Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

August 13, 2010 – December 22, 2022 R41368

Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
December 22, 2022
U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated geopolitical environment and with
Turkey in economic distress. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in
Jim Zanotti
Turkey—including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of
Specialist in Middle
a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—have raised questions about the future of
Eastern Affairs
bilateral relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and informal holds

on U.S. arms sales. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of
continued cooperation and Turkey’s
Clayton Thomas
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Specialist in Middle
(NATO). Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President
Eastern Affairs
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkey’s currency—perhaps partly

due to Erdogan’s unorthodox policy of keeping interest rates relatively low—have led to
speculation that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) might

be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections
planned for June 2023 if competitive elections occur. If a different Turkish president were to win 2023 elections and take
power, some domestic and foreign policy changes could be possible.
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other foreign policy
matters. While deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as an
important mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for
U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense;
growing relationships with other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power (including via the export of drone
aircraft); and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for
sales that would upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S.
political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial well-being. Congressional oversight
and legislation could affect arms sales, sanctions, military basing, and U.S. political and financial engagement with Turkey’s
government (including in connection with elections). The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense
cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkish leaders’ have
indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and
Armenia-Azerbaijan.
Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, Greece and Cyprus, and the Middle East. In the wake of Russia’s 2022
invasion of Ukraine, Turkey faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea
access, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy
by deepening economic and energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey
increased leverage in these dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has
become an important mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. In June,
Turkey agreed on a framework deal for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, but Turkey has delayed ratifying their accession
while demanding that the two countries help Turkey act against people it considers to be terrorists. Longstanding disputes
between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean seas have spiked in 2022 amid
greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, as well as renewed disagreements regarding Greek islands close
to Turkey’s coast. Turkey’s improved relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—perhaps partly
stemming from common concerns about Iran—appear to be further supports for Turkey’s struggling economy.
Syria and Iraq: ongoing conflict near borders. Turkish concerns regarding its southern borders with Syria and Iraq have
deepened further during Syria’s civil war, due largely to: (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S.
efforts to counter the Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym
PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that
complicate and somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various
areas of northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s
military could undertake another ground operation against PKK-linked Syrian Kurds, despite reported U.S. and Russian
expressions of concern.
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Introduction and Issues for Congress
While U.S.-Turkey1 ties have been consistently complicated since Turkey joined the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, tensions in at least the past six years have
produced a number of crises and have led to questions about the status and future of the bilateral
relationship (see “U.S. Relations” and “Congressional Action and Options” below). Although the
United States and Turkey, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies since 1952, share
some vital interests, harmonizing priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge
irrespective of who leads the two countries, based on differences in geography, threat perceptions,
and regional roles. This report provides background information and analysis on the following
topics:
 Turkey’s domestic setting and 2023 elections. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and his Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma
Partisi, or AKP), in power since 2003, rule in a largely authoritarian manner.
Erdogan has steadily consolidated control through elections and increasing
dominance over the country’s security apparatus and other key institutions.
Structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy (including major inflation and a
sharp decline in Turkey’s currency) have led to speculation that Erdogan and the
AKP might be vulnerable in presidential and parliamentary elections planned for
June 2023. Concerns about winning reelection in partnership with the Nationalist
Movement Party (Milliyet Halk Partisi, or MHP) may partly explain Erdogan’s
domestic and foreign policies. Polls suggest that an opposition coalition led by
the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP) and Good
Party (Iyi Parti) may have a chance to defeat Erdogan and the AKP in the
elections. Some observers argue that an election may not be fully free or fair
because of Erdogan’s control or influence over the judiciary and media in
Turkey.2 If a different president were to win 2023 elections and take power, some
policy changes could be possible, but might be limited in areas of core or
longstanding national security concern.
 Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey appears to compartmentalize its relationships
with United States, Russia, the European Union (EU), and its regional neighbors
depending on various circumstances. For example, Turkey received an S-400
surface-to-air defense system from Russia in 2019 and continues to cooperate
with it in other areas even after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. At the same
time, Turkey has provided Ukraine with military, political, and economic support
in response to the conflict, and has worked with other countries in its region,
perhaps partly as a means of countering Russian regional power.
 U.S. relations. Policy differences and public acrimony between Turkey and the
United States—including over the S-400 and Kurds in northern Syria—have
highlighted bilateral tensions. Yet, bilateral ties have somewhat improved due to

1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or
other equivalents (e.g. the German “Turkei,” the French “Turquie,” etc.) in Turkish government documents and
communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the
body to “Türkiye.” Some U.S. government statements use “Türkiye,” while others continue to use “Turkey.” Vivian
Salama and Jared Malsin, “Turkey’s push to change how the world pronounces its name causes a flap,” Wall Street
Journal, November 27, 2022.
2 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two
Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021.
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Turkey’s emergence as a potential regional counterweight to Russia and a
mediator between Russia and Ukraine, among other things. President Biden has
voiced support for arms sales to bolster Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet (see “Possible
F-16 Sales” below).
 Congressional actions and options. U.S.-Turkey tensions have led to a number
of congressional initiatives and other U.S. actions. These include sanctions for
Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia, informal congressional holds and
proposed legislation aimed at restricting arms sales, and other efforts to limit
strategic cooperation or empower Turkey’s rivals like Greece and the Republic of
Cyprus. Options for further legislative action or oversight could address topics
including possible F-16 sales; existing or new sanctions relating to the S-400,
Syria, and Russia; Turkey’s upcoming election, and U.S. political and economic
engagement with Turkey’s government.
Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 83,047,706. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.6 mil, Ankara 5.3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil,
Bursa 2.1 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.8 mil.
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% (2020)
Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 6%-11% (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% (2017)
Literacy: 96.7% (male 99.1%, female 94.4%) (2019)
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Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $38,759
Real GDP Growth: 5.0%
Inflation: 73%
Unemployment: 10.8%
Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 4.5%
Public Debt as % of GDP: 37.5%
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 5.7%
International currency reserves: $67.1 bil ion
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2022
end-of-year estimates or projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook Database; Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World
Factbook.
Country Overview and the Erdogan Era
Turkey’s large and diversified economy, strong military, Muslim-majority population of over 83
million, and geographic position straddling Europe and the Middle East make it a significant
power in both regions. For decades since its founding in the 1920s, the Turkish republic relied
upon its military, judiciary, and other bastions of its Kemalist (a term inspired by Turkey’s
republican founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) “secular elite” to protect it from political and
ideological extremes—sacrificing at least some of its democratic vitality in the process. Major
political developments in Turkey over the past two decades—including those described below—
appear to stem partly from significant socioeconomic changes that began in the 1980s. The
military-guided governments that came to power after a coup that occurred in 1980 helped
establish Turkey’s export-driven economy. This contributed to the gradual political awakening of
a largely Sunni Muslim middle class from Turkey’s Anatolian heartland.
The continued trajectory of these 1980s-initiated socioeconomic changes helped fuel Turkey’s
dramatic transformation after 2002, led by the Islamist-leaning AKP and President (formerly
Prime Minister) Erdogan. The AKP won governing majorities four times—2002, 2007, 2011, and
2015—during a period in which Turkey’s economy generally enjoyed growth and stability.
During his first decade as Turkey’s leader, Erdogan worked to reduce the political power of the
secular elite, with broad support among several Turkish constituencies that supported reforms to
bring Turkey closer to EU standards. He subsequently clashed with rivals for power, including
previous allies in the Fethullah Gulen movement.3 Domestic polarization intensified after 2013:
nationwide antigovernment protests that began in Istanbul’s Gezi Park took place that year, and
corruption allegations later surfaced against a number of Erdogan’s colleagues in and out of
government.4 After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular
presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a presidential
system of governance.

3 Gulen is a former Turkish state-employed imam who founded an international socioreligious movement that exercised
considerable influence in Turkish media, politics, and society until Erdogan and Turkish authorities acted against
thousands of its alleged members and sympathizers, starting in late 2013 and intensifying after a failed July 2016 coup
involving renegade elements within the military. For more information on Gulen and the Gulen movement, see CRS In
Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
4 Freedom House, Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey, February 3, 2014.
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Erdogan’s consolidation of power has continued and arguably accelerated since 2014. In response
to the 2016 coup attempt staged by rogue military officers, the government detained tens of
thousands of its citizens, enacted sweeping changes to military and civilian agencies, and took
over or closed various businesses, schools, and media outlets.5 Erdogan has argued, with
considerable popular support, that the Fethullah Gulen movement orchestrated the coup attempt,
in which more than 250 people were killed and thousands were injured.6 Forces and citizen
groups loyal to the government ultimately thwarted the apparent efforts of some renegade
military personnel (including airstrikes targeting Turkey’s presidential palace and parliament
building) to seize state control. Some leading opposition figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan
of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to suppress dissent and consolidate power.7
Additional developments expanded Erdogan’s presidential powers further, most notably
controversial victories in an April 2017 constitutional referendum and June 2018 presidential and
parliamentary elections (see below). In July 2018, parliament lifted the state of emergency that it
had instituted after the coup attempt, but enacted many of its features into law for three years
(extended for another three years in July 2021). However, the positive economic conditions that
helped propel Erdogan’s early political popularity have turned into largely negative ones in the
past four years, leading to uncertainty about his popularity.
Human Rights Concerns in Turkey
During the second decade of President Erdogan’s leadership of Turkey, domestic and international observers have
raised claims about human rights violations that they assert—amid some opposing views—are more widespread
and systematic than in the country’s past eras. During the 2000s, some of these observers expressed hopes that
reducing the role of Turkey’s military in its institutions of civilian governance could lead to a more liberal
democracy—and perhaps European Union membership. Since then, however, many have voiced worries about the
largely unchecked, Islamist-tinged civilian rule that Erdogan justifies on the basis of elections of questionable
legitimacy.8
Official analyses from the United States and European Union, as well as unofficial reports from human rights
monitors and other third parties, identify a number of issues,9 including the fol owing:

Practices by the government or its supporters (e.g., media control, censorship, intimidation, voter fraud or
manipulation) that may undermine the “free and fair” nature of Turkey’s elections.

Arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, and improper interrogation practices (including instances of torture),
and some general erosion of the justice sector’s independence and evidentiary standards.

Imprisonment, forced closures or asset transfers, and other measures targeting journalists, civil society
leaders, Erdogan’s political opponents, and independent institutions. The government justifies some measures
on the basis of countering terrorism, even though sometimes those targeted appear to have had only minimal

5 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, Turkey
2021 Report, October 19, 2021.
6 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,”
Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” Voice of America, July 15, 2019.
Partly because of Gulen’s residence in the United States, many Turks reportedly subscribe to conspiracy theories about
possible U.S. involvement. Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15.” CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and
the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
7 Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15”; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7,
2021.
8 See, for example, Gorkem Altinors and Umit Akcay, “The authoritarian consolidation attempt in Turkey,” European
Consortium for Political Research, February 22, 2022; Dimitar Bechev, Turkey Under Erdogan: How a Country
Turned from Democracy and the West, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022.
9 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, Turkiye
2022 Report, October 6, 2022; Human Rights Watch, “Turkey,” World Report 2022; Freedom House, “Turkey,”
Freedom in the World 2022.
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or superficial contacts with organizations classified by Turkey as terrorist groups—such as the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) or the Fethul ah Gulen movement.

Significant limits on the right to assemble and protest.

Conditions on and legal prosecution of content posted on key Internet and social media sites (i.e., YouTube,
Facebook, Twitter), including an October 2022 law criminalizing “disinformation.”

Weakened protections for women. In 2021, Erdogan withdrew Turkey from the Council of Europe
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (abbreviated as
the Istanbul Convention because it was signed in Istanbul in 2011), triggering statements of concern among
some domestic and international observers that perpetrators may be encouraged, not discouraged. In the
months leading up to Turkey’s withdrawal, some domestic religious and conservative groups lobbied against
the convention on the grounds that it degraded family values and advocated for LGBTQ.

Increased spending on Sunni Muslim religious (imam hatip) secondary schools, and expanded religious
instruction in other schools.
As a member of the Council of Europe, Turkey has agreed to accept the rulings of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), but in some cases has refused to implement rulings, leading to speculation that Turkey may be
removed from the Council.10 Specific concerns regarding the treatment of Turkey’s large ethnic Kurdish
population and its religious minorities are discussed in various sections below.
Analyses of Erdogan sometimes characterize him as one or more of the following: a pragmatic
populist, a protector of some historically marginalized groups, a budding authoritarian, or an
Islamic ideologue.11 While there may be some similarities between Turkey under Erdogan and
countries like Russia, Iran, or China, some factors distinguish Turkey from them. For example,
unlike Russia or Iran, Turkey cannot rely on significant rents from natural resources if foreign
sources of revenue or investment dry up. Unlike Russia and China, Turkey does not have nuclear
weapons under its command and control. Additionally, unlike all three others, Turkey’s economic,
political, and national security institutions and traditions have been closely connected with those
of the West for decades.
Erdogan and various other key Turkish figures (including political party leaders and potential
presidential candidates for 2023) are profiled in Appendix A.
Political Assessment
Overview
President Erdogan retains sweeping power over Turkey. At the same time, he presides over a
polarized electorate and faces substantial domestic and international criticism for governing in an
authoritarian manner. Many Turks’ opposition to his continued rule, along with Turkey’s ongoing
economic challenges, could undermine Turkey’s future stability and prosperity, whether or not it
leads to Erdogan leaving office.
Erdogan won the June 2018 presidential elections with about 53% of the vote, but the AKP won
just under 43% of votes in the concurrent parliamentary elections. To maintain a parliamentary
majority, Erdogan’s AKP has relied on the MHP (see Figure 2 below). The MHP is the country’s
traditional Turkish nationalist party, and is known for opposing political accommodation with the

10 Ali Kucukgocmen, “Turks risk losing Europe’s human rights protections after court spurned,” Reuters, November
10, 2022.
11 See, for example, Bechev, Turkey Under Erdogan; Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of
Modern Turkey, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2020; Bilge Yabanci, “Religion, Nationalism, and Populism in
Turkey under the AKP,” Middle East Institute, October 6, 2022.
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Kurds. The MHP also provided key support for the constitutional amendments approved in 2017.
Erdogan started courting nationalist constituencies around the time Kurdish voter support for the
AKP decreased in 2015 with the end of Turkey-PKK peace negotiations and the resumption of
armed conflict (see “Government Approaches to the Kurds” below). Some allegations of voter
fraud and manipulation surfaced in connection with the June 2018 elections,12 which was also the
case with the April 2017 constitutional referendum.13
Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context

Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Bipartisan Policy Center.
Note: Each square represents 12 parliamentary seats.
In 2019 local elections, the AKP maintained the largest share of votes but lost some key
municipalities to opposition candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP). The AKP’s most significant losses in those elections included
the capital, Ankara, and Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city and economic hub. The Istanbul municipal
election was particularly controversial: though CHP candidate Ekrem Imamoglu appeared to win
a narrow victory in the March 2019 election, the AKP disputed his vote total and the election was

12 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), International Election Observation Mission,
Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24,
2018 (published June 25, 2018).
13 OSCE, Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017).
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annulled by the Supreme Electoral Council. In the closely watched June 2019 re-vote, Imamoglu
won a decisive victory over AKP candidate and former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim.
2023 Elections
Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are planned for June 2023. Largely in the
context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls have fueled
speculation that Erdogan and the AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might be vulnerable.14 In one
late 2022 poll (see Figure 3), three parties from an opposition coalition (CHP-Iyi-DEVA)
outperformed AKP-MHP by a 36%-32% margin. In the same poll, Erdogan’s approval rating was
38%, the percentage who said things in Turkey were headed in the wrong direction was 59%, and
the percentage who said the economy was the most important issue was 67%.15
Figure 3. Turkish Political Party Preferences
(as of late 2022)

How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote could impact the
outcome (see “Government Approaches to the Kurds” below).16 Additionally, some observers
debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,17 (2) opposition parties

14 Ben Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan,” New York Times, December 5,
2022; “Polls indicate close race between rival blocs, yet people increasingly think Erdoğan will win,” BIA News,
October 12, 2022; Berk Esen, “The opposition alliance in Turkey: A viable alternative to Erdogan?” SWP Comment
(German Institute for International and Security Affairs [SWP]), August 2022.
15 “Al-Monitor/Premise poll finds tight race for Erdogan in Turkey's elections,” Al-Monitor, December 7, 2022.
16 Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” SWP Comment, April 2022.
17 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of
the United States, January 10, 2022; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to
Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?”
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can convince potential swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity
for Erdogan,18 or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.19
In February 2022, the CHP and the Good (or Iyi) Party, along with four smaller parties (including
two established in 2019 and 2020 by Ahmet Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, prominent former AKP
figures), signed a joint electoral manifesto, forming “the most comprehensive opposition
platform” since 1950, according to one observer.20 The primary pledge of this electoral coalition
is to return Turkey to the parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a
means of limiting executive power. Opposition figures have also criticized the Erdogan
government’s approach to a range of foreign and domestic policy issues and promised to make
changes (see “Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?” below).21
The coalition seeks to select a joint presidential candidate to run against Erdogan, probably from
the CHP. Party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (who has an Alevi background—see “Alevis” below)
generally polls lower than Istanbul mayor Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas (see
Appendix A).22 Though Imamoglu’s candidacy may be jeopardized by a criminal conviction (see
text box), public visibility from his mayorship may have helped widen his and the CHP’s
appeal.23 Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers have expressed doubt about
the opposition coalition’s prospects, citing ideological differences between its constituent
parties.24
Imamoglu’s Criminal Case and Potential Political Ban
Istanbul mayor and CHP member Ekrem Imamoglu could face a ban from political activity because of a December
2022 criminal conviction. The charge of insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council stemmed from a
remark that Imamoglu said he made about the annul ed March 2019 election (discussed above) in response to an
insult against him from Turkey’s interior minister.25 The court sentenced Imamoglu to jail and banned him from
political activity for two years and seven months, but both penalties are subject to appeal, and the timing of the
appellate process is unclear.26 In the meantime, Imamoglu continues to serve as mayor and engage politically.
Imamoglu and other opposition figures denounced the verdict and judicial process as politicized and a sign of
government attempts to sideline Erdogan’s potential electoral opponents.27

18 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times,
November 1, 2021.
19 Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a
champion,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022.
20 Esen, “The opposition alliance in Turkey”; Seren Selvin Korkmaz, “The strategies and struggles of the Turkish
opposition under autocratization,” Middle East Institute, October 4, 2022.
21 “Türkiye’s CHP forms technocratic committee to advise the govt,” Yetkin Report, December 4, 2022; Berk Esen,
“Post-2023 election scenarios in Turkey,” SWP Comment, September 2022; Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political
Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2022.
22 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish opposition forms plan to oust Erdogan, restore parliament’s power,” Al-Monitor, February
15, 2022; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.”
23 Gonca Tokyol, “Wielding Istanbul’s clout, Kaftancioglu and the CHP take aim at 2023 elections,” Turkey recap
(Substack), November 16, 2022.
24 See, for example, James Ryan, “The path ahead in Turkey’s upcoming electoral campaign,” War on the Rocks,
November 10, 2022.
25 “Turkish court orders jail, political ban for Erdogan rival,” Reuters, December 14, 2022; Andrew Wilks, “Cases
against opposition politicians mount ahead of Turkish elections,” Al-Monitor, June 2, 2022.
26 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15,
2022.
27 Ibid; Yusuf Selman Inanc, “Turkey: Istanbul mayor given two-year jail sentence and ‘political ban,’” Middle East
Eye, December 14, 2022.
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In response to the December court ruling, a State Department statement included the fol owing passage:
His [Imamoglu’s] conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms,
and the rule of law. We remain gravely concerned by the continued judicial harassment of civil
society, media, political and business leaders in Turkey, including through prolonged pretrial
detention, overly broad claims of support for terrorism, and criminal insult cases.
The people of Turkey deserve the ability to exercise their human rights and fundamental
freedoms without fear of retribution. The right to exercise the freedoms of expression, peaceful
assembly, and association is enshrined in Turkey’s constitution, its international law obligations,
and its OSCE commitments. We urge the government to cease prosecutions under criminal
“insult” laws, and to respect the rights and freedoms of all Turkish citizens, including by ensuring
an open environment for public debate.28
Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections before June 2023 and has thus far stated his
unwillingness to do so. Rather than compel elections in Turkey, domestic instability could lead
Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections.29
Economic Assessment
Overview and Ongoing Problems
The AKP’s political successes during the 2000s were aided considerably by robust Turkish
economic growth. Growth rates were comparable at times to other major emerging markets, such
as the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Key Turkish businesses include
diversified conglomerates (such as Koc and Sabanci) from traditional urban centers as well as
“Anatolian tigers” (small- to medium-sized export-oriented companies) scattered throughout the
country.
Since 2012, however, growth has at times slowed or reversed, and the Turkish economy has
experienced significant volatility. The “low-hanging fruit”—numerous major infrastructure
projects and the scaling up of low-technology manufacturing—that largely drove Turkey’s
economic success in the 2000s and early 2010s may be unlikely to produce similar results going
forward. Turkey’s relatively big current account deficit increases its vulnerability to higher
borrowing costs.
Concerns among domestic and foreign market actors about rule of law in Turkey may also drive
volatility. In July 2018, Erdogan gave himself the power to appoint central bank rate-setters and
appointed his son-in-law Berat Albayrak to serve as treasury and finance minister, leading some
observers to discern greater politicization of Turkey’s monetary policy.30 Albayrak resigned in
November 2020, and Erdogan replaced his successor around a year later, mirroring the frequent
personnel churn at Turkey’s central bank, where Erdogan fired three bank chiefs (and numerous
other officials) from 2019 to 2021.31 That turmoil contributed to the steady depreciation over
several years of Turkey’s currency, the lira, putting further strain on the economy. As of

28 State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction and Sentencing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu,” December 15, 2022.
29 “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” Duvar English, December 14,
2021.
30 See, for example, Marcus Ashworth, “Erdogan’s New Dynasty Makes Turkey Uninvestable,” Bloomberg, July 10,
2018.
31 Jared Malsin and Anna Hirtenstein, “Turkey’s Erdogan fires central bank officials, fueling economic uncertainty,”
Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2021.
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December 2022, the value of the lira had declined around 28% for the year, and nearly 80% since
2018.
At least some of these economic challenges appear to stem from Erdogan’s longstanding and
ideologically-motivated opposition to high interest rates. Erdogan, contrary to mainstream
economic thinking, has expressed the view that lowering interest rates is a means to combat
inflation.32 Turkey’s central bank hiked interest rates several times in 2020 and 2021, but in late
2021 returned to the interest rate cuts called for by Erdogan, despite a rising annual inflation rate
that reached 85% in October 2022, the highest since 1998.33 Some unofficial estimates have
suggested that actual inflation may be well over 100%.34
A persistent current account deficit has put further stress on Turkey’s central bank reserves, which
have declined as part of government efforts to bolster the lira, reportedly leading Turkey to seek
capital infusions from elsewhere. Turkey has sought currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states,
and also has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows (both from tourism and from Russia’s
nuclear agency, which is building a nuclear power plant in southern Turkey) that contribute to
U.S. warnings about potential sanctions evasion (see “Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy
Cooperation” below).35 According to one media account, Turkey’s central bank received $24.4
billion in unaccounted-for funds in the first seven months of 2022.36 In 2021, the inter-
governmental Financial Action Task Force had placed Turkey on an increased monitoring or
“grey” list for deficiencies in preventing money laundering and terrorist financing.37
The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living
and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private
sector companies. The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts,
minimum wage increases, and subsidies for basic expenses, along with borrowing incentives for
banks that hold liras.38 Erdogan has publicly rejected calls to turn to the International Monetary
Fund for a financial assistance package. In December 2021, the government announced a plan to
insure lira-denominated bank accounts against currency depreciation, in apparent coordination
with a significant state-backed market intervention.39
Energy
Turkey’s strategic location makes it relevant for world energy markets as a transit country while
also providing Turkey with opportunities to satisfy its own domestic energy needs, which are

32 “Is Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s monetary policy as mad as it seems?” Economist, January 27, 2022.
33 Beril Akman, “Turkey slashes interest rate in line with Erdogan’s demand,” Bloomberg, November 24, 2022;
“Yearly inflation in Turkey rises to new 24-year high of 85%,” Associated Press, November 3, 2022.
34 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish inflation hits 85.5% as doubts linger over official data,” Al-Monitor, November 3, 2022.
35 Laura Pitel “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” Financial Times, October 25, 2022;
Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East
Institute, November 7, 2022.
36 Louis Ashworth, “Who’s stuffing Turkey?” Financial Times, September 13, 2022.
37 Financial Action Task Force, “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - October 2021,” available at
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-
october-2021.html.
38 Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan”; Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey
Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2022.
39 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters, December 28, 2021.
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considerable: Turkey imports around $45 billion of oil and gas annually.40 With few hydrocarbon
resources of its own (pending recent Black Sea discoveries mentioned below), Turkey is generally
dependent on imports from other countries. Turkey seeks to diversify its energy suppliers, while
positioning itself as a regional and global energy transport hub and developing its own domestic
energy production capabilities.
Turkey’s most important energy provider by volume has traditionally been Russia, which
provides Turkey with significant amounts of natural gas and oil. Russia’s share of Turkey’s
natural gas imports fell from around 58% in 2013 to 34% in 2020, but rebounded to 44% in 2021
(see Figure 4).41 Turkey’s largest oil suppliers are Iraq (30% in 2021) and Russia (24%).42 Turkey
faces challenges in maintaining and broadening its efforts at diversification, including some
pertaining to long-term supply contracts and physical infrastructure.
Figure 4. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country
(in millions of cubic meters)

Source: Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), 2021 Annual Report.
Turkey has also sought to leverage its geography to position itself as a crucial transit country for
global energy trade routes, mostly though natural gas pipelines. In January 2020, Presidents
Erdogan and Putin inaugurated the TurkStream pipeline project (see Figure 5), which carries
Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to southern and central Europe via Turkey.43 A planned
second line is to extend northward as far as Austria.
Russian energy infrastructure projects involving Turkey could trigger U.S. sanctions under
existing legislation. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017
(CRIEEA, P.L. 115-44) authorizes sanctions on individuals or entities that invest in or engage in
trade for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines. In October 2017, the Trump
Administration published guidance noting that sanctions would not apply to projects for which

40 “Turkey – Country Commercial Guide,” U.S. Department of Commerce, July 26, 2022.
41 Turkey Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), Annual Natural Gas Market Report 2021.
42 EPDK, Annual Oil Market Report 2021.
43 CRS In Focus IF11177, TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe, by Sarah E. Garding et al.
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contracts were signed prior to August 2, 2017, the date of CRIEEA’s enactment. However, in July
2020, the Administration updated that guidance and stated that while the initial TurkStream
pipeline would not be subject to sanctions, the second line would be. The FY2020 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) enacted in December 2019 included, as Title
LXXV, the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019 (PEESA). This Act mandates
sanctions—subject to a presidential waiver for national security reasons—for actors involved in
laying subsea pipeline for TurkStream and possible successor projects on a going-forward basis.
In the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA, Section 1242 of the
FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283), Congress expanded the scope of targeted and potentially
sanctionable activities related to TurkStream and other projects.
Turkey has also been important for the U.S. and European effort to establish a southern corridor
for pipelines to Europe that bypass Russia. In late 2011, Turkey and Azerbaijan reached deals for
the transit of natural gas to and through Turkey via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP);44 the
project was inaugurated in June 2018.45 In November 2020, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)
commenced operations, bringing Azeri gas to Italy via TANAP.46
Figure 5. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure

Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of State, HIS, ESRI, European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Gas, Bulgartransgaz.
Geopolitical dynamics may pose challenges. For example, reports suggest that Turkey would like
to bolster its position as a hub for natural gas from Russia, but any such plans may run counter to
European countries’ aims to phase out Russian natural gas.47 Difficulties in relations with Greece,

44 The terms of the Turkey-Azerbaijan agreement specified that 565 billion-700 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas
would transit Turkey, of which 210 bcf would be available for Turkey’s domestic use.
45 “Leaders open TANAP pipeline carrying gas from Azerbaijan to Europe,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 12, 2018.
46 Dimitar Bechev, “The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline: Why it matters and what comes next?” Middle East Institute,
December 2, 2020.
47 Ragip Soylu, “Could Turkey become a gas hub for Europe?” Middle East Eye, November 13, 2022; Vladimir
Soldatkin and Oleysa Astakhova, “Analysis: Europe wary of Turkish hub to hide gas ‘made in Moscow,’” Reuters,
December 1, 2022.
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Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt are likely to complicate Turkish efforts to play a larger role in the
development and transport of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see “Greece and the
Republic of Cyprus” and “Israel and Sunni Arab Governments” below).
Turkey has opportunities to increase domestically-produced sources of energy.48 In August 2020,
President Erdogan announced a Turkish discovery of offshore natural gas deposits in the Black
Sea.49 Turkey expects production to begin in 2023 and reach its maximum by 2028, potentially
satisfying a large portion of Turkey’s natural gas needs, though Turkey requires additional capital
to fully develop its natural gas infrastructure.50
Beyond natural gas production, Turkey seeks to generate nuclear power, entering into an
agreement with a subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia’s state-run nuclear company) to have it build and
operate what would be Turkey’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, near the Mediterranean port
of Mersin. Construction began in April 2018, with operations on the first of four reactors
expected to begin in 2023; Turkey’s energy minister has said the site, which is scheduled to be
completed in 2026, will meet 10% of Turkey’s electricity demand.51 Despite speculation among
observers that U.S. and European sanctions could affect Rosatom’s ability to continue financing
and constructing the project, Rosatom has publicly asserted sanctions on Russia will not impact
Akkuyu.52 Turkey abandoned plans for Japan to assist with the construction of a second nuclear
power plant in Sinop on the Black Sea coast in January 2020; in October 2022, Turkey and Russia
reportedly began talks over Rosatom taking on construction of another four reactors at Sinop.53
Turkey’s Kurdish Issue
Background
Ethnic Kurds constitute approximately 19% of Turkey’s population.54 Kurds are largely
concentrated in the less economically developed southeast, though populations are found in urban
centers across the country. Some Kurds have resisted various aspects of Turkish state authority in
parts of the southeast—a dynamic that also exists between Kurds and national governments in
Iraq, Iran, and Syria. This resistance and harsh Turkish government measures to quell Kurdish
demands for rights have fed tensions that have occasionally escalated since the foundation of the
republic in 1923. Since 1984, the Turkish military has periodically countered an on-and-off
separatist insurgency and urban terrorism campaign by the PKK. The initially secessionist
demands of the PKK have since ostensibly evolved toward the less ambitious goal of greater
cultural and political autonomy.55 According to the U.S. government and EU, the PKK partially

48 Turkey supplies about half of its own coal, which accounts for 28% of Turkey’s total primary energy supply (TPES),
and all types of renewable energy, which account for 17% of TPES. Oil and natural gas account for 32% and 25% of
TPES, respectively. Turkey 2021: Energy Policy Review, International Energy Agency, March 2021.
49 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Erdogan Unveils Biggest Ever Black Sea Natural Gas Discovery,” Bloomberg, August 21, 2020.
50 See Wayne C. Ackerman, “Turkey: a new emerging gas player with resources and infrastructure,” Middle East
Institute, June 15, 2022.
51 “Construction begins on fourth Turkish reactor,” World Nuclear News, July 21, 2022.
52 “Turkish nuclear plant threatened by Russian sanctions,” Al Jazeera, May 16, 2022; “EU sanctions will not impede
Akkuyu nuclear plant financing: Rosatom,” Anadolu Agency, November 28, 2022.
53 “Turkey, Japan scrap partnership in Sinop nuclear plant in Turkey’s north,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 20, 2020;
Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey asks Russia to build another nuclear plant, defying US,” Bloomberg, October 20, 2022.
54 CIA World Factbook, Turkey (accessed November 2022).
55 Kurdish nationalist leaders demand that any future changes to Turkey’s constitution (in its current form following the
2017 amendments) not suppress Kurdish ethnic and linguistic identity. The first clause of Article 3 of the constitution
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finances its activities through criminal activities, including its alleged operation of a Europe-wide
drug trafficking network.56
The struggle between Turkish authorities and the PKK was most intense during the 1990s, but has
flared periodically since then. The PKK uses safe havens in areas of northern Iraq under the
nominal authority of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), while also reportedly
maintaining links to Kurdish groups in Syria (as discussed below). The Turkish military’s
approach to neutralizing the PKK has routinely been criticized by Western governments and
human rights organizations for being overly hard on ethnic Kurds. Turkish authorities have
imprisoned thousands and displaced or disrupted the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of
others for suspected PKK involvement or sympathies.57
PKK Designations by U.S.
Government Approaches to the Kurds
Government
Until the spring of 2015, Erdogan appeared to
Designation
Year
prefer negotiating a political compromise with
PKK leaders over the prospect of armed
Foreign Terrorist
1997
Organization
conflict.58 However, against the backdrop of
PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups’ success in Syria
Special y Designated
2001
and domestic political considerations, Erdogan
Global Terrorist
then adopted a more confrontational political
Significant Foreign
2008
stance with the PKK. Within that context, a
Narcotics Trafficker

complicated set of circumstances involving
terrorist attacks and mutual suspicion led to a resumption of violence between government forces
and the PKK in the summer of 2015. As a result of the violence, which was concentrated in
southeastern Turkey and was most intense from 2015 to 2016, thousands of fighters and hundreds
civilians died.59 In addition to mass population displacement, infrastructure in the southeast has
suffered significant damage. U.S. officials, while supportive of Turkey’s prerogative to defend
itself from attacks that it alleges come from the PKK or PKK allies, have advised Turkey to show
restraint and proportionality in its actions.60
Under the state of emergency enacted after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey’s
government cracked down on Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Dozens of elected Kurdish mayors
were removed from office and replaced with government-appointed “custodians.” In November
2016, the two then-co-leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halklarin
Demokratik Partisi, or HDP) were arrested along with other parliamentarians under various
charges of crimes against the state; some remain imprisoned, along with other party leaders and

reads, “The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” Because the
constitution states that its first three articles are unamendable, even proposing a change could face judicial obstacles.
56 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2022; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Five PKK Leaders
Designated Narcotics Traffickers,” April 20, 2011.
57 See, for example, Cengiz Candar, Turkey’s Mission Impossible: War and Peace with the Kurds, Blue Ridge Summit,
PA: Lexington Books, 2020.
58 As prime minister, Erdogan had led past efforts to resolve the Kurdish question by using political, cultural, and
economic development approaches, in addition to the traditional security-based approach, in line with the AKP’s
ideological starting point that common Islamic ties among Turks and Kurds could transcend ethnic differences.
59 International Crisis Group, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer,” last updated November 10, 2022.
60 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Council Coordinator for
Strategic Communications John Kirby,” November 28, 2022; Mark Landler and Carlotta Gall, “As Turkey Attacks
Kurds in Syria, U.S. Is on the Sideline,” New York Times, January 22, 2018.
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members who have been detained on similar charges since 2016. Turkish officials routinely
accuse Kurdish politicians of support for the PKK, but these politicians generally deny close ties.
In June 2021, Turkey’s Constitutional Court accepted an indictment from a state prosecutor
seeking to close the HDP and ban many of its members from politics. The HDP is the successor to
a number of pro-Kurdish parties that the state has shut down throughout Turkey’s history going
back to the early 1990s.61 As of December 2022, the court has yet to rule on the closure case.
The future trajectory of Turkey-PKK dealings may depend on a number of factors, including
 which Kurdish figures and groups (imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan
[profiled in Appendix A], various PKK militant leaders, the professedly
nonviolent HDP) are most influential in driving events;
 Erdogan’s approach to the issue, which has alternated between conciliation and
confrontation; and
 possible incentives to Turkey’s government and the Kurds from the United States
or other actors for mitigating violence and promoting political resolution.
Religious Minorities
The status of religious minorities in Turkey has attracted some congressional attention. Religious
minorities are generally concentrated in Istanbul and other urban areas, as well as the southeast,
and collectively represent around 0.2% of Turkey’s population. Adherents of non-Muslim
religions and minority Muslim sects (most prominently, the Alevis) often attract, and to some
extent rely on, legal appeals, political advocacy, and support from Western countries.
The Turkish government controls or closely oversees religious activities in the country. This
arrangement was originally used to enforce secularism (often referred to as “laicism”), partly to
prevent religion from influencing state actors and institutions as it did under Ottoman rule.
However, since at least 2015, observers have detected some movement by state religious
authorities in the direction of the AKP’s Islamist-friendly worldview, and successive Department
of State International Religious Freedom Reports indicate that the Turkish government limits the
rights of religious minorities.62
U.S. concerns focus largely on the rights of Turkey’s Christian and Jewish communities, which
have sought greater freedom to choose leaders, train clergy, own property, and otherwise function
independently of the Turkish government.63
Halki Seminary and Hagia Sophia
Some Members of Congress have expressed grievances through proposed congressional
resolutions and letters on behalf of the Ecumenical (Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate of

61 Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Middle East Eye,
March 20, 2021.
62 See also, e.g., Ceren Lord, Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP (Cambridge
University Press), 2018.
63 Since 2009, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has given Turkey designations
ranging from “country of particular concern” (highest concern) to “monitored.” As of the 2022 report, Turkey is among
12 countries recommended for the State Department’s Special Watch List. For additional information on Turkey’s
religious minorities, see the State Department’s Report on International Religious Freedom for 2021.
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Constantinople, the spiritual center of Orthodox Christianity based in Istanbul.64 The Patriarchate,
along with various U.S. and European officials, continues to press for the reopening of its Halki
Theological School, which was closed after a 1971 ruling by Turkey’s Constitutional Court
prohibiting the operation of private institutions of higher education.65 The State Department
issued a statement in July 2021 marking the 50th anniversary of Halki’s closure and urged Turkey
to allow its reopening.66 In the past, Erdogan reportedly has said that Halki’s reopening would
depend on measures by Greece to accommodate its Muslim community.67
Turkey has converted some historic Christian churches from museums into mosques, most
notably Istanbul’s landmark Hagia Sophia (Ayasofya in Turkish), a sixth-century Greek Orthodox
cathedral that had been converted to a mosque after the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and
then became a museum during the early years of the Turkish Republic. A popular movement to
convert the site back into a mosque gained strength in recent years, culminating in President
Erdogan’s public support for such a move during the March 2019 local elections campaign.68 In
July 2020, a Turkish court invalidated the 1934 decree that created Hagia Sophia as a museum,
and President Erdogan subsequently approved its conversion to a mosque and led the first prayers
there. The move, seen as a political overture to conservative Turkish nationalists, was criticized
by the Trump Administration, a number of Members of Congress, and the EU Foreign Affairs
Council.69
Alevis
About 10 to 20 million Turkish Muslims are Alevis (of whom about 20% are ethnic Kurds). The
Alevi community has some relation to Shiism and may contain strands from pre-Islamic
Anatolian and Christian traditions.70 Alevism has been influenced by Sufi mysticism that
emphasizes believers’ individual spiritual paths, but it defies precise description owing to its lack
of centralized leadership and its reliance on secret oral traditions. Alevis have long been among
the strongest supporters of secularism in Turkey, which they reportedly see as a form of
protection from the Sunni majority.71 In October 2022, President Erdogan announced plans to

64 See, for example, H.R. 3056 in the 117th Congress. During the 112th Congress in 2011, the House passed H.Res.
306—“Urging the Republic of Turkey to safeguard its Christian heritage and to return confiscated church properties”—
by voice vote. During the 113th Congress in 2014, the House Foreign Affairs Committee favorably reported the Turkey
Christian Churches Accountability Act (H.R. 4347). The Turkish government does not acknowledge the “ecumenical”
nature of the Patriarchate, but does not object to others’ reference to the Patriarchate’s ecumenicity.
65 The Patriarchate also presses for the Turkish government to lift the requirement that the Patriarch be a Turkish
citizen, and for it to return previously confiscated properties.
66 State Department, “50th anniversary of the closing of Halki Seminary,” July 29, 2021.
67 Stelyo Berberakis, “Patriarch hopes to reopen seminary after talks with president,” Daily Sabah, May 11, 2018;
“Turkey ready to open Halki Seminary in return for a mosque in Greece: report,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 8, 2015.
68 “Turkey’s Erdogan Says He Plans to Change Hagia Sophia’s Title from Museum to Mosque,” Reuters, March 29,
2019. In 2014, then-Prime Minster Erdogan responded to activists calling for Hagia Sophia to be opened as a mosque
by saying that other extant mosques in the area should be fully utilized before any change would be made to Hagia
Sophia. Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “What caused Erdogan’s change of heart on Hagia Sophia?” Al-Monitor, March 29,
2019.
69 State Department, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability,” July 15, 2020; Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, “Menendez, Risch Statement on Turkey’s Hagia Sophia,” July 10, 2020; Council of the European
Union, Foreign Affairs Council, July 13, 2020.
70 For additional historical background, see Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and managing
territorial diversity, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 11-18.
71 According to a scholar on Turkey, “Alevis suffered centuries of oppression under the Ottomans, who accused them
of not being truly Muslim and suspected them of colluding with the Shi’i Persians against the empire. Alevi Kurds were
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create a new government directorate to oversee financial support to cemevler (Alevi houses of
worship), with some Alevis welcoming the initiative and others rejecting it.72 Arab Alawites in
Syria and southern Turkey are a distinct Shia-related religious community.
Turkish Foreign Policy
General Assessment
Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global
and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations
with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought
greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system.
Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging
Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate
some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400
surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—
with which it has a long history of discord—including in political-military situations involving
Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. A Turkish analyst has argued that Turkish foreign
and security policy is shaped by three key objectives:
attaining long-term strategic autonomy in key geopolitical affairs and self-sufficiency in
defense technologies, building new partnerships to minimize Turkey’s over-dependence
on its traditional Western allies and avoiding direct confrontation with Russia.73
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential
countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these
actors and maintain its leverage with them.74 For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United
States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment
(including a customs union with the European Union since the late 1990s), and Russia and Iran
for energy imports. Without a means of global power projection or major natural resource wealth,
Turkey’s military strength and economic well-being appear to remain somewhat dependent on
these traditional relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles (discussed above) highlight
the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties.75

victims of the early republic’s Turkification policies and were massacred by the thousands in Dersim [now called
Tunceli] in 1937-39. In the 1970s, Alevis became associated with socialist and other leftist movements, while the
political right was dominated by Sunni Muslims. An explosive mix of sectarian cleavages, class polarization, and
political violence led to communal massacres of Alevis in five major cities in 1977 and 1978, setting the stage for the
1980 coup.” Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 14.
72 Sibel Hurtas, “Erdogan’s pre-election gesture to Alevis met with suspicion,” Al-Monitor, October 14, 2022; Yusuf
Selman Inanc, “Turkey: Erdogan’s Alevi reform initiative met with praise and scepticisim,” Middle East Eye, October
18, 2022.
73 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12,
2022.
74 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021;
Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and the
U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020.
75 Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay, “The Third Age of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy,” Center for European Policy
Analysis, February 17, 2022.
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Turkey and the European Union (EU)
Turkey has a long history of partnership with the EU (and its predecessor organizations) and began negotiations to
join the EU in 2005. Talks stalled shortly thereafter and Turkey’s membership now appears unlikely, at least in the
near future. Some scholars have interpreted resistance to Turkish EU accession as rooted in a fear among some
EU states that Turkey’s large Muslim population would fundamental y change the cultural character of the EU and
dilute the power of the EU’s founding Western European states in particular.76 Turkey’s unwil ingness to
normalize diplomatic and trade relations with the Republic of Cyprus (an EU member since 2004) presents a
major obstacle to its accession prospects. Other EU concerns over Turkey’s qualifications for membership center
on the treatment of Kurds and religious minorities, media freedoms, women’s rights, and the proper and
transparent functioning of Turkey’s democratic and legal systems.77
Debate within the EU regarding the extent to which Turkey meets EU standards has intensified since President
Erdogan’s consolidation of power starting around 2013. Erdogan has engaged in anti-European rhetoric with
audiences both at home and among the substantial Turkish diaspora communities in Europe. Despite the lack of
significant progress in accession negotiations, the EU has provided Turkey with more than €9 bil ion in pre-
accession financial and technical assistance since 2002. Citing concerns about Turkish backsliding on reforms, the
EU reduced pre-accession assistance levels in 2018. Annual assistance levels that ranged from between €493-626
mil ion for 2014-2017 dropped to slightly less than €400 mil ion for 2018-2020.78 Turkey has received additional
funding since then under an overall EU budget of €14.2 bil ion for 2021-2027 for Turkey and six Balkan countries.
Turkey’s compartmentalized approach to foreign policy may to some extent reflect domestic
political concerns. Because Erdogan’s control over parliament depends on the AKP’s coalition
with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, efforts to preserve support from core constituencies
may imbue Turkish policy with a nationalistic tenor. A largely nationalistic foreign policy also has
precedent from before Turkey’s Cold War alignment with the West.79 Turkey’s history as both a
regional power and an object of great power aggression seems to contribute to domestic
popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse, as well as support for Erdogan’s “neo-
Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish regional prestige.
Geopolitics: A Key Driver of Turkish Foreign Policy
Turkey’s geography has deep implications for its relations with neighbors and outside powers. Turkey is located at
the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits), which are
critical maritime chokepoints connecting the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Historically, Turkey’s political,
economic, and military strength has helped it shape developments in areas of close proximity. Its traditional rival
for regional primacy has been Iran, but since the middle of the 20th century countries such as Israel, Egypt, and
Saudi Arabia have developed aspects of military or economic power that approach or outstrip Turkey’s in some
ways.
For centuries, the influence of the Turkish state, and the Ottoman Empire that preceded it, has been checked and
countered by outside powers intent on some measure of control in the regions surrounding Turkey for strategic
and economic purposes. After the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the 16th century, its strength waned.
Gradually, it lost influence and territory to Russia, other European powers, and nationalist movements in the
Balkans, Middle East, and North Africa. Before the Empire disintegrated after its defeat in World War I, its rulers
spent the Empire’s last decades resorting to balance-of-power politics and military action to prolong its survival.
The Turkish Republic succeeded the Ottoman Empire and sought to create a stable nation-state for Turkish
Muslims within a smaller territorial area. To retain control throughout Anatolia (or Asia Minor) and in the Eastern
Thrace peninsula on the European side of the Straits, Turkey fought a 1919-1922 war of independence against
Greek, Armenian, and French forces.

76 “Does ‘Muslim’ Turkey belong in ‘Christian’ Europe?” Pew Research Center, January 13, 2005; Religion, Politics,
and Turkey’s EU Accession, Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, eds., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
77 European Commission, Türkiye 2022 Report.
78 See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180817-revised-indicative-strategy-paper-
2014-2020-for-turkey.pdf.
79 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, New York: Routledge, 2013 (3rd edition).
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These historical experiences and continued interactions between Turkey, its many neighbors, and several larger
powers with regional interests, have influenced a Turkish approach to foreign policy that balances cautious
accommodation with assertive claims when national priorities (which have fluctuated over time) are at stake.
Turkey’s sizable and restive Kurdish minority—approximately 19% of its population—makes it vulnerable to
Kurdish demands for autonomy, and to outside actors that aid Kurdish groups around Turkey’s borders in Syria,
Iraq, and Iran.
Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders
feel constrained by their traditional security and economic relationships with Western powers, and
how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks in those relationships while building other global
relationships. One reason Turkey may seek to increase economic ties with Russia, Arab Gulf
states, and other regional countries is to reduce its vulnerability to economic sanctions or other
coercive tactics by the United States or European Union countries. The Turkish public appears to
regard very few countries—Western or non-Western—as friendly to Turkey (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Turkish Public Opinion: Are These Countries Turkey’s Friends?
(% basis)

Source: M. Aydin, M. Çelikpala, S. Akgul-Açıkmeşe, E. Canan-Sokul u, S. Guvenç, O. Şenyuva, S. Kaya-Sonmez,
Quantitative Research Report: Public Perception on Turkish Foreign Policy 2022, Kadir Has University Turkish Studies
Group, Global Academy, Akademetre, September 8, 2022.
Notes: Decimal points are conveyed in the European style (with commas instead of periods). TRNC refers to
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which (as described below) is recognized only by Turkey.
See Appendix B for some other drivers of Turkish foreign policy, including arms procurement
and exports of drone aircraft, economics and energy, and leadership approaches.
Regional Security Concerns
Security considerations are critical in Turkish foreign policy calculations and overseas
deployments (see Figure 7). Turkish leaders often base their stances on perceived threats or
opportunities, with their general priority being to safeguard Turkey’s maritime approaches and
border areas. A number of more peripheral areas within the region remain important, but as
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secondary concerns. NATO membership is important for Turkey in part because its collective
defense promise may deter threats from regional actors outside of the alliance.
Figure 7. Turkey’s Military Presence Abroad
(as of August 2022)

Examples of priority concerns in Turkey’s immediate vicinity include:
 Border concerns in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s leaders have expressed concerns about
vulnerabilities to Kurdish militancy, refugee flows, and foreign influence near Turkey’s
southern borders with Iraq and Syria. Border threats have heavily influenced Turkish
policies since the advent of the PKK in the 1980s. These policies—oriented toward
containing cross-border Kurdish influence–evolved further after the creation of an
autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. Turkey’s
efforts to control developments near its southern borders have continued and expanded
during Syria’s civil war, due largely to: (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into
Turkey, (2) U.S. support for PKK-aligned Syrian Kurds against the Islamic State, and (3)
the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces that complicate and somewhat
constrain Turkish action in northern Syria (see “The Syrian Conflict” below).
 Cyprus and Greece. Turkey has engaged in decades-long disputes—with
elements of military conflict—regarding political outcomes in Cyprus and with
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Greece over islands and maritime/airspace boundaries (see “Greece and the
Republic of Cyprus” below).
 Turkey’s control over the Straits. Soviet designs on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles
Straits arguably played a major role in Turkey’s decision to invite U.S. support and
ultimately join NATO in the early years of the Cold War. Turkish control over the Straits
remains a priority amid Russia-Ukraine conflict (see “Black Sea Access” below).
Issues that are significant, but relatively peripheral, include:
 General stability and governance in the Middle East and North Africa. Beyond Syria
and Iraq, Turkey under Erdogan has played direct or indirect roles in some regional
countries’ internal armed or political struggles (especially Libya and Egypt). Turkey also
sided politically with Qatar in its 2017-2020 standoff with Arab Gulf countries and
Egypt, though it has improved relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) over the past two years (see “Israel and Sunni Arab Governments” below).
Additionally, Turkey has provided political support for the Palestinian Sunni Islamist
movement Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that engages in violent
conflict against Israel (and receives some aid from Iran). In some cases, Erdogan has
combined a pro-Islamist tilt with the pragmatic pursuit of gain, such as by using ties with
Libya’s Government of National Accord/Unity to safeguard Turkey’s commercial
interests and enter into favorable maritime boundary demarcation agreements.80 Some
observers have expressed concern that the preferences Erdogan and the AKP have shown
for Islamist figures and movements have provoked instability in at least some cases.81
 Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish leaders have consistently supported Azerbaijan in
territorial conflicts with Armenia, including in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.
Turkey and Azerbaijan share strong economic, military, cultural, and linguistic ties, while
Turkey has historical animosities with Armenia and its Russian protector.82 Armenia
poses little military threat to Turkey’s eastern border. In 2022, a new Turkey-Armenia
dialogue launched, offering a potential path to normalization, including via the opening
of their land border. President Erdogan has maintained that normalization is
“interdependent” with further progress in resolving Armenia’s differences with
Azerbaijan, stating in August 2022 that Turkey would “open our doors after problems
with Azerbaijan are solved.”83
 Iran’s role in the region. Turkey is Iran’s historical rival, and the government remains
leery of Iranian actions and intentions in the region. Yet, Turkey is less outwardly hostile
to Iran than are Israel and some Arab states. Turkey and Iran have a centuries-long history
of coexistence, Iran’s current regime has avoided directly threatening Turkey, and their
leaders maintain important diplomatic and trade ties—including on energy (see “Iran”
below for a discussion of sanctions or possible penalties against some Turkish entities for

80 Emadeddin Badi, “To Advance Its Own Interests, Turkey Should Now Help Stabilize Libya,” War on the Rocks,
May 24, 2021.
81 Anchal Vohra, “Erdogan’s War with Arab Monarchies Is Over,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2022; M. Hasim
Tekines, “What Would a Post-Erdogan Turkish Foreign Policy Look Like?” War on the Rocks, December 8, 2021;
Marwa Maziad and Jake Sotiriadis, “Turkey’s Dangerous New Exports: Pan-Islamist, Neo-Ottoman Visions and
Regional Instability,” Middle East Institute, April 21, 2020.
82 Patrick Keddie, “What’s Turkey’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?” Al Jazeera, October 30, 2020.
83 “President Erdogan Sees ‘Opportunity’ to Mend Armenia Ties,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 21, 2022; Amberin
Zaman, “Armenia Clings to Turkish Peace Talks to Avert War with Azerbaijan,” Al-Monitor, August 2, 2022.
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energy-related dealings with Iranian parties). However, Turkey has supported Sunni
political parties and militias in Syria and Iraq partly to counter Iran-allied groups.84
Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?
In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign
policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from
Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.85 Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment
among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have
difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern:
(1) addressing Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence in Syria and Iraq;
(2) exercising Turkish influence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (including by
countering Greece and ethnic Greek Cypriots, and supporting ethnic Turkish Cypriots); and (3)
balancing relations with Ukraine, Russia, and the West to address conflict and its consequences
while seeking to avoid dependence on any of them.
However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be
more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such
changes may include:
 Economic policy. Providing more flexibility to central bank and other officials
on monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic
problems.
 ECHR rulings. Giving greater consideration to ECHR rulings calling for the
release of imprisoned civil society figure Osman Kavala86 and Kurdish political
leader Selahattin Demirtas (see Appendix A for a profile of Demirtas).
 Less Islamist influence. Reducing (1) references to Islamic identity and symbols
as rallying points for regional policies, and (2) Turkish support for or willingness
to host certain Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas, the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions.
Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president
might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the
United States and European countries.87 Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing
some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less
inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western
states, such as by pursuing arms purchases from Russia, closer ties with the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO—see “Russia” below), or new military operations in northern
Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish government

84 Galip Dalay, “Turkey’s Middle East Reset: A Precursor for Re-Escalation?” Middle East Council on Global Affairs,
August 2022.
85 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen,
“Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”
86 In April 2022, a Turkish court sentenced Kavala to life imprisonment after convicting him of conspiring against the
government. The ECHR had demanded Kavala’s release in 2019. The State Department spokesperson said that
Kavala’s “unjust conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”
State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction of Osman Kavala,” April 25, 2022. In July, the ECHR ordered Turkey to
release Kavala and pay him damages. If Turkey does not comply, it could have its voting rights and membership in the
Council of Europe suspended. Nazlan Ertan, “Europe’s top court reprimands Turkey for jailing philanthropist,” Al-
Monitor, July 11, 2022.
87 Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.”
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feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate multiple domestic
constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s reputation for
assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition might become
more passive on foreign policy, even in some situations when U.S. officials request a more active
Turkish role.
U.S. steps to help a potential new Turkish government—whether on arms sales, sanctions, the
economy, or other matters—could encourage an improvement in bilateral relations. For
information on U.S.-Turkey trade and investment, see CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade
Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. If, however, Turkish leaders or domestic audiences assess that
any such steps are likely to bind future Turkish actions to U.S. interests, those concerns could
limit a new Turkish government’s willingness to embrace them.
Russia
Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made
a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could
be motivated by a combination of factors, including:
 Alternative to the West. Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the West via hedging
behavior, as discussed above.
 Economic opportunism. Erdogan’s assessment of an opportunity to reinforce Turkey’s
embattled economy by deepening economic and energy ties with Russia. Western
sanctions have reduced the pool of Russia’s economic partners and thus have arguably
increased Turkish leverage with Russia.
 Chances to increase regional influence at Russia’s expense. Turkish calculations that
potentially declining Russian influence in its near abroad could present opportunities for
Turkey’s relative rise in influence if it involves itself more in issues and organizations
spanning Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.
At the same time, Turkey has moved closer to a number of countries that were part of the Soviet
Union or otherwise in Russia’s historical sphere of influence, likely in part as a counterweight to
Russian regional power. These include Ukraine, Poland, and states in the Baltic, South Caucasus,
and Central Asia regions.88
Background
Turkey and Russia have a centuries-long history of geopolitical conflict and reluctant mutual
accommodation. Relations reached a relative low point in 2015-2016, when Turkey downed a
Russian plane near the Turkey-Syria border and Russia temporarily imposed sanctions. After that,
President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin cultivated closer ties. Putin showed
support for Erdogan during the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and subsequently allowed Turkey to
carry out military operations in northern Syria over the next two years that helped roll back
Kurdish territorial control and reduce refugee flows near Turkey’s border. The S-400 transaction
and cooperation on natural gas pipelines and nuclear energy are other collaborative aspects of
Turkey-Russia relations.

88 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond”; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels,
Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022.
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While Turkey-Russia cooperation could undermine Turkey’s relationships with the United States,
the European Union, and NATO to some degree, Turkish and Russian interests diverge
significantly in several places throughout the region. Some observers have remarked that
Turkey’s use of relatively inexpensive drone aircraft and proxy forces in Syria, Libya, and
Nagorno-Karabakh have frustrated Russia’s aspirations in these places—ironically by borrowing
some of the tactics Putin has used to frustrate Western designs in its near abroad.89 Other
observers suggest that Turkish military measures in these places may be less about setting limits
to Russian action or influence, and more about encouraging greater Turkey-Russia diplomatic
engagement to coordinate political outcomes.90 In 2022, Turkey’s involvement in Ukraine
(discussed below) has become the most prominent case under discussion regarding the
implications for Turkey-Russia relations.
Differences between Turkish and Russian leaders may not lead to a major rupture between the
two countries. Turkey’s cooperation or competition with different actors may depend on the
specific circumstances of each issue, rather than total alignment with or opposition to any great
power—be it the United States, Russia, or another country. As one example, more than three
years after taking delivery of the S-400 surface-to-air defense system from Russia, Turkey does
not appear to have activated the system for general use and seems to remain open to negotiating
with the United States about whether to do so.
Erdogan has stated that Turkey may join the SCO, raising questions about his actual intentions to
do so, and whether doing so would be a signal of greater alignment with Russia (and perhaps
China), or of increased Turkish strategic autonomy and regional prominence.91 In addition to
Russia and China, the SCO—a multilateral organization covering political, economic, and
security matters—includes most Central Asian countries, as well as India and Pakistan. The SCO
is not a formal alliance like NATO.
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its
relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-
Turkey ties. One former U.S. official has said:
Turkey will avoid picking a side in the sense of a binary, zero-sum outcome to the war.
Ukrainian defeat and dismemberment would be an unmitigated disaster for Turkey, but a
defeated and potentially unstable Russia would negatively impact Turkish interests in Syria
and the Caucasus, as well as its economy.92
Turkey’s links with Russia—especially its S-400 acquisition—have fueled significant U.S.-
Turkey tensions. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests
in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—may have
converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in

89 See, for example, Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October
22, 2020.
90 Asli Aydintasbas, “Hedge politics: Turkey’s search for balance in the Middle East,” European Council on Foreign
Relations, July 27, 2022; Guney Yildiz, “Turkish-Russian Adversarial Collaboration in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-
Karabakh,” SWP Comment, March 24, 2021.
91 Nazlan Ertan, “Why Erdogan’s Shanghai ambitions are risky business,” Al-Monitor, September 20, 2022; Mankoff,
“As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils.”
92 Rich Outzen, quoted in “How long can Turkey play both sides in the Ukraine war?” Atlantic Council, August 18,
2022.
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parallel with other NATO countries.93 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion and opposing
Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including Crimea),94 Turkey has supplied Ukraine with
armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant ambush-resistant (MRAP) vehicles, as well as
humanitarian assistance.95 Nevertheless, Turkey’s leaders likely hope to minimize spillover
effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and this might partly explain Turkey’s
continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate the conflict (discussed below).
One Turkish analyst has written:
Russian geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey closer to the geopolitical West, but
it is doubtful that this process will make the geopolitical West as indispensable for Turkey
as it was during the Cold War, or function as a geo-political anchor in the way it did then.96
Another Turkish analyst has observed that some experts argue Turkey is successfully building “a
new geo-strategic axis” through drone diplomacy and other security and energy partnerships with
Ukraine (see text box below) and other “Western-leaning post-Soviet and former Warsaw Pact
nations” that surround Russia. (see also Appendix B)97
Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation
Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.98 In 2017, a
Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in
the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their
respective defense industries.99 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer
cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.100
In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion
of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives. Turkish expertise
with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing
aerospace engines and missiles.101 Additionally, Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing
corvettes (small warships) for export.102
As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2
drones to Ukraine since 2019,103 and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has delivered additional

93 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall
Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022.
94 “Turkey President Erdoğan on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of NATO,” PBS Newshour, September
19, 2022. For information on Crimean Tatars and their relations with Turkey, see Joseph Massad, “Crimean Tatars
caught between Russia and Ukraine,” Middle East Eye, October 3, 2022; “Türkiye grants Crimean Tatars indefinite
leave to remain,” Daily Sabah, August 11, 2022; Emad Ahmed, “Who are the Crimean Tatars? The Turkic Muslim
minority loyal to Ukraine,” Middle East Eye, March 3, 2022.
95 For information on the MRAPs, see Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with
more expected,” Defense News, August 22, 2022.
96 Galip Dalay, “Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia,” SWP
Comment, May 20, 2022
97 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”
98 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and
U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt.
99 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017.
100 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw,
“Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022.
101 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”
102 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes
Navy International, October 3, 2022.
103 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4,
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TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.104 Multiple accounts have surfaced of Ukraine’s
successful use of TB2s to target Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries, helicopters, and ships—
often in coordination with other Ukrainian weapons platforms. A May 2022 report stated that Russia may have
destroyed Ukrainian TB2s in sufficient number to significantly reduce their likely future impact on the war.105 The
TB2’s main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 mil ion factory in Ukraine that could be in
position within about three years to manufacture the ful range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s
overall production capacity.106 Baykar also has planned for a testing, training, and maintenance center near the
factory.107
Because the Turkish defense industry has made deals with Ukrainian contractors to provide engines for newer
combat drone platforms, as well as various manned aircraft projects, threats posed to Ukraine’s manufacturing
capacity from Russia’s invasion could delay some of Turkey’s plans.108 Ukraine’s importance as an alternative
source for Turkey in procuring engines may have increased after a 2019-2020 decrease in Western supply due to
concerns about Turkish actions against Syrian Kurds and Armenians.109
Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation
Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from
the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy
cooperation with Russia (see “Energy” above). These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’
concerns about improving the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.110 For the
first nine months of 2022, Turkey-Russia trade volume was up sharply year-on-year from 2021.111
The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace
to Russian civilian flights. Decreases in Russian and Ukrainian tourism have affected Turkey’s
economy, and Turkey’s government is wary of potential Russian actions that could harm Turkey’s
economy even more, such as cutoffs of natural gas and wheat exports or military operations that
might increase refugee flows to Turkey.112 A European Union price cap arrangement on Russian
oil shipments has cast doubt on insurance coverage for oil tankers transiting the Straits as of
December. Turkey has been requiring tankers to document coverage to mitigate concerns of
financial risk from a spill or other costly incident.113
In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to boost Turkey-Russia
cooperation across economic sectors.114 Reportedly, many European companies prohibited by
sanctions from exporting directly to Russia, or otherwise wary of doing so, use Turkey as a base

2022. For more information on TB2s, see Appendix B and Figure B-4.
104 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” forbes.com, May 10, 2022.
105 Stephen Witt, “Weapon of Influence,” New Yorker, May 16, 2022.
106 Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2022.
107 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s defense industry eyes export expansion as government navigates geopolitical stage,”
Defense News, August 8, 2022.
108 Fehim Tastekin, “Will Ukraine crisis help Turkey dodge Western arms embargoes?” Al-Monitor, March 28, 2022.
109 Aykan Erdemir and Ryan Brobst, “Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan,” Foundation
for Defense of Democracies, March 24, 2022.
110 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times,
December 10, 2022.
111 Yoruk Isik, “In Turkish-Russian relations, the Ukraine grain deal is not the point,” Middle East Institute, November
9, 2022.
112 Sinem Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine,” SWP Comment, April 6, 2022.
113 “Turkey oil tanker logjam snarls Russia oil sanctions,” Reuters, December 9, 2022.
114 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5,
2022.
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for re-exports to Russia.115 Additionally, since the Russian invasion, Turkey has welcomed
sanctioned Russian oligarchs as tourists and investors.
Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions against
Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. In June 2022, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Wally Adeyemo reportedly visited Turkey to raise concerns over the movement of some Russian
assets and business operations to Turkey,116 and in August Adeyemo sent a letter to Turkish
business groups warning of penalties if they worked with Russian individuals or entities facing
sanctions.117 In September, several Turkish banks that had adopted the Mir payment system (a
Russian equivalent of Visa or MasterCard) stopped accepting it.118
Some observers have asserted that arrangements between Turkey and Russia could help Erdogan
address Turkey’s financial problems ahead of 2023 elections.119 Rosatom (the Russian state-
owned company building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, as mentioned above) began
implementing a plan in July 2022 to wire up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary, while also
seeking a credit line to finance the plant’s construction with Turkish treasury bonds.120 A former
Turkish central banker has argued that this transactional structure would minimize the risk of
Turkish institutions facing U.S. sanctions for the movement of Russian funds to Turkey.121 Russia
also agreed that Turkey could partially pay for Russian gas imports in rubles rather than
dollars.122
Black Sea Access
Turkey’s power to regulate access to the Black Sea via the Straits (see Figure 8) under the 1936
Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (the “Montreux Convention”) has implications
for U.S. interests.123 In February 2022, Turkey acknowledged a state of war between Russia and
Ukraine, invoking Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which generally bars belligerent
countries’ warships from traversing the Straits (except if they are returning to their base of
origin).124 Shortly after Turkey’s decision, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed
appreciation for Turkey’s implementation of the Convention and support for Ukraine.125 (The
United States is not a party to the Convention, but has complied with its terms since it went into
effect in 1936 as a treaty that is reflective of customary international law.)

115 Barbara Moens et al., “Erdoğan walks a fine line as the Ukraine war’s double agent,” Politico EU, August 17, 2022.
116 Amberin Zaman, “US deputy treasury secretary in Turkey to warn against evading Russian sanctions,” Al-Monitor,
June 22, 2022.
117 Elif Ince et al., “Russian Superyachts, Subject to Sanctions, Find a Haven in Turkey,” New York Times, October 24,
2022.
118 Ibid.
119 Sinem Ozdemir, “Turkey, Russia partnership essential to both,” Deutsche Welle, August 12, 2022; Fehim Tastekin,
“Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline,” Al-Monitor, August 10, 2022.
120 Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,” Middle East
Eye, July 30, 2022.
121 Ugur Gurses, quoted in Tastekin, “Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline.”
122 Tastekin, “Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline.”
123 Maximilian Hess, “Welcome to the Black Sea Era of War,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2022. Text of the Convention
is available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-Regime-of-the-
Straits.pdf.
124 “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022.
125 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” February 28, 2022.
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Figure 8. Map of Black Sea Region and Straits

Turkey’s invocation of Article 19 for the first time since World War II may prevent Russia from
replenishing ships it loses in battle. While Ukrainian coastal defenses have dealt losses to some
Russian ships and present some threats with uncrewed surface vessels carrying drone aircraft,
Russia’s fleet remains dominant in the northern Black Sea and controls the key Ukrainian port of
Mariupol as of late 2022.126
In March 10, 2022 correspondence with CRS, a Turkish official explained that Turkey (under the
Montreux Convention) has formally closed the Straits only to Russia and Ukraine as belligerent
countries, while advising all other non-Black Sea-littoral countries to refrain from sending
warships through the Straits. Some naval analysts have expressed concern that discouraging other
countries from transit could put NATO at a disadvantage.127 One has asserted that Black Sea
access is “essential for the alliance’s presence and security as well as to reassure” allies Romania
and Bulgaria.128 It is unclear what might lead Turkey and other Black Sea littoral countries (aside

126 H.I. Sutton, “Russian Navy Pulls Warships from Black Sea into Port After Attacks,” USNI News, November 7,
2022.
127 Isik, “In Turkish-Russian relations, the Ukraine grain deal is not the point”; Cornell Overfield, “Turkey Must Close
the Turkish Straits Only to Russian and Ukrainian Warships,” Lawfare Blog, March 5, 2022.
128 James Kraska, “Can Turkey Legally Close Its Straits to Russian Warships? It’s Complicated,” foreignpolicy.com,
March 1, 2022.
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from Russia) to take direct action or seek third-party help in asserting their interests and freedom
of navigation, and how that could affect regional security.
Mediating Russia-Ukraine Differences (Including Grain Export Deal)
Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate
access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of
contention. A Ukrainian analyst has argued that Turkey has positioned itself as a mediator “not
just in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine but more broadly in the struggle between Russia
and the West, and even globally between the West and the numerous non-Western countries that
have preferred to strike a more cautious and balanced approach to the war.”129 Additionally,
Turkish and Ukrainian officials have signed a memorandum of understanding for Turkish
involvement in helping rebuild Ukrainian infrastructure.130
In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with Russia and
Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly alleviate
global supply concerns.131 Under the deal, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have
representatives at a joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect
ships to prevent weapons smuggling.132 More than eight million tons of grain and other foodstuffs
had been exported from Ukrainian ports as of late October.133 Turkey played a major role in
getting guarantees from Ukraine to convince Russia to return to the deal in November after it
pulled out for a few days over allegations of Ukrainian attacks on its ships and complaints about
obstacles to Russian exports of grain and fertilizer.134 Later in November, the parties renewed the
initial four-month agreement for another four months (to March 2023). Ukraine has complained
that Turkey and other countries have purchased stolen Ukrainian wheat from Russia, with Turkish
officials promising to investigate but not announcing any conclusive findings as of December
2022.135 In President Biden’s November meeting with President Erdogan on the sidelines of the
G20 Summit in Indonesia, he expressed appreciation for Erdogan’s efforts to renew the deal, as
well as a hope that it would continue.136
In late 2022, Turkey’s mediation efforts expanded beyond the grain deal. Erdogan helped broker a
Russia-Ukraine prisoner exchange in September. In November, Central Intelligence Agency
Director William Burns reportedly met his Russian counterpart in Ankara to convey a message
about potential Russian nuclear weapons use and to discuss detained Americans in Russia.137 A
few days before Burns’s visit, President Erdogan said that he was committed to moving toward a
peace dialogue, while criticizing U.S. and Western stances toward Russia.138 Erdogan’s chief

129 Iliya Kusa, “Turkey’s Goals in the Russia-Ukraine War,” Wilson Center, June 13, 2022.
130 “Turkey and Ukraine sign agreement for reconstruction of war-torn country,” Middle East Eye, August 18, 2022.
131 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply” Associated Press, July 22,
2022.
132 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background.
133 Ezgi Akin, “Russia returns to Ukraine grain deal, easing food crisis fears,” Al-Monitor, November 2, 2022;
134 Ibid.
135 “Turkey says it is investigating claims of Russia shipping stolen Ukrainian grain,” Reuters, June 23, 2022.
136 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November
15, 2022.
137 Fatma Tanis, “Turkey is friendly with both Russia and Ukraine. Now it wants them to talk peace,” NPR, November
16, 2022.
138 “Turkey seeks Ukraine peace talks despite Western actions, Erdogan says,” Reuters, November 12, 2022.
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adviser and spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, later said that Russia “is interested in finding and
reaching a new deal with the West, and more particularly with the United States.”139
NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland
Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it
for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies
requires the unanimous agreement of existing members.
The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or
harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the PKK
and the Fethullah Gulen movement.140 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a
terrorist group.) Turkey demanded that both countries lift the suspension of arms sales they have
maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria against the PKK-linked Kurdish
group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) that has partnered with the U.S.-
led anti-Islamic State coalition.141 Turkey removed its objections to starting the accession process
after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June 2022 agreement between Turkey,
Sweden, and Finland. In the agreement, the three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes
remain in place between them. Further, Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or
Gulen movement, and pledged to work against the PKK.142
While Turkey’s decision to remove its objections generally drew plaudits from other NATO
members, during the delay some Western officials had raised questions about Turkey’s
commitment to strengthening NATO. President Erdogan maintained that Turkey might delay its
parliamentary ratification of the accession process.143 With Hungary likely to ratify Swedish and
Finnish accession by early 2023, Turkey could remain the only country delaying the process.144
Erdogan has said that he is more concerned about Sweden than Finland, but Finland insists it will
wait until both countries can join NATO together.
In November, Erdogan stated that he expected Sweden’s new government to take concrete steps
to implement the June 2022 agreement. He also demanded the extradition of various individuals,
including a prominent journalist from a now-defunct pro-Gulen media outlet.145 Observers note
that Sweden and Finland are unlikely to make political decisions on extradition that contravene
domestic judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.146 An unnamed

139 Tanis, “Turkey is friendly with both Russia and Ukraine.”
140 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17,
2022.
141 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country
Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,”
International Crisis Group, February 18, 2022; Barak Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, April 2016.
142 Agreement text available at Twitter, Ragip Soylu, June 28, 2022 – 2:48 PM, at https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/
1541856195257966592.
143 Amberin Zaman, “Erdogan says Sweden’s, Finland’s NATO memberships not done deal,” Al-Monitor, June 30,
2022.
144 William Mauldin and Michael R. Gordon, “Sweden and Finland on Track for NATO Membership,” Wall Street
Journal, December 9, 2022.
145 Ayla Jean Yackley, “Erdoğan demands Sweden do more to get Turkey’s approval to join Nato,” Financial Times,
November 8, 2022.
146 Ben Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,”
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European diplomat was quoted as saying, “It remains to be seen if Erdogan thinks he’s got
enough signs of goodwill from Sweden and it’s therefore in his political and military interest to
declare victory, or if he thinks sticking to the current line will serve his re-election campaign.”147
In December, Sweden reportedly extradited a man who had been convicted in Turkey in 2015 of
being a PKK member. Turkish officials have welcomed the action and expressed hope for
additional extraditions and steps on countering terrorist-related financing.148 Also in December,
Finland’s defense minister signaled openness to resuming arms export permits to Turkey.149
At a December press conference with Sweden’s and Finland’s foreign ministers, Secretary of
State Blinken reiterated strong U.S. support for the two countries’ NATO accession and said that
they have addressed Turkey’s security concerns in tangible ways. He stated that “it is not a
bilateral issue between the United States and Turkey and it’s not going to turn into one,” while
also expressing confidence that the process will come to a successful conclusion soon.150
Issues with Other U.S. Allies and Partners
Turkey’s regional policies have contributed to difficulties with some of its neighbors that are (like
Turkey) U.S. allies or partners.
Greece and the Republic of Cyprus
Background
Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and
broader Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, waxing and waning at
various points but bringing the sides close to military conflict on several occasions (see timeline
below). The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve
around contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace,
exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves (see Figure 9 and Figure 10 for maps of some
of the areas in dispute). Since a relative spike in Turkey-Greece tensions in 2019, Greece has
strengthened its defense cooperation and relations with the United States and a number of
regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt.
Timeline of Some Major Events: Disputes in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean
1923
Greek sovereignty over major Eastern Aegean islands confirmed by Treaty of Lausanne.
1930s
Greece claims 10 miles of national airspace (1931) and 6 miles of territorial waters (1936) around
islands.
1947
Greece acquires Dodecanese islands from Italy in Paris Peace Treaties.
1952
International Civil Aviation Organization gives Greece (Athens) Flight Information Region (FIR) air
traffic responsibility for most of the Aegean airspace.

Just Security, October 28, 2022.
147 Remi Banet, “Erdogan announces new meeting on Sweden’s NATO bid,” Agence France Presse, November 8,
2022.
148 “Turkey welcomes Sweden’s extradition of wanted convict,” Associated Press, December 5, 2022; “Turkey asks
Finland to resume defense sales amid NATO talks,” Al-Monitor, December 6, 2022.
149 “Finland to consider arms exports to Turkey as it seeks Ankara support for NATO bid,” Reuters, December 8, 2022.
150 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström and Finnish
Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto at a Joint Press Availability,” December 8, 2022.
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1960s
Greece stations some military personnel and equipment on some Aegean islands as Turkey-Greece
tensions grow over Cyprus. Turkey points to restrictions on militarization in Lausanne and Paris
treaties.
1974
Cyprus conflict: After Greece-backed coup, Turkey invades and occupies the northern one-third of
the island. Greece reinforces its military presence on some Aegean islands.
Turkey starts regularly challenging (1) Greek military presence on islands, (2) some aspects of
Greek maritime and airspace claims, and (3) the scope of the Athens FIR in the Aegean. Turkish
military aircraft begin overflights in disputed areas, sometimes challenged by Greek military aircraft.
1976
U.N. Security Council Resolution 395 calls on Turkey and Greece to resolve disputes via
negotiations, and take unresolved issues to International Court of Justice.
1996
Grey zones regarding smaller islets and rocks become a bigger issue with the Imia/Kardak
sovereignty dispute, which seemed to bring Turkey and Greece close to armed conflict.
2004
Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus is not adopted (approved in Turkish Cypriot popular
referendum, not approved in Greek Cypriot referendum). EU admits the Republic of Cyprus (ROC)
as member. Turkish EU accession hopes decrease in subsequent years, partly due to continuing
Turkey-ROC tensions.
2011
Turkey-ROC tensions grow and become intertwined with existing Turkey-Greece Aegean disputes
with the discovery of offshore natural gas in ROC’s exclusive economic zone and Turkish Cypriot
demands to participate in benefits from Eastern Mediterranean energy finds.
2019-2021
Various Turkish diplomatic and maritime actions aim at countering Greek and ROC energy
development aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Other regional countries, including Israel,
Egypt, and France, grow closer to Greece and ROC, including via the East Mediterranean Gas
Forum (EMGF). U.S. officials urge de-escalation while supporting EMGF.
2021
President Erdogan and Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar publicly advocate independent Turkish
Cypriot state, in departure from longtime internationally supported framework for a bi-zonal, bi-
communal federation.
2022
Turkey-Greece tensions resume amid mutual claims of military overflights and provocation, signs of
greater U.S.-Greece-ROC military cooperation, Greek statements discouraging U.S. arms sales to
Turkey, Greek military activity in some Aegean islands, and Turkish statements questioning Greek
sovereignty over those islands.
Sources: Various open sources, including Diego Cupolo, “TurkAegean or Greek Lake: The War of Words over
the Aegean Sea,” Turkey recap (Substack), July 5, 2022; Hasan Selim Özertem, “Turkish-Greek Relations in the
Aegean: Is a Solution Possible?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 16, 2021; Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved
Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation, New York: Routledge,
2019, pp. 89-108; Globalsecurity.org, Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute, available at
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/aegean.htm.
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Figure 9. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute

Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022 (https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-sovereignty-
16-maps/).
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Figure 10. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS.
Turkey-Greece tensions are further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved
conflicts, the de facto political division of the island of Cyprus along ethnic lines. The division
dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces invaded parts of the island to prevent
the ethnic Greek Cypriot leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece.151 Since Cyprus became
independent of the United Kingdom in 1960, Turkey has acted as the protector of the island’s
ethnic Turkish Cypriot minority from potential mistreatment by the ethnic Greek Cypriot
majority.152 The internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (ROC), which has close ties to
Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited
to the southern two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots
administer the northern one-third and are backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military
contingent there since the 1974 clash.153 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leaders proclaimed this part of

151 Turkey deployed its military in response to a coup d’état that had empowered pro-unification Greek Cypriot leaders.
152 Turkey is one of the three guaranteeing powers of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee that was signed at the time Cyprus
gained its independence. The United Kingdom and Greece are the other two guarantors.
153 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This presence is countered by an ROC force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between 50,000
and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February 3, 2021.
The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer
zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000
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the island the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), though no country other than
Turkey recognizes it.
A dispute during the past decade between Turkey and the ROC about Eastern Mediterranean
energy exploration appears to have brought Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt closer together.154
Turkey has objected to Greek Cypriot transactions in the offshore energy sector on the grounds
that they have not involved the de facto TRNC. Turkey also has supported Turkish Cypriot claims
to an exclusive economic zone around part of the island.
In late 2019, the Turkey-ROC dispute became intertwined with longtime Turkey-Greece
disagreements over continental shelves, territorial waters, airspace, and exclusive economic zones
when Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s then-Government of National Accord (GNA) on
maritime boundaries (see Figure 9).155 The dispute increased Turkey-Greece naval tensions,
especially after Greece and Egypt reached a maritime agreement in August 2020 rivaling the 2019
Turkey-Libya deal.156 Some observers have asserted that nationalistic and anti-Western sentiment
within elite Turkish national security circles has driven Turkey’s naval buildup and maximalist
maritime claims, citing arguments within these circles that Turkey was entitled to a “Blue
Homeland” in surrounding waters.157 Turkish decisions may partly stem from concerns about
potential geostrategic encirclement and exclusion from potentially lucrative commercial energy
transactions. A reported U.S. decision in 2022 to withdraw support for a natural gas pipeline from
Israel and Cyprus to Greece—in part for economic and environmental reasons158—appeared to
partly assuage Turkish concerns about possible regional containment, and drew support from
Erdogan.159
The 2019-2020 disputes involving Turkey, ROC, and Greece prompted U.S. and broader Western
criticism of Turkey and some EU sanctions against Turkish individuals in the context of EU
efforts to discourage Turkish drilling near Cyprus.160 Turkish ships with naval escorts engaged in
energy exploration activities; Greece, the ROC, France, and Italy held military exercises that may
have sought to deter these Turkish actions.161 The Turkish exploration activities abated near the
end of 2020, significantly reducing Turkey-Greece tensions.
Tensions During 2022
After a relative relaxation of Turkey-Greece tensions in late 2020, they spiked again in 2022.
First, the countries traded accusations regarding airspace violations over the Aegean. During this
period of early 2022, President Erdogan maintained dialogue with Greek Prime Minister

personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
154 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turkey, Rivals Square Off Over Gas Finds,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2020.
155 For background, see “Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute” at globalsecurity.org.
156 Michael Tanchum, “How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?”
foreignpolicy.com, August 18, 2020.
157 Ryan Gingeras, “Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy,” War on the Rocks,
June 2, 2020; “The Turkish Navy in an Era of Great Power Competition,” War on the Rocks, April 30, 2019.
158 Nektaria Stamouli, “A Pipeline Project That Ran Afoul of Geopolitics and Green Policies,” Politico, January 18,
2022.
159 “Erdogan says cost concerns force U.S. rethink on EastMed gas pipeline,” Reuters, January 18, 2022.
160 Council of the European Union press release, “Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: EU
puts two persons on sanctions list,” February 27, 2020.
161 Steven Erlanger, “Tensions Over Drilling Between Turkey and Greece Divide E.U. Leaders,” New York Times,
August 28, 2020.
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Kyriakos Mitsotakis. After Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern in May about U.S.-Turkey arms
transactions while addressing a joint session of Congress, Erdogan announced that he would no
longer deal with Mitsotakis.162 With U.S. officials already having notified Congress of a possible
upgrade of F-16s for Greece in 2021,163 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could
have significant implications for the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for
relations involving the three countries.164
While Turkey-Greece contacts have continued at ministerial levels, bilateral relations have
remained tense as of late 2022. Turkey has reiterated objections to Greek military presences and
reinforcements on Aegean islands located only a few miles from the Turkish mainland,
exacerbating Turkey-Greece disputes over the legality of the Greek actions under various 20th
century international agreements.165 In September 2022, Erdogan said that Turkey is not bound by
Greece’s occupation of the islands, while apparently hinting at potential future Turkish military
action.166 Later that month, the Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Greek and U.S.
ambassadors to protest the deployment of U.S.-origin armored vehicles on the islands of Lesbos
(alt. Lesvos) and Samos.167 On September 28, the State Department spokesperson said that
Greece’s sovereignty over the islands was not in question, and called on “all countries, including
our allies, to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to avoid actions that could inflame
tensions.”168
Additional developments signaling closer U.S. military relations with Greece and the ROC have
generated concern among Turkish officials. They have complained about the significant new U.S.
military presence at the Greek port of Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-
15 miles from the Turkish border.169 U.S. officials have explained that they are using the port as a
transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region given security concerns
regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.170 Some reports speculate about U.S.-Greece discussions
regarding the possibility of basing U.S. warships in Alexandropouli after the port’s planned

162 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S.
Congress,” May 17, 2022.
163 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Greece – F-16 Sustainment Materiel and Services, Transmittal No. 21-49,”
August 3, 2021.
164 Fehim Tastekin, “Greece’s growing influence frustrates Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, September 9, 2022; Aaron Stein,
“You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, 2022.
165 The respective Turkish and Greek arguments are set forth at https://www.mfa.gov.tr/militarization-of-eastern-
aegean-islands-contrary-tp-the-provisions-of-international-agreements.en.mfa and https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-
greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims-regarding-the-demilitarization-of-islands-in-the-aegean-
sea.html. See also Diego Cupolo, “TurkAegean or Greek Lake: The War of Words over the Aegean Sea,” Turkey recap
(Substack), July 5, 2022.
166 “Erdogan accuses Greece of ‘occupying’ demilitarised islands,” Reuters, September 3, 2022.
167 “Turkey files protest with Greece, US in islands row,” Agence France Presse, September 26, 2022.
168 State Department Press Briefing, September 28, 2022. In February 2022, an EU spokesperson criticized statements
by the Turkish foreign minister implying conditions on Greece’s sovereignty over the islands. The spokesperson said,
“Greece’s sovereignty over these islands is unquestionable. Turkey should respect it, refrain from provocative
statements and actions in this regard, commit unequivocally to good neighbourly relations and work to settle any
disputes peacefully. International agreements must be respected.” European External Action Service, “Turkey:
Statement by the Spokesperson on the sovereignty of Greece over its islands,” February 13, 2022.
169 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American
Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022.
170 Ibid; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense
Minister,” July 18, 2022.
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expansion.171 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey expert and former
congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky referenced U.S.-Greece defense
cooperation agreements from 2019 and 2021. He then said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli
allows NATO to bypass logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel
overland to allies and partners.172 (As mentioned above, Turkey has requested that warships from
non-Black Sea-littoral countries refrain from transiting the Straits.) In September, the State
Department announced that the ROC is permitted to receive defense articles in FY2023, fully
ending the embargo that Congress legally imposed in 1987 and lifted in 2019 (per P.L. 116-94,
Division J, Section 205). After Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022
that the United States no longer maintains a balanced approach in the Aegean,173 U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been no shift in U.S.
security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ collective efforts are
focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.174
In December, President Erdogan made remarks suggesting that Turkish missiles could target
Athens as a response to Greek reinforcement of Aegean islands. Greece’s foreign minister
condemned Erdogan’s comments as a threat against a NATO ally.175
Israel and Sunni Arab Governments
Since the 2010s, Turkey’s relations with Israel and with Sunni Arab governments that support
traditional authoritarian governance models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Egypt—have been fraught with tension. Under President Erdogan, Turkey and Israel have clashed
politically over Israel’s handling of Palestinian issues and Turkey’s support for Hamas, even as
the countries have continued to expand trade ties.176 The Sunni Arab governments have regarded
Turkey with suspicion largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for Islamist
political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.177
Developments in Libya increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern
Mediterranean and its rivalries with the Sunni Arab governments because they supported
opposing sides in Libya’s civil war. As mentioned above, 2019-2020 maritime boundary
agreements between Turkey and Libya’s then-GNA, and Greece and Egypt, respectively,
complicated the legal and economic picture in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey
reportedly seeks to improve relations with Egypt, Turkish agreements during 2022 to expand

171 Ahmet Gencturk, “US wants to turn Greek port into alternative to Turkish Straits, claims Greek media,” Anadolu
Agency, September 20, 2022; “A sleepy Greek port has become vital to the war in Ukraine,” Economist, July 21, 2022.
172 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and
Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy,
the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-
challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/.
173 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022.
174 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at
https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/1582273449145212928.
175 Andrew Wilks, “Greece compares Turkey to North Korea in latest row with Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, December 12,
2022.
176 Kemal Kirisci and Dan Arbell, “President Herzog’s visit to Ankara: A first step in normalizing Turkey-Israel
relations?” Brookings Institution, March 7, 2022.
177 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting
MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020.
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energy and defense cooperation with Libya’s interim Government of National Unity may present
obstacles to that goal.178
In the past two years, however, Turkey has sought rapprochement with some of its regional rivals.
The potential economic benefits could help alleviate Turkey’s financial crisis ahead of its
anticipated 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. For example, Erdogan and UAE
President Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al Nuhayyan have visited each other, and the two
countries have signed a currency swap deal along with many other agreements on economic
cooperation and investment.179 In April 2022, Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia after Turkey
transferred jurisdiction to the Saudis over the trial Turkey had previously convened for journalist
Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, which allegedly occurred in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. In June,
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud visited Turkey. Figures indicate that Turkey-
Saudi Arabia trade volume is expanding.180 A November 2022 media report suggested that Turkey
was expecting additional foreign exchange inflows from Saudi Arabia and Qatar.181
An early 2022 media report anticipated UAE investment in Turkey’s defense industry and
Turkish defense exports to the Gulf—potentially including drones, air defense systems, and
various air, sea, and land platforms.182 In September 2022, Turkey sent 20 Bayraktar TB2 drones
to the UAE, and the UAE reportedly expects to receive more.183 Saudi Arabia also reportedly
wants to acquire the TB2, and both countries have apparently raised the possibility of building
production facilities for Turkish-designed drones.184
Moreover, Israel and Turkey have shown signs of improving ties, perhaps partly from common
cause in countering Iran.185 Some reports have suggested potential changes to Turkish policy on
Hamas.186
In March 2022, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey, and the two countries’ foreign
ministers exchanged visits in May and June. After Turkey and Israel agreed in August to
exchange ambassadors for the first time since 2018, President Erdogan met with then-Israeli
Prime Minister Yair Lapid in New York in September, and Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz
visited Turkey in October. Turkish officials have expressed interest in energy cooperation with
Israel. However, Israeli officials reportedly remain skeptical about prospects for a subsea Israel-
Turkey natural gas pipeline.187 While Israel has pursued greater high-level interaction with

178 Fehim Tastekin, “Libya differences stall Turkey-Egypt fence-mending,” Al-Monitor, November 3, 2022.
179 “UAE and Turkey central banks seek further co-operation after currency swap deal,” The National, February 17,
2022.
180 Sinem Cengiz, “Echoes from President Erdoğan’s Saudi Arabia Visit: A Fresh Start?” Politics Today, May 5, 2022.
181 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish government banks on Gulf financial support to save economy,” Al-Monitor, November
30, 2022.
182 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s policy changes could see defense biz grow with Gulf rivals,” Defense News, March 1,
2022.
183 “Exclusive: Turkey sells battle-tested drones to UAE as regional rivals mend ties,” Reuters, September 21, 2022.
184 Ibid; Ali Bakir, “The UAE just received twenty drones from Turkey. What’s the backstory?” Atlantic Council,
November 16, 2022.
185 Galip Dalay, “Turkey’s Middle East Reset? A Precursor for Re-Escalation?” Middle East Council on Global Affairs,
August 2022; Ksenia Svetlova, “Iran helped Turkey and Israel mend ties. Here’s how,” Atlantic Council, September 9,
2022.
186 Pinar Dost, “With an eye on Iran, Turkish-Israeli relations will deepen,” Atlantic Council, November 10, 2022;
Ariel Kahana, “Report: Israel, Turkey working to deport Hamas officials from Ankara,” Israel Hayom, February 15,
2022.
187 Lazar Berman, “FM’s visit shows Turkey eager to accelerate reconciliation, but Israel more cautious,” Times of
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Turkey, it may be cautious about significant near-term improvements in bilateral relations, and
appears to remain committed to close strategic ties with Greece and the ROC.188
It is unclear how the expected late 2022 return of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister
might affect the improvement in Turkey-Israel relations.189 Erdogan and Netanyahu have often
engaged in contentious rhetorical exchanges, but the two spoke by phone after Netanyahu’s
November 2022 electoral victory and agreed to continue efforts to build positive Turkey-Israel
ties.190
The Syrian Conflict
Background
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly,
and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war and stance
toward Syrian President Bashar al Asad have evolved during the course of the conflict. Turkey
has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad)
since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have
engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where
U.S. forces have been based.
Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from
establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government
considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major
threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the
PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.191 The
YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group
including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner
against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas
of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border
area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.192 U.S. officials
have continued partnering with SDF forces against the Islamic State in some areas of Syria, while
the SDF has made arrangements elsewhere for protection to come from Syrian government
forces.

Israel, May 24, 2022. While such a pipeline may be the most feasible pipeline option for transporting Eastern
Mediterranean natural gas to Europe, political and economic obstacles may make liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports
from liquefaction terminals in Egypt a more practical option. “Turkey best option for East Med gas transit to Europe:
Experts,” Daily Sabah, March 10, 2022; Sean Mathews, “Russia-Ukraine war: Conflict boosts hopes for East
Mediterranean energy, experts say,” Middle East Eye, April 5, 2022. Rina Bassist, “Israeli energy minister inks deal to
export gas to Europe via Egypt,” Al-Monitor, June 15, 2022.
188 Steven A. Cook, “How Israel and Turkey Benefit from Restoring Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, August
31, 2022.
189 Nazlan Ertan, “What Netanyahu’s return means for Israel-Turkey ties,” Al-Monitor, November 8, 2022.
190 “Erdogan tells Netanyahu relations should be maintained with mutual respect,” Reuters, November 17, 2022.
191 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and
YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK
affiliates in Syria), see footnote 141.
192 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019.
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Turkey has set up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported
Syrian armed opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National
Army (SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure 11). These councils and associated security
forces provide public services in these areas with funding, oversight, and training from Turkish
officials. Questions persist about future governance and Turkey’s overarching role. In 2020, one
Turkish analyst wrote that the migration of thousands of Sunni Arabs to these areas has
significantly changed their demography.193 Syrian Kurds maintain self-rule in some areas, even
though these areas are less contiguous with each other and the Turkish border.194 The State
Department’s 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights on Syria said:
Armed Syrian opposition groups supported by Turkey in the northern region of the country
committed human rights abuses, reportedly targeting Kurdish and Yezidi residents and
other civilians, including: extrajudicial killings; the arbitrary detention and enforced
disappearance of civilians; torture; sexual violence; forced evacuations from homes;
looting and seizure of private property; transfer of detained civilians across the border into
Turkey; recruitment of child soldiers; and the looting and desecration of religious shrines....
Elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition of Syrian Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen,
and other minority groups that included members of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units,
reportedly engaged in human rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention,
recruitment of child soldiers, and restrictions on freedom of assembly.

193 Asli Aydintasbas, “A new Gaza: Turkey’s border policy in northern Syria,” European Council on Foreign Relations,
May 28, 2020.
194 Ibid.
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Figure 11. Syria Conflict Map

During fall 2022, the Al Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS, a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization) made inroads in the Turkey/SNA-occupied Afrin province, reportedly due to
complicated rivalries between Syrian opposition factions.195 Turkey persuaded HTS to withdraw
by November, but questions remain about the possibility of lingering HTS cells or loyalists.196
The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future
of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, which is largely controlled by HTS. Turkey deployed
troops to Idlib in 2017, ostensibly to protect it from Syrian government forces and prevent further
refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands
of Syrian civilians and caused several Turkish and Syrian casualties. Russian willingness to back
Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to
enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing heavy weapons and “radical terrorist
groups” from the province.197 Factors affecting future developments, partly due to Russia’s

195 Orwa Ajjoub, “HTS, Turkey, and the future of Syria’s north,” Middle East Institute, October 26, 2022.
196 Omer Ozkizilcik, “How a former al-Qaeda affiliate became an existential threat and a wake-up call for the Syrian
opposition,” Atlantic Council, November 14, 2022.
197 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-
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ongoing war in Ukraine, could include possible Russian changes in posture and strategy in Syria,
Turkish measures to limit Russian military access to Syria by air and sea,198 and Russia’s
willingness to permit humanitarian access to Syria beyond early 2023.199
Refugees in Turkey
Turkey hosts about 3.6 mil ion Syrian refugees—more than any other country—along with hundreds of thousands
from other countries.200 Unofficial reports suggest these numbers may be considerably higher, constituting around
7 percent of Turkey’s population.201 Refugees’ and other migrants’ living situations, effect on Turkey’s population,
and access to employment, education, and public services vary based on the differing circumstances that they face.
Growing numbers of Turks appear to have concerns about refugees’ impact on Turkey’s society and economy.202
According to one source, about half of the two mil ion adult Syrian refugees in Turkey work, and nearly all who do
work in the informal sector, where wages are below the legal minimum and workers can face exploitation and
unsafe working conditions.203
Turkey closed off most access to migrants from Syria in 2015204 and has sought to repatriate refugees who are
wil ing to return,205 with more than 500,000 reportedly having done so to date.206 Reportedly, Turkish authorities
have forcibly returned some refugees to Syria.207
Per a 2016 Turkey-EU agreement to minimize the flow of migrants to the EU, Greece can return Syrian migrants
to Turkey that come to its islands. As part of a structured process, the deal calls for the same number of people
to be resettled from Turkey in EU countries.208 The agreement also mandated EU economic assistance for
refugees in Turkey. During some times of crisis, President Erdogan has threatened to open Turkey’s borders to
allow migrants into Greece and Bulgaria. Those countries implement security measures—with the assistance of
the EU’s border and coast guard agency—to minimize the number of crossings via land or sea. Some sources have
criticized Turkey and the other countries involved for alleged ethical or international legal violations related to the
treatment of refugees or migrants.209
Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in
which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. As of late 2022, Russia is reportedly trying to
broker better ties. Turkey is seeking Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and
facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish
withdrawal in return.210 It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would

idlib-revealed-1.771953.
198 Dorian Jones, “Ankara Tightens Russian Access to Syria,” Voice of America, May 10, 2022.
199 Lara Jakes, “U.N. Yields to Russia’s Limits on Aid Mission in Syria,” New York Times, July 12, 2022.
200 See https://reporting.unhcr.org/turkey#toc-narratives.
201 Merve Tahiroglu, “Immigration Politics: Refugees in Turkey and the 2023 Elections,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung,
August 17, 2022.
202 M. Murat Erdogan, Syrians Barometer - 2020, 2022.
203 Tahiroglu, “Immigration Politics: Refugees in Turkey and the 2023 Elections.”
204 Ceylan Yeginsu and Karam Shoumali, “Turkey Moves to Close All Gates at Border With Syria,” New York Times,
March 29, 2015.
205 “Turkey talks with UN over returning Syrian refugees,” Associated Press, September 12, 2021.
206 Mohammed Hardan, “Half a million Syrians return from Turkey, but were they forced?” Al-Monitor, December 6,
2022.
207 Ibid; Sultan al-Kanj, “Turkey forcibly deports dozens of Syrians,” Al-Monitor, February 8, 2022.
208 Text of agreement available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-
statement/.
209 International Organization for Migration, “IOM Concerned about Increasing Deaths on Greece-Turkey Border,”
February 18, 2022; “Bulgaria: Pushbacks Escalate as Government Discusses Reinforcements at Borders,” European
Council on Refugees and Exiles, September 10, 2021.
210 “Syria resisting Russia's efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022.
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affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in
northern Syria.
Further Turkish Military Operations?
In May 2022, Erdogan began making public statements about a possible new Turkish military
operation to expand areas of Turkish control in Syria as a means of countering YPG influence and
providing areas for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey.211 The presence of
Syrian refugees has become politically charged in Turkey ahead of the scheduled 2023 elections,
partly because of Turkey’s ongoing economic turmoil. In June testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy
Dana Stroul said that any Turkish escalation in northern Syria “risks disrupting [Defeat]-ISIS
operations,” including the security of SDF-managed detention facilities.212 As of August 2022, a
media report suggested that approximately 900 U.S. Special Forces personnel were deployed in
northeastern Syria to help the SDF counter the Islamic State and to discourage other countries’
forces from occupying the area.213
A November 13, 2022 bombing that killed six people in Istanbul and injured dozens more may
have boosted the Turkish government’s resolve to consider a military operation in Syria. Turkish
officials have publicized information alleging YPG responsibility for the attack, though the YPG
and PKK deny involvement.214
Turkey began air and artillery strikes against SDF-controlled areas of northern Syria (including
civilian infrastructure) and PKK targets in northern Iraq on November 20, 2022, dubbing the
strikes Operation Claw-Sword and invoking self-defense as justification. Reportedly, the strikes
have killed tens of people in Syria and Iraq, including SDF and Syrian government troops (in
Syria), PKK militants (in Iraq), and civilians (in both countries).215 Apparent retaliatory mortar
and rocket attacks from Syria—alleged by Turkish officials to come from YPG/PKK militants—
killed two at a schoolyard in southern Turkey, and wounded others there and at a border gate.216
One of the Turkish drone strikes reportedly killed two SDF personnel at a post near Al Hasakeh
that is 130 meters from the main U.S. military base in the area, reportedly prompting calls
between U.S. and Turkish military chiefs of staff and intelligence chiefs.217 Apparent retaliatory
mortar and rocket attacks from Syria—alleged by Turkish officials to come from YPG/PKK
militants—have killed two civilians and wounded other people in southern Turkey.218 President

211 Fehim Tastekin, “The stumbling blocks facing Turkey’s new operation plan in Syria,” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2022.
212 Statement of Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy, Testimony Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Path Forward on U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy and Accountability,” June 8,
2022, available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060822_%20Stroul_Testimony.pdf.
213 Alexander Ward et al., “What are we still doing in Syria?” Politico, August 26, 2022.
214 “Turkey blames deadly bomb on Kurdish militants; PKK denies involvement,” Reuters, November 14, 2022.
215 Andrew Wilks, “Turkey strikes in Syria, Iraq a week after Istanbul bombing,” Associated Press, November 20,
2022.
216 Begum Donmez Ersoz, “Another Major Turkish Military Ground Incursion Very Likely Amid Rising Tensions in
Syria Experts Say,” Voice of America, November 22, 2022; “Rockets fired into southeastern Türkiye from northern
Syria,” TRT World, November 20, 2022.
217 Jared Szuba, “Pentagon’s concerns grow as Syria’s Kurds prepare for Turkish assault,” Al-Monitor, November 30,
2022; “Scoop: CIA warned Turkey strikes in Syria endanger U.S. troops,” Axios, December 7, 2022.
218 Begum Donmez Ersoz, “Another Major Turkish Military Ground Incursion Very Likely Amid Rising Tensions in
Syria Experts Say,” Voice of America, November 22, 2022; “Rockets fired into southeastern Türkiye from northern
Syria,” TRT World, November 20, 2022.
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Erdogan has appeared to challenge the U.S. policy of distinguishing the YPG from the PKK,
saying “It’s the end of the road for those who believe they can stall Turkey by pun games, by
changing names of terrorist organizations, by sharing pictures showing their soldiers next to
terrorists.”219 SDF commander Mazloum Abdi (or Kobane, whose real name is Ferhat Abdi
Sahin) has called for stronger statements from U.S. and Russian officials to prevent a new
Turkish-led ground incursion.
Various U.S. official statements have acknowledged Turkey’s right to self-defense, but have
generally opposed cross-border strikes and voiced concerns that Turkey-SDF clashes could
reduce the SDF’s focus on countering the Islamic State.220 In a November 30 call between
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, Secretary Austin
expressed the Defense Department’s “strong opposition to a new Turkish military operation.”221
Reportedly, U.S. government civilian staff in northeastern Syria have been evacuated to northern
Iraq for safety.222
Based on open source reporting, the likely focus of a Turkish ground operation would be to eject
the SDF from the towns and surroundings of Tell Rifat and Manbij (see Figure 11).223 These
areas include important supply routes connecting northwestern and northeastern Syria, and are
not in the American military sphere of operation in northeastern Syria, but farther west in the
Russian and Syrian regime sphere. Concerns about how a Turkish-led ground operation in areas
surrounding Aleppo province might affect Russian, Iranian, and Syrian government sway in the
province could affect Russia’s stance toward a potential operation.224 However, according to one
former U.S. official, U.S. and Russian pushback against Turkish military action may be less
effective than before because “The war in Ukraine has bolstered Turkey’s diplomatic leverage,
weakened Russia’s military credibility and resources, and made multilateral pressure far less
plausible.”225 One former senior U.S. official has speculated that Russia might approve a Turkish
operation into Kobane/Ayn al Arab in the hope that it could drive a wedge between the United
States and Turkey, and thus weaken their efforts to contain Russia in Syria.226
Iraq
Turkey has acted for decades in Iraq to counter threats to Turkey from the PKK, which maintains
safe havens there. Turkey has conducted airstrikes and special operations against PKK targets in
Iraq since 2007. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is the leading faction within
Iraq’s largely autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not generally objected to
these strikes, though it has shown sensitivity to pan-Kurdish sympathies among its population.

219 Jared Szuba, “Turkey strikes near US base in Syria after Pentagon calls for de-escalation,” Al-Monitor, November
22, 2022.
220 Ibid.
221 Defense Department, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Phone Call With Turkish Minister of
National Defense Hulusi Akar,” November 30, 2022.
222 Amberin Zaman, “Syrian Kurdish commander slams US response to Turkish attacks as US diplomats evacuated
from Syria,” Al-Monitor, November 29, 2022.
223 Rich Outzen, “The risks and rewards of Erdogan’s next military operation,” Atlantic Council, December 1, 2022.
224 Pepe Escobar, “Operation Claw-Sword: Erdogan’s big new game in Syria,” Asia Times, November 27, 2022; Soner
Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, interviewed in Nadeen Ebrahim, “Will Erdogan finally
deliver on his vow to invade northern Syria?” CNN, November 25, 2022.
225 Outzen, “The risks and rewards of Erdogan’s next military operation.”
226 James Jeffrey, “How the U.S. Can Compromise with Turkey on Syria,” Foreign Policy, December 9, 2022.
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The KDP has its own rivalry with the PKK.227 Turkey has stepped up its operations in Iraq and
near the Iraq-Syria border based on Turkish officials’ allegations that people and supplies from
PKK safe havens in the Sinjar and Qandil regions of Iraq reinforce the Syrian YPG. Turkey’s
military maintains various posts inside northern Iraq and a presence at a base in Bashiqa near
Mosul. Turkey has generally positive relations with the KRG—including via oil imports from
northern Iraq relations—but has opposed Iraqi Kurdish moves toward independence that might
spread separatist sentiment among Kurds in Turkey.
Turkey has an uneasy relationship with Iraq’s central government over Turkey’s military
involvement in northern Iraq and ties with the KRG. Additionally, Turkish officials reportedly
harbor concerns that Iraq’s Shia leaders are unduly influenced by Iran and that Iraq’s security
forces and Shia militias often mistreat Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and ethnic Turkmen.228 Relations with
Baghdad are also strained by Iraqi concerns about the potential impact that Turkish dam
construction and water management decisions have on downstream Iraqi communities.229
U.S. Relations
U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on regional security matters remains
mutually important,230 despite Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia and a number of other
differences between them (such as in Syria and with Greece and Cyprus). U.S. officials have
sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to counter Turkish actions.231
As mentioned above, however, Turkey has taken some steps to ease tensions with major U.S.
partners in the Middle East—namely Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia.
One important factor influencing Erdogan since at least 2010 appears to be a sense that U.S.
actions have harmed specific Turkish interests or his own personal interests. Presumably as a
result, Turkey since 2016 has adopted an approach that more actively shapes events near Turkey’s
borders and involves closer Turkish dealings with all relevant state actors, including Russia and
Iran. Important developments animating Erdogan’s purported sense of U.S.-inflicted harm on
Turkey include:
 U.S. partnership with Syrian Kurds. Close U.S. military cooperation against
the Islamic State with the YPG despite its links to the PKK.
 Islamists’ regional status. Erdogan’s position that the United States supported or
acquiesced to events during post-2011 turmoil in Egypt and Syria that
undermined Sunni Islamist figures tied to Turkey.
 Domestic sensitivities. Many Western leaders’ criticism of President Erdogan for
ruling in a largely authoritarian manner. Erdogan’s sensitivity to Western
concerns was exacerbated by the 2016 coup attempt that Erdogan blames on U.S.

227 CRS In Focus IF10350, The Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
228 Sinem Cengiz, “Why Iraq’s chaos is Turkey’s concern,” Arab News, September 2, 2022.
229 Samya Kullab, “Iraq complains Turkey causing water shortages,” Associated Press, November 18, 2022.
230 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Meeting of Secretary Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,”
May 18, 2022.
231 See, for example, Richard Outzen, “What Is Turkey Thinking in the Eastern Med?” Hoover Institution, December 7,
2021.
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permanent resident Fethullah Gulen and his international socioreligious
movement.232
Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside
cooperation on other foreign policy matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. In April
2021, President Biden notably characterized Ottoman Empire (Turkey’s predecessor state) mass
killings and forced marches of Armenians during World War I as a genocide.233 He has limited his
meetings with President Erdogan to the sidelines of multilateral conferences. This approach may
reflect a U.S. inclination to keep Turkey at arms’ length until after Turkey’s 2023 elections.234
Nevertheless, Turkey’s emergence as a key mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s
2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. While continued or
deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense
and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat
improved U.S.-Turkey relations.235 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to
Turkey (see “Possible F-16 Sales” below), and the United States and Turkey launched a “strategic
mechanism” dialogue in April 2022 involving various government ministries on “economic and
defense cooperation, counterterrorism, and key areas of shared regional and global interest.”236
Congressional Action and Options
Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey.
Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have
implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic
orientation and financial well-being.
Increased congressional criticism and actions against Turkey have influenced the trajectory of
U.S.-Turkey relations since the attempted 2016 coup, focused particularly on President Erdogan’s
domestic actions and Turkish foreign policy decisions on Russia, Syria, Greece, and Cyprus
(discussed above) that largely diverge from U.S. stances. Congressional actions have included
legislation and oversight to empower Turkish rivals Greece and the ROC, and the authorization of
sanctions against Turkey and informal holds on arms sales in response to the Turkey-Russia S-
400 transaction. Members may reevaluate various legislative and oversight options given
Turkey’s significant role in the Russian-Ukraine conflict and the Biden Administration’s
expressed interest in upgrading Turkey’s F-16 fleet, the prospect of closely contested presidential
and parliamentary elections by June 2023, and the following other factors:

232 CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton
Thomas.
233 White House, “Statement by President Joe Biden on Armenian Remembrance Day,” April 24, 2021. In late 2019
during the 116th Congress, the House and Senate passed nonbinding resolutions (H.Res. 296 in October 2019 and
S.Res. 150 in December 2019) characterizing the “killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from 1915
to 1923” as genocide. The resolutions came shortly after Turkish military operations against the Kurdish-led Syrian
Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria drew significant congressional denunciation. Turkish officials roundly
criticized both resolutions, but did not announce any changes to defense cooperation or any other aspect of U.S.-Turkey
relations, despite having threatened to do so in years past in connection with similar proposed resolutions.
234 Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine.”
235 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign
Relations, August 24, 2022.
236 State Department, “U.S.-Turkey Joint Statement on the Strategic Mechanism,” April 4, 2022.
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 Turkish decisions on whether and how to keep or use the Russian S-400 system.
 Whether and when Turkey’s parliament ratifies Swedish and Finnish NATO
accession.
 How various regional crises (Syria, Russia-Ukraine conflict, disputes with
Greece and Cyprus) unfold and influence Turkey’s relationships with key actors
(including the United States, Russia, the European Union, Israel, Iran, and Sunni
Arab governments).
 Whether Turkey projects greater power and increases its sphere of influence via
military and economic cooperation (including defense exports) with other
countries.
 The importance of Turkish bases and assets for the U.S. military, and the
availability of alternatives.
 Changes to Turkish domestic political and economic freedom and stability.
More specific analysis of U.S. engagement and congressional options on some issues is set forth
below.
Responses to Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35
Program, CAATSA Sanctions, and Informal Holds
Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia
delivered in 2019,237 has significant implications for U.S.-Turkey relations. For example, it has
raised questions about how Turkey can stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters,
particularly if it transitions to any major Russian weapons platform with a multi-decade lifespan.
As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on Turkey’s defense procurement
agency in December 2020.238 In explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35
program in 2019, one official said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian intelligence collection
platform [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35 program makes, repairs and
houses the F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth capabilities, so the ability to detect
those capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of the F-35 program.”239
Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least
100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and
industrial production of the aircraft.240 Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense

237 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source,
Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a
second system to come later.
238 CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
(CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
239 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting
Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019.
240 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
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Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to
Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-
400. Turkish officials continue to publicly express hope that they can acquire the F-35 at some
future time.
Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production (see
Appendix B)—thereby bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have influenced its
S-400 decision. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly did not feature technology sharing,241
one reason Turkish officials gave for favoring the S-400 was a hope that it could open the door
for future technology sharing on air defense with Russia.242 Lack of agreement between the
United States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system might have
contributed to Turkey’s interest in considering non-U.S. options for air defense, including an
abortive attempt from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a Chinese system.243
Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400. One is Turkey’s
apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.244 Another is President Erdogan’s possible
interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as those used by some Turkish military
personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.245
Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the system
generally operational. President Erdogan stated in September 2021 that Turkey expected to
purchase a second S-400 system.246 Secretary of State Blinken warned Turkey that acquiring an
additional system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.247 Turkey may need to forgo
possession or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed.
An August 2020 article reported that some Members of congressional committees placed informal
holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction.
Such a disruption had not occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.248 At the time of
the article, major sales (valued at $25 million or more) on hold reportedly included structural
upgrades for Turkey’s F-16 aircraft and export licenses for engines involved in a Turkish sale of
attack helicopters to Pakistan. Sales already underway or for smaller items and services—such as
spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance packages for older equipment—are not subject to these
holds.
U.S. Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey

241 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, July 29, 2019.
242 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News,
January 10, 2020.
243 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course.
244 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018.
245 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the
United States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology
So Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019.
246 Humeyra Pamuk, “Erdogan says Turkey plans to buy more Russian defense systems,” Reuters, September 27, 2021.
247 Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” The Hill, April 28, 2021.
248 Valerie Insinna, et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense
News, August 12, 2020.
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Historically, Turkey was one of the largest recipients of U.S. arms, owing to its status as a NATO ally, its large
military, and its strategic position. Since 1948, the United States has provided Turkey with approximately $13.8
bil ion in overall military assistance (nearly $8.2 bil ion in grants and $5.6 bil ion in loans).
U.S. arms sales to Turkey have declined over time given Turkey’s efforts mentioned above to become more self-
reliant, as well as recent bilateral tensions. Current annual military assistance is limited to approximately $2 mil ion
in International Military Education and Training (IMET).
Possible F-16 Sales
In the fall of 2021, sources reported that Turkey requested to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter
aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.249 President
Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 meeting
in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation and
notification process with Congress.250
Turkey’s value as a NATO ally amid a new crisis implicating European security—Russia’s war
on Ukraine—may have subsequently boosted the Administration’s interest in moving forward
with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53
Members of Congress in a February 2022 letter,251 a State Department official wrote in March
that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign influence in the
region.”252 While acknowledging that any sale would require congressional notification, the
official added, “The Administration believes that there are nonetheless compelling long-term
NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and
commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”253
In April 2022, the Administration reportedly notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade
some of Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet and provide short- and medium-range air-to-air missiles
(Sidewinder AIM-9X and AMRAAM AIM-120D) at a total cost to Turkey of around $500
million.254 In November 2021, a Turkish defense expert described what upgrades of Turkey’s F-
16 aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could entail, including a new radar, other
software and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each
aircraft’s service life.255 Other countries that are receiving or may receive new or upgraded F-16

249 Grant Rumley and Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s F-16 Request May Not Stave Off the Inevitable,” Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, October 28, 2021.
250 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego
Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For
background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
251 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/
20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf.
252 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says
potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022.
253 Ibid.
254 Jared Malsin, “Biden Administration Asks Congress to Approve New Weapons Deal with Turkey,” Wall Street
Journal, May 11, 2022; Daniel Flatley and Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Wins Biden Backing for Its F-16 Fighter Jets
Upgrades,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2022. For information on informal and formal congressional notifications, see CRS
Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
255 Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22,
2021.
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Block 70/72 Vipers include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain,
Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.256
U.S. sales to boost the capabilities and extend the lifespan of Turkey’s F-16 fleet would provide
Turkey time to develop its long-planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, dubbed the
TF-X and expected to come into operation over the next decade. Turkey is apparently seeking to
partner with the United Kingdom (including companies BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) to
develop technology for the TF-X.257 If unable to procure F-16s or F-16 upgrades to boost the
Turkish air force’s capabilities during the transition to the TF-X, Turkish officials have hinted that
they might consider purchasing Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft or Western European
alternatives.258 According to some defense analysts, however, Turkey’s calculus has likely
changed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.259 One has written that if Turkey cannot procure F-
16s, “Security needs and politics dictate Ankara to remain within the NATO scope in its fighter
jet inventory. The only viable options before Turkey flies the TF-X are the [Eurofighter] Typhoon,
Saab [Gripen] and F-16 Block 70.”260
Turkey’s support for Ukraine may factor into the decision-making of some Members of
congressional committees regarding a possible U.S. upgrade or sale of F-16s for Turkey. A May
2022 article interviewed some congressional committee leaders with oversight responsibilities for
arms sales.261 Most signaled openness to considering F-16 transactions. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Bob Menendez remained skeptical, however, saying, “[Turkey] acts in
ways that are contrary to our interests in a whole host of things. I think the administration has to
stop seeing … the aspirational part of what we would like Turkey to be and realize that Turkey is
under Erdogan.”262
At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-
Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President
Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as
well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.263 It is
unclear whether Turkey could use its positions on military action in Syria or ratifying Swedish
and Finnish NATO accession as leverage on the United States with the F-16 issue, or vice versa.
Congressional conditions or informal (not legally binding) holds on F-16 sales remain possible.
The House-passed version of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7900) contained a provision (Section
1271) that would condition the transfer of new F-16s or upgrade technology to Turkey on a
presidential certification (1) that the transfer is in the U.S. national interest, and (2) that includes a
“detailed description of concrete steps taken to ensure that such F-16s are not used by Turkey for
repeated unauthorized territorial overflights of Greece.” In December, a joint explanatory

256 Ibid.
257 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9,
2022.
258 “Türkiye signals it may turn to Russia if US blocks F-16 jet sales,” Daily Sabah, September 9, 2022; Paul Iddon,
“Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com, March 15, 2021.
259 Paul Iddon, “Where can Turkey buy fighter jets if US F-16 deal falls through?” Middle East Eye, September 29,
2022.
260 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.”
261 Bryant Harris, “Congress signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation,” Defense News, May 4,
2022.
262 Ibid.
263 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022.
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statement accompanying the expected final version of the FY2023 NDAA said that the final bill
(H.R. 7776) would not include the H.R. 7900 condition on F-16s, while stating, “We believe that
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial
overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”264 Shortly thereafter, Chairman Menendez tweeted:
Contrary to some claims, the NDAA is not a win for Turkey. This is just one of many tools
we have at our disposal in the Senate to deal with arms sales.
I'll say it again.
As SFRC Chairman, I will NOT approve F-16s for Turkey until Erdogan halts his abuses
across the region.265
Informal congressional holds are not legally binding, but the executive branch generally gives
broad deference to the chair and ranking member of the foreign affairs committees on major
foreign arms sales. After formal notification of a major arms sale, any Member of Congress can
privilege a joint resolution of disapproval for floor action if the Member introduces it within the
time period prescribed under the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320).266 The
President can veto a resolution of disapproval, subject to congressional override.
On December 7, the State Department spokesperson responded to questions about the status of
possible F-16 sales to Turkey by saying:
Turkey is an important NATO Ally. It’s an important security partner. We want to ensure
that our defense capabilities are integrated and that Turkey has what it needs to take on the
formidable threats that it faces. No NATO Ally has faced more terrorist attacks on its soil
than our Turkish Allies. And so our cooperation in the security realm is of paramount
importance to us....
Turkey’s desire for F-16s is something that we have discussed, including at the most senior
levels, with our Turkish allies, but it’s also something that we’re discussing with the Hill.267
U.S./NATO Presence in Turkey
The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the
NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the
West. For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about
encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing
leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria,
Turkey’s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military
operations and arms exports.268
Turkey’s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory
for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and
NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana (see text box

264 Joint explanatory statement available at https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-
117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70-JES.pdf.
265 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at
https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/status/1600519759493304321.
266 For Turkey, as a NATO ally, Members have 15 days after a formal notification of a major arms sale to introduce a
privileged resolution of disapproval. CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K.
Kerr.
267 State Department Press Briefing, December 7, 2022.
268 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13,
2022; Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.”
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below), other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern
Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure 12). As mentioned above,
Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through the Straits (see “Black Sea
Access”).
Incirlik Air Base
Turkey’s Incirlik (pronounced een-jeer-leek) air base in the southern part of the country has long been the symbolic
and logistical center of the U.S. military presence in Turkey, with the U.S. Air Force’s 39th Air Base Wing based
there. Since 1991, the base has been critical in supplying U.S. military missions in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Syria. Anti-Islamic State coalition flights in Syria and Iraq began in 2014, but reportedly dropped off significantly
by 2018 owing to U.S.-Turkey tensions.269 One unofficial source tracking U.S. military bases worldwide estimates
that Incirlik hosts 1,650 military personnel and around 4,850 total American citizens, when accounting for civilian
employees and dependents.270
The use of Incirlik by coup plotters within Turkey’s military in July 2016 caused temporary disruptions of some
U.S. military operations, and intensified debate about Turkey’s stability and the safety and utility of Turkish
territory for U.S. and NATO assets. Several open source media outlets have speculated about whether U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons are based at Incirlik Air Base, and if so, whether U.S. officials might consider taking them
out of Turkey.271
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. As a result of the tensions and questions about the
safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated
exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.272 Some reports suggest that expanded or
potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might
be connected with concerns about Turkey.273 In March 2022, Alan Makovsky said in the
congressional hearing testimony mentioned above that while the United States should make
efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation in recent years” justifies the
United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to
“hedge its bets.”274

269 Gordon Lubold, et al., “U.S. Pares Operations at Base in Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2018.
270 See http://www.militarybases.us/air-force/incirlik-ab/.
271 Dorian Jones, “US Military Base in Turkey Has Uncertain Future,” Voice of America, November 24, 2019; Miles A.
Pomper, “Why the US has nuclear weapons in Turkey—and may try to put the bombs away,” The Conversation,
October 23, 2019.
272 See, for example, Xander Snyder, “Beyond Incirlik,” Geopolitical Futures, April 19, 2019.
273 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The
Drive, January 14, 2019.
274 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining
U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.”
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Figure 12. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS.
Notes: All locations are approximate.
There are historical precedents for both the United States withdrawing military assets from
Turkey, and Turkey restricting U.S. use of its territory or airspace. These include the following:
 1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States withdrew its nuclear-tipped
Jupiter missiles following this crisis.
 1975 - Cyprus. Turkey closed most U.S. defense and intelligence installations in
Turkey during the U.S. arms embargo that Congress imposed in response to
Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus.
 2003 - Iraq. A Turkish parliamentary vote did not allow the United States to
open a second front from Turkey in the Iraq war.
U.S. officials and lawmakers assessing the costs and benefits of a U.S./NATO presence in Turkey,
and of potential changes in U.S./NATO posture that could be influenced by military
appropriations or congressional oversight, are likely to consider the following three questions:
 To what extent does the United States rely on direct use of Turkish territory or
airspace to secure and protect U.S. interests?
 How important is U.S./NATO support to Turkey’s external defense and internal
stability, and to what extent does that support serve U.S. interests?
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 To what extent would other regional countries provide more or less stability and
protection for U.S./NATO military assets and personnel?
Other Sanctions
Aside from CAATSA sanctions discussed above, Congress could consider authorizing sanctions
against Turkey or Turkey-linked entities or individuals in connection with Russia, Iran, or Syria.
It is unclear whether sanctions would deter Turkey from the behavior defined by U.S. officials or
lawmakers as objectionable, or prompt Turkey to increase economic ties with other regional
countries to reduce the sanctions’ impact.
Russia
As mentioned above, Deputy Treasury Secretary Adeyemo has reportedly warned Turkey that it
could face penalties for helping sanctioned Russian groups or individuals. Members may assess
actions to deter or penalize Turkey-Russia economic ties in light of Turkey’s ongoing role in
mediating and influencing military, political, and economic developments surrounding the
Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Iran
A U.S. federal criminal case is pending against Turkish state-owned bank Halkbank for the bank’s
alleged involvement in helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions a decade ago, and could lead to a
multibillion dollar fine from the Treasury Department.275 Additionally, in December 2022, the
Treasury Department designated a number of actors from the Turkish private sector, including
energy conglomerate ASB Group, for sanctions under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 (as
amended) for facilitating oil sales for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force
(IRGC-QF), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.276
Syria
If Members of Congress assess that Turkish actions against the SDF in Syria are endangering
important U.S. interests, they could reevaluate the merit of sanctions imposed or proposed during
the previous major operation in 2019. At that time, the Trump Administration levied sanctions on
some Turkish cabinet ministries and ministers pursuant to E.O. 13984 (which remains in
effect),277 but lifted them later that same month.278 The 116th Congress also considered a number
of sanctions bills, with the House passing the Protect Against Conflict by Turkey Act (H.R. 4695).
Election Oversight
Some Members following Turkey’s upcoming campaign and election might have concerns about
Erdogan’s use of the government to control the process, including but not limited to judicial

275 Amberin Zaman, “US deputy treasury secretary in Turkey to warn against evading Russian sanctions,” Al-Monitor,
June 22, 2022.
276 Treasury Department, “Treasury Targets Sanctions Evasion Network Generating Hundreds of Millions of Dollars
for Qods Force Oil Sales,” December 8, 2022.
277 White House, “Executive Order on Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Syria,” 84 Federal Register 55851-55855, October 14, 2019.
278 Department of the Treasury, Executive Order on Syria-related Sanctions; Syria-related Designations; Issuance of
Syria-related General Licenses, October 14, 2019; Department of the Treasury, Syria-related Designations Removals,
October 23, 2019.
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action against potential candidates (such as Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, as discussed above)
or parties. In that context, Congress could engage in public debate and oversight of the executive
branch to encourage freedom of expression, minority and women’s rights, proper election
practices and monitoring, and (if applicable) a peaceful transfer of power. Members may consider
how public advocacy or criticism might be received by the Turkish public or used by Erdogan or
other political figures.
Political and Economic Engagement with Turkey’s Government
How closely Members advocate U.S. engagement with a Turkish government—under Erdogan or
a different leader—could depend on their perceptions of the government’s popular legitimacy,
Turkish public attitudes toward U.S. credibility, and broader geopolitical, historical, and
economic considerations. Such factors might also influence congressional support or opposition
for U.S. or international measures to help relieve Turkey’s financial problems.
As mentioned above, U.S. steps to help a potential new Turkish government—whether on arms
sales, sanctions, the economy, or other matters—could encourage an improvement in bilateral
relations. CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. If,
however, Turkish leaders or domestic audiences perceive that any such steps are likely to bind
future Turkish actions to U.S. interests, those concerns could limit a new Turkish government’s
willingness to embrace them.
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Appendix A. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey
Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President
(pronounced air-doe-wan)
Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on
the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a
business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different
Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office,
imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious
incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After
Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party
was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP
won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After

the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special
election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of
the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to
power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and
won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. Many observers
assess that he seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of corruption
cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of Republican People’s Party (CHP)
(kuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo)
Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi background,
Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP, which is the main opposition party and
traditional political outlet of the Turkish nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the
party has also attracted various liberal and social democratic constituencies.
After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the
director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil
service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to
parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has since faced criticism for the
CHP’s failure to make electoral gains at the national level.
Ekrem Imamoglu—Mayor of Istanbul and Possible CHP Presidential
Candidate
(ee-mahm-oh-loo)
Born in 1970 in Trabzon on the Black Sea coast, Imamoglu is the mayor of Istanbul.
He received a bachelor’s degree in business and masters in human resources
management from Istanbul University.
Imamoglu became CEO for his family’s companies in the housing and urban planning
field before entering politics and becoming prominent within the CHP. He was elected
mayor of Istanbul’s Beylikduzu district in 2014 and grew in popularity while working
to improve living standards and infrastructure in the district. He became mayor of
Istanbul—giving the CHP the mayor’s seat for the first time since 1980—after winning
two elections: one in March 2019 that was annul ed by the Supreme Board of
Elections, and the fol owing second election in June 2019. He faces obstacles in his
administration from Erdogan’s government and the AKP-control ed city council.
Some observers say that Imamoglu’s youth, charisma, and effort to appeal to citizens
of varying backgrounds would make him a better presidential candidate than
Kilicdaroglu in upcoming 2023 elections. Most pol s indicate that he would have more
popular support. In December 2022, he was convicted of insulting members of
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Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (discussed above) and received a jail sentence and
political ban that remain subject to appeal.
Mansur Yavas—Mayor of Istanbul and Possible CHP Presidential Candidate
(yah-vahsh)
Born in 1955 in Beypazari near Turkey’s capital Ankara, Yavas is the mayor of Ankara.
He received a law degree from Istanbul University.
Yavas worked as a military prosecutor during his mandatory military service, then
started practicing law privately in Beypazari. He entered politics and was elected to
the Beypazari municipal council in 1989, then was elected as mayor of Beypazari from
1999 to 2009 while a member of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
In 2014, he lost as the CHP candidate for mayor of Ankara, but claimed that
irregularities cost him the election. He ran again in March 2019, winning and giving the
CHP the mayor’s seat for the first time since 1980. As with Imamoglu in Istanbul, he
faces an AKP-control ed municipal council.
Yavas has generally outpol ed both Kilicdaroglu and Imamoglu as a potential
presidential candidate. However, because of his background with the MHP, which has
taken a hard line against compromises with Kurds, he may have trouble gaining
support from Kurdish constituencies seeking to make common cause with opposition
parties against Erdogan and the AKP.
Devlet Bahceli—Leader of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)
(bah-cheh-lee)
Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the
MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds.
Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher
education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a
career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a
leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997
and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He
was initially elected to parliament in 2007.
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good (Iyi) Party
(awk-sheh-nar)
Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from
Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party
in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s
alliance with Erdogan.
Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from
Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was
first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior
minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by
a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from

2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to
provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum
establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned
vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the
controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its
presidential candidate in the 2018 elections.
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Selahattin Demirtas—Former Co-Leader and Presidential Candidate of
Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)
(day-meer-tosh)
Born in 1973 to an ethnic Kurdish family, Demirtas is the most prominent member of
the HDP, which has a Kurdish nationalist base but has also reached out to a number
of non-Kurdish constituencies, particularly liberals and minorities. The constituency of
the party and its various predecessors overlaps with that of the PKK, but the party
professes a nonviolent stance and claims an independent identity.
Demirtas was raised in Elazig in eastern Turkey. He attended universities in both Izmir
and Ankara and received his law degree from Ankara University. He became a human
rights activist leader in Diyarbakir and was elected to parliament for the first time in
2007, becoming co-leader of the HDP’s immediate predecessor party in 2010. His
national visibility increased after he ran as one of two candidates opposing Erdogan for
the presidency in 2014. His personal popularity and charisma are generally seen as
major reasons for the HDP becoming the first pro-Kurdish party to pass the electoral
threshold of 10% in June and November 2015 parliamentary elections.
Demirtas was arrested in November 2016 on terrorism-related charges, has received
conviction sentences totaling more than seven years (four years and eight months for
incitement in September 2018, and three years and six months for insulting President
Erdogan in March 2021), and is imprisoned in Edirne. He stepped down from party
leadership in January 2018 but ran for president in 2018 from prison, garnering about
8.5% of the vote. ECHR rulings and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe have called for Demirtas’s release.
Abdullah Ocalan—Founder of the PKK
(oh-juh-lawn)
Born in or around 1949 in southeastern Turkey (near Sanliurfa), Ocalan is the
founding leader of the PKK.
After attending vocational high school in Ankara, Ocalan served in civil service posts
in Diyarbakir and Istanbul until enrol ing at Ankara University in 1971. As his interest
developed in socialism and Kurdish nationalism, Ocalan was jailed for seven months in
1972 for participating in an il egal student demonstration. His time in prison with
other activists helped inspire his political ambitions, and he became increasingly
political y active upon his release.
Ocalan founded the Marxist-Leninist-influenced PKK in 1978 and launched a separatist
militant campaign against Turkish security forces in 1984—while also attacking the
traditional Kurdish chieftain class. He used Syrian territory as his safe haven, with the
group also using Lebanese territory for training and Iraqi territory for operations.
Syria forced Ocalan to leave in 1998 after Turkey threatened war for harboring him.
After traveling to several different countries, Ocalan was captured in February 1999 in
Kenya—possibly with U.S. help—and was turned over to Turkish authorities. The
PKK declared a cease-fire shortly thereafter. Ocalan was sentenced to death, in a trial
later ruled unfair by the European Court of Human Rights, but when Turkey abolished
the death penalty in 2002, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He
resides in a maximum-security prison on the island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara,
and was in solitary confinement until 2009.
Although other PKK leaders such as Cemil Bayik and Murat Karayilan have exercised
direct control over PKK operations during Ocalan’s imprisonment, some observers
believe that Ocalan stil ultimately controls the PKK through proxies.

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Appendix B. Some Drivers of Turkish Foreign
Policy
Arms Procurement and Exports
How Turkey procures and exports key weapons systems affects its partnerships with major
powers. For decades, Turkey has relied on important U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft,
helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.279 However, U.S. arms
sales to Turkey have declined over time (see Figure B-1).
Increasing Turkish Self-Sufficiency
Turkish goals to become more self-sufficient on national security matters and increase Turkey’s
arms exports affect the country’s procurement decisions. After a 1975-1978 U.S. arms embargo
over Turkish military intervention in Cyprus significantly hampered Turkish arms acquisitions,
Turkey sought to decrease dependence on foreign sources by building up its domestic defense
industry (see Figure B-1).280

279 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
280 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019.
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Figure B-1. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending

Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Arms Traders Database.
Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increasing percentage of Turkey’s defense needs,
on equipment such as armored vehicles, naval vessels, munitions, and drone aircraft. In
December 2022, Erdogan said, “When we took office, the defense industry was 20% domestic;
now it’s 80% domestic.”281 Yet, despite this growing self-sufficiency in defense procurement, it
still remains largely dependent on the United States and other Western countries for important
items such as aircraft and naval engines, advanced sensors, and microchips.282 For key equipment
that Turkey cannot produce itself, its leaders generally seek deals with foreign suppliers that
allow for greater co-production and technology sharing.283 These practices have helped Turkey
develop a growing arms export industry (see Figure B-2 and Figure B-3).

281 Wilks, “Greece compares Turkey to North Korea in latest row with Erdogan.”
282 Arda Mevlutoglu, quoted in “Turkey is the arms industry’s new upstart,” Economist, February 12, 2022; Ferhat
Gurini, “Turkey’s Unpromising Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 9, 2020.
283 “Turkey - Market Report,” Janes Navigating the Emerging Markets, March 5, 2020.
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Figure B-2. Turkish Arms Exports, 2000-2021
($ millions, non-inflation-adjusted)

Sources: SIPRI and Defense News, based on official Turkish reports.
Figure B-3. Turkish Arms Export Partners, 2012-2020

During the period 2017-2021, Turkey increased its arms exports by 31% and decreased arms
imports by 56% from the previous five years (2012-2016). Between 2017 and 2021, it was the
world’s 12th largest arms exporter (with a 0.9% share of worldwide exports) and 17th largest
importer (with a 1.5% share of worldwide imports).284 After an exponential increase in exports
since 2010 (see Figure B-2), Turkish officials anticipate that arms exports for 2022 may exceed
$4 billion.285

284 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021,” March
2022.
285 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s defense industry eyes export expansion as government navigates geopolitical stage,”
Defense News, August 8, 2022.
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Drone Aircraft
Turkey’s demonstrated battlefield successes with its drones have significantly increased demand
for exports to other countries.286 The growing global popularity of the Bayraktar TB2 drone in
particular has prompted one Western arms industry figure to call it the “Kalashnikov [rifle] of the
21st century.” (see Figure B-4 and Figure B-5)287 One analyst explained the TB2’s appeal by
saying that it “strikes a favorable balance between price and capability, being more affordable and
accessible compared to US drones while being far more reliable and effective than Chinese
models.”288 Reports suggest that Turkey’s integration of drones featuring attack and
reconnaissance functions with other platforms in warfighting contexts has become an influential
tactical innovation for other militaries. It has provided a model for regional powers seeking to
compensate for disparities with larger powers in more traditional platforms such as fighter
aircraft, missiles and air defense systems, and armored vehicles.289 Turkish companies Baykar
Technology, Kale Group, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), and STM are developing a variety
of additional drone and loitering munition platforms of varying sizes and functions, alongside the
development of Turkish-origin unmanned systems for naval and ground combat and
reconnaissance.290

286 Sinan Tavsan, “Turkish drone success in Ukraine sets stage for Asia roadshow,” Nikkei Asia, March 16, 2022.
287 Ibid.
288 Gabriel Honrada, “The Turkish drones winning the Ukraine war,” Asia Times, May 12, 2022.
289 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.”
290 Ibid; “Turkey’s Baykar to complete plant in Ukraine in two years –CEO,” Reuters, October 28, 2022.
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Figure B-4. Bayraktar TB2 Drone

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Figure B-5. Countries Interested in Bayraktar TB2 Drone Aircraft
(as of July 2022)

Source: ProPublica, based on news reports and statements from government officials and Baykar Technology.
Notes: Since the publication of this map, the UAE has reportedly acquired TB2s and Saudi Arabia has expressed
interest as well. “Türkiye sells its famed battle-tested drones to UAE as ties mend,” Daily Sabah/Reuters,
September 21, 2022. Other potential buyers include the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Uruguay, and Togo. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s defense industry eyes export expansion as government navigates
geopolitical stage,” Defense News, August 8, 2022; “Turkey's Bayraktar TB2 drone: Why African states are buying
them,” BBC News, August 25, 2022. A few countries (including Tunisia, Algeria, and Malaysia) have reportedly
purchased or expressed interest in the TAI Anka-S drone, which has a significantly larger flight range than the
TB2.
While Turkey’s “drone diplomacy” appears to be helping it build important regional and global
connections, some observers have raised concerns. One worry is that Turkey may enable human
rights violations; an example is the Ethiopian government’s use of TB2s (alongside drones
originally from Iran and China) against Tigrayan rebels.291 Another concern is that without greater

291 Salem Solomon, “Ethiopia Ups Use of Drone Strikes in Conflict Prompting Worries About Civilian Toll,” Voice of
America, February 2, 2022.
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oversight and transparency, exporting drones broadly could result in unintended, adverse
consequences for Turkey’s interests or those of its allies and partners.292
Economic and Energy Ties
Economic linkages and Turkey’s dependence on imported energy sources are another driver of
Turkish foreign policy. In some cases, Turkey’s economic and energy considerations have been at
cross-purposes with its more traditional security concerns. Examples of these linkages include:
 Europe. Turkey’s diversified, G20 economy is closely integrated with Europe’s due to
historical and institutional ties, including its customs union with the European Union.
While this may provide some leverage to Turkey with the EU, Turkish policies that
significantly harm Western interests could endanger the continued flow of European
goods, services, and capital into Turkey.
 Russia and Iran. Despite some tensions in Turkey’s relations with Russia and Iran, it has
depended on both countries for energy imports (see “Energy” above). Turkey generally
receives almost half of its natural gas from Russia,293 and Iran was its leading oil supplier
before the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018.294 Additionally, Russia is helping
finance and build Turkey’s first nuclear energy reactor. Even though Turkey has sought to
diversify its energy import sources and transports some gas from Azerbaijan to Europe as
an alternative to Russian gas,295 it has increased its Russian energy imports since the 2022
Russian invasion of Ukraine.296
The natural gas Turkey has claimed to find in the Black Sea could reduce its dependence on rivals
for energy later this decade.297
Leadership Approaches
Political leaders’ approaches to foreign policy can affect decisions and outcomes. In determining
how a leader may handle key issues, relevant questions could include:
 Is the leader naturally proactive or reactive in style and temperament? Does the leader
seek to change or maintain the regional or global status quo or Turkey’s role within it?
 Does the leader consciously adhere to a specific foreign policy approach—be it a
pragmatic, interests-based or ideological, values-based philosophy? Or does the approach
depend primarily on the situation?
 What is the leader’s tolerance for risk and motivation to obtain reward?

292 Fehim Tastekin, “Are Turkish drones complicating disputes in Central Asia?” Al-Monitor, September 26, 2022;
Federico Borsari, “Turkey’s drone diplomacy: Lessons for Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January
31, 2022; Alper Coskun, “Strengthening Turkish Policy on Drone Exports,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 18, 2022.
293 David O’Byrne, “Turkey, Russia gas ties grow contentious amid Ukraine war,” Al-Monitor, July 28, 2022.
294 “Despite rhetoric, Turkey complies with U.S. oil sanctions on Iran,” Reuters, May 21, 2019.
295 Tony Wesolowsky, “Can Azerbaijan Help Europe Kick Its Russian Gas Habit as Kremlin Threatens to Shut the
Taps?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 5, 2022.
296 “Turkey doubles Russian oil imports, filling EU void,” Reuters, August 22, 2022.
297 Ackerman, “Turkey: A new emerging gas player with resources and infrastructure.”
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In 2011, a prominent Brookings Institution scholar and National War College professor set forth a
framework asserting that modern Turkish leaders incline toward some combination of the
following three foreign policy approaches.298
Kemalist caution. This approach references the general admonition of republican Turkey’s
founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to maintain peace at home and abroad. After Turkey’s war of
independence in the 1920s, its military-guided leadership sought to avoid global and regional
conflicts unless core Turkish interests were threatened. Turkey remained neutral throughout
almost all of World War II (joining the Allied side near the end, without committing troops, in
order to be a charter member of the United Nations) and steered clear of postwar conflict and
instability in the Middle East. Its turn to NATO and greater alignment with the United States
came largely as a result of Soviet encroachment on Turkey (and especially the Straits), and
Turkey’s two major military campaigns of the late 20th century were on behalf of ethnic Turks on
the neighboring island of Cyprus and to counter domestic PKK militancy.
Neo-Ottoman projection of influence. This approach reflects the view that Turkey maintains
continuity with its Ottoman past, and should actively shape regional realities with confidence in
Turkish sources of military, economic, and cultural strength. Some Turkish leaders made moves
in a neo-Ottoman direction during the 20th century, but it became more prominent as a feature of
Turkish policy under Prime Minister and later President Erdogan, as elected civilian leaders
gradually overtook the historically Kemalist military as the main architects of foreign policy.
Turkish “Gaullist” autonomy in foreign policy. This approach draws from the previous
two, based on the idea that Turkish leaders’ caution and confidence can work hand in
hand to protect Turkey from outside actors while also boosting its power and prestige.
The Gaullist moniker refers to the model of France steering a largely independent course
between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, while nominally
remaining in the Western alliance. It helps explain some Turkish leaders’ desire to have
Turkey maintain its role in Western institutions and have dealings with non-Western
powers like Russia and China without being constrained by any of these actors, as well as
its diversification of international relationships to avoid dependence.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

298 Omer Taspinar, “The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey,” Brookings Institution, March 8, 2011.
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