Contents

• Background
• Issues for Congress
• Syria-Related Legislation in the 116^th Congress
• Recent Developments
• Military
• Islamic State Loses Last Territorial Stronghold
• Idlib: The Final Opposition Stronghold
• Turkish Operations in Northern Syria
• Israeli Strikes in Syria
Provisions in FY2020 Defense and Foreign Operations Legislation
• FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92)
• Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94)
• Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93)
• Syria-Related Legislation in the 116^th Congress
• Special Immigrant Status for U.S. Partner Forces
• Military Developments
• Turkish Incursion into Northern Syria
• Islamic State: Ongoing Threats
• Idlib: The Final Opposition Stronghold
• Political Negotiations
• The Geneva Process
• The Astana Process
• Humanitarian Situation
• Cross-Border Aid Endangered
• U.S. Policy
• Trump Administration Statements on Syria Policy
• U.S. Assistance to Vetted Syrian Groups
U.S. Military Operations;
• Political Negotiations
• The Geneva Process
• The Astana Process
• Kurdish Outreach to Asad Government
• Humanitarian Situation
• U.S. Humanitarian Funding
• International Humanitarian Funding
• U.S. Policy
• Trump Administration Syria Policy Evolves in 2018
• 2018: President Trump Announces Withdrawal of U.S. Forces
• 2019: Some U.S. Troops to Remain in Syria
• President Trump Recognizes Israeli Claim to Golan Heights
• Presidential Authority to Strike Syria under U.S. Law
• U.S. Assistance
• U.S. Military Operations in Syria and U.S. Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Efforts
• U.S. Military Presence in Syria
• U.S. Repositions Forces in 2019
Syria Train and Equip Program
• FY2019 Legislation
• FY2020FY2021 Defense Funding Request
• U.S. Nonlethal and Stabilization Assistance
• FY2019 Legislation and the FY2020 Request
• Overview: Syria Chemical Weapons and Disarmament
• Chemical Weapons Use
• 2018 Chemical Attack (Douma) and U.S. Response
• 2017 Chemical Attack (Khan Sheikhoun) and U.S. Response
• 2013 Chemical Weapons Attack (Ghouta)
• Syria and the CWC: Disarmament Verification
• International Investigations of CW Use
• Outlook
• Consolidating Gains Against the Islamic State
• Conflict in Northwestern Syria
• The Future of Displaced Syrians
• Reconstruction
• Addressing Syria-based Threats to Neighboring Countries
• Syria's Political Future
• Implications for Congress
• Author Contact Information
Outlook & Challenges
• Consolidating Gains against the Islamic State
• Preserving Relationships with Partner Forces
• Countering Iran
• Addressing Humanitarian Challenges in Extremist-Held Areas
• Assisting Displaced Syrians
• Preventing Involuntary Refugee Returns
• Managing Reconstruction Aid
• Supporting a Political Settlement to the Conflict

Summary

Since its start in 2011, the Syria conflict has presented significant policy challenges for the United States. (For a brief conflict summary, see Figure 2). U.S. policy toward Syria since 2014 has prioritized counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL/ISIS), but also has included nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition groups, diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the civil war, and humanitarian aid to Syria and regional countries affected by refugee outflows.which sought to direct external attacks from areas under the group's control in northeast Syria. Since 2015, U.S. forces deployed to Syria have trained, equipped, and advised local partners under special authorization from Congress and have worked primarily "by, with, and through" those local partners to retake nearly all areas formerly held by the Islamic State.

Following an internal policy review, Administration officials in late 2018 had described U.S. policy toward As of 2020, about 600 U.S. troops remain in Syria.

In addition to counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State, the United States also has responded to Syria's ongoing civil conflict by providing nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition and civil society groups, encouraging diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the civil war, and serving as the largest single donor of humanitarian aid to Syria and regional countries affected by refugee outflows.

The Trump Administration has described U.S. policy towards Syria as seeking (1) the enduring defeat of the Islamic State; (2) a political settlement to the Syrian civil war; and (3) the withdrawal of Iranian-commanded forces. President Trump's December 2018 announcement that U.S. forces had defeated the Islamic State and would leave Syria appeared to signal the start of a new U.S. approach. However, in February 2019, the White House stated that several hundred U.S. troops would remain in Syria, and the President is requesting $300 million in FY2020 defense funding to continue to equip and sustain Syrian partner forces. The FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 115-232) required the Administration to clarify its Syria strategy and report on current programs in order to obligate FY2019 defense funds for train and equip purposes in Syria.

Enduring defeat of ISIS. U.S.-backed partner forces re-captured the Islamic State's final territorial strongholds in Syria in March 2019. However, U.S. military officials in late 2019 assessed that the group remains cohesive, retains an intact command structure, and maintains an insurgent presence in much of rural Syria. The Defense Department has not disaggregated the costs of military operations in Syria from the overall cost of the counter-IS campaign in Syria and Iraq (known as Operation Inherent Resolve, OIR), which had reached $40.5 billion by December 2019. Political settlement to the conflict. The United States continues to advocate for a negotiated settlement between the government of Syrian President Bashar al Asad and Syrian opposition forces in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 (which calls for the drafting of a new constitution and U.N.-supervised elections). However, the Asad government's use of force to retake most opposition-held areas of Syria has reduced pressure on Damascus to negotiate, and U.S. intelligence officials in 2019 assessed that Asad has little incentive to make significant concessions to the opposition. U.S. officials have stated that the United States will not contribute aid to reconstruction in Asad-held areas unless a political solution is reached.

The United States has directed more than $9.1 billion toward Syria-related humanitarian assistance, and Congress has appropriated billions more for security and stabilization initiatives in Syria and neighboring countries. The Defense Department has not disaggregated the costs of military operations in Syria from the overall cost of the counter-IS campaign in Syria and Iraq (known as Operation Inherent Resolve, OIR), which had reached $28.5 billion by September 2018.

The 115^th Congress considered proposals to authorize or restrict the use of force against the Islamic State and in response to Syrian government chemical weapons attacks, but did not enact any Syria-specific use of force authorizations. The 116^th Congress may seek

Withdrawal of Iranian commanded forces. Administration officials state that the removal of Iran from Syria is a political rather than military goal, and have emphasized that the United States will seek to counter Iranian activities in Syria primarily through the use of economic tools such as sanctions. The United States has on occasion conducted strikes on Iranian-backed militias in Syria when such forces appeared to endanger U.S. or Coalition personnel.

External Players. A range of foreign states have intervened in Syria in support of the Asad government or Syrian opposition forces, as well in pursuit of domestic security goals. Pro-Asad forces operating in Syria include Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia. The United States and a range of regional and European states have at times backed select portions of the Syrian opposition, while also expressing concern about reported ties between some armed opposition groups and extremist elements. Israel has acknowledged conducting over 200 military strikes in Syria, mostly targeting Hezbollah and/or Iranian targets. In addition, Turkey maintains military forces in northern Syria as part of a broader campaign targeting Kurdish fighters.

Humanitarian Situation. As of 2020, roughly half of Syria's pre-war population remains internally displaced (6.2 million) or registered as refugees in neighboring states (5.6 million). The United States has directed nearly $10.5 billion toward Syria-related humanitarian assistance since FY2012, and Congress has appropriated billions more for security and stabilization initiatives in Syria and neighboring countries.

The 116^th Congress has sought clarification from the Administration concerning its overall Syria policy, plans for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces, the U.S role in ensuring a lasting defeat for the Islamic State, U.S. investments and approaches to postconflict stabilization, the future of Syrian refugees and U.S. partners inside Syria, and the challenges of dealing with the Iran- and Russia-aligned Asad government.

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Background

In March 2011, antigovernment protests broke out in Syria, which has been ruled by the Asad family for more than four decades. The protests spread, violence escalated (primarily but not exclusively by Syrian government forces), and numerous political and armed opposition groups emerged. In August 2011, President Barack Obama called on Syrian President Bashar al Asad to step down. Over time, the rising death toll from the conflict, and the use of chemical weapons by the Asad government, intensified pressure for the United States and others to assist the opposition. In 2013, Congress debated lethal and nonlethal assistance to vetted Syrian opposition groups, and authorized the latter. Congress also debated, but did not authorize, the use of force in response to an August 2013 chemical weapons attack.

In 2014, the Obama Administration requested authority and funding from Congress to provide lethal support to vetted Syrians for select purposes. The original request sought authority to support vetted Syrians in "defending the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime," but the subsequent advance of the Islamic State organization from Syria across Iraq refocused executive and legislative deliberations onto counterterrorism. Congress authorized a Department of Defense-led train and equip program to combat terrorist groups active in Syria, defend the United States and its partners from Syria-based terrorist threats, and "promote the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria."

In September 2014, the United States began air strikes in Syria, with the stated goal of preventing the Islamic State from using Syria as a base for its operations in neighboring Iraq. In October 2014, the Defense Department established Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) to "formalize ongoing military actions against the rising threat posed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria." CJTF-OIR came to encompass more than 70 countries, and has bolstered the efforts of local Syrian partner forces against the Islamic State. The United States also gradually increased the number of U.S. personnel in Syria from 50 in late 2015 to roughly 2,000 by late 2017. President Trump in early 2018 called for an expedited withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria,¹ but senior Administration officials later stated that U.S. personnel would remain in Syria to ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State. Then-National Security Advisor John Bolton also stated that U.S. forces would remain in Syria until the withdrawal of Iranian-led forces.² In December 2018, President Trump ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Syria, contributing to the subsequent decision by Defense Secretary James Mattis to resign, and drawing criticism from several Members of Congress. In early 2019, the White House announced that several hundred U.S. troops would remain in Syria.

The collapse of IS and oppositionAs the Islamic State and armed opposition groups have relinquished territorial control inover most of Syria since 2015 has been matched by, the Syrian government and its foreign partners have made significant military and territorial gains by the Syrian government. The U.S. intelligence community's 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment stated in February 2018 that, "The conflict has the conflict had by that point "decisively shifted in the Syrian regime's favor, enabling Russia and Iran to further entrench themselves inside the country."³ At the same time, ongoing conflict between the coalition's Syrian Kurdish partners and Turkey has continued to challenge U.S. policymakers, as has the entrenchment of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups among the opposition and the ongoing humanitarian crisis. As of 2019, 5.7 million Syrians are registered as refugees in nearby countries, with 6.2 million more internally displaced.

The U.N. has sponsored peace talks in Geneva since 2012, but it is unclear when (or whether) the parties might reach a political settlement that couldCoalition and U.S. gains against the Islamic State came largely through the assistance of Syrian Kurdish partner forces, but neighboring Turkey's concerns about those Kurdish forces emerged as a persistent challenge for U.S. policymakers. In 2019, Turkey launched a cross border military operation attempting to expel Syrian Kurdish U.S. partner forces from areas adjacent to the Turkish border. In conjunction with the operation, President Trump ordered the withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Syria and the repositioning of others in areas of eastern Syria once held by the Islamic State group. Territorial gains by the Syrian government have pushed remaining opposition forces (including Al Qaeda affiliates) into a progressively shrinking geographic space that is also occupied by roughly 3 million Syrian civilians. (Figure 3 and Figure 4 show how territory held by Syrian opposition forces was significantly reduced between 2017 and 2020.) The remaining opposition-held areas of Idlib province in northwestern Syria have faced intensified and ongoing Syrian government attacks since 2019. The U.N. has sponsored peace talks in Geneva since 2012, but it appears unlikely that the parties will reach a political settlement that would result in a transition away from Asad. With many armed opposition groups weakened, defeated, or geographically isolated, military pressure on the Syrian government to make concessions to the opposition has been reduced. U.S. officials have stated that the United States will not fund reconstruction in Asad-held areas unless a political solution is reached in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254.⁴

Figure 1. Syria: Map and Country Data

Figure 2. Syria Conflict 2011-2017 2019

Source: CRS. Note: For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11080, Syria Conflict Overview: 2011-2018, by Carla E. Humud.

Figure 3. Syria Areas of Influence 2019 2020 As of March 11, 2019 January 13, 2020

Sources: CRS using area of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor, last revised March 11, 2019January 13, 2020. All areas of influence approximate and subject to change. Other sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports. NotesNote: U.S. military officials have acknowledged publicly that U.S. forces are operating in select areas of eastern Syria to train, advise, assist, and equip partner forces. On March 25, 2019, President Trump issued a proclamation recognizing the Golan Heights as part of the state of Israel.

Figure 4. Syria Areas of Influence 2017 As of August 1January 3, 2017

Sources: CRS using area of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor, as of August 1, 2017. . All areas of influence approximate. Other sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports. NotesNote: U.S. military officials have acknowledged publicly that U.S. forces are operating in select areas of eastern Syria to train, advise, assist, and equip partner forces. This map does not depict all chemical attacks reported in Syria.

Issues for Congress

Congress has considered the following key issues since the outbreak of the Syria conflict in 2011:

• What are the core U.S. national interests in Syria? What objectives derive from those interests? How should U.S. goals in Syria be prioritized?
• What financial, military, and personnel resources are required to implement U.S. objectives in Syria? What measures or metrics can be used to gauge progress?
• Should the U.S. military continue to operate in Syria? For what purposes and on what authority? For how long?
• How are developments in Syria affecting other countries in the region, including U.S. partners?
• What potential consequences of U.S. action or inaction should be considered? How might other outside actors respond to U.S. choices?

Amid significant territorial losses by the Islamic State and Syrian opposition groups since 2015 and parallel military gains by the Syrian government and coalition partner forces, U.S. policymakers face a number of questions and potential decision points related to the following factors:

Counter-IS operations and the presence of U.S. military personnel in Syria

The announcement by President Trump in December 2018 that U.S. forces would withdraw from Syria was welcomed by the Syrian government and its Russian and Iranian partners, along with observers who questioned the necessity, utility, and legality of continued U.S. operations. The decision also drew domestic and international criticism from those who argued it could enable the reemergence of the Islamic State and embolden Russia and Iran in Syria (see "2018: President Trump Announces Withdrawal"). Some Members of Congress called upon President Trump to reconsider his decision to withdraw U.S. forces, stating that the move was premature and "threatens the safety and security of the United States."⁵ Others embraced the decision, citing concerns about the lack of specific authorization for the U.S. campaign and the effectiveness of U.S. efforts.⁶ In February 2019, the White House reversed its December announcement, stating that roughly 400 U.S. troops would remain in Syria.

Members of the 116^th Congress may seek clarification on the Administration's strategy to ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State. A Lead Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) released in February 2019 states that, "absent sustained [counterterrorism] pressure, ISIS could likely resurge in Syria within six to twelve months and regain limited territory in the [Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV)]."⁷

The future of the Syria Train and Equip program

The Islamic State has lost the territory it once held in Syria, and much of that territory is now controlled by local forces that have received U.S. training and assistance since 2014. (See Figure 3 and Figure 4.) In 2017 and 2018, significant reductions in IS territorial control prompted some reevaluation of the Syria Train and Equip (T&E) program, whose primary purpose had been to support offensive campaigns against Islamic State forces. The Trump Administration requested $300 million in FY2019 Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) monies for Syria programs, largely intended to shift toward training local partners as a hold force. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245) provided $1.35 billion for the CTEF account, slightly less than the Administration's requested amount for the overall account ($1.4 billion) based on congressional concerns about some Syria-related funds.

The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) extended the Syria T&E program's authority through the end of 2018, but the FY2018 NDAA did not extend it further, asking instead for the Trump Administration to submit a report on its proposed strategy for Syria by February 2018. The FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232) prohibited the obligation of FY2019 defense funds for the program until the strategy required by the FY2018 NDAA and an additional update report on train and equip efforts was submitted to Congress. The FY2019 act extended the Syria T&E authority through December 2019 but did not adjust the program's authorized scope or purposes.

The Administration's FY2020 defense funding request seeks an additional $300 million to equip and sustain vetted Syrian opposition (VSO) forces.

The future of U.S. relations with the Asad government

Strained U.S.-Syria ties prior to the start of the conflict, including Syria's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, are reflected in a series of U.S. sanctions and legal restrictions that remain in place today. U.S. policy toward Syria since August 2011 has been predicated on a stated desire to see Bashar al Asad leave office, preferably through a negotiated political settlement. However, the Asad government—backed by Russia and Iran—has reasserted control over much of western Syria since 2015, and appears poised to claim victory in the conflict. In an acknowledgement of the conflict's trajectory, U.S. calls for Asad's departure have largely faded. In late 2018, senior Administration officials stated that while "America will never have good relations with Bashar al Asad," the Syrian people ultimately "get to decide who will lead them and what kind of a government they will have. We are not committed to any kind of regime change."⁸ Nevertheless, the Trump Administration has stated its intent to refrain from supporting reconstruction efforts in Syria until a political solution is reached in accordance with UNSCR 2254, which calls for constitutional reform and U.N.-supervised elections.

The future of U.S. assistance and stabilization programs in Asad-led Syria

In the short term, policy discussions may focus on whether or how the Syrian government's reassertion of de facto control should affect U.S. military and assistance policy. The Trump Administration has directed a reorientation in U.S. assistance programs in Syria and has sought and arranged for new foreign contributions to support the stabilization of areas liberated from Islamic State control. The practical effect of this approach to date has been the drawdown of some assistance programs in opposition-held areas of northwestern Syria and the reprogramming of some U.S. funds appropriated by Congress for stabilization programs in Syria to other priorities. The future of U.S.-administered stabilization and other assistance programs in formerly opposition-held areas of Syria and areas currently held by U.S. partner forces is in question, in light of both the Asad government's reassertion of control in many areas, the planned reduction of U.S. military forces, and the December 2018 withdrawal of State Department and USAID personnel from northern Syria.

As noted above, the Administration has stated its intention to end U.S. nonhumanitarian assistance to Asad-controlled areas of the country until the Syrian government fulfills the terms of UNSCR 2254. The Administration also has stated its intent to use U.S. diplomatic influence to discourage other international assistance to government-controlled Syria in the absence of a credible political process.⁹

Then-U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura said in 2017 that Syria reconstruction will cost at least $250 billion,¹⁰ and a group of U.N.-convened experts estimated in August 2018 that the cost of conflict damage could exceed $388 billion.¹¹ Congress may debate how the United States might best assist Syrian civilians in need, most of whom live in areas under Syrian government control, without inadvertently strengthening the Asad government or its Russian and Iranian patrons.

Syria-Related Legislation in the 116^th Congress

Strengthening America's Security in the Middle East Act of 2019 (S. 1)

Introduced on January 3 by Senator Rubio and three cosponsors, the bill incorporates the Senate version of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2018 considered during the 115^th Congress and passed by the House in a different version. Title III would require the Secretary of the Treasury to make a determination within 180 days of enactment on whether the Central Bank of Syria is a financial institution of primary money laundering concern. If so, the bill would require the Secretary to impose one or more of the special measures described in Section 5318A(b) of Title 31, United States Code. The bill also would expand the scope of secondary sanctions on Syria to include foreign persons who knowingly provide support to Russian or Iranian entities operating on behalf of the Syrian government. It would also make eligible for sanctions foreign persons who knowingly sell or provide military aircraft and energy sector goods or services, or who knowingly provide significant construction or engineering services to the government of Syria. The bill does include several suspension and waiver authorities for the President. Its provisions would expire five years after the date of enactment.

Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (H.R. 31, S. 52)

In January, the House passed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, introduced by Representative Engel (H.R. 31). A version of the bill was also introduced in the Senate by Senators Risch, Menendez, and Rubio (S. 52). An earlier version of the bill was considered during the 115^th Congress. H.R. 31 would eliminate Sections 103 to 303 of S. 52 (primarily amendments to the Syria Human Rights Accountability Act of 2012). The House bill retains all of the provisions found in Title III of S. 1 (see above).

No Assistance for Assad Act (H.R. 1706)

Introduced in March by Representative Engel, the bill would state that it is the policy of the United States that U.S. foreign assistance made available for reconstruction or stabilization in Syria should only be used in a democratic Syria or in areas of Syria not controlled by the Asad government or aligned forces. Reconstruction and stabilization aid appropriated or otherwise available from FY2020 through FY2024 could not be provided "directly or indirectly" to areas under Syrian government control—as determined by the Secretary of State—unless the President certifies to Congress that the government of Syria has met a number of conditions. These include ceasing air strikes against civilians, releasing all political prisoners, allowing regular access to humanitarian assistance, fulfilling obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, permitting the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons, taking steps to establishing meaningful accountability for perpetrators of war crimes, and halting the development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles. The House passed an earlier version of the bill during the 115^th Congress.

By noting restrictions on U.S. aid provided "directly or indirectly," the bill also would limit U.S. funds that could flow into Syria via multilateral institutions and international organizations, including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The bill would permit exceptions to the above restrictions on aid to government-held areas for humanitarian projects, "projects to be administered by local organizations that reflect the aims, needs, and priorities of local communities," and projects that meet basic human needs including drought relief; assistance to refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims; the distribution of food and medicine; and the provision of health services.

The bill would also state that it is the sense of Congress that the United States should not fund projects in which any Syrian government official or immediate family member has a financial or material interest, or is affiliated with the implementing partner.

Recent Developments

Military

Islamic State Loses Last Territorial Stronghold

On March 23, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) announced that the Islamic State had lost its final stronghold in the eastern Syrian town of Baghouz.¹² President Trump initially announced the group's defeat in December 2018, although Coalition and SDF operations against the group continued in 2019.¹³ In early March CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel stated that the territory held by the Islamic State had been reduced down to a single square mile near Baghouz, along the Euphrates River (Figure 3). However, Votel also noted,

we should be clear that what we are seeing now is not the surrender of ISIS as an organization, but a calculated decision to preserve the safety of their families and preservation of their capabilities by taking their chances in camps for internally displaced persons and going to ground and remote areas and waiting for the right time to resurge.¹⁴

Votel also noted that, "ISIS population being evacuated from the remaining vestiges of caliphate largely remain unrepentant, unbroken, and radicalized. We will need to maintain a vigilant offensive against this now widely dispersed and disaggregated organization."¹⁵ Coalition officials previously have stated that they do not intend to operate in Syrian-government controlled territory,¹⁶ despite reports that IS militants remain present in those areas.¹⁷

Continued attacks by the Islamic State in 2019 have raised concerns about the group's resiliency and potential to regenerate, particularly given plans to withdraw most U.S. military forces from Syria. On January 16, a suicide bombing claimed by the Islamic State killed 4 Americans and 15 others in the northern city of Manbij, in Aleppo province. One week later, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device targeted a joint American-SDF patrol in the town of Ash Shaddadi in Hasakah province. Both cities were liberated from the Islamic State in 2016. The most recent Lead Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) states that, "absent sustained [counterterrorism] pressure, ISIS could likely resurge in Syria within six to twelve months and regain limited territory in the [Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV)]."¹⁸

Prior to the Administration's withdrawal announcement in December 2018, U.S. officials had stated that once the conventional fight against the Islamic State was completed, the coalition would shift to a "new phase" focused on stabilization, including the training of local forces to hold liberated areas.¹⁹ These plans were reflected in the Defense Department and State Department requests for appropriations for FY2019. Following the Administration's February announcement that several hundred U.S. troops would remain in Syria, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford stated,

[...] this is about campaign continuity. So we had a campaign that was designed to clear ISIS from the ground that they had held, and we always had planned to transition into a stabilization phase where we train local forces to provide security and prevent the regeneration of ISIS. So there is -- there is no change in the basic campaign, the resourcing is being adjusted because the threat has been changed.

While military officials have emphasized the continuity of the U.S. military campaign, it is not clear whether the threat posed by the Islamic State is similarly unchanged, particularly as the group shifts from controlling territory to operating as what General Votel has described as a "clandestine insurgency."²⁰ U.S. officials in 2018 stated that the Islamic State had "atomized," becoming more dispersed in its command and control, and posing a more decentralized threat.²¹ Former U.S. Special Envoy Brett McGurk, who resigned in December 2018, had stated that the "defeat of the physical space is not the defeat of ISIS," noting that the group is less vulnerable to conventional military operations once it no longer holds large areas of territory.²²

Islamic State Detainees in Syria U.S. officials have reported that over 700 detainees from about 40 different countries are currently in SDF custody, and that the State Department is engaged in ongoing discussions to secure the repatriation of detainees to their home countries.23 U.S. officials have stated that both the ongoing detention and the eventual repatriation of these individuals must be handled with care, noting that the early leaders of Islamic State were former detainees (from the 2003-2011 U.S. war in Iraq). Neither their home countries nor the SDF wish to assume long-term responsibility for the detainees, which are viewed as a security risk.24

Idlib: The Final Opposition Stronghold

Idlib province has been under rebel control since 2015, hindering the Asad government's ability to transit directly from government-held areas in the south to Syria's largest city of Aleppo, in the north. While a range of opposition groups operate in Idlib, U.S. officials have described the province as a safe haven for Al Qaeda, while also highlighting the significant civilian presence. U.S. initiatives in Idlib aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) were halted in May 2018 as part of a broader withdrawal of U.S. assistance to northwest Syria.²⁵

De-escalation Area & Demilitarized Zone. In May 2017, an agreement between Russia, Iran, and Turkey established the Idlib de-escalation area (encompassing all of Idlib province as well as portions of neighboring Lattakia, Aleppo, and Hama provinces).²⁶ The agreement was designed to reduce violence between regime and opposition forces. However, regime forces continued to pursue military operations in the area, recapturing about half of the de-escalation area by mid-2018. Both regime and armed opposition forces expressed determination to control the remaining portions of Idlib, raising fears that a large-scale offensive pitting Syrian government forces against a mix of armed opposition and jihadist forces could trigger a humanitarian crisis for civilians in the area. In October 2018, Russia and Turkey created a demilitarized zone in parts of Idlib province to separate the two sides.

2019 Jihadist Advance. In January 2019, the Al Qaeda-linked group Haya't Tahrir al Sham (HTS) seized large areas of Idlib province from rival armed groups, forcing them to accept an HTS-run civil administration. HTS was established in 2017 as a successor to the Nusra Front (Al Qaeda's formal affiliate in Syria). U.S. officials have stated that "The core of HTS is Nusra,"²⁷ and amended the FTO designation of the Nusra Front in May 2018 to include HTS as an alias.

Al Qaeda in Idlib

U.S. officials in mid-2017 described Idlib province as "the largest Al Qaeda safe haven since 9/11."²⁸ Beginning in 2014, the United States conducted a series of air strikes, largely in Idlib province, against Al Qaeda targets. These strikes fell outside the framework of Operation Inherent Resolve (which focuses on the Islamic State), and U.S. officials stated that they were conducted on the basis of the 2001 AUMF.²⁹ At least a dozen foreign Al Qaeda leaders have been killed in Syria since 2014, mostly in Idlib. A February 2017 U.S. drone strike in Idlib killed the deputy leader of Al Qaeda, and a U.S. strike on an Al Qaeda training camp in Idlib the previous month killed more than 100 Al Qaeda fighters.³⁰

Figure 5. Northern Syria Areas of Control As of March 11, 2019

Source: CRS using area of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor, last revised March 11, 2019. All areas of influence approximate and subject to change. Other sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports. Notes: U.S. military officials have acknowledged publicly that U.S. forces are operating in select areas of eastern Syria to train, advise, assist, and equip partner forces.

In addition to HTS, the intelligence community's 2019 worldwide threat assessment also referenced another Al Qaeda-linked group in Syria known as Hurras al Din ("Guardians of Religion"). While HTS and Hurras al Din have occasionally clashed in Idlib, some analysts have assessed that the two groups "serve different functions that equally serve al-Qa`ida's established objectives: one appeals to hardened jihadis with an uncompromising doctrine focused on jihad beyond Syria and one appeals to those focused on the Syrian war."³¹ In February 2019, the two groups signed an accord pledging broader cooperation.³²

Risk of Escalation

The 2019 expansion of jihadist groups in Idlib has raised concern about the potential for renewed Syrian and/or Russian operations in the area. In March 2019, Syrian and Russian strikes in Idlib reportedly intensified to their highest level in months.³³ U.N. officials have described Idlib as a "dumping ground" for fighters and civilians—including an estimated 1 million children—evacuated or displaced from formerly opposition-held areas in other parts of the country. U.N. officials have warned that a mass assault on Idlib could result in "the biggest humanitarian catastrophe we've seen for decades."³⁴

Turkish Operations in Northern Syria³⁵

Turkey has maintained a military presence in northern Syria since 2016, and currently has forces deployed in Aleppo and Idlib provinces. Turkish forces partner with local Arab militias and have conducted border operations against the Islamic State and other jihadist fighters, while also targeting Syrian Kurdish forces.

President Trump has stated that Turkey could play a larger role in countering the Islamic State in Syria,³⁶ although it is unclear to what extent U.S. and Turkish objectives overlap. Turkish officials have openly stated that their objectives are not limited to IS militants, and that they also intend to expand military operations against Kurdish forces—including those that have been allied with the United States as part of the counter-IS campaign.³⁷ It is unclear to what extent Ankara is prepared to launch counter-IS operations in parts of Syria not adjacent to Turkey's border. U.S. military officials have noted that Turkey has not participated in ground operations against the Islamic State in Syria since 2017, and that Turkish forces have not participated in the fight against the Islamic State in the Middle Euphrates River Valley (MERV), which is roughly 230 miles away from the Turkish border.³⁸ Turkish officials have requested U.S. air and logistical support for their potential operations, despite the two countries' different stances on the YPG.³⁹

In January 2019, President Trump proposed the creation of a 20-mile deep "safe zone" on the Syria side of the border.⁴⁰ Secretary of State Mike Pompeo later said that the U.S. "twin aims" are to make sure that those who helped take down the IS caliphate have security, and to prevent terrorists from attacking Turkey out of Syria.⁴¹ It is unclear who would enforce such a zone. Some sources suggest that U.S. officials favor having a Western coalition patrol any kind of buffer zone inside the Syrian border, with some U.S. support, while Turkey wants its forces together with allied Syrian opposition partners to take that role.⁴² Kurdish representatives have said that a safe zone must be guaranteed by international forces.⁴³

Israeli Strikes in Syria

In September 2018, Israeli Intelligence Minister Israel Katz said, "in the last two years Israel has taken military action more than 200 times within Syria itself."⁴⁴ Israeli strikes in Syria have mostly targeted locations and convoys near the Lebanese border associated with weapons shipments to Lebanese Hezbollah.⁴⁵ However, in 2018, strikes widely attributed to Israel for the first time directly targeted Iranian facilities and personnel in Syria.⁴⁶

In September 2018, Israel struck military targets in Syria's coastal province of Lattakia. A Syrian antiaircraft battery responding to the Israeli strikes downed a Russian military plane, killing 15 Russian personnel.⁴⁷ An IDF spokesperson stated that Israeli jets were targeting "a facility of the Syrian Armed Forces from which systems to manufacture accurate and lethal weapons were about to be transferred on behalf of Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon."⁴⁸ The spokesperson added that the IDF and the Russian military maintain a deconfliction system in Syria, stating that the Russian plane was not in the area of operation during the Lattakia strike and blaming "extensive and inaccurate" Syrian antiaircraft fire for the incident. In response to the downing of their plane, Russian defense officials announced plans to provide an S-300 air defense system to Syria.

The expanding presence of Iranian and Iranian-backed personnel in Syria remains a consistent point of tension between Israel and Iran. In a rare acknowledgement, Israeli military officials in January 2019 confirmed strikes on Iranian military targets in Syria.⁴⁹ Israel has accused Hezbollah of establishing a cell in Syrian-held areas of the Golan Heights, with the eventual goal of launching attacks into Israel.⁵⁰

For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10858, Iran and Israel: Tension Over Syria, by Carla E. Humud, Kenneth Katzman, and Jim Zanotti.

Political Negotiations

The Geneva Process

Since 2012, the Syrian government and opposition have participated in U.N.-brokered negotiations under the framework of the Geneva Communiqué. Endorsed by both the United States and Russia, the Geneva Communiqué calls for the establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers. According to the document, such a government "could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent."⁵¹ Issues for Congress Prior to the 2019 Turkish military incursion and U.S. withdrawal decisions, the 116^th Congress had been considering the Administration's FY2020 requests for defense and foreign aid appropriations, which presumed continued counterterrorism, train and equip, and humanitarian operations in Syria. Members debated legislative proposals that would have extended and amended related authorities and made additional funding available to continue U.S. efforts, including stabilization programs. Following President Trump's withdrawal and redeployment decisions, Congress enacted revisions to the underlying authority for U.S. military train and equip efforts in Syria and appropriated additional funds to continue related operations.

During 2020, Congress may further consider what, if any, revised defense and foreign assistance needs may be appropriate in connection with revised U.S. plans and any forthcoming changes to U.S. military deployments in Syria or in neighboring Iraq. Similarly, Members may consider how, if at all, Congress should increase, decrease, or reallocate defense, humanitarian, and stabilization resources for FY2021 and what, if any, new or revised oversight mechanisms ought to be employed.

Specific issues for congressional consideration could include the following.

U.S. military operations and authorities

U.S. forces have operated inside Syria since 2015 pursuant to the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMF),⁴ despite ongoing debate about the applicability of these authorizations to current operations in Syria.⁵ In December 2018, President Trump declared the Islamic State "defeated," raising questions about the authorities underlying a continued U.S. military presence in Syria. Defense and State Department officials continue to highlight the ongoing threat posed by the Islamic State, including to the U.S. homeland.⁶ Islamic State attacks continue in areas of eastern Syria, and oversight reporting suggests that Administration officials believe the group could resurge if military pressure on its remnants lessens.⁷ Nevertheless, some observers have argued that some U.S. military outposts in Syria (such as the U.S. garrison at At Tanf) appear primarily designed to stem the flow of Iranian-backed militias into Syria.⁸

Future of U.S.-SDF Partnership

Following the October 2019 Turkish incursion into northern Syria, the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) sought protection from the Asad government. U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Ambassador James Jeffrey stated that the SDF and the Asad government reached "an agreement in some areas to coordinate."⁹ In December 2019, senior U.S. military officials acknowledged "dialogue" between the SDF and the Syrian military, but testified that U.S. forces continue to conduct combined operations with the SDF.¹⁰ U.S. officials have not publicly elaborated on the scale of coordination and/or dialogue between the Syrian military and the SDF, or on how this may impact U.S. interactions with, or funding for, the group.

Security of U.S. Forces in Syria

Syrian government forces, with the support of Russia, have expanded their operations and presence in some areas of eastern Syria evacuated by U.S., Coalition, and SDF forces in 2019. The expanded presence of Syrian government forces in these areas may increase the potential for interactions between remaining U.S. personnel and Syrian or Russian forces, with uncertain implications for force protection and potential conflict. The Syrian government continues to refer to U.S. forces as occupiers and has warned that "resistance" forces might target U.S. personnel.¹⁵ Syrian officials have specifically called for the United States to end what they describe as the "illegal" presence of U.S. forces at Syrian oilfields.¹⁶ The Defense Department has stated that U.S. forces in Syria maintain "the inherent right to self-defense against any threat, includ[ing] while securing the oil fields."¹⁷ President Trump has stated that, "we may have to fight for the oil. It's okay. Maybe somebody else wants the oil, in which case they have a hell of a fight."¹⁸ Vice President Pence has stated that U.S. troops in troops in Syria will "secure the oil fields so that they don't fall into the hands of either ISIS or Iran or the Syrian regime."¹⁹ In February 2020, pro-regime forces manning a checkpoint in Qamishli opened fire on Coalition forces conducting a patrol; no Coalition injuries were reported.²⁰

In early 2020, media reports highlighted increasingly frequent "standoffs" between U.S. and Russian personnel along highways in northeast Syria.²¹ U.S. officials have described these incidents as occurring along a road that is shared by U.S., Russian, and Syrian forces operating in adjacent areas of the northeast, particularly around Qamishli.²² Ambassador Jeffrey has stated that, on a limited number of occasions, Russian personnel have "tried to come deep into the area where [the United States] and the SDF are patrolling, well inside the basic lines that we have sketched, not right along the borders. Those are the ones that worry me."²³ CJTF-OIR has reported that "although established de-confliction procedures exist, both Russia and the United States have limited options for enforcement if a party violates protocols, which could lead to increased risk to force protection and the potential for unintended escalation or miscalculation."²⁴

Syria Provisions in FY2020 Defense and Foreign Operations Legislation FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92)

The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) extends the Syria Train and Equip program's authority until the end of 2020, and modifies the program's purposes. Changes under Section 1222 of the act include

• specifying the program's beneficiaries to include "appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals," striking previous language referencing Syrian opposition forces;²⁵
• amending the program objectives to include securing territory formerly controlled by the Islamic State and supporting the temporary detention and repatriation of IS detainees;
• eliminating some of the details previously reported to congressional committees (such as the concept of operations, timelines, and types of training, equipment, stipends, sustainment, construction, and supplies to be required), while preserving broader reporting requirements on the goals and objectives of authorized assistance, and on the number and role of U.S. military personnel involved;
• removing the previously existing requirement for the Defense Department to use prior approval reprogramming procedures to obligate funds for the Syria T&E program and substituting a more frequent prior notification system (requiring reports no later than 15 days before the expenditure of each 10 percent increment of FY2019 and FY2020 funds);
• adding new reporting requirements on (1) the relationship between program recipients and civilian governance authorities; (2) U.S. stabilization activities in IS-liberated areas; and (3) IS detainees held by vetted Syrian groups; and
• restricting the provision of U.S. weapons to small arms.

Section 1224 of the act requires the president to identify or designate a senior-level coordinator responsible for the long-term disposition of IS members currently in SDF custody. The congressionally mandated Syria Study Group highlighted the lack of such a coordinator in its September 2019 final report.

The Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019

The FY2020 NDAA also incorporates the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (Title LXXIV). Section 7411 of the act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to make a determination within 180 days of enactment on whether the Central Bank of Syria is a financial institution of primary money laundering concern. If so, the Secretary would be required to impose one or more of the special measures described in Section 5318A(b) of title 31, United States Code, with respect to the Central Bank of Syria.

Section 7412 directs the President to impose sanctions on any foreign person who the President determines is knowingly providing significant financial, material, or technological support to the government of Syria or to a foreign person operating in a military capacity inside Syria on behalf of the governments of Syria, Russia, or Iran. It also makes eligible for sanctions foreign persons who knowingly sell or provide (1) goods, services, technology, or information that significantly facilitates the maintenance or expansion of the government of Syria's domestic production of natural gas, petroleum, or petroleum products; (2) aircraft or spare aircraft parts that are used for military purposes in Syria in areas controlled by the Syrian government or associated forces;( 3) significant construction or engineering services to the government of Syria.

Section 7413 requires the President to determine the areas of Syria controlled by the governments of Syria, Iran, and Russia, and to submit a strategy to deter foreign persons from entering into contracts related to reconstruction in those areas. The bill includes several suspension and waiver authorities for the President, including for nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance. Its provisions would expire five years after the date of enactment.

Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94)

The FY2020 State and Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (Division G of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94) contains several Syria-related provisions:

• Section 7033(c) makes ESF funds available notwithstanding any other provision of law for assistance for ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and Syria.
• Section 7035(a) makes NADR funds available for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) for programs in areas liberated from the Islamic State.
• Section 7041(i) makes not less than $40 million in ESF, INCLE, and PKO funds appropriated by this act available, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria—of which, not less than $7 million shall be made available for emergency medical and rescue response, and chemical weapons use investigations. These funds may not be used for activities that support Iran or Iranian proxies, or that further the strategic objectives of Russia. They also may not be used in areas of Syria controlled by the Asad government or associated forces.
• Section 7065(a) states that not less than $200 million of funds appropriated under ESF, INCLE, NADR, PKO, and FMF shall be made available for the Relief and Recovery Fund for assistance for areas liberated or at risk from, or under the control of, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, other terrorist organizations, or violent extremist organizations, including for stabilization assistance for vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities affected by conflict.
• This section also states that, of the funds made available for the Relief and Recovery Fund, not less than $10 million shall be made available for programs to promote accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, including in Iraq and Syria.
• Title V of the bill, known as the Global Fragility Act of 2019, establishes a new fund titled the Prevention and Stabilization Fund, and authorizes $200 million to be appropriated to the fund for each of the fiscal years 2020 through 2024. These funds are authorized be used to support stabilization of conflict affected areas, and to provide assistance to areas liberated from the Islamic State or other terrorist organizations—as well as to support vulnerable ethnic and religious minority communities affected by conflict. This new fund will replace the Relief and Recovery Fund designation applied in recent appropriations acts.

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-93)

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2020 (Division A of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-93 ) makes $1.195 billion in the Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) available to counter the Islamic State globally, including to provide training, equipment, logistics support, infrastructure repair, and sustainment to countries or irregular forces engaged in counter-IS activities. No specific amount is designated for Syria in the act, but the accompanying explanatory statement allocates $200 million for Syria programs, $100 million less than the Administration's request. Section 9019 states that no funds made available by the act may be used for the "introduction of United States armed or military forces into hostilities in Syria, into situations in Syria where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, or into Syrian territory, airspace, or waters while equipped for combat."

Syria-Related Legislation in the 116^th Congress Special Immigrant Status for U.S. Partner Forces²⁶

The October 2019 Turkish military incursion into northern Syria targeted Syrian Kurdish forces that had worked closely with the United States to secure the territorial defeat of ISIS. The same month, three bills were introduced that would each establish a special immigrant visa (SIV) program for certain Syrians²⁷ who had worked with U.S. military forces or the U.S. government. These programs would provide a new avenue under the U.S. immigration system for eligible individuals to be considered for admission to the United States. Upon admission, these individuals would become U.S. lawful permanent residents. Although the particular criteria in the three proposed SIV programs differ, all three would require applicants to obtain a favorable recommendation regarding their work with the U.S. government and be determined to be admissible to United States, which requires clearance of background checks and security screening, among other screening. All three programs would be subject to annual numerical limits, which would apply to the principal applicants but not to their accompanying spouses or children.

Syrian Allies Protection Act (S. 2625). Introduced by Senator Warner, the bill would authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide special immigrant status to a Syrian national who had worked directly with U.S. military forces as a translator or in another role deemed "vital to the success of the United States military mission in Syria," as determined by the Secretary of Defense, for a period of at least six months between September 2014 and October 2019. Applicants would need to obtain a written recommendation from a general or flag officer. The SIV program would be capped at 250 principal applicants per fiscal year.

Syrian Partner Protection Act (H.R. 4873). Introduced by Representative Crow, the bill would authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide special immigrant status to a Syrian national or stateless person habitually residing in Syria who worked for or with the U.S. government in Syria "as an interpreter, translator, intelligence analyst, or in another sensitive and trusted capacity" for an aggregate period of not less than one year after January 2014. The individual's "service to United States efforts against the Islamic State" would need to be documented in a positive recommendation or evaluation. The SIV program, which would be temporary, would be capped at 4,000 principal applicants per year for five fiscal years.

Promoting American National Security and Preventing the Resurgence of ISIS Act of 2019 (S. 2641). Section 203 of S. 2641, as reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would authorize the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide special immigrant status to a Syrian or stateless Kurd habitually residing in Syria who is or was employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government "in a role that was vital to the success of the United States' Counter ISIS mission in Syria," as determined by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense. The individual must have been so employed for a period of at least one year after January 2014 and must obtain a favorable written recommendation from a senior supervisor. In addition, the applicant must have experienced or must be "experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of the alien's employment by the United States Government." The SIV program would be capped at 400 principal applicants per fiscal year.

The Syrian SIV programs proposed by these bills are generally modeled on the existing temporary SIV programs for Iraqis and Afghans who have worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government, although there are some key differences. For example, under both the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs, the recommendation or evaluation (attesting to valuable service) that an applicant is required to submit must be accompanied by approval from the appropriate Chief of Mission. The Syrian SIV bills would not require applicants to obtain Chief of Mission approval, although S. 2641 would require an applicant's recommendation to be approved by a senior foreign service officer designated by the Secretary of State. S. 2641 is also the only one of the three bills to require an applicant to show that he or she has experienced or is experiencing a serious threat as a result of employment by the U.S. government; this is a requirement under both the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs. In addition, all three Syrian SIV bills include provisions that do not have counterparts under the Iraqi and Afghan programs that would provide for the protection or relocation of applicants who are in imminent danger or whose lives or safety are at risk.

No Assistance for Assad Act (H.R. 1706)

Introduced in March 2019 by Representative Engel, the bill would state that it is the policy of the United States that U.S. foreign assistance made available for reconstruction or stabilization in Syria should only be used in a democratic Syria or in areas of Syria not controlled by the Asad government or aligned forces. Reconstruction and stabilization aid appropriated or otherwise available from FY2020 through FY2024 could not be provided "directly or indirectly" to areas under Syrian government control—as determined by the Secretary of State—unless the President certifies to Congress that the government of Syria has met a number of conditions. These include ceasing air strikes against civilians, releasing all political prisoners, allowing regular access to humanitarian assistance, fulfilling obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, permitting the safe and voluntary return of displaced persons, taking steps to establishing meaningful accountability for perpetrators of war crimes, and halting the development and deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles. The House passed an earlier version of the bill during the 115^th Congress.

By noting restrictions on U.S. aid provided "directly or indirectly," the bill also would limit U.S. funds that could flow into Syria via multilateral institutions and international organizations, including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. The bill would permit exceptions to the above restrictions on aid to government-held areas for humanitarian projects, "projects to be administered by local organizations that reflect the aims, needs, and priorities of local communities," and projects that meet basic human needs including drought relief; assistance to refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims; the distribution of food and medicine; and the provision of health services.

Military Developments Turkish Incursion into Northern Syria

On October 9, 2019, Turkey's military (and allied Syrian opposition groups) entered northeastern Syria in a military operation targeting Kurdish People's Protection Unit (YPG) forces. Known as Operation Peace Spring (OPS), the Turkish operation followed a call between President Trump and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After the phone call, President Trump ordered a pullback of U.S. forces from the area of the anticipated Turkish incursion. (28 Special Forces Green Berets located along Turkey's initial "axis of advance" were withdrawn prior to the Turkish operation.)²⁸ This drew accusations among many, including some Members of Congress, that the Administration had offered a tacit "green light," to the Turkish operation, a charge strongly denied by Administration officials who described the U.S. decision to withdraw forces as a matter of personnel safety.²⁹ President Trump said in a statement, "The United States does not endorse this attack and has made it clear to Turkey that this operation is a bad idea."³⁰

A subsequent U.S.-brokered ceasefire in mid-October allowed for the withdrawal of SDF forces from the Turkish zone of incursion, roughly corresponding to the area between the towns of Tell Abiad and Ras al Ayn (see Figure 5). It also created a Turkish "safe zone" stretching between the two towns, extending to a depth of 32km inside Syria. Separately, Turkey and Russia negotiated security zones east and west of the OPS area, from which SDF forces were also expected to withdraw (to a depth of 30km from the border). These latter areas are being patrolled by a mix of Turkish, Russian, and Syrian forces.

Figure 5. Syria-Turkey Border

As of January 13, 2020

Source: CRS, using areas of influence data from IHS Conflict Monitor.

Note: This map does not depict precisely or comprehensively all U.S. bases or operating locations in Syria.

According to U.S. military sources, the Turkish operation "set in motion a series of actions that affected the Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) mission against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); the U.S. relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the United States' most reliable partner in Syria; and the control of territory in northeastern Syria."³¹ Similarly, Ambassador Jeffrey testified that the Turkish incursion was launched despite U.S. objections, "undermining the D-ISIS campaign, risking endangering and displacing civilians, destroying critical civilian infrastructure, and threatening the security of the area. Turkey's military actions have precipitated a humanitarian crisis and set conditions for possible war crimes."³²

Ultimate Turkish and YPG objectives regarding the areas in question remain unclear. Since late October, Turkish-led fighters have periodically skirmished against YPG or Syrian government forces in places outside the areas under nominal Turkish control.³³ Turkish officials also have blamed Kurdish forces for car bomb and land mine attacks in Turkish-held areas, some of which have caused civilian casualties.³⁴

As a result of the Turkish operation, SDF operations against the Islamic State were temporarily paused, as was U.S. training for the SDF in areas affected by the Turkish incursion.³⁵ U.S. forces withdrew from outposts in northern Syria (including Manbij and Ayn Issa); Syrian and Russian forces moved in "to fill the void created by departing U.S. forces."³⁶ The State Department also moved its Syria Transition Assistance Team personnel inside Syria (START-Forward) out of the country. In the same period, the SDF redoubled its dialogue with the Asad government and reached an agreement to coordinate in some areas. As of December 2019, U.S. military officials testified that, "[ ... ] we continue combined operations with the Syrian Democratic Forces in order to complete the enduring defeat of ISIS and prevent their reemergence."³⁷

Islamic State: Ongoing Threats

In March 2019, the Islamic State lost its final territorial stronghold in Syria, as a result of Coalition operations in partnership with the SDF. Since then, U.S. military officials have warned that the group is defeated but not eliminated, and that it continues to pose a significant threat to local and regional stability. A U.S. airstrike in October 2019 killed IS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in Syria's northwest province of Idlib. Abu Ibrahim al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi was named as Baghdadi's successor; little is publicly known about him. CENTCOM Commander Gen. Kenneth McKenzie stated that while Baghdadi's death may cause a slight disruption to the Islamic State's activities, "ISIS is first and last an ideology, so we are under no illusions that it's going to go away just because we killed Baghdadi."³⁸

President Trump's announcement in October 2019 that all U.S. forces would withdraw from northern Syria, triggered warnings about the potential for an IS resurgence. In January 2020, U.S. officials estimated that the Islamic State retained about 14,000-18,000 IS fighters active between Syria and Iraq—similar to estimates provided in mid-2019.³⁹

The October 2019 OIG Inspector General Report on Operation Inherent Resolve stated that, "With SDF and Coalition operations against ISIS in Syria diminished, U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic agencies warned that ISIS was likely to exploit the reduction in counterterrorism pressure to reconstitute its operations in Syria."⁴⁰ According to the report, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed that a reduction in counterterrorism pressure "will provide the group with time and space to expand its ability to conduct transnational attacks targeting the West."⁴¹ The withdrawal announcement has since been modified to allow for the continued deployment of roughly 600 U.S. forces to Syria.

Prior to the Turkish incursion, U.S. and Coalition forces had been training and equipping the SDF and other partner forces to enable them to hold territory and conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Islamic State in northeast Syria. CJTF-OIR reported that as of the end of fourth quarter of FY2019, the SDF remained in need of additional personnel, training, and equipment to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Islamic State. As noted above, in December 2019, Congress modified existing authorities for train and equip activities in Syria and appropriated an additional $200 million for related Syria programs.

Islamic State Detainees

The capture of the final Islamic State stronghold in Syria in March 2019 led to the surrender of thousands of IS fighters, as well as their spouses and children. Since then, the SDF has retained custody of roughly 10,000 IS militants (including approximately 2,000 foreign fighters) at several makeshift prisons in northern Syria. Wives and children of IS fighters (some of whom also may be radicalized) are held at separate IDP camps. The largest of these is Al Hol, which houses about 66,000 individuals, 96% of whom are women or children.⁴² Media reports suggest that the Islamic State continues to operate and recruit within the camp.⁴³

The SDF has stated that it is unable to assume long-term responsibility for IS detainees and their families, and the United States has urged countries to repatriate their citizens. To date, many countries have been reluctant to do so, citing concerns about their inability to prosecute or successfully monitor individuals who may have been radicalized. Some countries also have stripped IS fighters and/or family members of their citizenship.

The security of facilities housing IS fighters and family members continues to be a significant concern. The Islamic State has urged its followers to free IS detainees, and U.S. military assessments have noted that the SDF is unable to provide more than "minimal security" at Al Hol.⁴⁴ At the same time, humanitarian conditions within detention facilities such as Al Hol are dire. According to the Kurdish Red Crescent, at least 517 people, mostly children, died inside the Al Hol camp in 2019, due to malnutrition, inadequate healthcare for newborns, and hypothermia.⁴⁵

Idlib: The Final Opposition Stronghold Armed Syrian opposition groups first captured Idlib province in 2015, and as of 2020 roughly half the province remains under opposition control (see Figure 3). An estimated 3 million people reside in Idlib; including several thousand Al Qaeda-linked fighters.⁴⁶ In 2019, the Syrian government escalated military operations in Idlib; in 2020 these operations reportedly have been bolstered by Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah forces.⁴⁷

The ongoing military offensive in Idlib has generated what U.N. officials have described as a "humanitarian catastrophe,"⁴⁸ with over half a million people having fled their homes between 1 December 2019 and 2 February 2020 as a result of ongoing hostilities.⁴⁹ An estimated 400,000 people previously had been displaced from southern Idlib and northern Hama between April and August 2019.⁵⁰ The U.N. has estimated that 80 percent of those recently displaced are women and children.⁵¹

Al Qaeda in Idlib

U.S. officials in 2017 described Idlib as "the largest Al Qaeda safe haven since 9/11,"⁵² and Administration officials continue to describe the province as "a major terrorist concern."⁵³ U.S. initiatives in Idlib aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE) were halted in May 2018 as part of a broader withdrawal of U.S. assistance to northwest Syria.⁵⁴ In January 2019, the Al Qaeda-linked group Haya't Tahrir al Sham (HTS) seized large areas of Idlib province from rival armed groups. In early 2019, the U.S. intelligence community also highlighted another Al Qaeda-linked group in Syria known as Hurras al Din ("Guardians of Religion", HD). While HTS and HD have occasionally clashed in Idlib, some analysts have assessed that the two groups "serve different functions that equally serve al-Qa`ida's established objectives: one [HD] appeals to hardened jihadis with an uncompromising doctrine focused on jihad beyond Syria and one [HTS] appeals to those focused on the Syrian war."⁵⁵

In February 2019, the two groups signed an accord pledging broader cooperation.⁵⁶ In June and August of 2019, CENTCOM announced two U.S. strikes against "al-Qaida in Syria (AQ-S) leadership" in Aleppo and Idlib provinces, respectively.⁵⁷ The second strike

targeted AQ-S leaders responsible for attacks threatening U.S. citizens, our partners, and innocent civilians. [ ... ] Northwest Syria remains a safe haven where AQ-S leaders actively coordinate terrorist activities throughout the region and in the West.⁵⁸

In September 2019, the U.S. government named Hurras al Din as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended by Executive Order 13886.

Al Qaeda-Islamic State Links in Idlib

In October 2019, Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was killed in a U.S. strike in the village of Barisha in northern Idlib province. Baghdadi appears to have sought protection from the AQ-affiliated Hurras al Din—dominant in that area of Idlib—despite the fact that other senior IS and AQ leaders have been rivals and their forces have, at times, been adversaries.⁵⁹ Prior to the Islamic State's territorial defeat in March 2019, some IS members had requested safe passage to Idlib from SDF and coalition forces in exchange for the return of captured SDF personnel.⁶⁰

Political Negotiations The Geneva Process

Since 2012, the Syrian government and opposition have participated in U.N.-brokered negotiations under the framework of the Geneva Communiqué. Endorsed by both the United States and Russia, the Geneva Communiqué calls for the establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers. According to the document, such a government "could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent."⁶¹ The document does not discuss the future of Asad.

Subsequent negotiations have made little progress, as both sides have adopted differing interpretations of the agreement. The opposition has said that any transitional government must exclude Asad.⁶² The document does not discuss the future of Asad.

Subsequent negotiations have made little progress, as both sides have adopted differing interpretations of the agreement. The opposition has said that any transitional government must exclude Asad. The Syrian government maintains that Asad was reelected (by referendum) in 2014,⁵² and notes that the Geneva Communiqué does not explicitly require him to step down. In the Syrian government's view, a transitional government can be achieved by simply expanding the existing government to include members of the opposition. Asad has also stated that a political transition cannot occur until "terrorism" has been defeated, continues to state that a comprehensive solution to the current conflict must begin by "striking at terrorism" (which his government defines broadly to include all armedmost opposition groups.

) and by ending external interference in Syria.⁶³

As part of the Geneva Process, U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254, adopted in 2015, endorsed a "road map" for a political settlement in Syria, including the drafting of a new constitution and the administration of U.N.-supervised elections. U.S. officials continue to stress that a political solution to the conflict must be based on the principles of UNSCR 2254.

The last formal round of Geneva talks, facilitated by then-U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura, closed in late January 2018. While the United States continues to call for a political settlement to the conflict, the U.S. intelligence community since 2018 has assessed that Asad is "unlikely to negotiate himself from power"⁵³64 or make meaningful concession to the opposition:

The regime's momentum, combined with continued support from Russia and Iran, almost certainly has given Syrian President Bashar al-Asad little incentive to make anything more than token concessions to the opposition or to adhere to UN resolutions on constitutional changes that Asad perceives would hurt his regime.⁵⁴65 In October 2019, Ambassador Jeffrey testified that the United States continues to support U.N.-led political negotiations in Geneva pursuant to UNSCR 2254.⁶⁶ State Department officials have identified three points of leverage that the United States and its foreign partners could use to encourage the Asad regime to accept a political settlement: the withholding of reconstruction assistance, barring Syria's re-entry into the Arab League, and refusing to restore diplomatic relations with Damascus.⁶⁷

The United States has repeatedly expressed its view that Geneva should be the sole forum for a political settlement to the Syria conflict, possibly reflecting concern regarding the Russia-led Astana Process (see below). However, the United States supported de Mistura's efforts throughout 2018efforts by the U.N. Special Envoy for Syria to stand up a Syrian Constitutional Committee, an initiative originally stemming from the Russian-led Sochi conference in January 2018 (see below).⁵⁵ De Mistura resigned in December 2018, and was succeeded by veteran Norwegian diplomat Geir Pederson. As of early 2019, Pederson has continued De Mistura's efforts to convene a constitutional committee.68 In December 2018, Norwegian diplomat Geir Pederson succeeded Staffan de Mistura as U.N. Special Envoy for Syria. In September 2019, Pederson announced the successful formation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee. Pederson stated that the committee would be facilitated by the United Nations in Geneva (see "Constitutional Committee," below).⁶⁹

The Astana Process

Since January 2017, peace talks hosted by Russia, Iran, and Turkey have convened in the Kazakh capital of Astana. These talks were the forum through which three "de-escalation areas" were established—two of which have since been retaken by Syrian military forces. The United States is not a party to the Astana talks but has attended as an observer delegation.

Russia has played a leading role in the Astana process, which some have described as an alternate track to the Geneva process. The United States has strongly opposed the prospect of Astana superseding Geneva. Following the release of the Joint Statement by President Trump and Russian President Putin on November 11, 2017 (in which the two presidents confirmed that a political solution to the conflict must be forged through the Geneva process pursuant to UNSCR 2254), U.S. officials stated that

We have started to see signs that the Russians and the regime wanted to draw the political process away from Geneva to a format that might be easier for the regime to manipulate. Today makes clear and the [Joint Statement] makes clear that 2254 and Geneva remains the exclusive platform for the political process.⁵⁶

70

In January 2018, Russia hosted a "Syrian People's Congress" in Sochi, in which participants agreed to form a constitutional committee comprising delegates from the Syrian government and the opposition "for drafting of a constitutional reform," in accordance with UNSCR 2254.⁷¹ The conference was boycotted by most Syrian opposition groups and included mainly delegates friendly to the Asad government.⁷² The statement noted that final agreement regarding the mandate, rules of procedure, and selection criteria for delegates would be reached under the framework of the Geneva process.

Constitutional Committee. The committee, whose formation took nearly two years, consists of 150 delegates—50 each representing the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition, as well as a "middle third" list comprising 50 Syrian-national delegates selected by the U.N. from among the country's legal experts, civil society members, political independents, and tribal leaders. The committee includes a limited number of Kurds but does not include representatives from the YPG, the SDF or the SDF's political wing—the Syrian Democratic Council, SDC—which administer large areas of northern Syria.⁷³ The committee met for the first time in Geneva in October 2019, where it formed a smaller 45-member Constitution-drafting group. The current Syrian constitution was approved in a February 2012 referendum, replacing the constitution that had been in place since 1973.

Humanitarian Situation As of early 2020, more than 11.1 million people in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance, 6.2 million Syrians are internally displaced, and an additional 5.6 million Syrians are registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as refugees in nearby countries.⁷⁴ The U.N. Secretary-General regularly reports to the Security Council on humanitarian issues and challenges in and related to Syria pursuant to Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), and 2449 (2018).⁷⁵ Cross-Border Aid Endangered

The Syrian government has long opposed the provision of humanitarian assistance across Syria's border and across internal lines of conflict outside of channels under Syrian government control. Successive U.N. Security Council resolutions have nevertheless authorized the provision of such assistance. UNSCR 2449 authorized cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance until January 10, 2020. Russia and China abstained in the December 2018 vote that approved the resolution, and the Russian representative argued at the time that "new realities ... demand that [the mandate] be rejiggered with the ultimate goal of being gradually but inevitably removed."⁷⁶

On December 20, 2019, Russia and China vetoed a U.N. Security Council resolution that would have renewed the authorization enabling U.N. agencies to deliver aid into Syria from two points in Turkey and one in Iraq for another 12 months. U.N. officials warned that without cross-border operations, "we would see an immediate end of aid supporting millions of civilians."⁷⁷ On January 10, the Security Council approved Resolution 2504, re-authorizing cross border aid into Syria via two of the four existing border crossings—Bab al Salam and Bab al Hawa, both in Turkey—for a period of six months (rather than one year). The continued use of border crossings at Ramtha (Jordan) and Al Yarubiyah (Iraq) was not authorized.⁷⁸

U.S. Humanitarian Funding

The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the Syria crisis, drawing from existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed funding.⁷⁹ As of December 2019, total U.S. humanitarian assistance for the Syria crisis since 2011 had reached nearly $10.5 billion.⁸⁰ These funds have gone towards meeting humanitarian needs inside Syria, as well as towards support for communities in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt that host Syrian refugees.⁸¹

The 11^th round of Astana talks was held in November 2018. In February 2019, the presidents of Russia, Iran, and Turkey held a trilateral summit at the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi to discuss the future of Idlib, anticipated changes to the U.S. military presence in Syria, and how to move forward on the formation of a constitutional committee.⁵⁷

Constitutional Committee. Despite the November 2017 agreement, Russia persisted in its attempts to host, alongside Iran and Turkey, a "Syrian People's Congress" in Sochi, intended to bring together Syrian government and various opposition forces to negotiate a postwar settlement. The conference, held in January 2018, was boycotted by most Syrian opposition groups and included mainly delegates friendly to the Asad government.⁵⁸ Participants agreed to form a constitutional committee comprising delegates from the Syrian government and the opposition "for drafting of a constitutional reform," in accordance with UNSCR 2254.⁵⁹ The statement noted that final agreement regarding the mandate, rules of procedure, and selection criteria for delegates would be reached under the framework of the Geneva process. The United States supports the formation of the committee under U.N. auspices, but has emphasized that "the United Nations must be given a free hand to determine the composition of the committee, its scope of work, and schedule."⁶⁰

Following the 2018 Sochi Conference, de Mistura sought to reach consensus among the parties regarding delegates for the constitutional committee. The committee's membership is to be divided in equal thirds between delegates from the Syrian government, Syrian opposition, and delegates selected by the U.N. comprising Syrian experts, civil society, independents, tribal leaders, and women. The sticking point remains this latter, U.N.-selected group, known as the "middle third list."⁶¹ The Syrian government has objected to the U.N.'s role in naming delegates to the list, describing the constitution as "a highly sensitive matter of national sovereignty."⁶²

Kurdish Outreach to Asad Government

In July 2018, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political wing of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), opened formal discussions with the Syrian government.⁶³ The Kurdish-held areas in northern Syria, comprising about a quarter of the country, are the largest remaining areas outside of Syrian government control. Asad has stated that his government intends to recover these areas, whether by negotiations or military force.⁶⁴ In early 2019, the U.S. intelligence community also assessed that the Asad government was "likely to focus on reasserting control over Kurdish-held areas."⁶⁵

Following President Trump's announcement in December 2018 that the United States shortly would withdraw forces from Syria, Kurdish leaders sought Asad government protection from a possible Turkish attack. Turkey, which captured the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in northern Syria in 2018, has stated its intent to expand its military operations against PYD and YPG elements in Syria, and Kurdish concerns about such an operation appear to have accelerated talks between Kurdish representatives and the Asad government. The PYD is not a party to the ongoing talks in Geneva between Syrian government and opposition forces, despite the fact that its YPG militia controls the vast majority of territory that remains outside of Syrian government control.

Humanitarian Situation

As of 2019, nearly 12 million people in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance, 6.2 million Syrians are internally displaced, and an additional 5.6 million Syrians are registered with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as refugees in nearby countries.⁶⁶

The Syrian government has long opposed the provision of humanitarian assistance across Syria's border and across internal lines of conflict outside of channels under Syrian government control. Successive U.N. Security Council resolutions have nevertheless authorized the provision of such assistance. The Syrian government further seeks the prompt return of Syrian refugees from neighboring countries, while humanitarian advocates and practitioners raise concern about forced returns and the protection of returnees from political persecution and the difficult conditions prevailing in Syria.

The U.N. Secretary-General regularly reports to the Security Council on humanitarian issues and challenges in and related to Syria pursuant to Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017), 2401 (2018), and 2449 (2018).⁶⁷

U.S. Humanitarian Funding

The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the Syria crisis, drawing from existing funding from global humanitarian accounts and some reprogrammed funding.⁶⁸ As of March 2019, total U.S. humanitarian assistance for the Syria crisis since 2011 had reached more than $9.5 billion.⁶⁹ Of this total, roughly $4.7 billion has gone toward meeting humanitarian needs inside Syria, while the remainder has supported host communities in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt that host Syrian refugees.⁷⁰

The Trump Administration's FY2020 request would eliminate funding for the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account as well as funding for overseas humanitarian assistance programs previously funded through the Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account. Instead, it requests $5.9 billion in funding for a new International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) account, intended to consolidate all U.S. overseas humanitarian programming into a single account. Funds requested for the IHA account would fund the U.S. humanitarian response in Syria and other crisis areas.

International Humanitarian Funding

Multilateral humanitarian assistance in response to the Syria crisis includes both the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) and the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP). The 3RP is designed to address the impact of the conflict on Syria's neighbors, and encompasses the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, the Jordan Response Plan, and country chapters in Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt. It includes a refugee/humanitarian response coordinated by UNHCR and a "resilience" response (stabilization-based development assistance) led by the U.N. Development Program (UNDP).⁷¹82

In parallel to the 3RP, the HRP for Syria is designed to address the crisis inside the country through a focus on humanitarian assistance, civilian protection, and increasing resilience and livelihood opportunities, in part by improving access to basic services. This includes the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure (water, sewage, electricity) as well as the restoration of medical and education facilities and infrastructure for the production of inputs for sectors such as agriculture.⁷²

In 2019, U.N. officials warned that the Syria conflict was not over, and that significant humanitarian needs remain. 83 The 2019 3RP appeal seekssought $5.5 billion and the HRP for Syria seekssought $3.3 billion, on par with previous years. U.N. officials have noted that the 2018 3RP appeal was funded at 62%, while the Syria HRP was funded at 65%.⁷³The 2020 requirements have not yet been finalized.

U.S. Policy

Since 2011, U.S. policy toward the unrest and conflict in Syria has attempted to pursue parallel interests and manage interconnected challenges, with varying degrees of success. Among the objectives identified by successive Administrations and by many Members in successive sessions of Congress have been

• supporting Syrian-led efforts to demand more representative, accountable, and effective governance;
• seeking a negotiated settlement that includes a transition in Syria away from the leadership of Bashar al Asad and his supporters;
• limiting or preventing the use of military force by state and nonstate actors against civilian populations;
• mitigating transnational threats posed by Syria-based Islamist extremist groups;
• meeting the humanitarian needs of internally and externally displaced Syrians;
• preventing the presence and needs of Syrian refugees from destabilizing neighboring countries;
• limiting the negative effects of other third party interventions on regional and international balances of power; and
• responding to and preventing the use of chemical weapons.

As Syria's conflict has changed over time from civil unrest to nationwide military conflict involving multiple internal and external actors to the apparent resurgence of the Asad government, the policies, approaches, and priorities of the United States and others also have changed. As of late 2018, theThe United States and its Syrian and regional partners have not succeeded in inducing or compelling Syrian President Bashar al Asad to leave office or secured a fundamental reorientation of Syria's political system as part of a negotiated settlement process. The United States continues to advocate for an inclusive negotiated solution, but has largely acquiesced to Asad's resumption of political and security control. Forceful interventions in Syria by Russia, Iran, Turkey, the United States, and Israel have created a fundamentally different set of calculations for policymakers to consider relative to those that prevailed prior to the conflict.

Trump Administration Syria Policy Evolves in 2018

In 2018, the Administration's Syria policy underwent significant changes, reflecting an internal policy review as well as apparent differences of opinion between President Trump and senior military and diplomatic officials. In January 2018, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that "the United States will maintain a military presence in Syria focused on ensuring that ISIS cannot re-emerge."⁷⁴ Tillerson stated that the United States intended to carry out stabilization initiatives in areas liberated from IS control, pursue measures to de-escalate the conflict, partner with allies to address counterterrorism goals, encourage U.N.-mediated peace efforts, and provide targeted reconstruction in areas liberated from the Islamic State. This approach was echoed by CENTCOM Commander General Votel, who said in testimony that, "after we have removed [ISIS] from their control of the terrain, we have to consolidate our gains and we have to ensure that the right security and stability is in place so that they cannot resurge."⁷⁵

In March 2018, President Trump fired Secretary Tillerson. The President later stated that U.S. troops in Syria would be "coming out of Syria, like, very soon."⁷⁶ Speaking about Syria on April 3, Trump reiterated, "I want to get out. I want to bring our troops back home."⁷⁷ Military officials sought to downplay any divisions within the Administration, stating, "... as we reach finality against ISIS in Syria, we're going to adjust the level of our presence there. So in that sense, nothing actually has changed."⁷⁸ An April 7 chemical weapons attack by the Syrian government and subsequent U.S., British, and French air strikes on Syrian CW facilities also appeared to temper the President's calls for a quick U.S. military withdrawal from the country.

However, by May 2018, the Administration had begun to shift away from direct U.S. funding of stabilization programs in areas of Syria recently liberated from IS control. The Administration moved to end a range of U.S. nonlethal, nonhumanitarian assistance programs for opposition-held communities in southern and northwestern Syria, including in Idlib province.⁷⁹ At the same time, officials continued to stress the importance of a sustained U.S. presence in the country. In July, then-Defense Secretary Mattis stated that U.S. military forces were focused on the "last bastions" of the Islamic State in Syria, adding, "As that falls, then we'll sort out a new situation. But what you don't do is simply walk away and—and leave the place as devastated as it is, based on this war. You don't just leave it, and then ISIS comes back."

In August, Administration officials announced that the State Department would "redirect approximately $230 million in stabilization funds for Syria."⁸⁰ In August and September, the Administration notified Congress that these funds, originally appropriated as FY2017 ESF-OCO, would be reprogrammed to meet other priorities. Administration officials also stated that the United States intended to rely on contributions from foreign partners, including a $100 million contribution from Saudi Arabia and contributions from the United Arab Emirates and Germany, to continue stabilization efforts in northeastern Syria.⁸¹

In the fall of 2018, Administration officials began to articulate a three-track Syria strategy which included seeking the enduring defeat of the Islamic State, achieving a political settlement to the Syrian civil war based on the terms of UNSCR 2254, and inducing the departure of all Iranian-commanded forces from Syria.⁸² In September 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton stated, "We're not going to leave [Syria] as long as Iranian troops are outside Iranian borders and that includes Iranian proxies and militias."⁸³

In November 2018, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey—appointed in August as the Secretary of State's Special Representative for Syria Engagement—stated that, "U.S. troops will stay on in Syria we say until the enduring defeat of ISIS which means to establish the conditions so that local forces, local populations, local governments, can deal with ISIS as a terrorist or as an insurgent movement."⁸⁴ In December, then-Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk stated that, "Even as the end of the physical caliphate is clearly now coming into sight, the end of ISIS will be a much more long-term initiative," adding, "Nobody is declaring a mission accomplished." McGurk also stated that

if we've learned one thing over the years, enduring defeat of a group like this means you can't just defeat their physical space and then leave; you have to make sure the internal security forces are in place to ensure that those gains, security gains, are enduring.⁸⁵

2018: President Trump Announces Withdrawal of U.S. Forces

President Trump announced on December 19 that U.S. forces would be returning from Syria "now."⁸⁶ He stated, "We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency."⁸⁷ Pentagon Spokesperson Dana White later stated that while the U.S.-led coalition had liberated IS-held territory, the campaign against the group was not over.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, a Pentagon spokesperson confirmed that the Defense Department had "started the process of returning U.S. troops home" from Syria,⁸⁹ and State Department personnel reportedly were evacuated from Syria within 24 hours of the announcement.⁹⁰

The announced troop withdrawal came as a surprise to senior military and diplomatic officials, who publicly had stated that the United States intended to remain inside Syria to carry out stabilization operations. The week prior to the announcement, Brett McGurk had emphasized that the Islamic State is likely to be a resilient force, stating,

There's clandestine cells. Nobody is saying that they are going to disappear. Nobody is that naive. So we want to stay on the ground and make sure that stability can be maintained in these areas [...] obviously, it would be reckless if we were just to say, well, the physical caliphate is defeated, so we can just leave now.⁹¹

Following the announcement, some Defense and State Department officials reportedly sought to persuade the White House to reconsider the withdrawal.⁹² On December 20, Defense Secretary Mattis submitted his resignation.⁹³ On December 22, Brett McGurk announced that he would accelerate his resignation as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, stating that, "The recent decision by the president came as a shock and was a complete reversal of policy that was articulated to us […] I ultimately concluded that I could not carry out these new instructions and maintain my integrity."⁹⁴

The Syria withdrawal announcement was criticized by many Members of Congress, but some Members embraced the decision as overdue. Senators Graham, Shaheen, Ernst, King, Cotton, and Rubio drafted an open letter to President Trump, stating, "We believe that such action at this time is a premature and costly mistake that not only threatens the safety and security of the United States, but also emboldens ISIS, Bashar al Assad, Iran, and Russia."⁹⁵ Senator Graham also drafted a nonbinding resolution (S.Res. 738) calling on the President to reconsider his decision. In contrast, Senator Rand Paul and Representatives Ted Lieu and Ro Khanna praised the President's decision, citing concerns about the wisdom, effectiveness, and authorization for U.S. operations.

Some U.S. allies also criticized the decision, including coalition partners in the counter-IS campaign such as France and the United Kingdom. A spokesperson for the French Defense Ministry stated that French air strikes against the Islamic State in Syria would continue.⁹⁶ Britain's defense minister disputed the claim that the Islamic State had been defeated, saying that the group had morphed into another form and was "very much alive."⁹⁷ In contrast, Russian President Putin praised the U.S. move toward withdrawal, calling it "correct."⁹⁸ Turkish leaders also welcomed the U.S. decision, which some reports described as having been influenced by a call between President Trump and Turkish President Erdogan.⁹⁹

2019: Some U.S. Troops to Remain in Syria

In early January, U.S. forces began withdrawing equipment—but not personnel—from Syria. In late February, the White House announced that the United States would leave approximately 400 troops in Syria, reversing President Trump's December withdrawal announcement. These troops reportedly are intended to form part of a multinational force of roughly 800-1,500 military personnel, which the Administration intends to solicit mostly from NATO member states.¹⁰⁰

When asked about the mission of the remaining U.S. contingent in Syria, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford stated,

It's the same -- we're -- this is about campaign continuity. So we had a campaign that was designed to clear ISIS from the ground that they had held, and we always had planned to transition into a stabilization phase where we train local forces to provide security and prevent the regeneration of ISIS. So there is -- there is no change in the basic campaign, the resourcing is being adjusted because the threat has been changed.¹⁰¹

In March 2019, the Wall Street Journal, citing unnamed U.S. officials, reported that the U.S. military was preparing to leave as many as 1,000 troops in Syria.¹⁰² In a statement, General Dunford described this claim as "factually incorrect."¹⁰³ Other reports citing U.S. officials have stated that the number of U.S. forces to remain in Syria ultimately will depend on the number of forces pledged by allied states.¹⁰⁴ The Administration's FY2020 defense funding request assumes for budgeting purposes that more than 7,000 U.S. military personnel will be deployed to Iraq and Syria in FY2020.

It is unclear whether USAID and State Department personnel will redeploy to Syria to spearhead stabilization projects. Administration officials have stated that they are seeking increased coalition financial contributions to continue Syria stabilization efforts. The Administration's FY2020 foreign assistance request states that the United States will seek to "leverage" additional partner contributions. The request does not include funding for specific assistance programs in Syria but states that funds designated for Relief and Recovery Fund purposes could be used in Syria.

President Trump Recognizes Israeli Claim to Golan Heights

On March 25, President Trump issued a proclamation recognizing the Golan Heights as part of the state of Israel.¹⁰⁵ The Golan Heights, a roughly 450-square-mile plateau situated between Israel and Syria, has been disputed since 1967, when Israel captured most of the area from Syria. U.N. Security Council resolutions have called for the final status of the area to be determined via negotiations between the two sides. In 1974, U.N. Security Council Resolution 350 established the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) to monitor a separation zone between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights. In 1981, Israel effectively annexed the Golan Heights unilaterally by applying Israeli law to the area. In December 1981, the Security Council voted unanimously to adopt Resolution 497, stating that the annexation was "null and void and without international legal effect." Syria condemned the Trump Administration's March 2019 recognition of Israeli sovereignty, describing it as a "flagrant violation" of U.N. resolutions regarding the status of the Golan.¹⁰⁶ For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11081, Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights: President Trump Voices Support for Israeli Sovereignty Claim, by Jim Zanotti and Carla E. Humud.

Presidential Authority to Strike Syria under U.S. Law¹⁰⁷

Since 2011, Members of Congress and successive Administrations have debated presidential authority to conduct military operations in Syria absent a declaration of war. This has, over time, included debates regarding the potential imposition of no-fly zones over areas of the country to protect civilians, operations against various extremist groups, force protection for U.S. military personnel and partner forces inside Syria, and strikes against Syrian chemical weapons facilities and related forces. In April 2018, U.S. missile strikes targeted chemical weapons-related facilities in Syria, in response to a chemical weapons attack in the city of Douma. The strikes occurred just over a year after the U.S. strike on Al Shayrat airbase in Homs province, following the sarin gas attack in Khan Sheikhoun. Describing the Administration's view of the authorities underlying the 2018 operation, Defense Secretary Mattis stated

As our commander in chief, the president has the authority under Article II of the Constitution to use military force overseas to defend important U.S. national interests. The United States has an important national interest in averting a worsening catastrophe in Syria, and specifically deterring the use and proliferation of chemical weapons.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, in an April 8, 2017, letter to Congress, President Trump had stated that he had acted "pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive" in ordering the April 6, 2017, U.S. missile strikes on Al Shayrat airbase. In the letter, President Trump says that he "acted in the vital national security and foreign policy interests of the United States," and that, "the United States will take additional action, as necessary and appropriate, to further its important national interests."¹⁰⁹

In the past, Presidents have justified the use of military force by relying on presidential powers they assert are inherent under Article II Commander in Chief and Chief Executive authority. The executive branch has claimed that a President may use military force to defend U.S. national security interests (even when an immediate threat to the United States and its Armed Forces is not necessarily apparent) and to promote U.S. foreign policy.

In 2017 and 2018, the U.S. military used force against the Syrian government and its allies on limited occasions for force-protection purposes, including for the protection of U.S. partner forces. In an August 2017 letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker, the State Department asserted that "the 2001 AUMF also provides authority to use force to defend U.S., Coalition and partner forces engaged in the campaign to defeat ISIS to the extent such use of force is a necessary and appropriate measure in support of counter-ISIS operations." The letter states the Administration's view that

The strikes taken by the United States in May and June 2017 against the Syrian Government and pro-Syrian-Government forces were limited and lawful measures to counter immediate threats to U.S. or partner forces engaged in that campaign. The United States does not seek to fight the Syrian Government or pro-Syrian-Government forces. However, the United States will not hesitate to use necessary and proportionate force to defend U.S., Coalition, or partner forces engaged in the campaign against ISIS.¹¹⁰

Congress has debated Syria-specific and Islamic State-focused authorization for military force proposals intermittently in recent years. In 2013, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered and reported a proposed authorization for the use of military force following a chemical weapons attack in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria (S.J.Res. 21, 113^th Congress). The Senate did not consider the measure further.

Since U.S. military action against the Islamic State began in June 2014, starting in Iraq and then spreading to Syria, Congress also has debated the need for enactment of a new IS-specific authorization for use of military force. President Obama asserted that the campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was authorized by both the Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L. 107-40; claiming that the Islamic State was a successor organization of Al Qaeda and that elements of Al Qaeda were present in Syria) and Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243; claiming authority to defend Iraq from the Islamic State threat). As noted above, Senate committees held hearings on a proposed new AUMF (S.J.Res. 59) in 2018.

U.S. Assistance

U.S. Military Operations in Syria and U.S. Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Efforts

U.S. Military Presence in Syria

Since 2015, U.S. forces have operated in Syria in support of the counter-IS campaign. Roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel¹¹¹ conduct train and equip program-related activities as well as "advise and assist" operations in support of U.S. partner forces. The Special Operations Joint Task Force, Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR) led by Brigadier General Patrick B. Roberson has been "the primary advise, assist and accompany force in Syria, working closely with the SDF."¹¹² SOJTF-OIR has reported to the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), which leads the international coalition to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.¹¹³ In September 2018, Lieutenant General Paul LaCamera assumed command of CJTF-OIR. U.S. forces have operated in northern and eastern Syria in partnership with the SDF and in southwest Syria in partnership with the Maghawir al Thawra militia near the At Tanf garrison adjacent to the tri-border area shared by Syria, Jordan, and Iraq.

Military Authorities

As discussed above ("Presidential Authority to Strike Syria under U.S. Law"), U.S. strike operations against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda-affiliated targets in Syria are conducted pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. U.S. forces have operated in Syria for train and equip program purposes as well as to advise and assist U.S. partner forces, whether or not those specific partner forces were trained and/or armed under the train and equip program. Such "advise and assist" activities may have been conducted pursuant to the authorities outlined by train and equip program provisions or pursuant to other defense authorities defined in law or asserted by the executive branch. This includes military operations against IS targets conducted pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. U.S. operations in Syria also are supported in part by the 2014 request of the Iraqi government to the U.N. Security Council for military support to address the threat of terrorism emanating from Syria.

Syria Study Group Findings and Recommendations In September 2019, the congressionally mandated Syria Study Group (SSG) released its final report and recommendations. The group's principal findings were as follows (direct quotations): The liberation of ISIS-held territory does not eliminate the group's threat to the United States. The ISIS detainee population is a long-term challenge that is not being adequately addressed. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups remain active in Syria and threaten the United States. Despite Israeli air strikes and U.S. sanctions, Iran continues to entrench itself in Syria; Russia and Iran show few serious signs of divergence. Assad has not won the conflict in Syria. Progress toward a political settlement to the Syria conflict has stalled, and Assad shows no willingness to compromise with his opponents. The United States underestimated Russia's ability to use Syria as an arena for regional influence. U.S.-Turkey relations are strained in Syria by starkly diverging views of the SDF. A Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria would represent a major setback to U.S. aims in Syria and a new crisis for the U.S.-Turkish relationship. Although the SDF has been a highly effective partner in the fight against ISIS, it must undergo a transition to ensure stability in northeastern Syria. The Assad regime's systematic targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure constitutes war crimes and demands accountability, as well as enhanced efforts to protect civilians. Syria's humanitarian crisis, not least the challenges posed by internally displaced people and refugees, will reverberate for decades. Most refugees are unlikely to return voluntarily given current conditions in Syria. Despite these challenges, the United States maintains leverage to shape an outcome in Syria that protects core U.S. national security interests. The group's principal recommendations were as follows: Halt the U.S. military withdrawal, consolidate gains in IS liberated areas, help local communities establish alternate forms of governance Update the U.S. military mission to head off an IS insurgency Prepare contingency scenarios for an IS resurgence, a military engagement with Iranian and/or Russian proxies forces, and a Turkish incursion into northeast Syria Return START Forward personnel to Syria, restart U.S. stabilization funding, obligate unspent funds in the Relief and Recovery Fund Press the SDF to govern more inclusively and sever links with PKK leadership Develop an internationally coordinated strategy for addressing the challenge posed by IS detainees in Syria; designate one senior U.S. official charged with implementing a coherent strategy to address all IS detainees populations; increase CTEF funding and update authorized activities for Syria Assist the Iraqi Security Forces in preventing an IS resurgence in Iraq Continue to isolate the Asad regime through sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and denial of reconstruction aid Test Russia's willingness to support a political settlement but avoid making concessions to Moscow Prevent further entrenchment by Iran and its proxies through continued support of Israeli airstrikes, sanctions enforcement, and maintaining the U.S. military presence at the At Tanf garrison in southeastern Syria Seek areas for cooperation with Turkey to address its legitimate security concerns while pressing Turkey to avoid any incursion into northeast Syria Address humanitarian crisis in Idlib while countering the presence of terrorist groups Bolster humanitarian efforts; support neighboring states hosting refugees. Oppose efforts to forcibly return Syrian refugees; resume accepting Syrian refugees in the United States.

Trump Administration Statements on Syria Policy

Since 2018, U.S. policy in Syria has sought three primary goals: the enduring defeat of the Islamic State, a political settlement to the Syria conflict pursuant to UNSCR 2254, and the withdrawal of Iranian-backed forces.⁸⁴ The October 2019 Turkish military incursion into northern Syria and subsequent withdrawal and/or repositioning of the bulk of U.S. forces in the country raised questions about whether U.S. policy in Syria had (or would) shift. In late October 2019, Ambassador Jeffrey confirmed that previously articulated U.S. goals for Syria remained U.S. policy.⁸⁵ When asked whether the enduring defeat of the Islamic State could be accomplished without ground forces, Jeffrey stated, "We need ground forces. They do not necessarily have to be American."⁸⁶

In December 2019, Defense Secretary Mark Esper stated that, "The United States strategy in the Middle East seeks to ensure the region is not a safe haven for terrorists, is not dominated by any power hostile to the United States and contributes to a stable global energy market."⁸⁷ Esper added that the overarching U.S. goal with regard to Syria is to support a U.N.-sponsored political settlement to the conflict that addresses those three objectives, clarifying that the hostile power in the Syria context is Iran.

Administration officials have stated that the United States continues to work with the SDF, despite the group's decision following the Turkish incursion to coordinate in some areas with the Asad government. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley stated, "[ ... ] we're still working with [the SDF] in the eastern portion of northeast Syria, and then they are working with the Russian and Syrian regime in—in other parts of Syria."⁸⁸ In response to questioning from Members of Congress, U.S. military leaders in December 2019 confirmed that U.S. policy in Syria remains to work "by with and through" local partners. When asked about what conditions would need to be in place for U.S. forces to withdraw from Syria, Esper stated, "[ ... ] when we could consider redeploying if you will would be when we feel confident that local security and police forces are capable of handling any type of resurgence [ ... ] of ISIS."⁸⁹

U.S. Assistance to Vetted Syrian Groups U.S. Military Operations; Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip Efforts U.S. Military Presence in Syria

Since 2015, U.S. forces have operated in Syria in support of the counter-IS campaign. The Special Operations Joint Task Force, Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR) led by Brigadier General Patrick B. Roberson has been "the primary advise, assist and accompany force in Syria, working closely with the SDF."⁹⁰ SOJTF-OIR has reported to the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), which leads the international coalition to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.⁹¹ In September 2018, Lieutenant General Paul LaCamera assumed command of CJTF-OIR. U.S. forces have operated in northern and eastern Syria in partnership with the SDF and in southeast Syria in partnership with the Maghawir al Thawra militia near the At Tanf garrison adjacent to the tri-border area shared by Syria, Jordan, and Iraq (Figure 3).

Military Authorities

U.S. strike operations against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda-affiliated targets in Syria are conducted pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). U.S. forces have operated in Syria for train and equip program purposes as well as to advise and assist U.S. partner forces, whether or not those specific partner forces were trained and/or armed under the train and equip program. Such "advise and assist" activities may have been conducted pursuant to the authorities outlined by train and equip program provisions or pursuant to other defense authorities defined in law or asserted by the executive branch. This includes military operations against IS targets conducted pursuant to the 2001 AUMF. U.S. operations in Syria also are supported in part by the 2014 request of the Iraqi government to the U.N. Security Council for military support to address the threat of terrorism emanating from Syria. It remains to be seen whether the Iraqi government may seek to amend or rescind that request in light of some Iraqis' efforts to expel foreign military forces from Iraq.

U.S. Repositions Forces in 2019

Following an October 6 call between President Trump and Turkish President Erdogan, the White House announced that Turkey would "soon be moving forward with its long-planned operation into Northern Syria," and that U.S. forces would "no longer be in the immediate area."⁹² A total of 28 Special Forces Green Berets located along Turkey's initial "axis of advance" subsequently withdrew from the border area.⁹³ On October 9, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring into northern Syria. On October 14, Defense Secretary Esper announced that, at the President's direction, the United States would withdraw the approximately 1,000 remaining U.S. troops in northeast Syria. Esper stated that, "Due to Turkey's irresponsible actions, the risk to U.S. forces in northeast Syria has reached an unacceptable level. We are also at risk of being engulfed in a broader conflict."⁹⁴ In an October 19 briefing, Esper reinforced that "all forces" except those at At Tanf garrison in southeast Syria would be withdrawn "within weeks."⁹⁵

On October 21, Secretary Esper stated that U.S. troops located next to oil fields in northeast Syria "are not in the present phase of withdrawal. The present phase of withdrawal from northeast Syria involves those troops up along the border." Esper added that the focus for troops remaining in Syria would be to "deny access, specifically revenue, to ISIS and any other groups that may want to seek that revenue to enable their own malign activities."⁹⁶On October 21, President Trump stated, "We've secured the oil [ ... ] We want to keep the oil. And we'll work out something with the Kurds so they have some money, they have some cash flow."⁹⁷

Military officials stated on November 7, "I would be cautious with saying that 'the mission [is] to secure the oil fields.' The mission is the defeat of ISIS. The securing of the oil fields is a subordinate task to that mission, and—and the purpose of that task is to deny ISIS the—the revenues from that oil infrastructure."⁹⁸ On November 13, President Trump stated, "We're keeping the oil. We have the oil. The oil is secure. We left troops behind, only for the oil."⁹⁹ On December 11, Defense Secretary Esper clarified, "We are there to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. So, a sub task of that, as we've directed to our commander on the ground, is to deny ISIS access to that oil, because whoever controls that oil controls a resource that allows them to buy weapons, equipment, fighters, to provide for their communities, etc."¹⁰⁰

On December 5, Secretary Esper stated in an interview with Reuters that the U.S. military withdrawal from Syria was complete.¹⁰¹ Esper stated that approximately 600 U.S. troops would remain in Syria. A DOD Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve covering the period October-December 2019 stated that U.S. forces in northern Syria had been reduced from approximately 1,000 to 500. An additional 100 U.S. troops would remain at the At Tanf garrison in the tri-border area of southeast Syria.

Table 1. Evolution of U.S. Military Presence in Syria

2015	Oct: White House announces that less than 50 U.S. Special Operations Forces will deploy to Syria to support operations against the Islamic State.102
2016	Dec: Force Management Level (FML) for U.S. personnel in Syria increased to allow the deployment of up to 500 individuals.
2017	Dec: DOD states that approximately 2,000 U.S. personnel are operating in Syria.103
2018	Jan: Secretary of State Tillerson states that "the United States will maintain a military presence in Syria focused on ensuring that ISIS cannot re-emerge."104 Mar: President Trump states that U.S. troops will leave Syria "very soon."105 Nov: Special Representative for Syria Engagement James Jeffrey states that, "U.S. troops will stay on in Syria we say until the enduring defeat of ISIS."106 Dec: President Trump announces U.S. forces will be returning from Syria "now."107
2019	Feb: White House states U.S. will leave some forces in Syria, seeks troop contributions from allies to offset planned U.S. withdrawal. 6 Oct: President Trump directs withdrawal of U.S. troops from areas of northern Syria in advance of Turkish military incursion; 28 U.S. Special Forces withdraw.108 14 Oct: President Trump directs the full withdrawal of the roughly 1,000 remaining U.S. troops in northern Syria.109 21 Oct: Secretary Esper states that U.S. troops located near Syrian oil fields will remain to deny the Islamic State or "other groups" access to oil revenue.110 5 Dec. Secretary Esper states that the pullback of U.S. forces in Syria complete; roughly 600 U.S. troops to remain inside the country.111

Syria Train and Equip Program

Overview

In 2014, Congress created a new authority for the Department of Defense (DOD) to train and equip select Syrians in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1209 of P.L. 113-291, as amended). This authority, as amended by subsequent legislation, enables DOD "to provide assistance, including training, equipment, supplies, stipends, construction of training and associated facilities, and sustainment, to appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition and other appropriately vetted Syrian groups and individuals." Such assistance activities are authorized for select purposes, including supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria's civil war.

Congress has not appropriated funds specifically for the Syria train and equip program since the program's inception. Rather, Congress has authorizedthrough 2019, Congress required the Department of Defense to reprogram funds from global counterterrorism assistance accounts to operations and maintenance accounts to support program activities, with each reprogramming subject to the prior approval of the four congressional defense committees. As of March 2019, more than $2.5 billion has been reprogrammed or requested for the program. (Table 1Amendments to the train and equip authority included in the FY2020 NDAA changed this procedure and shifted the requirement to prior notification of each ten percent increment of available funds. (Table 2 provides information about program funding and related requests.)

FY2019 Legislation

The FY2019 NDAA (P.L. 115-232) extends the program's authorization through the end of 2019, but also places limitations on the use of FY2019 funds for the program until certain requirements have been met. The act prohibits the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be appropriated for FY2019 until both (1) the President submits the report on U.S. strategy in Syria required by Section 1221 of the FY2018 NDAA (P.L. 115-91), and (2) the Secretary of Defense submits a separate report to the congressional defense committees regarding the program. The act also requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a written certification quarterly on matters including progress on stabilization as well as any human rights violations committed by U.S.-supported groups. The act continues to apply the prior approval reprogramming requirements applied to date for the use of appropriated funds. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245) provides $1.35 billion for the CTEF account, slightly less than the Administration's requested amount for the overall account ($1.4 billion). As in previous years, the text of the act does not specify the amount for Syria-specific programs.

FY2020 Defense Funding Request

The Administration's FY2020 request seeks $300 million in CTEF funds to equip and sustain "vetted Syrian opposition (VSO) forces," including Internal Security Forces. The department describes U.S. SDF and other partners as VSO in planning and reporting documents. The request states that the "primary focus" will be on the continued equipping of Internal Security Forces, and that these forces "together with wide-area security and other VSO elements, will focus on back-clearing and holding areas that were liberated from ISIS."¹¹⁴

The Administration's FY2019 request had envisioned the creation of a 35,000-person Internal Security Force and a 30,000-person combat force. The FY2020 request references a 61,000 VSO force without specifying what percentage of these are to be focused on internal security versus other tasks. Other differences with the FY2019 request include a reduced emphasis on direct U.S. training of VSO forces. Instead, the FY2020 request states that DOD will "support the VSO's ongoing efforts to recruit, vet, train, and equip additional Syrians representative of the population and enable them to engage ISIS throughout the battlespace."¹¹⁵

The request states that $252 million was enacted for the Syria Train and Equip program in FY2019 (about $50 million less that the Administration's FY2019 request). It also notes that the FY2020 budget realigns $250 million in FY2019 funds for IS-related border security support to partner nations from the CTEF fund to Operation and Maintenance, Defense-wide.

U.S. Nonlethal and Stabilization Assistance

The Administration's FY2020 foreign assistance budget request reflects a move by the Trump Administration to end nonlethal assistance for the Syrian opposition, and to shift funding responsibility for stabilization projects to coalition partners. Since 2012, the United States has provided nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition groups FY2021 Defense Funding Request

The Administration's FY2021 defense funding request seeks $200 million in CTEF funds for the Syria Train and Equip Program, to "develop and sustain a force of 10,000 personnel to secure, defend, and stabilize territory previously controlled by ISIS."¹¹² This represents a shift from the FY2020 request, which envisioned a vetted Syrian opposition (VSO) force of 61,000.¹¹³ The FY21 request notes that the Defense Department adjusted its planning in light of the additional drawdown of U.S. forces in Syria.

The request calls for continued support to the following groups operating in eastern Syria:

Finish Forces, (commando and counterterrorism units) which conduct raids and clearance operations against Islamic State cells in urban areas.

Internal Security Forces, which provide civil protection and security via checkpoints and city patrols.

Provincial Internal Security Forces (PRISF), which provide wide area security (including perimeter security operations for uninhabited areas to limit IS freedom of movement). The PRISF also provide security at facilities for Islamic State detainees.

The request also calls for continued support to a group in southeastern Syria, Jaysh Maghawir ath Thawra (MaT). MaT operates out of the At Tanf garrison in the Syria-Iraq-Jordan tri-border area. In addition, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), "through its military councils and oil protection force, remains a committed partner eligible for military assistance as it continues to counter ISIS."

Roughly a quarter of the request would provide logistical support, supplies, and services to VSOs, including $15 million for basic life support services (subsistence, latrines, power generation) at detention facility sites operated by local partner forces in Syria.

U.S. Nonlethal and Stabilization Assistance The Administration's FY2020 foreign assistance budget request reflected the Trump Administration's intent to end U.S. nonlethal assistance for the Syrian opposition, and to shift funding responsibility for stabilization projects to coalition partners. From 2012 through 2018, the United States provided nonlethal assistance to some Syrian opposition groups for specific, congressionally approved purposes. The United States also has funded stabilization efforts in areas of northeastern Syria liberated from Islamic State control. Possibly reflecting a recognition that the Syria conflict has "decisively shifted in the Syrian regime's favor,"¹¹⁶114 the FY2020 request includes no Syria-specific funding.

sought no Syria-specific funding. However, Congress appropriated funds for Syria programs and directed specific amounts for stabilization and other priorities (see below).

Background

Since 2012, the United States has provided a range of nonlethal assistance to Syrian opposition and civil society groups. At the start of the Syria conflict, U.S. ability to provide aid to the Syrian opposition was limited by restrictions stemming from an existing body of U.S. bilateral sanctions against Syria, as well as Syria's status as a state sponsor of terrorism. President Obama invoked emergency and contingency authorities under the Foreign Assistance Act to enable initial deliveries. To enable the expanded delivery of aid to Syrian opposition groups, the executive branch requested and Congress granted specific authorities to provide nonlethal foreign assistance in Syria for certain purposes notwithstanding other provisions of law. Over time, Congress expanded and amended these authorities to focus on areas of congressional priority and to put into place oversight and reporting requirements.¹¹⁷

115

Nonlethal and Stabilization Aid to Syria: 2017-2019

2020

Since FY2012, successive Administrations and Congresses have taken evolving approaches to requests and appropriations of funds for assistance and stabilization programs in Syria. Funding for both types of projects has been drawn from a mix of regular and OCO funds from multiple accounts—largely ESF—with the Administration required to notify Congress of its intent to use these funds for assistance and stabilization efforts in Syria.

FY2017 Funds. In January 2017, the Obama Administration notified Congress that it intended to spend $230 million in FY2017 ESF-OCO funds (originally appropriated under the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, P.L. 114-254) to support stabilization in areas liberated from the Islamic State in Syria. In August and September 2018, the Trump Administration notified Congress of plans to reprogram those funds and instead rely on contributions from foreign partners—reflecting a broader assessment by the Administration that the United States was bearing more than its share of costs in regards to Syria stabilization. The Administration's FY2020 budget request statesstated that $422 million in OCO funds were obligated for Syria in FY2017.

FY2018 Funds. The Administration has not acted to did not obligate or expend funds appropriated by Congress in FY2018 foreign operations appropriations legislationfunds for nonlethal assistance and stabilization in Syria. The FY2018 appropriations act (P.L. 115-141) authorized the use ofdesignated $500 million in FY2018 funds from various foreign assistance accounts for a "Relief and Recovery Fund" (RRF) for areas liberated or at risk from the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations. The accompanying explanatory statement stated that funds were appropriated, among other purposes, "for non-lethal assistance programs to address the needs of civilians affected by conflict in Syria in a manner consistent with the prior fiscal year," but neither the act nor the statement allocated a specific amount for Syria. FY2018 RRF funds were available for Syria stabilization, but as of September 2019, FY2018 monies had only been notified for Syria-related atrocity crime accountability programs as directed by the act. FY2019 Funds. The FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6) stated from the Islamic State, while not specifying a specific amount for Syria. RRF funds could be used for Syria stabilization, but as of March 2019 no FY2018 monies have been notified for programs in Syria.

FY2019. The Administration's FY2019 budget request sought $130 million in Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) monies and $44.5 million in Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) for stabilization efforts in nongovernment-controlled areas of Syria.

FY2019 Legislation and the FY2020 Request

The FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6) states that, of the funds appropriated under the ESF, INCLE, and PKO accounts, no less than $40 million should be made available for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria, of which not less than $7 million should be made available for emergency medical and rescue response, and chemical weapons use investigations. Notably, the act statesstated only that nonlethal assistance is to be provided for stabilization purposes. This iswas a significant departure from the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141), which made funds available authorized the use of appropriated funds for 14 listed purposes, including establishing inclusive local governance, bolstering the viability of the Syrian opposition, developing civil society and independent media, and countering extremism.

In late 2019, $4.5 million in FY2019 ESF-OCO funds allocated to the RRF were obligated to support the Syrian Civil Defense (also known as the White Helmets). FY2020. The Administration's FY2020 State and Foreign Operations request for Syria seekssought no ESDF or NADR funding for Syria-specific programs, in contrast to the FY2019 request which sought $130 million and $44.5 million for Syria programs in the two accounts, respectively. The request includes $145 million from various accounts for the Relief and Recovery Fund, some of which could be used in Syria.

Uncertain Future for Syria START Programs and Cross Border Aid

Similar to the FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the FY2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-94) makes not less than $40 million available for nonlethal stabilization in Syria, and specifies that no less than $7 million shall be used for emergency medical and rescue response, and chemical weapons use investigations.

In October 2019, the White House announced that it was releasing $50 million in stabilization assistance for Syria.¹¹⁶ The funds are intended to support human rights and civil society groups, as well as ethnic and religious minorities affected by the conflict. It will support the removal of explosive remnants of war, and documentation and accountability efforts for human rights abuses. It is not clear which account or fiscal year these funds will be drawn from.

FY2021 Request. The Administration's FY2021 State and Foreign Operations request seeks no funds for Syria-specific programs. The request would allocate $135 million to the Relief and Recovery Fund, to support efforts in places including Syria. The request also seeks $5.9 billion for the new International Humanitarian Assistance account (IHA) to address humanitarian needs in crisis areas including Syria.

Uncertain Future for Syria START Programs

To monitor and implement U.S. assistance programs, several regionally based teams were established. A Syria Transition Assistance and Response Team (START) operated from Turkey and coordinated U.S. humanitarian and foreign assistance to northern Syria, including assistance to opposition-held areas. In Jordan, the Southern Syria Assistance Platform (SSAP) monitored and coordinated comparable U.S. humanitarian and foreign assistance to southern and eastern Syria, including assistance to opposition-held areas. The Trump Administration also deployed a small team of U.S. civilian assistance officials from the Department of State and USAID (known as START Forward) inside areas of northern Syria where DOD-trained and/or equipped local forces arewere in control.

In 2018, these programs underwent significant changesThese programs have undergone significant changes since 2018. Some START programs were amended and/or ended in 2018 in line with the Administration's plans to focus on stabilizing former IS-held areas to the east. Cross-border SSAP programs reportedly were halted in mid-2018, after Syrian military forces regained control of southwestern Syria.¹¹⁸117 In late 2018, the announced withdrawal of U.S. forces was preceded by the withdrawal of U.S. civilian personnel from northern Syria. With the Administration's 2019 announcementIn 2019, the Administration announced that some U.S. forces would remain in Syria, it is unclear whether or under what circumstancesand START Forward personnel might redeployredeployed to the country in July.¹¹⁸ In October 2019, following the Turkish military incursion into northern Syria, START Forward personnel were again withdrawn from Syria, although most Department of State and USAID assistance activities continued outside of the Turkish incursion zone.¹¹⁹

To date, stabilization programming for areas of northeast Syria liberated from IS control has comprised four primary lines of effort: (1) demining, (2) promotion of local governance and civil society, (3) rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, and (4) promotion of economic growth and development. The ability of the United States and U.S. partners to pursue these efforts in areas under SDF and/or Syrian government control may now be limited.

Outlook & Challenges

The victory of pro-Asad forces in the broader conflict appears likely, and, from a U.S. perspective, that may further complicate several unresolved issues, including

• the stabilization and governance of areas recaptured from the Islamic State;
• the resolution of security threats posed by extremist groups in northwest Syria;
• the return and reintegration of internally and externally displaced Syrians;
• the reconstruction of conflict-damaged areas;
• the management of Syria-based threats to Syria's neighbors; and
• the terms of a post-conflict political order in Syria.

In light of current trends and conditions related to these issues, Administration officials and Members of Congress may reexamine appropriate terms and conditions for U.S. investment, force deployment, and the nature of relationships with U.S. partners in and around Syria. Looking forward, challenges for U.S. policy in Syria may include

Consolidating Gains against the Islamic State

U.S. efforts to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State have focused on stabilization programming in IS-liberated areas as well as ongoing support to local partner forces. The Trump Administration in 2019 sought to shift financial responsibility for stabilization programs (which have included activities such as restoring electricity to liberated areas) to coalition partners, while also redeploying U.S. military personnel within and out of Syria. The State Department has reported that stabilization activities via the START (Turkey-based), SSAP (Jordan-based), and START-Forward platforms continue, albeit "almost exclusively with Coalition contributions."¹²⁰ To the extent that it relies on contributions by coalition partners, the future of stabilization programming in Syria appears uncertain.

As noted above, the Trump Administration did not seek funds for Syria stabilization in its FY2020 budget request, but Congress appropriated funds for this purpose. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 states that not less than $40 million shall be made available for nonlethal stabilization assistance for Syria. The act also makes additional funds available for IS-liberated areas, including via the Relief and Recovery Fund and the Prevention and Stabilization Fund. These funds could be used for stabilization activities in Syria, but are not specifically designated as such.

The Administration has come under some scrutiny for failing to obligate funds appropriated by Congress for Syria stabilization. The Syria Study Group report, issued in September 2019, recommended that the Administration obligate unspent funds in the Relief and Recovery Fund designated for areas liberated from the Islamic State (Congress has not appropriated these funds on a country-specific basis, but has used explanatory statement language to authorize their use in specific countries).

U.S. support to local partner forces has been another key element in the U.S. effort to securing the enduring defeat of the Islamic State and consolidating coalition gains. While the Administration in 2019 reduced its troop presence in Syria from roughly 1,000 to 600 forces, senior U.S. military leaders have emphasized their view that a continued U.S. military presence in Syria is vital to preventing the re-emergence of the Islamic State. In December 2019, Joint Chief of Staff Chairman Gen. Milley stated, "If we withdraw all our capabilities and support to the indigenous governments and we don't continue to operate by, with, and through them, then I believe that the conditions will be set for [an Islamic State] resurgence."¹²¹ Milley assessed that, in his view, the SDF does not have "the independent capability" to prevent an Islamic State resurgence in the absence of U.S. support. Moreover, ongoing political debate in Iraq concerning the future of U.S. and other foreign forces in that country may affect related U.S. and coalition operations in Syria during 2020.

Preserving Relationships with Partner Forces

Numerous Members of Congress have expressed concern about what they describe as the abandonment of U.S. Kurdish allies in Syria. In October 2019, Senator Menendez stated

It was the Kurds who were largely our ground forces. It's the Kurds that lost about 11 to 13,000 of their people. It's the Kurds that were detaining over 10,000 ISIS fighters and families for us [ ... ] when you betray the person who you—the entity who you were fighting on the battlefield with and you basically leave them when you're finished using them and say, you know, you're on your own, it's a hell of a way to send a global message that, in fact, don't fight for the United States because when they're finished with you they'll let you die on the battlefield.

President Trump has defended his decision, stating, "We never agreed to protect the Kurds for the rest of their lives [ ... ] Where's an agreement that said we have to stay in the Middle East for the rest of humanity, for the rest of civilization, to protect the Kurds?"¹²² Defense Secretary Esper also stated, "The handshake with the Kurds, with the SDF in particular, was a handshake that we would ensure that we would defeat ISIS. It was not a handshake that said yes, we would also help you establish an autonomous Kurdish state. It was also not a handshake that said yes, we would fight Turkey for you."¹²³ At the same time, U.S. military officials have stated that "allies and partners, both nation states but also indigenous partners like the SDF, are important to fulfill our national security objectives."¹²⁴ Some have noted that the U.S. raid that killed Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was reportedly made possible by information provided by an informant run by Kurdish intelligence officers.¹²⁵

It is unclear whether or how changes in U.S. posture in Syria during 2019 will durably reshape the U.S. relationship with Syrian Kurds. Military officials in late 2019 stated that joint U.S.-SDF operations against the Islamic State had resumed, and Congress has appropriated funds for the continued training and equipping of partner forces in Syria including the SDF. However, the perceived uncertainty regarding U.S. policy in Syria and the future of the U.S. military presence may prompt U.S. partner forces, including Kurds, to seek support elsewhere—including from U.S. adversaries.

In early 2019, CJTF-OIR assessed that it was possible the SDF would splinter into separate security force factions, depending in part on their negotiations with the Syrian government. CJTF-OIR reported that the SDF "seeks to maintain semi-autonomous control of northeastern Syria, either by controlling the territory with support from Coalition forces or by striking a deal favorable to the constituent parts of the SDF with the Syrian regime and Russia."¹²⁶ It is possible that as part of such an arrangement, the Syrian government and/or Russia could insist on limitations being placed on U.S. operations, with uncertain but potentially negative effects on U.S. operations against the Islamic State.

Countering Iran

U.S. military assessments continue to highlight the risks posed by foreign states operating in Syria, particularly Iran. In late 2019, CENTCOM reported that Iran continued to maintain a presence inside Syria in support of the Asad government and Iran's own strategic objectives.¹²⁷ CJTF-OIR reported to the DOD OIG that Iran's goals in Syria include "retaining access to Hezbollah in Lebanon, maintaining the ability to strike Israel from Syrian territory, maintaining a military presence and military influence in Syria, and recouping investment through securing economic and security contracts in Syria."¹²⁸

Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about Iranian drones conducting overflight operations of U.S. bases in Syria and Iraq, which Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Milley has described as "a very serious threat."¹²⁹ On at least two occasions in 2017, the U.S. Air Force shot down armed Iranian UAVs that had advanced towards coalition forces in Syria with "hostile intent."¹³⁰ Pro-Iranian militias operating in Syria, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), also may pose a threat to U.S. forces. In December 2019, the United States launched retaliatory airstrikes on two KH facilities in eastern Syria (and three KH facilities in Iraq) following a KH rocket attack in northern Iraq that killed a U.S. contractor. U.S. personnel in Syria may be vulnerable to additional attacks by Iran-backed forces, particularly following the January 2020 U.S. airstrike that killed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qassem Soleimani.

Addressing Humanitarian Challenges in Extremist-Held Areas

The international response to the humanitarian crisis in Idlib reflects a broader debate regarding humanitarian assistance and counterterrorism, and how donors should balance the needs of civilians against the risks that extremist groups could inadvertently benefit from, divert, or influence the distribution of humanitarian assistance.¹³¹ Areas of Idlib province are the most significant zone remaining outside of government control in western Syria, and the civilian population has been described as caught between various extremist groups operating in the area (some affiliated with Al Qaeda), and Syrian military forces which seek to bring the province under central government control. Nevertheless, the presence of extremist groups in Idlib has complicated the provision of humanitarian assistance to the province, out of concern that aid could fall into the hands of Al Qaeda affiliated groups.¹³²

Assisting Displaced Syrians

Conflict in Syria has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and has displaced millions within the country and beyond its borders. As the intensity of conflict has declined in some areas of the country, displaced Syrians have faced difficult choices about whether or how to return to their home areas amid uncertainty about security, potential political persecution, crime, economic conditions, lost or missing documentation, and prospects for recovery. In 2018, the Asad government passed legislation enabling the state to designate land anywhere in the country for redevelopment and displace its current residents—a measure which could alter the demographics of formerly opposition-held areas and complicate the return of refugees and displaced persons.¹³³ Humanitarian advocates and practitioners continue to raise concerns about the security and protection of returnees and displaced individuals in light of conditions in many areas of the country and questions about the Syrian government's approach to political reconciliation.¹³⁴

In addition, mechanisms and mandates that have provided for the delivery of humanitarian assistance across the Syrian border without the consent of the Syrian government are facing increasingly forceful opposition by Russia and China at the U.N. Security Council. These states argue that the situation on the ground has changed, making it possible for aid to transit through official checkpoints, and that cross border aid mechanisms should be evaluated and adjusted in light of these developments.¹³⁵ In January 2020, the Security Council renewed a more limited mandate for cross-border delivery of humanitarian assistance for six months instead of twelve. The United States remains the leading donor for international humanitarian efforts related to Syria, and U.S. policymakers may face a series of decisions about whether or how to continue or adapt U.S. support in light of changing conditions and administrative and logistical constraints.

Preventing Involuntary Refugee Returns

Despite the various impediments to the safe and voluntary return of refugees to Syria, neighboring states that have hosted thousands of Syrian refugees since the beginning of the crisis in 2011are increasingly calling for refugees to return home. In Lebanon, which hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees per capita (Syrian refugees are estimated to comprise up to a quarter of the population) political leaders have stated that the return of refugees should not be contingent on a political solution to the Syrian conflict.¹³⁶

In a September 2019 address to the U.N. General Assembly, Lebanese President Aoun argued that the conditions for the "safe and dignified return" of refugees to Syria have been met, stating, "per international reports, the security situation on most of the Syrian territories has become stable, the military confrontations have become confined to the Idlib region, and the Syrian State has officially declared, time and again, that it welcomes the return of its displaced citizens."¹³⁷ Aoun stated that more than 250,000 displaced persons had returned to Syria, and accused some states of trying to hinder refugee return by "sowing fear among the displaced."¹³⁸ In some cases, the return of refugees to Syria has been facilitated by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).¹³⁹ It is unclear whether all refugees departed Lebanon voluntarily.¹⁴⁰ UNHCR has continued to assess that conditions are not right for the large-scale return of refugees to Syria.

Turkey, which hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees overall, has proposed using international funds to resettle a portion of its refugee population in territory it currently occupies in northern Syria.¹⁴¹ In November 2019, President Erdogan presented the U.N. Secretary General with a plan for "new settlement areas for the return of Syrian refugees."¹⁴² The plan, which was reviewed by some media organizations, reportedly would require more than $26 billion in foreign assistance.¹⁴³ Some observers have questioned whether the plan would alter the demographics of northern Syria by moving (primarily) Sunni Arab refugees into areas formerly administered by Kurdish forces.¹⁴⁴ U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres "stressed the basic principles relating to the voluntary, safe and dignified of return of refugees," but stated that UNHCR would form a team to study the Turkish proposal.¹⁴⁵ In late 2019, human rights organizations stated that it is "likely" that hundreds of Syrian refugees had been detained and returned to Syria.¹⁴⁶ In a December 2019 hearing, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper also stated that Turkey was beginning to return refugees to northern Syria.¹⁴⁷

Managing Reconstruction Aid In 2017, U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura estimated that Syria's reconstruction will cost at least $250 billion, and a group of U.N.-convened experts estimated in August 2018 that the cost of conflict damage (including lost economic opportunity during the conflict) could exceed $388 billion.¹⁴⁸ to the country to assist in stabilization efforts.

Increasingly vocal demands by the Syrian government and its international supporters for an end to cross-border assistance operations may significantly complicate U.S. assistance operations. This dynamic has been evident in Russian objections to the renewal of the U.N. Security Council mandate for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian operations (Resolutions 2393 and 2449), but it similarly applies to ongoing Syrian government rejections of non-humanitarian assistance operations in opposition-held areas. UNSCR 2449 currently authorizes cross-border and cross-line humanitarian assistance until January 10, 2020—at which point the resolution will be subject to renewal at the Security Council. Russia and China abstained from the December 2018 renewal, and the Russian representative objections argued that "new realities ... demand that [the mandate] be rejigged with the ultimate goal of being gradually but inevitably removed."¹¹⁹

Overview: Syria Chemical Weapons and Disarmament¹²⁰

The United States, the United Nations, and others have assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons repeatedly against opposition forces and civilians in the country. Expert teams affiliated with the U.N.-OPCW Joint Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (JIM) and the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria have investigated some of these allegations and have found evidence that in some cases confirms and in others suggests that chemical weapons and/or toxic chemicals have been used in attacks by the Syrian regime and by the Islamic State.¹²¹ Any use of chemical weapons is prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, which Syria joined in September 2013.

Chemical Weapons Use

The majority of reports of chemical weapons use in Syria have consisted of chlorine use in barrel bombs in addition to the use of sarin in August 2013, April 2017, and possibly April 2018.¹²² The use of sarin by the Syrian military in the April 2017 and April 2013 attacks was confirmed by the United Nations. Reports of the use of chlorine gas as a chemical weapon in barrel bombs used by the Syrian military began to surface in April 2014 and continue.¹²³ Most recently, the FFM has been investigating an alleged CW incident in Aleppo on November 24, 2018. U.N. investigators have confirmed several cases of the use of mustard gas by the Islamic State. The OPCW established a fact-finding mission to investigate these allegations.

The Syrian government continues to deny categorically that it has used chemical weapons or toxic chemicals, while accusing opposition forces of doing so and calling into question the methods and results of some investigations into alleged chemical attacks. The Russian Federation supports the Syrian position.

2018 Chemical Attack (Douma) and U.S. Response

On April 7, Syrian government forces launched a chemical attack on Douma, killing at least 40 people and injuring hundreds more.¹²⁴ U.S. officials described the symptoms displayed by victims as consistent with an asphyxiation agent and "a nerve agent of some type."¹²⁵ Then-Defense Secretary Mattis stated, "We're very confident that chlorine was used. We are not ruling out sarin right now."¹²⁶ An OPCW/FFM investigation concluded in March 2019 that it is likely that toxic chlorine was used as a weapon in the attack,¹²⁷ which came within the context of broader Syrian government operations to retake the rebel enclave of eastern Ghouta, on the outskirts of Damascus.

On April 13 (April 14 local time), more than 100 missiles were launched into Syria from British, French, and U.S. air and naval platforms in the Red Sea, the Northern Arabian Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean. The strikes targeted three chemical weapons storage and research sites in Syria: the Barzeh Research and Development Center on the outskirts of Damascus and the Him Shinshar chemical weapons storage and bunker facilities in Homs province.¹²⁸ Contrasting the operation with the April 2017 U.S. strikes on Al Shayrat airbase, military officials stated, "Last year the focus was on the delivery [of chemical weapons]. This time, we went—the strikes went to the very heart of the enterprise, to the research, to development, to storage."¹²⁹ U.S. military officials also stated that "obviously the Syrian chemical weapons system is larger than the three targets that we addressed tonight. However, these are the targets that presented the best opportunity to minimize collateral damage, to avoid killing innocent civilians, and yet to send a very strong message."¹³⁰

2017 Chemical Attack (Khan Sheikhoun) and U.S. Response

On April 4, 2017, Syrian aircraft operating in rebel-held Idlib province conducted several air strikes using what U.S. officials assessed to be a chemical nerve agent.¹³¹ The strikes, which occurred in the town of Khan Sheikhoun, killed an estimated 80 to 100 people. The Director General of the OPCW, which conducted a fact-finding mission following the attack, stated on April 19 that four of its laboratories had "incontrovertible" evidence that victims "were exposed to Sarin or a Sarin-like substance."¹³² In addition, then-Secretary of State Tillerson said that the U.S. government had a "very high level of confidence" that the Syrian air force had used the nerve agent sarin in two earlier 2017 attacks—on March 25 and March 30 in neighboring Hamah province.¹³³

On April 6, 2017, the United States fired 59 Tomahawk missiles at Al Shayrat airfield in Homs province, from which U.S. intelligence sources had concluded the Khan Sheikhoun attack was launched.¹³⁴ A Defense Department statement said the U.S. strike "targeted aircraft, hardened aircraft shelters, petroleum and logistical storage, ammunition supply bunkers, air defense systems, and radars" and that "the strike was intended to deter the regime from using chemical weapons again." Secretary Mattis later stated that "around 20 aircraft were taken out" by the strike.¹³⁵ The United States also imposed sanctions on 271 Syrian employees of the Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), the entity responsible for managing Syria's chemical weapons program.¹³⁶

2013 Chemical Weapons Attack (Ghouta)

The largest-scale use of chemical weapons in Syria to date was an August 21, 2013, nerve gas attack, which the U.S. government estimated killed more than 1,400 people.¹³⁷ A U.N. investigation subsequently identified the nerve agent as sarin. The U.S. intelligence community assessed that the Syrian government had "used chemical weapons on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year."¹³⁸ President Obama requested congressional approval of a limited authorization for the use of military force to respond. As part of a diplomatic solution to the crisis based on a U.S.-Russian joint proposal, the Obama Administration withdrew the threat of military force and Syria agreed to give up its chemical weapons and join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). U.N. Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) further mandated that Syria give up all its chemical weapons under Chapter VII provisions of the U.N. Charter.¹³⁹

Syria and the CWC: Disarmament Verification

After joining the CWC in September 2013, Syria declared that it possessed 1,308 metric tons of chemical warfare agents and precursor chemicals, including several hundred metric tons of the nerve agents sarin and VX, as well as mustard agent in ready-to-use form. The nerve agents were stored as two separate components that are combined before use, called precursor chemicals, a form that facilitated removal and destruction efforts. In an unprecedented effort, the international community oversaw the removal in late 2013 and 2014 of chemical weapons agents to locations outside of Syria for destruction. As of January 4, 2016, all of Syria's declared Category 1 and 2 chemicals had been neutralized.¹⁴⁰ As of June 2018, the OPCW had verified that all 27 of Syria's declared chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) had been destroyed.¹⁴¹

The continued use of chemical weapons in Syria has raised questions about Syrian compliance. In addition, the OPCW has not been able to verify the completeness of the Syrian initial declaration, part of Syria's obligations after having joined the CWC. For years, the United States, the OPCW Director General, and other governments have asserted that Syria had not declared all of its chemical weapons stocks and facilities.¹⁴² The OPCW's Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) continues to investigate "gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies" through interviews and lab analysis of samples from site visits according to OPCW Executive Council reports. The latest report said that since the government of Syria has not answered the DAT's inquiries, the OPCW "cannot fully verify that the Syrian Arab Republic has submitted a declaration that can be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention."¹⁴³ A technical meeting to resolve these differences was held in mid-March.

International Investigations of CW Use

Since the first reports of alleged chemical weapons use during the conflict in Syria, the U.N. Secretary-General, the U.N. Security Council, and the CWC Executive Council have formed several different bodies to investigate chemical weapons use in Syria, outlined below. Of these, OPCW inspections to verify CWC compliance as well as the OPCW Fact Finding Mission are the only two currently functioning:

• In response to the Syrian government and other governments' request, in March 2013, the U.N. Secretary-General established the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁴⁴ The Syrian government alleged that opposition forces had used chemical weapons at Khan al-Asal on March 19, 2013, while opposition forces had accused the Asad government of CW use there.
• Following a U.S.- and Russian-brokered deal with Syria to join the CWC, the Security Council established the U.N.-OPCW Joint Mission to oversee the removal of chemical weapons in Syria between October 2013 and June 2014.¹⁴⁵
• After Syria joined the CWC in September 2013, the OPCW was responsible for overseeing the verification of its initial declaration and continues to monitor destruction of chemical weapons facilities in the country.¹⁴⁶
• The OPCW Director-General declared the creation of a Fact Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria on April 29, 2014, in response to new allegations of the use of chlorine as a weapon from December 2013 to April 2014. The CWC allows for the OPCW Director General to start an investigation into chemical weapons use in a member state with its permission. The Syrian government agreed to accept the FFM and provide security.¹⁴⁷ The FFM did not have authority to attribute attacks until a decision was taken by a special session of the CWC member states in June 2018. That decision gave the FFM authority to attribute as part of its investigations.¹⁴⁸
• On August 7, 2015, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2235, which established a new OPCW-U.N. Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) tasked with identifying "to the greatest extent feasible" those responsible for or involved in chemical attacks identified by the OPCW fact finding mission.¹⁴⁹ The JIM's mandate expired in November 2017.

Earlier U.N. and OPCW investigations starting in 2013 had not been tasked with assigning responsibility for alleged attacks but were to identify whether and which type of chemical weapons were used. This changed with the JIM, which was mandated to attribute attacks. The JIM was to have access anywhere in Syria; however, the JIM's mission was complicated by the security situation on the ground.

The OPCW FFM and JIM have concluded with a high degree of confidence that chemical weapons were used in Syria in 48 incidents from April 2014 to November 24, 2017. All incidents occurred in governorates considered by the Syrian government as outside its effective control from 2014 to present. The JIM was able to attribute the use of chemical weapons in 7 of these 48 incidents.¹⁵⁰ The JIM concluded that the Syrian Armed Forces dropped barrel-bombs containing chlorine or a chlorine-like substance from helicopters on towns in the Idlib Governorate in three attacks: Talmenes on April 21, 2014, Qmenas on March 16, 2015, and Sarmin on March 16, 2015.¹⁵¹ The FFM concluded in its June 2017 report that sarin had been used as a weapon in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib Governorate, on April 4, 2017.¹⁵² The JIM concluded on October 26, 2017, a few weeks before the expiration of its mandate, that the Syrian Armed Forces used sarin-filled aerial bombs in the Khan Sheikhoun attack, and that ISIL used sulfur mustard-filled mortars in attacks in Um Housh, Aleppo Governorate, on September 15 and 16, 2016.¹⁵³

The Security Council extended the mandate of the JIM through November 2017 but further attempts to renew the mandate were blocked by Russia, which argues for a wider regional coverage.¹⁵⁴ In January 2018, the French government gathered 30 countries in Paris to announce a new effort, the "International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons," to raise awareness of the issue, strengthen international action against CW use, and bolster international pressure on Syria.¹⁵⁵ Then-U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson attended.

Repeated efforts by these states to pass U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning attacks have been blocked by a Russian veto on multiple occasions.¹⁵⁶ The latest incidence of chemical weapons use on April 7, 2018, elevated these issues again to the U.N. Security Council, where Russia defends the Syrian stance. The United States, United Kingdom, and France proposed a U.N. Security Council Resolution in support of a U.N. investigation into who was responsible for the April 7 attack, but the resolution was vetoed by Russia. Nevertheless, under the U.N. and OPCW mechanisms already in place from past Security Council resolutions, the OPCW's Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) continued to investigate instances of use, including the April 2018 attack in Douma.¹⁵⁷

In August 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council established an Independent International Commission of Inquiry into human rights abuses and violations of international law in the Syrian conflict.¹⁵⁸ The Commission has documented the use of prohibited chemical weapons in Syria and is specifically mandated to identify perpetrators. It is instructed "where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity, are held accountable."¹⁵⁹ The Commission of Inquiry's 2017 report says that between March 2013 and March 2017, it documented 25 incidents of CW use in Syria, "of which 20 were perpetrated by government forces and used primarily against civilians."¹⁶⁰

Outlook

The victory of pro-Asad forces in the broader conflict appears likely, and, from a U.S. perspective, that may further complicate several unresolved issues, including

• the stabilization and governance of areas recaptured from the Islamic State;
• the resolution of security threats posed by extremist groups in northwest Syria;
• the return and reintegration of internally and externally displaced Syrians;
• the reconstruction of conflict-damaged areas;
• the management of Syria-based threats to Syria's neighbors; and,
• the terms of a postconflict political order in Syria.

In light of current trends and conditions related to these issues, Administration officials and Members of Congress may reexamine appropriate terms and conditions for U.S. investment, force deployment, and the nature of relationships with U.S. partners in and around Syria.

Consolidating Gains Against the Islamic State

Combatting the Islamic State in Syria has been the top priority for U.S. policymakers since 2014. Prior to President Trump's announcement in December 2018 that U.S. military forces would withdraw from Syria, U.S. policymakers had stated their intention to train and equip local forces to hold and secure areas recaptured from the Islamic State. They also had signaled that U.S. funds would no longer be invested at previously prevailing levels to stabilize conflict-damaged areas under U.S. partner control in Syria's northeast. Instead, the Trump Administration seeks to encourage coalition members and U.S. partners to contribute to stabilization efforts as a means of lowering the direct costs to the United States. Questions about program management, coordination, and evaluation may have accompanied what was expected to have been a planned shift toward joint stabilization. More fundamental questions now exist about the future of security and stabilization efforts amid U.S. plans for military withdrawal.

The Administration's FY2020 defense funding requests suggest it plans to continue to support U.S. partner forces, but the potential reintegration of areas of Syria's east and northeast by the Asad government—whether by force or negotiation—raises other challenging policy questions. If the resurgent Asad government adopts a confrontational posture toward withdrawing U.S. forces and their local partners, renewed conflict could result and create new threats to U.S. personnel, demands on U.S. resources, and dilemmas for U.S. decisionmakers. If the Asad government adopts a relatively conciliatory approach toward U.S. partners and moves to reintegrate the northeast under its control through negotiation, it may seek to absorb U.S.-trained and -equipped forces into its own ranks. In light of standing and proposed restrictions on the use of U.S. nonhumanitarian funding in Asad-controlled areas, the expansion of Syrian government control to the areas of northeastern Syria recaptured from the Islamic State could impose limits on U.S. involvement in stabilization and/or counterterrorism activities.

Conflict in Northwestern Syria

Areas of Idlib province are the most significant zone remaining outside of government control in western Syria, and pro-Asad forces may launch military operations to reclaim areas of the province in the coming months. Although infighting among anti-Asad groups in the province escalated in 2018 and mutual suspicions remain between Syrian and non-Syrian fighters, extremist groups and some opposition fighters relocated to the province are expected to forcefully resist any Syrian government military campaign. Turkish forces present in some areas also may oppose or actively resist pro-Syrian government forces if hostilities erupt. The wide-scale use of military force by the Syrian government and its supporters against opposition-held areas of Idlib would likely result in significant civilian casualties and displacement and could generate renewed calls for U.S. or coalition military intervention to protect and aid civilians.

The presence in Idlib of Al Qaeda-aligned individuals remains a security concern of the United States and its allies, but the ability of U.S. and coalition forces to operate in or over Idlib may continue to be complicated by Syrian government disapproval and Russian military capabilities. If the Syrian government delays or defers action against opposition-held areas of Idlib, extremist groups hostile to the United States could enjoy some degree of continued safe haven. The Asad government also might seek to leverage the persistence of an extremist threat in Idlib to aid in its consolidation of domestic political and international diplomatic support for Asad's continued rule.

The Future of Displaced Syrians

Conflict in Syria has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and has displaced millions within the country and beyond its borders. As the intensity of conflict has declined in some areas of the country, displaced Syrians have faced difficult choices about whether or how to return to their home areas amid uncertainty about security, potential political persecution, crime, economic conditions, lost or missing documentation, and prospects for recovery. The Asad government is actively encouraging internally displaced Syrians to return home and is seeking the return of Syrian refugees from neighboring countries under a Russian-designed plan. Humanitarian advocates and practitioners continue to raise concerns about the security and protection of returnees and displaced individuals in light of conditions in many areas of the country and questions about the Syrian government's approach to political reconciliation.

In addition, mechanisms and mandates that have provided for the delivery of humanitarian assistance across the Syrian border without the consent of the Syrian government could face renewed scrutiny in coming months, and the Asad government and its backers may pressure neighboring countries to forcefully return Syrian refugees that are within their jurisdictions. The United States remains the leading donor for international humanitarian efforts related to Syria, and U.S. policymakers may face a series of decisions about whether or how to continue or adapt U.S. support in light of changing conditions.

Reconstruction

In 2017, U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura estimated that Syria's reconstruction will cost at least $250 billion, and a group of U.N.-convened experts estimated in August 2018 that the cost of conflict damage could exceed $388 billion.¹⁶¹ The Trump Administration has stated its intent not to contribute to the reconstruction of Asad-controlled Syria absent fundamental political change and to use U.S. diplomatic influence to discourage other international assistance to Asad-controlled Syria. Congress also has acted to restrict the availability of U.S. funds for assistance projects in Asad-controlled areas¹⁶² and is considering legislation that would further restrict such assistance through FY2024 (H.R. 1706). The Trump Administration has stated its intent not to contribute to the reconstruction of Asad-controlled Syria absent fundamental political change and to use U.S. diplomatic influence to discourage other international assistance to Asad-controlled Syria. Congress also has acted to restrict the availability of U.S. funds for assistance projects in Asad-controlled areas.¹⁴⁹

In the absence of U.S. engagement, other actors such as Russia or China could conceivably provide additional assistance for reconstruction purposes, but may be unlikely to mobilize sufficient resources or adequately coordinate investments with other members of the international community to meet Syria's considerable needs. Predatory conditional assistance could also further indebt the Syrian government to these or other international actors and might strengthen strategic ties between Syria and third parties in ways inimical to U.S. interests. A lack of reconstruction, particularly of critical infrastructure, could delay the country's recovery and exacerbate the legacy effects of the conflict on the Syrian population, with negative implications for the country's security and stability.

Addressing Syria-based Threats to Neighboring Countries

Aside from terrorism threats posed by Syria-based Sunni Islamist extremists, U.S. partners and allies among Syria's neighbors perceive threats from Syria-based Iranian forces and associated militia, the reconstituted Syrian military and security services, Russia's presence, and the activities of Syria-based Kurdish armed groups. Asad's post-2015 fortunes in the conflict are largely attributable to the support of Russia and Iran. While there are some tensions reported between Syrian leaders and their foreign partners, it is difficult to foresee a scenario in the short term in which the current Syrian government would seek or be in a position to compel a fundamental change in the posture or presence of Russian or Iranian forces inside Syria. The Syrian security services, once severely degraded, have reconstituted some of their lost capabilities and may continue to grow in strength and coherence. For U.S. partners like Israel and Jordan, these conditions pose long-term strategic challenges, and any independent military or diplomatic actions on their part to address them in turn may create challenges in their relationship with the United States.

Similarly, the Turkish government expresses continuing concern about the presence and power in Syria of armed Kurdish groups, including groups partnered with the United States. Turkish military deployments inside Syria are ongoing and the prospect of confrontation between Turkish forces, U.S. forces, and their respective partners remains a real one. U.S. plans for any enduring partnership with Kurdish-led or -constituted armed groups in Syria or for an enduring U.S. presence in areas under their control would likely have caused related tensions in U.S. relations with Turkey, Syria, Russia, and Iran to persist. If Kurdish armed groups reconcile and align with the Asad-led government in the wake of U.S. drawdown or withdrawal, it could increase the likelihood of more pronounced confrontation between Turkey, the Syrian government, and its allies. An abrupt severance of all U.S. support for Kurdish groups also could sour U.S. relations not just with Syrian Kurds, but with Kurdish populations and leaders in other regional countries.

Syria's Political Future

Supporting a Political Settlement to the Conflict

Since 2011, the United States has pursued a policy of seeking fundamental political change in Syria, initially reflected in U.S. calls for President Asad to step aside. The Trump Administration in 2018has stated that it seeks behavior change rather than regime change in Syria. However, the Administration still calls for a political settlement to the Syria conflict based on UNSCR 2254—, which requires the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of U.N.-supervised elections.

Asad's reelection in self-administered 2014 elections and his subsequent reconsolidation of security control in much of western Syria may limit the likelihood of substantive political change in line with U.S. preferences. U.N.-led negotiations over a settlement of the conflict remain open-ended, but appear unlikely to result in the meaningful incorporation of opposition figures or priorities into new governing arrangements in the short term. Alternative negotiations backed by Asad's Russian and Iranian supporters have their own logic and momentum, and place Syria's opposition groups in a political predicament. Congress and the Administration may reexamine what remaining points of leverage the United States can exercise or whether new points of leverage could be developed that might better ensure a minimally acceptable political outcome. Members of Congress and Administration officials may differ among themselves over what such an outcome might entail. Perceptions among Syrian opposition supporters of U.S. abandonment or acquiescence to an Asad victory may also have long-term diplomatic and security consequences for the United States and its partners.

Implications for Congress

The 115^th Congress appropriated defense funds for FY2019 and the 116^th Congress has appropriated foreign assistance funds for FY2019. As discussed above, Congress conditioned the availability for obligation of some of the defense funds on the Administration's provision of a new strategic plan for Syria and the delivery of oversight reporting on current Syria programs to Congress. As of March 2019, Congress was reviewing the Administration's responses and its FY2020 requests for additional funding. Questions remain about the specifics of the Administration's planned military withdrawal as well as the decision's effect on other U.S. priorities.

The 116^th Congress may attempt to reach consensus on a formal congressional counterproposal to the Administration's priorities and initiatives, and such a task is likely to be challenging if past trends in congressional debate prevail.

As with Administration policy decisions, Asad's likely eventual victory in the conflict runs counter to long-stated congressional preferences and thus complicates appropriation, authorization, and sanctions decisions. Principal questions for Congress for the future may concern the extent and nature of conditions Congress places on U.S. engagement with the Asad-led government and on the expenditure of U.S. funds for any remaining U.S. programs in Asad-controlled areas.

For the foreseeable future, the essential dilemma for Members of Congress and the Administration may remain how to pursue U.S. counterterrorism and stabilization goals in Syria while maintaining a minimal U.S. military footprint in the country and avoiding actions that further empower the Asad government. While this may be accomplished in part by working through local partners and regional allies, these may also have interests and goals in Syria that do not align with U.S. preferences. New efforts by the Asad government and its external backers to assert the Syrian government's sovereignty could prompt additional scrutiny of residual U.S. and coalition military operations inside the country, to include partnership with local forces.

Observers, U.S. officials, and many Members of Congress continue to differ over which incentives and disincentives may prove most effective in influencing various combatants in Syria and their supporters. Still less defined are the long-term commitments that the United States and others may be willing to make to achieve an inclusive political transition; protect civilians; defend U.S. partners; promote accountability and reconciliation; or contribute to the rebuilding of a country significantly destroyed by years of brutal war.

Footnotes

Ibid, 2019.

50, 2019.

Reports submitted by/transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/.115.

117. 121. 147.

1.	Remarks by President Trump on the Infrastructure Initiative, March 30, 2018; Remarks by President Trump and Heads of the Baltic States in Joint Press Conference, April 3, 2018.
2.	"Bolton: U.S. forces will stay in Syria until Iran and its proxies depart," Washington Post, September 24, 2018.
3.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.
4.	U.S. State Department, Briefing on the Status of Syria Stabilization Assistance and Ongoing Efforts to Achieve an Enduring Defeat of ISIS, August 17, 2018.
5.	"Graham, Shaheen, Ernst, King, Cotton, Rubio Urge Trump Administration To Reconsider Withdrawing U.S. Forces From Syria," Press Release, Office of Sen. Lindsey Graham, December 19, 2018.
6.	Hon. Ted Lieu, "Statement on Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Syria," December 19, 2018; and, Hon. Ro Khanna, "Trump was right to pull out of Syria and Afghanistan. This is what he should do next." Washington Post, December 22, 2018.
7.	U.S. Central Command Response to DoD IG, January 16, 2019, as Operation Inherent Resolve and other Overseas Contingency Operations, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2018 – December 31, 2018, February 4, 2019, p. 2.
8.	Transcript, Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Interview with RIA Novosti and Kommersant, November 21, 2018.
9.	Briefing on the Status of Syria Stabilization Assistance and Ongoing Efforts to Achieve an Enduring Defeat of ISIS, David M. Satterfield, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition To Counter ISIS, August 17, 2018.
10.	Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Syria, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, November 27, 2017.
11.	Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Syria, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, November 27, 2017; and, U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, "Experts discuss post-conflict reconstruction policies after political agreement in Syria," August 7, 2018.
12.	"ISIS has lost its final stronghold in Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces says," CNN, March 23, 2019.
13.	See CJTF-OIR strike summaries, available at: http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/.
14.	CENTCOM Commander Gen. Joseph Votel before the House Armed Services Committee, March 7, 2019.
15.	Ibid.
16.	Department Of Defense Press Briefing By Maj. Gen. Gedney Via Teleconference, December 27, 2017.
17.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve I Quarterly Report to the United States Congress I July 1, 2018 - September 30, 2018 (p. 49).
18.	Operation Inherent Resolve and other Overseas Contingency Operations, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2018 – December 31, 2018, February 4, 2019, p. 2.
19.	U.S. State Department, Briefing on the Status of Syria Stabilization Assistance and Ongoing Efforts to Achieve an Enduring Defeat of ISIS, August 17, 2018; Media Roundtable with General Joseph F. Dunford and Special Envoy Brett McGurk, October 16, 2018.
20.	CENTCOM Commander Gen. Joseph Votel before the House Armed Services Committee, March 7, 2019.
21.	Media Roundtable with General Joseph F. Dunford and Special Envoy Brett McGurk, October 16, 2018.
22.	Ibid.
23.	Media Roundtable with General Joseph F. Dunford and Special Envoy Brett McGurk, October 16, 2018.
24.	"The jihadists no one wants," Washington Post, December 21, 2018.
25.	"Trump administration ends aid for northwestern Syria," CBS, May 18, 2018.
26.	The agreement also established de-escalation areas in northern Homs and northern Rural Damascus province. Both of these areas have since been retaken by the Syrian government.
27.	https://twitter.com/USEmbassySyria/status/864133630410584064.
28.	Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, at the Middle East Institute, July 27, 2017.
29.	Ibid.
30.	Statement by Pentagon Spokesman Captain Jeff Davis on US strike against al-Qaida Training Camp in Syria‎, January 20, 2017.
31.	Hassan Hassan, "Two Houses Divided: How Conflict in Syria Shaped the Future of Jihadism," CTC Sentinel, October 2018.
32.	Thomas Joscelyn, "Analysis: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Hurras al-Din reach a new accord," Long War Journal, February 15, 2019.
33.	"Russian and Syrian air strikes intensify on last rebel bastion," Reuters, March 13, 2019.
34.	Deutsche Welle, "Russia relaunches Idlib bombing campaign," September 4, 2018.
35.	For additional information on Turkish policy in Syria, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
36.	"Syrian surprise: How Trump's phone call changed the war," Reuters, December 28, 2018.
37.	Transcript, Acting Secretary Shanahan and Minister Akar Remarks at the Opening of the Bilateral Meeting, February 22, 2019.
38.	Operation Inherent Resolve and other Overseas Contingency Operations, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2018 – December 31, 2018, February 4, 2019, p. 6.
39.	"Turkey Seeks U.S. Aid in Syria," Wall Street Journal, January 5 Author Contact Information Carla E. Humud, Coordinator, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed]) Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs ([email address scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed]) Footnotes
1.	Remarks by President Trump on the Infrastructure Initiative, March 30, 2018; Remarks by President Trump and Heads of the Baltic States in Joint Press Conference, April 3, 2018.
2.	"Bolton: U.S. forces will stay in Syria until Iran and its proxies depart," Washington Post, September 24, 2018.
3.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.
4.	At a December 11, 2019, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Esper stated that, "[ ... ] we think we have sufficient authorities right now under the '01 and '02 AUMFs to conduct what we—to do what we need to do in Syria." Similarly, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley stated, "[ ... ] the '01 AUMF allows us to conduct offensive strike operations against terrorists, Al Qaeda, etc. ISIS, we should all remember, is a direct derivative of Al Qaeda, and it is Al Qaeda in Iraq rebranded as ISIS."
5.	During a December 11, 2019, hearing on U.S. Syria policy by the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Smith stated, " ... I don't think it's a good idea for us to be relying on the 2001 and 2002 AUMF in 2019. We could talk about what's in the 2001 AUMF and how it applies to now. I think that thing has been stretched beyond all recognition. But the 2002 AUMF, it's just ridiculous that we're still saying that this is an authority. I was here, and I voted for that. The 2002 AUMF was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and stop the threat that he posed."
6.	Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
7.	See reports (issued quarterly) by the Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve.
8.	Lara Seligman, "U.S. Considering Plan to Stay in Remote Syrian Base to Counter Iran," Foreign Policy, January 25, 2019.
9.	Ambassador James Jeffrey, State Department Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019.
10.	Defense Under Secretary for Policy John Rood before the Senate Armed Services Committee, December 5, 2019.
11.	See, for example, Hakan Copur, "US admissions of PYD-PKK links growing," Anadolu Agency, February 15, 2018.
12.	Ambassador Jeffrey before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019.
13.	2018 assessment referenced in "Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress," October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019, p. 43.
14.	Ibid.
15.	Syrian President Asad interview with Russia 24 and Rossiya Sevodnya, Syria Report, November 15, 2019.
16.	Louay Falouh, Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations, SC/14061, December 19, 2019.
17.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019, p. 43.
18.	Remarks by President Trump on the Death of ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, October 27, 2019.
19.	Remarks by Vice President Pence in a Press Gaggle | Erbil Air Base, November 23, 2019.
20.	OIR Spokesman Col. Myles B. Caggins III, statement posted to Twitter (@OIRSpox), February 12, 2020, 6:58 AM.
21.	"U.S. Troops in Standoffs With Russian Military Contractors in Syria," Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2020.
22.	Department of State transcript, "Ambassador Jeffrey on the Situation in Syria," February 5, 2020.
23.	Ibid.
24.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 1, 2019-December 31, 2019, p. 50.
25.	This change may reflect a gradual U.S. shift from supporting Syrian opposition forces (now largely defeated by the Syrian government) to a greater reliance on Syrian Kurdish groups (which oppose the Islamic State but not necessarily the Asad government).
26.	Andorra Bruno, Specialist in Immigration Policy, contributed to this section. For related information, see CRS Report R43725, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs.
27.	Two of the bills also reference stateless persons habitually residing in Syria, as Syrian government policy for the past several decades has denied Syrian citizenship to the majority of Kurdish residents.
28.	Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
29.	At a December 11, 2019, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Secretary Esper stated, "[ ... ] when you look at the situation at the time we faced maybe one or two scenarios. One would have been to allow our troops to stand there in the face of a [ ... ] Turkish onslaught which both Chairman Milley and I agreed wasn't worth risking our soldiers' lives. Option two would have been an un-credible option, which would be fighting a long-standing NATO ally."
30.	"Turkey's Syria invasion was a 'bad idea,' Trump says," Defense One, October 10, 2019.
31.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019, p. 2.
32.	Written testimony of Ambassador James Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019.
33.	"Fighting persists near Turkish border in Syria safe zone, Kurdish officials say," NBC News, October 31, 2019.
34.	"Car bomb kills at least 18 in Syrian town held by Turkey," Associated Press, November 16, 2019. "Car bomb attack kills eight in northern Syria," Al Jazeera, December 24, 2019.
35.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019.
36.	Ibid.
37.	Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, December 12, 2019.
38.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019.
39.	News conference with Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, January 23, 2020; Briefing by Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Ambassador James F. Jeffrey and Counterterrorism Coordinator Ambassador Nathan A. Sales, August 1, 2019.
40.
40.	https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1084584259510304768.
41.	Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Remarks to Traveling Press, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, January 14, 2019.
42.	"Erdogan-Putin summit highlights differences over Syria," Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, January 25, 2019.
43.	"The Safe Zone Northern Syria Needs," New York Times, January 23Ibid.
42.	UN OCHA Syrian Arab Republic, North East Syria: Al Hol camp, January 13, 2020. Among the population, 46% are Iraqis (30,724), 39% are Syrians (25,780), and 15% are third country nationals (TCNs) (9,597).
43.	"Guns, Filth and ISIS: Syrian Camp Is 'Disaster in the Making,'" New York Times, September 3, 2019.
44.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2019-June 30, 2019, p. 5.
45.	"More than 500 dead in Syria's Al-Hol in 2019: medics," AFP, January 16, 2020.
46.	In a press briefing on February 5, 2020, Ambassador Jeffrey estimated that 7,000 to 10,000 Nusra Front members were present in Syria. The Nusra Front emerged in late 2011 as Al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, today it is known as Haya't Tahrir al Sham (HTS).
47.	"Attacks on the People of Idlib," Press Statement by Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, January 27, 2020.
48.	Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock, "Briefing to the Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in Northwest Syria," February 6, 2020.
49.	U.N. OCHA, "Recent Developments in Northwest Syria," Flash Update—As of 6 February 2020.
44.	Dan Williams, "Israel says struck Iranian targets in Syria 200 times in last two years," Reuters, September 4, 2018.
45.	"Israel said to have hit Hezbollah convoys dozens of times," Times of Israel, August 17, 2017.
46.	An unnamed Israeli military source told Thomas Friedman of the New York Times that a strike on April 9 was the first time Israel "attacked live Iranian targets—both facilities and people." On April 17, the New York Times subsequently amended Friedman's commentary as published on April 15 to reflect the Israeli government's official position. According to Friedman, "After the story appeared, the Israeli Army's spokesman's office disputed the characterization and accuracy of the raid by my Israeli source, and emphasized that Israel maintains its policy to avoid commenting on media reports regarding the raid on the T4 airfield and other events. He would not comment further." See, Thomas Friedman, "The Real Next War in Syria: Iran vs. Israel," New York Times, April 15 and 17, 2018; Reuters, "Israel conducted April 9 strike on Syrian airbase: NYT quotes Israeli military source," April 16, 2018; Haaretz, "Israel Admits to Striking Syria: 'It Was the First Time We Attacked Live Iranian Targets,'" April 16, 2018; and, Jewish Voice, "IDF Source Credits Israel with Attack on Iranians in Syria," April 20, 2018.
47.	"Putin Calls Downing of Russian Plane in Syria 'Tragic,' Absolves Israel," New York Times, September 18, 2018.
48.	https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1042016239449722882.
49.	"Israel Confirms Attacks on Iranian Targets in Syria," New York Times, January 20, 2019. . U.N. OCHA, "Recent Developments in Northwest Syria," Situation Report No. 6—As of 15 January 2020.
5051.	"Israel Says Hezbollah Operative Is Setting Up a Terror Network in Golan Heights," Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2019U.N. OCHA, "Recent Developments in Northwest Syria," Flash Update—As of 6 February 2020.
5152.	Action Group for Syria, Final Communiqué, June 30, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf. Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS, at the Middle East Institute, July 27, 2017.
5253.	"Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Wins Third Term," BBC, June 5, 2014.
53.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018Briefing by Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Ambassador James F. Jeffrey and Counterterrorism Coordinator Ambassador Nathan A. Sales, August 1, 2019.
54.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019"Trump administration ends aid for northwestern Syria," CBS, May 18, 2018.
55.	Media Note, "The Secretary's Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Ambassador James Jeffrey Travels to Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia," October 15, 2018. Hassan Hassan, "Two Houses Divided: How Conflict in Syria Shaped the Future of Jihadism," CTC Sentinel, October 2018.
56.	Background Briefing on the Joint Statement by the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation on Syria, November 11, 2017Thomas Joscelyn, "Analysis: Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Hurras al-Din reach a new accord," Long War Journal, February 15, 2019.
57.	"Can the Astana process survive the U.S. withdrawal from Syria?" Al Jazeera, February 16, 2019. Statement from U.S. Central Command on strike against al-Qaida in Syria, June 30, 2019.
58.	"Syrian Peace Talks in Russia; 1,500 Delegates, Mostly Pro-Assad," New York Times, January 30, 2018Statement from U.S. Central Command on U.S. Forces strike against al-Qaida in Syria leadership in Idlib, Syria, Aug. 31, 2019.
59.	Final statement of the Congress of the Syrian national dialogue, Sochi, January 30, 2018"ISIS Leader Paid Rival for Protection but Was Betrayed by His Own," New York Times, October 30, 2019.
60.	"A Desperate Exodus From ISIS' Final Village," New York Times, February 6, 2019.
61.	Action Group for Syria, Final Communiqué, June 30, 2012, http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.
62.	Lara Seligman, Colum Lynch, "As Assad Gains Ground, New Syria Talks Offer Little Hope of Peace," Foreign Policy, November 12, 2019.
63.	Interview of Syrian President Asad by Syrian state TV, October 31, 2019. Transcript by state news agency SANA, accessible on Syria Report.
64.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.
65.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.
66.	Ambassador James Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019.
67.	"Syria Peace Talks to Open After a Long, Strange Month," New York Times, October 28, 2019.
68.	Media Note, "The Secretary's Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Ambassador James Jeffrey Travels to Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia," October 15, 2018.
69.	"U.N. announces formation of Syrian constitutional committee," Washington Post, September 23, 2019.
70.	Background Briefing on the Joint Statement by the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation on Syria, November 11, 2017.
71.	Final statement of the Congress of the Syrian national dialogue, Sochi, January 30, 2018.
72.	"Syrian Peace Talks in Russia; 1,500 Delegates, Mostly Pro-Assad," New York Times, January 30, 2018.
73.	"Syrian Kurds protest 'unjust' exclusion from constitutional committee," Middle East Eye, October 2, 2019.
74.	Reliefweb, Syrian Arab Republic. Latest figures available at https://m.reliefweb.int/country/226/syr?figures-display=all.
75.
76.	United Nations Security Council, 8423rd meeting, December 13, 2018, S/PV.8423.
77.	"Russia and China Block Cross-Border Aid Deliveries to Syria," New York Times, December 20, 2019.
78.	"Security Council beats midnight deadline, renews Syria cross-border aid in contentious vote," U.N. News, January 10, 2020.
79.	USAID Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance for the People of Syria, January 26, 2018.
80.	USAID Syria—Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #3, FY2020, January 16, 2020.
81.	State Department Fact Sheet: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syria Crisis, March 14, 2019.
82.	For additional details, see UNDP and UNHCR, 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2017—2018: In Response to the Syria Crisis: Regional Strategic Overview, December 5, 2016.
83.	For additional details, see UNOCHA, 2017 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Plan: January-December 2017.
84.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019, p. 27.
85.	Ambassador James Jeffrey before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 22, 2019.
86.	Ibid.
87.	Defense Secretary Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
88.	Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
89.	Defense Secretary Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
90.	Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Jarrard via teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq, October 31, 2017.
91.	See http://www.inherentresolve.mil for an organization chart.
92.	White House Statement from the Press Secretary, October 6, 2019.
93.	Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
94.	Department of Defense, "Statement by Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper Regarding Turkey, Syria Border Actions," October 14, 2019.
95.	DOD transcript, "Secretary of Defense Esper Media Engagement En Route to Afghanistan," October 19, 2019.
96.	DOD transcript, "Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Joint Press Conference With Senior Afghan Officials and Resolute Support Mission Commander," October 21, 2019.
97.	Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet Meeting, October 21, 2019.
98.	Department of Defense Press Briefing by Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Jonathan Rath Hoffman and Navy Rear Admiral William D. Byrne Jr., Vice Director, Joint Staff, November 7, 2019.
99.	Remarks by President Trump and President Erdoğan of Turkey Before Bilateral Meeting, November 13, 2019.
100.	Defense Secretary Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
101.	"Exclusive: U.S. military completes pullback from northeast Syria, Esper says," Reuters, December 5, 2019.
102.	Press Briefing by the Press Secretary Josh Earnest, October 30, 2015.
103.	"Pentagon Announces Troop Levels in Iraq, Syria," DoD News, December 6, 2017.
104.	Rex Tillerson, "Remarks on the Way Forward for the United States Regarding Syria," Hoover Institute at Stanford University, January 17, 2018.
105.	Remarks by President Trump on the Infrastructure Initiative, March 30, 2018.
106.	Telephonic Press Briefing with James Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement, November 7, 2018.
107.	Video posted to Twitter (@realDonald Trump), December 19, 2018, 3:10 PM.
108.	White House Statement from the Press Secretary, October 6, 2019; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
109.	Department of Defense, "Statement by Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper Regarding Turkey, Syria Border Actions," October 14, 2019.
110.	DOD transcript, "Remarks by Secretary Esper in a Joint Press Conference With Senior Afghan Officials and Resolute Support Mission Commander," October 21, 2019.
111.	"Exclusive: U.S. military completes pullback from northeast Syria, Esper says," Reuters, December 5, 2019.
112.	Justification for FY 2021 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), February 2020.
113.	Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), March 2019.
114.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.
60.	"Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Syria," Jonathan Cohen, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, June 27, 2018.
61.	"A Primer on Syria's Constitutional Committee," Lawfare, December 22, 2018.
62.	"Syrian Government's 'different understanding' of UN role, a 'very serious challenge' - Special Envoy," UN News, October 26, 2018.
63.	"Syria's Kurds hope for 'new state and system' via Assad talks," Al Jazeera, July 28, 2018.
64.	Transcript, Interview of Bashar al Asad by Russia Today, May 31, 2018.
65.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, January 29, 2019.
66.	"United Nations calls for sustained support to Syrians and the region ahead of Brussels conference," UNHCR Press Release, March 13, 2019.
67.	Reports submitted by/transmitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/sgreports/.
68.	USAID Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance for the People of Syria, January 26, 2018.
69.	State Department Fact Sheet: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance in Response to the Syria Crisis, March 14, 2019.
70.	Ibid.
71.	For additional details, see UNDP and UNHCR, 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2017 – 2018: In Response to the Syria Crisis: Regional Strategic Overview, December 5, 2016.
72.	For additional details, see UNOCHA, 2017 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Response Plan: January - December 2017.
73.	"United Nations calls for sustained support to Syrians and the region ahead of Brussels conference," UNHCR Press Release, March 13, 2019.
74.	Rex Tillerson, "Remarks on the Way Forward for the United States Regarding Syria," Hoover Institute at Stanford University, January 17, 2018.
75.	Gen. Joseph Votel before the House Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2018.
76.	Remarks by President Trump on the Infrastructure Initiative, March 30, 2018.
77.	Remarks by President Trump and Heads of the Baltic States in Joint Press Conference, April 3, 2018.
78.	Department Of Defense Press Briefing By Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White And Joint Staff Director Lt. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. In The Pentagon Briefing Room, April 5, 2018.
79.	"Trump administration ends aid for northwestern Syria," CBS News, May 18, 2018.
80.	"Syria Stabilization Efforts Continue With Coalition Contributions," State Department Press Statement, August 17, 2018.
81.	Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield and Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition To Counter ISIS Brett McGurk, Briefing on the Status of Syria Stabilization Assistance and Ongoing Efforts To Achieve an Enduring Defeat of ISIS, State Department, August 17, 2018.
82.	See Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Remarks at the 36th Annual Jewish Institute for National Security of America Awards Dinner, October 10, 2018; Telephonic Press Briefing with James Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement, November 7, 2018.
83.	"Bolton: U.S. forces will stay in Syria until Iran and its proxies depart," Washington Post, September 24, 2018.
84.	Telephonic Press Briefing with James Jeffrey, Special Representative for Syria Engagement, November 7, 2018.
85.	State Department Press Briefing, December 11, 2018.
86.	Video posted to Twitter (@realDonald Trump), December 19, 2018, 3:10 PM.
87.	Trump, Donald (@realDonaldTrump). "We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency." December 19, 2018, 6:29 AM. Tweet.
88.	White, Dana (@ChiefPentSpox). "The #Coalition has liberated ISIS-held territory, but the campaign against #ISIS is not over." December 19, 2018, 9:33 AM. Tweet.
89.	White, Dana (@ChiefPentSpox). "For force protection and operational security reasons we will not provide further details." December 19, 2018, 9:33 AM. Tweet.
90.	"U.S. State Department personnel being evacuated from Syria - U.S. official," Reuters, December 19, 2018.
91.	State Department Press Briefing, December 11, 2018.
92.	"Trump Withdraws U.S. Forces From Syria, Declaring 'We Have Won Against ISIS,'" New York Times, December 19, 2018.
93.	President Trump appointed Patrick Shanahan as Acting Secretary of Defense as of January 1; "Read Jim Mattis's Letter to Trump: Full Text," New York Times, December 20, 2018.
94.	"Splitting With Trump Over Syria, American Leading ISIS Fight Steps Down," New York Times, December 22, 2018.
95.	"Graham, Shaheen, Ernst, King, Cotton, Rubio Urge Trump Administration To Reconsider Withdrawing U.S. Forces From Syria," Press Release, Office of Sen. Lindsey Graham, December 19, 2018.
96.	"US withdrawal from Syria means likely an end to airstrikes, official says," CNN, December 20, 2018.
97.	"Isis not defeated in Syria despite Trump claim, says UK," The Guardian, December 19, 2018.
98.	"Putin Welcomes U.S. Withdrawal From Syria as 'Correct'," New York Times, December 20, 2018.
99.	"Turkish foreign minister: Turkey welcomes U.S. decision to withdraw troops from Syria," Associated Press, December 21, 2018; "Syrian surprise: How Trump's phone call changed the war," Reuters, December 28, 2018.
100.	"In Latest Shift, Trump Agrees to Leave 400 Troops in Syria," New York Times, February 22, 2019.
101.	Acting Secretary Shanahan and General Dunford Media Availability Prior to Honors Parade, February 22, 2019.
102.	"U.S. Military Now Preparing to Leave as Many as 1,000 Troops in Syria," Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2019.
103.	"Correction to the Record—Syria Troop Numbers," Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Public Affairs, March 17, 2019.
104.	"Top US general refutes report that military could keep nearly 1,000 US troops in Syria," CNN, March 17, 2019.
105.	Proclamation on Recognizing the Golan Heights as Part of the State of Israel, March 25, 2019.
106.	"Syria: Trump's recognition of annexing the occupied Syrian Golan to Zionist entity represents highest degrees of contempt for international legitimacy," Syrian Arab News Agency, March 25, 2019.
107.	Prepared by Matthew Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation.
108.	Statement by Secretary James N. Mattis on Syria, Department of Defense Press Release No: NR-113-18.
109.	On April 6, the President said he ordered the strikes to protect the "vital national security interest of the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons." The April 8 letter expands upon this explanation. The letter says the strikes were intended "to degrade the Syrian military's ability to conduct further chemical weapons attacks and to dissuade the Syrian regime from using or proliferating chemical weapons, thereby promoting the stability of the region and averting a worsening of the region's current humanitarian catastrophe."
110.	Letter to Senator Bob Corker from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional, Global and Functional Affairs Charles Faulkner, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, August 2, 2017.
111.	"Pentagon Announces Troop Levels in Iraq, Syria," DoD News, December 6, 2017.
112.	Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Jarrard via teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq, October 31, 2017.
113.	See http://www.inherentresolve.mil for an organization chart.
114.	Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), March 2019.
115.	Justification for FY 2020 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF), March 2019.
116.	Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 13, 2018.
117.	The FY2014 foreign operations appropriations act (Section 7041(i) of Division K of P.L. 113-76), as expanded and extended by the FY2015 act (Section 7041(h) of Division J of P.L. 113-235), made FY2015 and prior year ESF funding available "notwithstanding any other provision of law" for select nonlethal purposes inside Syria. The FY2016 appropriations act (Section 7041(h) of Division K of P.L. 114-113) extended this authority further, granting notwithstanding exceptions for FY2016 ESF funds as well as for FY2016 funds in the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) accounts. The Obama Administration used the INCLE and PKO accounts to support justice sector activities in opposition-held areas of Syria and to provide nonlethal assistance to select armed opposition groups. The appropriations acts for FY2017 (Section 7041(j) of Division J of P.L. 115-31) and FY2018 (Section 7041(k) of Division K of P.L. 115-141) further amended and specified the categories of assistance authorized to be provided from these accounts. Prior to the enactment of specific notwithstanding authority by Congress, the President was required to assert emergency and contingency authorities (i.e., Sections 451 and 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) to provide nonlethal assistance to the unarmed Syrian opposition and to communities inside Syria.179 In 2012, the Administration began to use these emergency and contingency authorities to provide food rations and medical supplies to the National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) and the Turkey-based Syrian Military Council (SMC).
118116.	White House Statement from the Press Secretary, October 12, 2019.	Written Statement of Robert W. Jenkins, Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S. Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle East & North Africa, November 29, 2018.
119118.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019, p. 42.
119.	Ibid., p. 40.
120.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019, p. 42.
United Nations Security Council, 8423rd meeting, December 13, 2018, S/PV.8423.
120.	Prepared by Mary Beth Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation. See also CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud.
121.	Find full reports at "The Fact Finding Mission (FFM)," OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria/the-fact-finding-mission/.
122.	UN Commission of Inquiry Info Graphic: Chemical Weapons Attacks Documented by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, as of September 6, 2017; Arms Control Association, "Timeline of Chemical Weapons Attacks in Syria: 2012-2018," ACA Fact Sheet, 2018.
123.	The use of chlorine as a weapon is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention. . Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
124122.	"Dozens Suffocate in Syria as Government Is Accused of Chemical Attack," New York Times, April 8, 2018. Remarks by President Trump in Cabinet Meeting, October 21, 2019.
125123.	"Douma symptoms consistent with nerve agent: U.S. State Department," Reuters, April 9, 2018Secretary of Defense Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
126124.	Press briefing by Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis; Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Joseph F. Dunford; Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White, April 13, 2018. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
127125.	"Kurdish informant provided key intel in operation that killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi," NBC News, October 28, 2019; "Trump's Syria Troop Withdrawal Complicated Plans for al-Baghdadi Raid," New York Times, October 27, 2019.
126.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2019-March 31, 2019.
127.	Lead Inspector General for Operation Inherent Resolve, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 1, 2019-October 25, 2019, p. 32.
128.	Ibid.
129.	Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Mark Milley before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
130.	"DoD Official: Sole Focus in Iraq, Syria Remains on ISIS," CENTCOM, June 20, 2017.
131.	See for example, Jessica Trisko Darden, "Humanitarian assistance has a terrorism problem. Can it be resolved?" War on the Rocks, January 3, 2019; Joel R. Charny, "Counter-terrorism and humanitarian action: the perils of zero tolerance," War on the Rocks, March 20, 2019.
132.	"US tightens counter-terror clampdown on Syria aid," The New Humanitarian, September 21, 2018.
133.	"Law No. 10 of 2018: Housing, Land, and Property," Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, December 10, 2018.
134.	See for example, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020: Syria (pp. 539-546).
135.	"Describing Vast Scale of Need, Humanitarian Official Urges Security Council to Renew Authorization for Lifesaving Cross-Border Aid Delivery in Syria," SC/14061, December 19, 2019.
136.	"Aoun Calls for Gradual Return of Syrian Refugees," Asharq Al Awsat, March 8, 2018.
137.	Address by Lebanese President Michel Aoun at the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 2019.
138.	Address by Lebanese President Michel Aoun at the 74th session of the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 2019.
139.	"Aoun: Lebanon Could Organize Return of Syrian Refugees with Damascus," Asharq Al Awsat, May 4, 2019; "The return of Syrian refugee families from the camps of Ersal to the village of Essal el-Ward in Syria," July 12, 2017, http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb.
140.	Amnesty International, "Lebanon: Authorities must immediately halt deportation of Syrian refugees," August 27, 2019.
141.	"Turkey Wants Refugees to Move to a 'Safe Zone.' It's a Tough Sell." New York Times, November 1, 2019; "Erdogan renews call for 'safe zone' support as Syrians return," Al Monitor, December 17, 2019.
142.	"Readout of the Secretary-General's meeting with H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey," www.un.org/sg/en, November 1, 2019.
143.	"Turkey Pitches Plan to Settle 1 Million Refugees in Northern Syria," Foreign Policy, December 18, 2019.
144.	Ibid.
145.	"Readout of the Secretary-General's meeting with H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey," www.un.org/sg/en, November 1, 2019.
146.	"Sent to a war zone: Turkey's illegal deportations of Syrian refugees," Amnesty International, October 25, 2019.
Report of the Fact-Finding Mission Regarding the Incident of Alleged Use of Toxic Chemicals as a Weapon in Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 April 2018, OPCW Technical Secretariat, S/1731/2019, March 1, 2019.
128.	Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Chief Spokesperson Dana W. White and Joint Staff Director Lt. Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. in the Pentagon Briefing Room, April 14, 2018.
129.	Ibid.
130.	Ibid.
131.	President Trump Statement on Syria, April 6, 2016; and, Statement from Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis on U.S. strike in Syria, Release No: NR-126-17, April 6, 2017.
132.	"OPCW Director-General Shares Incontrovertible Laboratory Results Concluding Exposure to Sarin," OPCW Press Release, April 19, 2017.
133.	Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, "Remarks With National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster," April 6, 2017.
134.	Ibid.
135.	Press Conference by Secretary Mattis and Gen. Votel in the Pentagon Briefing Room, April 11, 2017.
136.	"Treasury Sanctions 271 Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center Staff in Response to Sarin Attack on Khan Sheikhoun," April 24, 2017.
137.	White House Office of the Press Secretary, Government Assessment of the Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013, August 30, 2013.
138.	Ibid.
139.	Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter authorizes the use of punitive measures such as sanctions or military force.
140.	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons Completed," press release, January 4, 2016.
141.	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Note by the Director-General: Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme," EC-89/DG.24, September 24, 2018.
142.	Joint News Conference with Secretary Mattis and Minister of Defense Lieberman in Tel Aviv, Israel, Department of Defense News Transcript, April 21, 2017; Julian E. Barnes and Maria Abi-Habib, "Syrian Attack Defies 2013 Chemical-Weapons Deal," Wall Street Journal, April 6, 2017.
143.	"Report on the Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons Programme," OPCW, EC-90/DG.11, February 25, 2019.
144.	"Secretary-General's Press Encounter on Syrian Government Request," March 21, 2013.
145.	https://opcw.unmissions.org/.
146.	OPCW Reports on the Elimination of Chemical Weapons in Syria can be found here: https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria/related-official-documents/.
147.	"The Fact Finding Mission (FFM)," OPCW, https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria/the-fact-finding-mission/.
148.	The decision calls upon the OPCW make arrangements "to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic by identifying and reporting on all information potentially relevant to the origin of those chemical weapons in those instances in which the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission determines or has determined that use or likely use occurred, and cases for which the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism has not issued a report." https://www.opcw.org/news/article/cwc-conference-of-the-states-parties-adopts-decision-addressing-the-threat-from-chemical-weapons-use/. In November 2018, States parties approved an Attribution Team as part of the OPCW verification responsibilities.
149.	Resolution 2235 required that the U.N. Secretary-General, in coordination with the OPCW Director-General, submit within 20 days recommendations for its approval on the establishment of a Joint Investigative Mechanism "to identify to the greatest extent feasible individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organisers [sic], sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic where the OPCW FFM determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical…."
150.	In addition to these cases, the FFM and JIM have reported their recording through open sources of at least 138 other incidents involving the use of chemicals as weapons in Syria since April 2014.
151.	U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, "Third Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism," S/2016/738, August 24, 2016. "Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism," OPCW, S/2016/888, October 21, 2016.
152.	"Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism," OPCW, S/1510/2017, June 29, 2017.
153.	U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, "Sixth Report of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism," S/2017/552, June 28, 2017. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, "Letter Dated 26 October 2017 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/2017/904, October 26, 2017, Annex I.
154.	"Syria: Renewal of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism," What's In Blue, November 17, 2016.
155.	"Launch of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons," French Foreign Ministry, January 23, 2018.
156.	"Syria Draft Resolution Imposing Sanctions Regarding the Use and Production of Chemical Weapons," What's In Blue, February 25, 2017.
157.	"OPCW Will Deploy Fact-Finding Mission to Syria," OPCW Press Release, April 10, 2018.
158.	The Human Rights Council is the primary intergovernmental U.N. body charged with addressing human rights situations worldwide. The United States is currently a Council member.
159.	http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/CoIMandate.aspx; see also http://www.ohchr.org/SiteCollectionImages/Bodies/HRCouncil/IICISyria/COISyria_ChemicalWeapons.jpg.
160.	Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, September 6, 2017. . Defense Secretary Mark Esper before the House Armed Services Committee, December 11, 2019.
161148.	Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Syria, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, November 27, 2017; and, U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, "Experts discuss post-conflict reconstruction policies after political agreement in Syria," August 7, 2018.
162149.	Section 7041(i)(3)(B2)(C) of Division FG of P.L. 116-694 states that FY2019FY2020 funds made available for authorized purposes in Syria "should not be used in areas of Syria controlled by a government led by Bashar al-Assad or associated forces."