Turkey: Politics of Identity and Power
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
September 21, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41368
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Turkey: Politics of Identity and Power
Summary
Turkey has long been a valued U.S. NATO ally and strategic partner. Successive administrations
have viewed it as a secular democracy that could serve as an inspiration or model for other
Muslim majority countries. However, the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) foreign
policy decisions have led some U.S. observers, including Members of Congress, to question its
future course. Domestic political developments may be enabling the AKP’s greater assertiveness
in international affairs and are, therefore, worthy of closer scrutiny. This report provides that
examination via an overview of the current Turkish domestic political scene.
The main theme of the report is that the ongoing struggle for power in Turkey will determine the
country’s identity, and that will have consequences for U.S. policymakers. Turkey’s secular
identity has long been considered unique among majority Muslim states, as secularism was a
founding principle of the modern Turkish Republic as well as the principle that has produced the
most domestic political tension. The AKP, formed in 2001, has Islamist roots but claims to be
conservative and democratic. Its emergence and acquisition of power have exacerbated concerns,
especially in secularist circles, about whether AKP is intent on altering Turkey’s identity. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AKP have governed in an increasingly confident manner
since a court refused to ban the party for being “a focal point of anti-secular activities” in 2008.
Already in control of the executive and legislature, they have gained influence over bastions of
secularism in the judiciary and military. These developments may enable the AKP to implement a
domestic agenda that is more consistent with its core identity. However, the AKP has failed to
deal comprehensively with a significant domestic group’s struggle for recognition of its own
identity—the Kurds in a majority Turkish state. The government initiated a “Kurdish opening,”
but managed it poorly, produced unfulfilled expectations, and may have contributed to an
escalation in terrorism.
The unraveling of a series of alleged coup plots is another arena in which the struggle for power
and identity between the AKP and its opponents is being played out. In the first, major alleged
conspiracy, called Ergenekon, ultranationalists and secularists are said to have planned to create
instability in the country in order to provide a pretext for the military to intervene and overthrow
the government. Believers in the conspiracies, who include the AKP and its supporters, cite the
revelations as evidence of Turkey’s progress as a democracy because what is called the “deep
state,” or elite who have controlled the political system for 50 years, is finally being confronted.
Skeptics charge that the AKP is using a fictitious affair to intimidate and weaken opponents in the
military, judiciary, media, and elsewhere who are ardent secularists, and that the authorities’
handling of suspects fails to meet international legal standards, thereby marring Turkey’s
democratic advance. They also suggest that the enigmatic and powerful Fethullah Gulen
Movement, a religious group, may be driving the investigations and is a new “deep state.”
The AKP has appeared increasingly confident. Although its diminished plurality of votes in the
2009 municipal elections provided signs that it can be challenged, its victory in the September
2010 referendum on constitutional reforms produced doubts about whether AKP’s ambitions to
alter Turkey’s identity and policies can be constrained. Nonetheless, the vote indicates that that
the AKP continues to function within the parameters of a democratic political system, albeit
flawed, that allows these developments. For in-depth information on the period prior to this
report, see CRS Report RL34646, Turkey: Update on Crisis of Identity and Power, by Carol
Migdalovitz.
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Contents
Overview .................................................................................................................................... 1
Economic Context....................................................................................................................... 2
Demographic Snapshot ............................................................................................................... 2
Historical Context ....................................................................................................................... 3
Political Situation........................................................................................................................ 4
The Lawsuit to Ban the AKP ................................................................................................. 4
Aftermath ............................................................................................................................. 5
Ergenekon and Other Alleged Plots ....................................................................................... 6
Assessment ........................................................................................................................... 8
2009 Municipal Elections...................................................................................................... 9
Cabinet Changes ................................................................................................................. 10
Constitutional Reforms ....................................................................................................... 10
Role of the Military................................................................................................................... 13
Kurdish Issue ............................................................................................................................ 15
Press Freedom........................................................................................................................... 19
Fethullah Gulen Movement ....................................................................................................... 21
Future Political Possibilities ...................................................................................................... 23
Overall Assessment ................................................................................................................... 25
U.S. Policy................................................................................................................................ 26
Tables
Table 1. Results of 2009 Municipal Elections .............................................................................. 9
Table 2. Basic Facts .................................................................................................................. 30
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 30
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Turkey: Politics of Identity and Power
Overview
Turkey has become increasingly assertive on the international stage. Members of Congress and
other U.S. officials require an understanding of the current domestic political situation that,
combined with a exceptionally robust economy, has enabled the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) to act so confidently in order to develop appropriate policies. As a contribution
toward that goal, this report provides an overview of the Turkish domestic political scene. It does
not address specific foreign policy issues, which will be the subject of a separate report.
Turkey’s domestic politics are turbulent largely due to an ongoing struggle for power that
participants perceive as a struggle for the country’s identity. Turkey’s secular identity has long
been considered unique among majority Muslim states, as secularism has been one of the
“fundamental and unchanging principles” guiding the Turkish Republic since its founding in
1923. It also has been the principle that has led to considerable domestic political tension. Over
the years, political parties have emerged to challenge strict secularism and to seek to restore the
country’s Islamic identity to centrality. Each time, these parties have been banned from politics.
The AKP, formed in 2001, has Islamist roots but claims a conservative democratic place along the
political spectrum. The AKP won the 2002 national elections by a wide margin and the 2007
elections by a wider one, but its victories did not end secular-religious friction.
In 2007, the public prosecutor initiated a lawsuit to ban the AKP for being a “focal point of anti-
secular activities,”1 but the party survived. The authorities have since arrested many prominent
secularists/ultranationalists and active and retired military officers for alleged plots intended to
provoke the military to overthrow the government. The government initiated what became a
contentious “Kurdish opening” to address the causes of a decades-long insurgency/terrorism. It
also proposed constitutional reforms, several of which critics believe could alter Turkey’s secular-
religious balance and the balance among the branches of government. These dramas served to
highlight a polarized political climate and a still evolving contest over power and identity. Each
side has champions and opponents who disseminate conflicting interpretations of events. In some
instances, the schism is blurred, as some secularists argue AKP’s case in the name of democracy,
while some AKP supporters question their leaders’ actions. Nonetheless, the national rift is real.
The United States is concerned about Turkey’s domestic political stability because Washington
views it as a valued strategic partner and NATO ally and must deal with any government in power
there. The George W. Bush Administration regarded Turkey favorably as one of the few
predominantly Muslim democratic countries and an inspiration for other Muslims in the context
of the war against radical Islamist terrorism. President Obama visited Turkey and congratulated
Prime Minister Erdogan for his victory in the September 2010 constitutional referendum, but his
Administration generally has been reluctant to wade into Turkey’s domestic political maelstrom.
Nonetheless, some in the Turkish secularist political opposition interpreted the Administration’s
repeated outreach to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as unquestioning support. While that
interpretation probably is exaggerated, there are indications that the Administration may be
reassessing relations in light of some AKP foreign policy positions that have challenged
traditional U.S. expectations. The party’s ability to adopt those policies may derive, at least partly,
from its determined consolidation of its domestic strength.
1 Turkish law refers to “ban,” which also is commonly termed “closure.” In the West, some would use the word
“dissolution.”
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Economic Context
While this report focuses on politics, the economy provides a critical context. Turkey has the
world’s 17th-largest economy and is a member of the G-20 group of major economies. The AKP
government’s predecessor had stabilized the financial system in the aftermath of a severe crisis in
2000-2001, which prompted major reforms with the help of a massive infusion of funds from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Those reforms included floating the currency, strengthening
the banking system, and creating an independent central bank. The AKP has retained the policies
then instituted and privatized some state economic enterprises (SEEs), although the state sector
still is large. It has been credited with consecutive years of growth between 2002 and 2008,
averaging 4% a year, during which time the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita doubled.
Turkey rapidly overcame a setback due to the global economic downturn in 2009, which affected
exports and employment. The economy registered a striking 11.7% growth rate in the first quarter
of 2010 and 10.3% growth rate in the second quarter, with a forecast for the year of over 6%
growth. (See Table 2 at the end of the report for a fuller picture of the economy.) During the
AKP’s tenure, exports have increased markedly as the government has plumbed new markets in
the region and beyond. The growth in trade has especially benefited core AKP constituents in
small and mid-sized enterprises, who have shared their growing wealth with donations to the
party and to groups that support it. As a result, the party’s finances are believed to be sound and it
has easily withstood financial penalties that a predominantly secularist court imposed for being “a
focal point of anti-secular activities.”
There are limitations to this otherwise positive economic portrait. Analysts view the soaring
current account deficits (projected at an estimated 5% of GDP in 2010) as a potential risk to the
economy.2 Moreover, a large unregistered economy makes it difficult for the government to raise
revenues. In July 2010, the government postponed plans to adopt a “fiscal rule” to require a
budget deficit target of 1% of GDP. The IMF warned that the delay threatens a loss of
international “credibility” and that spending is in excess of targets. Prime Minister Erdogan
responded that the government had “escaped” from the IMF and claimed that its record of fiscal
discipline showed that it did not need the fiscal rule.3 The government’s secure victory in the
September 12 constitutional referendum may constrain a propensity for increased spending in the
run-up to the 2011 national elections that could worsen the deficit.
Demographic Snapshot4
Turkey’s 78 million people are relatively young, with 26.9% of the population 14 years of age or
younger. This contrasts markedly with countries in the European Union (EU), which Turkey
aspires to join. The comparable figure for Germany is 13.5%; the United Kingdom, 16.5%;
France, 18.6%; and Italy, 13.4%. Approximately 99.8% of the population is Muslim; the rest are
Christians and Jews. Most Muslims are Sunni, but 10 million to 20 million are Alevi, which
appears to be a combination of Sunnism, Shi’ism, and pre-Islamic beliefs. AKP followers are
2 For additional background, see Refik Erzan, “Turkey’s Economic Prospects: As Good as it Gets?,” International
Economic Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 29, 1010.
3 “IMF Pushes Turkey for Budget Deficit Cut,” Haberturk, September 8, 2010, Open Source Center (hereafter OSC)
Document GMP20100909016009.
4 Figures for all countries from CIA, The World Factbook, various dates.
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overwhelmingly Sunni, while Alevis have long been among the strongest supporters of the
secular state from which they derive protection from the Sunni majority.
The Turkish population also is literate, with 87% of the people, 95.3% of the men and 79.6% of
the women, able to read and write.5 Moreover, the government is making an effort to educate
more girls. Theses figures are higher than those of other large Muslim countries. Egypt has a
71.4% total literacy rate, with only 59.4% of its women able to read and write, while Iran,
Turkey’s neighbor, has a literacy rate of 77%, with 70.4% of women able to read and write.
The Turkish government uses its demographic profile to support a bid for EU membership,
arguing that it would bring a young, dynamic population to the aging ranks of Europe.
Historical Context
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 out of the remnants of the
Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman sultans had enjoyed both temporal and spiritual power, acting
simultaneously as heads of state and as Muslim caliphs. Ataturk decisively severed the link,
banishing religion to the private sphere and propounding laicism or secularism as a founding
principle of the state. He abolished the caliphate and seriat (Islamic law), replacing it with a
European civil code, closed religious schools, banned religious brotherhoods, discouraged women
from wearing the veil, and made Sunday instead of Friday the weekly day of rest. These
revolutionary changes distinguished Turkey from other Muslim countries.
Yet, there has long been doubt about how deeply “Kemalist” changes penetrated society. Major
urban centers in western Turkey were considered secularist strongholds, while people residing in
the vast Anatolian sub-continent (Asia Minor) remained devout. In 1950, Adnan Menderes of the
Democratic Party became the first democratically elected leader of Turkey, and he was more
tolerant of religious practices. His campaign called for the restoration of the Arabic call to prayer,
which Ataturk had banned. Once in office, Menderes reopened mosques and implied that
parliament could reimpose seriat. Menderes was overthrown in a 1960 military coup and he and
two of his ministers were subsequently hanged after what many considered a show trial. Civilian
governments returned in 1961, but they generally proceeded cautiously with respect to religious
affairs. (Another military junta took power for several years in 1980.) As noted above, there has
been little toleration of religiously oriented political parties over the years.
In 1997, the military maneuvered a government coalition led by the Islamist Refah (Welfare)
Party out of power. A successor government was unable to cope with a major financial crisis in
1999-2000 that severely harmed average Turks. Those in power were viewed as ineffective and
many also were considered corrupt. In that atmosphere, a group of young rebels who had begun
their political lives in Refah created the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a new political
party that played down religion while striving to project a clean image as conservative democrats.
They said that they supported Turkey’s EU ambitions in order to transform the country into a
truly modern state, but also probably because required reforms would ensure greater religious
liberty and constrain the power of the military. In the fall 2002 election, Turkish voters broke
from politicians of the past whom they held responsible for their economic plight and chose new
5 CIA, The World Factbook, June 24, 2010.
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leaders. AKP won a plurality of the vote and formed the first single party government in many
years.
On September 17, 2010, following his victory in the September 12 constitutional referendum,
AKP leader and Prime Minister Erdogan paid homage to Menderes and his colleagues when he
laid a wreath at their tombs. (See “Constitutional Reforms,” below.) Erdogan said, “The Turkish
nation has been commemorating these beloved people with gratitude and prayers for decades.”
He described Menderes and the others as “martyrs of democracy” and asserted, “the torch of
democracy lit by Menderes and his friends was carried at the highest level after passing from one
hand to another, each passing day, eventually reached us.”6
Political Situation
The Lawsuit to Ban the AKP
A political crisis began in spring 2007, when the AKP-controlled parliament sought to elect then
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as president of the republic.7 Gul has roots in Turkey’s Islamist
movement and his wife wears a head scarf, which secularists consider a symbol of both Islamism
and backwardness. To secularists and Islamists alike, therefore, the country’s identity was tied to
the selection of its president. Moreover, they argued that because the AKP already controlled the
prime ministry and parliament (the Turkish Grand National Assembly), the balance of political
power in the government would tilt in favor of Islamists if the party also assumed the presidency.
A Turkish president is mainly a symbolic head of state, but he has significant powers of
appointment as well as a bully pulpit. The crisis was temporarily resolved via early national
elections on July 22, 2007, which the AKP won with a decisive 46.6% (usually rounded up as
47%) of the vote, enabling it to gain a strong majority in parliament. On August 28, the new
legislature elected Gul president.
Secularist opponents continued to scrutinize the AKP government’s performance for Islamist
tendencies, and a reprise of the crisis may have been expected. In December 2007, President Gul
named an AKP-allied professor to head the Higher Education Board (YOK), disturbing some
secularists.8 They were even more provoked when, on January 14, 2008, Prime Minister Erdogan
declared that the ban on women wearing the head scarf in all public institutions was “a serious
problem in terms of freedom.”9 The ban has been in effect for several decades. On February 9,
following Erdogan’s lead, an overwhelming 411-vote majority in the 550-seat parliament passed
two constitutional amendments to lift the ban on wearing head scarves on university campuses;
President Gul ratified them on February 22.
On February 27, 2008, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Democratic Left
Party (DSP) filed suit in the Constitutional Court to overturn the new amendments. Then, on
6 Fulya Ozerkan, “Turkish PM Commemorates Executed Former Leader with Visit,” Hurriyet Daily News.com,
September 17, 2010.
7 See CRS Report RL34039, Turkey’s 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power, by Carol Migdalovitz, and CRS
Report RL34646, Turkey: Update on Crisis of Identity and Power, by Carol Migdalovitz, for background.
8 YOK oversees state universities and traditionally has been viewed as a bastion of secularism.
9 “Lifting the Headscarf Ban, Promoting Turkishness,” Turkish Daily News, January 15, 2008.
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March 14, the chief public prosecutor of the Court of Appeals requested the Constitutional Court
to ban the AKP and 71 of its leading members, including Erdogan, Gul, more than 40 members of
parliament, and 11 mayors, from politics for becoming a “focal point of anti-secular activities.”
Among other charges, the request cited parliament’s lifting of the head scarf ban in universities.
The AKP held a 340-seat majority in the 550-seat parliament and, therefore, the prosecutor
deemed it responsible for the action. He did not seek to indict the opposition Nationalist Action
Party (MHP) or smaller parties which had joined the AKP to provide the super-majority required
for parliament to amend the Constitution. The AKP defense claimed that lifting the ban was
aimed at expanding freedoms and rejected the prosecutor’s allegations.
Many analysts considered the outlook for the AKP’s survival bleak, as the Constitutional Court
was known to have a secularist majority. On June 5, the court ruled that parliament’s lifting of the
ban on head scarves in universities was unconstitutional; the decision was widely viewed as a
harbinger of a judgment on the AKP.
A seven-member super-majority out of 11 members was required to close the party. However, on
July 30, only six judges voted to ban the party, providing the AKP with a narrow escape. Four
others agreed that the party was a focal point for anti-secular activities, but not serious ones.
Thus, 10 judges found the party guilty. Yet, lacking seven votes, the court only imposed a
financial penalty that was no hardship for the AKP, whose private donors could readily
compensate for the loss. No AKP officials were banned.
Some observers suggested that the court may have been influenced by the lack of a possible
alternative government, given the absence of a serious political opposition at that time. Thus, the
AKP benefited from what was seen as the ineffectiveness and lack of vision of the two main
opposition parties, CHP and MHP. Neither has a party organization nor a level of grassroots
support that can compete with the AKP. Under Deniz Baykal’s leadership, the CHP, the party of
Ataturk, opposed government proposals without offering alternatives and may have lost its social
democratic ideals.10 Recent elections had shown that its constituents were mainly residents of
cities along the Aegean coast. For his part, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli supported lifting the head
scarf ban and opposed banning the AKP, but maintained that AKP’s leaders, such as Prime
Minister Erdogan, should be held responsible for illicit actions and subject to being banned from
holding political office. Thus, Bahceli transparently and opportunistically saw a route to possible
greater personal political success via banning the most popular and charismatic politician in the
country. A ban on the AKP might have produced an indefinite period of political instability or at
least uncertainty and been devastating for the country’s economy. It also could have seriously
harmed Turkey’s European Union prospects and perhaps its relations with other allies.
Aftermath
In the months after the prosecutor proposed the ban, AKP leaders assiduously conducted business
as usual in public, even though Ankara seemed frozen while awaiting the ruling. They refused to
call supporters into the streets for protests, believing that a counter-reaction by security forces or
opponents would exacerbate tensions and prove counterproductive. Shortly before the Court
ruling, Prime Minister Erdogan reportedly admitted that “we made mistakes.”11 However, he did
10 This is the opinion of some in the CHP as well as others who have since left. See, e.g., “Turkey: Summary of
Interview with CHP Leadership Candidate Haluk Koc,” Milliyet, April 21, 2008, OSC GMP20080421742001.
11 Interview with Ertugrul Ozkok, Hurriyet, July 26, 2008, OSC Document GMP20080726016007.
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not repeat that admission after the ruling, when he denied that his party had ever been a focal
point of anti-secular activities. After the judgment, AKP officials reaffirmed their commitment to
an agenda of reforms and EU membership. President Gul called for “self-criticism and empathy,”
saying, “in looking at our own errors, we at the same time have to place ourselves in the position
of those opposed to us and try to understand the thinking and feelings of those against us.”12
Yet, AKP had not abandoned its desire to change society. On August 6, 2008, President Gul
rejected 9 out of 21 nominees for university rector posts, reportedly because they had opposed the
government on the head scarf issue. Instead, he chose others close to the AKP. Gul acted within
his presidential authority, but some observers argued that he had proven unable to put himself—as
he had proposed—in the position of the opposition and understand how it would react. He could
not breach the country’s divide.
Ergenekon and Other Alleged Plots13
As the AKP was surviving the attempt to ban it with greater confidence, a series of revelations of
alleged coup plots besieged and weakened its more ardent opponents. On June 12, 2007, police
raided an apartment in Istanbul and seized a cache of hand grenades, explosives, and fuses. The
investigatory trail led to the arrests in January 2008 of prominent ultranationalists and secularists,
including retired military officers, the head of a fringe political party, a university rector, the head
of a non-governmental organization, businessmen, and journalists. On July 1, two retired four-star
generals, additional retired military officers, the head of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, and
journalists were taken into custody. The arrests of generals of such high rank were unprecedented.
The common denominator of those arrested appears to have been their opposition to the AKP and
its ancestor, the Islamist Welfare (Refah) Party of the 1990s.
The first indictment proposed on July 14, 2008, requested that 86 individuals be charged with
being members of an armed terrorist organization, attempting to overthrow the government by
force, inciting people to armed insurgency, instigating the killing of a judge during a 2006 attack
on the Council of State (the highest administrative court), and bombing of the Cumhurriyet
newspaper in 2007, among other crimes.14 The final first indictment was about 2,500 pages and
included almost all sensational political crimes committed in Turkey in recent times. Critics have
emphasized the length, excessiveness, and messiness of this and subsequent indictments. The
case began to be heard in October 2008. In January 2009, there were additional arrests of senior
officers, including three retired generals, a former head of the Higher Education Council (YOK),
and the former chief prosecutor who had tried to get the AKP banned.
The terrorism charge used in Ergenekon and in other alleged coup plot cases described below
enables the authorities to bypass the regular court system and use specially authorized courts for
which the minister of interior names judges and prosecutors, thereby involving the AKP
12 Interview with Hasan Cemal, Milliyet, August 2, 2008, OSC GMP20080802742001.
13 The charged members of the alleged criminal organization are said to have referred to themselves as Ergenekon.
Ergenekon means “steep mountain pass” and refers to the Turkish national myth: it was the route via which Turkish
ancestors, following a gray wolf, escaped from Central Asia to freedom in Turkey to exact revenge on their enemies.
All of the accused are known to have openly opposed the AKP.
14 The prosecutor defined terrorism according to Turkey’s Counterterrorism Law 3713, as “actions undertaken with the
aim of weakening, destroying, or seizing state authority, destroying the security of the state both at home and abroad,
and destroying public order.”
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government directly. No trials have concluded and no defendant has been convicted since
Ergenekon and other suspected plots began to surface, although the length of time that has
elapsed since the first detentions is not unusual in Turkey’s legal system.
A second indictment, submitted in March 2009, ran over 1,900 pages, and charged 56 people with
attempting to overthrow the government and possession of explosives and secret state documents.
Diaries allegedly belonging to a retired admiral and a leftist journalist were presented as evidence
amid other materials. The authorities controversially detained a number of academics and leaders
of non-governmental organizations for their alleged involvement in the plot. A third indictment,
submitted in August 2009, was more than 1,400 pages long and charged 52 suspects with a plot to
kill the prime minister, among others. A fourth indictment, submitted in January 2010, was “only”
300 pages long and charged 17 naval officers, including two retirees, in connection with a large
cache of arms found in April 2009 that was allegedly to be used to assassinate prosecutors of the
Ergenekon plot.
In addition, a special prosecutor in Erzurum submitted an indictment in March 2010, naming 16
defendants including 3rd Army Commander General Saldiray Berk, an active duty four-star
general, and the Chief Prosecutor for Erzincan who had been investigating the Gulen community,
several gendarmerie officers, and intelligence officials. (See “Fethullah Gulen Movement” below
for more on Gulen.) They also were charged with “membership in a terrorist organization,” that
is, Ergenekon, and intent to implement plans presented in earlier indictments. The group was
alleged to have conspired to incriminate members of the Gulen community, among other acts.
The plot has been called “The Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism” as fundamentalism is called
in Turkey. Then Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug and Land Forces Commander
General Isik Kosaner, who succeeded Basbug on August 30, 2010, defended General Berk and
charged that the indictment was based on secret witnesses and on misinterpreted innocent military
actions.
While the Ergenekon probe has been evolving, several other suspected plots have surfaced. The
“Cage Operation” is alleged to have been a plan originating in the navy to undermine the
government by assassinating prominent non-Muslims and bombing a museum while children
were present. Blame for the crimes was to be cast on the AKP.
“Operation Sledgehammer,” first reported in January 2010, is said to have been a high-level
military plot to perpetrate a coup in 2003, not long after the AKP took power. It reportedly was an
elaborate scheme to show that the AKP could not cope by bombing mosques, attacking museums,
and creating military tensions with Greece, and thereby pave the way for a military intervention.
A large number of active duty and retired military officers were arrested in connection with the
plot. Retired 1st Army Commander General Cetin Dogan is alleged to have been the mastermind.
Once again, AKP supporters accepted the veracity of the claims, but the general staff described
the preparations as a 1st Army training seminar for dealing with possible domestic uprisings or
threats.15 Some journalists and other analysts who have carefully examined the evidence maintain
that many documents used to support the case are forgeries or are flawed in other ways.16
15 “Turkish Army Spokesman Highlights Timing of Coup Plan Reports,” Anatolia (the state news agency), January 22,
2010, BBC Monitoring European.
16 Gareth Jenkins, Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation, Silk Road Paper, August 2009,
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the Institute
for Security and Development Policy, Dani Rodrik, “The Death of Turkey’s Democracy; ‘I No Longer Recognize the
(continued...)
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The detentions provoked tensions as General Basbug convened a meeting of all serving full
generals and admirals, sparking rumors of mass resignations. President Gul held an unusual
meeting with Prime Minister Erdogan and General Basbug and issued a statement to reassure
citizens. Former Deputy Chief of Staff General Ergin Saygun, former Air Force Commander
General Ibrahim Firtina, and former Naval Commander Admiral Ozden Ornek were released
from custody shortly thereafter. However, the 986-page indictment submitted on July 19 still
names General Dogan as “mastermind” and Firtina, Ornek, and former Land Forces Commander
Aytac Yalman, and other active duty generals and admirals as “suspects.”
Authorities also arrested military officers in connection with an alleged plot to assassinate Deputy
Prime Minister Bulent Arinc. The investigation began after two of the officers were apprehended
for acting suspiciously near Arinc’s home in December 2009. The general staff claimed that the
officers were engaged in intelligence collection unrelated to Arinc.17
Assessment
Turkey has a highly centralized government in which the interior minister, a member of the AKP
government, controls and funds the police, and the justice minister has influence over aspects of
the judiciary. Some analysts believe that the AKP is using Ergenekon and subsequent indictments
to intimidate its opponents, especially in the military.18 They claim that some allegations are
derived from extensive police wiretapping and some are wildly inaccurate.19 These observers
suggest that leaks of wiretaps to pro-government media outlets are part of a disinformation
campaign to boost the AKP’s fortunes and to help it ensnare well-known secularist opponents,
and not just coup-plotters.20 Former CHP Chairman Baykal argued that the Ergenekon charges are
“fictitious” and asserted, “there is a suspicion in society that it is turning out to be a political
revenge process rather than a legal process.”21
It is unknown if AKP or the Gulen Movement (see below) has devised Ergenekon for the
purposes of revenge and intimidation. However, there has been considerable and convincing
criticism of the conduct of the investigations, with practices such as defective search warrants,
excessive reliance on wiretap evidence, prolonged detention without charge, and harsh treatment
of those indicted.22 There also have been accusations of planted evidence and forged documents
and that “(d)eception at such a scale would be unimaginable without at least the implicit
cooperation of members of the government.”23 Some analysts suggest the police and prosecutors’
methods contradict European Union (EU) and international standards of justice and may
(...continued)
Country Where I was Raised,’” Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2010.
17 Statement of Office of the General Staff, December 23, 2009, OSC Document GMP20091223016002.
18 Nicholas Birch, “Ataturk Veneration Challenged; Nationalists and Islamists Pursued by Prosecutors,” Washington
Times, July 10, 2008, quoting a Turkish investigative journalist.
19 Bulent Aliriza and Seda Ciftci, “Another Long Hot Summer in Ankara,” Turkey Project Commentary, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, July 9, 2008.
20 Gareth Jenkins, “Pro-AKP Media Steps up Disinformation Campaign Over Ergenekon,” http://www.jamestown.org,
July 7, 2008.
21 Hidir Goktas and Selcuk Gokoluk, “Plan for Coup in Turkey,” The Gazette (Montreal), July 4, 2008.
22 See e.g., Riza Turman, “Waves of Arrests and Police Searches,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, April 21, 2009, Mehmet
Ali Birand, “Ergenekon will Make Life Difficult for AKP,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, April 21, 2009.
23 Dani Rodrik, Pinar Dogan, “Turkey’s Other Dirty War,” The New Republic, May 24, 2010.
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undermine hope that the case would serve to reinforce Turkey’s democracy, rule of law, and path
to the EU. The serial “revelations” are said to have produced a climate of fear among critics of the
government, worried that they could be apprehended next based on innocuous or fictitious
evidence. As yet, no AKP or government official is known to have criticized the manner in which
the investigations are being conducted. To the contrary, Prime Minister Erdogan has repeatedly
expressed support for the investigations and denied that they are a tool of the AKP.
Some observers see the alleged coup cases as a test of the ability of the civilian government to
achieve supremacy over the military.24 Mainly, they view the investigations as confronting the
extra-governmental power of what has long been referred to as the “deep state.”25 The “deep
state” refers to like-minded members of the military, bureaucracy, and related elite who believe it
their duty to safeguard the legacy of Ataturk and his vision for Turkey as a modern, secular state,
and who, according to this theory, have controlled the country and manipulated the political
system for 50 years. In that time, the military was responsible for two major coups d’état and
several other actions that deposed civilian governments. Members of the network are said to feel
most threatened by the AKP’s rise. This record of military interference or what its opponents
describe as “tutelage” lends some credibility to Ergenekon and other alleged plots.
2009 Municipal Elections26
Table 1. Results of 2009 Municipal Elections
Party
Orientation
Percent of Vote Changea
Justice and Development Party (AKP) Moderate Islamist/Centrist 38.1%
-7.8%
Republican People’s Party (CHP)
Nationalist Left
23.1%
+2.2%
Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
Nationalist Right
16.1%
+1.8%
Democratic Society Party (DTP)
Kurdish
5.6%
b
Felicity Party (SP)
Islamist
5.2%
+2.4%
a. From 2007 national election.
b. DTP did not compete as a party in 2007 because of the 10% of the vote threshold for parties to enter
parliament. Instead, it worked around that obstacle by sponsoring independent candidates and won 20
seats.
The March 2009 local elections for mayors and provincial councils may have been a wake-up call
for the AKP and dispelled the notion that its continued domination of Turkish politics is
inevitable. Although it placed first with 39% of the vote, won the most municipalities, and scored
victories nationwide, the party’s total vote was less than the 46.6% it had registered in 2007 and
its strength was mainly in Anatolia. Moreover, the combined vote of the opposition parties was
greater than the AKP’s. Voter turnout was normally high at 80%. CHP was said to have run a
more issue-oriented campaign than in 2007, when it sounded anti-religious. It won most of the
provinces along the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas. DTP retrieved its followers from AKP,
24 Omer Taspinar, “A Rotten Year for the Military,” Today’s Zaman online, January 4, 2010.
25 See, e.g., Oral Calislar, “Bitterness Against AKP Shouldn’t Blind Us to Ergenekon,” Turkish Daily News, July 16,
2008.
26 For an analysis of the election, see Eser Sekercioglu, “Turkey’s March 2009 Elections: Loss Without Defeat, Gain
Without Victory,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2009.
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which had polled well in the predominantly Kurdish southeast in 2007 and had tried to woo the
populace there. Instead, the Kurds asserted their ethnic identity by choosing DTP, a party whose
mission was to defend that identity. Elsewhere, nationalist parties may have gained some traction
from popular reaction to the unending war with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Some
moderates, who supported the AKP when it was under siege in 2007, were said to have become
disenchanted with the AKP’s flagging support for democratizing EU reforms. In addition, some
Islamists may have been repelled by an incipient stench of corruption afflicting AKP and asserted
their identity with SP, which had acquired new leaders since 2007.
While the election results were largely attributed to the economic downturn and the opposition’s
choice of more effective candidates,27 analysts also suggested that some voters were wary of
giving the AKP and its combative and somewhat authoritarian leader, that is, Prime Minister
Erdogan, monopolistic power.28 Others simply may have become tired of a government that had
been in power for seven years.
Cabinet Changes
The municipal elections produced a cabinet shake-up. On May 1, 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan
implemented major changes to renew his government by changing almost half of his ministers.
Most of those replaced represented districts where the AKP had fared badly in the vote. Portfolios
affected deal mainly with the economy and foreign policy, but other significant ones took on new
leaders as well. The prime minister anointed former speaker and fellow AKP founder Bulent
Arinc as first deputy prime minister. Arinc’s appointment was seen as an effort to stanch the rise
of or undermine the SP because he is associated with the orientation of National View or Milli
Gorus that characterized AKP’s precursor, the more Islamist Refah Party.29 Balancing that move,
advocate of girls’ education and former member of the CHP Nimet Cubukcu was named the first
woman minister of education, replacing a fervid advocate of Islamic education.30 Ali Babacan,
who some had considered out of his depth as foreign minister, became another deputy prime
minister and returned to his métier with oversight of ministries related to the economy.
Meanwhile, Ahmet Davutoglu, the academic influential advisor to President Gul and Prime
Minister Erdogan and architect of AKP’s foreign policy, emerged from the shadows for the public
role of foreign minister.
Constitutional Reforms
In 2010, the AKP government proposed to amend the 1982 constitution, which had been written
under the auspices of a military junta and has since been amended many times. The government
asserted that the changes were needed in order to pave the way for European Union membership
27 Turkey registered a growth rate of only 1.1% in 2008 and unemployment was 15.8% in March 2009, at the time of
the election. “Turkish Economy Growth 1.1 pct in 2008,” Xinhua News Agency, March 31, 2009, and “Turkey’s
Unemployment Rate Rises to 14.5% in Jan 2010,” Anatolia, April 15, 2010, OSC Document GMP20100415788015.
28 Soli Ozel, “The Electorate’s Tune-Up,” On Turkey, the German Marshall Fund of the United States (hereafter GMF),
March 31, 2009.
29 Amberin Zaman, “Turkey’s Cabinet Reshuffle: Another Balancing Act,” On Turkey, GMF, May 11, 2009.
30 The role of women in the government and bureaucracy reportedly has otherwise been diminishing statistically since
AKP came to power. Soner Cagaptay and Rueya Perincek, “Women’s Diminishing Power in Turkey,” Hurriyet Daily
News.com, May 24, 2010.
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and to create a modern and advanced democracy. The EU has advocated many of the reforms and
has pressed Turkey to adopt a completely new constitution.
Many of the 27 proposed amendments were in fact democratizing, such as ones to create an
ombudsman, and to improve the rights of children, elderly, women, the disabled, labor unions,
civil servants, and to privacy. Other changes would allow the trial of military officers who took
power via the September 1980 coup and enable the trial of military personnel in civilian courts
for non-military crimes.31 The most controversial reforms were amendments to add judges to the
Constitutional Court, change the makeup of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors
(HSYK), which appoints judges and prosecutors, and make it more difficult to ban parties. The
court was to be enlarged from 11 members to 17, with the president gaining power to appoint
most and parliament, where AKP holds sway, the remainder; members’ terms would be limited to
12 years; and the court’s jurisdiction would be limited. Meanwhile, HSYK would be enlarged
from 7 members to 21 and the minister of justice would gain more control over it.
The AKP clearly intended to exert greater influence over both judicial bodies. Professor Ilter
Turan suggested that Prime Minister Erdogan is “inclined to think that a party enjoying a
parliamentary majority should reign unconstrained by other institutions.”32 Other critics accused
the government of attacking the independence of and politicizing the judiciary, seeking to destroy
the separation of powers and checks and balances, and weaken a last bastion of secularist
opposition. The AKP denied the accusations and maintained that the changes would make the
functioning of the judicial system similar to that of some EU member states. Omer Taspinar of the
Brookings Institution observed that the judiciary heretofore has not been truly independent
anyway, as it primarily has served secularism.33
Parliament—in essence, 336 AKP members—agreed to all but one of the proposed amendments,
voting down the one making it more difficult to ban political parties. Ironically, that amendment
failed mainly because several AKP members said to be nationalists were concerned about the loss
of the ban as a weapon against allegedly separatist Kurdish political parties even though the
amendment also would have shielded the AKP. President Gul approved the package of
amendments on May 12. The AKP submitted the 26 amendments that passed parliament with less
than the 367 votes needed to avoid a referendum as a single package, not individually, to a
September 12 national vote.
Democratization advocates were disappointed that the AKP did not propose an entirely new
constitution and that the proposed amendments did not advance the rights of ethnic or religious
groups and of free expression, lower the 10% of the vote threshold for a party to enter parliament,
require political parties to hold primaries in order to end party leaders’ inordinate control, or limit
legislators’ immunity. Other critics charged that submitting the amendments as a package for a
referendum resembled methods used in authoritarian regimes. The (Kurdish) Peace and
Democracy Party (BDP) had indicated willingness to support changes if they included a lowering
of the 10% of the vote threshold for parties to enter parliament, which has long been an obstacle
31 Due to the probable expiration of the statute of limitations, none of the perpetrators of the coup may be prosecuted.
Moreover, General Kenan Evren, head of the 1980 junta, is now 93 years of age. The amendment appeared to be a ploy
to get the opposition CHP, which was ousted from power in 1980, to support the package of amendments. It did not
work.
32 Ilter Turan, “A Background to the Constitutional Referendum: Reinforcing the Politics of Polarization,” On Turkey,
GMF, August 30, 2010.
33 Omer Taspinar, “Judicial Independence and Democracy in Turkey,” Today’s Zaman Online, July 13, 2010.
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for Kurdish parties. As the amendments did not address that issue, the BDP members did not vote
for them. CHP deputies did not attend the votes, and MHP members voted against amendments.
CHP and 14 other members of parliament applied to the Constitutional Court to annul the entire
package of amendments, arguing that it contravenes the immutable Article 2 of the present
constitution, which defines Turkey as “a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule
of law,” etc.34 The court had the prerogative to annul individual amendments or the entire
package. On July 7, it annulled parts of the amendments dealing with the court and the HSYK.
While upholding increasing the number of members of both bodies, it opposed limiting the legal
establishment’s role in the selection of candidates for the court and thereby expanding the
president’s power of appointment. It also opposed expanding the pool of candidates for the
HSYK beyond the legal profession, which might have made it easier for the AKP to pack that
body. The remainder of those two amendments and rest of the package were submitted to the
referendum.
The AKP was satisfied that its reforms survived the court review with only minor changes. As
Deputy Prime Minister and former Justice Minister Cemil Cicek observed, “the constitutional
package is pretty good even in its new form.”35 AKP, SP, and the small Islamist Grand Unity
Party (BBP) campaigned for a “yes” vote in the referendum. MHP and CHP campaigned for a
“no” vote. CHP continued to argue that the amendments would politicize the judiciary. BDP said
that it would boycott the vote because the changes ignored the Kurds’ concerns. An EU
endorsement of the constitutional changes may have undermined the opposition description of
them. The Office of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement called the measures “a positive step
in the right direction as it addresses a number of shortcomings which the EU has identified over
the years.”36
The referendum campaign disappointed as neither side focused on the substance of the
amendments, leaving many voters ill-informed. Instead, Prime Minister Erdogan and CHP leader
Kemal Kilicdaroglu engaged in a nasty, divisive personal battle and dwelt on unrelated policy
issues, such as a general amnesty for the PKK and negotiating with the terrorist group. Erdogan
raised fears about his future conduct when he appeared to threaten non-governmental
organizations which chose to remain neutral with regard to the referendum and described
opponents of the amendments as “supporters of the (1980) military coup.” The campaign
transmogrified into a vote of confidence on Erdogan and possible preview of the next national
elections.
Despite predictions of a close vote, a much larger than expected 58.45% majority approved the
amendments, while 41.54% disapproved of them. The participation rate was 77% in a peaceful
climate. However, regional differences were strong and evidenced continuing polarization of
society. Most of Anatolia voted yes; most of the Mediterranean and Aegean coasts and Thrace
(the part of Turkey that is geographically part of Europe) voted no; and much of the southeast did
not vote. Erdogan hailed the result as a victory for democracy. It certainly was a personal victory
for him and for the AKP, which increased its share of the vote from the 2009 municipal elections.
CHP also appears to have increased its share, but it did not increase its vote in the southeast
34 Yusuf Kanli, “Indecent Offer,” Hurriyet Daily News. com, April 27, 2010.
35 “AK Party Hopeful, Opposition Vows to Vote Against Package,” Today’s Zaman Online, July 9, 2010.
36 Carol Malouf, “Turkey’s Democratic Revolution,” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, July 12, 2010.
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despite Kilicdaroglu’s campaign there. MHP suffered major defections to the yes position, as it
lost many municipalities that it controls.
Almost immediately after the results were announced, Erdogan announced plans for
implementing legislation and to draft a new constitution for approval after the national elections.
Interior Minister Besir Atalay declared, “a way has been opened now to help us to a more radical
change in our constitution and change it entirely.”37 The chairman of the parliamentary
Constitutional Commission (or committee) is considered an expert on presidential systems, which
the prime minister is known to prefer. The kind of system that is adopted may be the final test of
AKP’s dedication to democracy and its view of the identity of the state.
Role of the Military
The Turkish military views itself as the guarantor of the Turkish Republic and protector of its
secular identity, and has overtly intervened in the political process at least five times since 1960,
including two coups. Civilian leaders have heretofore had limited control over the military. The
general staff is not subordinate to the minister of defense; the chief of staff reports to the prime
minister. For years, the military practically chose its own chief of staff by submitting a name for
appointment. The name was that of the land forces commander.
Yet, during the crises over the possible closure of the AKP and the Ergenekon affair, the military
commanders were restrained, aside from calling for caution and respect for the law. They may not
have recovered from a bungled attempt to prevent President Gul’s election by means of a warning
notice that then Chief of the General Staff Yasar Buyukanit posted on the general staff’s website
on April 27, 2007, described by some as an attempted “e-coup.”38 That action was
counterproductive, as it helped bring about early national elections, contributed to the AKP
victory in the 2007 elections by generating sympathy for it as an underdog confronting the
powerful military, and produced Gul’s election.
Thus, the military may have been content to let secularist allies in the judicial bureaucracy take
the lead in the effort to eliminate the AKP. After the party survived its judicial test, the military
commanders verbally reasserted their oversight role and dedication to secularism at the change of
command ceremony on August 30, 2007, in the presence of President Gul and Prime Minister
Erdogan. Incoming Land Forces Commander General Isik Kosaner, who became chief of staff on
August 30, 2010, forthrightly stated, “protection of fundamental characteristics of the republic
cannot be considered intervention in domestic politics.” Then new Chief of the General Staff
General Ilker Basbug communicated the same message, but with more subtlety. He confirmed,
“the Turkish Armed Forces is always involved as a party when it comes to safeguarding and
protecting the underlying philosophy of the Republic of Turkey,” noting, “the principle of
secularism is one of the pillars of the underlying philosophy of the Republic.” Basbug also quoted
Article 24 of the constitution, which stipulates that religion should not be exploited for political
benefit.39 He recommended that it was essential for social peace that those concerned about the
growing influence of religious ideas on the country’s cultural identity be taken seriously.
37 “Referendum Opened Way for More Radical Change in Constitution, Interior Minister,” Anatolia, September 14,
2010, BBC Monitoring European, September 15, 2010.
38 Elif Safak, “It is Not Easy to Be a Turk,” Turkish Daily News, May 12, 2007.
39 Speech delivered by Turkish Chief of the General Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug at an inaugural ceremony held on August
(continued...)
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The military has not followed its rhetoric with action. Some analysts suggest that it has been
intimidated by the Ergenekon and other prosecutions and, therefore, is reluctant to challenge the
AKP directly. Others observe that the AKP has proven its popularity at the ballot box repeatedly
and there has been no public demand for military intervention. Moreover, until recently, there
have been no credible alternatives to AKP rule, so its removal might have produced a period of
instability that could derail the considerable economic progress that Turkey has made in the past
decade. Thus, the military’s own patriotism may have constrained any desire to overthrow the
government.
For its part, the AKP has gradually chipped away at the military’s power. Early on, it deprived the
general staff of the chairmanship of the National Security Council, giving the post to a civilian. In
2009, parliament passed a law granting jurisdiction over civilian crimes committed by members
of the military to civilian courts. (The Constitutional Court overturned the law in January 2010,
but AKP revived the idea as a constitutional amendment in the package that passed in September.)
As noted, critics of AKP rule believe that the investigations into Ergenekon and other alleged
coup plots for which retired and active duty members of the armed forces have been detained is
serving as a weapon to tame the military. Media leaks about Ergenekon and the other plots also
reveal possible fissures within the previously presumed united ranks of the armed forces, as some
journalists suggest that only those in the military could be sources of the revelations. Finally, in
February 2010, the government abolished the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public
Order (EMASYA), which allowed the military to intervene in domestic security matters on its
own initiative. It had been signed in the aftermath of the military’s 1997 ouster of a civilian
government led by AKP’s more Islamist predecessor. EMASYA’s demise was a byproduct of the
“Sledgehammer” Plot, in which military elements reportedly planned to create a climate of
insecurity in order to justify another military intervention. Chief of Staff General Basbug said that
the protocol was no longer needed.
Although the general staff is cooperating with the police by allowing searches of military
residences and the seizure of documents, its responses indicate that it may be unable to contend
with the barrage of media leaks from the investigation.40 In June 2009, General Basbug first
charged that an “asymmetric psychological operation” was being waged against the Turkish
Armed Forces via the media and that there was an organized “campaign to discredit and slander”
them.41 He voiced similar concerns on additional occasions, and new Chief of Staff General
Kosaner has echoed that anxiety. It is a sign of the military’s diminishing power that these
remarks have not stopped the legal and media onslaught.
The government played its strongest card against the military at the August 2010 meetings of the
Supreme Military Council (YAS), which decides military promotions. In a landmark
development, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gul exerted civilian control over the military
(...continued)
28, 2008, text on website of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, OSC Document, GMP20080828734009. A
more complete Basbug quote from Article 24 was “nobody should exploit or abuse any religion or religious feelings or
things that are regarded as sacred with a view to basing the basic social, economic, political, and legal systems or any
part of them on religious rules or deriving political or personal benefit or clout....”
40 Some view the cooperation with the police as a sign that some in the military command may be trying to get rid of
undemocratic elements. However, this notion may be yet another conspiracy theory produced in an atmosphere
conducive to them.
41 General Ilker Basbug News Conference on Plot Allegations, Anatolia, June 26, 2009, BBC Monitoring European,
June 28, 2009.
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by not rubber stamping recommendations of the military commanders. Two days before the YAS
session, AKP allies in the judiciary charged with prosecuting the alleged coup plots appeared to
aid the government. An Istanbul court hearing the Sledgehammer case (above) issued arrest
warrants for 102 officers, including 11 generals and admirals whose future service the YAS was
to determine. (The warrants would be annulled on August 7.) Some journalists perceived political
motivation in the timing of the arrests, as the trial is not scheduled until December.42 Gul and
Erdogan would not approve promotions of those subject to arrest, including 1st Army Commander
General Hasan Igsiz, who was expected to become land forces commander and next in line to be
chief of staff but was called to testify in the Sledgehammer case. In addition, Gul opposed retiring
officers and thereby infringing on their rights before the judicial process ran its course. Thus,
YAS did not announce the appointments of land forces commander and chief of the general staff
as per usual practice on the fourth day of meetings. Gul and Erdogan withheld approval of the
chief of staff until the land forces commander was decided, thereby denying the incoming chief of
staff of influence over the latter appointment.
Commander of the Gendarmerie General Atilla Isik reportedly was the government’s choice for
land forces instead of Igsiz, but he unexpectedly decided to retire early and not to take a post
denied his comrade. In the end, a compromise was reached. General Erdal Ceylanoglu was named
land forces commander to serve for one year before reaching mandatory retirement, at which time
General Necdet Ozel will succeed him and be in line to become chief of staff in 2013. Finally,
General Isik Kosaner was named the new chief of staff as expected.
Kurdish Issue
Kurds represent between 15% and 20% of the Turkish populace and have long struggled to claim
their own identity in a majority Turkish state. However, they do not constitute a recognized
minority, as Turkey only recognizes groups named in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as minorities, that
is, Greek Orthodox, Armenians, and Jews. Because of a resulting perception of minorities as
“others,” Kurdish politicians do not seek “minority rights” when they state their demands.
Instead, they voice them in terms of group or constitutional rights. Most Kurds trace their origins
to the impoverished southeast of the country, which still is predominantly Kurdish, but many have
migrated to major urban centers elsewhere.
Since 1984, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which the U.S.-State Department designated as
a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1996, has waged a guerrilla war against Turkish
security forces mainly in southeast Turkey and engaged in urban terrorism elsewhere in the
country. In 1999, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured and sentenced to life in prison on the
island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara and the insurgency abated temporarily. However, the PKK
took advantage of the chaos in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 to establish safe
havens in northern Iraq, from which it has since launched attacks against Turkey.
Since 2007, the United States military has provided “active intelligence” to Turkish counterparts,
leading to more targeted operations against the PKK. Turkish commanders have expressed
satisfaction with this cooperation. These operations, as well as increased cooperation with the
Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, may have
gradually provided Ankara with some sense of security needed to address the concerns of
42 Yusuf Kanli, “Domesticating the Military,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, August 5, 2010.
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Turkey’s Kurds. The combination of military escalation and government measures affected the
PKK, which unilaterally declared a cease-fire in 2009. The declaration had little meaning,
however, as intermittent PKK attacks on soldiers continued to occur. PKK military leader Murat
Karayilan, who is based in northern Iraq, claimed that the group was no longer seeking
independence, only autonomy. But this, and his demand for a separate regional parliament,
similar to those in Scotland and Wales, run counter to Turkey’s constitutional definition of a
unitary state.
From 2005, when Prime Minister Erdogan delivered a major speech to Kurds in the southeast city
of Diyarbakir, until 2007, the AKP government emphasized socioeconomic development of the
region and reaped benefits from these policies in terms of votes in the 2007 national election.
However, it also may have raised expectations that it would next address cultural identity issues,
which it did not do. Perhaps as a result, AKP’s showing in the southeast in the 2009 municipal
elections was poor, as DTP reclaimed many municipalities.
Over the years, Kurds repeatedly have endeavored to participate in Turkey’s political system
legally via the formation of political parties. Yet, none of these parties has distanced itself from or
condemned the PKK, as the parties and the terrorist group share the same goals and believe that
they serve the same community. Therefore, the courts have banned each party for alleged links to
the PKK. Most recently, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) was represented in parliament until
December 2009. It had an ambitious agenda: constitutional protection of Kurdish cultural rights
and language, what it called “democratic autonomy” or strengthening local administrations in the
southeast, abolition of the system of village guards (local militias set up by the state to help the
military fight the PKK), improvement of Ocalan’s prison conditions, and a general amnesty for
the PKK. Not unexpectedly, in November 2007, the prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to
ban the DTP and 221 of its members, including 18 members of parliament, for being in conflict
with the indivisible integrity of the territory of the state and supporting the PKK. Shortly after the
March 2009 municipal elections, security forces detained many DTP leaders and members.
A political calculus to position the AKP better for the next national elections after the 2009
municipal results may have spurred the government to launch what has been called a “Kurdish
opening.” The government said that the initiative was aimed at undermining support for the PKK
and finally ending the decades-long conflict. The move also may have been inspired by U.S.
plans to withdraw from Iraq and by Turkey’s improved relations with the Kurdish administration
in northern Iraq. On July 29, 2009, Interior Minister Atalay announced a “democratization”
initiative. He said that he would seek a national consensus to shape measures to be undertaken by
consulting political parties, non-governmental groups, and others. However, the government
never discussed specific proposals or sought a consensus with its interlocutors.
The nationalist opposition rapidly succeeded in defining the initiative in the public space. The
CHP and MHP charged that the government was negotiating with terrorists because of its
willingness to talk to the DTP, which they maintained was the same as the PKK. MHP leader
Bahceli accused the government of engaging in a “treasonous project,” and then CHP head
Baykal charged that the government was “trying to prevent terrorism by inciting ethnic
division.”43 Baykal said that he would oppose partial autonomy and initiatives that would
43 “Opposition sets Red Lines, Incurs Gov’t Wrath,” Hurriyet Daily News.com , August 10, 2009, “Erdogan Makes
Emotional Appeal for Unity on Kurdish Initiative,” Today’s Zaman online, August 12, 2009, Murat Yetkin, “We Will
Not Be Fellow Travelers in This Affair,” Radikal, September 6, 2009, BBC Monitoring European, September 7, 2009.”
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introduce ethnicity into the education system, that is, instruction in Kurdish language. Both
parties refused to meet with Atalay.
Chief of the General Staff General Basbug took a more nuanced approach. He had previously
acknowledged that there is no military solution to the Kurdish problem, yet he quoted Article 3 of
the Constitution which states, “The Turkish state … is an indivisible whole. Its language is
Turkish,” which appeared to eliminate regional autonomy and recognition of the Kurdish
language as possible aspects of the initiative. Basbug also declared, “the Turkish armed forces
cannot engage in any activity which might lead to the establishment of relations with the (PKK)
terrorist organization or its supporters.” Yet, he expressed support for “measures in the economic,
socio-cultural, and international areas,” thereby suggesting that the military was not completely
opposed to the government’s initiative.44
The “Kurdish opening” suffered a severe setback in October 2009, when 8 PKK members and 26
other Kurds returned to Turkey from a refugee camp in northern Iraq to a heroes’ welcome in
Diyarbakir, the regional capital of southeastern Turkey. Thousands of Kurds shouted slogans in
support of the PKK and of Abdullah Ocalan as if it were a victory celebration. The televised
images outraged many Turks because of the PKK’s long record of terrorism. Prime Minister
Erdogan described the events as a “crisis of confidence” and repeatedly blamed the DTP for the
demonstration and for upsetting the process.45 The government halted the arrival of additional
groups from Iraq and most of the returnees were imprisoned.
These developments did not completely deter the government, although the initial steps it
announced as part of the initiative, retitled the “democratic overture,” were modest. As stated in
November 2009, they included establishment of an independent human rights institution and a
commission to combat discrimination; parliamentary ratification of the U.N. Convention Against
Torture; a national mechanism to prevent torture; establishment of an independent body to receive
and investigate accusations of torture and mistreatment by the security forces; renaming areas in
line with demands from local residents (i.e., restoration of Kurdish names for villages that had
been renamed in Turkish); and freedom for political parties to communicate in languages other
than Turkish.
The government did not describe the measures as serving a specific group, that is, the Kurds.
Interior Minister Atalay said that they were part of a “dynamic process” and not a final list. There
was no amnesty for Ocalan or PKK militants, no federalism, and no raising of Kurdish to the
level of an official language. In other words, the government did not propose changes to
constitutional provisions mandating the unitary state or the official language (Turkish). As of this
date, the government has not implemented its limited proposals.
Meanwhile, DTP chose to champion ending Ocalan’s alleged ill-treatment in prison as a condition
for supporting the “Kurdish opening” and called for a government dialogue with Ocalan, whom it
considered essential to a solution of the Kurdish issue. DTP leader Ahmet Turk described the
government’s proposals as “some minor steps which will have no significance.”46
44 “Victory Week Message by General Staff Chief General Ilker Basbug,” Office of the Chief of the General Staff,
August 25, 2009, OSC Document GMP20090825788006.
45 “The Return of PKK Members from Europe Postponed,” NTV Online, October 24, 2009, OSC Document
GMP20091024017003.
46 “We will not Obstruct this Process,” Interview with Ahmet Turk, Milliyet, November 16, 2009, BBC Monitoring
(continued...)
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In December, seven soldiers were killed in a PKK attack in Tokat. Then, the Constitutional Court
unanimously voted to ban DTP and 37 members, including Ahmet Turk, from participating in
politics for five years. Turk and Aysel Tugluk, his deputy leader, also were expelled from
parliament. Shortly thereafter, some 200 Kurdish politicians were arrested in the southeast. Other
DTP members of parliament joined the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which has 20
members of parliament and Selahattin Demirtas and Gulten Kisanek as co-chairmen. Demirtas
has expressed interest in working with the government to find a solution.47 He denies that there is
an organic link between the BDP and PKK, but notes that the PKK is a reality with an important
constituency in the southeast, where BDP (DTP) receives its 2.5 million votes, and must be an
important actor for solution to the Kurdish problem. Demirtas has suggested that “Kurd” need not
be mentioned in the constitution, but that it should be “the Constitution of the Turkish citizens,”
not the Turkish nation. He also wants the constitution to allow education in a mother tongue
without supplanting the compulsory teaching of Turkish.48 In addition, he calls for the
establishment of regional assemblies to legislate on local issues, such as education and the
economy. He insists that the BDP is the interlocutor for cultural, political, and economic
dimensions of the Kurdish issue, and that only Ocalan can end the armed struggle. Police have
arrested dozens of BDP members, administrators, and mayors from the southeast who are part of
the Assembly of Communities of Kurdistan (KCK), which has alleged connections to the PKK. In
February 2010, a prosecutor launched an investigation into the BDP, which may pave the way for
yet another party closure.
While no longer in parliament, Ahmet Turk still is the most prominent Kurdish politician. In
August 2010, he became co-chairman of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), with Tugluk as
his co-chair. DTK is an umbrella organization of Kurdish parties and actors that is an influential
forum and appears to act as a superior to the BDP. It has called for a “reciprocal cease-fire.”
Ahmet Turk also calls for lowering the threshold to enter parliament to at least 5% and for the
release of local leaders and others from prison, where they have been held without trial.49
In the spring of 2010, the PKK again escalated its attacks, and Turkish warplanes responded with
bombing raids against the group’s strongholds in northern Iraq. In late May, the PKK killed seven
naval servicemen in Iskenderun—outside its usual areas of operation. On June 19, more than 200
PKK terrorists assaulted a mobile military unit in Semdinli, near the Iraq border, killing 9 soldiers
and injuring 14. Two others died and two were injured in pursuit of the perpetrators. Then, a PKK
front group claimed credit for bombing a military bus in Istanbul, killing 5 and injuring 11.
Officials also believe that the PKK was responsible for an explosion on a natural gas pipeline
near the Iraqi border in July, although company officials indicated that the cause was not
determined. Observers noted that, as opposed to its past acts of terrorism, the PKK did not target
civilians. Prime Minister Erdogan charged that the PKK was trying to sabotage “the economic,
social, and democratic improvement process,” but others suggested the group may be attempting
to fill the void created by the lack of real government action on its initiative.50 Most analysts
(...continued)
European, November 17, 2009.
47 Comments at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 4, 2010.
48 Safak Timur, “Pro-Kurdish Leader sees Dawn to Follow Political Midnight in Turkey,” Hurriyet Daily News.com,
June 29, 2010.
49 “I Prefer ‘Yes’ from a Conscientious and Ethical Standpoint,” interview with Ahmet Turkey by Cemal Kalyoncu and
Ayse Adli, Sunday’s Zaman Online, September 5, 2010, OSC Document GMP20100905788004.
50 “Turkish Premier says PKK a Tool for Plots Against Turkey,” Anatolia, June 20, 2010, BBC Monitoring European.
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agree that the government’s Kurdish opening is closing despite the government’s assertions that
“the democratic overture is continuing.”
In July 2010, Erdogan invited selected political parties to discuss terrorism. MHP and BDP were
noticeably not among the invitees because the prime minister claimed that they exploit terrorist
attacks for their political interests. This led some to question the sincerity of the government’s
desire for non-military solution to the Kurdish issue because representatives of two significant
antagonists were missing.51 Moreover, as nationalist anti-PKK sentiment has risen, the
government has focused increasingly on use of armed force, such as calling for the deployment of
professional soldiers along the border, while retaining its advocacy of a multifaceted approach.
There were fears that an escalation in ethnic violence was beginning. In July, nationalists and
Kurds clashed in the streets of a town in southeast Turkey after four policemen were killed in an
alleged PKK attack. Then, large-scale street battles between Turks and Kurds occurred in the
northwestern province of Bursa. Some analysts attributed the widening tensions, especially in the
west, to greater public discussion of ethnicity and identity and to a pre-election period in which
all groups seek to make their marks. The violence was unlikely to be conducive for even modest
government measures, much less for more dramatic ones that might satisfy Kurds’ ambitions
designed to gain greater official recognition of their demands regarding identity issues. However,
in August, the PKK announced a cease-fire for the month of Ramadan. As it was set to expire, a
bomb killed nine and wounded four civilians, including two children, in the southeast province of
Hakkari on September 17. The government blamed the PKK, but the group disavowed
responsibility and some reports implicated a dissenting PKK faction.52 The PKK subsequently
extended the cease-fire.
Press Freedom
The U.S. State Department and the European Union have long criticized Turkey for imposing
legal limitations on freedom of expression. Increasing pro-government groups’ acquisition of
formerly more independent media outlets and constraints on press freedom in particular have
raised questions about Prime Minister Erdogan’s and the AKP government’s commitment to
democratic values and whether they are attempting to squelch opposition voices. According to the
annual State Department report on human rights practices in Turkey in 2009, “individuals in
many cases could not criticize the state or government publicly without risk of criminal suits or
government investigations.”53 This particular criticism did not appear in the previous State reports
and may have resulted from the investigation and detention of journalists known to be ardent
secularists and critics of the AKP in the Ergenekon probe.
Moreover, pro-government forces, with family or business connections to Erdogan, have acquired
control of the second-largest media conglomerate in the country. In 2007, state banking regulators
took over and then sold, with the assistance of generous loans from state banks, the Ciner
51 Rusen Cakir, “Let us say the Professional Army was a Success,” Vatan Online, July 15, 2010.
52 “Interior Minister Atalay: All Findings in the Hakkari Blast Point to Similar Attacks by the Organization to Date,
Anatolia, September 17, 2010, OSC Document GMP20100918016008, “Deep PKK Responsible for Land Mine Attack,
Officials Say,” Anatolia, OSC Document 20100918017004.
53 U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Country Report on Human Right
Practices, March 11, 2010.
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publishing group to a company whose chief economic officer is the prime minister’s son-in-law.
Its large circulation daily, Sabah, subsequently became another voice supportive of the
government. Similarly loyal companies may now control about half of the media in the country.
The other half may be considered independent or opposition in orientation.
The case of the Dogan Media Group, the largest media conglomerate not controlled by
government allies, may be a prime example of Erdogan’s sensitivity to criticism and of dangers to
press freedom. Dogan owns seven newspapers, including the English-language Hurriyet Daily
News, Hurriyet, and Milliyet, as well as 28 magazines and 3 television channels, and engages in
business in other fields, as do other media conglomerates. Owner Aydin Dogan had long used his
media outlets to gain political influence for the benefit of his other businesses. In 2008, the Dogan
press increasingly criticized the AKP government’s actions. They reported about some Erdogan
family members’ business dealings and about a criminal case in Germany involving a Muslim
charity (Lighthouse) accused of funneling money to the AKP in violation of a Turkish ban on
foreign funding. In response, the prime minister castigated the Dogan Group publicly and called
for a boycott of its outlets. This treatment was not new, as Erdogan previously had attacked other
media owners, revoked the accreditation of journalist critics, sued cartoonists for defamation, and
called for other boycotts. In the Dogan case, Erdogan’s personal predilections may have waxed
into government policy.
In April 2008, the Ministry of Finance began a tax inspection of Dogan’s companies. In February
2009, it ordered Dogan Media to pay a penalty of approximately $490 million.54 In September,
another penalty of approximately $2.6 billion was imposed. Aydin Dogan charged that this
constituted an assault on freedom of the press and was the result of selective government
enforcement. Similarly, a European Commission spokesman stated, “when the sanction is of such
magnitude that it threatens the existence of an entire press group ... then freedom of the press is at
stake.”55 Then European Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn observed, “if a tax fine is worth
the annual turnover of the company, it is quite a strong sanction, and it may not only be a fiscal
sanction but also it feels like a political sanction.”56 Several international press and human rights
groups raised questions about the fine. The International Press Institute’s director said, “the
timing and unprecedented size of this tax fine raise serious concerns that the authorities are
changing their approach from rhetoric to using the state apparatus to harass the media…. (T)he
aim is not to punish the tax irregularity, but to liquidate the largest media group in the country.”57
Erdogan responded, “freedom of the press cannot be used as a means to shade smearing and
slander.”58 Dogan newspapers have since made personnel changes and they, and other media,
have muted their criticism of the government, although the case remains in the courts, which have
upheld some of the fines. A chilling effect on freedom of the press may be at play.
54 The case involved a dispute concerning the date that Dogan sold a percentage of its television holdings to a German
company. Dogan maintains that the sale occurred on January 2, 2007, while the Finance Ministry claims that it was
done in 2006 and that the government is owed taxes that were evaded, plus a penalty charge. Yusuf Kanli, “Whose
Turn will be Next?” Hurriyet Daily News.com, February 21, 2009.
55 “EU Slams Turkey over Media Group Fine,” Agence France Presse, September 11, 2009.
56 Stephen Castle and Sebnem Arsu, “Europeans Criticize Turkey over Threats to Media Freedom,” New York Times,
October 15, 2009.
57 International Press Institute, Press Release, February 20, 2009, BBC Monitoring Media, February 23, 2009.
58 BBC Monitoring, “Turkish Dogan Group Tax Penalty Termed ‘Assault’ on Media Freedom,” February 23, 2009,
OSC Document GMP20090223950045.
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Concern about constraints on freedom of expression also has been voiced about internet
censorship in Turkey. Authorities have banned some 5,000 websites for “inappropriate content.”
The video-sharing site YouTube has been banned since 2008 for illegally broadcasting videos
defaming Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and several Google services were banned in June 2010,
provoking protests in Istanbul. The government has defended its actions as a way to prevent
distribution of pornography and a response to tax delinquency. Reporters Sans Frontiers classifies
Turkey with less democratic regimes, such as Russia, United Arab Emirates, and Eritrea, when it
comes to internet censorship.59 As with the press, the larger issue involved is that of increasing
government control over access to information from varied sources.
Fethullah Gulen Movement60
A somewhat enigmatic force on the domestic political scene and one supportive of the AKP is the
Fethullah Gulen Movement (or Community). Fethullah Gulen, called hocaefendi (master), was
born in a village in Erzurum Province in eastern Turkey in 1941 and gained a popular following
while an imam on the government payroll in Edirne and Izmir in the west. Gulen is a student of
the ideas of Said Nursi (1876-1960), whose message was in part that “Muslims should not reject
modernity, but find inspiration in the sacred texts to engage with it.”61 Nursi opposed violence,
appreciated globalization, and encouraged interfaith dialogue.62 He founded the Sufi Nurcu
tariqat (Followers of Light religious order).63 The Nurcu fragmented after Nursi’s death, and
Gulen founded his own cemaat or Islamic group.
Gulen’s philosophy added a theme of nationalism to Nursi’s ideas. One analyst suggests that
“Gulen’s goals are simultaneously to Islamize the Turkish nationalist ideology and to Turkify
Islam. He hopes to reestablish the link between religion and the state that existed in the Ottoman
era, when leaders were expected to live their lives based on Islamic regulations. Such an
approach, he argues, would strengthen the state, and protect society by widening the state’s base
of legitimacy.”64 However, Gulen does not favor making seriat (Islamic law) state law. In the
1980s, the Gulen Movement became a nationwide phenomenon.
In the aftermath of the military’s ouster of the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party-led government in
1997, authorities brought charges against Fethullah Gulen for “working to overthrow the secular
government in Turkey” even though Gulen had publicly supported the military’s actions against
Refah. At the time, Gulen was in the United States for medical treatment. He was acquitted in
2006 and the acquittal was upheld in 2008. However, Gulen has not returned to Turkey. He
59 Cinar Kiper, “Roundup: Turks Start to Organize Against Internet Censorship,” Xinhua News Agency, July 17, 2010.
60 Fethullah Gulen websites include http://en.fgulen.com. and http://www.fethullahgulen.org. For an outsider’s
overview, see Bill Park, “The Fethullah Gulen Movement,” Middle East Review of International Affairs,” Vol. 12, No.
4, December 2008.
61 “Fethullah Gulen Promotes a Modern Islam,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, January 18, 2008.
62 Ahmet T. Kuru, “Globalization and the Diversification of Islamic Movements: Three Turkish Cases,” Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 120, Iss. 2, Summer 2006.
63 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk officially outlawed tariqats after founding the modern Turkish Republic. They remain
outlawed today, but survived and Turkish leaders have been linked to them. For example, former President Turgut Ozal
was known to be a Nakshibandi and Prime Minister Erdogan attended a seminary run by Nakshibandis.
64 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha, “Fethullah Gulen and his Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement,” Middle East News
Online, January 5, 2001.
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sought permanent residence in the United States. In 2007, the Department of Homeland Security
denied his application as an educator, maintaining that he “is primarily the leader of a large and
influential religious and political movement with immense commercial holdings.”65 Gulen won
an appeal and became a permanent U.S. resident in 2008. He resides in Saylorsburg, PA, in the
Pocono Mountains.
Gulen’s public message has evolved over the years to include a call for greater religious tolerance
and interfaith dialogue.66 He personally met Turkey’s chief rabbi, the Armenian and Greek
Orthodox Patriarchs, and Pope John Paul II.
Today, the Fethullah Gulen Movement is a vast grassroots movement. It controls a network of
schools around the world, including some in the United States; universities; banks with more than
$5 billion in assets; non-governmental organizations; and newspapers, magazines, and television
networks in Turkey and other countries.67 Its wealth is based on these sources and on generous
donations from members, who are from the new middle class that has developed since the 1980s.
One analyst has described it as “the most powerful movement right now (in Turkey)…. The point
where they are today scares me. There is no other movement to balance them in society.”68
The movement’s main voice in Turkey is the Zaman newspaper, which enjoys the largest
circulation in the country, and its English-language sister Today’s Zaman. Since 1988, its
Foundation of Journalists and Writers has organized annual Abant Platform discussions of the
relations between Islam and modernity. The movement is present in the Washington, DC, area
with a U.S. office of the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists trade
association, schools, and probably other organizations whose affiliation is publicly clouded.
Gulenists have not sought power directly. Yet, before he went into exile, Gulen reportedly advised
his followers to “move into the arteries of the system, without anyone noticing your existence,
until you reach all the power centers.”69 In August 2010, he asserted, “we are still at an equal
distance from every party. We never told anybody to enroll in a specific (party), attend its rallies
or act as its supporters.”70 However, Gulen encouraged support for the AKP’s effort to amend the
constitution in the September 12, 2010, referendum, maintaining that he was praising the work
rather than those who had achieved it.71 Also, members of the movement have assisted the rise of
the AKP government, which some suggest depends upon them because of their resources and
education.72 Gulenists have benefited greatly from the AKP’s emphasis on the free market and
trade. They have supported the AKP financially and in their media since the 2002 election and, in
65 Joe Lauria, “Confrontation at Sea: Reclusive Imam, Influential in Turkey, Criticizes Flotilla Aid Effort,” Wall Street
Journal, June 4, 2010.
66 For more on this theme, see Zaki Saritoprak, Sidney Griffith, “Fethullah Gulen and the ‘People of the Book’: A
Voice from Turkey for Interfaith Dialogue,” The Muslim World, Vol. 95, Iss. 3, July 2006.
67 “Gulen Movement: Turkey’s Third Power,” Islamic Affairs Analyst, jiaa.janes.com, February 2009.
68 Alexandra Hudson, “Turkish Islamic Preacher—Threat or Benefactor,” Reuters, May 14, 2008, quoting Hakan
Yavuz.
69 Bulent Aliriza, “Turkey’s Changing Dynamics,” Turkey Update, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Turkey Project, March 31, 2009.
70 “Gulen Endorses Reform Package, Appealing for ‘Yes’ on Sept. 12,” Today’s Zaman Online August 1, 2010.
71 “Gulen Says His Call for Yes Vote not Linked to Political Motives,” Today’s Zaman Online, August 25, 2010.
72 M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan, “Crisis in Turkey: The Conflict of Political Languages,” Middle East Policy,
Vol. XIV, No. 3, Fall 2007.
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exchange, Gulen members and supporters have been appointed to the judiciary and bureaucracy,
including the police and especially the domestic intelligence wing of the police.73
Gulenist champions emphasize their master’s public statements about the importance of
democracy and its compatibility with Islam, his opposition to anti-Western feelings, and his
condemnation of the 9/11 attacks.74 Gulen criticized the organizers of the controversial May 2010
flotilla seeking to bring aid to the Gaza Strip for not seeking Israel’s permission. (The flotilla is
known for a violent confrontation between passengers/activists on a Turkish ship and Israeli
special forces.) The Turkish group associated with the flotilla reportedly has ties to the Felicity
Party (SP), a direct descendant of the Refah Party, with which Gulen disagreed in the 1990s. So
his position may have more to do with domestic Islamist political competition than with the
flotilla per se, although it is in line with his advocacy of limiting tensions.
Critics charge that the Fethullah Gulen Movement is the force behind the Ergenekon investigation
and other anti-military campaigns, seeking revenge against those who had prosecuted Fethullah
Gulen. If true, this would contrast sharply with the benign public image that Gulenists have
cultivated over the years. As noted above, Gulenists reportedly play a major role in the police and
in its intelligence bodies. Leaked documents related to the investigations are publicized in Zaman
newspapers, known for their anti-military line. Columnists harshly criticize and even threaten
those who question the veracity of the Ergenekon affair, the benefits of AKP rule, or who shine a
contrarian light on the movement. The excesses of his followers, which belie a commitment to
tolerance, probably are not attributable to Gulen himself.
Other critics suggest that the movement’s understanding of democracy is narrow in that it
sometimes focuses on religious freedoms such as the right to wear headscarves and attend
universities after graduating from theological high schools, while also advocating stifling of some
free speech. (See disparagement of perceived opponents immediately above.) They warn “naïve”
Westerners not to be beguiled by the Gulenists.75 Rusen Cakir, an astute observer of Turkish
religious movements, describes the Gulen movement as another “deep state.”76
Future Political Possibilities
In April 2010, Prime Minister Erdogan stated that he favored a presidential system, and it has
long been believed that he has ambitions to be the first directly elected president of Turkey.
President Gul’s term in office ends either in 2012 or 2014. The uncertainty is due to his election
when the system still called for a seven-year term, before passage of a constitutional amendment
allowing for direct election of the president for a five-year term. It is not known which criterion
will apply to his tenure. Should AKP win the next national election that must be held by July
73 In summer 2010, a controversial new, best-selling, memoir (not available in English) by Hanefi Avci, a career police
officer and former Chief of Police in Eskisehir Province, alleged that the Gulen Movement has infiltrated the police,
gendarmerie, National Intelligence Organization (MIT), judiciary, and other government departments and have
conducted comprehensive wiretapping. It also charges that they are leading investigations in the Ergenekon and
Sledgehammer cases.
74 Kuru, op. cit.
75 Eldar Mamedov, “Fethullah Gulen Movement—a View from Brussels.” Hurriyet Daily News.com, May 28, 2010.”
76 “Former Turkish Police Chief’s Book Receives Conflicting Reactions in Media,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, August
30, 2010.
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2011, it is assumed that the party will move to change the political system to a presidential one
via a new constitution, and that Erdogan would want the post and an election in 2012. Given that
eventuality, President Gul is not expected to insist on a seven-year term, and he might then return
to parliament as prime minister.
Much of the above scenario depends upon AKP winning sufficient seats in the next national
election to form another single party government that could change the political system.
However, the opposition is actively working to prevent that from happening. After a sex scandal
forced the resignation of CHP leader Deniz Baykal in May 2010, a CHP convention elected
Kemal Kilicdaroglu as the new party chairman. Kilicdaroglu, who is known for his personal
integrity, had made an impressive showing in the election for mayor of Istanbul in 2009 with a
campaign that sounded strong anti-corruption, anti-poverty themes, even though AKP won the
post. On assuming the CHP leadership, he announced a revived social democratic agenda,
sympathized with coal miners who had recently experienced a disaster, toned down the party’s
strident secularism that some viewed as anti-religion, pledged to avoid ethnic and cultural
politics, and sharply attacked Erdogan. Kilicdaroglu announced his support for lowering the
threshold to enter parliament and limiting parliamentary immunity—both changes have been long
considered democratizing imperatives. In July, the CHP submitted a bill to lower the threshold
from 10% to 7%. (AKP and MHP are considered likely to oppose the measure, as it would benefit
BDP or its successor.) It would not take effect until after the next national election if passed.
Kilicdaroglu has called for a new constitution “in line with the EU norms, that is based on the
principle of separation of powers, that guarantees the independence of the media,” etc.77
For added measure, Kilicdaroglu refreshed the CHP by replacing about three-quarters of the 80-
member party assembly and removing the most strident ultranationalists, who were close
associates of Baykal. Moreover, Kilicdaroglu hails from Tunceli, in the east, which may enable
the party to gain some votes outside of the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts, to which it has been
limited in recent elections.
Kilicdaroglu asserts that (PKK) terrorism is caused by economic problems and that the alleviation
of poverty and unemployment would marginalize it. In line with his party’s established
nationalism, which he has not abandoned, he opposes use of Kurdish as a language of
education.78 Kilicdaroglu says that he refrains from using the word “Kurdish” in order not to
separate people by ethnic identity. Instead, he prefers to refer to an “eastern” or “southeastern”
issue.79 In contrast to his predecessor, the new CHP leader met the prime minister to explore ways
of cooperating in the fight against terror. At the meeting he brought up lowering the threshold to
enter parliament, abolishing special courts, and developing the southeast. He declared that, “as
long as there are sound and reasonable policies,” CHP will support the government on the
terrorism issue.80
Kilicdaroglu has not expressed many foreign policy views. He is committed to Turkey’s EU
accession and applauds the EU process for its potential to advance Turkey’s democracy,
77 “Kilicdaroglu Talks to Radikal,” interview, July 1, 2010, OSC Document GMP20100701744003.
78 Interview with Zekai Ozcinar and Habib Guler, “Turkey has to End Era of Military Intervention, says New CHP
Leader,” Today’s Zaman online, June 13, 2010.
79 “Turkey’s Route Should be Toward EU, Says Kilicdaroglu,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, June 11, 2010.
80 Selahattin Sonmez, “Opposition Leader Urges Turkish PM to Improve Living Conditions in Southeast,” Hurriyet
Daily News.com, July 15, 2010.
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freedoms, and human rights. Yet, he also states that Turkey would accomplish all that with or
without membership and opposes “a special preoccupation about EU entry or rejection.” He has
criticized the government for drifting away from the values of the West, such as democracy,
human rights, and laws, which have been the model for Turkey up to now, and called on it to
explain the reasons for the blockages in the EU process. He has not stated views on relations with
the United States. Therefore, it is not known if CHP will finally abandon its propensity for anti-
Americanism, such as conspiracy theories that blame America for everything bad that occurs in
and affects Turkey.
While it may be too early to announce the CHP’s revival, such a development is considered more
possible now than under Baykal. Kilicdaroglu suffered a defeat in the September 12 constitutional
referendum vote; he adopted the unsuccessful tactic of attacking Erdogan personally during the
campaign. Nevertheless, as noted, the party increased its share of the vote from the 2009
municipal elections without expanding its geographic base. The outlook remains uncertain.
Other parties also are endeavoring to make their mark. These include the Democrat Party, a
melding of former rivals True Path Party and Motherland Party, in which Mehmet Ali Bayar, a
former diplomat in Washington, is a major player. However, DP’s outlook probably is far less
optimistic than CHP’s. Some of the opposition parties may compete for the same constituencies,
which may limit their prospects of ousting AKP.
Many analysts believe that AKP still will come in first in the next national election and that it
gained momentum from the referendum vote. Given that a week is a lifetime in politics and the
elections are months away, it is not at all certain if the party would again win a sufficient plurality
to enable it to form a single party government, as it had after the last two national elections.
Instead, it might be forced into a coalition with one or more other parties. Alternatively,
opposition parties might win a plurality through their combined vote totals and be able to form a
coalition without the AKP. AKP’s confidence may be shaken, and its achievement of ambitions to
change Turkey’s political system and ability to modify its secular identity would be limited if it is
forced to take on a coalition partner. A government of opposition parties would have a different
agenda, while probably seeking to advance Turkey’s democracy in ways different than the AKP.
The opposition is strongly nationalistic and self identifies first as Turks, not as Muslims as do
many in the AKP. This might reassure currently besieged secularists, but not Kurds, whose
struggle seems destined to continue whoever is in charge of the next government.
Overall Assessment
One assessment that AKP’s critics sometimes offer concludes that the abortive attempt to ban the
AKP and 2007 national election resulted in strengthening the AKP’s hold on power and its ability
to weaken its actual and perceived opponents. President Gul’s exercise of his power of
appointment extended the party’s sway to the educational establishment. Ergenekon and other
alleged coup plot investigations have been vehicles for an assault on the military and the media,
among others, and the methods used in the probes have instilled fear in the ranks of the
opposition. AKP supporters have taken over much of the media, while the government’s lawsuits
against other elements have cowed some critics. Meanwhile, the party derives considerable
assistance from the financial and media support of followers of Fethullah Gulen. The AKP’s
attempt to burnish its democratic credentials and stanch terrorism with a Kurdish initiative has not
borne fruit, and it has had to revive the military option to deal with PKK violence. Analysts
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increasingly doubt the party’s commitment to democratic values and worry that the more
authoritarian tendencies of its leader may come to dominate.
Several developments may mitigate this judgment. The 2009 municipal elections may be a
harbinger of the renewal of the political opposition. They had the immediate effect of producing
changes in the cabinet, such as the replacement of the minister of education, that may constrain
some of the government’s more Islamist propensities. Moreover, Kilicdaroglu’s assumption of
CHP leadership may make it possible for a combination of opposition parties to force the
formation of a coalition government either with AKP in the lead or without AKP’s participation.
Before then, because the government failed to gain sufficient votes in parliament to ram through
its constitutional changes, it was forced into a referendum or popular vote to obtain its goals. In
addition, the Constitutional Court, in annulling some provisions of proposed amendments, may
have delayed the AKP’s realization of its ambitions to gain control over the judiciary. Finally,
regardless of how achieved, the military’s restraint may signal that its interference with civilian
rule has finally ended and that Turkey’s democracy, while still flawed, is maturing. In other
words, the situation may be more complex than the doomsday projections of AKP’s harshest
critics.
U.S. Policy
The overall U.S. policy toward Turkey has been largely determined by the United States’ need
and appreciation for Turkey as a strategic partner and NATO ally. Because of these priorities and
the traditional and inordinate role of the military in Turkey, the armed forces commanders had
long been considered primary interlocutors of U.S. policymakers—both civilian and military.
Since the AKP came to power, and especially since 2003, U.S. administrations have dealt more
with civilian counterparts, and the Turkish military has become the counterpart only of the U.S.
military.
Despite the AKP-dominated parliament’s refusal in March 2003 to allow U.S. troops to use
Turkish territory to open a northern front against Iraq, the George W. Bush Administration
nonetheless valued Turkey as a predominantly Muslim secular democracy that might provide
political inspiration for other Muslim countries in the context of its war on terror perpetrated by
radical Islamists. It also appreciated what was then Turkey’s willingness to cultivate good
relations with Israel in contrast to other Muslim governments. Therefore, the Bush Administration
had a vested interest in the continuation of Turkey’s democracy and political stability and did not
want a military coup there. The Administration adopted a stance of studied neutrality toward the
Turkish domestic political crisis resulting from the closure case against the AKP. On April 15,
2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, “we believe and hope that this will be
decided within Turkey’s democratic context and by its secular democratic principles.”81 Her
spokesman stated, “we are strong supporters of democracy in Turkey and we have faith in Turkish
democracy. But ultimately, these questions about politics and religion and different social values
are going to have to be ones that are resolved within the context of Turkish law, politics, and their
Constitution.” However, the constitution that Administration officials referred to was drafted
under the supervision of a military junta and accepted in a 1982 referendum without opposition.
Nonetheless, the Administration continued to emphasize democracy in Turkey, even as it
81 At American Turkish Council meeting in Washington, D.C., April 15, 2008.
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appeared to mute that theme for other Muslim majority countries due to the increasing popularity
of fundamentalist parties.
Rice also remarked about enjoying an excellent relationship with the AKP government. Yet, the
Bush Administration did not satisfy any group in Turkey. The AKP’s advocates sought stronger
opposition to the possible banning of a party that had won a decisive election. They believed that
the EU’s threat to suspend membership talks if the AKP were banned was more in line with
democratic principles. Others observed that the EU had to take a stronger stand and had more
clout because Turkey is a candidate for membership. On the other hand, secularists believed that
the Bush Administration brought the AKP to power, supported it as a model for Muslim
democracies, and wanted it to continue in office. They were suspicious of any positive comment
U.S. officials might make about the party.
Shortly after it took office, the Obama Administration signaled its appreciation for the importance
of U.S. relations with Turkey. In March 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited
Turkey and heralded it as an extraordinary example for the world because it showed that
“democracy, modernity, secularism, and Islam could all coexist.”82 The Secretary stated that the
United States and Turkey shared “a commitment to democracy, a secular constitution, religious
freedoms, a free market economy, and a sense of global responsibility.”83 Clinton announced a
forthcoming visit by President Obama and said that it showed the importance of the
Administration’s relations with Turkey.
Turkish officials appreciated the compliment that President Obama paid to their country by
visiting on his first overseas trip, and they were open to improving bilateral relations. They
singled out the President’s opposition to the war in Iraq and willingness to engage Syria and Iran
as indicators of a change in Washington. While in Turkey, the President stated that “Turkey and
the United States can build a model partnership in which a majority Christian and a majority
Muslim nation, a Western nation … can create a modern international community.”84 (Italics
added.) The phrase pleased Turkish leaders immensely.
In March 2010, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon
concluded remarks on U.S.-Turkish relations by commenting briefly on Turkey’s domestic
political scene.85 He urged care with regard to press freedoms and closure cases and alluded to the
Ergenekon prosecutions. Gordon stated, “media freedom is one of the bedrocks of a democratic
society and no actions should be taken that appear to undermine the ability of the press to do its
vital job…. (I)t is important that investigations or court proceedings, especially on politically
sensitive cases, must be open and fully respect Turkish law…. (I)n a democracy, political parties
should not fear being closed down.” Gordon’s comments were not as severe as the State
Department’s 2009 report on human rights practices in Turkey, released a week earlier.86 Yet, this
82 “U.S. Secretary of State Attends Talk Show on Turkish TV,” Anatolia, March 8, 2009, OSC Document
GMP20090308788003.
83 Joint news conference by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Ali Babacan in Ankara,
March 7, 2009, NTV, OSC Document GMP20090307744001.
84 “Turkish, US Presidents Answer Questions on Bilateral Ties, Armenian Issue,” NTV, April 8, 2009, OSC Document
GMP20090406744020.
85 “The United States and Turkey: The View from the Obama Administration,” accessible at http://www.brookings.edu.
86 The Report, released on March 11, stated outright, “The government limited freedom of expression through the use
of constitutional restrictions and numerous laws and through the application of tax fines against media conglomerates.”
Available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/20-09/eur/136062.htm.
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part of his speech drew few comments in Turkey, and one journalist wondered, “how many
people in total in Washington and Ankara give a damn about Phil Gordon’s words?”87
After the September 12 referendum on constitutional amendments, President Obama telephoned
Prime Minister Erdogan to “acknowledge the vibrancy of Turkey’s democracy.”88 The State
Department added “hope that through these reforms, it will further enhance Turkey’s democratic
processes and human rights protection.”
There has been increasing anxiety in Washington that the AKP’s consolidation of its position
domestically may be enabling a more assertive and independent foreign policy, favoring some
Muslim states and groups, that may challenge U.S. policymakers. In the spring of 2010, a spate of
events may have spurred some reassessment of bilateral relations. Those events include Turkey’s
championship of an international flotilla to break Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip.89 The flotilla
effort produced a confrontation between Israeli special forces and passengers/activists on a
Turkish ship, resulting in the deaths of eight Turks and one Turkish-American. In addition, it
produced a barrage of unsparing, inflammatory rhetoric from Prime Minister Erdogan and other
Turkish officials that some suggested had anti-Semitic tones.90 Erdogan also claimed that Hamas,
which controls the Gaza Strip, is a democratically elected political organization, and not a
terrorist group, and that it is needed for a successful peace process. This position contradicts U.S.
policy, which lists Hamas as a State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO). At the same time, Turkey has continued to cultivate close relations with Iran and Syria.
Washington does not view Turkey’s neighbors with the same rose-colored glasses as Ankara, due
to their nuclear ambitions, support for terrorist groups, and animosity toward Israel, among other
suspicions.
Turkish-Iranian relations and their progress in recent years are of special interest in Washington.91
Turkey appeared to undermine U.S. policy toward Iran on May 17, 2010, when Foreign Minister
Davutoglu and his Brazilian counterpart reached an agreement with Iran, called the Tehran
Declaration, for an exchange of uranium to take place in Turkey. Davutoglu and other officials
claimed that they had closely followed U.S. guidance. However, the Obama Administration
maintained that the declaration was based on parameters developed in fall 2009 that Iran’s
continuing uranium enrichment had rendered obsolete and appeared to believe that the Turkish-
Brazilian effort aimed at undermining a harder approach toward Iran that the United States and
others had been developing. This may well have been the Turkish intent, as the government
feared that Turkey, a close neighbor of Iran, would be most harmed by sanctions, citing past
experience with sanctions against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Thus, on the heels of the
declaration, Turkey voted in the U.N. Security Council against the imposition of new sanctions on
Iran for failing to ensure the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. In doing so, it voted against a
consensus of the international community and its partners in NATO, including the United States,
87 Asli Aydintasbas, “Loveless Marriage in Washington,” Milliyet Online, March 18, 2010, OSC Document
GMO20100318016005.
88 Marc Champion, Joe Park Inson, “Turkey Votes to Change Constitution,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2010.
89 For more on this, see CRS Report R41275, Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its
Aftermath, by Carol Migdalovitz.
90 Erdogan expressed understanding for those who compared the Zionist (sic) star to the swastika. Adem Kadam,
“Prime Minister in Konya,” Anatolia, June 4, 2010, OSC Document GMP20100608734014.
91 For background on Turkish-Iranian relations prior to these recent developments, see the chapter on Turkey in CRS
Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy, coordinated by Casey L. Addis.
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which had pushed for the sanctions. Its failure to join its allies or at least to abstain appeared to
indicate that the AKP valued its relationship with Iran more than ties with the West.
The dimensions of foreign policy developments will be addressed in another report, but they may
have implications for how the Obama Administration views and deals with the AKP government
and Prime Minister Erdogan and how they may be endeavoring to alter Turkey’s foundational
identity via the consolidation of power domestically. It is not yet certain that they are bent on
implementing a fundamental change in Turkey’s historic direction toward the West. Congress has
begun to assess the change and express its concern about that prospect, as seen in July 28, 2010,
hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.92 That oversight is likely to continue. Although
Turkey has not been a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance for many years, Members may
express their views on events in resolutions and other legislation. Both branches of government
will be scrutinizing the results of the constitutional referendum and of the national elections,
which must be held by July 2011, for their possible effects.
92 For hearing transcript, see http://foreignaffairs.house.gove/111/transcripts.pdf.
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Table 2. Basic Facts
Population
77.8 million (July 2010 est.)
Ethnic Groups
70%-75% Turkish
18% Kurdish
7%-12% other (2008 est.)
Religion
99.8% Muslim
(80%-85% Sunni, 15%-20%
Alevi)
2% other (mainly Christians
and Jews)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
-5.8% (2009 est.)
real growth rate
GDP per capita
$11,200 (2009 est.)
Unemployment
14.1% (2009 est.)
Underemployment
4% (2008 est.)
Inflation
6.3% (2009 est.)
Current Account Deficit
$13.96 billion (2009 est.)
External Debt
$274 billion (December 31,
2009)
Exports
apparel, foodstuffs, textiles,
metal manufactures, transport
equipment
Export Partners
Germany, France, UK, Italy,
Iraq (2009)
Imports
machinery, chemicals, semi-
finished goods, fuels, transport
equipment
Import Partners
Russia, Germany, China, U.S.
Italy (2009)
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, September 2, 2010.
Author Contact Information
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cmigdalovitz@crs.loc.gov, 7-2667
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