama Administration and
Congress would need to reevaluate any successor government’s policies with regard to support
for international terrorism in order to determine Syria’s potential eligibility for U.S. assistance.
Syria’s Economy and Sanctions
Reports indicate that the Syrian economy and national budget are suffering due to a steep drop in
oil exports resulting from sanctions; over a year of domestic unrest and the loss of tourism
revenues; and new social and military spending aimed at quelling public anger. Estimates vary on
the degree of contraction in 2011, ranging between 5% and 15%.51 The Economist Intelligence
Unit predicts that the Syrian economy will contract by 8.1% in 2012.
Urban areas are now experiencing daily power outages and fuel shortages;52 inflation is rising;53
and the value of the Syrian pound has plummeted on the black market (from 54 pounds against
51
“Cracks Widen in Syrian Economy,” IPS, January 24, 2012.
In May 2012, the Syrian government raised the price of subsidized fuel by 25%, just weeks after doubling electricity
prices.
53
Inflation may be as high as 30% in Syria. According to a June 2012 report, the Syrian government has recently
circulated new currency printed in Russia in order to pay public sector salaries amidst a ballooning fiscal deficit. See,
“Syria Prints New Money as Deficit Grows-Bankers,” Reuters, June 13, 2012.
52
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the dollar to over 103 pounds as of early March), forcing the government to spend resources
propping it up. Syria’s stock market is down 40% since the unrest began in March 2011. Foreign
exchange reserves held by the Syrian Central Bank have reportedly fallen from $18 billion in the
fall of 2011 to between $5 billion and $10 billion, and now lose about $1 billion a month.54 With
the loss of European export markets due to a European Union oil import ban, Syria has been
denied a major source of revenue and hard currency (25%-30% of total government revenue or
$4 billion a year). According to Syrian Oil Minister Sufian Alao, sanctions on Syrian oil exports
have cost the country $4 billion.
Before sanctions, the main buyers of approximately 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) of exported
Syrian oil were Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, and Turkey. Syria
produces about 380,000 bpd total, though 2011 total production fell to around 320,000 bpd due to
sanctions.55 Foreign oil companies that have suspended operations in Syria include Tatneft
(Russia), Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Total (France), Gulfsands (UK), Suncor (Canada), and INA
(Croatia). In March 2012, Syrian officials announced that the Russian energy company Gazprom
would take over INA’s oil and gas operations in Syria. The operating status of two Chinese
companies with investments in Syria, CNPC and Sinopec, is unknown.56 Western countries also
have banned new investment in Syria’s oil and gas sector, and energy traders and shipping firms
also report changes to their engagement with Syria. European sanctions do not ban the export of
liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to Syria, since it is widely used by ordinary households for heating
and cooking.
Since new sanctions were enacted, many analysts have speculated about whether new investors
and new foreign markets would arise for Syrian oil exports, albeit at lower prices due to sanctions
and increased shipping, insurance, and financing costs. Some experts believe that both India and
China are in a position to refine the heavy crude that Syria exports. However, others assert that
some Asian buyers would find the prospect of purchasing Syrian oil too risky or politically
problematic. Venezuela has supplied Syria with shipments of diesel fuel in exchange for Syrian
naphtha, a refined petroleum product. In 2012, Venezuelan Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez
referred to “a high level of cooperation with Syria, a besieged nation, whom the transnational
interests want to bring down.” Other reports have suggested that Russia and Iran export gasoil
and diesel to Syria.57 Syrian officials have referenced negotiations for fuel import deals with
Russia, Iran, and Algeria.58
54
“Syria Running out of Cash as Sanctions take toll, but Assad avoids Economic Pain,” Washington Post, April 24,
2012.
55
Though oil production declined in 2011, natural gas production increased by 8% due to investment in gas
infrastructure made before unrest began.
56
“Syria: Voting with their feet,” Economist Intelligence Unit—Business Middle East, January 16, 2012.
57
“How Russia, Iran keep fuel flowing to Syria,” Reuters, April 26, 2012.
58
“Syria, Russia Negotiating Long-Term Gas, Diesel Fuel Contracts,” ITAR-TASS World Service, May 25, 2012.
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Table D-1. U.S. Sanctions Against Syria in 2011-2013
(Implemented by Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC])
Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
April 18,
2013
Removed Nabil Rafik Al Kuzbari from the SDN list.
Syria Designation Removal
March 15,
2013
Authorizes U.S. persons to provide to the National
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces certain services, including transfers of funds,
otherwise prohibited by Executive Order 13582
Syria General License No. 16 Issued
December
11, 2012
Two senior leaders of the Syria-based Al Nusra
Front, Maysar Ali Musa Abdallah al-Juburi and Anas
Hasan Khattab, for acting on behalf of al-Qa'ida in
Iraq (AQI).
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List pursuant to Executive
Order 13224
December
11, 2012
Jaysh al-Sha'bi and Shabiha (two armed militia
groups that operate under the control of the Syrian
government) and two Shabiha commanders Ayman
Jaber and Mohammed Jaber
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List pursuant to Executive
Orders 13572 and 13582 variously
September
19, 2012
Amr Armanazi, director of Syria’s Scientific Studies
Research Center, Army Supply Bureau, involved in
missile procurement, and Belarus-based
Belvneshpromservice
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
September
14, 2012
Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, is
being designated pursuant to Executive Order
(E.O.) 13582, for providing support to the Syrian
government.
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List, pursuant to E.O.13582
August 14,
2012
Riyad Hijab, former Prime Minister
Post-defection removal from OFAC’s Specially
Designated Nationals (SDN) List
August 10,
2012
Hezbollah, SYTROL
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List, pursuant to E.O.13582
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Date
July 18,
2012
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Omran Ahed Al-Zoubi, Minister of Information;
Subhi Ahmad Al-Abdullah, Minister of Agriculture
and Agrarian Reform; Safwan Al-Assaf, Minister of
Housing and Urban Development; Wael Nader AlHalqi, Minister of Health; Mohammad Al-Jleilati,
Minister of Finance; Hala Al Nasser, Minister of
Tourism; Mohammad Abdul-Sattar Al-Sayyed,
Minister of Religious Endowments; Yasser Al-Sibaei,
Minister of Public Works; Hazwan Al Wazz,
Minister of Education; Mansour Fadlallah Azzam,
Minister of Presidential Affairs; Nazira Farah Sarkis,
Minister of State for Environmental Affairs; Hussein
Mahmoud Farzat, Minister of State; Omar Ibrahim
Ghalawanji, Deputy Prime Minister for Services
Affairs; Radwan Habib, Minister of Justice; Ali
Haidar, Minister of State for National Reconciliation
Affairs; Bassam Hanna, Minister of Water
Resources; Riyad Hijab, Prime Minister; Mahmoud
Ibrahim Said, Minister of Transport; Qadri Jamil,
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs; Imad
Mohammad Deeb Khamis, Minister of Electricity;
Adib Mayaleh, Governor of Central Bank of Syria;
Jassim Mohammad Zakarya, Minister of Social
Affairs and Labor; Lubanah Mshaweh, Minister of
Culture; Said Mu’zi Hneidi, Minister of Oil and
Mineral Resources; Imad Abdul-Ghani Sabouni,
Minister of Communications and Technology; Fuad
Shukri Kurdi, Minister of Industry; Joseph Jurji
Sweid, Minister of State; Mohammad Yehya Moalla,
Minister of Higher Education; Mohammad Zafer
Mihbek, Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade
Sanction or Related Activity Description
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
Business Lab, Drex Technologies(Virgin Islands)a,
Handasieh, Industrial Solutions, Mechanical
Construction Factory, Syronics
May 30,
2012
Syria International Islamic Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
May 1, 2012
Foreign Persons/Foreign Entities that have violated,
attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or
caused a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran or
Syria, or that have facilitated deceptive transactions
for persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning
Syria or Iran.
Executive Order 13608—Authorizes the
Department of the Treasury to publicly identify
foreign individuals and entities that have violated
U.S. sanctions against Iran and Syria and
generally bars their access to U.S. financial and
commercial systems.
April 27,
2012
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OFAC issued General License 4A, which
authorizes the exports or re-exports to Syria of
items licensed or otherwise authorized by the
Department of Commerce and of exports and
reexports of certain services. General License
4A replaces and supersedes General License 4,
dated August 18, 2011.
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Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
April 23,
2012
Governments of Syria and Iran, Ali Mamluk
(Director of the Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate), Syrian General Intelligence
Directorate, Syriatel, Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps, Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security,
Law Enforcement Forces of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Datak Telecom
Executive Order 13606—Blocks the property
and suspends entry into the United States of
certain persons with respect to grave human
rights abuses by the governments of Iran and
Syria via information technology.
March 30,
2012
General Munir Adanov (Deputy Chief of General
Staff of the Syrian Army), General Dawood Rajiha
(Minister of Defense)
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
March 5,
2012
General Organization of Radio and TV
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
February 23,
2012
OFAC issued General License 15 related to
Syria to authorize transactions in connection
with patent, trademark, copyright, or other
intellectual property protection that would
otherwise be prohibited by Executive Order
13582.
February 16,
2012
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
December
1, 2011
Muhammad Makhluf, Military Housing Establishment,
Real Estate Bank
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
October 3,
2011
OFAC issued two general licenses related to
Syria to authorize payments in connection with
overflight or emergency landing and transactions
with respect to telecommunications
September
27, 2011
OFAC issued a general license related to Syria
to authorize third-country diplomatic and
consular funds transfers and to authorize certain
services in support of nongovernmental
organizations’ activities.
September
9, 2011
OFAC issued four general licenses related to
Syria to authorize wind down transactions,
certain official activities of international
organizations, incidental transactions related to
U.S. persons residing in Syria and operation of
accounts.
August 30,
2011
Walid Mouallem (Foreign Minister), Ali Abdul Karim
Ali (Syrian Ambassador to Lebanon), Bouthaina
Shaaban (Advisor to the President)
Added to OFAC’s Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) List
August 18,
2011
Government of Syria
Executive Order 13582—Freezes all assets of
the Government of Syria, prohibits U.S. persons
from engaging in any transaction involving the
Government of Syria, bans U.S. imports of
Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products,
prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings
in or related to Syria’s petroleum or petroleum
products, and prohibits U.S. persons from
operating or investing in Syria.
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Date
Sanctioned Individual/Entity
Sanction or Related Activity Description
August 18,
2011
General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company
For Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian
Petroleum Company, Sytrol
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 10,
2011
Commercial Bank of Syria and its Lebanon-based
subsidiary, Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank,
Syriatel, the country’s main mobile phone operator
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
August 4,
2011
Muhammad Hamsho (businessman with ties to Asad
family), Hamsho International Group
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
June 29,
2011
Jamil Hassan (Head of Air Force Intelligence),
Political Security Directorate (PSD, domestic
intelligence)
Added to OFAC’s SDN List
May 18,
2011
President Bashar al Asad, Farouk al Shara (vice
president), Adel Safar (prime minister), Mohammad
Ibrahim al Shaar (minister of the interior), Ali Habib
Mahmoud (minister of defense), Abdul Fatah
Qudsiya (head of Syrian military intelligence),
Mohammed Dib Zaitoun (director of political
security directorate), Nabil Rafik al Kuzbari,
General Mohsen Chizari (Commander of Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corp Qods Force suspected
of human rights abuses in Syria), Al Mashreq
Investment Fund, Bena Properties, Cham Holding,
Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Syrian Military
Intelligence, Syrian National Security Bureau
Executive Order 13573 adds listed individuals
and entities to OFAC’s SDN List
April 29,
2011
Maher al Asad, Ali Mamluk (director of the Syrian
General Intelligence Directorate GID), Atif Najib
(former head of the Syrian Political Security
Directorate for Dara'a province and the president’s
cousin). the General Intelligence Directorate, and
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds
Force (for allegedly assisting Syria in its crackdown)
Executive Order 13572 adds listed individuals
and entities to OFAC’s SDN List
Source: U.S. Treasury Department.
Notes: As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or
controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such
as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such
individuals and companies are called Specially Designated Nationals or SDNs. Their assets are blocked and U.S.
persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.
a.
According to the Treasury Department, Drex Technologies, “belongs to Assad’s billionaire cousin and
government insider, Rami Makhluf, who was designated by the Treasury Department in February 2008
under E.O. 13460 for improperly benefiting from and aiding the public corruption of Syrian regime officials.
Drex Technologies was designated pursuant to E.O. 13572, which authorizes the United States to sanction
any entities owned or controlled by persons designated under E.O. 13460.”
Specific Sanctions Against Syria
Specific U.S. sanctions levied against Syria fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions resulting
from the passage of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act (SALSA) that,
among other things, prohibit most U.S. exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed by executive order
from the President that specifically deny certain Syrian citizens and entities access to the U.S.
financial system due to their participation in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
association with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or Osama bin Laden; or destabilizing activities in Iraq and
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Lebanon; and (3) sanctions resulting from the USA PATRIOT Act levied specifically against the
Commercial Bank of Syria in 2006.
The 2003 Syria Accountability Act
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese
Sovereignty Restoration Act into law, as P.L. 108-175. This law requires the President to impose
penalties on Syria unless it ceases support for international terrorist groups, ends its occupation of
Lebanon, ceases the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and has ceased
supporting or facilitating terrorist activity in Iraq (§§5(a) and 5(d)). Sanctions include bans on the
export of military items (already banned under other legislation, see above)59 and of dual use
items (items with both civil and military applications) to Syria (§5(a)(1)). In addition, the
President is required to impose two or more sanctions from a menu of six:
•
a ban on all exports to Syria except food and medicine;
•
a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria;
•
a ban on landing in or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft;
•
reduction of diplomatic contacts with Syria;
•
restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States; and
•
blocking of transactions in Syrian property (§5(a)(2)).
Implementation
On May 11, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13338, implementing the provisions of
P.L. 108-175, including the bans on munitions and dual use items (§5(a)(1)) and two sanctions
from the menu of six listed in Section 5(a)(2). The two sanctions he chose were the ban on
exports to Syria other than food and medicine (§5(a)(2)(A)) and the ban on Syrian aircraft landing
in or overflying the United States (§5(a)(2)(D)). In issuing his executive order, the President
stated that Syria has failed to take significant, concrete steps to address the concerns that led to
the enactment of the Syria Accountability Act. The President also imposed two additional
sanctions based on other legislation.
•
Under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, he instructed the Treasury
Department to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money
laundering concerns.
•
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), he issued
instructions to freeze assets of certain Syrian individuals and government entities
involved in supporting policies inimical to the United States.
59
Syria’s inclusion on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List as well as SALSA requires the President to restrict the
export of any items to Syria that appear on the U.S. Munitions List (weapons, ammunition) or Commerce Control List
(dual-use items).
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Waivers
In the executive order and in an accompanying letter to Congress, President Bush cited the waiver
authority contained in Section 5(b) of the Syria Accountability Act and stated that he wished to
issue the following waivers on grounds of national security.
Regarding Section 5(a)(1) and 5(a)(2)(A): The following exports are permitted: products in
support of activities of the U.S. government; medicines otherwise banned because of
potential dual use; aircraft parts necessary for flight safety; informational materials;
telecommunications equipment to promote free flow of information; certain software and
technology; products in support of U.N. operations; and certain exports of a temporary
nature.60
Regarding Section 5(a)(2)(D): The following operations are permitted: takeoff/landing of
Syrian aircraft chartered to transport Syrian officials on official business to the United States;
takeoff/landing for non-traffic and non-scheduled stops; takeoff/landing associated with an
emergency; and overflights of U.S. territory.
Targeted Financial Sanctions
Since the initial implementation of the Syria Accountability Act (in Executive Order 13338 dated
May 2004), the President has repeatedly taken action to sanction individual members of the Asad
regime’s inner circle.61 E.O. 13338 declared a national emergency with respect to Syria and
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to block the property of individual Syrians. Based on
Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has annually
extended his authority to block the property of individual Syrians (latest on April 29, 2011).
When issuing each extension, the President has noted that the actions and policies of the
government of Syria continued to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat.62
The following individuals and entities have been targeted by the U.S. Treasury Department
(Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC):
•
On June 30, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two senior Syrian
officials involved in Lebanon affairs, Syria’s then-interior minister and its head
of military intelligence in Lebanon (respectively, the late General Kanaan and
General Ghazali), as Specially Designated Nationals, thereby freezing any assets
they may have in the United States and banning any U.S. persons, including U.S.
60
According to U.S. regulations, any product that contains more than 10% de minimis U.S.-origin content, regardless
of where it is made, is not allowed to be exported to Syria. For U.S. commercial licensing prohibitions on exports and
re-exports to Syria, see 15 C.F.R. pt. 736 Supp No. 1. The Department of Commerce reviews license applications on a
case-by-case basis for exports or re-exports to Syria under a general policy of denial. For a description of items that do
not require export licenses, see, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Department of Commerce, Implementation
of the Syria Accountability Act, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/licensing/syriaimplementationmay14_04.htm.
61
According to the original text of E.O. 13338, the President’s authority to declare a national emergency authorizing
the blocking of property of certain persons and prohibiting the exportation or re-exportation of certain goods to Syria is
based on “The Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
(NEA), the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, P.L. 108-175 (SAA), and Section
301 of Title 3, United States Code.” available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/
13338.pdf.
62
The President last extended the State of Emergency on April 29, 2011.
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financial institutions outside of the United States, from conducting transactions
with them.63 Kanaan allegedly committed suicide in October 2005, though some
have speculated that he may have been murdered.
•
On January 18, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department took the same actions
against the President’s brother-in-law, Assef Shawkat, chief of military
intelligence.
•
On April 26, 2006, President Bush issued Executive Order 13399 that authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to freeze the U.S.-based assets of anyone found to
be involved in the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri. It also affects anyone involved in bombings or
assassinations in Lebanon since October 2004, or anyone hindering the
international investigation into the Hariri assassination. The order allows the
United States to comply with UNSCR 1636, which calls on all states to freeze the
assets of those persons designated by the investigating commission or the
government of Lebanon to be involved in the Hariri assassination.
•
On August 15, 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department froze assets of two other
senior Syrian officers: Major General Hisham Ikhtiyar, for allegedly contributing
to Syria’s support of foreign terrorist organizations including Hezbollah; and
Brigadier General Jama’a Jama’a, for allegedly playing a central part in Syria’s
intelligence operations in Lebanon during the Syrian occupation.64
•
On January 4, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated three Syrian
entities, the Syrian Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, the
Electronics Institute, and the National Standards and Calibration Laboratory, as
weapons proliferators under an executive order (E.O. 13382) based on the
authority vested to the President under IEEPA. The three state-sponsored
institutions are divisions of Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, which
was designated by President Bush as a weapons proliferator in June 2005 for
research on the development of biological and chemical weapons.65
•
On August 1, 2007, the President issued E.O. 1344166 blocking the property of
persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and
institutions. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
four individuals reportedly affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert
Syrian control over the Lebanese political system, including Assaad Halim
Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab, and Hafiz Makhluf (under the authority of E.O. 13441)
and Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik (under the authority of E.O. 13338).67
63
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js2617.aspx.
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp60.aspx.
65
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp216.aspx.
66
On July 29, 2010, President Obama extended that National Emergency with respect to Lebanon for another year,
stating that “While there have been some recent positive developments in the Syrian-Lebanese relationship, continuing
arms transfers to Hizballah that include increasingly sophisticated weapons systems serve to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty, contribute to political and economic instability in Lebanon, and continue to pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.” See, Notice of July 29, 2010—
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Actions of Certain Persons to Undermine the Sovereignty
of Lebanon or Its Democratic Processes and Institutions, Federal Register, Title 3—The President, [Page 45045].
67
See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp666.aspx.
64
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•
On February 13, 2008, President Bush issued another order (E.O.13460) blocking
the property of senior Syrian officials. According to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the order “targets individuals and entities determined to be
responsible for or who have benefitted from the public corruption of senior
officials of the Syrian regime.” The order also revises a provision in Executive
Order 13338 to block the property of Syrian officials who have undermined U.S.
and international efforts to stabilize Iraq.68 One week later, under the authority of
E.O. 13460, the U.S. Treasury Department froze the U.S. assets and restricted the
financial transactions of Rami Makhluf, a powerful cousin of President Bashar al
Asad.
Sanctions Against the Commercial Bank of Syria
As previously mentioned, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, President Bush instructed
the Treasury Department in 2004 to prepare a rule requiring U.S. financial institutions to sever
correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria because of money laundering
concerns. In 2006, the Treasury Department issued a final ruling that imposes a special measure
against the Commercial Bank of Syria as a financial institution of primary money laundering
concern. It bars U.S. banks and their overseas subsidiaries from maintaining a correspondent
account with the Commercial Bank of Syria, and it also requires banks to conduct due diligence
that ensures the Commercial Bank of Syria is not circumventing sanctions through its business
dealings with them.69
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329).
Section 303 of this act (90 Stat. 753-754) required termination of foreign assistance to countries
that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A (22 USC 2371). (Syria was not affected by this ban until
1979, as explained below.)
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (Title II of P.L. 95-223, codified at
50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq.) Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the
President has broad powers pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a
threat “which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” These powers include the ability to
seize foreign assets under U.S. jurisdiction, to prohibit any transactions in foreign exchange, to
prohibit payments between financial institutions involving foreign currency, and to prohibit the
import or export of foreign currency.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72). Section 6(i) of this act (93 Stat. 515)
required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress before
licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries determined to
68
A previous executive order, E.O. 13315, blocks property of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and members of
his former regime. On June 9, 2005, the Treasury Department blocked property and interests of a Syrian company, SES
International Corp., and two of its officials under the authority of E.O.13315.
69
See, “U.S. Trade and Financial Sanctions Against Syria.” Available at http://damascus.usembassy.gov/sanctionssyr html.
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have supported acts of international terrorism. (Amendments adopted in 1985 and 1986 relettered
Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7 million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called state sponsors of terrorism list. This list is
prepared annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support for
acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first prepared in
1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication Country Reports on
Terrorism, 2009, issued on August 5, 2010. Syria’s inclusion on this list in 1979 triggered the
above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-399). Section 509(a) of this
act (100 Stat. 853) amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to prohibit export of
items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of international terrorism,
thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban was reaffirmed by the AntiTerrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989—see below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans
obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-509). Section 8041(a) of this act (100 Stat.
1962) amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on income or war
profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting international terrorism.
(26 USC 901(j)). The President was given authority to waive this provision under Section 601 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-200, May 18, 2000).
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-222). Section 4
amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional notification and
licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar value, to countries
on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military capability or enhance their
ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribes conditions for removing a country from the terrorism list: prior
notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairmen of
two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite notification, the
President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly indicate it is no
longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification must be provided 45
days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list).
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 (Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FY1994-1995). Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles
and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance with the Arab
boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver, but no such waiver
has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s case because of other
prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). This act requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (§325) or lethal military
equipment (§326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President to waive this
provision on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to third countries that
sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in Section 549 of the Foreign
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Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by reference in H.R. 4811, which
was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens or
resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the terrorism
list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in consultation
with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation prohibits such
transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist acts in the United States.”
(31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996, p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996,
the then chairman of the House International Relations Committee reportedly protested to then
President Clinton about the Treasury Department’s implementing regulation, which he described
as a “special loophole” for Syria.
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign assistance
appropriations legislation enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S. aid.
The most recent ban appears in Section 7007 of P.L. 112-74, Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012, which states that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to
titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance
or reparations for the governments of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, or Syria: Provided, That for
purposes of this section, the prohibition on obligations or expenditures shall include direct loans,
credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank or its agents.”
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by Section 431 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United
States to withhold a proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for
programs that benefit eight specified countries or entities, including Syria.
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, P.L. 106-178, was amended by P.L. 109-112 to make its
provisions applicable to Syria as well as Iran. The amended act, known as the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act, requires the President to submit semi-annual reports to designated
congressional committees, identifying any persons involved in arms transfers to or from Iran or
Syria; also, the act authorizes the President to impose various sanctions against such individuals.
On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed P.L. 109-353 which expanded the scope of the
original law by adding North Korea to its provisions, thereby renaming the law the Iran, North
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Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (or INKSNA for short). The list of Syrian entities
designated under INKSNA includes Army Supply Bureau (2008), Syrian Navy (2009), Syrian Air
Force (2009), and Ministry of Defense (2008).8370 On May 24, 2011, the State Department
designated the Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center
(SSRC) under INKSNA.
70
See, State Department Press Releases And Documents “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act: Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
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Author Contact Information
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jsharp@crs.loc.gov, 7-8687
Congressional Research Service
Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428
83
See, State Department Press Releases And Documents “Near East: Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act: Imposed Sanctions,” July 20, 2010.
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