Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations
November 9, 2020
U.S.-Turkey tensions have raised questions about the future of bilateral relations and
have led to congressional action against Turkey, including informal holds on major new
Jim Zanotti
arms sales (such as upgrades to F-16 aircraft) and efforts to impose sanctions.
Specialist in Middle
Nevertheless, both countries’ officials emphasize the importance of continued U.S.-
Eastern Affairs
Turkey cooperation and Turkey’s membership in NATO. Observers voice concerns

about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Clayton Thomas
Turkey’s polarized electorate could affect Erdogan’s future leadership. His biggest
Analyst in Middle Eastern
challenge may be structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy—including a sharp
Affairs
decline in Turkey’s currency—that have worsened since the Coronavirus Disease 2019

pandemic began. The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

Turkey’s strategic orientation and U.S./NATO basing. Traditionally, Turkey has
relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and
investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. A number of complicated situations in Turkey’s surrounding
region—including those involving Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and
Azerbaijan), and Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration—affect its relationships with the United States and
other key actors, as Turkey seeks a more independent role. President Erdogan’s concerns about maintaining his
parliamentary coalition with Turkish nationalists may partly explain his actions in some of the situations
mentioned above. Turkey-Russia cooperation has grown in some areas. However, Turkish efforts to counter
Russia in several theaters of conflict at relatively low cost—using domestically produced drone aircraft
(reportedly with some U.S. components) and Syrian mercenaries—suggest that Turkey-Russia cooperation is
situational rather than comprehensive in scope.
Since Turkey’s 2019 agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord on Eastern Mediterranean maritime
boundaries, and its increased involvement in Libya’s civil war, Turkey’s tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean
with countries such as Cyprus and Greece have become more intertwined with its rivalry with Sunni Arab states
such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. In this context, some observers have
advocated that the United States explore alternative basing arrangements for U.S. and NATO military assets in
Turkey—including a possible arsenal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base. The August 2020
agreement between Israel and the UAE to normalize their ties could increase tensions between Turkey and these
other regional U.S. allies and partners.
Russian S-400 purchase and U.S. responses. Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense
system led to its removal by the United States from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The S-400 deliveries
that began in July 2019 also reportedly triggered informal congressional holds on major new arms sales. If Turkey
transitions to major Russian weapons platforms with multi-decade lifespans, it is unclear how it can stay closely
integrated with NATO on defense matters. The S-400 deal could trigger U.S. sanctions under Section 231 of the
Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA, title II of the Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA; P.L. 115-44). President Trump has reportedly delayed CAATSA
sanctions while seeking to persuade Turkey to refrain from operating the S-400. It is unclear how sanctions
against Turkey could affect its economy, trade, and defense procurement. Future U.S. actions in response to
Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 could affect U.S. arms sales and sanctions with respect to other U.S. partners
who have purchased or may purchase advanced weapons from Russia—including India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Qatar.
Congressional initiatives and other U.S. actions. Congressional and executive branch action on arms sales,
sanctions, or military basing regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S.
political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial well-being. How closely to
engage Erdogan’s government could depend on U.S. perceptions of his popular legitimacy, likely staying power,
and the extent to which a successor might change his policies in light of geopolitical, historical, and economic
considerations.
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Contents
Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1
Country Overview and the Erdogan Era ......................................................................................... 2
Political Assessment .................................................................................................................. 4
Economic Assessment ............................................................................................................... 7
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 7
Energy ................................................................................................................................. 8
The Kurdish Issue .................................................................................................................... 11
Background ........................................................................................................................ 11
Government Approaches to the Kurds .............................................................................. 12
Religious Minorities ................................................................................................................ 12
Halki Seminary and Hagia Sophia .................................................................................... 13
Alevis ................................................................................................................................ 14
Turkey’s Strategic Orientation and Military Involvement ............................................................ 14
U.S./NATO Presence ............................................................................................................... 16
Issues with Other U.S./NATO Allies ....................................................................................... 18
Eastern Mediterranean and Offshore Natural Gas ............................................................ 18
Middle East and Libyan Civil War .................................................................................... 19
The Syrian Conflict ................................................................................................................. 20
Countering the Syrian Kurdish YPG................................................................................. 21
Turkish-Occupied Areas and Idlib .................................................................................... 23
Role in Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute: Armenia and Azerbaijan ............................................... 24
Turkish Defense Procurement ................................................................................................. 25
Background ....................................................................................................................... 25
U.S. Arms Sales and Aid ................................................................................................... 26
Key Weapons Systems and Turkey’s Relationships: S-400, F-35, Patriot ........................ 27
Drones: Domestic Production, U.S. and Western Components, and Exports ................... 28
Congressional Scrutiny: U.S. Responses and Options .................................................................. 31
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 34

Figures
Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 2
Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context ................................................ 6
Figure 3. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country ......................................................................... 9
Figure 4. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure .................................................. 10
Figure 5. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey .................................................... 17
Figure 6. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean .......................................................... 19
Figure 7. Syria-Turkey Border ...................................................................................................... 22
Figure 8. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending ................................................. 26
Figure 9. Bayraktar TB2 Drone ..................................................................................................... 29
Figure 10. Turkish Military Export Statistics ................................................................................ 31

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Appendixes
Appendix A. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Relationships .................................................................... 35
Appendix B. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey ............................................................................ 43
Appendix C. Timeline of Turkey’s Involvement in Syria (2011-2020) ........................................ 46
Appendix D. Significant U.S.-Origin Arms Transfers or Possible Arms Transfers to
Turkey ........................................................................................................................................ 48

Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 49

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link to page 39 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Introduction and Issues for Congress
While U.S.-Turkey ties have always been complicated, tensions in recent years have produced a
number of crises and have led to questions about the status and future of the bilateral relationship.
Although the United States and Turkey, NATO allies since 1952, share some vital interests,
December 22, 2022 U.S. relations with Turkey take place within a complicated geopolitical environment and with Turkey in economic distress. U.S.-Turkey tensions that worsened after a failed 2016 coup in Jim Zanotti Turkey—including ongoing disagreements over Syrian Kurds and Turkey’s 2019 procurement of Specialist in Middle a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system—have raised questions about the future of Eastern Affairs bilateral relations. Congressional actions have included sanctions legislation and informal holds on U.S. arms sales. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish officials emphasize the importance of continued cooperation and Turkey’s Clayton Thomas membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Specialist in Middle (NATO). Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Eastern Affairs Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Major inflation and a sharp decline in Turkey’s currency—perhaps partly due to Erdogan’s unorthodox policy of keeping interest rates relatively low—have led to speculation that Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP) might be vulnerable to a coalition of opposition parties in presidential and parliamentary elections planned for June 2023 if competitive elections occur. If a different Turkish president were to win 2023 elections and take power, some domestic and foreign policy changes could be possible. Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other foreign policy matters. While deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for U.S. concern, Turkey’s emergence as an important mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. U.S.-Turkey relations have improved somewhat due to Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense; growing relationships with other countries that seek to counter Russian regional power (including via the export of drone aircraft); and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia. President Biden has voiced support for sales that would upgrade Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet, but some Members of Congress have expressed opposition. Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial well-being. Congressional oversight and legislation could affect arms sales, sanctions, military basing, and U.S. political and financial engagement with Turkey’s government (including in connection with elections). The following are key factors in the U.S.-Turkey relationship. Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkish leaders’ have indicated an interest in reducing their dependence on the West, and that may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia in Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. Major issues: Russia, Sweden-Finland-NATO, Greece and Cyprus, and the Middle East. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Turkey faces challenges in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. To some extent, Erdogan has sought to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and energy ties with Russia. Erdogan might assess that Western sanctions against Russia give Turkey increased leverage in these dealings. At the same time, Turkey has expanded defense cooperation with Ukraine. Turkey has become an important mediator between Russia and Ukraine on brokering a grain export corridor and other issues. In June, Turkey agreed on a framework deal for Sweden and Finland to join NATO, but Turkey has delayed ratifying their accession while demanding that the two countries help Turkey act against people it considers to be terrorists. Longstanding disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean seas have spiked in 2022 amid greater U.S. strategic cooperation with Greece and Cyprus, as well as renewed disagreements regarding Greek islands close to Turkey’s coast. Turkey’s improved relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—perhaps partly stemming from common concerns about Iran—appear to be further supports for Turkey’s struggling economy. Syria and Iraq: ongoing conflict near borders. Turkish concerns regarding its southern borders with Syria and Iraq have deepened further during Syria’s civil war, due largely to: (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. efforts to counter the Islamic State by working with Syrian Kurds linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Kurdish acronym PKK, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization), and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces in Syria that complicate and somewhat constrain Turkish action. Turkey and allied Syrian armed opposition groups have occupied various areas of northern Syria since 2016, and Turkey’s military continues to target Kurdish fighters in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s military could undertake another ground operation against PKK-linked Syrian Kurds, despite reported U.S. and Russian expressions of concern. Congressional Research Service link to page 5 link to page 7 link to page 9 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 13 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 19 link to page 20 link to page 21 link to page 21 link to page 23 link to page 26 link to page 27 link to page 27 link to page 28 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 33 link to page 34 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 39 link to page 41 link to page 43 link to page 43 link to page 47 link to page 48 link to page 49 link to page 50 link to page 51 link to page 51 link to page 53 link to page 55 link to page 58 link to page 58 link to page 58 link to page 58 link to page 58 link to page 59 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Contents Introduction and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 1 Country Overview and the Erdogan Era ......................................................................................... 3 Political Assessment .................................................................................................................. 5 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 5 2023 Elections ..................................................................................................................... 7 Economic Assessment ............................................................................................................... 9 Overview and Ongoing Problems ....................................................................................... 9 Energy ............................................................................................................................... 10 Turkey’s Kurdish Issue ........................................................................................................... 13 Background ....................................................................................................................... 13 Government Approaches to the Kurds .............................................................................. 14 Religious Minorities ................................................................................................................ 15 Halki Seminary and Hagia Sophia .................................................................................... 15 Alevis ................................................................................................................................ 16 Turkish Foreign Policy .................................................................................................................. 17 General Assessment ................................................................................................................ 17 Regional Security Concerns .................................................................................................... 19 Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President? ........................................................... 22 Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 23 Background ....................................................................................................................... 23 Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine ................................................................................... 24 Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation .......................................................... 26 Black Sea Access .............................................................................................................. 27 Mediating Russia-Ukraine Differences (Including Grain Export Deal) ........................... 29 NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland ................................................................. 30 Issues with Other U.S. Allies and Partners .............................................................................. 31 Greece and the Republic of Cyprus .................................................................................. 31 Background ................................................................................................................. 31 Tensions During 2022 ................................................................................................. 35 Israel and Sunni Arab Governments ................................................................................. 37 The Syrian Conflict ................................................................................................................. 39 Background ....................................................................................................................... 39 Further Turkish Military Operations? ............................................................................... 43 Iraq .......................................................................................................................................... 44 U.S. Relations ................................................................................................................................ 45 Congressional Action and Options ................................................................................................ 46 Responses to Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, CAATSA Sanctions, and Informal Holds ............................................................................................. 47 Possible F-16 Sales ................................................................................................................. 49 U.S./NATO Presence in Turkey .............................................................................................. 51 Other Sanctions ....................................................................................................................... 54 Russia ................................................................................................................................ 54 Iran .................................................................................................................................... 54 Syria .................................................................................................................................. 54 Election Oversight ................................................................................................................... 54 Political and Economic Engagement with Turkey’s Government .......................................... 55 Congressional Research Service link to page 6 link to page 10 link to page 11 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 23 link to page 24 link to page 32 link to page 37 link to page 38 link to page 45 link to page 57 link to page 64 link to page 65 link to page 65 link to page 67 link to page 68 link to page 60 link to page 63 link to page 70 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figures Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance ........................................................................................................... 2 Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context ................................................ 6 Figure 3. Turkish Political Party Preferences .................................................................................. 7 Figure 4. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country ........................................................................ 11 Figure 5. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure .................................................. 12 Figure 6. Turkish Public Opinion: Are These Countries Turkey’s Friends? ................................. 19 Figure 7. Turkey’s Military Presence Abroad ............................................................................... 20 Figure 8. Map of Black Sea Region and Straits ............................................................................ 28 Figure 9. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute ...................................................................................... 33 Figure 10. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean ........................................................ 34 Figure 11. Syria Conflict Map ....................................................................................................... 41 Figure 12. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey .................................................. 53 Figure B-1. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending ............................................. 60 Figure B-2. Turkish Arms Exports, 2000-2021 ............................................................................. 61 Figure B-3. Turkish Arms Export Partners, 2012-2020 ................................................................. 61 Figure B-4. Bayraktar TB2 Drone ................................................................................................. 63 Figure B-5. Countries Interested in Bayraktar TB2 Drone Aircraft .............................................. 64 Appendixes Appendix A. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey ............................................................................ 56 Appendix B. Some Drivers of Turkish Foreign Policy ................................................................. 59 Contacts Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 66 Congressional Research Service link to page 49 link to page 50 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Introduction and Issues for Congress While U.S.-Turkey1 ties have been consistently complicated since Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, tensions in at least the past six years have produced a number of crises and have led to questions about the status and future of the bilateral relationship (see “U.S. Relations” and “Congressional Action and Options” below). Although the United States and Turkey, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies since 1952, share some vital interests, harmonizing priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who harmonizing priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who
leads the two countries, based on leads the two countries, based on contrastingdifferences in geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles. geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles.
This report provides background information and analysis on the following topics: This report provides background information and analysis on the following topics:
  Turkey’s domestic setting and 2023 elections. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist-and his Islamist-
leaning Justice and Development Party (leaning Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, or AKP), in , or AKP), in
power since 2003, rule in a largely authoritarian manner. Erdogan has steadily power since 2003, rule in a largely authoritarian manner. Erdogan has steadily
consolidated control through elections and increasing dominance over the consolidated control through elections and increasing dominance over the
country’s security apparatus and other key institutions. country’s security apparatus and other key institutions. Erdogan’s biggest
challenge may be structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy—including a Structural weaknesses in Turkey’s economy (including major inflation and a sharp sharp
decline in Turkey’s currencydecline in Turkey’s currency—that have worsened since the Coronavirus Disease
2019 pandemic began. Concerns about maintaining his political support and the
AKP’s parliamentary coalition) have led to speculation that Erdogan and the AKP might be vulnerable in presidential and parliamentary elections planned for June 2023. Concerns about winning reelection in partnership with the Nationalist Movement Party ( with the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyet
Halk Partisi, or MHP) may partly explain Erdogan’s , or MHP) may partly explain Erdogan’s policies in the Eastern
Mediterranean and Middle East, and his efforts to weaken domestic minorities
(including the Kurds) and opponents.
 Turkey’s strategic orientation. Policy differences and public acrimony between
Turkey and the United States have fueled concern about their relationship and
about Turkey’s status as a U.S. ally and NATO member. domestic and foreign policies. Polls suggest that an opposition coalition led by the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP) and Good Party (Iyi Parti) may have a chance to defeat Erdogan and the AKP in the elections. Some observers argue that an election may not be fully free or fair because of Erdogan’s control or influence over the judiciary and media in Turkey.2 If a different president were to win 2023 elections and take power, some policy changes could be possible, but might be limited in areas of core or longstanding national security concern.  Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey appears to Turkey appears to
compartmentalize its relationships compartmentalize its relationships with United States, Russia, the European with United States, Russia, the European
Union (EU), Union (EU), China, and its regional neighbors depending on various and its regional neighbors depending on various
circumstances (see Appendix A)circumstances. For example, Turkey . For example, Turkey has purchasedreceived an S-400 surface-to-air defense system from Russia in 2019 and continues to cooperate with it in other areas even after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. At the same time, Turkey has provided Ukraine with military, political, and economic support in response to the conflict, and has worked with other countries in its region, perhaps partly as a means of countering Russian regional power.  U.S. relations. Policy differences and public acrimony between Turkey and the United States—including over the S-400 and Kurds in northern Syria—have highlighted bilateral tensions. Yet, bilateral ties have somewhat improved due to 1 In late 2021, President Erdogan directed the use of “Türkiye” (the country’s name in Turkish) in place of “Turkey” or other equivalents (e.g. the German “Turkei,” the French “Turquie,” etc.) in Turkish government documents and communications. In June 2022, the United Nations accepted the Turkish request to change the country’s name at the body to “Türkiye.” Some U.S. government statements use “Türkiye,” while others continue to use “Turkey.” Vivian Salama and Jared Malsin, “Turkey’s push to change how the world pronounces its name causes a flap,” Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2022. 2 Kemal Kirisci and Berk Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Just Security, November 22, 2021. Congressional Research Service 1 link to page 53 link to page 53 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Turkey’s emergence as a potential regional counterweight to Russia and a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, among other things. President Biden has voiced support for arms sales to bolster Turkey’s aging F-16 fleet (see “Possible F-16 Sales” below).  Congressional actions and options. U.S.-Turkey tensions have led to a number of congressional initiatives and other U.S. actions. These include sanctions for Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia, informal congressional holds and proposed legislation aimed at restricting arms sales, and other efforts to limit strategic cooperation or empower Turkey’s rivals like Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Options for further legislative action or oversight could address topics including possible F-16 sales; existing or new sanctions relating to the S-400, Syria, and Russia; Turkey’s upcoming election, and U.S. political and economic engagement with Turkey’s government. an S-400
surface-to-air defense system from Russia and cooperates with it in some other
areas, but also has blocked or opposed Russian interests in Syria, Libya, and
Nagorno-Karabakh (a region disputed by Armenia and Azerbaijan).
 Congressional scrutiny and U.S. responses and options. U.S.-Turkey tensions
have led to a number of congressional initiatives and other U.S. actions. These
include informal congressional holds and proposed legislation aimed at
restricting arms sales, possible sanctions on Turkey, and other efforts to limit
strategic cooperation or empower Turkey’s rivals.
According to the Turkish Coalition of America, a non-governmental organization that promotes
positive Turkish-American relations, as of November 2020, there are at least 101 Members of the
House of Representatives (98 of whom are voting Members), and four Senators in the
Congressional Caucus on Turkey and Turkish Americans.1 Reduced caucus membership numbers
since 2018 may reflect the increased difficulties in bilateral relations and congressional concerns
about Turkey’s trajectory under President Erdogan.

1 See http://www.tc-america.org/in-congress/caucus.htm.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 1. Turkey at a Glance

Geography
Area: 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas 783,562 sq km (302,535 sq. mile), slightly larger than Texas
People
Population: 82,017,51483,047,706. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.. Most populous cities: Istanbul 15.26 mil, Ankara 5. mil, Ankara 5.13 mil, Izmir 3 mil, Izmir 3.1 mil, mil,
Bursa 2.Bursa 2.01 mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1. mil, Adana 1.8 mil, Gaziantep 1.78 mil. mil.
% of Population 14 or Younger: 23.4% 23.4%
(2020) Ethnic Groups: Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities Turks 70%-75%; Kurds 19%; Other minorities 7%-126%-11% (2016) % (2016)
Religion: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% (2017) Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), Others (mainly Christian and Jewish) 0.2% (2017)
Literacy: 96. 96.27% (male % (male 98.899.1%, female %, female 93.5%) (2017)
94.4%) (2019) Congressional Research Service 2 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Economy
GDP Per Capita (at purchasing power parity): $ $26,768
38,759 Real GDP Growth: -3.9% (2020), 3.6% (2021 projection)
Inflation: 11.9%
5.0% Inflation: 73% Unemployment: 14.610.8% %
Budget Deficit as % of GDP: 5.64.5% %
Public Debt as % of GDP: 38.037.5% %
Current Account Deficit as % of GDP: 35.7% .7%
International currency reserves: $ $81.967.1 bil ion bil ion
Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using Graphic created by CRS. Map boundaries and information generated by Hannah Fischer using
Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (Department of State Boundaries (2011); Esri (2014); ArcWorld (2014); DeLorme (2014). Fact information (2020
estimates2022 end-of-year estimates or projections unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database; unless otherwise specified) from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database;
Economist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence AgencyEconomist Intelligence Unit; and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), , The World Factbook. .
Country Overview and the Erdogan Era
Turkey’s large and diversified economy, strong military, Muslim-majority populationTurkey’s large and diversified economy, strong military, Muslim-majority population of over 83 million, and , and
geographic position straddling Europe and the Middle East make it a significant geographic position straddling Europe and the Middle East make it a significant regional power.
power in both regions. For decades since its founding in the 1920s, the Turkish republic For decades since its founding in the 1920s, the Turkish republic had relied upon its military, relied upon its military,
judiciary, and other bastions of its Kemalist (a term inspired by Turkey’s judiciary, and other bastions of its Kemalist (a term inspired by Turkey’s republican founder, republican founder,
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) “secular elite” to protect it from political and ideological extremes—Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) “secular elite” to protect it from political and ideological extremes—
sacrificing at least some of its democratic vitality in the process. Major political developments in sacrificing at least some of its democratic vitality in the process. Major political developments in
Turkey over the past two decadesTurkey over the past two decades —including those described below—appear to stem partly from significant socioeconomic changes appear to stem partly from significant socioeconomic changes
that began in the 1980s. The military-guided governments that came to power after that began in the 1980s. The military-guided governments that came to power after Turkey’s 1980
coupa coup that occurred in 1980 helped establish Turkey’s export-driven economy. This helped establish Turkey’s export-driven economy. This ledcontributed to the gradual political to the gradual political
awakening of a largely Sunni Muslim middle class from Turkey’s Anatolian heartland. awakening of a largely Sunni Muslim middle class from Turkey’s Anatolian heartland.
TheseThe continued trajectory of these 1980s-initiated socioeconomic changes helped fuel Turkey’s dramatic transformation after 2002, led by the Islamist- changes helped fuel Turkey’s dramatic transformation after 2002, led by the Islamist-
leaning AKP and President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan. The AKP won governing leaning AKP and President (formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan. The AKP won governing
majorities four times—2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015—during a period in which Turkey’s economy majorities four times—2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015—during a period in which Turkey’s economy
generally enjoyed growth and stability. generally enjoyed growth and stability.
During his first decade as Turkey’s leader, Erdogan worked to reduce the political power of the During his first decade as Turkey’s leader, Erdogan worked to reduce the political power of the
“secular elite.” He subsequently clashed with other possible rival power centerssecular elite, with broad support among several Turkish constituencies that supported reforms to bring Turkey closer to EU standards. He subsequently clashed with rivals for power, including , including
previous allies in the Fethullah Gulen movement.previous allies in the Fethullah Gulen movement.23 Domestic polarization intensified after 2013: Domestic polarization intensified after 2013:
nationwide antigovernment protests that began in Istanbul’s Gezi Park took place that year, and nationwide antigovernment protests that began in Istanbul’s Gezi Park took place that year, and
corruption allegations later surfaced against a number of Erdogan’s colleagues in and out of corruption allegations later surfaced against a number of Erdogan’s colleagues in and out of
government.government.3
4 After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey’s first-ever popular presidential
election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a “presidential systempresidential system” of of
governance. Analyses of Erdogan sometimes characterize him as one or more of the following: a
pragmatic populist, a protector of traditionally marginalized groups, a budding authoritarian, or
an Islamic ideologue.4 While there may be some similarities between Turkey under Erdogan and
countries like Russia, Iran, or China, some factors distinguish Turkey from them. For example,
unlike Russia or Iran, Turkey’s economy cannot rely on significant rents from natural resources if
foreign sources of revenue or investment dry up. Unlike Russia and China, Turkey does not have
nuclear weapons under its command and control. Additionally, unlike all three others, Turkey’s
economic, political, and national security institutions and traditions have been closely connected
with those of the West for decades.
Erdogan’s consolidation of power has continued and arguably accelerated since 2014. After
Erdogan survived a July 2016 coup attempt staged by rogue military officers, Turkey’s parliament
approved a state of emergency. The state of emergency enabled Turkish authorities to target many
of Erdogan’s political opponents and civil society critics beyond those with proven connections to
the coup attempt. More than 60,000 Turks were arrested and 130,000 dismissed from government
posts.5 Erdogan and his supporters also gained greater control over the country’s government,
security, educational, media, and business institutions.6 After winning controversial victories in an
April 2017 constitutional referendum and June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections, (see
below), Erdogan’s presidential powers expanded. In July 2018, parliament lifted the state of
emergency, but enacted many of its features into law for another three years. However, the
positive economic conditions that helped propel Erdogan’s early political popularity have turned

2 For more on Gulen and the Gulen movement, see CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United
States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
3 Freedom House, Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey, February 3, 2014.
4 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co.
Ltd, 2017; Burak Kadercan, “Erdogan’s Last Off-Ramp: Authoritarianism, Democracy, and the Future of Turkey,” War
on the Rocks, July 28, 2016.
5 Carlotta Gall, “Turkish Leader’s Next Target in Crackdown on Dissent: The Internet,” New York Times, March 4,
2018.
6 Kareem Fahim, “As Erdogan prepares for new term, Turkey dismisses more than 18,000 civil servants,” Washington
Post, July 8, 2018.
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governance. 3 Gulen is a former Turkish state-employed imam who founded an international socioreligious movement that exercised considerable influence in Turkish media, politics, and society until Erdogan and Turkish authorities acted against thousands of its alleged members and sympathizers, starting in late 2013 and intensifying after a failed July 2016 coup involving renegade elements within the military. For more information on Gulen and the Gulen movement, see CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 4 Freedom House, Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey, February 3, 2014. Congressional Research Service 3 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Erdogan’s consolidation of power has continued and arguably accelerated since 2014. In response to the 2016 coup attempt staged by rogue military officers, the government detained tens of thousands of its citizens, enacted sweeping changes to military and civilian agencies, and took over or closed various businesses, schools, and media outlets.5 Erdogan has argued, with considerable popular support, that the Fethullah Gulen movement orchestrated the coup attempt, in which more than 250 people were killed and thousands were injured.6 Forces and citizen groups loyal to the government ultimately thwarted the apparent efforts of some renegade military personnel (including airstrikes targeting Turkey’s presidential palace and parliament building) to seize state control. Some leading opposition figures in Turkey have accused Erdogan of planning, controlling, and/or using the failed coup to suppress dissent and consolidate power.7 Additional developments expanded Erdogan’s presidential powers further, most notably controversial victories in an April 2017 constitutional referendum and June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections (see below). In July 2018, parliament lifted the state of emergency that it had instituted after the coup attempt, but enacted many of its features into law for three years (extended for another three years in July 2021). However, the positive economic conditions that helped propel Erdogan’s early political popularity have turned into largely negative ones in the past into largely negative ones in the past two years, raising questions about how much popularity he
can maintain over timefour years, leading to uncertainty about his popularity. .
Human Rights Concerns in Turkey
During the second decade of President Erdogan’s leadership of Turkey, domestic and international observers have During the second decade of President Erdogan’s leadership of Turkey, domestic and international observers have
raised claims about human rights violations that they assert—amid some opposing views—are more widespread raised claims about human rights violations that they assert—amid some opposing views—are more widespread
and systematic than in the country’s past eras. During the 2000s, some of these observers expressed hopes that and systematic than in the country’s past eras. During the 2000s, some of these observers expressed hopes that
reducing the role of Turkey’s military in its institutions of civilian governance could lead to a more liberal reducing the role of Turkey’s military in its institutions of civilian governance could lead to a more liberal
democracy—and perhaps European Union membership. Since then, however, many have voiced worries about the democracy—and perhaps European Union membership. Since then, however, many have voiced worries about the
largely unchecked, Islamist-tinged civilian rule that Erdogan justifies on the basis of elections of questionable largely unchecked, Islamist-tinged civilian rule that Erdogan justifies on the basis of elections of questionable
legitimacy.legitimacy.78
Official analyses from the United States and European Union, as well as unofficial reports from human rights Official analyses from the United States and European Union, as well as unofficial reports from human rights
monitors and other third parties, identify a number of issues,monitors and other third parties, identify a number of issues,89 including the fol owing: including the fol owing:
 
Practices by the government or its supporters (e.g., media control, censorship, intimidation, voter fraud or Practices by the government or its supporters (e.g., media control, censorship, intimidation, voter fraud or
manipulation) that may undermine the “free and fair” nature of Turkey’s elections. manipulation) that may undermine the “free and fair” nature of Turkey’s elections.
 
Arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, and improper interrogation practices (including instances of torture), Arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, and improper interrogation practices (including instances of torture),
and some general erosion of the justice sector’s independence and evidentiary standards. and some general erosion of the justice sector’s independence and evidentiary standards.
 
Imprisonment, forced closures or asset transfers, and other measures targeting journalists, civil society Imprisonment, forced closures or asset transfers, and other measures targeting journalists, civil society
leaders, Erdogan’s political opponents, and independent institutions. The government justifies some measures leaders, Erdogan’s political opponents, and independent institutions. The government justifies some measures
on the basis of countering terrorism, even though sometimes those targeted appear to have had only minimal on the basis of countering terrorism, even though sometimes those targeted appear to have had only minimal
or superficial contacts with organizations classified by Turkey as terrorist groups—such as the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK) or the Fethul ah Gulen movement.

Significant limits on the right to assemble and protest.

Conditions on and legal prosecution of content posted on key Internet and social media sites (i.e., YouTube,
Facebook, Twitter).

Increased spending on Sunni Muslim religious (imam hatip) secondary schools, and expanded religious
instruction in other schools.
As a member of the Council of Europe, Turkey agrees to accept the rulings of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), but has not done so in some cases.9 5 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, Turkey 2021 Report, October 19, 2021. 6 Gareth Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15: Erdogan’s New Turkey and the Myth of Its Immaculate Conception,” Turkey Analyst, July 15, 2021; Dorian Jones, “Turkey Looks Back at Failed Coup,” Voice of America, July 15, 2019. Partly because of Gulen’s residence in the United States, many Turks reportedly subscribe to conspiracy theories about possible U.S. involvement. Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15.” CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 7 Jenkins, “Five Years After July 15”; “Turkey coup: Top officers given life terms in mass trial,” BBC News, April 7, 2021. 8 See, for example, Gorkem Altinors and Umit Akcay, “The authoritarian consolidation attempt in Turkey,” European Consortium for Political Research, February 22, 2022; Dimitar Bechev, Turkey Under Erdogan: How a Country Turned from Democracy and the West, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022. 9 State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2021, Turkey; European Commission, Turkiye 2022 Report, October 6, 2022; Human Rights Watch, “Turkey,” World Report 2022; Freedom House, “Turkey,” Freedom in the World 2022. Congressional Research Service 4 link to page 60 link to page 10 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations or superficial contacts with organizations classified by Turkey as terrorist groups—such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or the Fethul ah Gulen movement.  Significant limits on the right to assemble and protest.  Conditions on and legal prosecution of content posted on key Internet and social media sites (i.e., YouTube, Facebook, Twitter), including an October 2022 law criminalizing “disinformation.”  Weakened protections for women. In 2021, Erdogan withdrew Turkey from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (abbreviated as the Istanbul Convention because it was signed in Istanbul in 2011), triggering statements of concern among some domestic and international observers that perpetrators may be encouraged, not discouraged. In the months leading up to Turkey’s withdrawal, some domestic religious and conservative groups lobbied against the convention on the grounds that it degraded family values and advocated for LGBTQ.  Increased spending on Sunni Muslim religious (imam hatip) secondary schools, and expanded religious instruction in other schools. As a member of the Council of Europe, Turkey has agreed to accept the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), but in some cases has refused to implement rulings, leading to speculation that Turkey may be removed from the Council.10 Specific concerns regarding the treatment of Turkey’s large Specific concerns regarding the treatment of Turkey’s large
ethnic Kurdish ethnic Kurdish population and its religious minorities are discussed in various sections below. Analyses of Erdogan sometimes characterize him as one or more of the following: a pragmatic populist, a protector of some historically marginalized groups, a budding authoritarian, or an Islamic ideologue.11 While there may be some similarities between Turkey under Erdogan and countries like Russia, Iran, or China, some factors distinguish Turkey from them. For example, unlike Russia or Iran, Turkey cannot rely on significant rents from natural resources if foreign sources of revenue or investment dry up. Unlike Russia and China, Turkey does not have nuclear weapons under its command and control. Additionally, unlike all three others, Turkey’s economic, political, and national security institutions and traditions have been closely connected with those of the West for decades. population and its religious minorities are discussed in various sections below.
Erdogan and various other key Turkish figures (including political party leadersErdogan and various other key Turkish figures (including political party leaders and potential presidential candidates for 2023) are profiled ) are profiled inin
Appendix BA.
Political Assessment
Overview President Erdogan retains sweeping power over Turkey. President Erdogan retains sweeping power over Turkey. HoweverAt the same time, he presides over a polarized , he presides over a polarized
electorate and faces substantial domestic and international criticism for governing in an electorate and faces substantial domestic and international criticism for governing in an
authoritarian manner. Many Turks’ opposition to his continued rule, along with Turkey’s ongoing authoritarian manner. Many Turks’ opposition to his continued rule, along with Turkey’s ongoing
economic challenges, could undermine Turkey’s future stability and prosperity, economic challenges, could undermine Turkey’s future stability and prosperity, even if it does not
leadwhether or not it leads to Erdogan leaving office. to Erdogan leaving office.10

7 See, e.g., “Democracy Talks: Mustafa Akyol, Author and Journalist,” George W. Bush Presidential Center, April 28,
2020.
8 Department of State, “Turkey,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019; European Commission, Turkey
2020 Report, October 6, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “Turkey,” World Report 2020; Freedom House, “Turkey,”
Freedom in the World 2020.
9 “Turkey’s Erdogan says ECHR ruling on jailed politician supports terrorism,” Reuters, November 21, 2018.
10 See, e.g., Max Hoffman, “Turkey’s President Erdoğan Is Losing Ground at Home,” Center for American Progress,
August 24, 2020.
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Erdogan won the June 2018 presidential elections with about 53% of the vote. To obtain a
parliamentary majority in the June 2018 elections, Erdogan’s AKP relied on the MHP (see Figure
2 below). The MHP is the country’s traditional Turkish nationalist party, and is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. The MHP also had Erdogan won the June 2018 presidential elections with about 53% of the vote, but the AKP won just under 43% of votes in the concurrent parliamentary elections. To maintain a parliamentary majority, Erdogan’s AKP has relied on the MHP (see Figure 2 below). The MHP is the country’s traditional Turkish nationalist party, and is known for opposing political accommodation with the 10 Ali Kucukgocmen, “Turks risk losing Europe’s human rights protections after court spurned,” Reuters, November 10, 2022. 11 See, for example, Bechev, Turkey Under Erdogan; Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2020; Bilge Yabanci, “Religion, Nationalism, and Populism in Turkey under the AKP,” Middle East Institute, October 6, 2022. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 18 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Kurds. The MHP also provided key support for provided key support for
the constitutional amendments approved in 2017. Erdogan started courting nationalist the constitutional amendments approved in 2017. Erdogan started courting nationalist
constituencies around the time Kurdish voter support for the AKP decreased in 2015 with the end constituencies around the time Kurdish voter support for the AKP decreased in 2015 with the end
of Turkey-PKK peace negotiations and the resumption of armed conflict (see of Turkey-PKK peace negotiations and the resumption of armed conflict (see “Government
Approaches to the Kurds” below). Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in below). Some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in
connection with the June 2018 elections,connection with the June 2018 elections,1112 which was also the case with the April 2017 which was also the case with the April 2017
constitutional referendum.constitutional referendum.12
The Post-2018 Presidential System
Two years into the presidential system in Turkey, it is unclear how the formalities of government and the
surrounding politics wil affect checks and balances. Commentators routinely compare Turkey’s system with other
presidential systems, particularly those in the United States and France.13 Under Turkey’s constitutional changes, a
president may serve for up to two five-year terms, and presidential and parliamentary elections occur at the same
time. The president can appoint ministers, other senior officials, and a large majority of senior judges without
parliamentary approval, and also is responsible for preparing the budget proposals.
The 600-seat parliament has some ability to counter presidential actions. It retains power to legislate, appoint
some judges and bureaucrats, and approve the president’s budget proposals. It also may impeach the president
with a two-thirds majority. The president can declare a state of emergency, but parliament can reverse this action,
and decrees made during a state of emergency lapse if parliament does not approve them within three months.

11 OSCE, International Election Observation Mission, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey,
Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, 2018 (published June 25, 2018).
12 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final
Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017).
13 See, e.g., Chris Morris, “Turkey elections: How powerful will the next Turkish president be?” BBC News, June 25,
2018.
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Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context


Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Bipartisan Policy Center.
Note: Each square represents 12 parliamentary seats.
In 2019 local elections, the AKP maintained the largest share of votes but lost some key
municipalities to opposition candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP). The AKP’s most significant losses in those elections include
the capital, Ankara, and Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city and economic hub. The Istanbul municipal
election was particularly controversial: though CHP candidate Ekrem Imamoglu appeared to win
a narrow victory in the March 2019 election, the AKP disputed his vote total and the election was
annulled by the Supreme Electoral Council. In the closely watched June 2019 re-vote, Imamoglu
won a decisive victory over AKP candidate and former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim.
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It is unclear to what extent, if at all, these losses were connected with Turkey’s economic troubles
and represent a threat to Erdogan’s rule. Imamoglu and some other opposition mayors have
national profiles and by some measures reportedly may rival Erdogan in popularity.14 Using
access to information that their positions afford, they have claimed that their AKP predecessors
engaged in corrupt and wasteful practices.15 Additionally, since the local elections, Ahmet
Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, who are prominent former AKP figures from previous Erdogan-led
governments, each have established new political parties that could weaken Erdogan’s hold on his
conservative political base. Erdogan is up for reelection at the end of his term in 2023. He could
call early elections at any time, but may be unlikely to do so unless a comfortable AKP victory
seems assured.16
Economic Assessment
Overview
13 Figure 2. Turkey: 2018 Parliamentary Election Results in Context Sources: Institute for the Study of War; Bipartisan Policy Center. Note: Each square represents 12 parliamentary seats. In 2019 local elections, the AKP maintained the largest share of votes but lost some key municipalities to opposition candidates from the secular-leaning Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP). The AKP’s most significant losses in those elections included the capital, Ankara, and Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city and economic hub. The Istanbul municipal election was particularly controversial: though CHP candidate Ekrem Imamoglu appeared to win a narrow victory in the March 2019 election, the AKP disputed his vote total and the election was 12 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), International Election Observation Mission, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Turkey, Early Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, June 24, 2018 (published June 25, 2018). 13 OSCE, Limited Referendum Observation Mission Final Report, Turkey, April 16, 2017 (published June 22, 2017). Congressional Research Service 6 link to page 11 link to page 18 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations annulled by the Supreme Electoral Council. In the closely watched June 2019 re-vote, Imamoglu won a decisive victory over AKP candidate and former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim. 2023 Elections Turkey’s next presidential and parliamentary elections are planned for June 2023. Largely in the context of Turkey’s economic problems discussed above, public opinion polls have fueled speculation that Erdogan and the AKP-MHP parliamentary coalition might be vulnerable.14 In one late 2022 poll (see Figure 3), three parties from an opposition coalition (CHP-Iyi-DEVA) outperformed AKP-MHP by a 36%-32% margin. In the same poll, Erdogan’s approval rating was 38%, the percentage who said things in Turkey were headed in the wrong direction was 59%, and the percentage who said the economy was the most important issue was 67%.15 Figure 3. Turkish Political Party Preferences (as of late 2022) How Kurdish citizens of Turkey (numbering nearly 20% of the population) vote could impact the outcome (see “Government Approaches to the Kurds” below).16 Additionally, some observers debate whether (1) free and fair elections could take place under Erdogan,17 (2) opposition parties 14 Ben Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan,” New York Times, December 5, 2022; “Polls indicate close race between rival blocs, yet people increasingly think Erdoğan will win,” BIA News, October 12, 2022; Berk Esen, “The opposition alliance in Turkey: A viable alternative to Erdogan?” SWP Comment (German Institute for International and Security Affairs [SWP]), August 2022. 15 “Al-Monitor/Premise poll finds tight race for Erdogan in Turkey's elections,” Al-Monitor, December 7, 2022. 16 Mesut Yegen, “Erdogan and the Turkish Opposition Revisit the Kurdish Question,” SWP Comment, April 2022. 17 Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, “It Is Not Too Early to Think About Political Change in Turkey,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, January 10, 2022; Kirisci and Esen, “Might the Turkish Electorate Be Ready to Say Goodbye to Erdoğan After Two Decades in Power?” Congressional Research Service 7 link to page 26 link to page 20 link to page 60 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations can convince potential swing voters to side with them despite their personal or ideological affinity for Erdogan,18 or (3) Erdogan would cede power after an electoral defeat.19 In February 2022, the CHP and the Good (or Iyi) Party, along with four smaller parties (including two established in 2019 and 2020 by Ahmet Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, prominent former AKP figures), signed a joint electoral manifesto, forming “the most comprehensive opposition platform” since 1950, according to one observer.20 The primary pledge of this electoral coalition is to return Turkey to the parliamentary system that existed before the 2018 election, largely as a means of limiting executive power. Opposition figures have also criticized the Erdogan government’s approach to a range of foreign and domestic policy issues and promised to make changes (see “Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President?” below).21 The coalition seeks to select a joint presidential candidate to run against Erdogan, probably from the CHP. Party leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu (who has an Alevi background—see “Alevis” below) generally polls lower than Istanbul mayor Imamoglu and Ankara mayor Mansur Yavas (see Appendix A).22 Though Imamoglu’s candidacy may be jeopardized by a criminal conviction (see text box), public visibility from his mayorship may have helped widen his and the CHP’s appeal.23 Despite Erdogan’s potential vulnerability, some observers have expressed doubt about the opposition coalition’s prospects, citing ideological differences between its constituent parties.24 Imamoglu’s Criminal Case and Potential Political Ban Istanbul mayor and CHP member Ekrem Imamoglu could face a ban from political activity because of a December 2022 criminal conviction. The charge of insulting members of Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council stemmed from a remark that Imamoglu said he made about the annul ed March 2019 election (discussed above) in response to an insult against him from Turkey’s interior minister.25 The court sentenced Imamoglu to jail and banned him from political activity for two years and seven months, but both penalties are subject to appeal, and the timing of the appellate process is unclear.26 In the meantime, Imamoglu continues to serve as mayor and engage politically. Imamoglu and other opposition figures denounced the verdict and judicial process as politicized and a sign of government attempts to sideline Erdogan’s potential electoral opponents.27 18 Ozer Sencar of Metropoll, in Laura Pitel, “Will the ailing Turkish economy bring Erdogan down?” Financial Times, November 1, 2021. 19 Unnamed Western diplomat quoted in Laura Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan: Turkey’s opposition searches for a champion,” Financial Times, May 5, 2022. 20 Esen, “The opposition alliance in Turkey”; Seren Selvin Korkmaz, “The strategies and struggles of the Turkish opposition under autocratization,” Middle East Institute, October 4, 2022. 21 “Türkiye’s CHP forms technocratic committee to advise the govt,” Yetkin Report, December 4, 2022; Berk Esen, “Post-2023 election scenarios in Turkey,” SWP Comment, September 2022; Alper Coskun and Sinan Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2022. 22 Andrew Wilks, “Turkish opposition forms plan to oust Erdogan, restore parliament’s power,” Al-Monitor, February 15, 2022; Pitel, “Defeating Erdogan.” 23 Gonca Tokyol, “Wielding Istanbul’s clout, Kaftancioglu and the CHP take aim at 2023 elections,” Turkey recap (Substack), November 16, 2022. 24 See, for example, James Ryan, “The path ahead in Turkey’s upcoming electoral campaign,” War on the Rocks, November 10, 2022. 25 “Turkish court orders jail, political ban for Erdogan rival,” Reuters, December 14, 2022; Andrew Wilks, “Cases against opposition politicians mount ahead of Turkish elections,” Al-Monitor, June 2, 2022. 26 Ben Hubbard and Safak Timur, “Conviction May Sideline Rival of Turkish Leader,” New York Times, December 15, 2022. 27 Ibid; Yusuf Selman Inanc, “Turkey: Istanbul mayor given two-year jail sentence and ‘political ban,’” Middle East Eye, December 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 8 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In response to the December court ruling, a State Department statement included the fol owing passage: His [Imamoglu’s] conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. We remain gravely concerned by the continued judicial harassment of civil society, media, political and business leaders in Turkey, including through prolonged pretrial detention, overly broad claims of support for terrorism, and criminal insult cases. The people of Turkey deserve the ability to exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms without fear of retribution. The right to exercise the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, and association is enshrined in Turkey’s constitution, its international law obligations, and its OSCE commitments. We urge the government to cease prosecutions under criminal “insult” laws, and to respect the rights and freedoms of all Turkish citizens, including by ensuring an open environment for public debate.28 Erdogan controls whether to initiate elections before June 2023 and has thus far stated his unwillingness to do so. Rather than compel elections in Turkey, domestic instability could lead Erdogan’s cabinet to initiate a state of emergency with the potential to delay elections.29 Economic Assessment Overview and Ongoing Problems The AKP’s political successes during the 2000s were aided considerably by robust Turkish The AKP’s political successes during the 2000s were aided considerably by robust Turkish
economic growth. Growth rates were comparable at times to other major emerging markets, such economic growth. Growth rates were comparable at times to other major emerging markets, such
as the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Key Turkish businesses include as the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Key Turkish businesses include
diversified conglomerates (such as Koc and Sabanci) from traditional urban centers as well as diversified conglomerates (such as Koc and Sabanci) from traditional urban centers as well as
“Anatolian tigers” (small- to medium-sized export-oriented companies) scattered throughout the “Anatolian tigers” (small- to medium-sized export-oriented companies) scattered throughout the
country. country.
In the past decadeSince 2012, however, growth has at times slowed or reversed, and the Turkish economy , however, growth has at times slowed or reversed, and the Turkish economy
has experienced significant volatility. The “low-hanging fruit”—numerous has experienced significant volatility. The “low-hanging fruit”—numerous largemajor infrastructure infrastructure
projects and the scaling up of low-technology manufacturing—that largely drove projects and the scaling up of low-technology manufacturing—that largely drove the previous
decadeTurkey’s economic success’s economic success in the 2000s and early 2010s may be unlikely to produce similar results going forward. Turkey’s may be unlikely to produce similar results going forward. Turkey’s
relatively relatively largebig current account deficit increases its vulnerability to higher current account deficit increases its vulnerability to higher borrowing costs. Concerns among domestic and foreign market actors about rule of law in Turkeyborrowing costs.
Concerns about rule of law in Turkey and the possibility of U.S. sanctions may also drive may also drive
volatility. In July 2018, Erdogan gave himself the power to appoint central bank rate-setters and volatility. In July 2018, Erdogan gave himself the power to appoint central bank rate-setters and
appointed his son-in-law Berat Albayrak appointed his son-in-law Berat Albayrak (the former energy minister) to serve as treasury and to serve as treasury and
finance minister, finance minister, exacerbating concerns aboutleading some observers to discern greater politicization of Turkey’s monetary greater politicization of Turkey’s monetary
policy.policy.17
The30 Albayrak resigned in November 2020, and Erdogan replaced his successor around a year later, mirroring the frequent personnel churn at Turkey’s central bank, where Erdogan fired three bank chiefs (and numerous other officials) from 2019 to 2021.31 That turmoil contributed to the steady depreciation over several years of Turkey’s currency, the lira, steady depreciation over several years of Turkey’s currency, the lira, has putputting further strain on further strain on
the economy. As of November 2020, the value of the lira had declined nearly 30% for the year.
With net foreign currency reserves probably in negative territory, and interest rates below the rate
of inflation, analysts have predicted that Turkey will need to raise interest rates—perhaps
dramatically—or seek significant external assistance to address its financial fragility.18 In
November, Erdogan replaced Turkey’s central bank governor and Albayrak resigned as treasury
and finance minister, fueling speculation about the likelihood of interest rate hikes despite
Erdogan’s long-expressed disdain of them.19 Turkey unsuccessfully sought currency swap lines

14 Laura Pitel and Funja Guler, “Turkish opposition mayors outshine Erdogan with ‘kindness’ campaigns,” Financial
Times, June 23, 2020.
15 Laura Pitel, “Turkish mayors accuse government of coronavirus cover-up,” Financial Times, August 30, 2020.
16 Nick Danforth, “The Outlook for Turkish Democracy: 2023 and Beyond,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
March 2020.
17 Marcus Ashworth, “Erdogan’s New Dynasty Makes Turkey Uninvestable,” Bloomberg, July 10, 2018.
18 Economist Intelligence Unit, Turkey country report (retrieved November 3, 2020).
19 Laura Pitel, “Shock change in Turkey’s economic leadership raises stakes for lira,” Financial Times, November 8,
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from the U.S. Federal Reserve earlier in 2020, having relied to date for some liquidity on swaps
from Qatar and China.20
Some observers have speculated that if investment dries up, Turkey may need to turn to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a financial assistance package.21 Erdogan has publicly
rejected such speculation. Doing so would be a sensitive challenge for Erdogan because his
political success story is closely connected with helping Turkey become independent from its
most recent IMF intervention in the early 2000s.
Energy
Turkey’s importance as a regional energy transport hubthe economy. As of 28 State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction and Sentencing of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu,” December 15, 2022. 29 “Professor says Turkey may declare state of emergency following economic crisis,” Duvar English, December 14, 2021. 30 See, for example, Marcus Ashworth, “Erdogan’s New Dynasty Makes Turkey Uninvestable,” Bloomberg, July 10, 2018. 31 Jared Malsin and Anna Hirtenstein, “Turkey’s Erdogan fires central bank officials, fueling economic uncertainty,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 30 link to page 30 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations December 2022, the value of the lira had declined around 28% for the year, and nearly 80% since 2018. At least some of these economic challenges appear to stem from Erdogan’s longstanding and ideologically-motivated opposition to high interest rates. Erdogan, contrary to mainstream economic thinking, has expressed the view that lowering interest rates is a means to combat inflation.32 Turkey’s central bank hiked interest rates several times in 2020 and 2021, but in late 2021 returned to the interest rate cuts called for by Erdogan, despite a rising annual inflation rate that reached 85% in October 2022, the highest since 1998.33 Some unofficial estimates have suggested that actual inflation may be well over 100%.34 A persistent current account deficit has put further stress on Turkey’s central bank reserves, which have declined as part of government efforts to bolster the lira, reportedly leading Turkey to seek capital infusions from elsewhere. Turkey has sought currency swaps from some Arab Gulf states, and also has benefitted from Russian-origin inflows (both from tourism and from Russia’s nuclear agency, which is building a nuclear power plant in southern Turkey) that contribute to U.S. warnings about potential sanctions evasion (see “Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation” below).35 According to one media account, Turkey’s central bank received $24.4 billion in unaccounted-for funds in the first seven months of 2022.36 In 2021, the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force had placed Turkey on an increased monitoring or “grey” list for deficiencies in preventing money laundering and terrorist financing.37 The currency and inflation crisis in Turkey has dramatically affected consumers’ cost of living and the cost of international borrowing (mostly conducted in U.S. dollars) for banks and private sector companies. The government has sought to stop or reverse inflation by providing tax cuts, minimum wage increases, and subsidies for basic expenses, along with borrowing incentives for banks that hold liras.38 Erdogan has publicly rejected calls to turn to the International Monetary Fund for a financial assistance package. In December 2021, the government announced a plan to insure lira-denominated bank accounts against currency depreciation, in apparent coordination with a significant state-backed market intervention.39 Energy Turkey’s strategic location makes it relevant for world energy makes it relevant for world energy
marketsmarkets as a transit country while while also providing Turkey with opportunities to satisfy its own domestic energy needs, which are 32 “Is Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s monetary policy as mad as it seems?” Economist, January 27, 2022. 33 Beril Akman, “Turkey slashes interest rate in line with Erdogan’s demand,” Bloomberg, November 24, 2022; “Yearly inflation in Turkey rises to new 24-year high of 85%,” Associated Press, November 3, 2022. 34 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish inflation hits 85.5% as doubts linger over official data,” Al-Monitor, November 3, 2022. 35 Laura Pitel “Turkey finance minister defends economic links with Russia,” Financial Times, October 25, 2022; Murat Kubilay, “As liquidity problems worsen, Turkey turns to capital controls and informal FX flows,” Middle East Institute, November 7, 2022. 36 Louis Ashworth, “Who’s stuffing Turkey?” Financial Times, September 13, 2022. 37 Financial Action Task Force, “Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring - October 2021,” available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-risk-and-other-monitored-jurisdictions/documents/increased-monitoring-october-2021.html. 38 Hubbard, “Skyrocketing Prices in Turkey Hurt Families and Tarnish Erdogan”; Baris Balci and Inci Ozbek, “Turkey Rewrites All Inflation Forecasts,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2022. 39 “Turkish lira erodes last week’s gains,” Reuters, December 28, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 15 link to page 16also providing Turkey with opportunities to satisfy its own domestic energy needs.
With few hydrocarbon resources of its own, Turkey has been traditionally dependent on other
countries for energy imports—particularly Russia and Iran. However, Turkey has significantly
reduced its dependence on natural gas delivered via pipeline from Russia (see Figure 3), in part
by increasing its purchases of liquefied natural gas (LNG). From 2016 to June 2020, Russia’s
share of Turkish natural gas imports reportedly fell from 50% to 14%, while U.S. LNG as a share
of Turkey’s imports grew from 0% to 10%.22 Turkey faces challenges in maintaining and
broadening its efforts at diversification, including some pertaining to long-term supply contracts
and physical infrastructure. Additionally, Russia may retain leverage with Turkey on issues such
as arms sales, nuclear energy, and regional crises (i.e., Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh).

2020.
20 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkey’s ‘peg-legged’ foreign currency reserves,” Al-Monitor, July 6, 2020.
21 Bobby Ghosh, “Erdogan should break his IMF taboo,” Bloomberg, April 19, 2020.
22 Rauf Mammadov, “Turkey Makes Strides in Diversifying Its Natural Gas Imports,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 17,
Issue 97, July 6, 2020.
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Figure 3. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country

Source: Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), 2019 Annual Report
Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations considerable: Turkey imports around $45 billion of oil and gas annually.40 With few hydrocarbon resources of its own (pending recent Black Sea discoveries mentioned below), Turkey is generally dependent on imports from other countries. Turkey seeks to diversify its energy suppliers, while positioning itself as a regional and global energy transport hub and developing its own domestic energy production capabilities. Turkey’s most important energy provider by volume has traditionally been Russia, which provides Turkey with significant amounts of natural gas and oil. Russia’s share of Turkey’s natural gas imports fell from around 58% in 2013 to 34% in 2020, but rebounded to 44% in 2021 (see Figure 4).41 Turkey’s largest oil suppliers are Iraq (30% in 2021) and Russia (24%).42 Turkey faces challenges in maintaining and broadening its efforts at diversification, including some pertaining to long-term supply contracts and physical infrastructure. Figure 4. Turkish Natural Gas Imports by Country (in millions of cubic meters) Source: Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), 2021 Annual Report. Turkey has also sought to leverage its geography to position itself as a crucial transit country for global energy trade routes, mostly though natural gas pipelines. In January 2020, Presidents Erdogan and Putin inaugurated the TurkStream pipeline project (In January 2020, Presidents Erdogan and Putin inaugurated the TurkStream pipeline project (seesee
Figure 45), which carries Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to southern and central Europe , which carries Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to southern and central Europe
via Turkey.via Turkey.2343 A planned second line is to extend northward as far as Austria A planned second line is to extend northward as far as Austria. Russian energy infrastructure projects involving Turkey could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing legislation. The Countering . The Countering
Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEARussian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA;, P.L. 115-44) authorizes sanctions P.L. 115-44) authorizes sanctions
on individuals or entities that invest in or engage in trade for the construction of Russian energy on individuals or entities that invest in or engage in trade for the construction of Russian energy
export pipelines. In October 2017, the export pipelines. In October 2017, the Trump Administration published guidance noting that Administration published guidance noting that Section 232
sanctions would not apply to projects for which sanctions would not apply to projects for which 40 “Turkey – Country Commercial Guide,” U.S. Department of Commerce, July 26, 2022. 41 Turkey Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK), Annual Natural Gas Market Report 2021. 42 EPDK, Annual Oil Market Report 2021. 43 CRS In Focus IF11177, TurkStream: Russia’s Southern Pipeline to Europe, by Sarah E. Garding et al. Congressional Research Service 11 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations contracts were signed prior to August 2, 2017, the contracts were signed prior to August 2, 2017, the
date of CRIEEA’s enactment. However, in July 2020, the Administration updated that guidance date of CRIEEA’s enactment. However, in July 2020, the Administration updated that guidance
and stated that while the initial TurkStream pipeline would not be subject to and stated that while the initial TurkStream pipeline would not be subject to Section 232
sanctions, the second line would be. The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, sanctions, the second line would be. The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA,
P.L. 116-92) enacted in December 2019 included, as Title LXXV, the Protecting Europe’s Energy P.L. 116-92) enacted in December 2019 included, as Title LXXV, the Protecting Europe’s Energy
Security Act of 2019 (PEESA). This Act mandates sanctions—subject to a presidential waiver for Security Act of 2019 (PEESA). This Act mandates sanctions—subject to a presidential waiver for
national security reasons—for actors involved in laying subsea pipeline for TurkStream and national security reasons—for actors involved in laying subsea pipeline for TurkStream and
possible successor projects on a goingpossible successor projects on a going -forward basis. In the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA, Section 1242 of the FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283), Congress expanded the scope of targeted and potentially sanctionable activities related to TurkStream and other projects. Turkey has also been important forforward basis.
Turkey’s location has made it a key country in the U.S. and European effort to establish a the U.S. and European effort to establish a
southern corridor for pipelines to Europe that bypass Russia.southern corridor for pipelines to Europe that bypass Russia.24 In late 2011, Turkey and In late 2011, Turkey and
Azerbaijan reached deals for the transit of natural gas to and through Turkey via the Trans-Azerbaijan reached deals for the transit of natural gas to and through Turkey via the Trans-
Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP);Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP);2544 the the project was inaugurated in June 2018.45 In November 2020, the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) commenced operations, bringing Azeri gas to Italy via TANAP.46 Figure 5. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of State, HIS, ESRI, European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas, Bulgartransgaz. Geopolitical dynamics may pose challenges. For example, reports suggest that Turkey would like to bolster its position as a hub for natural gas from Russia, but any such plans may run counter to European countries’ aims to phase out Russian natural gas.47 Difficulties in relations with Greece, 44project was inaugurated in June 2018.26 As of September
2020, work is nearing completion on the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which is to transport

23 CRS In Focus IF11177, TurkStream: Russia’s Newest Gas Pipeline to Europe, by Sarah E. Garding et al.
24 Department of State press statement, “The Importance of Diversity in European Energy Security,” June 29, 2018.
25 The terms of the Turkey-Azerbaijan agreement specified that 565 billion-700 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas The terms of the Turkey-Azerbaijan agreement specified that 565 billion-700 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas
would transit Turkey, of which 210 bcf would be available for Turkey’s domestic use. would transit Turkey, of which 210 bcf would be available for Turkey’s domestic use.
26 45 “Leaders open TANAP pipeline carrying gas from Azerbaijan to Europe,” “Leaders open TANAP pipeline carrying gas from Azerbaijan to Europe,” Hurriyet Daily News, June 12, 2018. , June 12, 2018.
46 Dimitar Bechev, “The Trans-Adriatic Pipeline: Why it matters and what comes next?” Middle East Institute, December 2, 2020. 47 Ragip Soylu, “Could Turkey become a gas hub for Europe?” Middle East Eye, November 13, 2022; Vladimir Soldatkin and Oleysa Astakhova, “Analysis: Europe wary of Turkish hub to hide gas ‘made in Moscow,’” Reuters, December 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 12 Congressional Research Service

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link to page link to page 22
35 link to page 35 link to page 41 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Azeri gas to Italy via TANAP.27 Difficult relations with Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt are Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt are
likely to complicate Turkish efforts to play a larger role in the development and transport of likely to complicate Turkish efforts to play a larger role in the development and transport of
natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (see “Eastern Mediterranean and Offshore Natural Gas”
below).28
Greece and the Republic of Cyprus” and “Israel and Sunni Arab Governments” below). Turkey has opportunities to increase domestically-produced sources of energy.48 In August 2020, President Erdogan announced a Turkish discovery of offshore natural gas In August 2020, President Erdogan announced a Turkish discovery of offshore natural gas
deposits in the Black deposits in the Black Sea.49 Turkey expects production to begin in 2023 and reach its maximum by 2028, potentially satisfying a large portion of Turkey’s natural gas needs, though Turkey requires additional capital to fully develop its natural gas infrastructure.50 Beyond natural gas production, Turkey seeks to generate nuclear power, entering into an Sea. It is unclear how this news might impact the situation in the Eastern
Mediterranean and Turkey’s overall energy policies.29 Even if the deposits can be accessed,
commercially developing them for domestic consumption or trade could take years.30
Figure 4. Turkey and Southeastern European Gas Infrastructure

Source: Created by CRS using data from U.S. Department of State, HIS, ESRI, European Network of
Transmission System Operators for Gas, Bulgartransgaz.
Another part of Turkey’s strategy to become more energy independent is to increase domestic
energy production. Turkey has entered into an agreement with a subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia’s agreement with a subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia’s
state-run nuclear company) to have it build and operate what would be Turkey’s first nuclear state-run nuclear company) to have it build and operate what would be Turkey’s first nuclear
power plant in Akkuyupower plant in Akkuyu, near the Mediterranean port near the Mediterranean port of Mersin. Construction began in April 2018, with operations on the first of four reactors expected to begin in 2023; Turkey’s energy minister has said the site, which is scheduled to be completed in 2026, will meet 10% of Turkey’s electricity demand.51 Despite speculation among observers that U.S. and European sanctions could affect Rosatom’s ability to continue financing and constructing the project, Rosatom has publicly asserted sanctions on Russia will not impact Akkuyu.52 Turkey abandoned plans for Japan to assist with the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Sinop on the Black Sea coast in January 2020; in October 2022, Turkey and Russia reportedly began talks over Rosatom taking on construction of another four reactors at Sinop.53 Turkey’s Kurdish Issue Background Ethnic Kurds constitute approximately 19% of Turkey’s population.54 Kurds are largely of Mersin. Construction, which had been
delayed for several years, began in April 2018, with operations expected to begin in 2023.31 Some
observers have expressed both skepticism about the construction timeline and concerns that the
plant could provide Russia with additional leverage over Turkey.32 Plans for Japan to assist with

27 Shabnam Hasanova, “Where does the TAP gas pipeline project stand to date? The view from Baku,” Jamestown
Foundation, June 30, 2020.
28 Yigal Chazon, “Race to exploit Mediterranean gas raises regional hackles,” Financial Times, March 9, 2018.
29 See John V. Bowlus, “Pulling Back the Curtain on Turkey’s Natural Gas Strategy,” War on the Rocks, August 26,
2020.
30 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Erdogan Unveils Biggest Ever Black Sea Natural Gas Discovery,” Bloomberg, August 21, 2020.
31 “Construction starts on 2nd unit of Turkey’s 1st nuclear power plant Akkuyu,” Daily Sabah, June 28, 2020.
32 See, e.g., Aram Ekin Duran, “Akkuyu nuclear plant: Turkey and Russia’s atomic connection,” Deutsche Welle, April
3, 2018.
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the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Sinop on the Black Sea coast were abandoned
in January 2020.33
The Kurdish Issue
Background
Ethnic Kurds reportedly constitute approximately 19% of Turkey’s population.34 Kurds are
largely concentrated in the less economically developed southeast, though populations are found concentrated in the less economically developed southeast, though populations are found
in urban centers across the country. Some Kurds have in urban centers across the country. Some Kurds have been reluctant to recognizeresisted various aspects of Turkish state Turkish state
authority in authority in various parts of the southeast—a dynamic that also exists between Kurds and national parts of the southeast—a dynamic that also exists between Kurds and national
governments in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. This governments in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. This reluctanceresistance and harsh Turkish government measures to and harsh Turkish government measures to
quell Kurdish demands for rights have fed tensions that have occasionally escalated since the quell Kurdish demands for rights have fed tensions that have occasionally escalated since the
foundation of the republic in 1923. Since 1984, the Turkish military has periodically countered an foundation of the republic in 1923. Since 1984, the Turkish military has periodically countered an
on-and-off separatist insurgency and urban terrorism campaign by the PKK.on-and-off separatist insurgency and urban terrorism campaign by the PKK.35 The initially The initially
secessionist demands of the PKK have since ostensibly evolved toward the less ambitious goal of secessionist demands of the PKK have since ostensibly evolved toward the less ambitious goal of
greater cultural and political autonomy.greater cultural and political autonomy.3655 According to the U.S. government and EU, the PKK According to the U.S. government and EU, the PKK
partially finances its activities through criminal activities, including its operation of a Europe-
wide drug trafficking network.37
The struggle between Turkish authorities and the PKK was most intense during the 1990s, but has
flared periodically since then. The PKK uses safe havens in areas of northern Iraq under the
nominal authority of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Turkish military’s
approach to neutralizing the PKK has been routinely criticized by Western governments and
human rights organizations for being overly hard on ethnic Kurds. Thousands have been
imprisoned and hundreds of thousands have been displaced or had their livelihoods disrupted for
suspected PKK involvement or sympathies.

33 “Turkey, Japan scrap partnership in Sinop nuclear plant in Turkey’s north,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 20, 2020.
34 CIA World Factbook, Turkey (accessed August 2020).
35 According to the International Crisis Group, around 14,000 Turks have been killed since fighting began in the early
1980s. This figure includes Turkish security personnel of various types and Turkish civilians (including Turkish Kurds
who are judged not to have been PKK combatants). Estimates of PKK dead run from 33,000 to 43,000. International
Crisis Group, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: The Rising Toll” (interactive blog updated into 2018); Turkey: Ending the PKK
Insurgency, Europe Report No. 213, September 20, 2011.
36partially 48 Turkey supplies about half of its own coal, which accounts for 28% of Turkey’s total primary energy supply (TPES), and all types of renewable energy, which account for 17% of TPES. Oil and natural gas account for 32% and 25% of TPES, respectively. Turkey 2021: Energy Policy Review, International Energy Agency, March 2021. 49 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Erdogan Unveils Biggest Ever Black Sea Natural Gas Discovery,” Bloomberg, August 21, 2020. 50 See Wayne C. Ackerman, “Turkey: a new emerging gas player with resources and infrastructure,” Middle East Institute, June 15, 2022. 51 “Construction begins on fourth Turkish reactor,” World Nuclear News, July 21, 2022. 52 “Turkish nuclear plant threatened by Russian sanctions,” Al Jazeera, May 16, 2022; “EU sanctions will not impede Akkuyu nuclear plant financing: Rosatom,” Anadolu Agency, November 28, 2022. 53 “Turkey, Japan scrap partnership in Sinop nuclear plant in Turkey’s north,” Hurriyet Daily News, January 20, 2020; Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey asks Russia to build another nuclear plant, defying US,” Bloomberg, October 20, 2022. 54 CIA World Factbook, Turkey (accessed November 2022). 55 Kurdish nationalist leaders demand that any future changes to Turkey’s constitution (in its current form following the Kurdish nationalist leaders demand that any future changes to Turkey’s constitution (in its current form following the
2017 amendments) not suppress Kurdish ethnic and linguistic identity. The first clause of Article 3 of the constitution 2017 amendments) not suppress Kurdish ethnic and linguistic identity. The first clause of Article 3 of the constitution
reads, “The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” Because the
constitution states that its first three articles are unamendable, even proposing a change could face judicial obstacles.
37 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018; U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, “Five
PKK Leaders Designated Narcotics Traffickers,” April 20, 2011.
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link to page 47 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Government Approaches to the Kurds
PKK Designations by U.S.
Until the spring of 2015, Erdogan appeared to
Government
prefer negotiating a political compromise with
Designation
Year
PKK leaders over the prospect of armed
conflict.
Foreign Terrorist
1997
38 However, against the backdrop of
Organization
PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups’ success in Syria
and domestic political considerations, Erdogan
Special y Designated
2001
then adopted a more confrontational political
Global Terrorist
stance with the PKK. Within that context, a
Significant Foreign
2008
complicated set of circumstances involving
Narcotics Trafficker

Congressional Research Service 13 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations finances its activities through criminal activities, including its alleged operation of a Europe-wide drug trafficking network.56 The struggle between Turkish authorities and the PKK was most intense during the 1990s, but has flared periodically since then. The PKK uses safe havens in areas of northern Iraq under the nominal authority of Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), while also reportedly maintaining links to Kurdish groups in Syria (as discussed below). The Turkish military’s approach to neutralizing the PKK has routinely been criticized by Western governments and human rights organizations for being overly hard on ethnic Kurds. Turkish authorities have imprisoned thousands and displaced or disrupted the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of others for suspected PKK involvement or sympathies.57 PKK Designations by U.S. Government Approaches to the Kurds Government Until the spring of 2015, Erdogan appeared to Designation Year prefer negotiating a political compromise with PKK leaders over the prospect of armed Foreign Terrorist 1997 Organization conflict.58 However, against the backdrop of PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups’ success in Syria Special y Designated 2001 and domestic political considerations, Erdogan Global Terrorist then adopted a more confrontational political Significant Foreign 2008 stance with the PKK. Within that context, a Narcotics Trafficker complicated set of circumstances involving terrorist attacks and mutual suspicion led to a terrorist attacks and mutual suspicion led to a
resumption of violence between government forces and the PKK in the summer of 2015. As a resumption of violence between government forces and the PKK in the summer of 2015. As a
result of the violence, which result of the violence, which has beenwas concentrated in southeastern Turkey and was most intense concentrated in southeastern Turkey and was most intense
from 2015 to 2016, from 2015 to 2016, hundredsthousands of fighters and of fighters and civilians have died.39hundreds civilians died.59 In addition to mass population In addition to mass population
displacement, infrastructure in the southeast has suffered significant damage. U.S. officials, while displacement, infrastructure in the southeast has suffered significant damage. U.S. officials, while
supportive of Turkey’s prerogative to defend itself from attackssupportive of Turkey’s prerogative to defend itself from attacks that it alleges come from the PKK or PKK allies, have advised Turkey to show , have advised Turkey to show
restraint and proportionality in its actions.restraint and proportionality in its actions.4060
Under the state of emergency enacted after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey’s Under the state of emergency enacted after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey’s
government cracked down on Turkey’s Kurdish minority. government cracked down on Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Since then, dozensDozens of elected Kurdish of elected Kurdish
mayors mayors have beenwere removed from office and replaced with government-appointed “custodians.” In removed from office and replaced with government-appointed “custodians.” In
November 2016, the two then-co-leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party November 2016, the two then-co-leaders of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party
((Halklarin Demokratik Partisi, or HDP) were arrested along with , or HDP) were arrested along with nine other parliamentarians other parliamentarians
under various charges of crimes against the state; some remain imprisoned, along with other party under various charges of crimes against the state; some remain imprisoned, along with other party
leaders and members who have been detained on similar charges.41 Turkish officials routinely
accuse Kurdish politicians of support for the PKK, but these politicians generally deny close tiesleaders and reads, “The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” Because the constitution states that its first three articles are unamendable, even proposing a change could face judicial obstacles. 56 European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2022; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Five PKK Leaders Designated Narcotics Traffickers,” April 20, 2011. 57 See, for example, Cengiz Candar, Turkey’s Mission Impossible: War and Peace with the Kurds, Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Lexington Books, 2020. 58 As prime minister, Erdogan had led past efforts to resolve the Kurdish question by using political, cultural, and economic development approaches, in addition to the traditional security-based approach, in line with the AKP’s ideological starting point that common Islamic ties among Turks and Kurds could transcend ethnic differences. 59 International Crisis Group, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer,” last updated November 10, 2022. 60 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” November 28, 2022; Mark Landler and Carlotta Gall, “As Turkey Attacks Kurds in Syria, U.S. Is on the Sideline,” New York Times, January 22, 2018. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 60 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations members who have been detained on similar charges since 2016. Turkish officials routinely accuse Kurdish politicians of support for the PKK, but these politicians generally deny close ties. In June 2021, Turkey’s Constitutional Court accepted an indictment from a state prosecutor seeking to close the HDP and ban many of its members from politics. The HDP is the successor to a number of pro-Kurdish parties that the state has shut down throughout Turkey’s history going back to the early 1990s.61 As of December 2022, the court has yet to rule on the closure case. .
The future trajectory of Turkey-PKK dealings may depend on a number of factors, including The future trajectory of Turkey-PKK dealings may depend on a number of factors, including
 which Kurdish figures and groups (imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan  which Kurdish figures and groups (imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan
[profiled i [profiled in Appendix BA], various PKK militant leaders, the professedly , various PKK militant leaders, the professedly
nonviolent HDP) are most influential in driving events; nonviolent HDP) are most influential in driving events;
 Erdogan’s approach to the issue, which has alternated between conciliation and  Erdogan’s approach to the issue, which has alternated between conciliation and
confrontation; and confrontation; and
 possible incentives to Turkey’s government and the Kurds from the United States  possible incentives to Turkey’s government and the Kurds from the United States
or other actors for mitigating violence and promoting political resolution. or other actors for mitigating violence and promoting political resolution.
Religious Minorities
Many Members of Congress follow theThe status of religious minorities in Turkey status of religious minorities in Turkey has attracted some congressional attention. Religious . Religious
minorities are generally concentrated in Istanbul and other urban areas, as well as the southeast, minorities are generally concentrated in Istanbul and other urban areas, as well as the southeast,
and collectively represent around 0.2% of Turkey’s population. Adherents of non-Muslim and collectively represent around 0.2% of Turkey’s population. Adherents of non-Muslim

38 As prime minister, Erdogan had led past efforts to resolve the Kurdish question by using political, cultural, and
economic development approaches, in addition to the traditional security-based approach, in line with the AKP’s
ideological starting point that common Islamic ties among Turks and Kurds could transcend ethnic differences.
39 International Crisis Group, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: The Rising Toll.”
40 Mark Landler and Carlotta Gall, “As Turkey Attacks Kurds in Syria, U.S. Is on the Sideline,” New York Times,
January 22, 2018.
41 See https://hdp-usa.com/political-prisoners.
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religions and minority Muslim sects (most prominently, the Alevis) often attract, and to some religions and minority Muslim sects (most prominently, the Alevis) often attract, and to some
extent rely on, legal appeals, political advocacy, and support from Western countries. extent rely on, legal appeals, political advocacy, and support from Western countries.
The Turkish government controls or closely oversees religious activities in the country. This The Turkish government controls or closely oversees religious activities in the country. This
arrangement was originally used to enforce secularism (often referred to as “laicism”), partly to arrangement was originally used to enforce secularism (often referred to as “laicism”), partly to
prevent religion from influencing state actors and institutions as it did under Ottoman rule. prevent religion from influencing state actors and institutions as it did under Ottoman rule.
However, since at least 2015, observers have detected some movement by state religious However, since at least 2015, observers have detected some movement by state religious
authorities in the direction of the AKP’s Islamist-friendly worldview, and successive Department authorities in the direction of the AKP’s Islamist-friendly worldview, and successive Department
of State International Religious Freedom Reports indicate that the Turkish government limits the of State International Religious Freedom Reports indicate that the Turkish government limits the
rights of religious minorities.rights of religious minorities.4262
U.S. concerns focus largely on the rights of Turkey’s Christian and Jewish communities, which U.S. concerns focus largely on the rights of Turkey’s Christian and Jewish communities, which
have sought greater freedom to choose leaders, train clergy, own property, and otherwise function have sought greater freedom to choose leaders, train clergy, own property, and otherwise function
independently of the Turkish government.independently of the Turkish government.4363
Halki Seminary and Hagia Sophia
Some Members of Congress Some Members of Congress routinely expresshave expressed grievances through proposed congressional grievances through proposed congressional
resolutions and letters on behalf of the Ecumenical (Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate of resolutions and letters on behalf of the Ecumenical (Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate of
61 Alex McDonald, “Threat to close pro-Kurdish party echoes long tradition in Turkey’s politics,” Middle East Eye, March 20, 2021. 62 See also, e.g., Ceren Lord, Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP (Cambridge University Press), 2018. 63 Since 2009, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has given Turkey designations ranging from “country of particular concern” (highest concern) to “monitored.” As of the 2022 report, Turkey is among 12 countries recommended for the State Department’s Special Watch List. For additional information on Turkey’s religious minorities, see the State Department’s Report on International Religious Freedom for 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Constantinople, the spiritual center of Orthodox Christianity based in Istanbul.64Constantinople, the spiritual center of Orthodox Christianity based in Istanbul.44 The Patriarchate, The Patriarchate,
along with various U.S. and European officials, continues to press for the reopening of its Halki along with various U.S. and European officials, continues to press for the reopening of its Halki
Theological School,Theological School,45 which was closed after a 1971 ruling by Turkey’s Constitutional Court which was closed after a 1971 ruling by Turkey’s Constitutional Court
prohibiting the operation of private institutions of higher education.prohibiting the operation of private institutions of higher education.46 In February 2019, then-
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras made the first-ever visit by a Greek prime minister to the
seminary. In the past, Erdogan has reportedly65 The State Department issued a statement in July 2021 marking the 50th anniversary of Halki’s closure and urged Turkey to allow its reopening.66 In the past, Erdogan reportedly has said that Halki’s reopening would depend on said that Halki’s reopening would depend on
measures by Greece to accommodate its Muslim community.measures by Greece to accommodate its Muslim community.4767
Turkey has converted some historic Christian churches from museums into mosques, most Turkey has converted some historic Christian churches from museums into mosques, most
notably Istanbul’s landmark Hagia Sophia (notably Istanbul’s landmark Hagia Sophia (Ayasofya in Turkish), a sixth-century Greek Orthodox in Turkish), a sixth-century Greek Orthodox
cathedral that cathedral that washad been converted to a mosque after the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and then converted to a mosque after the 1453 Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and then
became a museum during the early years of the Turkish Republic. A popular movement to convert became a museum during the early years of the Turkish Republic. A popular movement to convert
the site back into a mosque gained strength in recent years, culminating in President Erdogan’s the site back into a mosque gained strength in recent years, culminating in President Erdogan’s
public support for such a move during the March 2019 local elections campaign.public support for such a move during the March 2019 local elections campaign.4868 In In July 2020, a Turkish court invalidated the 1934 decree that created Hagia Sophia as a museum, and President Erdogan subsequently approved its conversion to a mosque and led the first prayers there. The move, seen as a political overture to conservative Turkish nationalists, was criticized by the Trump Administration, a number of Members of Congress, and the EU Foreign Affairs Council.69 Alevis About 10 to 20 million Turkish Muslims are Alevis (of whom about 20% are ethnic Kurds). The Alevi community has some relation to Shiism and may contain strands from pre-Islamic Anatolian and Christian traditions.70 Alevism has been influenced by Sufi mysticism that emphasizes believers’ individual spiritual paths, but it defies precise description owing to its lack of centralized leadership and its reliance on secret oral traditions. Alevis have long been among the strongest supporters of secularism in Turkey, which they reportedly see as a form of protection from the Sunni majority.71 In October 2022, President Erdogan announced plans to 64 See, for example, H.R. 3056 in the 117th Congress. During the 112th Congress in 2011July 2020, a

42 See also, e.g., Ceren Lord, Religious Politics in Turkey: From the Birth of the Republic to the AKP (Cambridge
University Press), 2018.
43 Since 2009, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has given Turkey designations
ranging from “country of particular concern” (highest concern) to “monitored.” As of the 2020 report, Turkey is
recommended for the Department of State’s Special Watch List. For additional information on Turkey’s religious
minorities, see the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report for 2019.
44 On December 13, 2011, for example, the House passed H.Res. 306—“Urging the Republic of Turkey to safeguard its , the House passed H.Res. 306—“Urging the Republic of Turkey to safeguard its
Christian heritage and to return confiscated church properties”—by voice vote. Christian heritage and to return confiscated church properties”—by voice vote. In JuneDuring the 113th Congress in 2014, the House Foreign Affairs 2014, the House Foreign Affairs
Committee favorably reported the Turkey Christian Churches Accountability Act (H.R. 4347). The Turkish Committee favorably reported the Turkey Christian Churches Accountability Act (H.R. 4347). The Turkish
government does not acknowledge the “ecumenical” nature of the Patriarchate, but does not object to others’ reference government does not acknowledge the “ecumenical” nature of the Patriarchate, but does not object to others’ reference
to the Patriarchate’s ecumenicity. to the Patriarchate’s ecumenicity.
45 65 The Patriarchate also presses for the Turkish government to lift the requirement that the Patriarch be a Turkish The Patriarchate also presses for the Turkish government to lift the requirement that the Patriarch be a Turkish
citizen, and for it to return previously confiscated properties. citizen, and for it to return previously confiscated properties.
46 In remarks accompanying the release of the 2018 religious freedom report, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said,
“We urge the immediate reopening of the Halki Seminary.” Department of State, “Secretary of State Michael R.
Pompeo at the Release of the 2018 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom,” June 21, 2019.
4766 State Department, “50th anniversary of the closing of Halki Seminary,” July 29, 2021. 67 Stelyo Berberakis, “Patriarch hopes to reopen seminary after talks with president,” Stelyo Berberakis, “Patriarch hopes to reopen seminary after talks with president,” Daily Sabah, May 11, 2018; , May 11, 2018;
“Turkey ready to open Halki Seminary in return for a mosque in Greece: report,” “Turkey ready to open Halki Seminary in return for a mosque in Greece: report,” Hurriyet Daily News, May 8, 2015. , May 8, 2015.
4868 “Turkey’s Erdogan Says He Plans to Change Hagia Sophia’s Title from Museum to Mosque,” “Turkey’s Erdogan Says He Plans to Change Hagia Sophia’s Title from Museum to Mosque,” Reuters, March 29,
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Turkish court invalidated the 1934 decree that created Hagia Sophia as a museum, and President
Erdogan subsequently approved its conversion to a mosque and led the first prayers there. The
move, also seen as a political overture to conservative Turkish nationalists, was criticized by
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, a number of Members of Congress, and the EU Foreign
Affairs Council.
Alevis
About 10 to 20 million Turkish Muslims are Alevis (of whom about 20% are ethnic Kurds). The
Alevi community has some relation to Shiism and may contain strands from pre-Islamic
Anatolian and Christian traditions.49 Alevism has been traditionally influenced by Sufi mysticism
that emphasizes believers’ individual spiritual paths, but it defies precise description owing to its
lack of centralized leadership and reliance on secret oral traditions. Despite multiple decisions by
Turkey’s top appeals court that the state financially support cemevis (Alevi houses of worship),
the government still does not do so.50
Alevis have long been among the strongest supporters of secularism in Turkey, which they
reportedly see as a form of protection from the Sunni majority.51Reuters, March 29, 2019. In 2014, then-Prime Minster Erdogan responded to activists calling for Hagia Sophia to be opened as a mosque by saying that other extant mosques in the area should be fully utilized before any change would be made to Hagia Sophia. Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “What caused Erdogan’s change of heart on Hagia Sophia?” Al-Monitor, March 29, 2019. 69 State Department, “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability,” July 15, 2020; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Menendez, Risch Statement on Turkey’s Hagia Sophia,” July 10, 2020; Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs Council, July 13, 2020. 70 For additional historical background, see Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and managing territorial diversity, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 11-18. 71 According to a scholar on Turkey, “Alevis suffered centuries of oppression under the Ottomans, who accused them of not being truly Muslim and suspected them of colluding with the Shi’i Persians against the empire. Alevi Kurds were Congressional Research Service 16 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations create a new government directorate to oversee financial support to cemevler (Alevi houses of worship), with some Alevis welcoming the initiative and others rejecting it.72 Arab Alawites in Syria and Arab Alawites in Syria and
southern Turkey are a distinct Shia-related religious community.
Turkey’s Strategic Orientation and Military
Involvement
Numerous points of tension and Turkey’s military operations in various places have raised
questions within the United States and Turkey about the two countries’ alliance, as well as
Turkey’s commitment to NATO and its Western orientation. Nevertheless, U.S. and Turkish
officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on a number of issues—including regional security
and counterterrorism—remains mutually important.52
Concerns among Turkish leaders that U.S. policy might undermine Turkey’s security date back at
least to the 1991 Gulf War,53 but the following developments have fueled them since 2010:

2019. In 2014, then-Prime Minster Erdogan responded to activists calling for Hagia Sophia to be opened as a mosque
by saying that other extant mosques in the area should be fully utilized before any change would be made to Hagia
Sophia. Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “What caused Erdogan’s change of heart on Hagia Sophia?” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse,
March 29, 2019.
49 For additional historical background, see Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and managing
territorial diversity, New York: Routledge, 2013, pp. 11-18.
50 Patrick Kingsley, “Turkey’s Alevis, a Muslim Minority, Fear a Policy of Denying Their Existence,” New York Times,
July 22, 2017; “Turkey’s top appeals court rules for state to pay utilities of Alevi houses of worship,” Daily Sabah,
November 29, 2018.
51 According to a scholar on Turkey, “Alevis suffered centuries of oppression under the Ottomans, who accused them
of not being truly Muslim and suspected them of colluding with the Shi’i Persians against the empire. Alevi Kurds were
southern Turkey are a distinct Shia-related religious community. Turkish Foreign Policy General Assessment Turkey’s strategic orientation, or how it relates to and balances between the West and other global and regional powers, is a major consideration for the United States. Trends in Turkey’s relations with the United States and other countries reflect changes to this orientation, as Turkey has sought greater independence of action as a regional power within a more multipolar global system. Turkish leaders’ interest in reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western influence over their domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia, such as in Syria and with Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—including in political-military situations involving Syria, Ukraine, Libya, and Armenia-Azerbaijan. A Turkish analyst has argued that Turkish foreign and security policy is shaped by three key objectives: attaining long-term strategic autonomy in key geopolitical affairs and self-sufficiency in defense technologies, building new partnerships to minimize Turkey’s over-dependence on its traditional Western allies and avoiding direct confrontation with Russia.73 Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other influential countries as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on these actors and maintain its leverage with them.74 For decades, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment (including a customs union with the European Union since the late 1990s), and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Without a means of global power projection or major natural resource wealth, Turkey’s military strength and economic well-being appear to remain somewhat dependent on these traditional relationships. Turkey’s ongoing economic struggles (discussed above) highlight the risks it faces if it jeopardizes these ties.75 victims of the early republic’s Turkification policies and were massacred by the thousands in Dersim [now called victims of the early republic’s Turkification policies and were massacred by the thousands in Dersim [now called
Tunceli] in 1937-39. In the 1970s, Alevis became associated with socialist and other leftist movements, while the Tunceli] in 1937-39. In the 1970s, Alevis became associated with socialist and other leftist movements, while the
political right was dominated by Sunni Muslims. An explosive mix of sectarian cleavages, class polarization, and political right was dominated by Sunni Muslims. An explosive mix of sectarian cleavages, class polarization, and
political violence led to communal massacres of Alevis in five major cities in 1977 and 1978, setting the stage for the political violence led to communal massacres of Alevis in five major cities in 1977 and 1978, setting the stage for the
1980 coup.” Jenny White, 1980 coup.” Jenny White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 14. , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 14.
52 Stephen J. Flanagan,72 Sibel Hurtas, “Erdogan’s pre-election gesture to Alevis met with suspicion,” Al-Monitor, October 14, 2022; Yusuf Selman Inanc, “Turkey: Erdogan’s Alevi reform initiative met with praise and scepticisim,” Middle East Eye, October 18, 2022. 73 Can Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond,” Jamestown Foundation, October 12, 2022. 74 Nur Ozcan Erbay, “Ankara to use compartmentalization in managing relations,” Daily Sabah, June 24, 2021; Stephen J. Flanagan et al., et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course: Implications for the U.S.-Turkish Strategic Partnership and
the U.S. Army, RAND Corporation, 2020. , RAND Corporation, 2020.
53 See, e.g., Keith Johnson and Robbie Gramer, “Who Lost Turkey?” foreignpolicy.com, July 19, 2019.
75 Rich Outzen and Soner Cagaptay, “The Third Age of Erdoğan’s Foreign Policy,” Center for European Policy Analysis, February 17, 2022. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

1417 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Turkey and the European Union (EU) Turkey has a long history of partnership with the EU (and its predecessor organizations) and began negotiations to join the EU in 2005. Talks stalled shortly thereafter and Turkey’s membership now appears unlikely, at least in the near future. Some scholars have interpreted resistance to Turkish EU accession as rooted in a fear among some EU states that Turkey’s large Muslim population would fundamental y change the cultural character of the EU and dilute the power of the EU’s founding Western European states in particular.76 Turkey’s unwil ingness to normalize diplomatic and trade relations with the Republic of Cyprus (an EU member since 2004) presents a major obstacle to its accession prospects. Other EU concerns over Turkey’s qualifications for membership center on the treatment of Kurds and religious minorities, media freedoms, women’s rights, and the proper and transparent functioning of Turkey’s democratic and legal systems.77 Debate within the EU regarding the extent to which Turkey meets EU standards has intensified since President Erdogan’s consolidation of power starting around 2013. Erdogan has engaged in anti-European rhetoric with audiences both at home and among the substantial Turkish diaspora communities in Europe. Despite the lack of significant progress in accession negotiations, the EU has provided Turkey with more than €9 bil ion in pre-accession financial and technical assistance since 2002. Citing concerns about Turkish backsliding on reforms, the EU reduced pre-accession assistance levels in 2018. Annual assistance levels that ranged from between €493-626 mil ion for 2014-2017 dropped to slightly less than €400 mil ion for 2018-2020.78 Turkey has received additional funding since then under an overall EU budget of €14.2 bil ion for 2021-2027 for Turkey and six Balkan countries. Turkey’s compartmentalized approach to foreign policy may to some extent reflect domestic political concerns. Because Erdogan’s control over parliament depends on the AKP’s coalition

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 Close U.S. military cooperation against the Islamic State with Syrian Kurdish
forces linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist
organization that has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish
government since the 1980s while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq.
 Turkey’s view that the United States supported or acquiesced to events during
post-2011 turmoil in Egypt and Syria that undermined Sunni Islamist figures tied
to Turkey.
 Many Western leaders’ criticism of President Erdogan for ruling in a largely
authoritarian manner. Erdogan’s sensitivity to Western concerns was exacerbated
by the 2016 coup attempt. Erdogan blames the coup attempt on Fethullah Gulen,
a former Turkish imam (prayer leader) who leads a worldwide socioreligious
movement and lives in the United States.
Turkey arguably seeks a more independent foreign policy course than at any time since joining
NATO in 1952, driven partly by geopolitical and economic considerations. Traditionally, Turkey
has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for
trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. Turkish leaders’ interest in
reducing their dependence on the West for defense and discouraging Western influence over their
domestic politics may partly explain their willingness to coordinate some actions with Russia in
Syria and purchase a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Nevertheless, Turkey retains
significant differences with Russia—with which it has a long history of discord—including over
political outcomes in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Also, as mentioned above, Turkey
appears to be making efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. While Turkey-Russia
cooperation on some issues may not reflect a general Turkish realignment toward Russia, Russia
may be content with helping weaken Turkey’s ties with the United States, NATO, and the EU to
reduce obstacles to Russian actions and ambitions.54
Turkish leaders appear to compartmentalize their partnerships and rivalries with other global
powers as each situation dictates, partly in an attempt to reduce Turkey’s dependence on and
maintain its leverage with these actors.55 This approach may to some extent reflect President
Erdogan’s efforts to consolidate control domestically. Because Erdogan’s Islamist-friendly AKP
maintains a parliamentary majority in partnership with the more traditionally nationalist MHP, with the more traditionally nationalist MHP,
efforts to efforts to maintain thepreserve support support offrom core constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a core constituencies may imbue Turkish policy with a
nationalistic tenor. A largely nationalistic foreign policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s nationalistic tenor. A largely nationalistic foreign policy also has precedent from before Turkey’s
Cold War alignment with the West.Cold War alignment with the West.5679 Turkey’s history as both a regional power and an object of Turkey’s history as both a regional power and an object of
great power aggression great power aggression translates into wideseems to contribute to domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions domestic popularity for nationalistic political actions
and discourse, as well as and discourse, as well as sympathysupport for Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish for Erdogan’s “neo-Ottoman” narrative of restoring Turkish
regional prestige.
Turkish Hard Power: Using Drones and Proxy Forces in Regional Conflicts
During Erdogan’s first decade as prime minister, Turkey’s main approach in its surrounding region (with the
exception of its long-running security operations against the PKK) was to project political and economic influence,
or “soft power,” backed by diplomacy and military deterrence. As regional unrest increased near Turkey’s borders
with the onset of conflict in Syria, however, Turkey’s approach shifted dramatically in light of newly perceived

54 See, e.g., Marc Pierini, “How Far Can Turkey Challenge NATO and the EU in 2020?” Carnegie Europe, January 29,
2020; Andrew Higgins, “Putin and Erdogan Reach Accord to Halt Fighting in Syria,” New York Times, March 5, 2020.
55 Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course.
56 Pierini, “How Far Can Turkey Challenge NATO and the EU?”
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link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 39 link to page 21 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

threats. This was especial y the case after Erdogan (as president) began courting Turkish nationalist constituencies
in 2015 and consolidating power fol owing the July 2016 coup attempt.
Under this modified approach, Turkey now largely relies on hard power to affect regional outcomes. Specifically,
Turkey has focused on a relatively low-cost method of using armed drones (see “Drones: Domestic Production,
U.S. and Western Components, and Exports”) and/or proxy forces (particularly Syrian fighters who oppose the
Syrian government and otherwise have limited sources of income) in theaters of conflict including northern Syria
and Iraq, western Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Partly because the drones and proxy forces limit Turkey’s
political and economic risk, Turkish leaders have shown less constraint in deploying them, and they have
reportedly proven effective at countering other actors’ more expensive but less mobile armored vehicles and air
defense systems. Turkey’s early 2018 “Operation Olive Branch” against PKK-linked Syrian Kurds in Syria’s Afrin
province was reportedly a crucial early test of this method.
During 2020, Turkey’s drones and proxies appear to have blocked or made inroads against Russian-assisted forces
in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh.57 Turkish efforts to counter Russia in multiple theaters suggest that
Turkey-Russia cooperation is situational rather than comprehensive in scope (see Appendix A), and that U.S.
and Turkish interests may overlap in some of these cases.
U.S./NATO Presence
Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory
for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and
NATO. From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional value has been to mitigate its concerns
about encroachment by neighbors. Turkey initially turned to the West largely as a reaction to
aggressive post-World War II posturing by the Soviet Union. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near
the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile
defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure 5).
Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through its straits pursuant to the Montreux
Convention of 1936.
Incirlik Air Base
Turkey’s Incirlik (pronounced een-jeer-leek) air base in the southern part of the country has long been the symbolic
and logistical center of the U.S. military presence in Turkey, with the U.S. Air Force’s 39th Air Base Wing based
there. Since 1991, the base has been critical in supplying U.S. military missions in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Syria. Anti-Islamic State coalition flights in Syria and Iraq began in 2014, but reportedly dropped off significantly
by 2018 owing to U.S.-Turkey tensions.58
The use of Incirlik by coup plotters within Turkey’s military in July 2016 caused temporary disruptions of some
U.S. military operations, and intensified concerns about Turkey’s stability and the safety and utility of Turkish
territory for U.S. and NATO assets. Several open source media outlets have speculated about whether U.S.
tactical nuclear weapons may be based at Incirlik Air Base, and if so, whether U.S. officials might consider taking
them out of Turkey.59
Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions
about the continued use of Turkish bases. As a result of the tensions and questions about the

57 Mitch Prothero, “Turkey's Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year — here's how he did it,” Business Insider,
October 22, 2020.
58 Gordon Lubold, et al., “U.S. Pares Operations at Base in Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2018.
59 Dorian Jones, “US Military Base in Turkey Has Uncertain Future,” Voice of America, November 24, 2019; Miles A.
Pomper, “Why the US has nuclear weapons in Turkey—and may try to put the bombs away,” The Conversation,
October 23, 2019. A bill introduced in the Senate in October 2019 (S. 2644) would, among other provisions, require the
President to provide an interagency report to Congress “assessing viable alternative military installations or other
locations to host personnel and assets of the United States Armed Forces currently stationed at Incirlik Air Base in
Turkey.”
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safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated
exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.60 Some reports suggest that expanded or
potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might
be connected with concerns about Turkey.61
Figure 5. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey

Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS.
Notes: All locations are approximate.
There are historical precedents for the United States withdrawing military assets from Turkey and
Turkey restricting U.S. use of its territory or airspace. These include the following:
 1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States withdrew its nuclear-tipped
Jupiter missiles following this crisis.
 1975 - Cyprus. Turkey closed most U.S. defense and intelligence installations in
Turkey during the U.S. arms embargo that Congress imposed in response to
Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus.

60 See, e.g., Xander Snyder, “Beyond Incirlik,” Geopolitical Futures, April 19, 2019.
61 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph
Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The
Drive, January 14, 2019.
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 2003 - Iraq. A Turkish parliamentary vote did not allow the United States to
open a second front from Turkey in the Iraq war.
Assessing costs and benefits to the United States of a U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and of
potential changes in U.S./NATO posture, largely revolves around three questions:
 To what extent does the United States rely on direct use of Turkish territory or
airspace to secure and protect U.S. interests?
 How important is U.S./NATO support to Turkey’s external defense and internal
stability, and to what extent does that support serve U.S. interests?
 To what extent would other regional countries provide more or less stability and
protection for U.S./NATO military assets and personnel?
Issues with Other U.S./NATO Allies
Turkey’s regional ambitions have contributed to difficulties with some of its neighbors that are
(like Turkey) U.S. allies or partners.
Eastern Mediterranean and Offshore Natural Gas
A dispute during the past decade between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus about Eastern
Mediterranean energy exploration arguably has brought Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt closer
together.62 Turkey has objected to Greek Cypriot transactions in the offshore energy sector
because they have not involved the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus that controls
the northern one-third of the island. Turkey also has supported Turkish Cypriot claims to an
exclusive economic zone around part of the island. Cyprus, Greece, and Israel have discussed
possible cooperation to export gas finds to Europe via a pipeline bypassing Turkey.63
In late 2019, the Turkey-Cyprus dispute became intertwined with longtime Turkey-Greece
disagreements over continental shelves, territorial waters, airspace, and exclusive economic zones
when Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) on
maritime boundaries (see Figure 6).64 The dispute has increased Turkey-Greece naval tensions,
especially after Greece and Egypt reached a maritime agreement in August 2020 rivaling the 2019
Turkey-Libya deal.65 Some observers assert that nationalistic and anti-Western sentiment within
elite Turkish national security circles may help drive Turkey’s recent naval buildup and
maximalist maritime claims, citing arguments within these circles that Turkey is entitled to a
“Blue Homeland” in surrounding waters.66 Turkish decisions may partly stem from concerns
about potential geostrategic encirclement and exclusion from potentially lucrative commercial
energy transactions.

62 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turkey, Rivals Square Off Over Gas Finds,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2020.
63 “Battling over boundaries,” Economist, August 22, 2020. The feasibility of such a pipeline is unclear. Sue Surkes,
“Mistake to leave Turkey out of new East Med gas club – international expert,” Times of Israel, September 27, 2020.
64 For background, see “Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute” at globalsecurity.org.
65 Michael Tanchum, “How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?”
foreignpolicy.com, August 18, 2020.
66 Ryan Gingeras, “Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy,” War on the Rocks,
June 2, 2020; “The Turkish Navy in an Era of Great Power Competition,” War on the Rocks, April 30, 2019.
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regional prestige. Geopolitics: A Key Driver of Turkish Foreign Policy Turkey’s geography has deep implications for its relations with neighbors and outside powers. Turkey is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. It controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits (the Straits), which are critical maritime chokepoints connecting the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Historically, Turkey’s political, economic, and military strength has helped it shape developments in areas of close proximity. Its traditional rival for regional primacy has been Iran, but since the middle of the 20th century countries such as Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have developed aspects of military or economic power that approach or outstrip Turkey’s in some ways. For centuries, the influence of the Turkish state, and the Ottoman Empire that preceded it, has been checked and countered by outside powers intent on some measure of control in the regions surrounding Turkey for strategic and economic purposes. After the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith in the 16th century, its strength waned. Gradually, it lost influence and territory to Russia, other European powers, and nationalist movements in the Balkans, Middle East, and North Africa. Before the Empire disintegrated after its defeat in World War I, its rulers spent the Empire’s last decades resorting to balance-of-power politics and military action to prolong its survival. The Turkish Republic succeeded the Ottoman Empire and sought to create a stable nation-state for Turkish Muslims within a smaller territorial area. To retain control throughout Anatolia (or Asia Minor) and in the Eastern Thrace peninsula on the European side of the Straits, Turkey fought a 1919-1922 war of independence against Greek, Armenian, and French forces. 76 “Does ‘Muslim’ Turkey belong in ‘Christian’ Europe?” Pew Research Center, January 13, 2005; Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession, Dietrich Jung and Catharina Raudvere, eds., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 77 European Commission, Türkiye 2022 Report. 78 See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180817-revised-indicative-strategy-paper-2014-2020-for-turkey.pdf. 79 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774, New York: Routledge, 2013 (3rd edition). Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 23 link to page 63 link to page 24 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations These historical experiences and continued interactions between Turkey, its many neighbors, and several larger powers with regional interests, have influenced a Turkish approach to foreign policy that balances cautious accommodation with assertive claims when national priorities (which have fluctuated over time) are at stake. Turkey’s sizable and restive Kurdish minority—approximately 19% of its population—makes it vulnerable to Kurdish demands for autonomy, and to outside actors that aid Kurdish groups around Turkey’s borders in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Turkey’s future foreign policy course could depend partly on the degree to which Turkish leaders feel constrained by their traditional security and economic relationships with Western powers, and how willing they are to risk tensions or breaks in those relationships while building other global relationships. One reason Turkey may seek to increase economic ties with Russia, Arab Gulf states, and other regional countries is to reduce its vulnerability to economic sanctions or other coercive tactics by the United States or European Union countries. The Turkish public appears to regard very few countries—Western or non-Western—as friendly to Turkey (see Figure 6). Figure 6. Turkish Public Opinion: Are These Countries Turkey’s Friends? (% basis) Source: M. Aydin, M. Çelikpala, S. Akgul-Açıkmeşe, E. Canan-Sokul u, S. Guvenç, O. Şenyuva, S. Kaya-Sonmez, Quantitative Research Report: Public Perception on Turkish Foreign Policy 2022, Kadir Has University Turkish Studies Group, Global Academy, Akademetre, September 8, 2022. Notes: Decimal points are conveyed in the European style (with commas instead of periods). TRNC refers to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which (as described below) is recognized only by Turkey. See Appendix B for some other drivers of Turkish foreign policy, including arms procurement and exports of drone aircraft, economics and energy, and leadership approaches. Regional Security Concerns Security considerations are critical in Turkish foreign policy calculations and overseas deployments (see Figure 7). Turkish leaders often base their stances on perceived threats or opportunities, with their general priority being to safeguard Turkey’s maritime approaches and border areas. A number of more peripheral areas within the region remain important, but as Congressional Research Service 19 link to page 43 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations secondary concerns. NATO membership is important for Turkey in part because its collective defense promise may deter threats from regional actors outside of the alliance. Figure 7. Turkey’s Military Presence Abroad (as of August 2022) Examples of priority concerns in Turkey’s immediate vicinity include:  Border concerns in Syria and Iraq. Turkey’s leaders have expressed concerns about vulnerabilities to Kurdish militancy, refugee flows, and foreign influence near Turkey’s southern borders with Iraq and Syria. Border threats have heavily influenced Turkish policies since the advent of the PKK in the 1980s. These policies—oriented toward containing cross-border Kurdish influence–evolved further after the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War. Turkey’s efforts to control developments near its southern borders have continued and expanded during Syria’s civil war, due largely to: (1) the flow of nearly four million refugees into Turkey, (2) U.S. support for PKK-aligned Syrian Kurds against the Islamic State, and (3) the presence of Russian, American, and Iranian forces that complicate and somewhat constrain Turkish action in northern Syria (see “The Syrian Conflict” below).  Cyprus and Greece. Turkey has engaged in decades-long disputes—with elements of military conflict—regarding political outcomes in Cyprus and with Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 35 link to page 35 link to page 31 link to page 41 link to page 58 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Greece over islands and maritime/airspace boundaries (see “Greece and the Republic of Cyprus” below).  Turkey’s control over the Straits. Soviet designs on the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits arguably played a major role in Turkey’s decision to invite U.S. support and ultimately join NATO in the early years of the Cold War. Turkish control over the Straits remains a priority amid Russia-Ukraine conflict (see “Black Sea Access” below). Issues that are significant, but relatively peripheral, include:  General stability and governance in the Middle East and North Africa. Beyond Syria and Iraq, Turkey under Erdogan has played direct or indirect roles in some regional countries’ internal armed or political struggles (especially Libya and Egypt). Turkey also sided politically with Qatar in its 2017-2020 standoff with Arab Gulf countries and Egypt, though it has improved relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the past two years (see “Israel and Sunni Arab Governments” below). Additionally, Turkey has provided political support for the Palestinian Sunni Islamist movement Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that engages in violent conflict against Israel (and receives some aid from Iran). In some cases, Erdogan has combined a pro-Islamist tilt with the pragmatic pursuit of gain, such as by using ties with Libya’s Government of National Accord/Unity to safeguard Turkey’s commercial interests and enter into favorable maritime boundary demarcation agreements.80 Some observers have expressed concern that the preferences Erdogan and the AKP have shown for Islamist figures and movements have provoked instability in at least some cases.81  Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkish leaders have consistently supported Azerbaijan in territorial conflicts with Armenia, including in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Turkey and Azerbaijan share strong economic, military, cultural, and linguistic ties, while Turkey has historical animosities with Armenia and its Russian protector.82 Armenia poses little military threat to Turkey’s eastern border. In 2022, a new Turkey-Armenia dialogue launched, offering a potential path to normalization, including via the opening of their land border. President Erdogan has maintained that normalization is “interdependent” with further progress in resolving Armenia’s differences with Azerbaijan, stating in August 2022 that Turkey would “open our doors after problems with Azerbaijan are solved.”83  Iran’s role in the region. Turkey is Iran’s historical rival, and the government remains leery of Iranian actions and intentions in the region. Yet, Turkey is less outwardly hostile to Iran than are Israel and some Arab states. Turkey and Iran have a centuries-long history of coexistence, Iran’s current regime has avoided directly threatening Turkey, and their leaders maintain important diplomatic and trade ties—including on energy (see “Iran” below for a discussion of sanctions or possible penalties against some Turkish entities for 80 Emadeddin Badi, “To Advance Its Own Interests, Turkey Should Now Help Stabilize Libya,” War on the Rocks, May 24, 2021. 81 Anchal Vohra, “Erdogan’s War with Arab Monarchies Is Over,” Foreign Policy, March 22, 2022; M. Hasim Tekines, “What Would a Post-Erdogan Turkish Foreign Policy Look Like?” War on the Rocks, December 8, 2021; Marwa Maziad and Jake Sotiriadis, “Turkey’s Dangerous New Exports: Pan-Islamist, Neo-Ottoman Visions and Regional Instability,” Middle East Institute, April 21, 2020. 82 Patrick Keddie, “What’s Turkey’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?” Al Jazeera, October 30, 2020. 83 “President Erdogan Sees ‘Opportunity’ to Mend Armenia Ties,” Hurriyet Daily News, October 21, 2022; Amberin Zaman, “Armenia Clings to Turkish Peace Talks to Avert War with Azerbaijan,” Al-Monitor, August 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 21 link to page 60 link to page 27 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations energy-related dealings with Iranian parties). However, Turkey has supported Sunni political parties and militias in Syria and Iraq partly to counter Iran-allied groups.84 Foreign Policy Changes Under a Different President? In anticipation of 2023 elections, observers have speculated about how a new president’s foreign policy (including domestic policy with clear foreign policy ramifications) might differ from Erdogan’s if an opposition candidate wins.85 Because of widespread nationalistic sentiment among Turkey’s population and most of its political parties, a different president may have difficulty changing Turkish policies on some of the following matters of core security concern: (1) addressing Kurdish militancy, refugee issues, and other countries’ influence in Syria and Iraq; (2) exercising Turkish influence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean (including by countering Greece and ethnic Greek Cypriots, and supporting ethnic Turkish Cypriots); and (3) balancing relations with Ukraine, Russia, and the West to address conflict and its consequences while seeking to avoid dependence on any of them. However, a different president may be more likely to alter certain ongoing policies that may be more reflective of Erdogan’s or the AKP’s preferences than of broad national consensus. Such changes may include:  Economic policy. Providing more flexibility to central bank and other officials on monetary policy decisions and other measures to address Turkey’s economic problems.  ECHR rulings. Giving greater consideration to ECHR rulings calling for the release of imprisoned civil society figure Osman Kavala86 and Kurdish political leader Selahattin Demirtas (see Appendix A for a profile of Demirtas).  Less Islamist influence. Reducing (1) references to Islamic identity and symbols as rallying points for regional policies, and (2) Turkish support for or willingness to host certain Sunni Islamist groups like Hamas, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and Syrian armed opposition factions. Some Turkish opposition parties’ foreign policy statements suggest that a different president might be less willing than Erdogan to say and do things that risk harming relationships with the United States and European countries.87 Thus, despite the difficulties that may surround changing some policies (as mentioned above), a different Turkish president could conceivably be less inclined toward implementing those policies in a way that might worsen relations with Western states, such as by pursuing arms purchases from Russia, closer ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO—see “Russia” below), or new military operations in northern Syria or the Aegean/Eastern Mediterranean area. However, if a new, untested Turkish government 84 Galip Dalay, “Turkey’s Middle East Reset: A Precursor for Re-Escalation?” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, August 2022. 85 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Hinge Election,” Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, November 2022; Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” 86 In April 2022, a Turkish court sentenced Kavala to life imprisonment after convicting him of conspiring against the government. The ECHR had demanded Kavala’s release in 2019. The State Department spokesperson said that Kavala’s “unjust conviction is inconsistent with respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.” State Department, “Turkey’s Conviction of Osman Kavala,” April 25, 2022. In July, the ECHR ordered Turkey to release Kavala and pay him damages. If Turkey does not comply, it could have its voting rights and membership in the Council of Europe suspended. Nazlan Ertan, “Europe’s top court reprimands Turkey for jailing philanthropist,” Al-Monitor, July 11, 2022. 87 Coskun and Ulgen, “Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy.” Congressional Research Service 22 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations feels pressure to signal its strength to various international actors or to placate multiple domestic constituencies within a coalition, that president may strive to match Erdogan’s reputation for assertiveness. Conversely, a president facing lack of consensus within a coalition might become more passive on foreign policy, even in some situations when U.S. officials request a more active Turkish role. U.S. steps to help a potential new Turkish government—whether on arms sales, sanctions, the economy, or other matters—could encourage an improvement in bilateral relations. For information on U.S.-Turkey trade and investment, see CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. If, however, Turkish leaders or domestic audiences assess that any such steps are likely to bind future Turkish actions to U.S. interests, those concerns could limit a new Turkish government’s willingness to embrace them. Russia Turkey’s relations with Russia feature elements of cooperation and competition. Turkey has made a number of foreign policy moves since 2016 toward closer ties with Russia. These moves could be motivated by a combination of factors, including:  Alternative to the West. Turkey’s effort to reduce dependence on the West via hedging behavior, as discussed above.  Economic opportunism. Erdogan’s assessment of an opportunity to reinforce Turkey’s embattled economy by deepening economic and energy ties with Russia. Western sanctions have reduced the pool of Russia’s economic partners and thus have arguably increased Turkish leverage with Russia.  Chances to increase regional influence at Russia’s expense. Turkish calculations that potentially declining Russian influence in its near abroad could present opportunities for Turkey’s relative rise in influence if it involves itself more in issues and organizations spanning Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. At the same time, Turkey has moved closer to a number of countries that were part of the Soviet Union or otherwise in Russia’s historical sphere of influence, likely in part as a counterweight to Russian regional power. These include Ukraine, Poland, and states in the Baltic, South Caucasus, and Central Asia regions.88 Background Turkey and Russia have a centuries-long history of geopolitical conflict and reluctant mutual accommodation. Relations reached a relative low point in 2015-2016, when Turkey downed a Russian plane near the Turkey-Syria border and Russia temporarily imposed sanctions. After that, President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin cultivated closer ties. Putin showed support for Erdogan during the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and subsequently allowed Turkey to carry out military operations in northern Syria over the next two years that helped roll back Kurdish territorial control and reduce refugee flows near Turkey’s border. The S-400 transaction and cooperation on natural gas pipelines and nuclear energy are other collaborative aspects of Turkey-Russia relations. 88 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond”; Jeffrey Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils,” War on the Rocks, October 11, 2022. Congressional Research Service 23 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations While Turkey-Russia cooperation could undermine Turkey’s relationships with the United States, the European Union, and NATO to some degree, Turkish and Russian interests diverge significantly in several places throughout the region. Some observers have remarked that Turkey’s use of relatively inexpensive drone aircraft and proxy forces in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh have frustrated Russia’s aspirations in these places—ironically by borrowing some of the tactics Putin has used to frustrate Western designs in its near abroad.89 Other observers suggest that Turkish military measures in these places may be less about setting limits to Russian action or influence, and more about encouraging greater Turkey-Russia diplomatic engagement to coordinate political outcomes.90 In 2022, Turkey’s involvement in Ukraine (discussed below) has become the most prominent case under discussion regarding the implications for Turkey-Russia relations. Differences between Turkish and Russian leaders may not lead to a major rupture between the two countries. Turkey’s cooperation or competition with different actors may depend on the specific circumstances of each issue, rather than total alignment with or opposition to any great power—be it the United States, Russia, or another country. As one example, more than three years after taking delivery of the S-400 surface-to-air defense system from Russia, Turkey does not appear to have activated the system for general use and seems to remain open to negotiating with the United States about whether to do so. Erdogan has stated that Turkey may join the SCO, raising questions about his actual intentions to do so, and whether doing so would be a signal of greater alignment with Russia (and perhaps China), or of increased Turkish strategic autonomy and regional prominence.91 In addition to Russia and China, the SCO—a multilateral organization covering political, economic, and security matters—includes most Central Asian countries, as well as India and Pakistan. The SCO is not a formal alliance like NATO. Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has heightened challenges Turkey faces in balancing its relations with the two countries and managing Black Sea access, with implications for U.S.-Turkey ties. One former U.S. official has said: Turkey will avoid picking a side in the sense of a binary, zero-sum outcome to the war. Ukrainian defeat and dismemberment would be an unmitigated disaster for Turkey, but a defeated and potentially unstable Russia would negatively impact Turkish interests in Syria and the Caucasus, as well as its economy.92 Turkey’s links with Russia—especially its S-400 acquisition—have fueled significant U.S.-Turkey tensions. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. and Turkish interests in countering Russian revisionist aims—including along the Black Sea coast—may have converged in some ways as Turkey has helped strengthen Ukraine’s defense capabilities in 89 See, for example, Mitch Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year,” Business Insider, October 22, 2020. 90 Asli Aydintasbas, “Hedge politics: Turkey’s search for balance in the Middle East,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2022; Guney Yildiz, “Turkish-Russian Adversarial Collaboration in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh,” SWP Comment, March 24, 2021. 91 Nazlan Ertan, “Why Erdogan’s Shanghai ambitions are risky business,” Al-Monitor, September 20, 2022; Mankoff, “As Russia Reels, Eurasia Roils.” 92 Rich Outzen, quoted in “How long can Turkey play both sides in the Ukraine war?” Atlantic Council, August 18, 2022. Congressional Research Service 24 link to page 63 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations parallel with other NATO countries.93 In addition to denouncing Russia’s invasion and opposing Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (including Crimea),94 Turkey has supplied Ukraine with armed drone aircraft and mine-resistant ambush-resistant (MRAP) vehicles, as well as humanitarian assistance.95 Nevertheless, Turkey’s leaders likely hope to minimize spillover effects to Turkey’s national security and economy, and this might partly explain Turkey’s continued engagement with Russia and desires to help mediate the conflict (discussed below). One Turkish analyst has written: Russian geopolitical revisionism is set to drive Turkey closer to the geopolitical West, but it is doubtful that this process will make the geopolitical West as indispensable for Turkey as it was during the Cold War, or function as a geo-political anchor in the way it did then.96 Another Turkish analyst has observed that some experts argue Turkey is successfully building “a new geo-strategic axis” through drone diplomacy and other security and energy partnerships with Ukraine (see text box below) and other “Western-leaning post-Soviet and former Warsaw Pact nations” that surround Russia. (see also Appendix B)97 Turkey-Ukraine Defense Cooperation Turkey and Ukraine have strengthened their relations since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014.98 In 2017, a Turkish security analyst attributed these closer ties to growing mutual interests in countering Russian influence in the Black Sea region and in sharing military technology to expand and increase the self-sufficiency of their respective defense industries.99 Since 2020, the two countries have signed multiple agreements signifying closer cooperation, and also signed a broader free trade agreement (pending ratification) in February 2022.100 In line with these agreements, Turkish and Ukrainian companies have engaged in or planned a significant expansion of defense transactions, including a number of joint development or co-production initiatives. Turkish expertise with drone and other aircraft and naval platforms complements Ukrainian skil s in designing and constructing aerospace engines and missiles.101 Additionally, Turkey is helping establish Ukraine’s naval capabilities by producing corvettes (small warships) for export.102 As part of the deepening bilateral defense cooperation, Turkey has sold several Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2 drones to Ukraine since 2019,103 and some reports have suggested that the manufacturer has delivered additional 93 Saban Kardas, “The War in Ukraine and Turkey’s Cautious Counter-Balancing Against Russia,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 3, 2022. 94 “Turkey President Erdoğan on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of NATO,” PBS Newshour, September 19, 2022. For information on Crimean Tatars and their relations with Turkey, see Joseph Massad, “Crimean Tatars caught between Russia and Ukraine,” Middle East Eye, October 3, 2022; “Türkiye grants Crimean Tatars indefinite leave to remain,” Daily Sabah, August 11, 2022; Emad Ahmed, “Who are the Crimean Tatars? The Turkic Muslim minority loyal to Ukraine,” Middle East Eye, March 3, 2022. 95 For information on the MRAPs, see Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey sends 50 mine-resistant vehicles to Ukraine, with more expected,” Defense News, August 22, 2022. 96 Galip Dalay, “Deciphering Turkey’s Geopolitical Balancing and Anti-Westernism in Its Relations with Russia,” SWP Comment, May 20, 2022 97 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” 98 For information on the Crimea invasion, see CRS Report R45008, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy, by Cory Welt. 99 Metin Gurcan, “Turkey-Ukraine defense industry ties are booming,” Al-Monitor, May 1, 2017. 100 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 16, 2020; Christopher Isajiw, “Free trade and drones: Turkey and Ukraine strengthen strategic ties,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2022. 101 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” 102 Kate Tringham, “Update: Turkey launches first Ada-class corvette for Ukraine and cuts steel for second,” Janes Navy International, October 3, 2022. 103 Dorian Jones, “Turkey Strengthens Defense Industry with Its Ukraine Partnership,” Voice of America, February 4, Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 14 link to page 63 link to page 67Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 6. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean

Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS.
The disputes involving Turkey, Cyprus, and Greece have prompted U.S. and broader Western
criticism of Turkey and some EU sanctions against Turkish individuals aimed at discouraging
Turkish drilling near Cyprus.67 Diplomatic prospects to reduce the Turkey-Greece tensions, which
could undermine NATO unity, remain uncertain as Turkish ships with naval escorts have engaged
in exploration activities and Greece, Cyprus, France, and Italy have held military exercises aimed
at deterring these Turkish actions.68
Middle East and Libyan Civil War
In the Middle East, Sunni Arab states that support traditional authoritarian governance models in
the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt—regard Turkey
with suspicion, largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for Islamist political
groups and its close relationship with Qatar.69 Ties with Turkey bolster Qatar amid its isolation

67 Council of the European Union press release, “Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: EU
puts two persons on sanctions list,” February 27, 2020.
68 Steven Erlanger, “Tensions Over Drilling Between Turkey and Greece Divide E.U. Leaders,” New York Times,
August 28, 2020.
69 Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting
MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020.
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from other Arab states, and Turkey has relied on Qatari resources to strengthen its troubled
financial position and support its regional military efforts.70
One aspect of Turkey’s rivalry with some Sunni Arab states is their support for opposing sides in
Libya’s civil war. Turkey and Qatar have supported forces aligned with the U.S.- and U.N.
Security Council-recognized GNA, while Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (along with Russia
and possibly France) have supported those of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA).
Turkey has sent drone aircraft, military personnel, and allied Syrian fighters to Libya, and
suffered some casualties in helping GNA-allied forces drive back an LNA offensive against
Tripoli in early 2020.71 GNA-allied forces face threats of heightened intervention from Egypt if
they advance east.72 Further signs of tension between Turkey and Sunni Arab states come from a
Turkish military presence at bases in Qatar and Somalia.73
Turkey’s involvement in Libya and maritime dealings with the GNA have increased the overlap
between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and its rivalry with Sunni Arab states.
The U.S.-brokered agreement between Israel and the UAE in August 2020 to normalize their
relations could further solidify common cause among Eastern Mediterranean countries and Arab
Gulf states to counter Turkish regional influence.74 Some Saudi business leaders have called for a
boycott of Turkish goods, fueling speculation about possible efforts to encourage other Arab Gulf
and North African states to reduce regional trade with Turkey.75 Turkey maintains diplomatic ties
and significant levels of trade with Israel, but Turkey-Israel relations have deteriorated
significantly during Erdogan’s rule (see Appendix A).
The Syrian Conflict
Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly, and has
severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties.76 Turkey’s priorities in Syria have evolved during the course
of Syria’s civil war. While Turkey still opposes Syrian President Bashar al Asad, it has engaged in
a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (Asad’s supporters) on some matters
since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Similar interaction takes place
between Turkey and the United States given the U.S. military presence in key areas of northern
Syria east of the Euphrates River.

70 Ibrahim Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar: Foul-Weather Friends!” Defence Turkey, Vol. 14, Issue 98, 2020, pp. 34-47;
“Qatar boosts support for Turkey’s regional forays,” The Arab Weekly, July 5, 2020.
71 Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, East Africa Counterterrorism Operation, North and West
Africa Counterterrorism Operation, Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, January 1, 2020-
March 30, 2020, July 16, 2020.
72 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11556, Libya and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. Instability
within the GNA and how different Libyan political groups interact could also affect Turkey’s position.
73 Sunnetci, “Turkey and Qatar”; “Turkey to train 1/3 of entire Somali military, envoy says,” Daily Sabah, August 4,
2020.
74 Simon A. Waldman, “Erdogan’s Crumbling Superpower Dreams Make Turkey Even More Dangerous,” haaretz.com,
August 24, 2020.
75 “Saudi imports from Turkey rise in August despite informal boycott,” Reuters, October 25, 2020. Turkey-Saudi
relations also have been affected by the killing of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in
October 2018.
76 For background, see Burak Kadercan, “Making Sense of Turkey’s Syria Strategy: A ‘Turkish Tragedy’ in the
Making,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2017.
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Countering the Syrian Kurdish YPG
In the ongoing conflict, Turkey seeks to manage and reduce threats to itself and to influence
political and security outcomes (see Appendix C for a timeline of Turkey’s involvement).
Turkish-led forces have occupied and administered parts of northern Syria since 2016 (see Figure
7). Turkey’s chief objective has been to thwart the PKK-linked Syrian Kurdish People’s
Protection Units (YPG) from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with
Turkey. Turkish-led military operations to that end included Operation Euphrates Shield (August
2016-March 2017) against an Islamic State (IS)-controlled area in northern Syria, and Operation
Olive Branch in early 2018 directly against the Kurdish enclave of Afrin.
Turkey has considered the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD),
to be a top threat to Turkish security because of Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains
emboldened the PKK in Turkey.77 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF)—an umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became
the main U.S. ground force partner against the Islamic State in 2015. Shortly after the YPG/PYD
and SDF began achieving military and political success, Turkey-PKK peace talks broke down,
tensions increased, and occasional violence resumed within Turkey.
In October 2019, Turkey’s military attacked some SDF-controlled areas in northeastern Syria
after President Trump ordered a pullback of U.S. Special Forces following a call with President
Erdogan.78 The declared aims of what Turkey called Operation Peace Spring (OPS) were to target
“terrorists”—both the YPG and the Islamic State—and create a “safe zone” for the possible return
of some of the approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey.79 The ground component of
the Turkish operation—as during previous Turkish operations in Syria—was carried out to a
major extent by Syrian militia forces comprised largely of Sunni Arab opponents of the Syrian
government.
Turkey’s capture of territory from the SDF during OPS separated the two most significant
Kurdish-majority enclaves in northern Syria, complicating Syrian Kurdish aspirations for
autonomy. Turkey then reached agreements with the United States and Russia that ended the
fighting, created a buffer zone between Turkey and the YPG, and allowed Turkey to directly
monitor some areas over the border (see Figure 7).80

77 See, e.g., Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,”
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019.
78 In the previous months, joint U.S.-Turkey ground patrols had monitored the border area and some YPG fortifications
were dismantled, but Turkish leaders repeatedly criticized the United States for not doing enough to secure the removal
of the YPG from the border area. Ryan Browne et al., “US and Turkish troops conduct first joint ground patrol of
Syrian ‘safe zone,’” CNN, September 8, 2019.
79 Ibrahim Kalin, Twitter post, 4:32 AM, October 7, 2019.
80 White House, “The United States and Turkey Agree to Ceasefire in Northeast Syria,” October 17, 2019; Department
of State, “Special Representative for Syria Engagement James F. Jeffrey Remarks to the Traveling Press,” October 17,
2019; White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Situation in Northern Syria,” October 23, 2019; President of
Russia, Memorandum of Understanding Between Turkey and the Russian Federation, October 22, 2019.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations TB2s to Ukraine at various times since Russia’s 2022 invasion.104 Multiple accounts have surfaced of Ukraine’s successful use of TB2s to target Russian armored vehicle convoys, air defense batteries, helicopters, and ships—often in coordination with other Ukrainian weapons platforms. A May 2022 report stated that Russia may have destroyed Ukrainian TB2s in sufficient number to significantly reduce their likely future impact on the war.105 The TB2’s main producer, Baykar Technology, is planning to build a $100 mil ion factory in Ukraine that could be in position within about three years to manufacture the ful range of the company’s drones—doubling Baykar’s overall production capacity.106 Baykar also has planned for a testing, training, and maintenance center near the factory.107 Because the Turkish defense industry has made deals with Ukrainian contractors to provide engines for newer combat drone platforms, as well as various manned aircraft projects, threats posed to Ukraine’s manufacturing capacity from Russia’s invasion could delay some of Turkey’s plans.108 Ukraine’s importance as an alternative source for Turkey in procuring engines may have increased after a 2019-2020 decrease in Western supply due to concerns about Turkish actions against Syrian Kurds and Armenians.109 Turkey-Russia Economic and Energy Cooperation Turkish officials have sought to minimize any negative economic impact Turkey might face from the Russia-Ukraine war, partly through boosting various forms of economic and energy cooperation with Russia (see “Energy” above). These efforts may stem from Turkish leaders’ concerns about improving the country’s economic profile in advance of 2023 elections.110 For the first nine months of 2022, Turkey-Russia trade volume was up sharply year-on-year from 2021.111 The Turkish government has not joined economic sanctions against Russia or closed its airspace to Russian civilian flights. Decreases in Russian and Ukrainian tourism have affected Turkey’s economy, and Turkey’s government is wary of potential Russian actions that could harm Turkey’s economy even more, such as cutoffs of natural gas and wheat exports or military operations that might increase refugee flows to Turkey.112 A European Union price cap arrangement on Russian oil shipments has cast doubt on insurance coverage for oil tankers transiting the Straits as of December. Turkey has been requiring tankers to document coverage to mitigate concerns of financial risk from a spill or other costly incident.113 In August 2022, Presidents Erdogan and Putin publicly agreed to boost Turkey-Russia cooperation across economic sectors.114 Reportedly, many European companies prohibited by sanctions from exporting directly to Russia, or otherwise wary of doing so, use Turkey as a base 2022. For more information on TB2s, see Appendix B and Figure B-4. 104 David Hambling, “New Bayraktar Drones Still Seem to Be Reaching Ukraine,” forbes.com, May 10, 2022. 105 Stephen Witt, “Weapon of Influence,” New Yorker, May 16, 2022. 106 Jared Malsin, “Erdogan Seizes Chance to Give Turkey a Global Role,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2022. 107 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s defense industry eyes export expansion as government navigates geopolitical stage,” Defense News, August 8, 2022. 108 Fehim Tastekin, “Will Ukraine crisis help Turkey dodge Western arms embargoes?” Al-Monitor, March 28, 2022. 109 Aykan Erdemir and Ryan Brobst, “Engines of Influence: Turkey’s Defense Industry Under Erdogan,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, March 24, 2022. 110 Patricia Cohen, “Turkey Tightens Energy Ties with Russia as Other Nations Step Back,” New York Times, December 10, 2022. 111 Yoruk Isik, “In Turkish-Russian relations, the Ukraine grain deal is not the point,” Middle East Institute, November 9, 2022. 112 Sinem Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine,” SWP Comment, April 6, 2022. 113 “Turkey oil tanker logjam snarls Russia oil sanctions,” Reuters, December 9, 2022. 114 “Russia’s Putin, Turkey’s Erdogan agree to boost economic, energy cooperation,” Agence France Presse, August 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 26 link to page 32 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations for re-exports to Russia.115 Additionally, since the Russian invasion, Turkey has welcomed sanctioned Russian oligarchs as tourists and investors. Turkey’s Russia-related dealings could potentially lead to Western secondary sanctions against Turkey for facilitating Russian sanctions evasion. In June 2022, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo reportedly visited Turkey to raise concerns over the movement of some Russian assets and business operations to Turkey,116 and in August Adeyemo sent a letter to Turkish business groups warning of penalties if they worked with Russian individuals or entities facing sanctions.117 In September, several Turkish banks that had adopted the Mir payment system (a Russian equivalent of Visa or MasterCard) stopped accepting it.118 Some observers have asserted that arrangements between Turkey and Russia could help Erdogan address Turkey’s financial problems ahead of 2023 elections.119 Rosatom (the Russian state-owned company building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, as mentioned above) began implementing a plan in July 2022 to wire up to $15 billion to a Turkish subsidiary, while also seeking a credit line to finance the plant’s construction with Turkish treasury bonds.120 A former Turkish central banker has argued that this transactional structure would minimize the risk of Turkish institutions facing U.S. sanctions for the movement of Russian funds to Turkey.121 Russia also agreed that Turkey could partially pay for Russian gas imports in rubles rather than dollars.122 Black Sea Access Turkey’s power to regulate access to the Black Sea via the Straits (see Figure 8) under the 1936 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (the “Montreux Convention”) has implications for U.S. interests.123 In February 2022, Turkey acknowledged a state of war between Russia and Ukraine, invoking Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which generally bars belligerent countries’ warships from traversing the Straits (except if they are returning to their base of origin).124 Shortly after Turkey’s decision, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed appreciation for Turkey’s implementation of the Convention and support for Ukraine.125 (The United States is not a party to the Convention, but has complied with its terms since it went into effect in 1936 as a treaty that is reflective of customary international law.) 115 Barbara Moens et al., “Erdoğan walks a fine line as the Ukraine war’s double agent,” Politico EU, August 17, 2022. 116 Amberin Zaman, “US deputy treasury secretary in Turkey to warn against evading Russian sanctions,” Al-Monitor, June 22, 2022. 117 Elif Ince et al., “Russian Superyachts, Subject to Sanctions, Find a Haven in Turkey,” New York Times, October 24, 2022. 118 Ibid. 119 Sinem Ozdemir, “Turkey, Russia partnership essential to both,” Deutsche Welle, August 12, 2022; Fehim Tastekin, “Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline,” Al-Monitor, August 10, 2022. 120 Ragip Soylu, “Russia plans to buy Turkish treasury bonds via Akkuyu nuclear plant $6bn loan deal,” Middle East Eye, July 30, 2022. 121 Ugur Gurses, quoted in Tastekin, “Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline.” 122 Tastekin, “Russia offers Erdogan economic lifeline.” 123 Maximilian Hess, “Welcome to the Black Sea Era of War,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2022. Text of the Convention is available at https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/formidable/18/1936-Convention-Regarding-the-Regime-of-the-Straits.pdf. 124 “Turkey recognises Russia-Ukraine ‘war’, may block warships,” Agence France Presse, February 27, 2022. 125 State Department, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” February 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 27 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 8. Map of Black Sea Region and Straits Turkey’s invocation of Article 19 for the first time since World War II may prevent Russia from replenishing ships it loses in battle. While Ukrainian coastal defenses have dealt losses to some Russian ships and present some threats with uncrewed surface vessels carrying drone aircraft, Russia’s fleet remains dominant in the northern Black Sea and controls the key Ukrainian port of Mariupol as of late 2022.126 In March 10, 2022 correspondence with CRS, a Turkish official explained that Turkey (under the Montreux Convention) has formally closed the Straits only to Russia and Ukraine as belligerent countries, while advising all other non-Black Sea-littoral countries to refrain from sending warships through the Straits. Some naval analysts have expressed concern that discouraging other countries from transit could put NATO at a disadvantage.127 One has asserted that Black Sea access is “essential for the alliance’s presence and security as well as to reassure” allies Romania and Bulgaria.128 It is unclear what might lead Turkey and other Black Sea littoral countries (aside 126 H.I. Sutton, “Russian Navy Pulls Warships from Black Sea into Port After Attacks,” USNI News, November 7, 2022. 127 Isik, “In Turkish-Russian relations, the Ukraine grain deal is not the point”; Cornell Overfield, “Turkey Must Close the Turkish Straits Only to Russian and Ukrainian Warships,” Lawfare Blog, March 5, 2022. 128 James Kraska, “Can Turkey Legally Close Its Straits to Russian Warships? It’s Complicated,” foreignpolicy.com, March 1, 2022. Congressional Research Service 28 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations from Russia) to take direct action or seek third-party help in asserting their interests and freedom of navigation, and how that could affect regional security. Mediating Russia-Ukraine Differences (Including Grain Export Deal) Turkey’s maintenance of close relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and its ability to regulate access to the Straits has put it in a position to mediate between the parties on various issues of contention. A Ukrainian analyst has argued that Turkey has positioned itself as a mediator “not just in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine but more broadly in the struggle between Russia and the West, and even globally between the West and the numerous non-Western countries that have preferred to strike a more cautious and balanced approach to the war.”129 Additionally, Turkish and Ukrainian officials have signed a memorandum of understanding for Turkish involvement in helping rebuild Ukrainian infrastructure.130 In July 2022, Turkey and the United Nations entered into parallel agreements with Russia and Ukraine to provide a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports that could partly alleviate global supply concerns.131 Under the deal, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, and the U.N. have representatives at a joint coordination center in Istanbul to oversee implementation and inspect ships to prevent weapons smuggling.132 More than eight million tons of grain and other foodstuffs had been exported from Ukrainian ports as of late October.133 Turkey played a major role in getting guarantees from Ukraine to convince Russia to return to the deal in November after it pulled out for a few days over allegations of Ukrainian attacks on its ships and complaints about obstacles to Russian exports of grain and fertilizer.134 Later in November, the parties renewed the initial four-month agreement for another four months (to March 2023). Ukraine has complained that Turkey and other countries have purchased stolen Ukrainian wheat from Russia, with Turkish officials promising to investigate but not announcing any conclusive findings as of December 2022.135 In President Biden’s November meeting with President Erdogan on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Indonesia, he expressed appreciation for Erdogan’s efforts to renew the deal, as well as a hope that it would continue.136 In late 2022, Turkey’s mediation efforts expanded beyond the grain deal. Erdogan helped broker a Russia-Ukraine prisoner exchange in September. In November, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Burns reportedly met his Russian counterpart in Ankara to convey a message about potential Russian nuclear weapons use and to discuss detained Americans in Russia.137 A few days before Burns’s visit, President Erdogan said that he was committed to moving toward a peace dialogue, while criticizing U.S. and Western stances toward Russia.138 Erdogan’s chief 129 Iliya Kusa, “Turkey’s Goals in the Russia-Ukraine War,” Wilson Center, June 13, 2022. 130 “Turkey and Ukraine sign agreement for reconstruction of war-torn country,” Middle East Eye, August 18, 2022. 131 “Ukraine, Russia agree to export grain, ending a standoff that threatened food supply” Associated Press, July 22, 2022. 132 See https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background. 133 Ezgi Akin, “Russia returns to Ukraine grain deal, easing food crisis fears,” Al-Monitor, November 2, 2022; 134 Ibid. 135 “Turkey says it is investigating claims of Russia shipping stolen Ukrainian grain,” Reuters, June 23, 2022. 136 White House, “Readout of President Biden’s Meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkiye,” November 15, 2022. 137 Fatma Tanis, “Turkey is friendly with both Russia and Ukraine. Now it wants them to talk peace,” NPR, November 16, 2022. 138 “Turkey seeks Ukraine peace talks despite Western actions, Erdogan says,” Reuters, November 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 29 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations adviser and spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, later said that Russia “is interested in finding and reaching a new deal with the West, and more particularly with the United States.”139 NATO Accession Process for Sweden and Finland Sweden and Finland formally applied to join NATO in May 2022, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Turkey objected to the formal start of the two countries’ accession process, delaying it for more than a month. Under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of new allies requires the unanimous agreement of existing members. The Turkish objections centered around claims that Sweden and Finland have supported or harbored sympathies for groups that Turkey deems to be terrorist organizations, namely the PKK and the Fethullah Gulen movement.140 (The United States and EU also classify the PKK as a terrorist group.) Turkey demanded that both countries lift the suspension of arms sales they have maintained against Turkey since its 2019 incursion into Syria against the PKK-linked Kurdish group (the People’s Protection Units—Kurdish acronym YPG) that has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition.141 Turkey removed its objections to starting the accession process after NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg mediated a June 2022 agreement between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland. In the agreement, the three countries confirmed that no arms embargoes remain in place between them. Further, Sweden and Finland agreed not to support the YPG or Gulen movement, and pledged to work against the PKK.142 While Turkey’s decision to remove its objections generally drew plaudits from other NATO members, during the delay some Western officials had raised questions about Turkey’s commitment to strengthening NATO. President Erdogan maintained that Turkey might delay its parliamentary ratification of the accession process.143 With Hungary likely to ratify Swedish and Finnish accession by early 2023, Turkey could remain the only country delaying the process.144 Erdogan has said that he is more concerned about Sweden than Finland, but Finland insists it will wait until both countries can join NATO together. In November, Erdogan stated that he expected Sweden’s new government to take concrete steps to implement the June 2022 agreement. He also demanded the extradition of various individuals, including a prominent journalist from a now-defunct pro-Gulen media outlet.145 Observers note that Sweden and Finland are unlikely to make political decisions on extradition that contravene domestic judicial findings conducted under due process and the rule of law.146 An unnamed 139 Tanis, “Turkey is friendly with both Russia and Ukraine.” 140 Semih Idiz, “How long can Erdogan sustain threat to veto Finnish, Swedish NATO bids?” Al-Monitor, May 17, 2022. 141 Sources citing links between the PKK and YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria) include State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2020, Syria; Berkay Mandiraci, “Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Regional Battleground in Flux,” International Crisis Group, February 18, 2022; Barak Barfi, Ascent of the PYD and the SDF, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2016. 142 Agreement text available at Twitter, Ragip Soylu, June 28, 2022 – 2:48 PM, at https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/1541856195257966592. 143 Amberin Zaman, “Erdogan says Sweden’s, Finland’s NATO memberships not done deal,” Al-Monitor, June 30, 2022. 144 William Mauldin and Michael R. Gordon, “Sweden and Finland on Track for NATO Membership,” Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2022. 145 Ayla Jean Yackley, “Erdoğan demands Sweden do more to get Turkey’s approval to join Nato,” Financial Times, November 8, 2022. 146 Ben Keith, “Turkey’s Erdoğan Deploys Sweden and Finland’s NATO Membership Bids to Further His Repression,” Congressional Research Service 30 link to page 37 link to page 38 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations European diplomat was quoted as saying, “It remains to be seen if Erdogan thinks he’s got enough signs of goodwill from Sweden and it’s therefore in his political and military interest to declare victory, or if he thinks sticking to the current line will serve his re-election campaign.”147 In December, Sweden reportedly extradited a man who had been convicted in Turkey in 2015 of being a PKK member. Turkish officials have welcomed the action and expressed hope for additional extraditions and steps on countering terrorist-related financing.148 Also in December, Finland’s defense minister signaled openness to resuming arms export permits to Turkey.149 At a December press conference with Sweden’s and Finland’s foreign ministers, Secretary of State Blinken reiterated strong U.S. support for the two countries’ NATO accession and said that they have addressed Turkey’s security concerns in tangible ways. He stated that “it is not a bilateral issue between the United States and Turkey and it’s not going to turn into one,” while also expressing confidence that the process will come to a successful conclusion soon.150 Issues with Other U.S. Allies and Partners Turkey’s regional policies have contributed to difficulties with some of its neighbors that are (like Turkey) U.S. allies or partners. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus Background Since the 1970s, disputes between Greece and Turkey over territorial rights in the Aegean Sea and broader Eastern Mediterranean have been a major point of contention, waxing and waning at various points but bringing the sides close to military conflict on several occasions (see timeline below). The disputes, which have their roots in territorial changes after World War I, revolve around contested borders involving the two countries’ territorial waters, national airspace, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves (see Figure 9 and Figure 10 for maps of some of the areas in dispute). Since a relative spike in Turkey-Greece tensions in 2019, Greece has strengthened its defense cooperation and relations with the United States and a number of regional countries such as France, Israel, and Egypt. Timeline of Some Major Events: Disputes in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean 1923 Greek sovereignty over major Eastern Aegean islands confirmed by Treaty of Lausanne. 1930s Greece claims 10 miles of national airspace (1931) and 6 miles of territorial waters (1936) around islands. 1947 Greece acquires Dodecanese islands from Italy in Paris Peace Treaties. 1952 International Civil Aviation Organization gives Greece (Athens) Flight Information Region (FIR) air traffic responsibility for most of the Aegean airspace. Just Security, October 28, 2022. 147 Remi Banet, “Erdogan announces new meeting on Sweden’s NATO bid,” Agence France Presse, November 8, 2022. 148 “Turkey welcomes Sweden’s extradition of wanted convict,” Associated Press, December 5, 2022; “Turkey asks Finland to resume defense sales amid NATO talks,” Al-Monitor, December 6, 2022. 149 “Finland to consider arms exports to Turkey as it seeks Ankara support for NATO bid,” Reuters, December 8, 2022. 150 State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström and Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto at a Joint Press Availability,” December 8, 2022. Congressional Research Service 31 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 7. Syria-Turkey Border

Source: CRS, using area of influence data from IHS Jane’s Conflict Monitor. All areas of influence approximate
and subject to change. Other sources include U.N. OCHA, Esri, and social media reports.
Note: This map does not depict all U.S. bases in Syria.
Ultimate Turkish and YPG objectives regarding the northern Syrian areas in question remain
unclear. U.S. officials have continued partnering with SDF forces against the Islamic State in
some areas of Syria south of the zones from which YPG personnel were cleared,81 while the SDF
has made some arrangements for its own protection by Syrian government forces.

81 “US to deploy more troops to eastern Syria to secure oilfields,” Al Jazeera, October 25, 2019.
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Syrian Refugees in Turkey
In addition to its ongoing military activities in Syria, Turkey hosts about 3.6 mil ion registered Syrian refugees—
more than any other country. Turkey has largely closed its border to additional refugee influxes since 2016,
though it also assists thousands of displaced Syrians in makeshift camps near the border.82 President Erdogan
claimed in 2019 that Turkey had spent $40 bil ion on refugee assistance,83 though one source estimated in
November 2019 that the amount could be closer to $24 bil ion.84 Turkey closed several refugee camps in 2019
and encouraged Syrians in those camps to integrate into Turkish society while resolution of their long-term status
is pending.
Economic competition—particularly at a time of general economic uncertainty in Turkey—may fuel some tensions
between refugees and Turkish citizens.85 Surveys suggest that a majority of Turks have concerns about refugees’
impact on Turkey’s society and economy.86 While a July 2019 study indicated that 84% of refugee households had
at least one member working, most Syrians’ jobs are in the informal sector, where wages are below the legal
minimum and workers can face exploitation and unsafe working conditions.87 The United Nations estimates that
64% of Syrian refugees in Turkish cities (where the vast majority reside) live below the poverty line.
The return of refugees to Syria is a sensitive issue. Some reports claim that, in light of domestic pressure,88
Turkey may have forcibly returned thousands of Syrian refugees to Syria,89 though Turkish officials deny these
claims.90 Erdogan presented a plan to U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in November 2019 for facilitating
the return of one mil ion refugees to areas of Syria that Turkey captured during OPS, but the plan does not
appear to have elicited serious consideration to date.
Turkish-Occupied Areas and Idlib
In areas of northern Syria that Turkey has occupied since 2016, Turkey has set up local councils,
though questions persist about future governance and Turkey’s overarching role. The local
councils and associated security forces reportedly provide public services in these areas with
funding, oversight, and training from Turkish officials. One Turkish analyst has observed that the
migration of thousands of Sunni Arabs to these areas has significantly changed their demography,
while Syrian Kurds maintain self-rule in some areas, even though they are less contiguous with
each other and the Turkish border.91 The same analyst has written that Turkish officials debate
how permanent their control in northern Syria should be, surmising that Erdogan foresees a long-
term Turkish presence rather than a transition to Syrian government rule.92

82 Kemal Kirisci and Basak Yavcan, “As Covid-19 worsens precarity for refugees, Turkey and the EU must work
together,” Brookings Institution, June 11, 2020.
83 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “Erdogan: Turkey is Stepping Up Where Others Fail to Act,” Wall Street Journal, October
14, 2019.
84 Mustafa Sonmez, “Mystery surrounds Turkey’s $40 billion refugee bill,” Al-Monitor Turkey Pulse, November 2,
2019.
85 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma,” Center for American Progress, March 13, 2019; Sarah Dadouch,
“‘They want to kill you’: Anger at Syrians erupts in Istanbul,” Reuters, July 9, 2019.
86 Suat Kiniklioglu, “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Changing Attitudes and Fortunes,” German Institute for International
and Security Affairs, February 2020.
87 Dogus Simsek, “Integration for whom?” Heinrich Boll Stiftung, October 1, 2019; “Refugees in Turkey: Livelihoods
Survey Findings 2019,” Turkish Red Crescent and World Food Programme, July 11, 2019.
88 Pinar Tremblay, “Are Syrians in Turkey no longer Erdogan’s ‘brothers’?” Al-Monitor, July 30, 2019.
89 Human Rights Watch, “Turkey: Syrians Being Deported to Danger,” October 24, 2019; Amnesty International, Sent
to a War Zone: Turkey’s Illegal Deportations of Syrian Refugees, October 2019.
90 Fahrettin Altun, “Turkey Is Helping, Not Deporting, Syrian Refugees,” foreignpolicy.com, August 23, 2019.
91 Asli Aydintasbas, “A new Gaza: Turkey’s border policy in northern Syria,” European Council on Foreign Relations,
May 28, 2020.
92 Ibid.
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Turkey has increasingly focused on Syria’s northern province of Idlib. The majority of the armed
opposition to the Asad government—including elements aligned with Al Qaeda—is based there,
along with millions of civilians (including many internally displaced persons from other areas of
the country). Idlib is one of the specific “de-escalation zones” identified in a September 2017
agreement as part of the Astana Process involving Turkey, Russia, and Iran. The Syrian
government has since seized the other zones. Turkey deployed troops to Idlib to protect it from
government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey.
The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future
of Idlib. A limited outbreak of conflict in early 2020 led to several Turkish casualties (including
dozens reportedly killed in Russian air operations), displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian
civilians, and opened highway access for Syrian forces through the province to other parts of the
country. After the fighting, the United States announced that it would provide ammunition for the
Turkish military, as well as $108 million in humanitarian assistance for U.N. programs aiding
Syrian civilians.93 Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part
from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing
heavy weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.94
Role in Nagorno-Karabakh Dispute: Armenia and Azerbaijan
Turkey plays a significant role in the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of
Nagorno-Karabakh, due largely to Turkey’s close ethnic and linguistic ties with Azerbaijan and
its troubled history with the Armenian people. Nagorno-Karabakh is within Azerbaijan’s borders
but has been controlled by its ethnic Armenian majority—with Armenian assistance—since the
end of an initial conflict over the area in 1994 after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
As Azerbaijan’s energy-rich economy allowed it to spend more on its military over the past
decade, its capabilities relative to Armenian rivals improved. Key Azeri acquisitions reportedly
have included Turkish-origin drones, as well as kamikaze drones and ballistic missiles from
Israel.95 Azeri weapons purchases from Turkey surged over the first nine months of 2020, totaling
around $123 million, compared with $21 million over the same time period in 2019.96 After some
Armenia-Azerbaijan border clashes in July 2020, Turkey held joint exercises with Azerbaijan on
its territory. According to some reports, Turkey may have left some key equipment and personnel
in Azerbaijan.97
The frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh resumed in September 2020, with Azeri units
reportedly using Israeli Harop and Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones in its attacks on ethnic
Armenian positions, including armored vehicles and air defense systems. Azeri President Ilham
Aliyev has stated that some Turkish F-16s are based in Azerbaijan and available for use if the
conflict escalates.98 Additionally, reports suggest that Turkey has recruited and paid Syrian

93 Tuvan Gumrukcu, “U.S. willing to give Turkey ammunition for Syria’s Idlib,” Reuters, March 3, 2020; Jared Malsin,
“U.S. Offers Aid, not Missiles, as Turkey Pushes Back Syrian Forces,” wsj.com, March 3, 2020.
94 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on-
idlib-revealed-1.771953.
95 Anton Troianovski, “Resignation and Despair Stoke Armenian Conflict,” New York Times, October 19, 2020.
96 Ece Toksabay, “Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan surged before Nagorno-Karabakh fighting,” Reuters, October 14,
2020.
97 Paul Antonopoulos, “Hundreds of Turkish military personnel are orchestrating Azerbaijan’s invasion of Artsakh:
reports,” Greek City Times, October 18, 2020.
98 “Aliyev threatens to use Turkish F-16s against possible external aggression,” Turkish Minute, October 26, 2020.
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mercenaries to assist Azerbaijan’s military, as it has previously done in Libya.99 One Turkish
journalist has observed that placing Sunni Arab Syrians in predominantly Shia Azerbaijan could
fan sectarian tensions and also raise concerns in Russia about the potential for Islamist political
unrest among its own Muslim population in the Caucasus.100 In October, Secretary of State
Pompeo criticized Turkey for increasing the risk in the conflict by lending its firepower to
Azerbaijan, and as of November 6, 97 Representatives were co-sponsoring an introduced
nonbinding resolution (H.Res. 1165) that would condemn Azerbaijan’s military operations and
denounce Turkey’s involvement.101
President Erdogan has supported Azeri demands that Armenian forces withdraw from Nagorno-
Karabakh. In doing, he has opposed some calls from the Minsk Group (chaired by the United
States, Russia, and France) for a cease-fire.102
The mutual involvement of Turkey and Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis could give one or
both of them leverage over the other on their other issues of mutual interest, such as Syria, Libya,
arms sales, and energy. Russia maintains close political and security ties with both Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Russia’s treaty obligation to defend Armenia from attack does not appear to apply to
Nagorno-Karabakh because it is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.103
Turkish Defense Procurement
Background
Turkish goals to become more self-sufficient on national security matters and increase Turkey’s
arms exports affect the country’s procurement decisions. After the 1975-1978 U.S. arms embargo
over Cyprus significantly hampered Turkish arms acquisitions, Turkey sought to decrease
dependence on foreign sources by building up its domestic defense industry (see Figure 8).104
Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increased percentage of Turkey’s defense needs,
on equipment ranging from armored personnel carriers and naval vessels to drone aircraft. For
key items that Turkey cannot produce itself, its leaders generally seek deals with foreign suppliers
that allow for greater co-production and technology sharing.105

99 Raja Abdulrahim, “Hundreds of Syrian Rebels Join Armenia-Azerbaijan Fight,” Wall Street Journal, October 14,
2020.
100 Fehim Tastekin, “Syrian fighters add snarls to tangled south Caucasus,” Al-Monitor, October 2, 2020.
101 “Pompeo Criticizes Turkey's Involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Reuters, October 16, 2020.
102 The Minsk Group formed in 1992 to lead the efforts of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in
mediating a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
103 Dmitri Churciu, “Russia says defense pact does not apply to Karabakh,” Anadolu Agency, October 7, 2020.
104 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019.
105 “Turkey - Market Report,” Jane’s Navigating the Emerging Markets, March 5, 2020. According to one source, since
Erdogan became prime minister in 2003, Turkey went from providing around 20% of its own defense industry needs to
around 65%. Interview with Bulent Aliriza of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Aaron Mehta, “4
questions on the risks facing Turkey’s defense industry,” Defense News, April 22, 2019.
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Figure 8. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending

Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms
Traders Database.
U.S. Arms Sales and Aid
Historically, Turkey was one of the largest recipients of U.S. arms, owing to its status as a NATO
ally, its large military, and its strategic position. Since 1948, the United States has provided
Turkey with approximately $13.8 billion in overall military assistance (nearly $8.2 billion in
grants and $5.6 billion in loans).
However, U.S. arms sales to Turkey have declined over time given Turkey’s efforts mentioned
above to become more self-reliant, as well as recent bilateral tensions. Current annual military
assistance is limited to approximately $2 million in International Military Education and Training
(IMET). See Appendix D for information on recent arms sales or potential sales.
An August 2020 article reported that some Members of congressional committees have placed
informal holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey over the past two years in
connection with the Turkey-Russia S-400 transaction discussed below. Such a disruption has not
occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.106 Major sales (valued at $25 million or

106 Valerie Insinna, et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense
News, August 12, 2020.
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more) supposedly on hold include structural upgrades for Turkey’s F-16 aircraft and export
licenses for engines involved in a Turkish sale of attack helicopters to Pakistan. Sales already
underway or for smaller items and services—such as spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance
packages for older equipment—are not subject to these holds.
Key Weapons Systems and Turkey’s Relationships: S-400, F-35, Patriot
How Turkey procures key weapons systems affects its partnerships with major powers. For
decades, Turkey has relied on important U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters,
missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.107 Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-
400 surface-to-air defense system and its exploration of possibly acquiring Russian Sukhoi fighter
aircraft may raise the question: If Turkey transitions to major Russian weapons platforms with
multi-decade lifespans, how can it stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters?
A number of factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 instead of the
U.S.-origin Patriot system. One is Turkey’s apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms
sources.108 Another is Erdogan’s possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as
those used by Turkish military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.109
Turkey’s general interest (discussed above) in procurement deals that feature technology sharing
and co-production also may have affected its S-400 decision. Lack of agreement between the
United States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system over a number of
years possibly contributed to Turkey’s interest in considering other options.110 While Turkey’s S-
400 purchase reportedly does not feature technology sharing,111 Turkish officials express hope
that a future deal with Russia involving technology sharing and co-production might be possible
to address Turkey’s longer-term air defense needs, with another potential option being Turkish
co-development of a system with European partners.112
In response to the beginning of S-400 deliveries to Turkey, the Trump Administration announced
in July 2019 that it was removing Turkey from participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
program. In explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program, Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord said, “Turkey cannot field a
Russian intelligence collection platform [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35
program makes, repairs and houses the F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth
capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of
the F-35 program.”113 Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization

107 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany
(submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype).
108 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018.
109 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the
United States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology
So Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019.
110 Flanagan, et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course.
111 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research
Institute, July 29, 2019.
112 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News,
January 10, 2020.
113 Department of Defense transcript, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey
Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air And Missile Defense System, July 17, 2019.
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Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries
of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400.
Turkey had planned to purchase at least 100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original
consortium partners in the development and industrial production of the aircraft.114 According to
U.S. officials, most of the supply chain handled by Turkish companies was due to move
elsewhere by March 2020, with a few contracts in Turkey continuing until completion.115 The cost
of shifting the supply chain, beyond some production delays,116 was estimated in July 2019 to be
between $500 million and $600 million.117
Into 2020, Turkey continued discussions with the Trump Administration about having the United
States deploy or sell Patriot surface-to-air defense systems to Turkey if Turkey returned the S-400
to Russia or limited its use,118 but the discussions have stalemated.119 Since 2013, various NATO
countries have stationed air defense batteries in southern Turkey as a means of assisting Turkey
during Syria’s civil war. The United States removed its contribution of Patriot batteries from
Turkey in 2015, explaining the action in terms of its global missile defense priorities while
contributing to doubts among Turkish leaders about the U.S. commitment to their security.120 As
of September 2020, Spain operates a Patriot system in the Turkish city of Adana under NATO
auspices.
Drones: Domestic Production, U.S. and Western Components, and Exports
Over the past decade, Turkey has built up a formidable arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), or drone aircraft, to carry out armed attacks or perform target acquisition. Their primary
purpose has been to counter the PKK or PKK-linked militias in southeastern Turkey, Iraq, and
Syria. In 2020 Turkey and its allies also have reportedly used armed drones against Syrian
government forces in Idlib, the LNA in Libya, and ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Open source accounts report that the drones have been effective in targeting adversaries, while
also raising concerns about the legality of their use in these settings and the danger they pose to
civilians. Since 2018, some open sources have claimed that Turkish drones have made
reconnaissance flights over Greek islands, Cyprus, and Eastern Mediterranean waters.121

114 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler.
115 Marcus Weisgerber, “Turkey Will Make F-35 Parts Throughout 2020, Far Longer Than Anticipated,” Defense One,
January 14, 2020.
116 Paul McLeary, “F-35 Production Hurt If Turkey Kicked Out of Program: Vice Adm. Winter,” Breaking Defense,
April 4, 2019.
117 Department of Defense transcript. It is unclear whether the United States or the F-35 consortium could be liable for
financial penalties beyond refunding Turkey’s initial investment in the program, an estimated $1.5 billion. Michael R.
Gordon, et al., “U.S. to Withhold Order of F-35s from Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2019.
118 Tuvan Gumrukcu and Orhan Coskun, “Turkey says U.S. offering Patriot missiles if S-400 not operated,” Reuters,
March 10, 2020.
119 Aaron Stein, “Finding Off Ramps to the Ongoing S-400 Crisis with Turkey,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
July 1, 2020.
120 Jim Townsend and Rachel Ellehuus, “The Tale of Turkey and the Patriots,” War on the Rocks, July 22, 2019;
Ibrahim Kalin, “No, Turkey Has Not Abandoned the West,” Bloomberg, July 22, 2019.
121 Dan Gettinger, “Turkey’s military drones: an export product that’s disrupting NATO,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, December 6, 2019.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Turkey has focused on producing drones domestically. This is partly due to its failure in the early
2010s to acquire U.S.-made armed MQ-9 Reapers because of reported congressional
opposition,122 as well as to concerns that Israel may have deliberately delivered underperforming
versions of its Heron reconnaissance drones to Turkey in 2010.123 Kale Group and Baykar
Technologies have produced the Bayraktar TB2 (see Figure 9), and Turkish Aerospace Industries
(TAI) has produced the Anka-S. Turkey anticipates adding both larger (the Aksungar and
Bayraktar Akinci) and smaller drones (the Kargu-2 and Alpagu) to its arsenal over the next
decade.124 Selcuk Bayraktar, a son-in-law of President Erdogan, has played a key role in
engineering the Bayraktar drones that dominate Turkey’s fleet.125
Figure 9. Bayraktar TB2 Drone

While Turkish companies have assembled the drones, they apparently rely on Western countries
for some key components, including engines, optical sensors, and camera systems.126 After a

122 Ibid.
123 Itamar Eichner, “Turkey accuses Israel of selling them defective drones,” Ynetnews, June 24, 2018.
124 Paul Iddon, “Turkey’s Drones Are Coming in All Sizes These Days,” forbes.com, October 4, 2020.
125 Umar Farooq, “The Second Drone Age: How Turkey Defied the U.S. and Became a Killer Drone Power,” The
Intercept, May 14, 2019.
126 “Canadian decision to halt tech exports exposes key weakness in Turkish drone industry,” Turkish Minute, October
17, 2020.
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Canadian-produced camera system was reportedly found in a Bayraktar TB2 downed in Nagorno-
Karabakh in October 2020, Canada halted export permits for parts used in Turkish drones
pending an investigation.127 Also in October, a Canadian company whose Austrian subsidiary
produces engines for Bayraktar TB2s announced that it would suspend engine deliveries to
“countries with unclear usage.”128 Additionally, Armenian sources have raised concerns about the
possible use of some U.S.-origin components in Bayraktar TB2s that could affect their future
availability.129
It is unclear if Turkey can produce replacements for Western-origin drone components. Since
2018, TAI has reportedly been integrating domestically produced engines into its drones,
including the Anka-S.130 Following the Canadian decision on export permits, the head of Turkey’s
government defense procurement agency said that Turkey is beginning mass production of a
domestic camera system for its drones.131
Turkey’s drones’ apparent effectiveness—such as in destroying Russian-origin air defense
systems132—may have boosted global demand for Turkish defense exports (see Figure 10). In
addition to Azerbaijan, Qatar and Ukraine have reportedly purchased Bayraktar TB2s. Ukraine
apparently seeks to make additional purchases, which could lead to some form of co-
production.133 Serbia, Indonesia, and Tunisia also have supposedly expressed interest in Turkish
drones. It is unclear whether a more combative Turkish foreign policy approach that helps market
drones to other countries is a net plus or minus for Turkey’s fragile economy, in light of the
potential for Turkey’s actions to isolate it from major powers that represent key sources of trade
and investment.134

127 Levon Sevunts, “Armenia claims it found Canadian tech on downed Turkish drone,” Radio Canada International,
October 20, 2020.
128 Levon Sevunts, “Bombardier Recreational Products suspends delivery of aircraft engines used on military drones,”
Radio Canada International, October 25, 2020.
129 “How much does the production of Turkish ‘local’ Bayraktar TB2 ATS depend on foreign supplies?” Ermeni Haber
Ajansi (translated from Armenian), October 26, 2020.
130 Beth Davidson, “IDEF’19: Anka Aksungur to Fly with Turkish Engine by Year-end,” AIN Online, May 1, 2019.
131 Gokhan Ergocun, “‘Turkish defense industry moving on despite embargoes,’” Anadolu Agency, October 6, 2020.
132 Seth Frantzman, “Russian air defense systems outmatched by Turkish drones in Syria and Libya,” Long War
Journal (Foundation for Defense of Democracies), June 10, 2020.
133 “Ukraine considers buying 48 Bayraktar TB2 drones from Turkey,” Daily Sabah, October 6, 2020.
134 See, e.g., Metin Gurcan, “Turkey's foreign policy becoming alarmingly militarized,” Al-Monitor, September 22,
2020; Sinan Ulgen, “A Weak Economy Won’t Stop Turkey’s Activist Foreign Policy,” foreignpolicy.com, October 6,
2020.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations 1960s Greece stations some military personnel and equipment on some Aegean islands as Turkey-Greece tensions grow over Cyprus. Turkey points to restrictions on militarization in Lausanne and Paris treaties. 1974 Cyprus conflict: After Greece-backed coup, Turkey invades and occupies the northern one-third of the island. Greece reinforces its military presence on some Aegean islands. Turkey starts regularly challenging (1) Greek military presence on islands, (2) some aspects of Greek maritime and airspace claims, and (3) the scope of the Athens FIR in the Aegean. Turkish military aircraft begin overflights in disputed areas, sometimes challenged by Greek military aircraft. 1976 U.N. Security Council Resolution 395 calls on Turkey and Greece to resolve disputes via negotiations, and take unresolved issues to International Court of Justice. 1996 Grey zones regarding smaller islets and rocks become a bigger issue with the Imia/Kardak sovereignty dispute, which seemed to bring Turkey and Greece close to armed conflict. 2004 Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus is not adopted (approved in Turkish Cypriot popular referendum, not approved in Greek Cypriot referendum). EU admits the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) as member. Turkish EU accession hopes decrease in subsequent years, partly due to continuing Turkey-ROC tensions. 2011 Turkey-ROC tensions grow and become intertwined with existing Turkey-Greece Aegean disputes with the discovery of offshore natural gas in ROC’s exclusive economic zone and Turkish Cypriot demands to participate in benefits from Eastern Mediterranean energy finds. 2019-2021 Various Turkish diplomatic and maritime actions aim at countering Greek and ROC energy development aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Other regional countries, including Israel, Egypt, and France, grow closer to Greece and ROC, including via the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). U.S. officials urge de-escalation while supporting EMGF. 2021 President Erdogan and Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar publicly advocate independent Turkish Cypriot state, in departure from longtime internationally supported framework for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. 2022 Turkey-Greece tensions resume amid mutual claims of military overflights and provocation, signs of greater U.S.-Greece-ROC military cooperation, Greek statements discouraging U.S. arms sales to Turkey, Greek military activity in some Aegean islands, and Turkish statements questioning Greek sovereignty over those islands. Sources: Various open sources, including Diego Cupolo, “TurkAegean or Greek Lake: The War of Words over the Aegean Sea,” Turkey recap (Substack), July 5, 2022; Hasan Selim Özertem, “Turkish-Greek Relations in the Aegean: Is a Solution Possible?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 16, 2021; Alexis Heraclides, “The unresolved Aegean dispute: Problems and prospects,” Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation, New York: Routledge, 2019, pp. 89-108; Globalsecurity.org, Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute, available at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/aegean.htm. Congressional Research Service 32 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 9. Some Areas of Aegean Dispute Source: Greek Reporter, June 2022 (https://greekreporter.com/2022/06/09/turkey-challenge-greece-sovereignty-16-maps/). Congressional Research Service 33 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 10. Competing Claims in the Eastern Mediterranean Source: Main map created by The Economist, with slight modifications by CRS. Turkey-Greece tensions are further complicated by one of the region’s major unresolved conflicts, the de facto political division of the island of Cyprus along ethnic lines. The division dates from the 1974 military clash in which Turkish forces invaded parts of the island to prevent the ethnic Greek Cypriot leadership from unifying Cyprus with Greece.151 Since Cyprus became independent of the United Kingdom in 1960, Turkey has acted as the protector of the island’s ethnic Turkish Cypriot minority from potential mistreatment by the ethnic Greek Cypriot majority.152 The internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (ROC), which has close ties to Greece, claims jurisdiction over the entire island, but its effective administrative control is limited to the southern two-thirds, where Greek Cypriots comprise a majority. Turkish Cypriots administer the northern one-third and are backed by Turkey, including a Turkish military contingent there since the 1974 clash.153 In 1983, Turkish Cypriot leaders proclaimed this part of 151 Turkey deployed its military in response to a coup d’état that had empowered pro-unification Greek Cypriot leaders. 152 Turkey is one of the three guaranteeing powers of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee that was signed at the time Cyprus gained its independence. The United Kingdom and Greece are the other two guarantors. 153 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot soldiers). This presence is countered by an ROC force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to between 50,000 and 75,000 reserves. “Cyprus - Army,” Janes Sentinel Security Assessment - Eastern Mediterranean, February 3, 2021. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP) of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia. The United Kingdom maintains approximately 3,000 Congressional Research Service 34 link to page 37 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations the island the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), though no country other than Turkey recognizes it. A dispute during the past decade between Turkey and the ROC about Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration appears to have brought Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and Egypt closer together.154 Turkey has objected to Greek Cypriot transactions in the offshore energy sector on the grounds that they have not involved the de facto TRNC. Turkey also has supported Turkish Cypriot claims to an exclusive economic zone around part of the island. In late 2019, the Turkey-ROC dispute became intertwined with longtime Turkey-Greece disagreements over continental shelves, territorial waters, airspace, and exclusive economic zones when Turkey signed an agreement with Libya’s then-Government of National Accord (GNA) on maritime boundaries (see Figure 9).155 The dispute increased Turkey-Greece naval tensions, especially after Greece and Egypt reached a maritime agreement in August 2020 rivaling the 2019 Turkey-Libya deal.156 Some observers have asserted that nationalistic and anti-Western sentiment within elite Turkish national security circles has driven Turkey’s naval buildup and maximalist maritime claims, citing arguments within these circles that Turkey was entitled to a “Blue Homeland” in surrounding waters.157 Turkish decisions may partly stem from concerns about potential geostrategic encirclement and exclusion from potentially lucrative commercial energy transactions. A reported U.S. decision in 2022 to withdraw support for a natural gas pipeline from Israel and Cyprus to Greece—in part for economic and environmental reasons158—appeared to partly assuage Turkish concerns about possible regional containment, and drew support from Erdogan.159 The 2019-2020 disputes involving Turkey, ROC, and Greece prompted U.S. and broader Western criticism of Turkey and some EU sanctions against Turkish individuals in the context of EU efforts to discourage Turkish drilling near Cyprus.160 Turkish ships with naval escorts engaged in energy exploration activities; Greece, the ROC, France, and Italy held military exercises that may have sought to deter these Turkish actions.161 The Turkish exploration activities abated near the end of 2020, significantly reducing Turkey-Greece tensions. Tensions During 2022 After a relative relaxation of Turkey-Greece tensions in late 2020, they spiked again in 2022. First, the countries traded accusations regarding airspace violations over the Aegean. During this period of early 2022, President Erdogan maintained dialogue with Greek Prime Minister personnel at two sovereign base areas on the southern portion of the island at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. 154 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Turkey, Rivals Square Off Over Gas Finds,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2020. 155 For background, see “Turkish-Greek Aegean Dispute” at globalsecurity.org. 156 Michael Tanchum, “How Did the Eastern Mediterranean Become the Eye of a Geopolitical Storm?” foreignpolicy.com, August 18, 2020. 157 Ryan Gingeras, “Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2020; “The Turkish Navy in an Era of Great Power Competition,” War on the Rocks, April 30, 2019. 158 Nektaria Stamouli, “A Pipeline Project That Ran Afoul of Geopolitics and Green Policies,” Politico, January 18, 2022. 159 “Erdogan says cost concerns force U.S. rethink on EastMed gas pipeline,” Reuters, January 18, 2022. 160 Council of the European Union press release, “Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: EU puts two persons on sanctions list,” February 27, 2020. 161 Steven Erlanger, “Tensions Over Drilling Between Turkey and Greece Divide E.U. Leaders,” New York Times, August 28, 2020. Congressional Research Service 35 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Kyriakos Mitsotakis. After Mitsotakis appeared to raise concern in May about U.S.-Turkey arms transactions while addressing a joint session of Congress, Erdogan announced that he would no longer deal with Mitsotakis.162 With U.S. officials already having notified Congress of a possible upgrade of F-16s for Greece in 2021,163 U.S. decisions on bolstering Turkey’s F-16 fleet could have significant implications for the security balance between Turkey and Greece, and for relations involving the three countries.164 While Turkey-Greece contacts have continued at ministerial levels, bilateral relations have remained tense as of late 2022. Turkey has reiterated objections to Greek military presences and reinforcements on Aegean islands located only a few miles from the Turkish mainland, exacerbating Turkey-Greece disputes over the legality of the Greek actions under various 20th century international agreements.165 In September 2022, Erdogan said that Turkey is not bound by Greece’s occupation of the islands, while apparently hinting at potential future Turkish military action.166 Later that month, the Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Greek and U.S. ambassadors to protest the deployment of U.S.-origin armored vehicles on the islands of Lesbos (alt. Lesvos) and Samos.167 On September 28, the State Department spokesperson said that Greece’s sovereignty over the islands was not in question, and called on “all countries, including our allies, to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to avoid actions that could inflame tensions.”168 Additional developments signaling closer U.S. military relations with Greece and the ROC have generated concern among Turkish officials. They have complained about the significant new U.S. military presence at the Greek port of Alexandroupoli (alt. Alexandroupolis), located around 10-15 miles from the Turkish border.169 U.S. officials have explained that they are using the port as a transit hub to send equipment to allies and partners in the region given security concerns regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.170 Some reports speculate about U.S.-Greece discussions regarding the possibility of basing U.S. warships in Alexandropouli after the port’s planned 162 Greek Prime Minister’s website, “Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ address to the Joint Session of the U.S. Congress,” May 17, 2022. 163 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Greece – F-16 Sustainment Materiel and Services, Transmittal No. 21-49,” August 3, 2021. 164 Fehim Tastekin, “Greece’s growing influence frustrates Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, September 9, 2022; Aaron Stein, “You Go to War with the Turkey You Have, Not the Turkey You Want,” War on the Rocks, May 30, 2022. 165 The respective Turkish and Greek arguments are set forth at https://www.mfa.gov.tr/militarization-of-eastern-aegean-islands-contrary-tp-the-provisions-of-international-agreements.en.mfa and https://www.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/turkish-claims-regarding-the-demilitarization-of-islands-in-the-aegean-sea.html. See also Diego Cupolo, “TurkAegean or Greek Lake: The War of Words over the Aegean Sea,” Turkey recap (Substack), July 5, 2022. 166 “Erdogan accuses Greece of ‘occupying’ demilitarised islands,” Reuters, September 3, 2022. 167 “Turkey files protest with Greece, US in islands row,” Agence France Presse, September 26, 2022. 168 State Department Press Briefing, September 28, 2022. In February 2022, an EU spokesperson criticized statements by the Turkish foreign minister implying conditions on Greece’s sovereignty over the islands. The spokesperson said, “Greece’s sovereignty over these islands is unquestionable. Turkey should respect it, refrain from provocative statements and actions in this regard, commit unequivocally to good neighbourly relations and work to settle any disputes peacefully. International agreements must be respected.” European External Action Service, “Turkey: Statement by the Spokesperson on the sovereignty of Greece over its islands,” February 13, 2022. 169 Niki Kitsantonis and Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Sleepy Greek Port Turns into Pivotal Transit Point for American Military,” New York Times, August 19, 2022. 170 Ibid; Department of Defense News, “Strategic Port Access Aids Support to Ukraine, Austin Tells Greek Defense Minister,” July 18, 2022. Congressional Research Service 36 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations expansion.171 In March 2022 congressional hearing testimony, Turkey expert and former congressional committee staff member Alan Makovsky referenced U.S.-Greece defense cooperation agreements from 2019 and 2021. He then said that having facilities at Alexandroupoli allows NATO to bypass logjams or closures of the Straits to transport troops and materiel overland to allies and partners.172 (As mentioned above, Turkey has requested that warships from non-Black Sea-littoral countries refrain from transiting the Straits.) In September, the State Department announced that the ROC is permitted to receive defense articles in FY2023, fully ending the embargo that Congress legally imposed in 1987 and lifted in 2019 (per P.L. 116-94, Division J, Section 205). After Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in October 2022 that the United States no longer maintains a balanced approach in the Aegean,173 U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Jeff Flake released a statement saying that there has been no shift in U.S. security posture to favor Turkey or Greece, and that the NATO allies’ collective efforts are focused on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine.174 In December, President Erdogan made remarks suggesting that Turkish missiles could target Athens as a response to Greek reinforcement of Aegean islands. Greece’s foreign minister condemned Erdogan’s comments as a threat against a NATO ally.175 Israel and Sunni Arab Governments Since the 2010s, Turkey’s relations with Israel and with Sunni Arab governments that support traditional authoritarian governance models in the region—notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt—have been fraught with tension. Under President Erdogan, Turkey and Israel have clashed politically over Israel’s handling of Palestinian issues and Turkey’s support for Hamas, even as the countries have continued to expand trade ties.176 The Sunni Arab governments have regarded Turkey with suspicion largely because of the Turkish government’s sympathies for Islamist political groups and its close relationship with Qatar.177 Developments in Libya increased the overlap between Turkey’s disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and its rivalries with the Sunni Arab governments because they supported opposing sides in Libya’s civil war. As mentioned above, 2019-2020 maritime boundary agreements between Turkey and Libya’s then-GNA, and Greece and Egypt, respectively, complicated the legal and economic picture in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey reportedly seeks to improve relations with Egypt, Turkish agreements during 2022 to expand 171 Ahmet Gencturk, “US wants to turn Greek port into alternative to Turkish Straits, claims Greek media,” Anadolu Agency, September 20, 2022; “A sleepy Greek port has become vital to the war in Ukraine,” Economist, July 21, 2022. 172 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa and Global Counterterrorism; and Subcommittee on Europe, Energy, the Environment and Cyber, March 31, 2022, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/opportunities-and-challenges-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-examining-u-s-interests-and-regional-cooperation/. 173 “Cavusoglu says US siding against Turkey in the Aegean, East Med,” Kathimerini, October 21, 2022. 174 Twitter, U.S. Embassy Türkiye, October 18, 2022 – 3:32 AM, at https://twitter.com/USEmbassyTurkey/status/1582273449145212928. 175 Andrew Wilks, “Greece compares Turkey to North Korea in latest row with Erdogan,” Al-Monitor, December 12, 2022. 176 Kemal Kirisci and Dan Arbell, “President Herzog’s visit to Ankara: A first step in normalizing Turkey-Israel relations?” Brookings Institution, March 7, 2022. 177 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course; Andrew England, et al., “UAE vs Turkey: the regional rivalries pitting MBZ against Erdogan,” Financial Times, October 26, 2020. Congressional Research Service 37 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations energy and defense cooperation with Libya’s interim Government of National Unity may present obstacles to that goal.178 In the past two years, however, Turkey has sought rapprochement with some of its regional rivals. The potential economic benefits could help alleviate Turkey’s financial crisis ahead of its anticipated 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. For example, Erdogan and UAE President Shaykh Mohammad bin Zayid al Nuhayyan have visited each other, and the two countries have signed a currency swap deal along with many other agreements on economic cooperation and investment.179 In April 2022, Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia after Turkey transferred jurisdiction to the Saudis over the trial Turkey had previously convened for journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s murder, which allegedly occurred in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. In June, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud visited Turkey. Figures indicate that Turkey-Saudi Arabia trade volume is expanding.180 A November 2022 media report suggested that Turkey was expecting additional foreign exchange inflows from Saudi Arabia and Qatar.181 An early 2022 media report anticipated UAE investment in Turkey’s defense industry and Turkish defense exports to the Gulf—potentially including drones, air defense systems, and various air, sea, and land platforms.182 In September 2022, Turkey sent 20 Bayraktar TB2 drones to the UAE, and the UAE reportedly expects to receive more.183 Saudi Arabia also reportedly wants to acquire the TB2, and both countries have apparently raised the possibility of building production facilities for Turkish-designed drones.184 Moreover, Israel and Turkey have shown signs of improving ties, perhaps partly from common cause in countering Iran.185 Some reports have suggested potential changes to Turkish policy on Hamas.186 In March 2022, Israeli President Isaac Herzog visited Turkey, and the two countries’ foreign ministers exchanged visits in May and June. After Turkey and Israel agreed in August to exchange ambassadors for the first time since 2018, President Erdogan met with then-Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid in New York in September, and Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz visited Turkey in October. Turkish officials have expressed interest in energy cooperation with Israel. However, Israeli officials reportedly remain skeptical about prospects for a subsea Israel-Turkey natural gas pipeline.187 While Israel has pursued greater high-level interaction with 178 Fehim Tastekin, “Libya differences stall Turkey-Egypt fence-mending,” Al-Monitor, November 3, 2022. 179 “UAE and Turkey central banks seek further co-operation after currency swap deal,” The National, February 17, 2022. 180 Sinem Cengiz, “Echoes from President Erdoğan’s Saudi Arabia Visit: A Fresh Start?” Politics Today, May 5, 2022. 181 Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkish government banks on Gulf financial support to save economy,” Al-Monitor, November 30, 2022. 182 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s policy changes could see defense biz grow with Gulf rivals,” Defense News, March 1, 2022. 183 “Exclusive: Turkey sells battle-tested drones to UAE as regional rivals mend ties,” Reuters, September 21, 2022. 184 Ibid; Ali Bakir, “The UAE just received twenty drones from Turkey. What’s the backstory?” Atlantic Council, November 16, 2022. 185 Galip Dalay, “Turkey’s Middle East Reset? A Precursor for Re-Escalation?” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, August 2022; Ksenia Svetlova, “Iran helped Turkey and Israel mend ties. Here’s how,” Atlantic Council, September 9, 2022. 186 Pinar Dost, “With an eye on Iran, Turkish-Israeli relations will deepen,” Atlantic Council, November 10, 2022; Ariel Kahana, “Report: Israel, Turkey working to deport Hamas officials from Ankara,” Israel Hayom, February 15, 2022. 187 Lazar Berman, “FM’s visit shows Turkey eager to accelerate reconciliation, but Israel more cautious,” Times of Congressional Research Service 38 link to page 34 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Turkey, it may be cautious about significant near-term improvements in bilateral relations, and appears to remain committed to close strategic ties with Greece and the ROC.188 It is unclear how the expected late 2022 return of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister might affect the improvement in Turkey-Israel relations.189 Erdogan and Netanyahu have often engaged in contentious rhetorical exchanges, but the two spoke by phone after Netanyahu’s November 2022 electoral victory and agreed to continue efforts to build positive Turkey-Israel ties.190 The Syrian Conflict Background Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s conflict since it started in 2011 has been complicated and costly, and has severely strained U.S.-Turkey ties. Turkey’s priorities in Syria’s civil war and stance toward Syrian President Bashar al Asad have evolved during the course of the conflict. Turkey has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (which support Asad) since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Turkey and the United States have engaged in similarly inconsistent interactions in northern Syria east of the Euphrates River, where U.S. forces have been based. Since at least 2014, Turkey has actively sought to thwart the Syrian Kurdish YPG from establishing an autonomous area along Syria’s northern border with Turkey. Turkey’s government considers the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), to be a major threat to Turkish security, based on Turkish concerns that YPG/PYD gains have emboldened the PKK (which has links to the YPG/PYD) in its domestic conflict with Turkish authorities.191 The YPG/PYD has a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an umbrella group including Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements that became the main U.S. ground force partner against the Islamic State in 2015. Turkish-led military operations in October 2019 to seize areas of northeastern Syria from the SDF—after U.S. Special Forces pulled back from the border area—led to major criticism of and proposed action against Turkey in Congress.192 U.S. officials have continued partnering with SDF forces against the Islamic State in some areas of Syria, while the SDF has made arrangements elsewhere for protection to come from Syrian government forces. Israel, May 24, 2022. While such a pipeline may be the most feasible pipeline option for transporting Eastern Mediterranean natural gas to Europe, political and economic obstacles may make liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from liquefaction terminals in Egypt a more practical option. “Turkey best option for East Med gas transit to Europe: Experts,” Daily Sabah, March 10, 2022; Sean Mathews, “Russia-Ukraine war: Conflict boosts hopes for East Mediterranean energy, experts say,” Middle East Eye, April 5, 2022. Rina Bassist, “Israeli energy minister inks deal to export gas to Europe via Egypt,” Al-Monitor, June 15, 2022. 188 Steven A. Cook, “How Israel and Turkey Benefit from Restoring Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 31, 2022. 189 Nazlan Ertan, “What Netanyahu’s return means for Israel-Turkey ties,” Al-Monitor, November 8, 2022. 190 “Erdogan tells Netanyahu relations should be maintained with mutual respect,” Reuters, November 17, 2022. 191 See, for example, Soner Cagaptay, “U.S. Safe Zone Deal Can Help Turkey Come to Terms with the PKK and YPG,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 7, 2019. For sources linking the PKK to the YPG (or PKK affiliates in Syria), see footnote 141. 192 Rachel Oswald, “Sanctions on Turkey go front and center as Congress returns,” Roll Call, October 15, 2019. Congressional Research Service 39 link to page 45 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Turkey has set up local councils in areas of northern Syria that Turkey and Turkish-supported Syrian armed opposition groups—generally referred to under the moniker of the Syrian National Army (SNA)—have occupied since 2016 (see Figure 11). These councils and associated security forces provide public services in these areas with funding, oversight, and training from Turkish officials. Questions persist about future governance and Turkey’s overarching role. In 2020, one Turkish analyst wrote that the migration of thousands of Sunni Arabs to these areas has significantly changed their demography.193 Syrian Kurds maintain self-rule in some areas, even though these areas are less contiguous with each other and the Turkish border.194 The State Department’s 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights on Syria said: Armed Syrian opposition groups supported by Turkey in the northern region of the country committed human rights abuses, reportedly targeting Kurdish and Yezidi residents and other civilians, including: extrajudicial killings; the arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance of civilians; torture; sexual violence; forced evacuations from homes; looting and seizure of private property; transfer of detained civilians across the border into Turkey; recruitment of child soldiers; and the looting and desecration of religious shrines.... Elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition of Syrian Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and other minority groups that included members of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, reportedly engaged in human rights abuses, including torture, arbitrary detention, recruitment of child soldiers, and restrictions on freedom of assembly. 193 Asli Aydintasbas, “A new Gaza: Turkey’s border policy in northern Syria,” European Council on Foreign Relations, May 28, 2020. 194 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 40 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 11. Syria Conflict Map During fall 2022, the Al Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization) made inroads in the Turkey/SNA-occupied Afrin province, reportedly due to complicated rivalries between Syrian opposition factions.195 Turkey persuaded HTS to withdraw by November, but questions remain about the possibility of lingering HTS cells or loyalists.196 The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future of Syria’s northwestern province of Idlib, which is largely controlled by HTS. Turkey deployed troops to Idlib in 2017, ostensibly to protect it from Syrian government forces and prevent further refugee flows into Turkey. A limited outbreak of conflict in 2020 displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians and caused several Turkish and Syrian casualties. Russian willingness to back Syrian operations in Idlib perhaps stems in part from Turkey’s unwillingness or inability to enforce a 2018 Turkey-Russia agreement by removing heavy weapons and “radical terrorist groups” from the province.197 Factors affecting future developments, partly due to Russia’s 195 Orwa Ajjoub, “HTS, Turkey, and the future of Syria’s north,” Middle East Institute, October 26, 2022. 196 Omer Ozkizilcik, “How a former al-Qaeda affiliate became an existential threat and a wake-up call for the Syrian opposition,” Atlantic Council, November 14, 2022. 197 Text of agreement available at https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/full-text-of-turkey-russia-memorandum-on- Congressional Research Service 41 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations ongoing war in Ukraine, could include possible Russian changes in posture and strategy in Syria, Turkish measures to limit Russian military access to Syria by air and sea,198 and Russia’s willingness to permit humanitarian access to Syria beyond early 2023.199 Refugees in Turkey Turkey hosts about 3.6 mil ion Syrian refugees—more than any other country—along with hundreds of thousands from other countries.200 Unofficial reports suggest these numbers may be considerably higher, constituting around 7 percent of Turkey’s population.201 Refugees’ and other migrants’ living situations, effect on Turkey’s population, and access to employment, education, and public services vary based on the differing circumstances that they face. Growing numbers of Turks appear to have concerns about refugees’ impact on Turkey’s society and economy.202 According to one source, about half of the two mil ion adult Syrian refugees in Turkey work, and nearly all who do work in the informal sector, where wages are below the legal minimum and workers can face exploitation and unsafe working conditions.203 Turkey closed off most access to migrants from Syria in 2015204 and has sought to repatriate refugees who are wil ing to return,205 with more than 500,000 reportedly having done so to date.206 Reportedly, Turkish authorities have forcibly returned some refugees to Syria.207 Per a 2016 Turkey-EU agreement to minimize the flow of migrants to the EU, Greece can return Syrian migrants to Turkey that come to its islands. As part of a structured process, the deal calls for the same number of people to be resettled from Turkey in EU countries.208 The agreement also mandated EU economic assistance for refugees in Turkey. During some times of crisis, President Erdogan has threatened to open Turkey’s borders to allow migrants into Greece and Bulgaria. Those countries implement security measures—with the assistance of the EU’s border and coast guard agency—to minimize the number of crossings via land or sea. Some sources have criticized Turkey and the other countries involved for alleged ethical or international legal violations related to the treatment of refugees or migrants.209 Erdogan has hinted at the possibility of repairing relations with Asad, after more than a decade in which Turkey has sought an end to Asad’s rule. As of late 2022, Russia is reportedly trying to broker better ties. Turkey is seeking Syria’s help to push YPG fighters farther from the border and facilitate the return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey. Asad reportedly wants full Turkish withdrawal in return.210 It is unclear whether the two leaders can compromise and how that would idlib-revealed-1.771953. 198 Dorian Jones, “Ankara Tightens Russian Access to Syria,” Voice of America, May 10, 2022. 199 Lara Jakes, “U.N. Yields to Russia’s Limits on Aid Mission in Syria,” New York Times, July 12, 2022. 200 See https://reporting.unhcr.org/turkey#toc-narratives. 201 Merve Tahiroglu, “Immigration Politics: Refugees in Turkey and the 2023 Elections,” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, August 17, 2022. 202 M. Murat Erdogan, Syrians Barometer - 2020, 2022. 203 Tahiroglu, “Immigration Politics: Refugees in Turkey and the 2023 Elections.” 204 Ceylan Yeginsu and Karam Shoumali, “Turkey Moves to Close All Gates at Border With Syria,” New York Times, March 29, 2015. 205 “Turkey talks with UN over returning Syrian refugees,” Associated Press, September 12, 2021. 206 Mohammed Hardan, “Half a million Syrians return from Turkey, but were they forced?” Al-Monitor, December 6, 2022. 207 Ibid; Sultan al-Kanj, “Turkey forcibly deports dozens of Syrians,” Al-Monitor, February 8, 2022. 208 Text of agreement available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/. 209 International Organization for Migration, “IOM Concerned about Increasing Deaths on Greece-Turkey Border,” February 18, 2022; “Bulgaria: Pushbacks Escalate as Government Discusses Reinforcements at Borders,” European Council on Refugees and Exiles, September 10, 2021. 210 “Syria resisting Russia's efforts to broker Turkey summit, sources say,” Reuters, December 5, 2022. Congressional Research Service 42 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations affect Turkey’s relationship with the SNA and the overall dynamic with other stakeholders in northern Syria. Further Turkish Military Operations? In May 2022, Erdogan began making public statements about a possible new Turkish military operation to expand areas of Turkish control in Syria as a means of countering YPG influence and providing areas for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees living in Turkey.211 The presence of Syrian refugees has become politically charged in Turkey ahead of the scheduled 2023 elections, partly because of Turkey’s ongoing economic turmoil. In June testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy Dana Stroul said that any Turkish escalation in northern Syria “risks disrupting [Defeat]-ISIS operations,” including the security of SDF-managed detention facilities.212 As of August 2022, a media report suggested that approximately 900 U.S. Special Forces personnel were deployed in northeastern Syria to help the SDF counter the Islamic State and to discourage other countries’ forces from occupying the area.213 A November 13, 2022 bombing that killed six people in Istanbul and injured dozens more may have boosted the Turkish government’s resolve to consider a military operation in Syria. Turkish officials have publicized information alleging YPG responsibility for the attack, though the YPG and PKK deny involvement.214 Turkey began air and artillery strikes against SDF-controlled areas of northern Syria (including civilian infrastructure) and PKK targets in northern Iraq on November 20, 2022, dubbing the strikes Operation Claw-Sword and invoking self-defense as justification. Reportedly, the strikes have killed tens of people in Syria and Iraq, including SDF and Syrian government troops (in Syria), PKK militants (in Iraq), and civilians (in both countries).215 Apparent retaliatory mortar and rocket attacks from Syria—alleged by Turkish officials to come from YPG/PKK militants—killed two at a schoolyard in southern Turkey, and wounded others there and at a border gate.216 One of the Turkish drone strikes reportedly killed two SDF personnel at a post near Al Hasakeh that is 130 meters from the main U.S. military base in the area, reportedly prompting calls between U.S. and Turkish military chiefs of staff and intelligence chiefs.217 Apparent retaliatory mortar and rocket attacks from Syria—alleged by Turkish officials to come from YPG/PKK militants—have killed two civilians and wounded other people in southern Turkey.218 President 211 Fehim Tastekin, “The stumbling blocks facing Turkey’s new operation plan in Syria,” Al-Monitor, May 30, 2022. 212 Statement of Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Path Forward on U.S.-Syria Policy: Strategy and Accountability,” June 8, 2022, available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/060822_%20Stroul_Testimony.pdf. 213 Alexander Ward et al., “What are we still doing in Syria?” Politico, August 26, 2022. 214 “Turkey blames deadly bomb on Kurdish militants; PKK denies involvement,” Reuters, November 14, 2022. 215 Andrew Wilks, “Turkey strikes in Syria, Iraq a week after Istanbul bombing,” Associated Press, November 20, 2022. 216 Begum Donmez Ersoz, “Another Major Turkish Military Ground Incursion Very Likely Amid Rising Tensions in Syria Experts Say,” Voice of America, November 22, 2022; “Rockets fired into southeastern Türkiye from northern Syria,” TRT World, November 20, 2022. 217 Jared Szuba, “Pentagon’s concerns grow as Syria’s Kurds prepare for Turkish assault,” Al-Monitor, November 30, 2022; “Scoop: CIA warned Turkey strikes in Syria endanger U.S. troops,” Axios, December 7, 2022. 218 Begum Donmez Ersoz, “Another Major Turkish Military Ground Incursion Very Likely Amid Rising Tensions in Syria Experts Say,” Voice of America, November 22, 2022; “Rockets fired into southeastern Türkiye from northern Syria,” TRT World, November 20, 2022. Congressional Research Service 43 link to page 45 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Erdogan has appeared to challenge the U.S. policy of distinguishing the YPG from the PKK, saying “It’s the end of the road for those who believe they can stall Turkey by pun games, by changing names of terrorist organizations, by sharing pictures showing their soldiers next to terrorists.”219 SDF commander Mazloum Abdi (or Kobane, whose real name is Ferhat Abdi Sahin) has called for stronger statements from U.S. and Russian officials to prevent a new Turkish-led ground incursion. Various U.S. official statements have acknowledged Turkey’s right to self-defense, but have generally opposed cross-border strikes and voiced concerns that Turkey-SDF clashes could reduce the SDF’s focus on countering the Islamic State.220 In a November 30 call between Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, Secretary Austin expressed the Defense Department’s “strong opposition to a new Turkish military operation.”221 Reportedly, U.S. government civilian staff in northeastern Syria have been evacuated to northern Iraq for safety.222 Based on open source reporting, the likely focus of a Turkish ground operation would be to eject the SDF from the towns and surroundings of Tell Rifat and Manbij (see Figure 11).223 These areas include important supply routes connecting northwestern and northeastern Syria, and are not in the American military sphere of operation in northeastern Syria, but farther west in the Russian and Syrian regime sphere. Concerns about how a Turkish-led ground operation in areas surrounding Aleppo province might affect Russian, Iranian, and Syrian government sway in the province could affect Russia’s stance toward a potential operation.224 However, according to one former U.S. official, U.S. and Russian pushback against Turkish military action may be less effective than before because “The war in Ukraine has bolstered Turkey’s diplomatic leverage, weakened Russia’s military credibility and resources, and made multilateral pressure far less plausible.”225 One former senior U.S. official has speculated that Russia might approve a Turkish operation into Kobane/Ayn al Arab in the hope that it could drive a wedge between the United States and Turkey, and thus weaken their efforts to contain Russia in Syria.226 Iraq Turkey has acted for decades in Iraq to counter threats to Turkey from the PKK, which maintains safe havens there. Turkey has conducted airstrikes and special operations against PKK targets in Iraq since 2007. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which is the leading faction within Iraq’s largely autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not generally objected to these strikes, though it has shown sensitivity to pan-Kurdish sympathies among its population. 219 Jared Szuba, “Turkey strikes near US base in Syria after Pentagon calls for de-escalation,” Al-Monitor, November 22, 2022. 220 Ibid. 221 Defense Department, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III's Phone Call With Turkish Minister of National Defense Hulusi Akar,” November 30, 2022. 222 Amberin Zaman, “Syrian Kurdish commander slams US response to Turkish attacks as US diplomats evacuated from Syria,” Al-Monitor, November 29, 2022. 223 Rich Outzen, “The risks and rewards of Erdogan’s next military operation,” Atlantic Council, December 1, 2022. 224 Pepe Escobar, “Operation Claw-Sword: Erdogan’s big new game in Syria,” Asia Times, November 27, 2022; Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, interviewed in Nadeen Ebrahim, “Will Erdogan finally deliver on his vow to invade northern Syria?” CNN, November 25, 2022. 225 Outzen, “The risks and rewards of Erdogan’s next military operation.” 226 James Jeffrey, “How the U.S. Can Compromise with Turkey on Syria,” Foreign Policy, December 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service 44Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Figure 10. Turkish Military Export Statistics

Congressional Scrutiny: U.S. Responses and
Options
In a context where many Members of Congress are increasingly critical of Turkey’s domestic and
foreign policy actions, as reflected in legislative proposals and oversight, some U.S. concerns
have led to sanctions and other measures against Turkey, and to efforts to empower Turkey’s
rivals. These measures or others in the future could, in turn, affect U.S.-Turkey relations more
broadly.
Selected Events Affecting U.S.-Turkey Tensions
July 2016
Failed coup attempt in Turkey. President Erdogan and many Turks blame the Fethul ah
Gulen movement for the coup and call for Gulen’s extradition from the United States
(which has not happened to date). Several domestic and international observers,
including in the United States, criticize Turkey’s post-coup arrests and purge of the
public sector.
May 2017
During President Erdogan’s visit to Washington, DC, several of his security guards
reportedly assault ethnic Kurdish protestors gathered near the Turkish ambassador’s
residence in Sheridan Circle, drawing sharp criticism from some Members of
Congress.
August 2018
The United States and Turkey levy reciprocal sanctions against one another over
disagreements relating to Turkey’s imprisonment of American pastor Andrew
Brunson. Brunson is released in October 2018, but three Turkish nationals employed
by U.S. consulates remain under various forms of legal confinement or restraint.
July 2019
Turkey begins receiving S-400 system components from Russia; Department of
Defense announces Turkey’s removal from F-35 program.
October 2019
Turkey and allied Syrian militias seize territory in northeastern Syria and attack PKK-
linked Syrian Kurdish forces that partner with the U.S.-led anti-Islamic State coalition,
drawing intense criticism from many Members of Congress.
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Department of Justice charges Turkey’s largely state-owned Halkbank for various
offenses related to a supposed multi-bil ion dol ar scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on
Iran. Criminal penalties could affect Turkey’s economy; the case also could implicate
Erdogan directly, and it has some connection to his domestic struggles against the
Gulen movement.135
Summer 2020
Turkey-Greece tensions intensify in the Eastern Mediterranean over energy, maritime,
and airspace disputes, fueling U.S. and European criticism of Turkey.
Fall 2020
Turkey provides political and material support for Azerbaijan in its resumption of
conflict with ethnic Armenians over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, further
increasing U.S. criticism of Turkey.
Sanctions’ effect on Turkish behavior may be difficult to gauge. One financial strategist said in
October 2019 that measures constraining Turkish banks from transacting in dollars could
particularly affect Turkey’s financial system.136 While negative effects on Turkey’s economy
could lead to domestic pressure to change Turkish policies,137 they also could increase popular
support for the government. While Turkey has long-standing, deeply rooted ties with the West,
some sanctions could potentially create incentives for Turkey to increase trade, investment, and
arms dealings with non-Western actors.138 President Erdogan has stated that U.S. actions against
Turkey could lead to the ejection of U.S. military personnel and assets from Turkey.139
Relevant U.S. measures affecting or potentially affecting Turkey include:
 Congressional action on arms sales. Beyond the informal holds mentioned
above (see “U.S. Arms Sales and Aid”), Congress could respond to Turkish
policies of concern—in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, Nagorno-Karabakh, or
elsewhere—by taking action on specific arms sales or on sales generally,
including U.S.-origin components used in domestically produced systems. In
October 2020, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Member Bob
Menendez introduced S.Res. 755, a resolution entitled to expedited consideration
in the Senate (under Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 22
USC 2304(c)) that could require a Department of State report within 30 days on
possible Turkish human rights abuses both domestically and in the South
Caucasus, Syria, Libya, and Iraq; and lead to expedited action on U.S. arms sales
and assistance to Turkey.
 CAATSA sanctions. The S-400 acquisition also could trigger the imposition of
U.S. sanctions under CRIEEA (Title II of the Countering America’s Adversaries

135 According to one media source, the charges against Halkbank might have come sooner and also been brought
against some prominent individuals involved with the transactions in question were it not for direct efforts by President
Erdogan to seek Trump Administration intervention with the prosecutor’s office, given considerations that might range
from foreign policy sensitivities to personal affinities between Presidents Trump and Erdogan. Eric Lipton and
Benjamin Weiser, “Trump Ties to Erdogan Snarled U.S. Inquiry into Turkish Bank,” New York Times, October 30,
2020.
136 Sebastian Galy, cited in Jack Ewing, “Tariffs Won’t Stop Turkey’s Invasion of Syria, Analysts Warn,” New York
Times, October 15, 2019.
137 Ewing, “Tariffs Won’t Stop Turkey’s Invasion of Syria, Analysts Warn.”
138 Remarks by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Congressional Record vol. 165, no. 173, Senate - October
31, 2019, p. S6310 (Turkey and Syria); Paul McLeary, “Tough Sanctions May Drive Turkey into Russia’s Arms,”
Breaking Defense, October 10, 2019; Burak Ege Bekdil and Matthew Bodner, “No obliteration: Western arms embargo
has little impact on Turkey as it looks east,” Defense News, October 24, 2019.
139 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Pentagon chief questions Turkey’s NATO loyalty after base threat,” Bloomberg, December 17,
2019.
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Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA; P.L. 115-44; 22 U.S.C. 9525). Under
Section 231 of CAATSA, the President is required to impose sanctions on any
party that he determines has knowingly engaged in “a significant transaction with
a person that is part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence
sectors of the Government of the Russian Federation.” Section 1292 of the
FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act passed by the House in July 2020
(H.R. 6395) has a provision that would require the Administration to impose
CAATSA sanctions on Turkey. The Administration imposed CAATSA sanctions
against China in September 2018, roughly eight months after it took possession
of Russian S-400-related components and fighter aircraft.140 President Trump has
appeared to favor an “interim solution” allowing Turkey to avoid sanctions if it
does not operate the S-400. Reportedly, Turkey has delayed plans to put the
system into use, but has tested it multiple times since 2019.141
 Sanctions related to Syria. In October 2019, the Trump Administration imposed
sanctions on some Turkish cabinet ministries and ministers in response to
Turkey’s armed incursion against Kurdish-led forces in Syria, but lifted them
later that same month.142 The sanctions came pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)
13984, which President Trump signed on October 14, 2019, and which remains
in effect.143 That same month, Congress considered a number of sanctions bills in
response to Turkey’s incursion into Syria, with the House passing the Protect
Against Conflict by Turkey Act (H.R. 4695).
 End of arms embargo against Cyprus. Section 1250A of the FY2020 National
Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92), enacted in December 2019, lifted a 32-
year-old embargo on U.S. arms sales to the Republic of Cyprus, amid the Turkey-
Greece-Cyprus tensions over Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration and
maritime boundary issues described above. In July 2020, the U.S. embassy in
Cyprus announced that the United States would begin providing some
International Military Education and Training to Cyprus in FY2021.144 In
September, Secretary of State Pompeo waived restrictions on the U.S. sale of
non-lethal defense articles and services to Cyprus for FY2021, attracting
criticism from Turkish officials.
 Reduced U.S.-Turkey cooperation against the PKK. One media report citing
U.S. and Turkish officials stated that in response to Turkey’s October 2019
military operations against the YPG, the U.S. military stopped drone flights that

140 Department of State, “CAATSA Section 231: Addition of 33 Entities and Individuals to the List of Specified
Persons and Imposition of Sanctions on the Equipment Development Department,” September 20, 2018.
141 Stein, “Finding Off Ramps”; Joyce Karam, “Turkey tests S-400 Russian missile system with US jets, defying
Washington,” The National, November 25, 2019; “US Condemns Turkey for Testing Russian-Made S-400 Missile,”
Voice of America, October 17, 2020.
142 Department of the Treasury, Executive Order on Syria-related Sanctions; Syria-related Designations; Issuance of
Syria-related General Licenses, October 14, 2019; Department of the Treasury, Syria-related Designations Removals,
October 23, 2019.
143 White House, “Executive Order on Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the
Situation in Syria,” 84 Federal Register 55851-55855, October 14, 2019.
144 U.S. Embassy in Cyprus, “U.S. International Military Education and Training for the Republic of Cyprus,” July 8,
2020.
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had been sharing intelligence to help Turkey target PKK locations in northern
Iraq for more than a decade.145
Outlook
The future of U.S.-Turkey relations could depend on a number of factors, including:
 whether Turkey makes its Russian S-400 system fully operational and considers
additional Russian arms purchases;
 how various regional crises (Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Eastern Mediterranean
disputes with Greece and Cyprus) unfold and influence Turkey’s relationships with key
actors (including the United States, Russia, China, the European Union, Israel, Iran, and
Sunni Arab states);
 whether Turkey can project power and create its own sphere of influence using military
and economic cooperation (including defense exports); and
 whether President Erdogan is able to maintain broad control over the country given its
economic problems and human rights concerns.
Administration and congressional actions regarding Turkey can have implications for bilateral
ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial
well-being. For example, U.S. actions in response to Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 could
affect U.S. relations with respect to other key partners who have purchased or may purchase
advanced weapons from Russia—including India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. These actions
could include placing conditions on arms sales, whether and how to impose CAATSA sanctions,
assessing U.S./NATO basing options, and balancing relations with Turkey and its regional rivals.
How closely to engage Erdogan’s government could depend on U.S. perceptions of his popular
legitimacy, likely staying power, and the extent to which a successor might change his policies in
light of geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations. Key constituencies to consider
include pious Sunni Muslims, secular Turks, nationalists, Kurds, Alevis, various elites, and the
middle and working classes.

145 Humeyra Pamuk and Phil Stewart, “Exclusive: U.S. halts secretive drone program with Turkey over Syria
incursion,” Reuters, February 5, 2020.
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Appendix A. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Relationships
A number of considerations drive the complicated dynamics behind Turkey’s international
relationships. Turkey’s maintenance of cooperative relationships with countries whose respective
interests may conflict involves a balancing act. Turkey’s vulnerability to threats from Syria and
Iraq on its southern border increases the pressure on it to manage this balance, a balance further
complicated by the active involvement of other regional and global powers in these countries.
Russia
After reaching a low point in Turkey-Russia relations in 2015-2016 (brought about by the Turkish
downing of a Russian plane near the Turkey-Syria border and Russia’s temporary imposition of
sanctions), President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin cultivated closer ties. Putin
showed support for Erdogan during the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and subsequently allowed
Turkey to carry out military operations in northern Syria over the next two years that helped roll
back Kurdish territorial control and reduce refugee flows near Turkey’s border. The S-400
transaction and cooperation on natural gas pipelines and nuclear energy are other positive aspects
of Turkey-Russia relations, even though the two countries have a centuries-long history of
geopolitical conflict.
While some Western observers express concern that Turkey-Russia cooperation could undermine
Turkey’s relationships with the United States, the European Union, and NATO, Turkish and
Russian interests diverge significantly in several places throughout the region. Several observers
have remarked that Turkey’s use of relatively inexpensive drones and proxy forces in Syria,
Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh have frustrated Russia’s aspirations in these places—ironically by
borrowing some of the tactics Putin has used to frustrate Western designs in its near abroad.146
Additionally, Turkey is strengthening its defense cooperation with Ukraine in a way that seems
calculated to check Russian regional dominance, and Turkey continues to oppose Russia’s
annexation of Crimea.147
These differences between Turkey and Russia may not lead to a major rupture between them.
They suggest that any Turkish drift away from the West might lead Turkey toward more
compartmentalization of its relations—in which cooperation or competition with different actors
will depend on the specific circumstances of each issue—rather than toward close alignment with
Russia or any other great power. Reinforcing this is Turkey’s ongoing diversification of energy
imports and the uncertainty surrounding its use of the S-400 and future defense cooperation with
Russia.
China
Turkey and China cooperate on various matters in a way that generally does not affect the tense
regional crises that enmesh Turkey and other international actors. For Turkey, China is a growing
source of imports, lending, investment, and tourism at a time of economic difficulty and
uncertainty in its relations with its traditional strategic partners in the West. For China, Turkey’s
strategic location at the crossroads of Eurasian transportation corridors makes it an important
country for China’s Belt and Road Initiative.148 Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE have

146 Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.”
147 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agreements,” Associated Press, October 30, 2020.
148 For more information on the Belt and Road Initiative, see CRS Report R45898, U.S.-China Relations, coordinated
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increased their involvement in Turkey’s telecommunications sector, and other Chinese firms have
made significant investments in Turkish energy and transportation infrastructure.149 Turkey and
China also maintain some bilateral defense ties. Nevertheless, Turkey-China economic, military,
and political ties remain relatively limited in contrast to Turkey’s linkages with the United States
and Europe.150
China’s negative treatment of its Uyghur minority may be an obstacle to closer Turkey-China
relations because the Uyghurs—a Turkic Muslim people—share ethnic, linguistic, and religious
ties with most Turks. An estimated 50,000 Uyghurs have fled China in the past decade and found
refuge in Turkey.151 Once publicly critical of China’s repression of the Uyghurs, Erdogan has
become less outspoken in recent years despite China’s detention of roughly 1.5 million Uyghurs
in political re-education centers. His reticence may be due at least partly to Turkey’s hopes that
expanded Chinese lending and investment can help its struggling economy.152 Reports in 2020
that suggest some Uyghur dissidents living in Turkey have been repatriated to China via third
countries prompted a Department of State spokesperson to issue the following statement in July:
“The United States will continue to call on the People’s Republic of China to immediately end its
campaign of repression in [China’s] Xinjiang [province, where most Uyghurs live], release all
those arbitrarily detained, and cease efforts to coerce members of Muslim minority groups
residing abroad to return to China to face an uncertain fate.”153
European Union154
Turkey has a long history of partnership with the EU (and its predecessor organizations) and
began negotiations to join the EU in 2005. Talks stalled shortly thereafter and Turkey’s
membership is now seen as unlikely, at least in the near future. Many analysts argue that
resistance to Turkish EU accession has been rooted in a fear that Turkey’s large Muslim
population would fundamentally change the cultural character of the EU and dilute the power of
the EU’s founding Western European states in particular. Turkey’s unwillingness to normalize
diplomatic and trade relations with EU member Cyprus presents a major obstacle to its accession
prospects. Other EU concerns over Turkey’s qualifications for membership center on the
treatment of Kurds and religious minorities, media freedoms, women’s rights, and the proper and
transparent functioning of Turkey’s democratic and legal systems.155

by Susan V. Lawrence.
149 Ayca Alemdaroglu and Sultan Tepe, “Erdogan Is Turning Turkey into a Chinese Client State,” foreignpolicy.com,
September 16, 2020.
150 Gonul Tol, “The Middle Kingdom and the Middle Corridor: Prospects for China-Turkey ties,” Middle East Institute,
May 29, 2020.
151 Aykan Erdemir and Philip Kowalski, “China Buys Turkey’s Silence on Uyghur Oppression,” The Diplomat, August
21, 2020.
152 Ibid.
153 Emily Judd, “US calls on China to stop coercing Uighurs to return after Turkey extradition report,” Al Arabiya, July
26, 2020.
154 For more information on this subject, see archived CRS Report RS22517, European Union Enlargement: A Status
Report on Turkey’s Accession Negotiations, by Vincent L. Morelli; and CRS Report RS21344, European Union
Enlargement, by Kristin Archick and Vincent L. Morelli.
155 European Commission, Turkey 2020 Report.
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Debate regarding the extent to which Turkey meets EU standards has intensified in recent years in
light of domestic controversies since 2013 and President Erdogan’s consolidation of power.
Erdogan has used anti-European rhetoric to gain support both at home and among the substantial
Turkish diaspora communities in Europe. Turkish domestic expectations of full accession to the
EU have apparently been in decline for several years. Despite the lack of significant progress in
accession negotiations, the EU has provided
Turkey-EU Relations in Brief
Turkey with more than €9 billion in pre-
1959: Turkey applies for associate membership in
accession financial and technical assistance
the then-European Economic Community (EEC)
since 2002 (which is separate from the support
1963: Turkey is made an associate member of the
for refugees addressed below). Based on
EEC (Ankara Agreement)
concerns about Turkish backsliding on reforms,
1970: Protocol signed outlining eventual
the EU reduced pre-accession assistance levels
establishment of Customs Union
in 2018. Annual assistance levels that ranged
1982: European Community (EC, successor to the
from between €493-626 million for 2014-2017
EEC and forerunner of the EU) freezes relations with
Turkey in response to 1980 coup; relations resume 4
dropped to slightly less than €400 million for
years later
2018-2020.156
1987: Turkey applies to join the EC as a ful member
Since 2011, nearly four million refugees or
1996: Customs Union between Turkey and the EU
migrants from Syria and other countries have
takes effect
come to Turkey, posing significant
1999: EU recognizes Turkey as a candidate for
humanitarian, socioeconomic, and security
membership
challenges. Many have sought to cross from
2005: Accession negotiations begin
Turkey into Europe. Turkey and the EU reached
2016: The European Parliament passes a nonbinding
an arrangement in March 2016 providing for the
resolution urging that accession talks with Turkey be
halted
return from Greece to Turkey of “irregular
migrants or asylum seekers whose applications
have been declared inadmissible.”157 In exchange, the EU agreed to resettle one Syrian refugee
for every Syrian readmitted to Turkey and provide Turkey with €6 billion to be used to support
refugees, among other incentives.158 The deterrent effect of the arrangement on migrants appears
to have helped dramatically reduce the number of people crossing from Turkey to the Greek
islands.159
In February 2020, as conflict in Syria’s Idlib province threatened to bring a new wave of refugees
into Turkey, President Erdogan—apparently partly owing to a desire for bolstered and expedited
EU funding—announced that Turkey would no longer abide by the agreement. Turkish officials
reportedly facilitated efforts by thousands of migrants—mostly Afghans, not Syrians—to cross
Turkey’s land border with Greece.160 While such threats may highlight the potential for Turkey to
use refugees as leverage with the EU,161 in this case Turkish leverage appears to have been

156 See https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20180817-revised-indicative-strategy-paper-
2014-2020-for-turkey.pdf.
157 European Commission Fact Sheet, “Implementing the EU-Turkey Statement—Questions and Answers,” June 15,
2016, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1664_en.htm. The arrangement is controversial
because of questions surrounding its compatibility with international legal and human rights standards.
158 For more, see https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/fourth_annual_report_on_the_facility_for_refugees_in_turkey.pdf.
159 “UN agency praises ‘huge impact’ of EU-Turkey refugee deal,” Hurriyet Daily News, April 18, 2018.
160 Berkay Mandiraci, “Sharing the Burden: Revisiting the EU-Turkey Migration Deal,” International Crisis Group,
March 13, 2020.
161 Kemal Kirisci and Basak Yavcan, “As COVID-19 worsens precarity for refugees, Turkey and the EU must work
together,” Brookings Institution, June 11, 2020.
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relatively light given robust Greek border controls and reportedly little interest in leaving Turkey
among Syrian refugees who live there.162
Armenia
Turkey’s relations with Armenia are fraught for historical reasons. From 1915 to 1923, hundreds
of thousands of Armenians died as a result of actions of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey’s
predecessor state). U.S. and international characterizations of these events influence Turkey’s
domestic and foreign policy, and are in turn influenced by developments in Turkey-Armenia
relations. Turkey and Armenia initially agreed in 2009 on a set of joint protocols to normalize
relations, but the ratification process in both countries stalled shortly thereafter. Armenia
cancelled the protocols in 2018 in light of Turkish inaction. Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan in the
ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh crisis also has implications for its relations with Armenia.
All U.S. Presidents since Jimmy Carter have made public statements memorializing the events,
with President Ronald Reagan referring to a “genocide of the Armenians” during a Holocaust
Remembrance Day speech in 1981.163 In annual statements issued on every April 24 of his
presidency, President Trump (echoing statements made by President Obama) has said that the
events were “one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century” and that “one and a half million
Armenians were deported, massacred, or marched to their deaths.”164 In addition to past
statements or actions by U.S. policymakers, the website of the Armenian National Institute, a
U.S.-based organization, asserts that at least 29 other countries (not counting the United States or
Armenia) have characterized the events as genocide in some way, including 16 of the 27 EU
member states.165
Congress has considered how to characterize the events of 1915-1923 on a number of occasions.
In 1975 (H.J.Res. 148) and 1984 (H.J.Res. 247), the House passed proposed joint resolutions that
referred to “victims of genocide” of Armenian ancestry from 1915 and 1915-1923, respectively.166
Neither proposed joint resolution came to a vote in the Senate. Fifteen other proposed resolutions
characterizing these World War I-era events as genocide were reported by various congressional

162 Kadri Gursel, “Why Ankara’s Syrian refugee threat has lost its impact,” Al-Monitor, March 19, 2020.
163 Additionally, in a May 1951 written statement to the International Court of Justice, the Truman Administration cited
“Turkish massacres of Armenians” as one of three “outstanding examples of the crime of genocide” (along with Roman
persecution of Christians and Nazi extermination of Jews and Poles). International Court of Justice, Reservations on the
Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1951:
Pleadings, Arguments, Documents, p. 25.
164 See, e.g., White House, “Statement by the President on Armenian Remembrance Day,” April 24, 2020. Beginning
with President Obama in 2009, annual White House statements (including those from President Trump) have
continuously referenced the “Meds Yeghern,” an Armenian phrase that translates roughly to “great crime.” Vartan
Matiossian, “The ‘Exact Translation’: How ‘Medz Yeghern’ Means Genocide,” Armenian Weekly, May 15, 2013.
165 The EU states listed as having recognized a genocide are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden. The
European Parliament has also referred to the deaths as genocide. The non-EU states are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Lebanon, Paraguay, Russia, Switzerland, Vatican City, Venezuela, and Uruguay. In April 2015, the
Republic of Cyprus’s ethnic Greek parliament passed a resolution making it a crime to deny that the events constituted
genocide. In 2007, Switzerland criminally fined an ethnic Turkish politician for denying that the events constituted
genocide, and in 2012 France passed a law making it a crime to deny that the events constituted genocide—though the
law was subsequently invalidated by the French Constitutional Council. Long-standing Turkish law criminalizes
characterization of the events as genocide.
166 Neither H.J.Res. 148 nor H.J.Res. 247 explicitly identified the Ottoman Empire or its authorities as perpetrators of
the purported genocide. H.J.Res. 247 stated that “one and one-half million people of Armenian ancestry” were “the
victims of the genocide perpetrated in Turkey.”
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committees from 1984 to 2014, but neither chamber passed measures related to the issue until the
116th Congress.
In late 2019, the House and Senate passed nonbinding resolutions (H.Res. 296 in October 2019
and S.Res. 150 in December 2019) characterizing the “killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the
Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923” as genocide. The resolutions came shortly after Turkish
military operations against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria drew
significant congressional denunciation. Turkish officials roundly criticized both resolutions, but
did not announce any changes to defense cooperation or any other aspect of U.S.-Turkey
relations, despite having threatened to do so in years past in connection with similar proposed
resolutions. In response to the Senate’s December 2019 vote, the Department of State released a
statement reading, “The position of the Administration has not changed. Our views are reflected
in the president’s definitive statement on this issue from last April.”167
Cyprus and Greece
Since Cyprus became independent of the United Kingdom in 1960, Turkey has viewed itself as
the protector of the island’s ethnic Turkish-Cypriot minority from potential mistreatment by the
ethnic Greek-Cypriot majority.168 Responding to Greek and Greek-Cypriot political developments
that raised concerns about a possible Greek annexation of Cyprus, Turkey’s military intervened in
1974 and established control over the northern third of the island. This prompted an almost total
ethnic and de facto political division along geographical lines that persists today.169 The ethnic
Greek-Cypriot-ruled Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized as having jurisdiction over
the entire island, while the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (in the
northern third) has only Turkish recognition.
The Republic of Cyprus’s accession to the EU in 2004 and Turkey’s refusal to normalize political
and commercial relations with it are seen as major obstacles to Turkey’s EU membership
aspirations. Moreover, EU accession may have reduced incentives for Cyprus’s Greek population
to make concessions toward a reunification deal.170 Incoming TRNC leader Ersin Tatar, who was
elected in October 2020, favors a separate Turkish Cypriot state.
Turkey’s relations with Greece are also fraught. The two countries joined NATO in 1952, but
intercommunal tensions, the Cyprus question, and airspace and maritime border disputes
“ensured that war between the two allies remained a real risk well into the 1990s.”171 Despite
more regular diplomatic relations in the following two decades, Turkish relations with Greece
have again deteriorated in recent years, including a resumption of Turkey-Greece border incidents
(see “Eastern Mediterranean and Offshore Natural Gas”). In August 2020, in the context of

167 Senate Resolution 150, Department of State, December 17, 2019.
168 Turkey views its protective role as justified given its status as one of the three guaranteeing powers of the 1960
Treaty of Guarantee that was signed at the time Cyprus gained its independence. The United Kingdom and Greece are
the other two guarantors.
169 Turkey retains between 30,000 and 40,000 troops on the island (supplemented by several thousand Turkish Cypriot
soldiers). This is countered by a Greek Cypriot force of approximately 12,000 with reported access to 50,000 reserves.
“Cyprus - Army,” Jane’s Group UK, October 2019. The United Nations maintains a peacekeeping mission (UNFICYP)
of approximately 900 personnel within a buffer zone headquartered in Cyprus’s divided capital of Nicosia (known as
Lefkosa in Turkish). Since the mission’s inception in 1964, UNFICYP has suffered 186 fatalities. The United Kingdom
maintains approximately 3,000 personnel at two sovereign military bases on the southern portion of the island at
Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
170 The Greek Cypriots rejected by referendum a United Nations reunification plan (called the Annan plan after then
Secretary-General Kofi Annan) in 2004 that the Turkish Cypriot population accepted.
171 “Why Turkey and Greece cannot reconcile,” Economist, December 14, 2017.
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disputes over maritime borders and offshore natural gas exploration, Greek and Turkish frigates
had a minor collision in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Middle East and North Africa
Turkey’s Middle Eastern profile expanded in the 2000s as Erdogan (while serving as prime
minister) sought to build economic and political linkages—often emphasizing shared Muslim
identity—with Turkey’s neighbors. However, efforts to increase Turkey’s influence and offer it as
a “model” for other regional states appear to have been set back by a number of developments
since 2011: (1) conflict and instability that engulfed the region and Turkey’s own southern border,
(2) Turkey’s failed effort to help Muslim Brotherhood-aligned groups gain lasting power in Syria
and North Africa, and (3) domestic polarization accompanied by government repression. Turkey’s
troubled relations with some Sunni Arab states are described in “Middle East and Libyan Civil
War,” while its relations with other key regional states are outlined below.
Iran
While Turkey and Iran are sometimes rivals for regional influence, the two neighbors also work
together on certain regional issues. Along with Russia, they coordinate efforts in Syria as part of
the Astana Process. They also have some common concerns regarding Kurdish militant groups
that maintain presences in Iraq.172 However, Turkey is wary of Tehran’s ambitions near its borders
in those two countries, as well as its close relations with their governments. Turkish officials have
periodically criticized Iran in stark terms, accusing it of destabilizing the region in pursuit of
sectarian interests or “Persian expansionist policies.”173
Turkey and Iran maintain significant economic ties, though Turkey’s traditional reliance on
Iranian oil and gas has declined in recent years. Turkey cut oil imports in 2019 in light of the re-
imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran. Turkey is still one of the largest importers of Iranian gas
(under a contract that expires in 2026), but Iran’s share of Turkish gas imports has decreased over
the past decade as Turkey has increased its imports of LNG.174 Iran has opposed the proposed
Trans-Caspian Pipeline, which would bypass Iran by connecting Turkmenistan’s considerable gas
reserves with Azerbaijan, and from there to Turkey.
Iraq
Turkey’s first priority in Iraq is to counter threats to Turkey from the PKK, which maintains safe
havens there. Another concern—despite the generally positive relations described below between
Turkey and Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—is the possibility that Iraqi Kurdish
moves toward independence could spread separatist sentiment among Kurds in Turkey. Turkey
has conducted airstrikes against PKK targets in Iraq since 2007. The KRG—given its own rivalry
with the PKK—has not generally objected to these strikes, though it is sensitive to pan-Kurdish

172 Iran faces a separatist Kurdish insurgency by an affiliate of the PKK known as PJAK (Kurdish acronym for
Kurdistan Free Life Party). Like the PKK, the PJAK has a presence in Iraq. Turkey and Iran have conducted separate
operations against the two groups in northern Iraq, periodically coordinating but generally not to a significant extent.
173 “Iran and Turkey trade barbs over Syria and Iraq,” Al Jazeera, February 21, 2017; Ilnur Cevik, “Turkey is caught
between the US and Iran,” Daily Sabah, July 23, 2018.
174 Tamer Badawi, “The economic turn in Turkish-Iranian relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
March 12, 2020; Omid Shokri Kalehsar, “The future of Iranian natural gas exports to Turkey,” National Interest, June
24, 2020.
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sympathies among its population.175 Large Turkish air and ground offensives targeting PKK safe
havens in 2020 have been condemned both by the KRG and Iraq’s central government.176
Around 2008, Turkey started developing a political and economic partnership with the KRG. As
part of this cooperation, in 2013 the KRG began transporting oil through pipelines to Turkish
ports for international export. Turkey halted these exports after the KRG’s symbolic 2017
referendum on independence, which it strongly opposed, but has since resumed them. Periodic
attacks attributed to the PKK have shut down these pipelines at times.177
Turkey maintains an uneasy relationship with Iraq’s central government over concerns that its
Shia leaders are unduly influenced by Iran and that Iraq’s security forces and Shia militias often
mistreat Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and ethnic Turkmen. Relations with Baghdad are also strained by
Iraqi concerns about the potential impact that Turkish dam construction and water management
decisions could have on downstream Iraqi communities.178 Turkey’s military maintains various
posts inside northern Iraq and a presence at a base in Bashiqa near Mosul.
Israel
Ties between Turkey and Israel, which were close during the 1990s and early 2000s, have
deteriorated considerably during Erdogan’s rule. This slide has reflected the military’s declining
role in Turkish society relative to Erdogan and other leaders whose criticisms of Israel resound
with domestic public opinion. Despite the countries’ differences, trade between the two countries
has grown.
After years of downgraded diplomatic ties following the 2010 Mavi Marmara (or Gaza flotilla)
incident,179 Turkey and Israel announced the full restoration of diplomatic relations in 2016, in a
deal reportedly facilitated by the United States.180 Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship remains
tense.
Israelis routinely decry Turkey’s ties with Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant group Hamas (a
U.S.-designated terrorist organization). Erdogan’s Islamist sympathies have contributed to these
ties.181 Some reports claim that some Hamas operatives are located in Turkey and involved in
planning attacks on Israeli targets.182 In September 2019, the Department of the Treasury
designated an individual and an entity based in Turkey—under existing U.S. counterterrorism
sanctions authorities—for providing material support to Hamas.183

175 CRS In Focus IF10350, The Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.
176 Amberin Zaman, “KRG seeks US help to rein in Turkish attacks,” Al-Monitor, August 5, 2020.
177 Mohammed Hussein et al., “PKK suspected of Iraq-Turkey Pipeline attack,” Iraq Oil Report, October 30, 2020.
178 “Iraq complains Turkey causing water shortages,” Arab Weekly, July 17, 2020.
179 The incident took place in international waters under disputed circumstances and resulted in the death of nine Turks
and an American of Turkish descent.
180 According to media reports, the rapprochement included Israeli compensation to the families of those killed in the
flotilla incident in exchange for an end to legal claims, as well as opportunities for Turkey to assist with humanitarian
and infrastructure projects for Palestinian residents in the Gaza Strip.
181 Department of State spokesperson, President Erdogan’s Meeting with Hamas Leadership, August 25, 2020.
182 See, e.g., Raf Sanchez, “Exclusive: Hamas plots attacks on Israel from Turkey as Erdogan turns blind eye,”
telegraph.co.uk, December 14, 2019.
183 Department of the Treasury press release, Treasury Targets Wide Range of Terrorists and Their Supporters Using
Enhanced Counterterrorism Sanctions Authorities, September 10, 2019.
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For their part, Turkish leaders often condemn Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, especially in the
Gaza Strip. Additionally, Erdogan has sought to lead regional opposition to various U.S. policies
that go against Palestinian stances, including the 2017 recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital
and the encouragement of Israeli normalization of relations with Arab states such as the UAE,
Bahrain, and Sudan. After the U.S. embassy moved to Jerusalem in May 2018, Turkey expelled
Israel’s ambassador to Turkey, leading Israel to respond in kind with Turkey’s ambassador to
Israel. The ambassadors have not returned to date. Israeli officials are reportedly interested in
countering Turkish aid, tourism, and civil society initiatives in Jerusalem seen as bolstering the
city’s Islamic identity and Arab residents.184
Some observers have characterized negative statements by Erdogan and other prominent Turkish
voices about Israel, Zionism, and various regional and global trends as anti-Semitic.185 Erdogan
insists that his criticisms of the Israeli government and its policies are not directed to the Jewish
people or to Jews in Turkey.
Other International Relationships
Turkey seeks to use political and economic influence to strengthen relationships with non-
Western countries. Through political involvement, increased trade and investment, and
humanitarian and development projects, Turkey has curried favor with foreign countries not only
in the greater Middle East, but also in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and sub-
Saharan Africa. Gulen movement-affiliated organizations had spearheaded some of these ties with
other countries before Turkey’s government classified the movement as a terrorist organization.
Questions persist about how these ties will develop in response to changes in Turkey.

184 Ahmad Melham, “Israel goes after Turkish projects in Jerusalem,” Al-Monitor, July 2, 2020.
185 Hannah Lucinda Smith, et al., “Turkey blames ‘Jewish lobby’ for economic crisis,” Times (UK), May 30, 2018.
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Appendix B. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey
Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President
(pronounced air-doe-wan)
Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on
the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul.
In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a
business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different
Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan.
Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office,
imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious
incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After
Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party
was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP
won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After

the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special
election, and after he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister.
Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of
the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to
power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and
won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. Many observers
believe that he primarily Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations The KDP has its own rivalry with the PKK.227 Turkey has stepped up its operations in Iraq and near the Iraq-Syria border based on Turkish officials’ allegations that people and supplies from PKK safe havens in the Sinjar and Qandil regions of Iraq reinforce the Syrian YPG. Turkey’s military maintains various posts inside northern Iraq and a presence at a base in Bashiqa near Mosul. Turkey has generally positive relations with the KRG—including via oil imports from northern Iraq relations—but has opposed Iraqi Kurdish moves toward independence that might spread separatist sentiment among Kurds in Turkey. Turkey has an uneasy relationship with Iraq’s central government over Turkey’s military involvement in northern Iraq and ties with the KRG. Additionally, Turkish officials reportedly harbor concerns that Iraq’s Shia leaders are unduly influenced by Iran and that Iraq’s security forces and Shia militias often mistreat Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and ethnic Turkmen.228 Relations with Baghdad are also strained by Iraqi concerns about the potential impact that Turkish dam construction and water management decisions have on downstream Iraqi communities.229 U.S. Relations U.S. and Turkish officials maintain that bilateral cooperation on regional security matters remains mutually important,230 despite Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia and a number of other differences between them (such as in Syria and with Greece and Cyprus). U.S. officials have sometimes encouraged cooperation among other allies and partners to counter Turkish actions.231 As mentioned above, however, Turkey has taken some steps to ease tensions with major U.S. partners in the Middle East—namely Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. One important factor influencing Erdogan since at least 2010 appears to be a sense that U.S. actions have harmed specific Turkish interests or his own personal interests. Presumably as a result, Turkey since 2016 has adopted an approach that more actively shapes events near Turkey’s borders and involves closer Turkish dealings with all relevant state actors, including Russia and Iran. Important developments animating Erdogan’s purported sense of U.S.-inflicted harm on Turkey include:  U.S. partnership with Syrian Kurds. Close U.S. military cooperation against the Islamic State with the YPG despite its links to the PKK.  Islamists’ regional status. Erdogan’s position that the United States supported or acquiesced to events during post-2011 turmoil in Egypt and Syria that undermined Sunni Islamist figures tied to Turkey.  Domestic sensitivities. Many Western leaders’ criticism of President Erdogan for ruling in a largely authoritarian manner. Erdogan’s sensitivity to Western concerns was exacerbated by the 2016 coup attempt that Erdogan blames on U.S. 227 CRS In Focus IF10350, The Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 228 Sinem Cengiz, “Why Iraq’s chaos is Turkey’s concern,” Arab News, September 2, 2022. 229 Samya Kullab, “Iraq complains Turkey causing water shortages,” Associated Press, November 18, 2022. 230 State Department, “Joint Statement on the Meeting of Secretary Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu,” May 18, 2022. 231 See, for example, Richard Outzen, “What Is Turkey Thinking in the Eastern Med?” Hoover Institution, December 7, 2021. Congressional Research Service 45 link to page 53 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations permanent resident Fethullah Gulen and his international socioreligious movement.232 Under President Joe Biden, some existing U.S.-Turkey tensions have continued alongside cooperation on other foreign policy matters and opportunities to improve bilateral ties. In April 2021, President Biden notably characterized Ottoman Empire (Turkey’s predecessor state) mass killings and forced marches of Armenians during World War I as a genocide.233 He has limited his meetings with President Erdogan to the sidelines of multilateral conferences. This approach may reflect a U.S. inclination to keep Turkey at arms’ length until after Turkey’s 2023 elections.234 Nevertheless, Turkey’s emergence as a key mediator between Russia and Ukraine after Russia’s 2022 invasion has arguably increased Turkey’s importance for U.S. policy. While continued or deepening ties with Russia in certain areas remain a cause for concern for the Biden Administration and some Members of Congress, Turkey’s cautious support for Ukraine’s defense and openness to rapprochement with Israel, some Arab states, and Armenia have somewhat improved U.S.-Turkey relations.235 President Biden has expressed support for selling F-16s to Turkey (see “Possible F-16 Sales” below), and the United States and Turkey launched a “strategic mechanism” dialogue in April 2022 involving various government ministries on “economic and defense cooperation, counterterrorism, and key areas of shared regional and global interest.”236 Congressional Action and Options Members of Congress may consider legislative and oversight options regarding Turkey. Congressional and executive branch action regarding Turkey and its rivals could have implications for bilateral ties, U.S. political-military options in the region, and Turkey’s strategic orientation and financial well-being. Increased congressional criticism and actions against Turkey have influenced the trajectory of U.S.-Turkey relations since the attempted 2016 coup, focused particularly on President Erdogan’s domestic actions and Turkish foreign policy decisions on Russia, Syria, Greece, and Cyprus (discussed above) that largely diverge from U.S. stances. Congressional actions have included legislation and oversight to empower Turkish rivals Greece and the ROC, and the authorization of sanctions against Turkey and informal holds on arms sales in response to the Turkey-Russia S-400 transaction. Members may reevaluate various legislative and oversight options given Turkey’s significant role in the Russian-Ukraine conflict and the Biden Administration’s expressed interest in upgrading Turkey’s F-16 fleet, the prospect of closely contested presidential and parliamentary elections by June 2023, and the following other factors: 232 CRS In Focus IF10444, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey, and the United States: A Reference, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 233 White House, “Statement by President Joe Biden on Armenian Remembrance Day,” April 24, 2021. In late 2019 during the 116th Congress, the House and Senate passed nonbinding resolutions (H.Res. 296 in October 2019 and S.Res. 150 in December 2019) characterizing the “killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923” as genocide. The resolutions came shortly after Turkish military operations against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria drew significant congressional denunciation. Turkish officials roundly criticized both resolutions, but did not announce any changes to defense cooperation or any other aspect of U.S.-Turkey relations, despite having threatened to do so in years past in connection with similar proposed resolutions. 234 Adar, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine.” 235 Alper Coskun, “Making the New U.S.-Turkey Strategic Mechanism Meaningful,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 12, 2022; Kali Robinson, “Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 24, 2022. 236 State Department, “U.S.-Turkey Joint Statement on the Strategic Mechanism,” April 4, 2022. Congressional Research Service 46 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations  Turkish decisions on whether and how to keep or use the Russian S-400 system.  Whether and when Turkey’s parliament ratifies Swedish and Finnish NATO accession.  How various regional crises (Syria, Russia-Ukraine conflict, disputes with Greece and Cyprus) unfold and influence Turkey’s relationships with key actors (including the United States, Russia, the European Union, Israel, Iran, and Sunni Arab governments).  Whether Turkey projects greater power and increases its sphere of influence via military and economic cooperation (including defense exports) with other countries.  The importance of Turkish bases and assets for the U.S. military, and the availability of alternatives.  Changes to Turkish domestic political and economic freedom and stability. More specific analysis of U.S. engagement and congressional options on some issues is set forth below. Responses to Russian S-400 Acquisition: Removal from F-35 Program, CAATSA Sanctions, and Informal Holds Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 system, which Turkey ordered in 2017 and Russia delivered in 2019,237 has significant implications for U.S.-Turkey relations. For example, it has raised questions about how Turkey can stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters, particularly if it transitions to any major Russian weapons platform with a multi-decade lifespan. As a direct result of the transaction, the Trump Administration removed Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program in July 2019, and imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44) on Turkey’s defense procurement agency in December 2020.238 In explaining the U.S. decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 program in 2019, one official said, “Turkey cannot field a Russian intelligence collection platform [within the S-400 system] in proximity to where the F-35 program makes, repairs and houses the F-35. Much of the F-35’s strength lies in its stealth capabilities, so the ability to detect those capabilities would jeopardize the long-term security of the F-35 program.”239 Before Turkey’s July 2019 removal from the F-35 program, it had planned to purchase at least 100 U.S.-origin F-35s and was one of eight original consortium partners in the development and industrial production of the aircraft.240 Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense 237 “Turkey, Russia sign deal on supply of S-400 missiles,” Reuters, December 29, 2017. According to this source, Turkey and Russia reached agreement on the sale of at least one S-400 system for $2.5 billion, with the possibility of a second system to come later. 238 CRS Insight IN11557, Turkey: U.S. Sanctions Under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas. 239 Defense Department, “Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen M. Lord and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy David J. Trachtenberg Press Briefing on DOD’s Response to Turkey Accepting Delivery of the Russian S-400 Air and Missile Defense System,” July 17, 2019. 240 A 2007 memorandum of understanding among the consortium participants is available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/102378.pdf, and an earlier 2002 U.S.-Turkey agreement is available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/196467.pdf. For information on the consortium and its members, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler. Congressional Research Service 47 link to page 63 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. Turkish officials continue to publicly express hope that they can acquire the F-35 at some future time. Turkish interest in procurement deals that feature technology sharing and co-production (see Appendix B)—thereby bolstering Turkey’s domestic defense industry—may have influenced its S-400 decision. While Turkey’s S-400 purchase reportedly did not feature technology sharing,241 one reason Turkish officials gave for favoring the S-400 was a hope that it could open the door for future technology sharing on air defense with Russia.242 Lack of agreement between the United States and Turkey on technology sharing regarding the Patriot system might have contributed to Turkey’s interest in considering non-U.S. options for air defense, including an abortive attempt from 2013 to 2015 to purchase a Chinese system.243 Other factors may have influenced Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400. One is Turkey’s apparent desire to diversify its foreign arms sources.244 Another is President Erdogan’s possible interest in defending against U.S.-origin aircraft such as those used by some Turkish military personnel in the 2016 coup attempt.245 Turkey has conducted some testing of the S-400 but does not appear to have made the system generally operational. President Erdogan stated in September 2021 that Turkey expected to purchase a second S-400 system.246 Secretary of State Blinken warned Turkey that acquiring an additional system could lead to more U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.247 Turkey may need to forgo possession or use of the S-400 in order to have CAATSA sanctions removed. An August 2020 article reported that some Members of congressional committees placed informal holds on major new U.S.-origin arms sales to Turkey in connection with the S-400 transaction. Such a disruption had not occurred since the 1975-1978 embargo over Cyprus.248 At the time of the article, major sales (valued at $25 million or more) on hold reportedly included structural upgrades for Turkey’s F-16 aircraft and export licenses for engines involved in a Turkish sale of attack helicopters to Pakistan. Sales already underway or for smaller items and services—such as spare parts, ammunition, and maintenance packages for older equipment—are not subject to these holds. U.S. Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey 241 Aaron Stein, “Putin’s Victory: Why Turkey and America Made Each Other Weaker,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, July 29, 2019. 242 Burak Ege Bekdil, “West’s reluctance to share tech pushes Turkey further into Russian orbit,” Defense News, January 10, 2020. 243 Flanagan et al., Turkey’s Nationalist Course. 244 “Turkey is buying Russian missiles to diversify supply,” Oxford Analytica, January 26, 2018. 245 Nicholas Danforth, “Frustration, Fear, and the Fate of U.S.-Turkish Relations,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, July 19, 2019; Ali Demirdas, “S-400 and More: Why Does Turkey Want Russian Military Technology So Badly?” nationalinterest.org, July 14, 2019. 246 Humeyra Pamuk, “Erdogan says Turkey plans to buy more Russian defense systems,” Reuters, September 27, 2021. 247 Tal Axelrod, “Blinken warns Turkey, US allies against purchasing Russian weapons,” The Hill, April 28, 2021. 248 Valerie Insinna, et al., “Congress has secretly blocked US arms sales to Turkey for nearly two years,” Defense News, August 12, 2020. Congressional Research Service 48 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Historically, Turkey was one of the largest recipients of U.S. arms, owing to its status as a NATO ally, its large military, and its strategic position. Since 1948, the United States has provided Turkey with approximately $13.8 bil ion in overall military assistance (nearly $8.2 bil ion in grants and $5.6 bil ion in loans). U.S. arms sales to Turkey have declined over time given Turkey’s efforts mentioned above to become more self-reliant, as well as recent bilateral tensions. Current annual military assistance is limited to approximately $2 mil ion in International Military Education and Training (IMET). Possible F-16 Sales In the fall of 2021, sources reported that Turkey requested to purchase 40 new F-16 fighter aircraft from the United States and to upgrade 80 F-16s from Turkey’s aging fleet.249 President Biden reportedly discussed the F-16 request with Erdogan during an October 2021 G20 meeting in Rome, indicating that the request would go through the regular arms sales consultation and notification process with Congress.250 Turkey’s value as a NATO ally amid a new crisis implicating European security—Russia’s war on Ukraine—may have subsequently boosted the Administration’s interest in moving forward with an F-16 transaction with Turkey. Responding to criticism of a possible F-16 sale from 53 Members of Congress in a February 2022 letter,251 a State Department official wrote in March that Turkey’s support for Ukraine was “an important deterrent to malign influence in the region.”252 While acknowledging that any sale would require congressional notification, the official added, “The Administration believes that there are nonetheless compelling long-term NATO alliance unity and capability interests, as well as U.S. national security, economic and commercial interests that are supported by appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.”253 In April 2022, the Administration reportedly notified Congress informally of its intent to upgrade some of Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet and provide short- and medium-range air-to-air missiles (Sidewinder AIM-9X and AMRAAM AIM-120D) at a total cost to Turkey of around $500 million.254 In November 2021, a Turkish defense expert described what upgrades of Turkey’s F-16 aircraft to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration could entail, including a new radar, other software and hardware enhancements, and structural improvements that significantly extend each aircraft’s service life.255 Other countries that are receiving or may receive new or upgraded F-16 249 Grant Rumley and Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey’s F-16 Request May Not Stave Off the Inevitable,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 28, 2021. 250 “Biden talks F-16s, raises human rights in meeting with Turkey’s Erdogan,” Reuters, October 31, 2021; Diego Cupolo, “In troubled US-Turkey relations, F-16 deal seen as path for dialogue,” Al-Monitor, November 1, 2021. For background information, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 251 Text of letter available at https://pallone.house.gov/sites/pallone.house.gov/files/20220123%20Letter%20on%20Turkey%20F-16%20Request.pdf. 252 Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Naz Durakoglu, quoted in Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. says potential F-16 sale to Turkey would serve U.S. interests, NATO – letter,” Reuters, April 6, 2022. 253 Ibid. 254 Jared Malsin, “Biden Administration Asks Congress to Approve New Weapons Deal with Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2022; Daniel Flatley and Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey Wins Biden Backing for Its F-16 Fighter Jets Upgrades,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2022. For information on informal and formal congressional notifications, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 255 Arda Mevlutoglu, “F-16Vs Instead of F-35s: What’s behind Turkey’s Request?” Politics Today, November 22, 2021. Congressional Research Service 49 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Block 70/72 Vipers include Greece, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Morocco, Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and Slovakia.256 U.S. sales to boost the capabilities and extend the lifespan of Turkey’s F-16 fleet would provide Turkey time to develop its long-planned indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, dubbed the TF-X and expected to come into operation over the next decade. Turkey is apparently seeking to partner with the United Kingdom (including companies BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce) to develop technology for the TF-X.257 If unable to procure F-16s or F-16 upgrades to boost the Turkish air force’s capabilities during the transition to the TF-X, Turkish officials have hinted that they might consider purchasing Russian Su-35 fighter aircraft or Western European alternatives.258 According to some defense analysts, however, Turkey’s calculus has likely changed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.259 One has written that if Turkey cannot procure F-16s, “Security needs and politics dictate Ankara to remain within the NATO scope in its fighter jet inventory. The only viable options before Turkey flies the TF-X are the [Eurofighter] Typhoon, Saab [Gripen] and F-16 Block 70.”260 Turkey’s support for Ukraine may factor into the decision-making of some Members of congressional committees regarding a possible U.S. upgrade or sale of F-16s for Turkey. A May 2022 article interviewed some congressional committee leaders with oversight responsibilities for arms sales.261 Most signaled openness to considering F-16 transactions. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez remained skeptical, however, saying, “[Turkey] acts in ways that are contrary to our interests in a whole host of things. I think the administration has to stop seeing … the aspirational part of what we would like Turkey to be and realize that Turkey is under Erdogan.”262 At the end of the June 2022 NATO summit in Spain, where Turkey agreed to allow the Sweden-Finland accession process to move forward (pending final Turkish ratification) and President Biden met with President Erdogan, Biden expressed support for selling new F-16s to Turkey as well as for upgrades. He also voiced confidence in obtaining congressional support.263 It is unclear whether Turkey could use its positions on military action in Syria or ratifying Swedish and Finnish NATO accession as leverage on the United States with the F-16 issue, or vice versa. Congressional conditions or informal (not legally binding) holds on F-16 sales remain possible. The House-passed version of the FY2023 NDAA (H.R. 7900) contained a provision (Section 1271) that would condition the transfer of new F-16s or upgrade technology to Turkey on a presidential certification (1) that the transfer is in the U.S. national interest, and (2) that includes a “detailed description of concrete steps taken to ensure that such F-16s are not used by Turkey for repeated unauthorized territorial overflights of Greece.” In December, a joint explanatory 256 Ibid. 257 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts,” Defense News, March 9, 2022. 258 “Türkiye signals it may turn to Russia if US blocks F-16 jet sales,” Daily Sabah, September 9, 2022; Paul Iddon, “Here Are Turkey’s Stopgap Options Until It Can Acquire Fifth-Generation Fighters,” forbes.com, March 15, 2021. 259 Paul Iddon, “Where can Turkey buy fighter jets if US F-16 deal falls through?” Middle East Eye, September 29, 2022. 260 Bekdil, “Russian invasion of Ukraine is reviving Euro-Turkish fighter efforts.” 261 Bryant Harris, “Congress signals openness to Turkey F-16 sale amid Ukraine cooperation,” Defense News, May 4, 2022. 262 Ibid. 263 “Biden supports F-16 sale to Turkey, is confident about congressional approval,” Reuters, June 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service 50 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations statement accompanying the expected final version of the FY2023 NDAA said that the final bill (H.R. 7776) would not include the H.R. 7900 condition on F-16s, while stating, “We believe that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should not conduct unauthorized territorial overflights of another NATO ally’s airspace.”264 Shortly thereafter, Chairman Menendez tweeted: Contrary to some claims, the NDAA is not a win for Turkey. This is just one of many tools we have at our disposal in the Senate to deal with arms sales. I'll say it again. As SFRC Chairman, I will NOT approve F-16s for Turkey until Erdogan halts his abuses across the region.265 Informal congressional holds are not legally binding, but the executive branch generally gives broad deference to the chair and ranking member of the foreign affairs committees on major foreign arms sales. After formal notification of a major arms sale, any Member of Congress can privilege a joint resolution of disapproval for floor action if the Member introduces it within the time period prescribed under the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320).266 The President can veto a resolution of disapproval, subject to congressional override. On December 7, the State Department spokesperson responded to questions about the status of possible F-16 sales to Turkey by saying: Turkey is an important NATO Ally. It’s an important security partner. We want to ensure that our defense capabilities are integrated and that Turkey has what it needs to take on the formidable threats that it faces. No NATO Ally has faced more terrorist attacks on its soil than our Turkish Allies. And so our cooperation in the security realm is of paramount importance to us.... Turkey’s desire for F-16s is something that we have discussed, including at the most senior levels, with our Turkish allies, but it’s also something that we’re discussing with the Hill.267 U.S./NATO Presence in Turkey The United States has valued Turkey’s geopolitical importance to and military strength within the NATO alliance, while viewing Turkey’s NATO membership as helping anchor Turkey to the West. For Turkey, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about encroachment by neighbors, such as the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing leading up to the Cold War. In more recent or ongoing arenas of conflict like Ukraine and Syria, Turkey’s possible interest in countering Russian objectives may be partly motivating its military operations and arms exports.268 Turkey’s location near several conflict areas has made the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana (see text box 264 Joint explanatory statement available at https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70-JES.pdf. 265 Twitter, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 7, 2022 – 10:57 AM, at https://twitter.com/SFRCdems/status/1600519759493304321. 266 For Turkey, as a NATO ally, Members have 15 days after a formal notification of a major arms sale to introduce a privileged resolution of disapproval. CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 267 State Department Press Briefing, December 7, 2022. 268 Dimitar Bechev, “Russia, Turkey and the Spectre of Regional Instability,” Al Sharq Strategic Research, April 13, 2022; Prothero, “Turkey’s Erdogan has been humiliating Putin all year.” Congressional Research Service 51 link to page 57 link to page 31 link to page 31 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations below), other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure 12). As mentioned above, Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through the Straits (see “Black Sea Access”). Incirlik Air Base Turkey’s Incirlik (pronounced een-jeer-leek) air base in the southern part of the country has long been the symbolic and logistical center of the U.S. military presence in Turkey, with the U.S. Air Force’s 39th Air Base Wing based there. Since 1991, the base has been critical in supplying U.S. military missions in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. Anti-Islamic State coalition flights in Syria and Iraq began in 2014, but reportedly dropped off significantly by 2018 owing to U.S.-Turkey tensions.269 One unofficial source tracking U.S. military bases worldwide estimates that Incirlik hosts 1,650 military personnel and around 4,850 total American citizens, when accounting for civilian employees and dependents.270 The use of Incirlik by coup plotters within Turkey’s military in July 2016 caused temporary disruptions of some U.S. military operations, and intensified debate about Turkey’s stability and the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets. Several open source media outlets have speculated about whether U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are based at Incirlik Air Base, and if so, whether U.S. officials might consider taking them out of Turkey.271 Tensions between Turkey and other NATO members have fueled internal U.S./NATO discussions about the continued use of Turkish bases. As a result of the tensions and questions about the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.272 Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, and Jordan might be connected with concerns about Turkey.273 In March 2022, Alan Makovsky said in the congressional hearing testimony mentioned above that while the United States should make efforts to keep Turkey in the “Western camp,” Turkish “equivocation in recent years” justifies the United States building and expanding military facilities in Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece to “hedge its bets.”274 269 Gordon Lubold, et al., “U.S. Pares Operations at Base in Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2018. 270 See http://www.militarybases.us/air-force/incirlik-ab/. 271 Dorian Jones, “US Military Base in Turkey Has Uncertain Future,” Voice of America, November 24, 2019; Miles A. Pomper, “Why the US has nuclear weapons in Turkey—and may try to put the bombs away,” The Conversation, October 23, 2019. 272 See, for example, Xander Snyder, “Beyond Incirlik,” Geopolitical Futures, April 19, 2019. 273 “Pentagon pushes back on claim that US to leave Turkey’s Incirlik base,” Al-Monitor, September 16, 2020; Joseph Trevithick, “Docs Show US to Massively Expand Footprint at Jordanian Air Base amid Spats with Turkey, Iraq,” The Drive, January 14, 2019. 274 Prepared testimony of Alan Makovsky, “Opportunities and Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean: Examining U.S. Interests and Regional Cooperation.” Congressional Research Service 52 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 12. Map of U.S. and NATO Military Presence in Turkey Sources: Department of Defense, NATO, and various media outlets; adapted by CRS. Notes: All locations are approximate. There are historical precedents for both the United States withdrawing military assets from Turkey, and Turkey restricting U.S. use of its territory or airspace. These include the following:  1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States withdrew its nuclear-tipped Jupiter missiles following this crisis.  1975 - Cyprus. Turkey closed most U.S. defense and intelligence installations in Turkey during the U.S. arms embargo that Congress imposed in response to Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus.  2003 - Iraq. A Turkish parliamentary vote did not allow the United States to open a second front from Turkey in the Iraq war. U.S. officials and lawmakers assessing the costs and benefits of a U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and of potential changes in U.S./NATO posture that could be influenced by military appropriations or congressional oversight, are likely to consider the following three questions:  To what extent does the United States rely on direct use of Turkish territory or airspace to secure and protect U.S. interests?  How important is U.S./NATO support to Turkey’s external defense and internal stability, and to what extent does that support serve U.S. interests? Congressional Research Service 53 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations  To what extent would other regional countries provide more or less stability and protection for U.S./NATO military assets and personnel? Other Sanctions Aside from CAATSA sanctions discussed above, Congress could consider authorizing sanctions against Turkey or Turkey-linked entities or individuals in connection with Russia, Iran, or Syria. It is unclear whether sanctions would deter Turkey from the behavior defined by U.S. officials or lawmakers as objectionable, or prompt Turkey to increase economic ties with other regional countries to reduce the sanctions’ impact. Russia As mentioned above, Deputy Treasury Secretary Adeyemo has reportedly warned Turkey that it could face penalties for helping sanctioned Russian groups or individuals. Members may assess actions to deter or penalize Turkey-Russia economic ties in light of Turkey’s ongoing role in mediating and influencing military, political, and economic developments surrounding the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Iran A U.S. federal criminal case is pending against Turkish state-owned bank Halkbank for the bank’s alleged involvement in helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions a decade ago, and could lead to a multibillion dollar fine from the Treasury Department.275 Additionally, in December 2022, the Treasury Department designated a number of actors from the Turkish private sector, including energy conglomerate ASB Group, for sanctions under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 (as amended) for facilitating oil sales for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.276 Syria If Members of Congress assess that Turkish actions against the SDF in Syria are endangering important U.S. interests, they could reevaluate the merit of sanctions imposed or proposed during the previous major operation in 2019. At that time, the Trump Administration levied sanctions on some Turkish cabinet ministries and ministers pursuant to E.O. 13984 (which remains in effect),277 but lifted them later that same month.278 The 116th Congress also considered a number of sanctions bills, with the House passing the Protect Against Conflict by Turkey Act (H.R. 4695). Election Oversight Some Members following Turkey’s upcoming campaign and election might have concerns about Erdogan’s use of the government to control the process, including but not limited to judicial 275 Amberin Zaman, “US deputy treasury secretary in Turkey to warn against evading Russian sanctions,” Al-Monitor, June 22, 2022. 276 Treasury Department, “Treasury Targets Sanctions Evasion Network Generating Hundreds of Millions of Dollars for Qods Force Oil Sales,” December 8, 2022. 277 White House, “Executive Order on Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria,” 84 Federal Register 55851-55855, October 14, 2019. 278 Department of the Treasury, Executive Order on Syria-related Sanctions; Syria-related Designations; Issuance of Syria-related General Licenses, October 14, 2019; Department of the Treasury, Syria-related Designations Removals, October 23, 2019. Congressional Research Service 54 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations action against potential candidates (such as Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, as discussed above) or parties. In that context, Congress could engage in public debate and oversight of the executive branch to encourage freedom of expression, minority and women’s rights, proper election practices and monitoring, and (if applicable) a peaceful transfer of power. Members may consider how public advocacy or criticism might be received by the Turkish public or used by Erdogan or other political figures. Political and Economic Engagement with Turkey’s Government How closely Members advocate U.S. engagement with a Turkish government—under Erdogan or a different leader—could depend on their perceptions of the government’s popular legitimacy, Turkish public attitudes toward U.S. credibility, and broader geopolitical, historical, and economic considerations. Such factors might also influence congressional support or opposition for U.S. or international measures to help relieve Turkey’s financial problems. As mentioned above, U.S. steps to help a potential new Turkish government—whether on arms sales, sanctions, the economy, or other matters—could encourage an improvement in bilateral relations. CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar. If, however, Turkish leaders or domestic audiences perceive that any such steps are likely to bind future Turkish actions to U.S. interests, those concerns could limit a new Turkish government’s willingness to embrace them. Congressional Research Service 55 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Appendix A. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan—President (pronounced air-doe-wan) Born in 1954, Erdogan was raised in Istanbul and in his familial hometown of Rize on the Black Sea coast. He attended a religious imam hatip secondary school in Istanbul. In the 1970s, Erdogan studied business at what is today Marmara University, became a business consultant and executive, and became politically active with the different Turkish Islamist parties led by eventual prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. Erdogan was elected mayor of Istanbul in 1994 but was removed from office, imprisoned for six months, and banned from parliamentary politics for religious incitement after publicly reciting a poem drawing from Islamic imagery. After Erbakan’s government resigned under military pressure in 1997 and his Welfare Party was disbanded, Erdogan became the founding chairman of the AKP in 2001. The AKP won a decisive electoral victory in 2002, and has led the government ever since. After the election, a legal change allowed Erdogan to run for parliament in a 2003 special election. After he won, Erdogan replaced Abdul ah Gul as prime minister. Erdogan and his personal popularity and charisma have been at the center of much of the domestic and foreign policy change that has occurred in Turkey since he came to power. Erdogan became Turkey’s first popularly elected president in August 2014 and won reelection to a newly empowered presidency in June 2018. Many observers assess that he seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of seeks to consolidate power and to avoid the reopening of
corruption cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates. corruption cases that could implicate him and close family members or associates.
Erdogan is married and has two sons and two daughters. He is widely believed to be
positioning his son-in-law Berat Albayrak (currently treasury and finance minister) as a
possible successor. Erdogan does not speak English fluently.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu—Leader of Republican People’s Party (CHP)
((kill-itch-darkuhl-utch-dahr-oh-loo)
Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi background, Born in 1948 in Tunceli province in eastern Turkey to an Alevi background,
Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP, which is the main opposition party and Kilicdaroglu is the leader of the CHP, which is the main opposition party and
traditional political outlet of the Turkish nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the traditional political outlet of the Turkish nationalist secular elite. In recent years, the
party has also attracted various liberal and social democratic constituencies. party has also attracted various liberal and social democratic constituencies.
After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara, After receiving an economics degree from what is now Gazi University in Ankara,
Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the Kilicdaroglu had a civil service career—first with the Finance Ministry, then as the
director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil director-general of the Social Security Organization. After retiring from the civil
service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to service, Kilicdaroglu became politically active with the CHP and was elected to
parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to parliament from Istanbul in 2002. He gained national prominence for his efforts to
root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara. root out corruption among AKP officials and the AKP-affiliated mayor of Ankara.
Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has since faced criticism for the Kilicdaroglu was elected as party leader in 2010 but has since faced criticism for the
CHP’s failure to make electoral gainsCHP’s failure to make electoral gains.
Kilicdaroglu is married with a son and two daughters at the national level. Ekrem Imamoglu—Mayor of Istanbul and Possible CHP Presidential Candidate (ee-mahm-oh-loo) Born in 1970 in Trabzon on the Black Sea coast, Imamoglu is the mayor of Istanbul. He received a bachelor’s degree in business and masters in human resources management from Istanbul University. Imamoglu became CEO for his family’s companies in the housing and urban planning field before entering politics and becoming prominent within the CHP. He was elected mayor of Istanbul’s Beylikduzu district in 2014 and grew in popularity while working to improve living standards and infrastructure in the district. He became mayor of Istanbul—giving the CHP the mayor’s seat for the first time since 1980—after winning two elections: one in March 2019 that was annul ed by the Supreme Board of Elections, and the fol owing second election in June 2019. He faces obstacles in his administration from Erdogan’s government and the AKP-control ed city council. Some observers say that Imamoglu’s youth, charisma, and effort to appeal to citizens of varying backgrounds would make him a better presidential candidate than Kilicdaroglu in upcoming 2023 elections. Most pol s indicate that he would have more popular support. In December 2022, he was convicted of insulting members of Congressional Research Service 56 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council (discussed above) and received a jail sentence and political ban that remain subject to appeal. Mansur Yavas—Mayor of Istanbul and Possible CHP Presidential Candidate (yah-vahsh) Born in 1955 in Beypazari near Turkey’s capital Ankara, Yavas is the mayor of Ankara. He received a law degree from Istanbul University. Yavas worked as a military prosecutor during his mandatory military service, then started practicing law privately in Beypazari. He entered politics and was elected to the Beypazari municipal council in 1989, then was elected as mayor of Beypazari from 1999 to 2009 while a member of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). In 2014, he lost as the CHP candidate for mayor of Ankara, but claimed that irregularities cost him the election. He ran again in March 2019, winning and giving the CHP the mayor’s seat for the first time since 1980. As with Imamoglu in Istanbul, he faces an AKP-control ed municipal council. Yavas has generally outpol ed both Kilicdaroglu and Imamoglu as a potential presidential candidate. However, because of his background with the MHP, which has taken a hard line against compromises with Kurds, he may have trouble gaining support from Kurdish constituencies seeking to make common cause with opposition parties against Erdogan and the AKP..
Devlet Bahceli—Leader of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)
((bah-cheh-lee) )
Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the Born in 1948 in Osmaniye province in southern Turkey, Bahceli is the leader of the
MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for MHP, which is the traditional Turkish nationalist party of Turkey that is known for
opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. opposing political accommodation with the Kurds.
Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher Bahceli moved to Istanbul for his secondary education, and received his higher
education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a education, including a doctorate, from what is now Gazi University in Ankara. After a
career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a career as an economics lecturer at Gazi University, he entered a political career as a
leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997 leader in what would become the MHP. He became the chairman of the MHP in 1997
and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He and served as a deputy prime minister during a 1999-2002 coalition government. He
was initially elected to parliament in 2007. was initially elected to parliament in 2007.
Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017 Bahceli and the MHP have allied with Erdogan, providing support for the 2017
constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018. constitutional referendum and joining a parliamentary coalition with the AKP in 2018.
Bahceli speaks fluent English.
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Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Meral Aksener—Founder and Leader of the Good (Iyi) Party
((awk-sheh-nar) )
Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from Born in 1956 in Izmit in western Turkey to Muslims who had resettled in Turkey from
Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party Greece, Aksener is the founder and leader of the Good Party. She founded the party
in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s in 2017 as an alternative for nationalists and other Turks who oppose the MHP’s
alliance with Erdogan. alliance with Erdogan.
Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from Aksener studied at Istanbul University and received a doctorate in history from
Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was Marmara University, becoming a university lecturer before entering politics. She was
first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior first elected to parliament in 1995 with the True Path Party, and served as interior
minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by minister in the coalition government that was ultimately forced from office in 1997 by
a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from a memorandum from Turkey’s military. She served in parliament with the MHP from

2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker. 2007 to 2015 and served for most of that time as deputy speaker.
Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to Aksener became a forceful opponent of Erdogan after the MHP agreed in 2016 to
provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum provide him the necessary parliamentary support for a constitutional referendum
establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned establishing a presidential system of government. She left the party and campaigned
vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the vigorously against the proposed changes, which won adoption in 2017 despite the
controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its controversy that attended the vote. After founding the Good Party, she ran as its
presidential candidate in the 2018 elections. presidential candidate in the 2018 elections.
Congressional Research Service 57 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Selahattin Demirtas—Former Co-Leader and Presidential Candidate of
Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)
((day-meer-tosh) )
Born in 1973 to an ethnic Kurdish family, Demirtas is the most prominent member of Born in 1973 to an ethnic Kurdish family, Demirtas is the most prominent member of
the HDP, which has a Kurdish nationalist base but has also reached out to a number the HDP, which has a Kurdish nationalist base but has also reached out to a number
of non-Kurdish constituencies, particularly liberals and minorities. The constituency of of non-Kurdish constituencies, particularly liberals and minorities. The constituency of
the party and its various predecessors overlaps with that of the PKK, but the party the party and its various predecessors overlaps with that of the PKK, but the party
professes a nonviolent stance and claims an independent identity. professes a nonviolent stance and claims an independent identity.
Demirtas was raised in Elazig in eastern Turkey. He attended universities in both Izmir Demirtas was raised in Elazig in eastern Turkey. He attended universities in both Izmir
and Ankara and received his law degree from Ankara University. He became a human and Ankara and received his law degree from Ankara University. He became a human
rights activist leader in Diyarbakir and was elected to parliament for the first time in rights activist leader in Diyarbakir and was elected to parliament for the first time in
2007, becoming co-leader of the HDP’s immediate predecessor party in 2010. His 2007, becoming co-leader of the HDP’s immediate predecessor party in 2010. His
national visibility increased after he ran as one of two candidates opposing Erdogan for national visibility increased after he ran as one of two candidates opposing Erdogan for
the presidency in 2014. His personal popularity and charisma are generally seen as the presidency in 2014. His personal popularity and charisma are generally seen as
major reasons for the HDP becoming the first pro-Kurdish party to pass the electoral major reasons for the HDP becoming the first pro-Kurdish party to pass the electoral
threshold of 10% in June and November 2015 parliamentary elections. threshold of 10% in June and November 2015 parliamentary elections.
Demirtas was arrested in November 2016 on terrorism-related charges, Demirtas was arrested in November 2016 on terrorism-related charges, andhas received received
a 4-year, 8-month sentence for incitement in September 2018conviction sentences totaling more than seven years (four years and eight months for incitement in September 2018, and three years and six months for insulting President Erdogan in March 2021), and is imprisoned in and is imprisoned in
Edirne. He stepped down from party leadership in January 2018 but ran for president Edirne. He stepped down from party leadership in January 2018 but ran for president
in 2018 from prison, garnering about 8.5% of the vote. in 2018 from prison, garnering about 8.5% of the vote.
Demirtas is married with two daughtersECHR rulings and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe have called for Demirtas’s release. .
Abdullah Ocalan—Founder of the PKK
((oh-juh-lawn)
Born in or around 1949 in southeastern Turkey (near Sanliurfa), Ocalan is the Born in or around 1949 in southeastern Turkey (near Sanliurfa), Ocalan is the
founding leader of the PKK. founding leader of the PKK.
After attending vocational high school in Ankara, Ocalan served in civil service posts After attending vocational high school in Ankara, Ocalan served in civil service posts
in Diyarbakir and Istanbul until enrol ing at Ankara University in 1971. As his interest in Diyarbakir and Istanbul until enrol ing at Ankara University in 1971. As his interest
developed in socialism and Kurdish nationalism, Ocalan was jailed for seven months in developed in socialism and Kurdish nationalism, Ocalan was jailed for seven months in
1972 for participating in an il egal student demonstration. His time in prison with 1972 for participating in an il egal student demonstration. His time in prison with
other activists helped inspire his political ambitions, and he became increasingly other activists helped inspire his political ambitions, and he became increasingly
political y active upon his release. political y active upon his release.
Ocalan founded the Marxist-Leninist-influenced PKK in 1978 and launched a separatist Ocalan founded the Marxist-Leninist-influenced PKK in 1978 and launched a separatist
militant campaign against Turkish security forces militant campaign against Turkish security forces in 1984—while also attacking the traditional —while also attacking the traditional
Kurdish chieftain classKurdish chieftain class—in 1984. He used Syrian territory as his safe haven, with the . He used Syrian territory as his safe haven, with the
group also using Lebanese territory for training and Iraqi territory for operations. group also using Lebanese territory for training and Iraqi territory for operations.
Syria forced Ocalan to leave in 1998 after Turkey threatened war for harboring him. Syria forced Ocalan to leave in 1998 after Turkey threatened war for harboring him.
After traveling to several different countries, Ocalan was captured in February 1999 in After traveling to several different countries, Ocalan was captured in February 1999 in
Kenya—possibly with U.S. help—and was turned over to Turkish authorities. The Kenya—possibly with U.S. help—and was turned over to Turkish authorities. The
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PKK declared a cease-fire shortly thereafter. Ocalan was sentenced to death, in a trial PKK declared a cease-fire shortly thereafter. Ocalan was sentenced to death, in a trial
later ruled unfair by the European Court of Human Rights, but when Turkey abolished later ruled unfair by the European Court of Human Rights, but when Turkey abolished
the death penalty in 2002, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He the death penalty in 2002, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He
resides in a maximum-security prison on the island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara, resides in a maximum-security prison on the island of Imrali in the Sea of Marmara,
and was in solitary confinement until 2009. and was in solitary confinement until 2009.
Although other PKK leaders such as Cemil Bayik and Murat Karayilan have exercised Although other PKK leaders such as Cemil Bayik and Murat Karayilan have exercised
direct control over PKK operations during Ocalan’s imprisonment, some observers direct control over PKK operations during Ocalan’s imprisonment, some observers
believe that Ocalan stil ultimately controls the PKK through proxies. believe that Ocalan stil ultimately controls the PKK through proxies.
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link to page 64 link to page 64 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix C. Timeline of Turkey’s Involvement in
Syria (2011-2020)
2011
Though the two leaders once closely corresponded, then-Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan calls for
Syrian President Bashar al Asad to step down as protests and violence escalate; Turkey begins
support for Sunni Arab-led opposition groups in cooperation with the United States and some Arab
Gulf states
2012-2014
As conflict escalates in Syria and involves more external actors, Turkey begins facing cross-border
fire and jihadist terrorist attacks in border areas and urban centers; as well as allegations of Turkish
government permissiveness with jihadist groups that oppose the Asad government

Turkey unsuccessful y calls for U.S. and NATO assistance to establish safe zones in northern Syria
as places to train opposition forces and gather refugees and IDPs

At Turkey’s request, a few NATO countries (including the United States) station air defense
batteries in Turkey near Syrian border
2014
The Islamic State obtains control of large swath of northern Syria

IS attack on Kurdish-majority Syrian border town of Kobane unchallenged by Turkish military but
repulsed by YPG-led Syrian Kurds (and some non-YPG Kurds from Iraq permitted to transit
Turkish territory) with air support from U.S.-led coalition, marking the beginning of joint anti-IS
efforts between the United States and YPG-led forces (including non-Kurdish elements) that (in
2015) become the SDF through U.S. train-and-equip initiatives

Turkey, with Erdogan now president, begins allowing anti-IS coalition aircraft to use its territory for
reconnaissance purposes
2015
Turkey begins permitting anti-IS coalition aircraft to conduct airstrikes from its territory

As YPG-led forces find success in taking over IS-control ed areas with U.S.-led coalition support, a
Turkey-PKK peace process (ongoing since 2013) breaks down and violence resumes in Turkey;
Turkish officials’ protests intensify in opposition to U.S. partnership with SDF in Syria

U.S. military withdraws Patriot air defense battery from Turkey; some other NATO countries
continue operating air defense batteries on Turkey’s behalf

In September, Russia expands its military involvement in Syria and begins helping Asad regain
control over much of the country
In November, a Turkish aircraft shoots down a Russian aircraft based in Syria under disputed
circumstances; Russia responds with punitive economic measures against Turkey
2016
After failed coup attempt in Turkey in July, Turkey partners in August with Syrian opposition forces
on its first military operation in Syria (Operation Euphrates Shield), an effort to eject IS fighters
from and occupy an area between SDF-control ed enclaves
2017
Turkey begins Astana peace process on Syria with Russia and Iran

In preparation for the campaign against the final major IS-held urban center in Raqqah, U.S. officials
decide in May to arm YPG personnel directly, insisting to protesting Turkish officials that the arms
wil be taken back after the defeat of the Islamic State
2018
Turkey and its Syrian opposition partners militarily occupy the Kurdish enclave of Afrin (Operation
Olive Branch); significant Kurdish displacements prompt humanitarian and human rights concerns
In September, Turkey and Russia agree on parameters for Idlib province, including a demilitarized
zone
2019
Erdogan insists on a safe zone in Syria to prevent opportunities for YPG attacks in Turkey or
col aboration with Turkey-based PKK forces, and to resettle Syrian refugees; U.S. officials try to
prevent conflict and to get coalition assistance to patrol border areas in northeastern Syria
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In October, President Trump announces highly controversial pul back of U.S. Special Forces from
SDF-control ed border areas; to date, the United States had not recovered U.S.-origin arms from
YPG personnel
Turkey launches Operation Peace Spring (OPS), with Turkish-led forces obtaining control of various
border areas and key transport corridors in northeastern Syria; reports of civilian casualties and
displacement take place amid general humanitarian and human rights concerns
Turkey reaches agreements with United States and Russia that end OPS and create a buffer zone
between Turkey and the YPG
2020
A Russian-aided Syrian offensive in Idlib province leads to several Turkish and Syrian casualties,
displaces hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs, and opens access for Syrian forces through the
province to other parts of the country
Sources: Various open sources.
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B. Some Drivers of Turkish Foreign Policy Arms Procurement and Exports How Turkey procures and exports key weapons systems affects its partnerships with major powers. For decades, Turkey has relied on important U.S.-origin equipment such as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other munitions to maintain military strength.279 However, U.S. arms sales to Turkey have declined over time (see Figure B-1). Increasing Turkish Self-Sufficiency Turkish goals to become more self-sufficient on national security matters and increase Turkey’s arms exports affect the country’s procurement decisions. After a 1975-1978 U.S. arms embargo over Turkish military intervention in Cyprus significantly hampered Turkish arms acquisitions, Turkey sought to decrease dependence on foreign sources by building up its domestic defense industry (see Figure B-1).280 279 Turkey also has procurement and co-development relationships with other NATO allies, including Germany (submarines), Italy (helicopters and reconnaissance satellites), and the United Kingdom (a fighter aircraft prototype). 280 Omar Lamrani, “Facing Sanctions, Turkey’s Defense Industry Goes to Plan B,” Stratfor, November 7, 2019. Congressional Research Service 59 link to page 65 link to page 65 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure B-1. Arms Imports as a Share of Turkish Military Spending Sources: Stratfor, based on information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Traders Database. Over time, Turkish companies have supplied an increasing percentage of Turkey’s defense needs, on equipment such as armored vehicles, naval vessels, munitions, and drone aircraft. In December 2022, Erdogan said, “When we took office, the defense industry was 20% domestic; now it’s 80% domestic.”281 Yet, despite this growing self-sufficiency in defense procurement, it still remains largely dependent on the United States and other Western countries for important items such as aircraft and naval engines, advanced sensors, and microchips.282 For key equipment that Turkey cannot produce itself, its leaders generally seek deals with foreign suppliers that allow for greater co-production and technology sharing.283 These practices have helped Turkey develop a growing arms export industry (see Figure B-2 and Figure B-3). 281 Wilks, “Greece compares Turkey to North Korea in latest row with Erdogan.” 282 Arda Mevlutoglu, quoted in “Turkey is the arms industry’s new upstart,” Economist, February 12, 2022; Ferhat Gurini, “Turkey’s Unpromising Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 9, 2020. 283 “Turkey - Market Report,” Janes Navigating the Emerging Markets, March 5, 2020. Congressional Research Service 60 link to page 65 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure B-2. Turkish Arms Exports, 2000-2021 ($ millions, non-inflation-adjusted) Sources: SIPRI and Defense News, based on official Turkish reports. Figure B-3. Turkish Arms Export Partners, 2012-2020 During the period 2017-2021, Turkey increased its arms exports by 31% and decreased arms imports by 56% from the previous five years (2012-2016). Between 2017 and 2021, it was the world’s 12th largest arms exporter (with a 0.9% share of worldwide exports) and 17th largest importer (with a 1.5% share of worldwide imports).284 After an exponential increase in exports since 2010 (see Figure B-2), Turkish officials anticipate that arms exports for 2022 may exceed $4 billion.285 284 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2021,” March 2022. 285 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s defense industry eyes export expansion as government navigates geopolitical stage,” Defense News, August 8, 2022. Congressional Research Service 61 link to page 67 link to page 68 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Drone Aircraft Turkey’s demonstrated battlefield successes with its drones have significantly increased demand for exports to other countries.286 The growing global popularity of the Bayraktar TB2 drone in particular has prompted one Western arms industry figure to call it the “Kalashnikov [rifle] of the 21st century.” (see Figure B-4 and Figure B-5)287 One analyst explained the TB2’s appeal by saying that it “strikes a favorable balance between price and capability, being more affordable and accessible compared to US drones while being far more reliable and effective than Chinese models.”288 Reports suggest that Turkey’s integration of drones featuring attack and reconnaissance functions with other platforms in warfighting contexts has become an influential tactical innovation for other militaries. It has provided a model for regional powers seeking to compensate for disparities with larger powers in more traditional platforms such as fighter aircraft, missiles and air defense systems, and armored vehicles.289 Turkish companies Baykar Technology, Kale Group, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), and STM are developing a variety of additional drone and loitering munition platforms of varying sizes and functions, alongside the development of Turkish-origin unmanned systems for naval and ground combat and reconnaissance.290 286 Sinan Tavsan, “Turkish drone success in Ukraine sets stage for Asia roadshow,” Nikkei Asia, March 16, 2022. 287 Ibid. 288 Gabriel Honrada, “The Turkish drones winning the Ukraine war,” Asia Times, May 12, 2022. 289 Kasapoglu, “Turkish Drone Strategy in the Black Sea Region and Beyond.” 290 Ibid; “Turkey’s Baykar to complete plant in Ukraine in two years –CEO,” Reuters, October 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 62 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure B-4. Bayraktar TB2 Drone Congressional Research Service 63 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Figure B-5. Countries Interested in Bayraktar TB2 Drone Aircraft (as of July 2022) Source: ProPublica, based on news reports and statements from government officials and Baykar Technology. Notes: Since the publication of this map, the UAE has reportedly acquired TB2s and Saudi Arabia has expressed interest as well. “Türkiye sells its famed battle-tested drones to UAE as ties mend,” Daily Sabah/Reuters, September 21, 2022. Other potential buyers include the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Uruguay, and Togo. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey’s defense industry eyes export expansion as government navigates geopolitical stage,” Defense News, August 8, 2022; “Turkey's Bayraktar TB2 drone: Why African states are buying them,” BBC News, August 25, 2022. A few countries (including Tunisia, Algeria, and Malaysia) have reportedly purchased or expressed interest in the TAI Anka-S drone, which has a significantly larger flight range than the TB2. While Turkey’s “drone diplomacy” appears to be helping it build important regional and global connections, some observers have raised concerns. One worry is that Turkey may enable human rights violations; an example is the Ethiopian government’s use of TB2s (alongside drones originally from Iran and China) against Tigrayan rebels.291 Another concern is that without greater 291 Salem Solomon, “Ethiopia Ups Use of Drone Strikes in Conflict Prompting Worries About Civilian Toll,” Voice of America, February 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 64 link to page 14 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations oversight and transparency, exporting drones broadly could result in unintended, adverse consequences for Turkey’s interests or those of its allies and partners.292 Economic and Energy Ties Economic linkages and Turkey’s dependence on imported energy sources are another driver of Turkish foreign policy. In some cases, Turkey’s economic and energy considerations have been at cross-purposes with its more traditional security concerns. Examples of these linkages include:  Europe. Turkey’s diversified, G20 economy is closely integrated with Europe’s due to historical and institutional ties, including its customs union with the European Union. While this may provide some leverage to Turkey with the EU, Turkish policies that significantly harm Western interests could endanger the continued flow of European goods, services, and capital into Turkey.  Russia and Iran. Despite some tensions in Turkey’s relations with Russia and Iran, it has depended on both countries for energy imports (see “Energy” above). Turkey generally receives almost half of its natural gas from Russia,293 and Iran was its leading oil supplier before the reimposition of U.S. sanctions in 2018.294 Additionally, Russia is helping finance and build Turkey’s first nuclear energy reactor. Even though Turkey has sought to diversify its energy import sources and transports some gas from Azerbaijan to Europe as an alternative to Russian gas,295 it has increased its Russian energy imports since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.296 The natural gas Turkey has claimed to find in the Black Sea could reduce its dependence on rivals for energy later this decade.297 Leadership Approaches Political leaders’ approaches to foreign policy can affect decisions and outcomes. In determining how a leader may handle key issues, relevant questions could include:  Is the leader naturally proactive or reactive in style and temperament? Does the leader seek to change or maintain the regional or global status quo or Turkey’s role within it?  Does the leader consciously adhere to a specific foreign policy approach—be it a pragmatic, interests-based or ideological, values-based philosophy? Or does the approach depend primarily on the situation?  What is the leader’s tolerance for risk and motivation to obtain reward? 292 Fehim Tastekin, “Are Turkish drones complicating disputes in Central Asia?” Al-Monitor, September 26, 2022; Federico Borsari, “Turkey’s drone diplomacy: Lessons for Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January 31, 2022; Alper Coskun, “Strengthening Turkish Policy on Drone Exports,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 18, 2022. 293 David O’Byrne, “Turkey, Russia gas ties grow contentious amid Ukraine war,” Al-Monitor, July 28, 2022. 294 “Despite rhetoric, Turkey complies with U.S. oil sanctions on Iran,” Reuters, May 21, 2019. 295 Tony Wesolowsky, “Can Azerbaijan Help Europe Kick Its Russian Gas Habit as Kremlin Threatens to Shut the Taps?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 5, 2022. 296 “Turkey doubles Russian oil imports, filling EU void,” Reuters, August 22, 2022. 297 Ackerman, “Turkey: A new emerging gas player with resources and infrastructure.” Congressional Research Service 65 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In 2011, a prominent Brookings Institution scholar and National War College professor set forth a framework asserting that modern Turkish leaders incline toward some combination of the following three foreign policy approaches.298 Kemalist caution. This approach references the general admonition of republican Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to maintain peace at home and abroad. After Turkey’s war of independence in the 1920s, its military-guided leadership sought to avoid global and regional conflicts unless core Turkish interests were threatened. Turkey remained neutral throughout almost all of World War II (joining the Allied side near the end, without committing troops, in order to be a charter member of the United Nations) and steered clear of postwar conflict and instability in the Middle East. Its turn to NATO and greater alignment with the United States came largely as a result of Soviet encroachment on Turkey (and especially the Straits), and Turkey’s two major military campaigns of the late 20th century were on behalf of ethnic Turks on the neighboring island of Cyprus and to counter domestic PKK militancy. Neo-Ottoman projection of influence. This approach reflects the view that Turkey maintains continuity with its Ottoman past, and should actively shape regional realities with confidence in Turkish sources of military, economic, and cultural strength. Some Turkish leaders made moves in a neo-Ottoman direction during the 20th century, but it became more prominent as a feature of Turkish policy under Prime Minister and later President Erdogan, as elected civilian leaders gradually overtook the historically Kemalist military as the main architects of foreign policy. Turkish “Gaullist” autonomy in foreign policy. This approach draws from the previous two, based on the idea that Turkish leaders’ caution and confidence can work hand in hand to protect Turkey from outside actors while also boosting its power and prestige. The Gaullist moniker refers to the model of France steering a largely independent course between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, while nominally remaining in the Western alliance. It helps explain some Turkish leaders’ desire to have Turkey maintain its role in Western institutions and have dealings with non-Western powers like Russia and China without being constrained by any of these actors, as well as its diversification of international relationships to avoid dependence. Author Information Jim Zanotti Clayton Thomas Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs 298 Omer Taspinar, “The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey,” Brookings Institution, March 8, 2011. Congressional Research Service 66 Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations

Appendix D. Significant U.S.-Origin Arms
Transfers or Possible Arms Transfers to Turkey
(Congressional notifications since 2009)


Year


FMS or
Cong.
Primary
Estimated
Amount/Description
DCS
Notice
Contract Delivery Contractor(s)
Cost
400 RIM-162 Ship-air
DCS
2009
Signed
2011-
Raytheon
$300 mil ion
missiles (ESSM)
2019
72 Patriot Advanced
FMS
2009


Raytheon and
$4 bil ion
Capability Missiles
Lockheed
(PAC-3), 197 Patriot
Martin
Guidance Enhanced
Missiles, and associated
equipment
14 CH-47F CHINOOK
FMS
2009
2011 and
2016,
Boeing
$1.2 bil ion
Helicopters
2015
2018-
($531 mil ion

2019 (10)
for 10)
3 AH-1W SUPER
FMS
2011
Signed
2012
N/A (from U.S.
$111 mil ion
COBRA Attack
Marine Corps
Helicopters
inventory)
117 AIM-9X-2
FMS
2012
2014
2015-
Raytheon
$140 mil ion
SIDEWINDER Block II
2016
Air-air missiles (SRAAM)
and associated
equipment
48 MK-48 Mod 6
FMS
2014


Raytheon and
$170 mil ion
Advanced Technology
Lockheed
All-Up-Round (AUR)
Martin
Warshot torpedoes and
associated equipment
145 AIM-120C-7 Air-air
FMS
2014
Signed
2016-
Raytheon
$320 mil ion
missiles (AMRAAM)
2019
21 MK-15 Phalanx Block
FMS
2015
2015 and
2017-
Raytheon
$310 mil ion
1B Baseline 2 Close-in
2016
2018
weapons systems
(for 10)
(4
(CIWS) (sale/upgrade)
estimated)
Joint Direct Attack
FMS
2015
2015 and
2017-
Boeing
$70 mil ion
Munitions (JDAM) and
2017
2018
associated equipment
(1,400
estimated)
80 Patriot MIM-104E
FMS
2018


Raytheon and
$3.5 bil ion
Guidance Enhanced
Lockheed
Missiles, 60 PAC-3
Martin
Missile Segment
Enhancement missiles
and related equipment
Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms
Transfer Database, Defense News, Hurriyet Daily News, Global Security.
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Notes: All figures and dates are approximate; blank entries indicate that data is unknown or not applicable. FMS
refers to “Foreign Military Sales” contemplated between the U.S. government and Turkey, while DCS refers to
“Direct Commercial Sales” contemplated between private U.S. companies and Turkey.

Author Information

Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs




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