Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
April 23, 2013
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41368
CRS Report for Congress
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epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
Summary
Several Turkish domestic and foreign policy issues have significant relevance for U.S. interests,
and Congress plays an active role in shaping and overseeing U.S. relations with Turkey. This
report provides background information on Turkey and discusses possible policy options for
Members of Congress and the Obama Administration. U.S. relations with Turkey—a longtime
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally—have evolved over time. Turkey’s economic
dynamism and geopolitical importance—it straddles Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia
and now has the world’s 16th-largest economy—have increased its influence regionally and
globally. Although Turkey still depends on the United States and other NATO allies for political
and strategic support, its growing economic diversification and military self-reliance allows
Turkey to exercise greater leverage with the West. These trends have helped fuel continuing
Turkish political transformation led in the past decade by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has Islamist roots.
Future domestic political developments may determine the extent to which Turkey reconciles
popular views favoring Turkish nationalism and Sunni Muslim values with protection of
individual freedoms, minority rights, rule of law, and the principle of secular governance. Debate
on issues such as the status of Turkey’s ethnic Kurdish population (including the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), the civil-military balance, the
role of religion in public life, and press freedom could coalesce in 2013 around a popular
referendum on a new constitution. This, in turn, could have significant ramifications for
scheduled presidential elections in 2014 and parliamentary elections in 2015.
Congressional interest in Turkey is high with respect to the following issues:
• Working with Turkey in the Middle East to influence political outcomes in Syria,
Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere; counter Iranian influence; and preserve
stability;
• Past deterioration and possible improvement in Turkey-Israel relations and how
that might affect U.S.-Turkey relations; and
• A potential congressional resolution or presidential statement on the possible
genocide of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire (Turkey’s predecessor state)
during World War I.
Many U.S. policymakers also are interested in the rights of minority Christian communities
within Turkey; the currently stalemated prospects of Turkish accession to the European Union
(EU); promoting increased trade with Turkey; and Turkey’s role in the Cyprus dispute. Congress
appropriates approximately $5 million annually in military and security assistance for Turkey.
The EU currently provides over $1 billion to Turkey annually in pre-accession financial and
technical assistance.
Since 2011, U.S.-Turkey cooperation on issues affecting the Middle East has become closer, as
Turkey agreed to host a U.S. radar as part of a NATO missile defense system and the two
countries have coordinated efforts in responding to the ongoing conflict in Syria. Nevertheless,
developments during the Obama Administration on Syria, Israel, and other issues have led to
questions about the extent to which U.S. and Turkish strategic priorities and values converge on
both a short- and long-term basis.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
Contents
Introduction and Issues for Congress ............................................................................................... 1
Country Overview ........................................................................................................................... 4
Domestic Politics ....................................................................................................................... 4
Economy, Trade, and Energy ..................................................................................................... 6
The Kurdish Issue ...................................................................................................................... 9
U.S.-Turkey Relations ................................................................................................................... 11
Overview ................................................................................................................................. 11
Bilateral and NATO Defense Cooperation .............................................................................. 13
Key Foreign Policy Issues of Interest ...................................................................................... 15
Israel .................................................................................................................................. 15
Syria .................................................................................................................................. 18
Iran .................................................................................................................................... 20
Possible U.S. Policy Options ......................................................................................................... 21
Influencing Regional Change and Promoting Stability ........................................................... 22
Arms Sales and Military/Security Assistance .......................................................................... 22
Possible Armenian Genocide ................................................................................................... 23
Bilateral Trade Promotion ....................................................................................................... 24
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 25
Figures
Figure 1. Turkey and Its Neighbors ................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. Major Pipelines Traversing Turkey and Possible Nuclear Power Plants .......................... 9
Figure 3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence and Transport Routes in Turkey ................. 14
Tables
Table 1. Parties in Turkey’s Parliament ........................................................................................... 5
Table 2. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Turkey ................................................................................ 7
Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Turkey ................................................................................... 14
Appendixes
Appendix A. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey ............................................................................ 26
Appendix B. List of Selected Turkish-Related Organizations in the United States ....................... 29
Appendix C. General Background Information ............................................................................. 30
Appendix D. Additional Foreign Policy Issues of U.S. Interest .................................................... 35
Appendix E. Congressional Committee Reports of Armenian Genocide-Related Proposed
Resolutions ................................................................................................................................. 41
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 41
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
Introduction and
Issues for Congress
Turkey in Brief
Population:
75,627,384 (2012 est.)
As global challenges to U.S. interests have
Area:
783,562 sq km (302,535 sq.
changed over time, U.S. relations with
mi., slightly larger than
Turkey—an important ally since the Cold
Texas)
War era—have evolved. Congress
Most Populous Cities:
Istanbul 13.85 mil., Ankara
appropriates relatively small amounts of
4.97 mil., Izmir 4.01 mil.,
military and security assistance for Turkey
Bursa 2.69 mil., Adana 2.13
compared with past sums, but still plays an
mil. (2012 est.)
active role in shaping and overseeing U.S.
Ethnic Groups:
Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 18%;
relations with Turkey. Several Turkish
Other minorities 7%-12%
domestic and foreign policy issues have
(2008 est.)
significant relevance for U.S. interests.
Religion:
Muslim 99.8% (Sunni 75%-
88%, Alevi 12%-25%),
Since the 1980s, Turkey has experienced
Others (mainly Christian and
Jewish) 0.2%
fundamental internal change—particularly
the economic empowerment of a middle
Literacy:
87% (male 95%, female 80%)
class from its Anatolian heartland that
(2004 est.)
emphasizes Sunni Muslim values. This
% of Population 14 or
24.9% (2012 est.)
change has helped fuel continuing political
Younger:
transformation led in the past decade by
GDP Per Capita:
$10,504 ($15,066 at
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
purchasing power parity)
President Abdullah Gul, and Foreign
(2012 est.)
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (all of whom
Real GDP Growth:
2.2% (2012 est.)
are profiled in Appendix A). They all come
Inflation:
7.3% (March 2013 est.)
from the Islamic-leaning Justice and
Development Party (known by its Turkish
Unemployment:
10.1% (December 2012 est.)
acronym, AKP, or Adalet ve Kalkinma
Budget Deficit:
2.0% (2012 est.)
Partisi), which first came to power in
External Debt as % of
elections in 2002. For decades, the Turkish
GDP:
36.8% (2012 est.)
republic relied upon its military, judiciary,
Current Account
and other bastions of its Kemalist (a term
(Trade) Deficit as % of 8.2% (2012 est.)
inspired by Turkey’s republican founder,
GDP:
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) “secular elite” to
Sources: Turkish Statistical Institute; Economist Intelligence
protect it from political and ideological
Unit; Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook.
extremes—sacrificing at least some of its
democratic vitality in the process. Through a series of elections, popular referenda, court
decisions, and other political developments within the existing constitutional order, Turkey has
changed into a more civilian-led system that increasingly reflects the new middle class’s
dedication to market economics and conservative values.
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Figure 1. Turkey and Its Neighbors
Source: CRS Graphics.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
Turkey’s internal transformation has helped to drive increased engagement and influence within
its own region. At the same time, its leaders have tried to maintain Turkey’s traditional alliances
and economic partnerships with Western nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the European Union (EU), routinely asserting that Turkey’s location at the
crossroads of Europe and Asia and its increasing soft power provides it and its allies with
“strategic depth.”1 Thus, the geopolitical importance of Turkey for the United States is now
intertwined with its importance as an ally and symbol—politically, culturally, economically, and
religiously. Turkey’s continued regional influence could depend on its maintaining the robust
economic growth from its past decade that has led to its having the world’s 16th-largest economy.
Gauging how U.S. and Turkish interests coincide has become increasingly complicated and
dynamic. U.S.-Turkey closeness on issues affecting the Middle East has increased since 2011
because
• Turkish leaders perceive a need for U.S. help to encourage regional democratic
transition while countering actors with the potential to undermine internal
Turkish and regional stability—including the Iranian and Syrian regimes and
terrorists from Turkey’s own ethnic Kurdish population; and
• The United States may be more dependent on its alliance with Turkey to forward
U.S. interests in the region because of the recent end of the U.S. military mission
in Iraq and other possible future reductions in its Middle East footprint.
These factors have led to frequent high-level U.S.-Turkey consultation on developments in Syria
and the broader region. In addition, U.S. officials reportedly interpreted Turkey’s agreement in
September 2011 to host a U.S. early warning radar as part of a NATO missile defense system for
Europe2 as a critical sign of Turkey’s interest in continued strategic cooperation with Washington.
During the previous year, some U.S. and European policymakers and analysts had voiced concern
about Turkey’s reliability as a bilateral and NATO ally owing to its active opposition to United
Nations sanctions against Iran for its nuclear program and its deteriorating relationship with
Israel.3
Congressional interest in Turkey is high with respect to the following issues and questions:
• Addressing Regional Change in the Greater Middle East: Will Turkey’s policies
and actions be reconcilable with U.S. interests in countries such as Syria, Iraq,
Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Afghanistan with regard to political and material
support for populations, opposition movements, and transitional governments;
1 See Ahmet Davutoglu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring,” International Policy
and Leadership Institute and Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), Turkey Policy Brief Series,
2012 – Third Edition. See also Gareth Jenkins, “On the edge – The AKP shifts Turkey’s political compass,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, August 2, 2010.
2 The proposed elements of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense proposed by the
Obama Administration and a deployment timeline are described in a September 15, 2011, White House press release
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/15/fact-sheet-implementing-missile-defense-europe.
This document explicitly contemplates the EPAA as a means of countering missile threats from Iran. See also CRS
Report RL34051, Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe, by Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek.
3 This was particularly so in the wake of the May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident, which took place in international waters
under disputed circumstances and resulted in the death of eight Turks and an American of Turkish origin, but signs of
deterioration predated that event.
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existing and potential future sanctions against autocratic regimes; internationally
mandated humanitarian and/or military action that includes or may include the
use of Turkish bases or territory; and limiting Iranian influence?
• Israel and the U.S.-Turkey Relationship: What are prospects for future Turkey-
Israel relations, especially given signs of improvement in early 2013? How might
these relations affect U.S. efforts at regional security coordination? If Turkey-
Israel tensions persist, should they affect congressional views generally on
Turkey’s status as a U.S. ally?
• Armenian Genocide Resolution: What are the arguments for and against a
potential U.S. congressional resolution or presidential statement characterizing
World War I-era deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians through actions
of Ottoman Empire (Turkey’s predecessor state) authorities as genocide? How
would such a resolution or statement affect U.S.-Turkey relations and defense
cooperation?
• Rights of Non-Muslim Minority Religions: What is Congress’s proper role in
promoting the rights of established Christian and Jewish communities within
Turkey?
Many U.S. policymakers also are interested in the currently stalemated prospects of Turkish
accession to the EU; Turkey’s domestic political developments, including its Kurdish issue;
promoting increased trade with Turkey; and Turkey’s role in the decades-long dispute between
ethnic Greek and ethnic Turkish populations regarding the control of Cyprus.
According to the Turkish Coalition of America, a non-governmental organization that promotes
positive Turkish-American relations, as of April 2013, there are 157 Members of Congress in the
Congressional Caucus on Turkey and Turkish Americans.4
Country Overview
For historical background on Turkey and information about the Fethullah Gulen movement5 and
religious minorities, see Appendix C.
Domestic Politics
Domestic Turkish political developments affect the country’s civil-military balance, its debate on
religion in public life, the status of its Kurdish and other ethnic and religious minorities, and
heightened concerns about press and civil society freedoms. Developments on these issues are in
turn likely to help determine and influence who shapes Turkey’s foreign policy and how they
conduct it. Various reports indicate that Prime Minister Erdogan may seek approval in the Turkish
Grand National Assembly (parliament) for a popular referendum sometime in 2013 on a new
4 See http://www.tc-america.org/in-congress/caucus.htm.
5 The Gulen movement is a multifaceted array of individuals and organizations in Turkey and other countries around
the world. These individuals and organizations subscribe to or sympathize with the teachings of a former Turkish state
imam who currently resides in the United States.
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constitution investing greater power in Turkey’s presidency.6 Most observers anticipate that
Erdogan will seek the presidency in Turkey’s first direct presidential elections7—scheduled for
the fall of 2014. Local elections, which are often used to gauge shifts in nationwide public
opinion, are scheduled for March 2014—preceding the presidential elections. Parliamentary
elections are to take place in 2015.
Table 1. Parties in Turkey’s Parliament
(Based on national elections held in June 2011)
June 2011
Members of
Party
Vote
Parliament General
Orientation
Justice and Development Party (AKP)
49.8%
326
Economic liberalism, social
Leader: Recep Tayyip Erdogan
conservatism
Republican People’s Party (CHP)
26.0%
135
Social democracy, secular interests
Leader: Kemal Kilicdaroglu
Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
13.0%
53
Turkish nationalist interests
Leader: Devlet Bahceli
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)
6.6%a
36
Ethnic Kurdish interests, social
Leader: Selahattin Demirtas
democracy
Source: Supreme Electoral Board of Turkey, Parties and Elections in Europe Website
a. This is the percentage vote figure for the 61 BDP members who ran in the election as independents for
individual geographic constituencies, as described in footnote 28.
Domestic and international observers have raised concerns about Erdogan’s and the AKP
government’s level of respect for civil liberties.8 Although infringement upon press freedom is of
routine concern in Turkey, measures taken by authorities in recent years have been widely
criticized as unusually severe and ideologically driven.9 These measures include intimidation and
multiple arrests of journalists,10 Kurdish public figures, and active and former military officers,
6 The AKP needs support from outside the party to obtain the 60% parliamentary supermajority necessary to bring
about a referendum. The constitutional commission comprised of the four parties in Turkey’s parliament has so far
been unable to reach consensus on a draft constitution.
7 Previously, the Turkish parliament elected the president by secret ballot.
8 Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership, Independent Task Force Report No. 69,
2012, p. 23: “In some areas, the AKP-led government has used the same nondemocratic tools as its predecessor,
making it appear no more liberal than previous Turkish governments.” See also the U.S. State Department’s Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010. According to Reporters Without Borders’s 2013 World Press Freedom
Index, Turkey is the 154th “freest” country out of 179 evaluated.
9 In February 5, 2013, remarks transcribed on the website of the U.S. embassy in Ankara from a press conference held
there addressing the February 1 bombing of a U.S. embassy security checkpoint and several other issues of mutual
U.S.-Turkey interest, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone said, “The Prime Minister, the Speaker of
Parliament, the President of Turkey in recent days have spoken to the outcomes from your judicial system that do not
seem right to them. You have members of Parliament who have been behind bars for a long time, sometimes on unclear
charges. You have your military leaders, who were entrusted with the protection of this country, behind bars as if they
were terrorists. You have professors. You have the former head of YOK [Turkey’s Council of Higher Education] who
is behind bars on unclear charges evidently relating to him upholding the law when he was a government official
sixteen years ago. You have non-violent student protesters protesting tuition hikes behind bars. When a legal system
produces such results and confuses people like that for terrorists, it makes it hard for American and European courts to
match up. We are working to reconcile our legal processes in both countries.”
10 “Not So Free,” Economist, April 6-12, 2013, stating, “Turkey is now the world’s leading jailer of journalists.
Estimates vary, but at least 49 are behind bars.”
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often under a law on terrorism that many human rights organizations and international observers
criticize for being vague and overly broad.
Current concerns about media and political association freedoms are in large part connected with
two national issues: tensions involving Turkey’s Kurdish population, and criminal investigations
into the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (or Balyoz) cases. Ergenekon and Sledgehammer concern
alleged plots to undermine or overthrow the AKP government in the early 2000s.11 In September
2012, a civilian trial court convicted more than 300 active and former military officers in the
Sledgehammer verdicts. Appeals to higher Turkish courts are ongoing, and could possibly reach
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).12 Many in the media claim that even if some of
the anti-government plots were real, authorities with pro-AKP leanings or sympathies for the
Fethullah Gulen movement13 have used the allegations to silence or weaken political and
ideological opponents. Concerns about AKP overreach likely reflect anxieties among some Turks.
They apparently feel unsure to what extent effective checks and balances exist on Erdogan’s
charismatic and Islamic-friendly single-party rule given the weakening of the military and other
guardians of the Kemalist order. Some observers express concern that Erdogan’s proposed
constitutional changes would effectively abolish separation of powers.
Economy, Trade, and Energy14
The AKP’s political successes have been aided considerably by robust Turkish economic growth
that was set back only briefly as a result of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis. Gross domestic
product more than tripled from the time of the AKP’s first electoral victory in 2002 to 2010.
Growth rates, fueled by diversified Turkish conglomerates such as Sabanci and Koc as well as
“Anatolian tigers” (small- to medium-sized, export-oriented businesses concentrated in central
and southern Turkey), have been comparable in the past decade to those of China, India, and
other major developing economies. The dependence of Turkey’s economy on foreign investment
and exports has led to challenges stemming from the economic slowdown in the European
Union—Turkey’s main trading partner. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, growth
slowed from 8.8% in 2011 to 2.2% in 2012. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit,
however, growth is expected to be 3.5% in 2013 and around 5% for the subsequent four years—
partly owing to a “moderate improvement in global financial and economic conditions”, and
11 The existence and validity of evidence for these purported plots is vigorously disputed in domestic and international
circles. Gareth Jenkins, “Ergenekon, Sledgehammer, and the Politics of Turkish Justice: Conspiracies and
Coincidences,” MERIA Journal, vol. 15, no. 2, June 2011; Sedat Ergin, “The Balyoz case is actually starting now,”
hurriyetdailynews.com, September 28, 2012; Yildiray Ogur, “Listen, Balyoz is speaking,” todayszaman.org, September
24, 2012.
12 As a member of the Council of Europe since 1949, Turkey is subject to the ECHR’s jurisdiction.
13 For a description of the Gulen movement, see Appendix C. Many of the movement’s members and sympathizers are
among the most vocal supporters of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer prosecutions, probably at least partly owing to
concerns about societal power dynamics and Gulenist perceptions of vulnerability, justice, and/or retribution involving
the military and other guardians of Turkey’s secular elite. These concerns probably largely stem from the past
prosecution of Fethullah Gulen, the movement’s spiritual leader, under military-guided governments. A series of events
since 2012, public comments by Erdogan regarding the need for closure on the court cases involving the military, and
the reshuffling of prosecutorial and other civil service portfolios reportedly involving Gulen movement members or
sympathizers, possibly signify a rift between the movement and the AKP that could have future political repercussions.
See, e.g., M. Kemal Kaya and Svante E. Cornell, “The Big Split: The Differences That Led Erdogan and the Gulen
Movement to Part Ways,” Turkey Analyst, vol. 5, no. 5, March 5, 2012.
14 Michael Ratner, Specialist in Energy Policy, contributed to the portions of this section concerning energy issues.
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partly owing to increased Turkish consumer demand aided by “cautious monetary loosening”
from Turkey’s central bank.15
Structural economic goals for Turkey include incentivizing greater research and development to
encourage Turkish technological innovation and global competitiveness, harmonizing the
educational system with future workforce needs, and increasing and diversifying energy supplies
to meet ever-growing consumption demands. Through monetary and fiscal policy and various
regulatory practices, Turkish policymakers may seek to attract more equity and foreign direct
investment inflows and fewer short-term loans and portfolio inflows. The former generally are
accompanied by skill and technology transfers, while the latter are more prone to sudden
reversal.16
The European Union is Turkey’s main trading partner by far, while the United States is Turkey’s
fourth-largest trading partner (behind the EU, Russia, and China). Turkey is the United States’s
35th-largest trading partner.17 Though Turkish pursuit of new markets since 1991 has reduced
trade with the EU (from nearly 50% to just over 40%) and with the United States (from over 9%
to around 5%) as a percentage of Turkey’s total trade, overall trade volume with both is generally
trending upward.
Table 2. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Turkey
($ in millions)
2007 2008 2009 2010
2011 2012
Exports
6,500 9,960 7,090 10,550 14,660 12,580
Imports
4,600 4,640 3,660 4,200 5,220 6,230
Total
Volume 11,100 14,600 10,750 14,750 19,880 18,810
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau.
Despite concerns by U.S. senior business executives regarding Turkey’s legal and regulatory
system and other issues according to a 2011 survey, 65% of these businesspeople would be
willing to invest further in Turkey. Additionally, 88% advocate more U.S. government
engagement with Turkey’s government to “improve the investment, market access, and operating
climate for US companies in Turkey.”18
Turkey’s importance as a regional energy transport hub elevates its increasing relevance for world
energy markets while also providing Turkey with opportunities to satisfy its own growing
domestic energy needs.19 Turkey’s location has made it a key country in the U.S. and European
effort to establish a southern corridor for natural gas transit from diverse sources.20 However, as
15 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Turkey, generated April 19, 2013.
16 See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Surveys: Turkey, July 2012.
17 Statistics on Turkey’s status relative to other U.S. trading partners compiled by U.S. International Trade
Commission, available at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/SCRIPTS/cy_m3_run.asp.
18 American Business Forum in Turkey, Business and Investment Climate in Turkey 2011, October 2011.
19 Transatlantic Academy, Getting to Zero: Turkey, Its Neighbors, and the West, June 2010, citing Turkish government
statistics.
20 The U.S. energy strategy in Europe is designed to work together with European nations and the European Union to
seek ways to diversify Europe’s energy supplies. The focus of U.S. efforts has been on establishing a southern corridor
(continued...)
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one analyst writes, “Turkey’s ability to effectively play the energy card to further its foreign
policy goals is limited by the extent to which the Turkish economy itself is dependent on energy
imports, particularly oil and natural gas from Russia and Iran.”21 Since 1991, trade with Russia as
a percentage of Turkey’s total trade has more than doubled—from 5% to over 11%—largely due
to energy imports. Additionally, a subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia’s state-run nuclear company)
has entered into an agreement to build and operate what would be Turkey’s first nuclear power
plant22 in Akkuyu near the Mediterranean port of Mersin, with construction projected to begin in
2016. Iran is also a major source of Turkish energy (see “Iran” below). However, in late 2011,
Turkey and Azerbaijan reached deals for the transit of natural gas to and through Turkey23 via a
proposed Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), with gas projected to begin to flow by 2018. The
deals have attracted attention as a potentially significant precedent for transporting non-Russian,
non-Iranian energy to Europe. Nevertheless, Turkey also agreed in late 2011 to permit Russia’s
South Stream pipeline to traverse its Black Sea territorial waters to Bulgaria (from which point
the pipeline is proposed to extend through the northern Balkans to Italy), reportedly in exchange
for discounts to Turkey on purchases of Russian natural gas.
(...continued)
route for Caspian and Middle Eastern natural gas supplies to be shipped to Europe, generally through pipelines
traversing Turkey. See, e.g., Tolga Demiryol, “Turkey’s energy security and foreign policy,” Turkish Review,
January/February 2012; Transatlantic Academy, op. cit.
21 Demiryol, op. cit.
22 In June 2008, the United States and Turkey signed a 15-year “123 Agreement” for peaceful nuclear cooperation in
line with international nuclear non-proliferation norms. Turkey is also a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and has a safeguards agreement and additional protocol in place with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). It is an observer to—not a full participant in—the International Framework for Nuclear Energy
Cooperation (IFNEC, formerly known as the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) founded by the United States, Russia,
China, France, and Japan in 2007. IFNEC promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy by helping establish
reprocessing centers for nuclear fuel. Turkey is one of the regional countries that analysts routinely mention could
decide to pursue its own nuclear weapons program in the event that one or more countries in the region, such as Iran,
achieves or declares a nuclear weapons capability. Israel is generally believed by most analysts to have had a nuclear
arsenal since the late 1960s, but it maintains a policy of “nuclear opacity” wherein its nuclear weapons status remains
officially undeclared. For discussion of Turkey and nuclear weapons, see CRS Report R41761, Turkey-U.S. Defense
Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges, by Jim Zanotti.
23 The terms of Turkish-Azerbaijani agreement specified that 565 billion-700 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas
would transit Turkey, of which 210 bcf would be available for Turkey’s domestic use.
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Figure 2. Major Pipelines Traversing Turkey and Possible Nuclear Power Plants
Source: Turkish Economic Ministry, adapted by CRS.
Note: All locations are approximate.
Among other countries, China’s share of Turkish trade is also increasing, with volume reportedly
rising from $1 billion per year in 2000 to about $24 billion per year by 2011.24 Additionally,
Turkey has actively pursued economic opportunities with many Arab countries in recent years
through free trade and no-visa agreements. Continued political upheaval in the region could
contribute to future challenges to Turkish economic growth and foreign investment.
The Kurdish Issue
Ethnic Kurds constitute 15 to 20 percent of Turkey’s population. They are largely concentrated in
urban areas and the relatively impoverished southeastern region of the country, but pockets exist
throughout the country. Kurdish reluctance to recognize Turkish state authority—a dynamic that
also exists between Kurds and national governments in Iraq, Iran, and Syria—and harsh Turkish
measures to quell Kurdish identity- and rights-based claims and demands have fed tensions that
have periodically worsened since the foundation of the republic in 1923. Since 1984, the Turkish
military has waged an on-and-off struggle to put down a separatist insurgency and urban
terrorism campaign by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, or Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan,
whose founder, Abdullah Ocalan, is profiled in Appendix A).25 The initially secessionist demands
of the PKK have since evolved to a less ambitious goal of greater cultural and political autonomy.
24 Gokhan Bacik, “Envisioning the Asia-Pacific Century: Turkey between the United States and China,” On Turkey,
German Marshall Fund of the United States, December 8, 2011.
25 In footnote 2 of a September 2011 report, the International Crisis Group stated that Turkish government figures
estimate that 11,700 Turks have been killed since fighting began in the early 1980s. This figure includes Turkish
security personnel of various types and Turkish civilians (including Turkish Kurds who are judged not to have been
PKK combatants). The same report states that Turkish estimates of PKK dead during the same time period run from
30,000 to 40,000. International Crisis Group, Turkey: Ending the PKK Insurgency, Europe Report No. 213, September
20, 2011.
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The struggle between Turkish authorities and the PKK was most intense during the 1990s, but
resumed in 2003 after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, following an intervening lull. According to
the U.S. government, the PKK partially finances its activities through criminal activities,
including its operation of a Europe-wide drug trafficking network.26 The PKK has used safe
havens in northern Iraq to coordinate and launch attacks at various points since the end of the
1991 Gulf War. Amid internal conflict in Syria since 2011, the PKK’s Syrian sister organization,
the Democratic Union of Syria (PYD), has gained a measure of control over a swath of Kurdish-
populated territory near Syria’s border with Turkey. This raises questions for Turkey about the
possibility of another base of support for PKK training, leadership, and operations.27
Turkey’s AKP government has acknowledged
PKK Designations by U.S. Government
that the integration of Kurds into Turkish
Designation
Year
society will require political, cultural, and
economic development approaches in addition
Foreign Terrorist
1997
to the more traditional security-based approach.
Organization
The Turkish military’s approach to neutralizing
Specially Designated
2001
the PKK has been routinely criticized by
Global Terrorist
Western governments and human rights
Significant Foreign
2008
organizations for being overly hard on ethnic
Narcotics Trafficker
Kurds—thousands have been imprisoned for
PKK involvement or sympathies and hundreds
of thousands have been displaced.
The AKP has a sizeable constituency in rural Kurdish areas because of its appeal to traditional
values. By appealing to common Islamic identity, Erdogan and other government ministers have
moved away from the state’s past unwillingness to acknowledge the multiethnic nature of
Turkey’s citizenry. The government has adopted some measures allowing greater use of Kurdish
languages in education, election campaigns, and the media.28 Nevertheless, government
statements or efforts until late 2012 that were aimed at giving greater rights to Kurds and greater
normalized status to Kurdish nationalist leaders and former militants were politically undermined
by upswings in violence and public manifestations of nationalist pride among ethnic Turks and
26 U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, “Five PKK Leaders Designated Narcotics Traffickers,” April 20, 2011.
27 However, northern Syria’s more open terrain and comparably small and dispersed Kurdish population may make it a
less plausible base of operations than Iraq. Some observers have speculated that the Asad regime and Iran entered into
an informal partnership of convenience with the PKK in retaliation for Turkey’s support for the Syrian opposition.
Heiko Wimmen and Müzehher Selcuk, “The Rise of Syria’s Kurds,” Carnegie Endowment of International Peace,
February 5, 2013. Syria hosted the PKK’s leadership until 1998, and historical and personal links persist among Syrian
Kurds and the PKK.
Media reports in early 2013, however, indicate that the PYD is cooperating with various Syrian opposition groups in de
facto arrangements regarding control over the country’s northern areas, perhaps partly because of a calculation that the
Asad regime has little or no remaining control there. See, e.g., Matthieu Aikins, “The Kurdish Factor,”
latitude.blogs.nytimes.com, April 1, 2013.
28 Kurdish nationalist leaders demand that any future changes to Turkey’s 1982 constitution not suppress Kurdish
ethnic and linguistic identity. The first clause of Article 3 of the constitution reads, “The Turkish state, with its territory
and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” Because the constitution states that its first three articles
are unamendable, even proposing a change could face judicial obstacles. Kurds in Turkey also seek to modify the
electoral law to allow for greater Kurdish nationalist participation in Turkish politics by lowering the percentage-vote
threshold (currently 10%) for political parties in parliament. In the 2011 election, 61 members of the Kurdish
nationalist Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) ran as independents for individual geographic constituencies because of
a calculation that the party would not reach the 10% threshold. These independents won 36 of the constituencies and
6% of the national vote.
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ethnic Kurds. Many observers discerned a trend leading Turkish authorities and the PKK toward a
period of indefinite violent conflict, for various reasons. These included (1) continuing upticks in
violence; (2) waves of arrests of Kurdish public figures; (3) ongoing political stalemate on
measures to provide Kurds with greater rights and local autonomy; (4) and political timelines
potentially favoring a nationalistic, security-centric response by Turkish leaders.29
Despite these negative signs, Prime Minister Erdogan publicly revealed in late December 2012
that Turkish intelligence has been conducting negotiations with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah
Ocalan in an attempt to get the PKK to disarm. In late March 2013, Ocalan and other PKK
leaders declared a cease-fire, although its durability may depend on the government’s ability to
persuade the PKK and other Kurds that it sincerely seeks to address the issues of key importance
to them. Some commentators theorize that Erdogan has authorized the talks to bolster prospects
for his election to the Turkish presidency and for a yes-vote in the constitutional referendum that
may precede it (see “Domestic Politics” above). Other theories suggest that Erdogan may be
trying to defuse potential PKK threats from Syria, or to take advantage of intra-Kurdish divisions
and Ocalan’s personal desire for freedom.
Observers express a range of opinions regarding the advisability and prospects of negotiations, as
well as the extent to which Ocalan and the PKK represent Turkey’s Kurds. Yet, most observers
agree that Erdogan’s public acknowledgment of the talks was a bold step that could mobilize
broad public support for a deal, but also could greatly exacerbate the conflict if negotiations fail.30
In a February 2013 interview with a Turkish journalist, President Obama was quoted as saying, “I
applaud Prime Minister Erdogan’s efforts to seek a peaceful resolution to a struggle that has
caused so much pain and sorrow for the people of Turkey for more than 30 years.”31
U.S.-Turkey Relations
Overview
The United States and Turkey have enjoyed a decades-long alliance. The calculations that led the
United States to invest heavily in Turkey’s defense and its military and economic development
during the Cold War have evolved as the dynamics within both countries and the regional and
global environments have changed. Another change has been Turkey’s decreased dependence on
U.S. material support and its increased assertiveness as a foreign policy actor.
At the outset of the Obama Administration, U.S. officials made clear their intent to emphasize the
importance of a multifaceted strategic relationship with Turkey. In April 2009, President Obama,
speaking of a “model partnership,” visited Turkey during his first presidential trip abroad and
addressed the Parliament in Ankara. He said that “Turkey is a critical ally…. And Turkey and the
United States must stand together—and work together—to overcome the challenges of our time.”
29 The International Crisis Group stated that the time period from the summer of 2011 until mid-August 2012 featured
the worst fighting between the PKK and Turkish authorities since 1999, reporting that 711 people had been killed in
that time—“222 soldiers, police and village guard militia, 405 PKK fighters and 84 civilians”. International Crisis
Group, Turkey: The PKK and a Kurdish Settlement, Europe Report No. 219, September 11, 2012.
30 See, e.g., “The war may be over,” Economist, March 30-April 3, 2013.
31 Interview of President Barack Obama by Pinar Ersoy of Milliyet, quoted in “Obama ‘applauds’ Turkey’s effort to
find peaceful solution to Kurdish problem,” hurriyetdailynews.com, February 10, 2013.
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However, subsequent Turkish and U.S. actions and statements on issues relating to Armenia, Iran,
and Israel revealed possible tensions between the United States and Turkey on values and
priorities. A vote in March 2010 by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to report a proposed
resolution (H.Res. 252) for consideration by the full House on the question of a possible
Armenian genocide led Turkey to temporarily recall its ambassador. A number of events that
followed—especially the Gaza flotilla incident and a U.N. Security Council sanctions vote on
Iran—led some Members of Congress and Administration officials to openly question Turkey’s
orientation as a U.S. and Western ally.32 They expressed concerns that Turkish leaders’ rhetoric
and actions were (1) undermining a top U.S. priority in the Iranian nuclear issue and (2) at odds
with the U.S. characterization of Israel as an ally and Iran as a threat.
Turkey’s agreement in 2011 to host the U.S./NATO missile defense radar appears to have
significantly allayed bilateral tensions stemming from earlier foreign policy disputes. The United
States and Turkey also began cooperating closely in the Middle East—particularly in Syria—to
promote democratic transition and prevent Iran and other actors from exacerbating regional
sectarian tensions and security dilemmas. U.S. and Turkish approaches and apparent senses of
urgency have diverged at times, perhaps partly due to Turkey’s greater geographic proximity to
conflict areas and seemingly greater willingness to work with other actors espousing an overtly
Sunni Muslim perspective. Additionally, according to a 2012 Council on Foreign Relations task
force report chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former National
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley (the “Albright-Hadley report”), “public opinion polls in Turkey
consistently reveal unfavorable impressions of the United States among the Turkish public.…
This is a problem that can damage the bilateral relations, especially now that public opinion
matters more than ever before in Turkish foreign policy.”33 Such unfavorable impressions, to the
extent they exist, do so within a context of Turks’ generally low favorability ratings for foreign
countries.
Many U.S. observers have criticized Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu for
perceived double standards. Erdogan has adamantly denounced Israel’s treatment of Palestinians,
especially in the Gaza Strip—sometimes referring to it as “state terrorism”—and has suggested
that international sanctions against Israel could help end the stalemate in the Arab-Israeli peace
process. Yet, he has met with Hamas leaders in Turkey and has dubbed its members “resistance
fighters” instead of terrorists. He was one of the first world leaders to congratulate Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his disputed reelection in June 2009. Erdogan also has said
in defending Sudanese President Omar al Bashir regarding allegations from Darfur and elsewhere
that it is “not possible for those who belong to the Muslim faith to carry out genocide.” Even as
regional upheaval since late 2010 has led Turkey to coordinate more closely with its U.S. and
other NATO allies, Erdogan has periodically questioned their positions and/or motivations.34
Erdogan publicly supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while routinely
criticizing the U.S.-led approach to the peace process in the international media.
32 “US official: Turkey must demonstrate commitment to West,” Today’s Zaman, June 28, 2010.
33 Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 7.
34 For example, during a September 2011 trip to Libya, Erdogan criticized what he perceived to be Britain’s and
France’s overly commercial interests in the country—despite Turkey’s own well-documented commercial interests in
Libya and participation in and support for the 2011 NATO operation there.
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Bilateral and NATO Defense Cooperation35
The U.S.-Turkey alliance has long centered on the defense relationship, both bilaterally and
within NATO. With several challenges to U.S. national security emanating from the greater
Middle East, Turkey is arguably a more significant ally for the United States at present than
during the Cold War. Turkey’s location near several global hotspots makes the continuing
availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable
for the United States and NATO. Turkey’s hosting of a U.S./NATO early warning missile defense
radar and the transformation of a NATO air command unit in Izmir into a ground forces command
appear to have reinforced Turkey’s strategic importance for the alliance. For information on
NATO’s role in supporting Turkey’s defense in light of ongoing conflict in Syria, see “Syria”
below.
Although the Turkish military remains a trusted national institution, its decline in influence in the
last decade has led many observers to conclude that the military’s traditional role as the primary
interlocutor for the United States and other NATO allies is in jeopardy, if not already obsolete.
Changes in the Turkish civil-military power structure present a challenge for U.S. officials in
adjusting future modes of bilateral interaction. It might lead to an approach that is more
multidimensional than the well-established pattern some observers see in which the State
Department and other U.S. officials rely on the “Pentagon to wield its influence.”36
The largest U.S. military presence in Turkey is at Incirlik (pronounced in-jur-lick) air base near
the southern city of Adana, with approximately 1,500 U.S. personnel (plus approximately 3,500
Turkish contractors). Since the end of the Cold War, Incirlik has been used to support U.S. and
NATO operations in Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. According to The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Incirlik also is the reported home of vaults holding
approximately 60-70 U.S. tactical, aircraft-deliverable B61 nuclear gravity bombs under NATO
auspices.37 Turkey maintains the right to cancel U.S. access to Incirlik with three days’ notice.
35 For detailed information on this subject, see CRS Report R41761, Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and
Challenges, by Jim Zanotti.
36 Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey’s New Global Role,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 17, 2010.
The challenge for U.S. officials to manage cooperation with Turkey could be magnified by the way the U.S.
government is structured to work with Turkey. Former U.S. ambassador to Turkey Mark Parris has said, “For reasons
of self-definition and Cold War logic, Turkey is considered a European nation. It is therefore assigned, for purposes of
policy development and implementation, to the subdivisions responsible for Europe: the European Bureau (EUR) at the
State Department; the European Command (EUCOM) at the Pentagon; the Directorate for Europe at the [National
Security Council (NSC)], etc. Since the end of the Cold War, however, and progressively since the 1990-91 Gulf War
and 9/11, the most serious issues in U.S.-Turkish relations – and virtually all of the controversial ones – have arisen in
areas outside “Europe.” The majority, in fact, stem from developments in areas which in Washington are the
responsibility of offices dealing with the Middle East: the Bureau for Near East Affairs (NEA) at State; Central
Command (CENTCOM) at the Pentagon; the Near East and South Asia Directorate at NSC.” Omer Taspinar, “The
Rise of Turkish Gaullism: Getting Turkish-American Relations Right,” Insight Turkey, vol. 13, no. 1, winter 2011,
quoting an unpublished 2008 paper by Mark Parris.
37 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011,” The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, vol. 67, no. 1, January/February 2011. Reportedly, the U.S. has approximately 150-200 B61 bombs in
Turkey, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands left over from their deployment during the Cold War. This
amount is a very small fraction of the over 7,000 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe during the 1970s.
Ibid.
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Figure 3. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence and Transport Routes in Turkey
Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, Hurriyet Daily News; adapted by CRS.
Notes: All locations are approximate. According to CRS email correspondence with a NATO commander on
April 5, 2013, remaining elements of the former Allied Air Component Command in Izmir—now subject to Air
Command based in Germany—are scheduled to be completely deactivated in May 2013. The Incirlik and Kurecik
bases are Turkish bases, parts of which are used for limited purposes by the U.S. military and NATO. Additional
information on the U.S./NATO military presence in Turkey is available in archived CRS Report R41761, Turkey-
U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges, by Jim Zanotti.
Since 1948, the United States has provided Turkey with approximately $13.8 billion in overall
military assistance (nearly $8.2 billion in grants and $5.6 billion in loans). Current annual military
and security grant assistance, however, is limited to approximately $5 million annually in
International Military Education and Training (IMET); International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs
(NADR) funds.
Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Turkey
($ in millions)
FY2013
Account FY2010
FY2011
FY2012
Requesta
International Military Education and Training
5.0 4.0 4.0
3.6
(IMET)
International Narcotics Control and Law
— 0.5
0.5
—
Enforcement (INCLE)
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and
3.0 1.4 1.1
0.9
Related Programs (NADR)
Total 8.0
5.9
5.6
4.7
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Source: U.S. Department of State.
Note: All amounts are approximate.
a. Actual amounts of U.S. assistance to Turkey for FY2013 cannot be provided with precision. Any FY2013
assistance is subject to continuing resolution authority and budget sequestration as set forth in the fol owing
legal authorities (and regulations and guidelines promulgated thereunder): The Budget Control Act of 2011
(P.L. 112-25), as amended by the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240/H.R. 8); and the
Department of Defense, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6/H.R. 933).
Key Foreign Policy Issues of Interest
For information and analysis of foreign policy issues other than the ones below (including
Turkey’s regional stance, Iraq, Cyprus, Armenia, Afghanistan, European Union, and others), see
Appendix D.
Israel
In the 1990s and early 2000s, Turkey and Israel enjoyed close military ties that fostered
cooperation in other areas, including a free trade agreement signed in 2000. In recent years,
however, Turkey-Israel relations have worsened. This downturn can be attributed to a number of
factors, ranging from Turkish domestic political changes to specific incidents that increased
tensions. In terms of change within Turkey, the slide in Turkey-Israel relations reflected the
military’s declining role in Turkish society, and the greater empowerment of Prime Minister
Erdogan and other AKP and national leaders. These leaders seem to view criticism of Israel as
both merited and popular domestically and regionally. They often characterize Israeli security
measures in the West Bank and especially the Gaza Strip as institutionalized mistreatment of
Palestinians. Turkish leaders also have argued that Israel relies too heavily on military capabilities
and deterrence (including its undeclared but universally acknowledged nuclear weapons arsenal)
in addressing regional problems.
One of the key events that marked the decline in relations was the May 2010 Gaza flotilla
incident (mentioned above). Partly to register dissatisfaction with the September 2011 report
issued by a U.N. Secretary-General panel of inquiry on the flotilla incident,38 Turkey downgraded
diplomatic relations with Israel to the second secretary level.39 Turkey’s demand for an apology
from Israel in connection with the incident was met in March 2013, in a U.S.-facilitated exchange
(discussed further below) that was intended to repair the Turkey-Israel rift. Before this, Erdogan
prominently registered his disapproval of Israel’s military operations in Gaza in December 2008-
38 The report is available at http://go.ynet.co.il/pic/news/Palmer-Committee-Final-report.pdf. The panel was chaired by
former New Zealand Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey Palmer, and included former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and
one participant each from Turkey and Israel. The report expressly provided that its findings were not intended to decide
legal questions. Upon the report’s leak, Turkish officials disputed the report’s finding that Israel’s naval blockade of the
Gaza Strip was legal, notwithstanding the report’s criticism of Israel’s handling of the incident itself.
39 Turkey similarly downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel in 1980 following Israel’s enactment of a law on the
status of Jerusalem that was deemed a violation of international law by U.N. Security Council Resolution 478.
Resolution 478 passed on August 20, 1980 by a vote of 14-0, with the United States as the lone abstention. Turkey
reinstated Israel’s ambassador in 1992 following the 1991 Madrid Conference that signaled the beginning of the Middle
East peace process. Linda Gradstein, “No end in sight for downward spiral in Turkish-Israeli ties,” JTA, September 6,
2011.
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January 2009, reportedly angry that then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert did not inform him
of Israel’s military plans during Olmert’s visit to Ankara shortly before the conflict.
Turkey’s deteriorated relationship with Israel has presented problems for the United States
because of the U.S. desire to coordinate its regional policies with two of its closest allies. U.S.
officials seem to have concerns about the repercussions Turkey-Israel tensions could have for
regional order and the alignment of U.S. and Turkish interests. This risk could be especially high
if Turkey-Israel disagreements on Palestinian issues result in future high-profile incidents.
Though Turkey publicly supports a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, it backs Palestinian pursuit of United Nations membership and Fatah-Hamas
reconciliation as well. In January 2012, Erdogan introduced Hamas’s prime minister in Gaza,
Ismail Haniyeh, as the “elected prime minister of Palestine” at a session of Turkey’s parliament.
Some Members of Congress have shown concern over problematic Turkey-Israel relations.
Following the flotilla incident, the Senate passed S.Res. 548 by voice vote on June 24, 2010. The
resolution condemned the attack by the “extremists aboard the Mavi Marmara,” invoked Israel’s
right to self-defense, and encouraged “the Government of Turkey to recognize the importance of
continued strong relations with Israel and the necessity of closely scrutinizing organizations with
potential ties to terrorist groups” (a reference to the Turkish Islamist non-governmental
organization IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, the main organizer of the flotilla).40 In early
2011, a New York Times Magazine article quoted a Turkish diplomat responsible for U.S. relations
as saying, “We’re getting a lot of flak from the Hill. We used to get hit by the Greek lobby and the
Armenian lobby, but we were protected by the Jewish lobby. Now the Jewish lobby is coming
after us as well.”41 A U.S.-based analyst who focuses specifically on Israel and Turkey
commented in March 2013 that “with the establishment of an Israel-Hellenic caucus in Congress
and arms deals with Turkey either being held up or not being introduced into committee at all,
there is no doubt in my mind that Turkey’s feud with Israel is adversely impacting its interests in
the U.S.”42
Such adverse effects could potentially be softened following recent developments that might be
early signals of rapprochement between Turkey and Israel. During President Obama’s trip to
Israel in March 2013, he and Secretary of State John Kerry facilitated a telephone conversation
between Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu apologized to
Erdogan for any operational mistakes by Israel during the flotilla incident “that might have led to
the loss of life or injury” and pledged to conclude an agreement on “compensation/nonliability.”43
The apology, on top of other signs that Turkey-Israel relations were slightly improving,44 has led
40 In the House, Representative Dina Titus sponsored H.Res. 1532, which was not passed but garnered 23 co-sponsors.
H.Res. 1532 would have called upon the Secretary of State to investigate the “role of any foreign governments,
including the Republic of Turkey, which may have aided and abetted the organizers of the recent Gaza Flotilla mission
to breach Israeli coastal security and assault the naval defense forces of the State of Israel.”
41 James Traub, “Turkey’s Rules,” New York Times Magazine, January 20, 2011.
42 Michael Koplow, “O&Z Goes to Turkey,” ottomansandzionists.com, March 4, 2013.
43 Summary of conversation between Netanyahu and Erdogan from Israeli Prime Minister’s Office website, March 22,
2013.
44 In December 2012, reports cited a Turkish official as saying that Turkey had withdrawn previous objections to
Israel’s non-military participation in NATO activities. Gulsen Solaker and Jonathon Burch, “Turkey lifts objection to
NATO cooperation with Israel,” Reuters, December 24, 2012. Israel is part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, along
with Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia. In addition, trade between the two countries has
remained on an upward trajectory since the flotilla incident, and by February 2013, Israel had reportedly unblocked the
delivery of electronic support measures systems—pursuant to a pre-existing contract—for early warning aircraft that
(continued...)
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to widespread speculation regarding how much and how fast the two countries’ former closeness
on military, intelligence, and political matters might be restored.45 Potential sticking points
remain, including ongoing Israeli restrictions and limitations on the passage of people and goods
to and from Gaza’s sea coast and its land borders with Israel.46
Media reports focus on new prospects for Turkey-Israel coordination with respect to Syria and
possible Turkish consumption and transport of natural gas from Israel’s new offshore discoveries
in the Eastern Mediterranean, while voicing caution that a return to 1990s-era closeness is
unlikely.47 Some reports also foresee a more visible Turkish mediating role between Israelis and
Palestinians.48 Erdogan reportedly consulted with Fatah and Hamas (the two main Palestinian
factions) before agreeing to the U.S.-arranged phone call with Netanyahu, and reportedly plans to
visit Gaza in late May 2013 over U.S. objections.
U.S. leaders may have felt compelled to broker some sort of improvement in Turkey-Israel
relations following remarks Erdogan made in late February 2013 at the United Nations Alliance
of Civilizations in Vienna, Austria that appeared to equate Zionism with fascism.49 That
comparison drew heavy criticism from Israel, the White House, Secretary Kerry, and some
Members of Congress. In a March 12 letter to Erdogan, 89 Members of Congress (including 23
Senators) called on him to retract what they termed his “appalling comment” about Zionism in
Vienna, while also stating that they know that Turkey’s government “shares a commitment to
meaningful international involvement to advance security and peace”, and expressing hope for
the restoration of good relations between Turkey and Israel.50 It is unclear whether Netanyahu’s
apology to Erdogan in the immediate aftermath of Erdogan’s controversial comments might lead
Turkish leaders to calculate that future provocative remarks could elicit additional concessions
from Israel or the United States.
(...continued)
Turkey is purchasing from U.S.-based Boeing. Burak Bekdil, “Israel abandons block on sales to Turkish AWACS,”
Hurriyet Daily News, February 22, 2013.
45 See, e.g., Oded Eran, “Israel-Turkey Reconciliation Still Remote,” nationalinterest.org, April 18, 2013; Uzi
Mahnaimi, “Israel to corral Iran with Turkish airbase,” Sunday Times (UK), April 21, 2013.
46 State Department transcript of remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu, Ciragan Palace, Istanbul, Turkey, April 7, 2013.
47 See, e.g., “A useful first step,” Economist, March 30-April 5, 2013.
48 See, e.g., Semih Idiz, “Israeli Apology May Restore Turkey’s Regional Influence,” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, March
26, 2013.
49 According to media sources, the following represents an accurate English translation of Erdogan’s remarks, which
were delivered as part of an address that primarily concerned Western countries’ treatment of Muslim communities and
diasporas: “We should be striving to better understand the beliefs of others but instead we see that people act based on
prejudice and exclude others and despise them. And that is why it is necessary that we must consider—just like
Zionism or anti-Semitism or fascism—Islamophobia as a crime against humanity.” Video and partial transcript of
remarks and translation available at http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/video-of-turkish-premier-comparing-
zionism-to-anti-semitism-and-fascism/?smid=tw-thelede&seid=auto.
50 Text of letter available at http://israel.house.gov/images/PDF/erdoganletteronzionismcomment.pdf. In a March 19
interview with a prominent Danish news source, although Erdogan did not explicitly retract his Vienna remarks, he was
quoted as saying that his criticisms “are directed at Israeli policies” and that “My several statements openly
condemning anti-semitism clearly display my position on this issue.” “Exclusive Erdogan-interview: ‘We see a human
tragedy before our eyes,’” Politiken (Denmark), March 19, 2013.
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Syria51
Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu initially tried to use their then-good
relations with Bashar al Asad to help broker a peaceful end to the budding Syrian insurgency in
2011. When that failed to moderate Asad’s approach to the opposition, they changed tack and
adopted a strong stance against the Syrian regime. According to one Turkish journalist:
In the summer of 2011, Turkey decided to bring down the Baath regime in Damascus and
sought ways to implement its decision as much as its capacity allowed. Turkey did
everything it could with the exception of direct military intervention in Syria. It is not a
secret that Turkey sponsored the initial organization and coordination of the Syrian
opposition, opened its territory to the use of the opposition military forces and provided
logistical support to them.52
Turkey has coordinated its efforts closely with other countries—including the United States, other
NATO allies, and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar—that also provide political,
financial, and/or material support to the opposition. The United States and other key Western
countries have reportedly refused or been more reluctant than Turkey and other Sunni-majority
countries to provide advanced weaponry such as anti-aircraft missiles to the rebels because of
concerns about potentially empowering extremist elements and worsening regional sectarianism.
Some reports assert that Turkey’s intelligence service has been supporting the Free Syrian Army
and—like some Arab states’ intelligence services—is cultivating ties with other Sunni Islamist
militias.53
Tensions between Turkey and Arab Gulf states on one side, and Iran on the other, have reportedly
deepened considerably over developments in both Syria and Iraq that have stirred Sunni-
Shia/Alawite sectarian undercurrents. A February 11, 2013, a car bomb explosion at a Syria-
Turkey border checkpoint killed 14 people (including four Turks) and injured approximately 25
more. Some reports speculate about possible links from this bombing, as well as from the
February 1 suicide bombing of a security checkpoint at the U.S. embassy in Ankara,54 to various
elements within the Asad regime.55
Absent a clear endgame in Syria, Turkey has focused increasingly on minimizing the spillover
effects of the ongoing civil war. In June 2012, the Syrian regime shot down a Turkish F-4
warplane that may have at one point been in Syrian airspace. This was followed in October 2012
by cross-border artillery fire that killed two women and three children in the Turkish town of
51 For background information on Syria, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International
Response, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard. Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International
Humanitarian Policy, authored the portions of this section on Syrian refugees.
52 Kadri Gursel, “NATO Patriot Missiles Show Turkey's Military Weakness,” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, December 28,
2012.
53 One report claims that Turkish intelligence has contacts with a Turkish group and a Turkish-speaking Chechen group
that are in Syria in opposition to the Asad regime. “GID and MIT back jihadists,” Intelligence Online, No. 684, March
13, 2013.
54 The Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C, sometimes known as “Dev Sol”) claimed
responsibility for the embassy bombing. The DHKP/C is a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization with a
Marxist-Leninist ideology, a long track record of anti-U.S. and anti-NATO militancy, and some historical links with the
Asad regime.
55 “Turkey blames Syria for border gate attack,” hurriyetdailynews.com, March 11, 2013; Mustafa Akyol, “The Ankara
Bomber: A Pro-Assad Communist,” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, February 2, 2013.
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Akcakale. In response to the October incident, Turkey returned fire, leading to several days of
cross-border artillery exchanges. Turkey also convened consultations with its allies under Article
4 of NATO’s North Atlantic Treaty.56
Although a majority of NATO member states appear to oppose a possible NATO military
intervention in Syria, allied leaders gave approval in December 2012 for the deployment of six
Patriot missile batteries to areas near Turkey’s southeastern border with Syria. NATO and allied
leaders have asserted that the batteries are being deployed for defensive purposes only. On April
11, 2013, Air Force General Philip Breedlove addressed the potential for other uses of NATO’s
Patriot missile presence in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing regarding his possible
confirmation as U.S. European Command Commander and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
In his testimony, General Breedlove stated that the two batteries representing the U.S.
contribution “could be used in a role to project into Syria. They have the capability to do it…. if
Turkey and the U.S. were looking to do this in a bilateral fashion, or if we could convince our
NATO partners to come alongside of us, to also be a part of that”.
NATO’s Patriot deployment presumably defends against potential Syrian Scud missile and/or
chemical weapons attacks, as Turkey does not have a missile defense capability of its own.57 In
addition to the two batteries and operational teams contributed by the United States in or near the
city of Gaziantep, Germany and the Netherlands have each contributed two Patriot batteries and
operational teams to the population centers of Karamanmaras and Adana, respectively. The
batteries reportedly became operational, under NATO command and control, in late January and
early February 2013.58
Syrian refugees present an ongoing and increasing dilemma for Turkey. According to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of April 2013, the Turkish government
was operating at least 17 government-run refugee camps. Between refugees residing in the camps
and those in urban areas outside the camps, the total Syrian refugee population in Turkey is now
estimated to be more than 293,000 and is projected to increase. The Regional Response Plan, a
U.N. appeal, includes assistance to meet immediate Syrian refugee needs in Turkey.59
Registration of refugees and camp management are coordinated by the Turkish government’s
Disaster Relief Agency (AFAD), with operational support from the Turkish Red Crescent and
other agencies. UNHCR provides technical advice and assistance. One late 2012 report reflected
a widely-held assessment among observers that although Turkey has managed to avoid significant
economic difficulties from the refugee flows, social and political costs are emerging—especially
tensions between Sunni refugees and Turkish Alawites in the border province of Hatay.60
56 Article 4 reads: “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity,
political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”
57 Turkey has announced plans to purchase a ballistic defense missile system, but has repeatedly delayed a procurement
decision. It has reportedly entertained offers from the United States (Patriots from Raytheon Co.), the European
consortium Eurosam, Russia, and China, and it is unclear whether NATO’s deployment of Patriot batteries might affect
the decision.
58 NATO press release, “All NATO Patriot batteries in Turkey operational,” February 16, 2013.
59 UNHCR factsheet, “UNHCR Turkey Syrian Daily Sitrep,” February 28, 2013; UNHCR, “Turkey: High
Commissioner for Refugees in Syria region, Turkey refugee numbers revised upwards,” March 12, 2013.
60 Christopher Phillips, “The impact of Syrian refugees on Turkey and Jordan,” The World Today (Royal Institute of
International Affairs at Chatham House), vol. 68, no. 8/9, 2012.
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Iran
Turkey seems to be seeking a balance between helping the United States contain Iranian regional
influence and maintaining relatively normal political and economic ties with Iran. Differing
Iranian and Turkish interests in the region, particularly with regard to Syria and Iraq, have led to
increased competition for influence. Turkey and Iran also compete for the admiration of Arab
populations on issues such as championing the Palestinian cause. Turkey’s renewed closeness
with the United States has further fueled Turkey-Iran tensions at a time when the Obama
Administration is continuing its efforts to isolate Iran because of Iran’s nuclear program, backing
of the Asad regime, and support for militant and terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah.
Within this context, Turkey agreed in September 2011 to host a U.S. forward-deployed early
warning radar at the Kurecik base near the eastern Turkish city of Malatya as part of a NATO-
approved missile defense system. Most analysts interpret this system as an attempt to counter
potential ballistic missile threats to Europe from Iran.61 An unnamed senior U.S. Administration
official was quoted as calling this agreement “probably the biggest strategic decision between the
United States and Turkey in the past 15 or 20 years.”62
Some Iranian officials, after initially expressing displeasure with Turkey’s decision, have stated
that Iran would target the radar in Turkey in the event of a U.S. or Israeli airstrike on Iran. During
their visit to Tehran in late March 2012, Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu
reportedly said on Iranian television that Turkey could have the radar dismantled within six
months if “conditions Turkey had put forward to host the radar are not respected”63—a likely
reference to Turkish leaders’ public insistence that data collected from the radar are not to be
shared with Israel.64
Despite these sources of tension, Turkish officials continue to stress the importance of good
relations with Iran and meet regularly with Iranian counterparts. There is Turkish interest in
maintaining stability and trade. Turkey may also be trying to keep open the possibility of
mediating the international impasse on Iran’s nuclear program. Following some reports that Iran
might be assisting the PKK, Iran and Turkey publicly committed in October 2011 to cooperating
against the PKK and the Iranian Kurdish separatist organization Party of Free Life of Kurdistan
(PJAK) that also maintains safe havens in northern Iraq.
61 See footnote 2. The radar was activated in late December 2011. “Part of NATO missile defense system goes live in
Turkey,” CNN, January 16, 2012. It is reportedly operated by U.S. personnel from a command center in Diyarbakir,
with a Turkish general and his team stationed in Germany to monitor the command and control mechanisms
headquartered there for the entire missile defense system. “Malatya radar system to be commanded from Ramstein,”
Hurriyet Daily News, February 4, 2012.
62 Thom Shanker, “U.S. Hails Deal with Turkey on Missile Shield,” New York Times, September 15, 2011.
63 “Erdogan, in Iran, says NATO radar could be dismantled if needed,” Today’s Zaman, March 30, 2012.
64 According to U.S. officials, despite this Turkish insistence, information collected from the radar is coordinated as
necessary with the U.S. missile defense radar deployed in Israel. One senior Administration official has been quoted as
saying, “Data from all U.S. missile defense assets worldwide, including not only from radars in Turkey and Israel, but
from other sensors as well, is fused to maximize the effectiveness of our missile defenses worldwide; this data can be
shared with our allies and partners in this effort.” Josh Rogin, “Amid tensions, U.S. and Turkey move forward on
missile defense,” thecable.foreignpolicy.com, September 19, 2011. Some Members of Congress had insisted that
sharing information for Israel’s potential defense be a condition of the radar’s placement in Turkey. The text of a
September 19, 2011, letter to President Barack Obama from six Senators on this subject is available at
http://kirk.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=299.
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According to a November 2012 Wall Street Journal article, Iran provides 51% of Turkey’s oil and
18% of its natural gas.65 Turkey’s announcement in the spring of 2012 that it would reduce
Iranian oil imports by 20% helped it gain an exemption from the U.S. sanctions that took effect in
June 2012.66 Media and official attention in late 2012 and early 2013 focused on a “gold-for-
energy” trading practice between Turkey and Iran that was characterized by many as helping Iran
circumvent newly instituted international restrictions on access to the global financial system.
However, a new U.S. law is set to take effect in July 2013 specifically sanctioning the provision
of precious metals to Iran (Section 1245 of P.L. 112-239, National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013, enacted January 2, 2013).67 Perhaps as a consequence, reports indicate that
Turkey may be reducing or preparing to reduce gold-for-energy trades with Iran.68 Additional
U.S. and international concerns about Iran’s possible use of Turkish companies or institutions to
finance and supply its nuclear program and avoid the impact of sanctions largely focus on
Turkey’s legal standards69 and on the reported recent profusion of Iranian-financed firms in
Turkey.70
Possible U.S. Policy Options
Although U.S. and Turkish interests and policies intersect in many respects, Turkey’s growing
regional influence and military and economic self-reliance have decreased its dependence on the
United States. Still, the appeal of U.S. and Western power, prestige, values, and military
technology might currently outstrip that of potential competitors.71 Over the long term, a
significant challenge for U.S. policymakers may be to convince Turkish officials of a continuing
imperative to cooperate despite an apparently growing sense of Turkish confidence and
independence. The 2012 Albright-Hadley report implied that Turkey’s ability to exercise regional
influence on its own remains limited:
Still, for all the investment, goodwill, and concomitant influence it has developed over the
past decade, Ankara was unable to leverage that prestige to sway the behavior of either
Libya’s Muammar al-Qaddafi or Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, two leaders the Turks
studiously cultivated during the AKP’s tenure.72
Members of Congress, through active inquiry into and possible coordination with Obama
Administration positions on Turkey, and their own engagement on Turkey-related issues, can
consider how various options might serve U.S. interests. One U.S. analyst wrote in December
2011:
65 Joe Parkinson and Emre Peker, “Turkey Swaps Gold for Iranian Gas,” Wall Street Journal, November 23, 2012.
66 This exemption, which requires renewal every 180 days by the Administration, was renewed in December 2012 after
Turkey apparently agreed to reduce Iranian oil imports further. Press Statement by then Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, “Regarding Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases,” Washington, DC, December 7, 2012.
67 For more general information on this subject, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
68 Asli Kandemir, “Exclusive: Turkey to Iran gold trade wiped out by new U.S. sanction,” Reuters, February 15, 2013.
69 Financial Action Task Force Public Statement, Paris, February 22, 2013; Daniel Dombey, “Turkey’s last-minute
terror laws: will they be enough?”, blogs.ft.com, February 8, 2013.
70 “New Iranian firms in Turkey stir front company worries for Ankara,” todayszaman.com, February 17, 2013.
71 See “Other International Relationships” in Appendix D.
72 Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 40.
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Despite record levels of communication and travel between top leaders in Ankara and
Washington, the societal and institutional connections are still in need of revitalization and
strengthening…. [C]oordination and policy on Turkey continues to affect vital interests
throughout Washington, which ideally must go beyond the administration to the Hill and
society at large even if there is short-term turbulence.73
Influencing Regional Change and Promoting Stability
Turkey is likely to play a key role in affecting the outcomes of ongoing political change and
unrest in the broader Middle East. In partnering with Turkey to influence regional change and
promote stability, the following options are available for Members of Congress and Obama
Administration officials to adopt or continue:
• Determine how to encourage improvement in Turkey’s relations with Israel.
• Determine the proper nature and extent of bilateral and NATO military and
intelligence cooperation, including joint use of Turkish bases and territory, as
well as information sharing to assist in countering the PKK and in facilitating
interdiction of illegal arms shipments from other countries or non-state actors.
• Determine whether and how to encourage Turkish political and financial support
for individuals and groups opposing autocratic regimes, and whether and how
such backing should be linked to support for political and economic transitions in
countries experiencing unrest or leadership changes.
• Determine whether and how to coordinate with Turkey to impose and enforce
unilateral, multilateral, or international sanctions (diplomatic, military, and/or
economic) that have the potential to effectively weaken or change the behavior of
regimes or other actors violating human rights or otherwise contravening
international laws and norms. Examples include the Asad regime and possibly
other actors in Syria and the Iranian regime for its nuclear program and support
of regional terrorist groups.
• Determine whether and how to support Turkish efforts to coordinate regional
security and development with other local actors, especially other U.S. allies.
Action on any of these options would take place in a complex regional and strategic environment
whose trajectory has probably become more unpredictable since regional unrest and political
change began in late 2010.
Arms Sales and Military/Security Assistance
Turkey continues to seek advanced U.S. military equipment (i.e., fighter aircraft, drone aircraft,
helicopters, and missile defense systems), and its defense industry participates in joint ventures
with the United States (e.g., on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter). However, Turkey’s growing
defense industry and its increased willingness to engage in arms import-export transactions or
joint military exercises with non-NATO countries, such as China, Russia, Pakistan, and South
Korea, indicate Turkey’s interest in diversifying its defense relationships and decreasing its
73 Joshua W. Walker, “U.S.-Turkish Relations: Modesty and Revitalization,” On Turkey, German Marshall Fund of the
United States, December 15, 2011.
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dependence on the United States. U.S. military and security assistance programs for Turkey are
designed to cultivate closeness in relationships and practices between Turkish military officers
and security officials and their U.S. counterparts. These programs also seek to counter terrorist
and criminal networks that are active in the region, including those which historically have
operated within and across Turkey’s borders.74 In April 2013, Turkish police stated that in
February they had detained conspirators in potential Al Qaeda-linked terrorist plots against the
U.S. embassy in Ankara and two other sites.75
Since 2008, Turkey has reportedly been particularly interested in acquiring armed drones from the
United States to use against the PKK.76 Reports have indicated that some Members of Congress
have balked at the drone sale.77 By redeploying four unarmed U.S. Predator drones from Iraq to
Turkey in late 2011,78 the Obama Administration might have bought time for further consultations
with Congress on a potential drone sale and with Turkey on potential alternatives. It is unclear
how Turkey’s ongoing negotiations with the PKK may affect its military procurement plans.
Possible Armenian Genocide
Congress’s involvement on Turkey-Armenia issues has the potential to strongly influence U.S.-
Turkey relations. In March 2010 during the 111th Congress, the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs voted to report H.Res. 252 for consideration by the full House (by a vote of 23-22).
H.Res. 252 characterized actions of the Ottoman Empire against Armenians from 1915 to 1917 as
genocide. Similar resolutions had been reported multiple times by congressional committees since
1984 (see Appendix E for a full list), and President Ronald Reagan referred to a “genocide of the
Armenians” during a Holocaust Remembrance Day speech in 1981.
H.Res. 252 did not pass, but in response to the March 2010 committee action, Turkey recalled its
ambassador from the United States for one month, and at least one prominent AKP lawmaker
reportedly warned that “the relationship would be downgraded on every level” in the event of
House passage of the resolution. This warning was commonly interpreted as including a threat to
curtail, at least partially or temporarily, U.S. access to Turkish bases and territory for transporting
non-lethal cargo to missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.79 Representative Robert Dold introduced
74 State Department FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives,
pp. 482-483.
75 Sebnem Arsu, “U.S. Embassy in Turkey Said to Be Targeted,” New York Times, April 12, 2013.
76 According to Jane’s, Turkey has sought to purchase four MQ-1 Predator drones and six MQ-9 Reaper drones (more
advanced versions of the Predator). “Procurement, Turkey,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern
Mediterranean, December 16, 2010. Previous potential sales of Reapers to NATO allies such as the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Italy were notified to Congress in 2008 and 2009 with the understanding that the drones would be used
to support coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
77 In October 2011, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow
reportedly said in a speech to the American-Turkish Council, “This topic is influenced by the problems in Turkish-
Israeli relations. This is not a secret. But just to repeat it, we do support the sale.” Craig Whitlock, “Pentagon agrees to
sell three attack helicopters to Turkey,” Washington Post, November 1, 2011.
78 “US deployed Predators to Incirlik: Davutoglu,” Hurriyet Daily News, November 13, 2011. According to then
Secretary of Defense Panetta, the Iraqi government gave the United States permission to keep flying Predator drones on
surveillance missions over northern Iraq. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. drones allowed in Iraqi skies,”
washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington, December 16, 2011.
79 Robert Tait and Ewen McCaskill, “Turkey threatens ‘serious consequences’ after US vote on Armenian genocide,”
Guardian (UK), March 5, 2010.
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H.Res. 304—virtually identical to H.Res. 252—in June 2011 during the 112th Congress, and
Senator Robert Menendez introduced a similar proposed resolution as S.Res. 399 in March 2012.
Neither resolution advanced through committee. Advocates of recognizing a genocide are to
commemorate the event’s 100th anniversary in 2015. At least 20 countries other than Armenia
have recognized the Ottoman-era deaths as genocide in some way, including 11 of the 27 EU
member states.80
Bilateral Trade Promotion
Although successive U.S. Administrations have cited the importance of increased trade with
Turkey, and the Obama Administration has reemphasized this in articulating its vision for a
multifaceted bilateral strategic relationship,81 it is unclear how effective government efforts to
promote U.S.-Turkey trade can be. Bilateral trade has expanded in recent years, although the gap
(in favor of the United States) has widened since 2009 both in actual terms and in percentage
terms.82 The U.S. government has designated Turkey as a priority market under the National
Export Initiative and the interagency Trade Policy Coordination Committee has developed an
Export Enhancement Strategy for Turkey.83 On its side, the Turkish Ministry of Economy has
identified six U.S. states as the focus of its efforts to increase bilateral trade: California, Texas,
New York, Florida, Illinois, and Georgia.84
Turkish officials have occasionally proposed a U.S.-Turkey free or preferential trade agreement
or U.S. legislation establishing qualified industrial zones (QIZs) in Turkey without success.85
With U.S. and EU officials both publicly contemplating a Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), some analysts and advocates have called for Turkey to be included in
whatever discussions may occur.86 The 2012 Albright-Hadley report encouraged the pursuit of a
U.S.-Turkey free or preferential trade agreement or other measures emphasizing “market access,
regulatory compatibility, business facilitation, assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises,
and promotion of trade in cutting-edge technologies”.87 Some policymakers and observers claim
80 The EU states recognizing a genocide are France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, Greece, and Cyprus. The European Parliament has also recognized the deaths as genocide.
81 The two countries signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty in 1990 and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
in 1999. Annual meetings for the U.S.-Turkey Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation began
in 2010 at the cabinet ministerial level.
82 See, e.g., Sidar Global Advisors, op. cit.
83 For more detailed information on bilateral efforts to promote trade, see U.S. Department of Commerce Fact Sheet:
U.S.-Turkey Framework for Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation, October 14, 2010.
84 Information provided to CRS by Turkish Ministry of Economy, September 2011.
85 Turkey’s customs union with the EU (see Appendix D) apparently would preclude a free trade or preferential
agreement between the United States and Turkey absent a similar U.S.-EU agreement. See Turkish Ministry of
Economy website at http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tradeagreements&bolum=fta®ion=0.
86 See, e.g., Kemal Kirisci, “Don’t Forget Free Trade with Turkey,” nationalinterest.org, April 15, 2013; Bahadir
Kaleagasi and Baris Ornarli, Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD), “Why Turkey belongs to
transatlantic economy,” thehill.com/blogs, March 12, 2013.
87 Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., pp. 12-13. Additionally, a March 2012 report jointly sponsored by the Turkish
Industry & Business Association (TUSIAD) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recommended that U.S. and Turkish
trade and investment promotion agencies align strategies and use resources efficiently to “achieve certain mutually set
benchmarks and goals.” See Sidar Global Advisors, U.S.-Turkish Economic Relations in a New Era: Analysis and
Recommendations for a Stronger Strategic Partnership, Turkish Industry & Business Association (TUSIAD) and U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, March 2012.
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that even if past economic conditions may have limited U.S. trade with Turkey, recent growth in
Turkish consumer demand, quality of products and services, and global competitiveness and
brand recognition have increased Turkey’s value as an import source, target market, and place of
investment for U.S. companies.88
Conclusion
Turkey’s importance to the United States may be increasing relative to previous eras of U.S.-
Turkey cooperation because of Turkey’s geopolitical importance, growing economy, and greater
foreign policy assertiveness. The United States looks to Turkey, which plays a role in a number of
hotspots in the region, as a partner for pursuing key interests. The effectiveness of Turkey as a
U.S. partner is likely to be tested in relation to developments in Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
Convergence between U.S. and Turkish interests remains subject to fluctuation as events develop,
particularly with regard to Turkey’s complicated relations with Israel and concerns over strategic
preeminence and energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Congressional action on the
ongoing civil conflict in Syria, Turkey’s request to purchase U.S. drone aircraft to counter the
PKK, or a potential Armenian genocide resolution could significantly affect U.S.-Turkey
relations, particularly if Members of Congress link their stances on these issues to the state of
Turkey-Israel relations.
The positions Members of Congress take on specific issues concerning Turkey—including
defense cooperation, trade promotion, and Turkish domestic developments—also will indicate
U.S. priorities at a critical time for global and regional stability and for the Turkish republic’s
political and constitutional evolution. This could influence Turkish leaders’ future foreign policy
rhetoric, decisions, and alignments, which in turn will likely have implications for regional
security and for Turkey’s EU accession prospects. Congressional positions could also have some
influence on Turkey’s commitment to civilian-led, democratic government that enshrines
individual, media, and minority rights; rule of law; and due process.
88 See, e.g., Mark Scott, “In Turkey, Western Companies Find Stability and Growth,” New York Times, December 23,
2011.
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Appendix A. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Prime Minister Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan) was born in Istanbul in 1954 and spent much
of his childhood in his family’s ancestral hometown of Rize on the Black Sea coast. He and his
family returned to Istanbul for his teenage years, and he attended a religious imam hatip school.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, played soccer semi-
professionally, and became politically active with the National Salvation Party, led by the
pioneering Turkish Islamist figure (and eventual prime minister) Necmettin Erbakan. After the
military banned all political parties in the wake of its 1980 coup, Erdogan became a business
consultant and executive. When political life in Turkey resumed, Erdogan became a prominent
local leader and organizer for Erbakan’s new Welfare Party.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 at the beginning of a wave of Islamist political
victories in Turkey in the mid-1990s. He was removed from office, imprisoned for six months,
and banned from parliamentary politics for religious incitement after he recited a poem in the
southeastern city of Siirt in December 1997 that included the passage (translated from Turkish):
“The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful
our soldiers.”
After Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and the Welfare Party was
disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP won a decisive
electoral victory in 2002, securing the single-party rule that it has maintained since. After the
election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special election in Siirt,
and after he won, Erdogan replaced Abdullah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of the
domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey in the past decade. In January
2009 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, following the Gaza Strip conflict
between Israel and Hamas, he left the panel discussion in which he was participating after
perceiving a slight by the moderator (Washington Post columnist David Ignatius). Before leaving,
he pointedly criticized fellow panelist Shimon Peres, president of Israel. His criticism of Israel
and its actions has boosted his popularity at home and throughout the Muslim Middle East, where
polls show that he may be the region’s most popular world leader.
Erdogan is married and has two sons and two daughters. His wife Emine and daughters wear the
headscarf. He is not fluent in English but his understanding may be improving. Observers have
speculated about his health, particularly following a November 2011 surgical procedure to
remove stomach polyps. He has said that he does not have cancer.
President Abdullah Gul
President Gul was born in 1950 in Kayseri in central Turkey. He studied economics in Turkey and
England, and received his Ph.D. from Istanbul University, becoming a university professor and an
economist at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Gul was first elected to
parliament from Kayseri in 1991 as a member of the Islamist Welfare Party and served as a
minister in and spokesman for the coalition government it briefly headed in 1996-1997. After the
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Welfare Party was disbanded, Gul stayed on in parliament as a reform-minded member of the
Islamist Virtue Party. Gul served on parliamentary assemblies of NATO and the Council of
Europe. When the AKP was formed in 2001, he became deputy chairman and—briefly—its first
prime minister after the successful election of 2002. When Erdogan took over the prime ministry
in 2003, Gul became Turkey’s foreign minister and helped accelerate Turkey’s EU accession
process.
In 2007, the AKP nominated Gul for the presidency amid substantial secularist opposition, partly
owing to statements from his early political career that indicated distaste for the secular nature of
Turkey’s republic. Parliament nevertheless elected Gul president. Many observers believe him to
be a moderating influence on the Erdogan government. They also speculate about whether
President Gul will challenge Erdogan in the 2014 presidential election, possibly in part out of a
desire to prevent greater authoritarianism.89
Gul is married with two sons and a daughter. His wife Hayrunissa and daughter wear the
headscarf. He speaks fluent English.
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
Foreign Minister Davutoglu was born in 1959 in Konya in central Turkey. He attended a German
international school in Istanbul and received a Ph.D. in Political Science and International
Relations from Bosphorus University. He became a university professor, spending time in
Malaysia in the early 1990s before establishing himself as a scholar known for applying academic
theory to practical matters of Turkish foreign policy and national security strategy. His book
Strategic Depth, which was published in 2001 and has been translated into other languages but
not English, is thought by some to represent a blueprint of sorts for the policies Davutoglu has
since helped implement.
Following the AKP’s victory in 2002, Davutoglu was appointed chief foreign policy advisor to
the prime minister. Upon his appointment as foreign minister in 2009, he quickly gained renown
for articulating and applying his concepts of “zero problems with neighbors” and strategic depth.
He advocates for a preeminent role for Turkey in its surrounding region, but disputes the
characterization of his policies by some observers as “neo-Ottomanism.” He won an AKP
parliamentary seat for the first time in June 2011.
Davutoglu is married with four children. His wife Sare is a medical doctor. He speaks fluent
English, as well as German and Arabic.
Opposition Leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu
Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (known by its Turkish
acronym, CHP, or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), was born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern
Turkey. After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the director-
89 Kadri Gursel, “Can Erdogan, Gul Still Reconcile?”, Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, December 17, 2012. However, Gul, as
a fellow member of the AKP and an erstwhile political ally of Erdogan’s, may not be inclined to run against him.
Another possibility would be for Gul to “switch places” with Erdogan and return to the prime minister’s post.
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general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil service, Kilicdaroglu
became politically active with the CHP and was elected to parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He
gained national prominence for his efforts to root out corruption among AKP officials and the
AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara. When CHP leader Deniz Baykal was forced to resign over a
videotape sex scandal in May 2010, Kilicdaroglu was elected to replace him. In the first national
election with him as party leader in June 2011, the CHP gained 23 seats in parliament—not as
many as some observers had expected.
Kilicdaroglu is married with a son and two daughters. He is an Alevi and speaks fluent French.
PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan
Abdullah Ocalan was born in or around 1949 in southeastern Turkey (near Sanliurfa). After
attending vocational high school in Ankara, Ocalan served in civil service posts in Diyarbakir and
Istanbul until enrolling at Ankara University in 1971. As his interest developed in socialism and
Kurdish nationalism, Ocalan was jailed for seven months in 1972 for participating in an illegal
student demonstration. His time in prison with other activists helped inspire his political
ambitions, and he became increasingly politically active upon his release. Ocalan founded the
Marxist-Leninist-influenced PKK in 1978 and launched a separatist militant campaign against
Turkish security forces—while also attacking the traditional Kurdish chieftain class—in 1984. He
used Syrian territory as a safe haven. Syria forced Ocalan to leave in 1998 after Turkey threatened
war for harboring him. After traveling to several different countries, Ocalan was captured in
February 1999 in Kenya—possibly with U.S. help—and was turned over to Turkish authorities.
The PKK declared a cease-fire shortly thereafter. Ocalan was sentenced to death, in a trial later
ruled unfair by the European Court of Human Rights, but when Turkey abolished the death
penalty in 2002, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He resides in a maximum-
security prison on the island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara, and was in solitary confinement
until 2009.
Although acting PKK leader Murat Karayilan and other commanders have exercised direct
control over PKK operations during Ocalan’s imprisonment, some observers believe that Ocalan
still ultimately controls the PKK through proxies. PKK violence resumed in 2003 and has since
continued off-and-on until the most recent cease-fire that Ocalan and Karayilan called in March
2013. Ocalan has indicated that the organization is seeking a negotiated resolution that does not
require forming a Kurdish state, and is apparently engaging in talks with Turkish intelligence to
that end.
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Appendix B. List of Selected Turkish-Related
Organizations in the United States
American Friends of Turkey (http://afot.us/)
American Research Institute in Turkey (http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/ARIT/)
American Turkish Society (http://www.americanturkishsociety.org/)
American-Turkish Council (http://www.the-atc.org/)
Assembly of Turkish American Associations (http://www.ataa.org/)—component organizations
from 17 states and District of Columbia
Ataturk Society of America (http://www.ataturksociety.org/)
Federation of Turkish American Associations
Institute of Turkish Studies (http://turkishstudies.org/)
SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (http://setadc.org)
Turkic American Alliance (http://www.turkicamericanalliance.org/)
• West America Turkic Council (West region)—includes Pacifica Institute
• Turkish American Federation of Midwest (Midwest region)
• Turquoise Council of Americans and Eurasians (South region)—includes
Institute of Interfaith Dialog
• Turkic American Federation of Southeast (Southeast region)—includes Istanbul
Center
• Council of Turkic American Associations (Northeast region)
• Mid Atlantic Federation of Turkic American Associations (Mid-Atlantic
region)—includes Rumi Forum
• Rethink Institute (housed at Turkic American Alliance headquarters in
Washington, DC)
Turkish Coalition of America (http://www.tc-america.org/)
Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON) (http://www.tuskonus.org/
tuskon.php)
Turkish Cultural Foundation (http://www.turkishculturalfoundation.org/)
Turkey Policy Center (http://www.turkishpolicycenter.com/)
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Appendix C. General Background Information
Historical Context
Changes to the old Kemalist order did not materialize suddenly with the AKP’s rise to power.
They reflect long-standing dynamics in Turkish politics and society that continue to evolve within
Turkey’s existing constitutional framework. Popular desires to allow greater public space for
traditional Islamic-oriented lifestyles manifested themselves politically as early as the 1950s
during the rule of Turkey’s first democratically elected leader, Adnan Menderes. Menderes was
eventually overthrown by a military-led coup in 1960 (and subsequently hanged), and the military
continued to discourage the overt influence of religion in politics, intervening again in 1971 and
1980 to replace governments that it deemed had lost control of the country or had steered it away
from secularism or toward ideological extremes.
The military allowed Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs (later Prime Minister and
President) Turgut Ozal to begin liberalizing the traditionally statist Turkish economy following its
restoration of internal order in 1980. This helped set in motion a chain of events leading to the
economic and political empowerment of millions of Turks hailing from traditional communities
removed from Turkey’s more secular urban centers. Subsequent social and political developments
reflected accommodation of this rising middle class—many of whom migrated to bigger cities—
and their values. For example, imam hatip religious schools, initially established for young males
seeking clerical careers, became widely attended by youth from religiously conservative families.
In 1997, the military compelled Turkey’s first-ever Islamist-led coalition government to resign,
but junior members of the coalition-leading Refah (Welfare) Party went on to form the AKP,90
which they characterize as a center-right reformist party without an Islamist agenda.
Popular discontent with coalition rule stemming from a 1999-2001 economic and financial crisis
and perceptions of government corruption and ineffectiveness opened the way for the AKP to
achieve single-party rule with its first election victory in 2002. Since the AKP came to power, the
military has reportedly become less scrutinizing of its rising officers’ religious backgrounds and
views, taxes and regulations on the consumption of alcohol have increased, and the wearing of
headscarves by women in universities and other public places has gained legal and social
acceptance. In early 2012, an education reform bill enacted by parliament to extend the length of
compulsory education also reportedly reversed constraints that were placed on imam hatip
schools following the 1997 military intervention and increased the emphasis on Islamic education
in the state’s general curriculum.91 Such developments, among others, prompted this observation
in the 2012 Albright-Hadley report:
To ensure social stability and a democratic trajectory, it is thus incumbent on the new
establishment to reassure secular-minded Turks that their way of life has a place in Turkish
society, even if secularists failed to do the same for observant Muslims during their long
period of ascendancy.92
90 AKP members generally use the acronym “AK Party” or “AK,” partly because the Turkish word ak means “clean”
and “unblemished,” thus presenting an image of incorruptibility.
91 M. Kemal Kaya and Halil M. Karaveli, “Remolding Compulsory Education, the AKP Erases a Secularist Legacy—
and Seeks to Check the Gulen Brotherhood,” Turkey Analyst, vol. 5, no. 7, April 2, 2012.
92 Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 17.
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Fethullah Gulen Movement93
The Fethullah Gulen movement (or community) became a nationwide grassroots movement in the
1980s as part of the emergence of the new conservative Turkish middle class. The movement is
comprised of adherents of Turkish imam Fethullah Gulen, who is now a permanent U.S.
resident.94 He preaches a distinctly Turkish brand of Islam that condemns terrorism,95 promotes
interfaith dialogue and cross-cultural understanding, and can function in concert with secular
democratic mechanisms and modern economic and technological modes of living. Gulenist-
affiliated schools96 and other organizations97 are also located in the United States and other
regions worldwide.
The movement rose to greater prominence in parallel with the AKP, and Gulen-inspired
businesses, media enterprises, schools, charitable organizations, and civil society groups now
exercise considerable influence in Turkey.98 Additionally, a Council on Foreign Relations analyst
has written, “Opponents of both the AKP and the Gulen movement express concern that the
party’s influence over the parliament and executive branch provides the Gulenists with
unprecedented reach into government institutions, thereby threatening Turkey’s secular political
order.”99
93 For a range of views on the Gulen movement, see M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen
Movement, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013; Helen Rose Ebaugh, The Gulen Movement: A Sociological
Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam, New York: Springer, 2010; “Hank, The Gulen Movement,
The Role of a Lifetime,” 60 Minutes, CBS News, May 13, 2012; Alexander Brock, “What Is the Gulen Movement?”,
Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., Appendix B; Claire Berlinski, “Who Is Fethullah Gülen?”, City Journal, vol. 22,
no. 4, autumn 2012.
94 Gulen lives in seclusion at a retreat center with some of his adherents in Saylorsburg, PA, in the Pocono Mountains.
He came to the United States in 1999 for medical treatment for a cardiovascular condition, and elected to stay after an
ultimately unsuccessful criminal case was brought against him in Turkey charging that he sought to undermine
Turkey’s secular government.
95 Days after the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011, Gulen took out advertisements in the New York
Times and Washington Post condemning the attacks as incompatible with the teachings of Islam.
96 Gulenist organizations have reportedly founded and operate as many as 135 publicly-funded charter schools in 25
U.S. states. Berlinski, op. cit. These schools have generated publicity both for their high academic quality and for
questions and possible federal investigations regarding their hiring and business practices. Phyllis Schlafly, “Look
What’s Going On in Charter Schools,” creators.com, April 10, 2012; Stephanie Saul, “Charter Schools Tied to Turkey
Grow in Texas,” New York Times, June 6, 2011; Martha Woodall and Claudio Gatti, “U.S. charter-school network with
Turkish link draws federal attention,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 20, 2011. In April 2012, Tennessee’s legislature
passed a bill limiting the percentage of foreign employees permitted to work in its charter schools. The initiative was
reportedly driven in large part by political activists citing various media reports on Gulen-inspired schools. Mark Todd
Engler, “Legislature Passes Limits on Foreign Staffers at TN Charter Schools,” tnreport.com, April 16, 2012.
97 Gulenists are involved with Turkish and Turkish-American trade associations and foundations active in the United
States—both regionally and in the Washington, DC, area. Such organizations reportedly include the Turkic American
Alliance umbrella of organizations and the business confederation TUSKON. Ilhan Tanir, “The Gulen movement plays
big in Washington,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 14, 2010; Ebaugh, op. cit., p. 49.
98 For example, adherents of Gulen’s teachings launched the Zaman newspaper in 1986. It is now the most widely
circulated newspaper in Turkey, and has an English-language sister publication, Today’s Zaman. Gulen also
encouraged a group of businessmen to launch the Samanyolu television channel—today a major channel in Turkey
with a worldwide reach through satellite and Internet transmission—in 1993.
99 Alexander Brock, “What Is the Gulen Movement?”, Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., Appendix B. The
criminal case charging Gulen with undermining Turkey’s secular government was largely based on a video in which
Gulen apparently stated: “You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you
reach all the power centers…. You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have
brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institution in Turkey.” Berlinski, op. cit. Many of Gulen’s
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Gulen, however, insists that he is neutral as to political parties and leaders in Turkey.100 Some
developments, especially since 2012, indicate the possibility of a rift between the Erdogan-led
AKP and the Gulen movement.101 In April 2012, the Gulen-inspired Journalists and Writers
Foundation issued a lengthy statement asserting both that Hizmet (the Gulen movement’s name
for itself—a Turkish word meaning “service”) does not have a hierarchy to direct the actions of
individuals who adhere to its teachings, and that the movement’s support for principles of
democracy, human rights, and rule of law is not defined in terms of loyalty or opposition to the
AKP or any other political party.102 Whether the movement generally operates more like a
hierarchy or more like a loose confederation of philosophically similar groups and individuals is a
matter of considerable debate.
Religious Minorities
While U.S. constitutional law prohibits the excessive entanglement of the government with
religion, republican Turkey has maintained secularism or “laicism” by controlling or closely
overseeing religious activities in the country. This is partly to prevent religion from influencing
state actors and institutions, as it did during previous centuries of Ottoman rule. Sunni Muslims,
although not monolithic in their views on freedom of worship, have better recourse than other
religious adherents to the democratic process for accommodation of their views because of their
majority status. Minority Muslim sects (most prominently, the Alevis) and non-Muslim religions
largely depend on legal appeals, political advocacy, and support from Western countries to protect
their rights in Turkey.
Christians and Jews
U.S. concerns focus on the rights of established Christian and Jewish communities and religious
leaderships and their associated foundations and organizations within Turkey to choose leaders,
train clergy, own property, and otherwise function independently of the Turkish government.103
Some Members of Congress routinely express grievances through proposed congressional
resolutions and through letters to the President and to Turkish leaders on behalf of the Ecumenical
(Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate of Constantinople, the spiritual center of Orthodox Christianity
(...continued)
supporters claimed that the video had been doctored.
100 Gulen asserted in August 2010 that “we are still at an equal distance from every party. We never told anybody to
enroll in a specific [party], attend its rallies or act as its supporters.” “Gulen Endorses Reform Package, Appealing for
‘Yes’ on Sept. 12,” Today’s Zaman, August 1, 2010. He has backed AKP-proposed constitutional amendments, but
distinguished his support for the substance of the initiatives from support for the party or individual leaders that had
proposed them. “Gulen Says His Call for Yes Vote Not Linked to Political Motives,” Today’s Zaman, August 25, 2010.
101 See footnote 13.
102 “GYV: Hizmet a civilian movement, has no political ambitions,” Today’s Zaman, April 5, 2012.
103 The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom included Turkey on its watch list from 2009 to 2011, and
recommended that the State Department list Turkey as a “country of particular concern” for the first time in 2012. The
State Department is not obliged to follow the commission’s recommendations, and has not on a number of occasions.
Turkey’s 2012 designation generated controversy because one of the nine commissioners unsuccessfully tried to
change his position, which would have resulted in Turkey again only being placed on the watch list. The commission’s
website carries its 2012 annual report (covering April 2010-February 2011). See also the State Department’s
International Religious Freedom Report for 2011.
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based in Istanbul.104 On December 13, 2011, for example, the House passed H.Res. 306—
“Urging the Republic of Turkey to safeguard its Christian heritage and to return confiscated
church properties”—by voice vote.105
In an April 2012 interview with the Chicago Tribune, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was
quoted as saying that recent changes in Turkey
have been extremely positive. Years ago, you couldn't have dreamed of the changes. You
couldn’t have believed it. The prime minister has promised to restore properties confiscated
from Christians and Jews years ago. He has promised to reopen the Orthodox seminary at
Halki, which has been closed for many years. Of course, we have concerns in some areas,
and there are legal questions remaining, but the Orthodox-Islamic dialogue has been
extremely positive. More positive than I ever would have imagined.106
Patriarch Bartholomew, along with various U.S. and European officials, continues to press for the
reopening of the Halki Theological School. In March 2013, Erdogan reportedly conditioned
Halki’s reopening on measures by Greece to accommodate its Muslim community.107 In January
2013, 190 hectares of forestland surrounding Halki were returned to the Greek Orthodox
foundation listed as its owner-of-record, as part of the government’s return of properties to
religious groups discussed immediately below.108
At various times in the Turkish Republic’s history, the state has confiscated the properties of
religious groups as part of its efforts to control religious life in the country. In late August 2011,
Erdogan announced that Turkey would return properties confiscated since the adoption of a 1935
law governing religious foundations, to the extent the properties are still held publicly.109 Many of
these properties were confiscated following a Turkish High Court of Appeals ruling in 1974 that
had invalidated non-Muslim religious foundations’ abilities to acquire real estate.110 Properties to
be returned potentially include schools, orphanages, cemeteries, commercial properties, and
hospitals affiliated with various Christian churches and Turkey’s Jewish community. According to
104 The Patriarchate traces its roots to the Apostle Andrew. The most commonly articulated congressional grievances on
behalf of the Patriarchate—whose ecumenicity is not acknowledged by the Turkish government, but also not objected
to when acknowledged by others—are the non-operation of the Halki Theological School on Heybeliada Island near
Istanbul, the requirement that the Patriarch be a Turkish citizen, and the failure of the Turkish government to return
previously confiscated properties.
105 H.Res. 306 was sponsored by Representative Edward Royce. An identically worded proposed resolution was
introduced in the Senate in March 2012 as S.Res. 392. Other proposed resolutions from the 112th Congress include
H.Res. 180 (“Urging Turkey to respect the rights and religious freedoms of the Ecumenical Patriarchate”), and S.Res.
196 (“A resolution calling upon the Government of Turkey to facilitate the reopening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s
Theological School of Halki without condition or further delay”).
106 John Kass, “With faith and hope, Turkey builds a new identity,” Chicago Tribune, April 11, 2012. Some sources
indicate that Prime Minister Erdogan promised at a March 2012 meeting with President Obama in Seoul, South Korea,
that he would reopen the Halki seminary. See, e.g., David Ignatius, “Obama’s friend in Turkey,” Washington Post,
June 7, 2012.
107 “PM indicates opening Halki Seminary depends on reciprocal gesture by Greece,” todayszaman.com, March 30,
2013.
108
109 According to reports, the foundations would receive compensation for property since transferred to third parties. See
Sebnum Arsu, “Turkish Government to Return Seized Property to Religious Minorities,” New York Times, August 29,
2011.
110 The ability for these foundations to acquire real estate has since been restored. The 1974 court ruling came at a time
of high Turkish-Greek tensions with the outbreak of conflict in Cyprus.
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one report, “The government’s willingness to explore restitution does not yet cover the hundreds,
if not thousands, of property seizures from individuals, or the takeovers that occurred before
1936. An even more contentious point is confiscation that occurred prior to the formation of the
Republic of Turkey in 1923.”111 Property returns have begun, and more are expected in the near
future pursuant to each organization’s application for return of applicable properties and the
determination of the government’s General Directorate of Foundations.112 Prior to Erdogan’s 2011
decree, which amended an earlier 2008 law, the European Court of Human Rights made multiple
rulings requiring Turkey to pay compensation to various religious-affiliated organizations after
earlier attempts by the government to remedy the situation did not satisfy the organizations.
Alevis
Most Muslims in Turkey are Sunni, but 10 million to 20 million are Alevis (of whom about 20%
are ethnic Kurds). The Alevi sect of Islam is an offshoot of Shiism113 that contains strands from
pre-Islamic Anatolian traditions. Alevism has been traditionally influenced by Sufi mysticism that
emphasizes believers’ individual spiritual paths, but it defies precise description owing to its lack
of centralized leadership and reliance on oral traditions historically kept secret from outsiders.
Alevis have long been among the strongest supporters of Turkey’s secular state, which they
reportedly perceive as their protector from the Sunni majority.114
111 Dorian Jones, “Turkey: Making Room for Religious Minorities,” EurasiaNet.org, October 3, 2011.
112 CRS correspondence with U.S. diplomat based in Turkey, November 2011.
113 For information comparing and contrasting Sunnism and Shiism, see CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and
Shiites, by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report WVB00001, Sunni and Shi'a Islam: Video Brief, by Christopher
M. Blanchard.
114 According to a Boston University anthropologist who studies modern Turkish society, “Alevis suffered centuries of
oppression under the Ottomans, who accused them of not being truly Muslim and suspected them of colluding with the
Shi’i Persians against the empire. Alevi Kurds were victims of the early republic’s Turkification policies and were
massacred by the thousands in Dersim in 1937-39. In the 1970s, Alevis became associated with socialist and other
leftist movements, while the political right was dominated by Sunni Muslims. An explosive mix of sectarian cleavages,
class polarization, and political violence led to communal massacres of Alevis in five major cities in 1977 and 1978,
setting the stage for the 1980 coup.” Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013, p. 14.
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Appendix D. Additional Foreign Policy Issues of
U.S. Interest
The “Turkish Model” and Regional Stance
Given the unrest and political change occurring across much of the Arab Middle East since late
2010, Turkey might view the United States as needing more Turkish support in the region. Turkey
exercises considerable regional influence given its military, economic, and political power—aided
by its status as an established Muslim-majority democracy and its membership in NATO.
Political activists in several countries undergoing leadership transitions—including Tunisia and
Egypt—have cited Turkey as a potential model for their own political systems. This has raised
questions among leaders and analysts about which aspects of Turkey’s system these activists seek
to emulate—whether it is its outwardly secular mechanisms, its historical military guardianship,
its economic vitality, its political system in which civilian leaders with Islamist leanings have
exerted increasing power, or some combination of these.
Arab interpretations of the “Turkish model” tend to emphasize the recent democratic and
economic empowerment of Turkey’s middle class and the connection between this and Turkey’s
emergence as a regional power with a foreign policy independent of the West. Some Western
views favor some notion of military guardianship of the state from disorder and ideological
extremes (a model that many Westerners have historically equated with republican Turkey).115
While some in both the Arab world and the West suspect that Turkey’s government favors the rise
of pro-democracy Islamist movements that emulate the AKP, Prime Minister Erdogan was
criticized by North African Islamists during his September 2011 trip to Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya
for voicing his support for secular democratic mechanisms. Many analysts and Turkish officials
have stated that Turkey might more aptly be characterized as an inspiration than as a model
because the historical experiences and characteristics of its people, society, and economic system
are distinct from those of Arab countries.116
Within the context of regional change, Turkey has sought to balance its support for country-
specific democratic reforms with its interests in overall stability. Turkish interests appear to
reflect three factors: (1) It is the leading Muslim-majority democracy in the region with an
interest in promoting its political values, (2) it has a significant economic stake in the region, and
(3) it is concerned about the regional balance of power and possible spillover effects for its own
security. Turkish leaders are particularly concerned about developments at or near its borders with
Syria and Iraq, especially given Turkey’s own on-and-off struggles with Kurdish separatist
militants who maintain safe havens in northern Iraq and who could be further strengthened by
their fellow ethnic Kurds in Syria, Iraq, and Iran if those states’ governments are weakened.
115 For a critique of viewpoints that favor a Turkey-like military-led transition in Egypt, see Steven Cook, “The Turkish
Model for Egypt? Beware of False Analogies,” blogs.cfr.org, February 4, 2011.
116 Nathalie Tocci, Omer Taspinar, Henri Barkey, Eduard Soler i Lecha, and Hassan Nafaa, Turkey and the Arab
Spring: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy from a Transatlantic Perspective, German Marshall Fund of the
United States, 2011; Sinan Ulgen, From Inspiration to Aspiration: Turkey in the New Middle East, Carnegie Europe,
December 2011.
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Iraq
Turkey cooperated with the United States in the 1991 Gulf War and following the U.S.-led 2003
Iraq invasion, but the Turkish parliamentary decision in 2003 not to allow U.S. forces to use its
territory to open a northern front significantly affected U.S.-Turkey relations at that time. The
decision showed the United States that in its strategic relationship with Turkey, it could no longer
rely solely on past legacies of cooperation and its close ties with the Turkish military.117 Starting
in late 2007, U.S. willingness to provide greater counterterrorism support to Turkey in its struggle
against the PKK helped move U.S.-Turkey priorities in Iraq toward greater alignment.
For Turkey, strong governance and stability in Iraq is important particularly due to Turkish
interests in denying the PKK use of Iraqi territory for its safe havens; discouraging the cross-
border spread of Kurdish separatist sentiment; countering Iranian influence; and accessing Iraq’s
potentially lucrative export markets and ample energy resources (which could eventually lessen
Turkey’s dependence on Iranian and Russian energy imports). U.S. officials have repeatedly
expressed appreciation for Turkey’s constructive role in post-conflict Iraq, with which it has
growing trade and where it has improved relations with the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG).
Without a U.S. military mission in Iraq, Turkey’s influence appears to be more significant. Iraqi
Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, a Shiite, has accused Turkey of undue interference in Iraqi
internal affairs. This is likely due to Turkey’s close ties to Sunni Arab and Kurdish leaders in the
country, as well as warnings by Prime Minister Erdogan that Turkey would not “remain silent” in
the event of renewed sectarian conflict.118 The KRG and Turkey are reportedly discussing and
negotiating a broad energy deal that would include Turkish investment in oil and gas extraction in
KRG-controlled territory, as well as construction of a separate oil pipeline linking KRG-
controlled fields to the Turkish border that would reduce KRG dependence on the national oil
export grid. Both parties routinely express concern that U.S. policy does not appear to be
preventing Prime Minister Maliki from sowing further ethnic and sectarian division within Iraq or
encouraging Maliki to build democratically and constitutionally accountable national institutions.
The Iraqi government claims that the contemplated Turkey-KRG pipeline deal would violate its
sovereignty.
Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean119
Since Cyprus became independent of the United Kingdom in 1960, Turkey has viewed itself and
has acted as the protector of the island’s ethnic Turkish minority from potential mistreatment by
the ethnic Greek majority.120 Responding to Greek and Cypriot political developments that raised
concerns about a possible Greek annexation of Cyprus, Turkey’s military intervened in 1974121
117 For further information, see CRS Report R41761, Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges, by
Jim Zanotti.
118 Jonathon Burch, “Turkey warns Iraqi PM over sectarian conflict,” Reuters, January 24, 2012.
119 For more information on this subject, see CRS Report R41136, Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, by Vincent
Morelli.
120 Turkey views its protective role as justified given its status as one of the three guaranteeing powers of the 1960
Treaty of Guarantee that was signed at the time Cyprus gained its independence. The United Kingdom and Greece are
the other two guarantors.
121 Turkish intervention in Cyprus with U.S.-supplied arms prompted Congress to impose an embargo on military
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and established control over the northern third of the island, prompting an almost total ethnic and
de facto political division along geographical lines. That division persists today and is the subject
of continuing international efforts aimed at reunification.122 Additionally, according to a New York
Times article, “after the 1974 invasion, an estimated 150,000 Turkish settlers arrived in the north
of Cyprus, many of them poor and agrarian Turks from the mainland, who Greek Cypriots say are
illegal immigrants used by Turkey as a demographic weapon.”123 The ethnic Greek-ruled
Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized as having jurisdiction over the entire island,
while the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the northern third has only Turkish
recognition.
The Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004 and Turkey’s refusal to normalize political
and commercial relations with it are seen as a major obstacle to Turkey’s EU membership
aspirations. The Cyprus dilemma also hinders effective EU-NATO defense cooperation.
Moreover, EU accession may have reduced incentives for Cyprus’s Greek population to make
concessions toward a reunification deal. The Greek Cypriots rejected by referendum a United
Nations reunification plan (called the Annan plan after then Secretary-General Kofi Annan) in
2004 that the Turkish Cypriot population accepted. Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leaders claim that
the Turkish Cypriot regime’s lack of international recognition unfairly denies its people basic
economic and political rights, particularly through barriers to trade with and travel to countries
other than Turkey.
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have assertively opposed efforts by the Republic of Cyprus and
other Eastern Mediterranean countries—most notably Israel—to agree upon a division of offshore
energy drilling rights without a solution to the question of the island’s unification.124 The
Republic of Cyprus appears to anticipate considerable future export revenue from drilling in the
Aphrodite gas field off Cyprus’s southern coast.
Congress imposed an embargo on military grants and arms sales to Turkey from 1975 to 1978 in
response to Turkey’s use of U.S.-supplied weapons in the 1974 conflict, and several Members
remain interested in Cyprus-related issues.125
(...continued)
assistance and arms sales to Turkey from 1975 to 1978. This Cold War-era disruption in U.S.-Turkey relations is often
cited by analysts as a major factor in Turkey’s continuing efforts to avoid overdependence on the United States or any
other country for military equipment or expertise.
122 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by approximately 5,000 Turkish
Cypriot soldiers and 26,000 reserves). “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment -
Eastern Mediterranean, October 30, 2009. This is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000
(including roughly 1,300 Greek officers and soldiers seconded to Cyprus) with reported access to 50,000 reserves.
“Cyprus,” Jane’s World Armies, November 3, 2011. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission
(UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia
(known as Lefkosa in Turkish). Since the mission’s inception in 1964, UNFICYP has suffered 179 fatalities. The
United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign military bases on the southern portion of
the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
123 Dan Bilefsky, “On Cyprus Beach, Stubborn Relic of Conflict,” New York Times, August 3, 2012. The CIA World
Factbook estimates Cyprus’s total population to be 1,150,000 (77% Greek, 18% Turkish, 5% other).
124 “Gas drilling heightens east Mediterranean tension,” UPI, September 16, 2011.
125 See, e.g., from the 112th Congress, H.Res. 676 (To expose and halt the Republic of Turkey's illegal colonization of
the Republic of Cyprus with non-Cypriot populations, to support Cyprus in its efforts to control all of its territory, to
end Turkey's illegal occupation of northern Cyprus, and to exploit its energy resources without illegal interference by
Turkey.); S.Con.Res. 47 (A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress on the sovereignty of the Republic
(continued...)
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Armenia126
In late 2009, Turkey and Armenia, aided by Swiss mediation, agreed to joint protocols that would
have normalized relations and opened borders between the two countries. They also would have
called for a dialogue and impartial examination of the historical record with respect to “existing
problems,” widely believed to refer to the issue of World War I-era deaths of hundreds of
thousands of Armenians through the actions of Ottoman Empire authorities. Turkish leaders were
unwilling to push for parliamentary ratification of the protocols, however, due to Azerbaijani
objections to Turkey-Armenia normalization prior to desired progress on the issue of Nagorno-
Karabakh.127 Azerbaijan influences Turkish policy on this issue because of its close cultural and
economic ties with Turkey, particularly as Azerbaijan is a key energy supplier. Another possible
cause for Turkish reluctance was a 2010 Armenian constitutional court ruling that indicated
inflexibility on the genocide issue. Subsequently, Turkey and Armenia have made little or no
progress toward ratifying the protocols or otherwise normalizing their relations, though the
protocols remain under consideration in Turkey’s parliament.128 The tenor of relations between
Turkey and Armenia could be an important factor in a potential congressional debate over a future
genocide resolution.
Afghanistan
Turkey has twice commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan
and has had troops participating in ISAF since shortly after its inception in December 2001.
Turkey’s approximately 2,000 troops concentrate on training Afghan military and security forces
and providing security in Kabul, where Turkey commands ISAF’s Regional Command-Capital, as
well as in Wardak (just west of Kabul) and Jawzjan (in northern Afghanistan) provinces. In
addition, some Afghan police are trained in Turkey.
As with several other NATO and non-NATO contributors to ISAF, Turkey’s troops are not
involved in combat. Turkey’s history of good relations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan and its
status as the Muslim-majority country with the greatest level of involvement in ISAF are thought
by some analysts to help legitimize ISAF’s presence. These relations could become more
important to preparing Afghanistan for stable, self-sufficient rule, with the United States and other
ISAF countries scheduled to wind down their military presence in Afghanistan in future years.
(...continued)
of Cyprus over all of the territory of the island of Cypress [sic].); and H.R. 2597 (American-Owned Property in
Occupied Cyprus Claims Act).
126 For more information, see CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests, by Jim Nichol.
127 Nagorno-Karabakh is a predominantly ethnic-Armenian-populated enclave within Azerbaijan’s international
borders. Disputes over its status led to armed conflict in 1991 in parallel with the Soviet Union’s dissolution and the
independence of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The conflict ended with a 1994 ceasefire, but Armenian troops still
occupy portions of the territory. The Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (co-
chaired by the United States, Russia, and France, and including both Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Turkey and a
number of other European countries) has been trying to negotiate a permanent settlement since then.
128 In the meantime, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a 10-year security and mutual assistance agreement in August 2010.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
European Union129
The Turkish government uses its demographic profile to support its bid for EU membership,
arguing that the country would bring a young, dynamic population to the aging ranks of Europe
and boost EU influence in the Muslim world. Turkey first sought to associate itself with what was
then the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, and Turkey and the EEC entered into an
agreement of association in 1963. Since the end of 1995, Turkey has had a full customs union
with the EU, which is viewed by many observers as one of the primary drivers of the competitive
surge of Turkey’s economy during the 2000s.130 Turkey also is a member of the Council of
Europe, along with several other non-EU states (including Russia), and is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Council’s European Court of Human Rights.
EU accession talks, which began in 2005, have been stalled owing to the opposition of key EU
states—most notably France and Germany—to Turkey’s full membership. Opponents generally
give empirical reasons for their positions, but many analysts argue that resistance to Turkish EU
accession is rooted in a fear that Turkey’s large Muslim population would fundamentally change
the cultural character of the EU and dilute the power of the EU’s founding Western European
states to drive the policy agenda. As mentioned above, Turkey’s unwillingness to normalize
diplomatic and trade relations with EU member Cyprus presents a major obstacle to its accession
prospects.131 Other EU concerns over Turkey’s qualifications for membership center on the
treatment of Kurds and religious minorities, media freedoms, women’s rights, and the proper and
transparent functioning of Turkey’s democratic and legal systems.132 One U.S.-based European
analyst writes, “Turkey’s process of alignment with EU laws and standards is still very
incomplete and interest in this goal seems to have weakened as political forces that once
embraced the goal [as a means for facilitating Turkish domestic reform] have become stronger
and more self-reliant.”133
Turkish domestic expectations of and support for full accession to the EU were apparently
already waning when fundamental concerns arose over the economic and political soundness of
the EU given the ongoing eurozone crisis.134 Nevertheless, the EU provides over $1 billion in
annual pre-accession financial and technical assistance to Turkey aimed at harmonizing its
economy, society, bureaucracy, and political system with those of EU members.135
129 For more information on this subject, see CRS Report RS22517, European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on
Turkey’s Accession Negotiations, by Vincent Morelli.
130 Council on Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 18.
131 Turkey’s unwillingness to open its ports to Greek Cypriot trade according to the Additional Protocol that it signed at
the outset of the accession process in 2005 prompted the EU Council to block eight out of the 35 chapters of the acquis
communautaire that Turkey would be required to meet to the Council’s satisfaction in order to gain EU membership.
France blocked five additional chapters in 2007 and the Republic of Cyprus blocked six in 2009. France unblocked one
chapter in early 2013, in what some analysts interpreted as a portent for better prospects of Turkey’s eventual
accession. Thus far, one of the chapters has been fully negotiated, and 13 others have been opened.
132 European Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2012 Progress Report, October 10, 2012.
133 Emiliano Alessandri, “Turkey-EU Relations: Back to Basics?”, On Turkey, German Marshall Fund of the United
States, February 27, 2013.
134 Dan Bilefsky, “For Turkey, Lure of Tie to Europe Is Fading,” New York Times, December 4, 2011. According to the
Transatlantic Trends surveys of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the percentage of Turks who think
that Turkish EU membership would be a good thing was 73% in 2004 and 48% in 2011.
135 See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/turkey/index_en.htm for further information.
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Other International Relationships
As Turkey continues to exercise increased political and economic influence, it seeks to establish
and strengthen relationships with non-Western global powers. It is expanding trade and defense
industrial ties with China,136 Russia, and other countries in Asia and Africa. In June 2012, Turkey
became a “dialogue partner” of the China- and Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), and Prime Minister Erdogan made remarks in early 2013 hinting at possible Turkish
interest in an even greater role in the SCO.137 Turkey also has held joint military exercises with
China on Turkish soil.
Turkey additionally seeks to expand the scope of its geographical influence, with its officials
sometimes comparing its historical links and influence with certain countries—especially former
territories of the Ottoman Empire—to the relationship of Britain with its commonwealth.
Through hands-on political involvement, as well as increased private trade and investment and
public humanitarian and development projects, Turkey has enhanced its influence and image as a
leading Muslim-majority democracy with Muslim-populated countries not only in the Middle
East, but also in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.138
136 Richard Weitz, “China-Turkey Summit: Economic Enticements Overshadow Differences,” Turkey Analyst, vol. 5,
no. 6, March 19, 2012.
137 “Turkey seeks observer member status in SCO,” hurriyetdailynews.com, February 1, 2013. Turkey is the only
NATO member formally affiliated with the SCO.
138 See, e.g., Hajrudin Somun, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans and ‘Neo-Ottomanism’: A Personal Account,”
Insight Turkey, vol. 13, no. 3, summer 2011; Yigal Schleifer, “Turkey’s Neo-Ottoman Problem,” World Politics
Review, February 16, 2010; Greg Bruno, “Turkey’s Near Abroad,” Council on Foreign Relations Analysis Brief,
September 19, 2008.
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Appendix E. Congressional Committee Reports of
Armenian Genocide-Related Proposed Resolutions
Date Reported or of
Vote for Report
Proposed Resolution(s)
Committee
April 5, 1984
S.J.Res. 87
Senate Judiciary
September 28, 1984
S.Res. 241
Senate Foreign Relations
July 9, 1985
H.J.Res. 192
House Post Office and Civil Service
July 23, 1987
H.J.Res. 132
House Post Office and Civil Service
August 3, 1987
H.Res. 238
House Rules
October 18, 1989
S.J.Res. 212
Senate Judiciary
October 11, 2000
H.Res. 596 and H.Res. 625
House Rules
October 10, 2007
H.Res. 106
House Foreign Affairs
March 4, 2010
H.Res. 252
House Foreign Affairs
Author Contact Information
Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
jzanotti@crs.loc.gov, 7-1441
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