Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs




Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant
Visa Programs

Updated June 21, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R43725




Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Summary
Congress has enacted a series of legislative provisions since 2006 to enable certain Iraqi and
Afghan nationals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs). These provisions make
certain Iraqis and Afghans who worked as translators or interpreters, or who were employed by,
or on behalf of, the U.S. government in Iraq or Afghanistan, eligible for special immigrant visas
(SIVs). Special immigrants comprise a category of permanent employment-based admissions
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). While the special immigrant category is
unique, it does bear some similarities to other admission categories that are authorized by other
sections of the INA, including refugees and Amerasians.
To apply under the SIV programs for Iraqis or Afghans, a prospective special immigrant must
submit a petition to the Department of Homeland Security; be otherwise eligible for an immigrant
visa; and be otherwise admissible to the United States. An Iraqi or Afghan SIV applicant whose
petition is approved and who is abroad is required to have an in-person visa interview at a U.S.
embassy or consulate abroad to determine visa eligibility. Upon admission to the United States,
SIV recipients are granted LPR status. Iraqi and Afghan special immigrants are eligible for the
same resettlement assistance and federal public benefits as refugees.
There are three SIV programs for Iraqi and Afghan nationals. One is a permanent program for
certain Iraqis and Afghans who have worked directly with U.S. Armed Forces, or under Chief of
Mission authority, as translators or interpreters. This program is currently capped at 50 principal
aliens (excluding spouses and children) per year.
The other two SIV programs for Iraqis and Afghans are temporary. One program is for certain
Iraqis who were employed in Iraq by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government during a specified
period. It was capped at 5,000 principal aliens annual y for FY2008 through FY2012 and
included a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from one fiscal year to the next. It
expired at the end of FY2013, but was subsequently revived. Current statutory authority provides
for the issuance of no more than 2,500 visas to principal applicants after January 1, 2014.
Applications are no longer being accepted for this program because the application deadline has
passed.
There is a similar SIV program for certain Afghans who were employed in Afghanistan by, or on
behalf of, the U.S. government or by the International Security Assistance Force during a
specified period. The program was capped at 1,500 principal aliens annual y for FY2009 through
FY2013, with a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from one fiscal year to the next.
Current statutory authority provides for the issuance of no more than 26,500 visas to principal
applicants after December 19, 2014, according to the Department of State. The application period
for this program remains open.
Through March 2021, almost 100,000 individuals were granted special immigrant status under
the three SIV programs for Iraqi and Afghan nationals. Principal applicants accounted for about
31,000 of the total, and dependent spouses and children accounted for the remaining 69,000.
The Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs have faced chal enges with respect to application processing,
security screening, and visa availability. The structure of the SIV programs themselves, with
statutory timeframes and numerical limitations, introduces additional complication.
Congressional Research Service

link to page 4 link to page 5 link to page 6 link to page 7 link to page 8 link to page 8 link to page 9 link to page 11 link to page 12 link to page 13 link to page 14 link to page 15 link to page 15 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 18 link to page 19 link to page 22 link to page 25 link to page 27 link to page 28 link to page 11 link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 30 link to page 33 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Legislative History of the Special Immigrant Category ......................................................... 2
Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis and Afghans ................................................................... 3
Iraqi and Afghan Translators or Interpreters ................................................................... 4
Iraqis and Afghans Who Worked for the U.S. Government ............................................... 5
Iraqi Program ...................................................................................................... 5
Afghan Program................................................................................................... 6
Conversion of Petitions .............................................................................................. 8
Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Application Process................................................ 9
Comparison of Special Immigrants to Other Selected Admissions Categories ......................... 10
Refugees ................................................................................................................ 11
Resettlement Assistance and Federal Public Benefits ............................................... 12
Amerasians............................................................................................................. 12
Special Immigrant Visa Statistics..................................................................................... 13
Selected Chal enges....................................................................................................... 14
Application Processing ............................................................................................. 15
Legislative Provisions and Reporting Requirements................................................. 16
Afghan SIV Pending Applications and Processing Times .......................................... 19
Security Concerns.................................................................................................... 22
Visa Availability ...................................................................................................... 24
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 25

Tables
Table 1. Comparison of Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs............................. 8
Table 2. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqi and Afghan Translators and Interpreters ................. 13
Table 3. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis and Afghans Who Worked for the
U.S. Government ....................................................................................................... 14

Table A-1. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqi Translators and Interpreters .............................. 27
Table A-2. Special Immigrant Visas for Afghan Translators and Interpreters ........................... 28
Table A-3. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis Who Worked for the U.S. Government .............. 29
Table A-4. Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans Who Worked for the U.S. Government .......... 29

Appendixes
Appendix. Additional Special Immigrant Data ................................................................... 27

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 30
Congressional Research Service

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Introduction
On April 14, 2021, President Joe Biden announced that it was “time to end the forever war” in
Afghanistan and begin the “final withdrawal” of U.S. troops.1 This decision gave new urgency to
longstanding concerns of and for Afghan nationals who have assisted the U.S. government,
including the U.S. military, in the fight against the Taliban and other forces since 2001.
Press reports following the withdrawal announcement highlighted the fears of Afghans who had
worked for the United States. A former U.S. Army translator was quoted as saying, “The
Americans are out. So who are they [the Taliban] going to take revenge on? Those who helped
Americans.”2 An official with a refugee advocacy organization expressed similar concerns:
“We're expecting the security situation to rapidly deteriorate for anyone who’s seen as opposing
the Taliban. That wil certainly include translators and other employees of the US government.”3
Congress first took action more than 15 years ago in response to concerns about the dangers faced
by Iraqi and Afghan nationals who were assisting the U.S. government during hostilities in their
countries. In January 2006, the 109th Congress enacted the first in a series of legislative
provisions to enable certain Iraqi and Afghan nationals to become U.S. lawful permanent
residents (LPRs).4 Section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY20065
made certain Iraqi and Afghan nationals who had worked directly with U.S. Armed Forces as
translators eligible for special immigrant visas (SIVs). Special immigrants comprise a category of
permanent employment-based admissions under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).6
Upon admission to the United States, holders of SIVs are granted LPR status.
A House Judiciary Committee report on a related SIV bil for Iraqi and Afghan translators in the
109th Congress (H.R. 2293) described the need for the legislation, as follows:
A number of alien translators currently working in Iraq and Afghanistan embedded with
units of the U.S. Armed Forces are providing extremely valuable services. Their
cooperation and close identification with the U.S. military have put these individuals and
their families in danger. This danger will only escalate after U.S. forces leave or reduce
their strength in Iraq and Afghanistan.7
Congress subsequently broadened the special immigrant classification for translators and also
authorized a second special immigrant classification. This second classification consists of
separate, paral el programs for certain Iraqi nationals and for certain Afghan nationals who
worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq or Afghanistan, respectively. The Iraqi

1 White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in Afghanistan , April 14, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-way-
forward-in-afghanistan/. For additional information, see CRS Report R45122, Afghanistan: Background and U.S.
Policy: In Brief
.
2 Joshua Keating, “T here’s No Good Exit Plan for Afghans Who Supported American Forces,” Slate, April 22, 2021,
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/afghan-special-immigrant-visas-refugees.html.
3 Priscilla Alvarez and Kylie Atwood, “'I stay up nights’: Afghans working for US worry about their future after Biden
withdrawal announcement,” CNN, May 23, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/21/politics/us-afghanistan-
withdrawal-visa/index.html.
4 Lawful permanent residents, also known as green card holders, are noncitizens who are authorized to reside
permanently in the United States.
5 P.L. 109-163, Div. A.
6 Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, as amended, codified at 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq.
7 U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, To Provide Special Immigrant Status for Aliens Serving as
Translators with the United States Arm ed Forces
, report to accompany H.R. 2293, 109th Cong., 1st sess., H.Rept. 109-
99, May 26, 2005, p. 2.
Congressional Research Service

1

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

program’s application deadline has passed, although visas continue to be issued under it. The
Afghan program continues to accept new applications.
This report analyzes the SIV classifications for Iraqis and Afghans within the context of both the
larger INA special immigrant category and selected other permanent admissions categories. It
discusses the legislative changes to the individual Iraqi and Afghan special immigrant programs
since their initial authorization, provides statistics on visa issuances, and considers chal enges the
programs have faced.
Legislative History of the Special
Immigrant Category
The term special immigrant is defined in Section 101(a)(27) of the INA. The definition consists
of an enumeration of classifications eligible for this category, such as LPRs who are returning
from a temporary stay abroad.8 Most special immigrant classifications are subject to an annual
numerical limitation.9
The special immigrant category was added to the INA by a 1965 immigration law, known as the
1965 amendments.10 The INA, as original y enacted in 1952, included a predecessor category of
nonquota immigrants, immigrants who could be admitted to the United States without regard to
numerical limitations. In the 1952 act, these nonquota immigrants included returning LPRs,
natives of Western Hemisphere countries, ministers of religion, and long-serving employees of
the U.S. government abroad, among other groups. The 1965 amendments redesignated the
nonquota immigrants as special immigrants and made some changes to the various
classifications.
The Immigration Act of 199011 further amended the special immigrant provisions in the INA. It
placed the special immigrant category under a revised INA section on permanent employment-
based immigration12 and imposed an overal annual numerical limitation of 10,000 on special
immigrants, with exemptions for certain classifications.13 In addition, the 1990 act amended the
existing special immigrant classifications and added several new ones. A 1991 immigration act14
changed the overal annual limitation on special immigrants from 10,000 to 7.1% of the
worldwide level of employment-based immigration.15 Subsequent laws added new special
immigrant classifications.
Today the special immigrant category encompasses a hodgepodge of classifications, but there are
some commonalities among the seemingly disparate groups. Many of the classifications, for
example, have a humanitarian element. In another commonality, some of the classifications are

8 INA §101(a)(27)(A), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(A).
9 Returning LPRs represent an exception; this special immigrant classification is not subject to a numerical limitation.
10 P.L. 89-236.
11 P.L. 101-649.
12 INA §203(b), 8 U.S.C. §1153(b). For information on the permanent immigration system, see CRS Report R42866,
Perm anent Legal Im m igration to the United States: Policy Overview.
13 T he 1990 act also imposed a cap of 5,000 on religious workers other than ministers within the overall annual
numerical limitation of 10,000.
14 Miscellaneous and T echnical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991 (P.L. 102-232).
15 T he base worldwide limit on employment -based immigration is 140,000; using this base, the special immigrant limit
of 7.1% equals 9,940. See CRS Report R42866, Perm anent Legal Im migration to the United States: Policy Overview.
Congressional Research Service

2

link to page 11 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

directed at individuals in certain fields of work that have a public service component. These
include classifications for religious workers, graduates of foreign medical schools licensed to
practice medicine in the United States, and international broadcasters.16
Particularly relevant for this report are special immigrant classifications that apply to individuals
who have worked for the U.S. government. These include classifications for 15-year employees
or former employees of the U.S. government abroad; nationals of Panama who are 15-year
employees or former employees of the U.S. government in the former Canal Zone; and
individuals who, after lawful enlistment abroad, have served or wil serve on active duty in the
U.S. Armed Forces for 12 years.17 Some of the classifications based on U.S. government
employment apply to individuals who are placed in danger because of their work. For example,
there is a special immigrant classification for individuals who were employees of the Panama
Canal Company or Canal Zone Government on April 1, 1979, who provided faithful service for at
least five years, and “whose personal safety, or the personal safety of whose spouse or children,
as a direct result of such Treaty, is reasonably placed in danger because of the special nature of
any of that employment.”18 As discussed in the next section, the two special immigrant
classifications for Iraqis and Afghans similarly apply to individuals who performed U.S.
government-related service, with one requiring the presence of a serious threat to the individual
as a result of that U.S. government employment.
Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis and Afghans
There are two special immigrant classifications specifical y for nationals of Iraq and Afghanistan:
one for individuals who worked as translators or interpreters and one for individuals who were
employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government in Iraq or by, or on behalf of, the U.S.
government or by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. These
classifications, in their current form, are the products of a series of legislative enactments, which
initial y established the classifications and then amended them (see Table 1 for a comparison of
the main features of the programs within these classifications). These legislative enactments were
free-standing measures; they did not amend INA Section 101(a)(27). For this reason, the special
immigrant classifications for Iraqis and Afghans are not enumerated in INA Section 101(a)(27).19
Under both classifications, a prospective Iraqi or Afghan special immigrant must submit a
petition; be otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa; and be otherwise admissible to the
United States for permanent residence, as specified. Regarding this last requirement, in order to
gain admission to the United States, an individual must be admissible under the INA. The INA
sets forth various grounds of inadmissibility, which include health-related grounds, security-

16 INA §101(a)(27)(C), (H), (M), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(C), (H), (M).
17 INA §101(a)(27)(D), (F), (K), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(D), (F), (K). With respect to the Panamanian nationals, in the
early 1900s the United States gained rights to build and operate the Panama Canal and gained permanent rights to a
Panama Canal Zone. Under the terms of the Panama Canal T reaty of 1977, t he Panama Canal Zone ceased to exist in
1979 and the Canal was turned over to the Panamanians in 1999. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian,
Milestones: 1977-1980, “ The Panama Canal and the T orrijos-Carter T reaties,” http://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-
1980/panama-canal.
18 INA §101(a)(27)(G), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(G). April 1, 1979, was the effective date of the exchange of instruments
of ratification of the Panama Canal T reaty of 1977.
19 T he statutory provisions establishing the translator/interpreter program and the program for Afghans employed by, or
on behalf of, the U.S. government are codified at 8 U.S.C. Section 1101 note. T he statutory provisions establishing the
program for Iraqis employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government are codified at 8 U.S.C. Section 1157 note.
Congressional Research Service

3

link to page 5 link to page 5 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

related grounds, and public charge (i.e., indigence).20 The public charge ground does not apply to
applicants under the special immigrant programs for Iraqis and Afghans; thus, these applicants are
not required to demonstrate economic self-sufficiency.
On February 4, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order that addressed the Iraqi and
Afghan SIV programs. The President directed the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, to conduct a review of the
programs and submit a report “with recommendations to address any concerns” within 180 days.
The report is to include “an assessment of agency compliance with existing law governing the
SIV programs,” among other items.21
Iraqi and Afghan Translators or Interpreters
Section 1059 of the FY2006 NDAA made certain Iraqi and Afghan nationals who had worked
directly with U.S. Armed Forces for at least one year as translators, and their spouses and
children,22 eligible to be classified as special immigrants. The provision capped the number of
principal aliens23 who could become special immigrants at 50 annual y and provided that these
individuals would count against the overal special immigrant cap (see the “Legislative History of
the Special Immigrant Category” section of this report). Section 1059 was amended in 200724 to
expand eligibility to certain Iraqi and Afghan nationals who had worked directly with U.S. Armed
Forces, or under Chief of Mission (COM) authority,25 for at least one year as translators or
interpreters.
To be eligible for this special immigrant classification, as amended, the principal applicant must
obtain a favorable written recommendation from the COM or a general or flag officer in the
relevant Armed Forces unit. The 2007 legislation temporarily increased the numerical limit on
this special immigrant program (to 500 for each of FY2007 and FY2008) and provided that the
classification would be exempt from the overal numerical limits on special immigrants.26

20 T he grounds of inadmissibility are enumerated in INA §212(a) (8 U.S.C. §1182(a)).
21 Executive Order 14013 of February 4, 2021, “Rebuilding and Enhancing Programs T o Resettle Refugees and
Planning for the Impact of Climate Change on Migration,” 86 Federal Register 8839, February 9, 2021 (hereinafter
cited as “E.O. 14013”).
22 In accordance with the INA, the word children, as used in this report, refers to unmarried children under age 21. INA
§101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1).
23 Alien, a term used in the INA, refers to a person who is not a U.S. citizen or a U.S. national. INA §101(a)(3), 8
U.S.C. §1101(a)(3). Principal aliens, as used in this report, excludes spouses and children.
24 P.L. 110-28, T itle III, §3812; P.L. 110-36. T hese two public laws include many of the same provisions on special
immigrant visas for Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters.
25 T he Chief of Mission is the principal officer in charge of a U.S. diplomatic mission abroad. An individual who
worked for the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, or the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, directly (not as a
contractor) is deemed to have worked under Chief of Mission authority.
26 In addition, the legislation authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to adjust the status of an alien to LPR
status if the alien (1) had been paroled into the country or admitted as a temporary legal resident and (2) was otherwise
eligible for the special immigrant classification, even if the alien was not in a lawful immigration status, had engaged in
unauthorized employment, or had otherwise violated the terms of his or her nonimmigrant visa. With some exceptions,
such behavior would typically make an alien ineligible to adjust to LPR status. Parole is discretionary authority that
may be exercised by DHS to allow an alien to enter the United States temporarily (without being formally admitted) for
urgent humanitarian reasons or when the entry is determined to be for significant public benefit. For additional
information about parole, see CRS Report R46570, Im migration Parole.
Congressional Research Service

4

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Another 2007 amendment to Section 1059 provided that if the numerical limits were not reached
in a fiscal year any remaining numbers would be carried forward to the next year.27
Iraqis and Afghans Who Worked for the U.S. Government
A second special immigrant classification for nationals of Iraq or Afghanistan and their spouses
and children was established by Section 1244 of the FY2008 NDAA (for Iraqis) and by Title VI
of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (for Afghans).28 This classification, as subsequently
amended, is for certain Iraqi and Afghan nationals who were employed by, or on behalf of, the
U.S. government in Iraq or Afghanistan, respectively, as specified. The Carl Levin and Howard P.
“Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for FY201529 expanded eligibility for the
Afghan program to include employees of the ISAF who served as interpreters or translators while
travel ing off base with U.S. military personnel or who performed sensitive activities for U.S.
military personnel.
To be eligible for this special immigrant classification for nationals of Iraq or Afghanistan, a
principal applicant must obtain a recommendation from a senior supervisor that documents the
individual’s “faithful and valuable service” as wel as approval from the COM. In addition, the
applicant must have experienced “an ongoing serious threat” as a result of his or her employment.
Iraqi Program
The Section 1244 program for Iraqis who were employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S.
government in Iraq requires not less than one year of employment on or after March 20, 2003.
The law that original y established the program did not specify an end date for the employment
period. The Iraqi program was initial y capped at 5,000 principal aliens annual y for five years
(later specified as FY2008-FY2012)30 with a provision to carry forward any unused numbers
from one fiscal year to the next, including from FY2012 to FY2013. This program expired for
principal aliens at the end of FY2013.31
At the beginning of FY2014, however, the 113th Congress approved a short-term extension of the
program in P.L. 113-42.32 For FY2014, P.L. 113-42 provided for the approval of cases that were
pending when the program expired on September 30, 2013, as wel as 2,000 new cases, as long as
the principal aliens in the new cases completed the required one-year period of employment by
September 30, 2013, and filed an application with the COM in Iraq by December 31, 2013. The
NDAA for FY201433 rewrote the extension language in P.L. 113-42 to provide for the issuance of
no more than 2,500 visas to principal applicants after January 1, 2014, and to extend the
application deadline to September 30, 2014 (for an overview of the application process, see the

27 P.L. 110-161, Div. J, §699J.
28 P.L. 110-181, Div. A (Iraqis); P.L. 111-8, Div. F (Afghans).
29 P.L. 113-291, Div. A, §1227.
30 P.L. 110-242.
31 At the time, USCIS maintained that “the authority to grant derivative [special immigrant] status to spouses and
children of principal Iraqi applicant s did not sunset on Sept. 30, 2013.” USCIS, “ Special Immigrant Visa Program for
Iraqi Nationals Who Worked For or On Behalf Of the U.S. Government Extended,” news alert, October 10, 2013,
http://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/special-immigrant -visa-program-iraqi-nationals-who-worked-or-behalf-us-
government -extended.
32 §1.
33 P.L. 113-66, Div. A, §1218.
Congressional Research Service

5

link to page 12 link to page 12 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

“Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Application Process” section of this report). No
changes to the numerical cap or application deadline have been made since then.
Afghan Program
A similar SIV program for Afghans who were employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government
in Afghanistan, as original y enacted, required not less than one year of employment on or after
October 7, 2001. It was initial y capped at 1,500 principal aliens annual y for FY2009 through
FY2013 with a provision to carry forward any unused numbers from one fiscal year to the next,
including from FY2013 to FY2014.
Several laws passed by the 113th Congress amended the Afghan program’s numerical limitations
to provide for additional visas. The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA)34 provided
for the granting of special immigrant status to up to 3,000 principal aliens for FY2014 and the
carrying forward and use of any unused balance for FY2014 through the end of FY2015. This law
required the one-year employment period to end by December 31, 2014, and required principal
applicants to file an application with the COM in Afghanistan by September 30, 2014 (see the
“Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Application Process” section of this report). A 2014
law35 provided that an additional 1,000 principal aliens could be granted special immigrant status
by December 31, 2014. This language required principal applicants to submit applications no
later than the same December 31, 2014, date.
Making further changes to the Afghan program’s numerical limitations, the FY2015 NDAA
provided that an additional 4,000 principal applicants could obtain special immigrant status from
the enactment date (December 19, 2014) through September 30, 2016. For purposes of obtaining
special immigrant status under the new provision, the law set the termination date for the required
one-year employment period at September 30, 2015, the application deadline at December 31,
2015, and the expiration date for the visa issuance authority at March 31, 2017.
Legislation passed in the 114th Congress further amended the Afghan SIV program. The NDAA
for FY201636 increased from 4,000 to 7,000 the number of additional SIVs available for issuance
after December 19, 2014, and provided that these visas would remain available until used. The act
also modified the employment requirements for certain applicants, requiring no less than two
years of employment for those filing petitions after September 30, 2015, and extended both the
employment period for eligibility and the application deadline until December 31, 2016.
Regarding the future of the Afghan SIV program, the act included the following provision:
It is the sense of Congress that the necessity of providing special immigrant status under
this subsection should be assessed at regular intervals by the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives,
taking into account the scope of the current and planned presence of United States troops
in Afghanistan, the current and prospective numbers of citizens and nation als of
Afghanistan employed ... and the security climate in Afghanistan.
The NDAA for FY201737 increased the number of additional SIVs to 8,500 and extended both the
employment eligibility period and the application deadline to December 31, 2020. At the same
time, it placed restrictions on qualifying employment for, or on behalf of, the U.S. government for
visa issuance purposes for applications filed after the law’s date of enactment (December 23,

34 P.L. 113-76, Div. K, §7034(o).
35 P.L. 113-160, §1.
36 P.L. 114-92, Div. A, §1216.
37 P.L. 114-328, Div. A, §1214.
Congressional Research Service

6

link to page 19 link to page 19 link to page 17 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

2016). These restrictions mirrored existing requirements for employees of the ISAF. For
applications filed after December 23, 2016, they limited eligibility to Afghans employed in
Afghanistan (1) to serve as interpreters and translators, particularly while traveling away from
U.S. embassies and consulates with personnel of the Department of State (DOS) or the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), or traveling off base with U.S. military
personnel; or (2) to perform sensitive activities for the U.S. government in Afghanistan.
In the 115th Congress, the FY2017 CAA38 increased the number of additional visas available
under the Afghan SIV program from 8,500 to 11,000. The NDAA for FY201839 provided 3,500
additional visas under this program, for a total of 14,500 visas available for issuance after
December 19, 2014. The employment termination date and the application deadline remained
unchanged at December 31, 2020.
In the 116th Congress, the FY2019 CAA40 made an additional 4,000 visas available under the
Afghan SIV program, bringing the total to 18,500. It left the employment termination date and the
application deadline at December 31, 2020. This law also made the funding for the additional
visas conditional on the Secretary of State developing a system for prioritizing the processing of
Afghan SIV applications and submitting specified reports, including a report on processing
improvements that was required under the NDAA for FY201941 (see the “Legislative Provisions
and Reporting Requirements” section of this report).
The FY2020 NDAA42 authorized an additional 4,000 visas and made other statutory changes to
the Afghan SIV program. It amended the program’s statutory numerical limitation language to
provide that the total number of principal aliens who could be granted special immigrant status
after December 19, 2014, could not exceed 22,500. It also extended the employment termination
date and application deadline to December 31, 2021. In addition, this act modified the program
eligibility criteria by eliminating certain employment requirements that had been added by the
FY2017 NDAA. As noted above, in the case of applications filed after December 23, 2016, the
FY2017 NDAA limited eligibility based on U.S. government employment to Afghans who were
employed as interpreters and translators or to perform sensitive activities. The FY2020 NDAA
restored the more general requirement of employment by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government. It
did not change the eligibility requirements applicable to employment for the ISAF.
The FY2020 NDAA also included a new reporting requirement related to the Iraqi and Afghan
SIV programs.43 It directed the DOS Inspector General to submit a report to Congress that
“evaluate[s] the obstacles to effective protection of Afghan and Iraqi al ies through the special
immigrant visa programs” and suggests improvements for future programs. The resulting report
only addressed the Afghan SIV program44 (see the “Selected Chal enges” section of this report for
further discussion of the OIG report).

38 P.L. 115-31, Div. J, §7083.
39 P.L. 115-91, Div. A, §1213.
40 P.L. 116-6, Div. F, §7076.
41 P.L. 115-232, Div. A, §1222.
42 P.L. 116-92, Div. A, §1219.
43 Ibid., §1215.
44 U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits, Review of the Afghan Special Immigrant
Visa Program
, Report Number AUD-MERO-20-35, June 2020 (hereinafter cited as “ 2020 DOS OIG report”).
According to the report: “At the start of this review, OIG learned that the Iraqi SIV program concluded in September
2014 and only had 84 applicants in the pipeline to be processed as of December 15, 2019, whereas the Afghan SIV
program had 18,768. As a result, OIG did not evaluate the Iraqi SIV program and informed Congress of this decision
Congressional Research Service

7

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Two FY2021 measures enacted at the end of the 116th Congress included language to authorize
different numbers of additional Afghan SIVs. The FY2021 CAA, enacted on December 27, 2020,
rewrote the existing statutory visa cap language (which provided 22,500 visas) to authorize a new
total of 26,500, an increase of 4,000 visas.45 The FY2021 NDAA, enacted on a veto-override vote
on January 1, 2021, included language to replace the 22,500 figure with 22,620, an increase of
120 visas.46 DOS has taken the position that the CAA provision controls (on the grounds that at
the time the NDAA was enacted “the reference to ‘22,500’ was no longer in [statute]”47) and that
the total number of visas available for issuance after December 19, 2014, is 26,500.48 Both the
FY2021 CAA and the FY2021 NDAA extended the employment termination date and application
deadline to December 31, 2022.
Conversion of Petitions
Since FY2009, the annual numerical limit on the Section 1059 program for translators and
interpreters has been 50. A 2008 law49 authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Secretary of State to convert an approved petition under the Section 1059 program (filed before
October 1, 2008) for which a visa was not immediately available to an approved petition under
the program for Iraqis who were employed by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government, subject to
the numerical limits of that latter program.50
Table 1. Comparison of Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs
Afghans Who Worked
for or on Behalf of the
Iraqis and Afghans
U.S. Government or
Who Worked as
Iraqis Who Worked
for the International
Translators or
for or on Behalf of the
Security Assistance

Interpreters
U.S. Government
Force
Nature/duration of
Permanent
Temporary (until al visas
Temporary (until al visas
Program
issued)
issued)
Required work period for
At least 1 year
At least 1 year between
At least 1 year (or at least
eligibility

3/20/2003 and 9/30/2013
2 years if petition filed
after 9/30/15) between
10/7/2001 and 12/31/2022
Ability of spouse/children
Yes
Yes
Yes
to accompany

on January 24, 2020”; p. 1 (footnote 1).
45 P.L. 116-260, Div. K, §7034(l)(11).
46 P.L. 116-283, Div. A, §1212.
47 Email from DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs to CRS, June 3, 2021. DOS has not published its reasoning in support
of this position.
48 See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans - Who Were
Em ployed by/on Behalf of the U.S. Governm ent
, “ Afghan SIV Program Update,” https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/
en/us-visas/immigrate/special-immg-visa-afghans-employed-us-gov.html. CRS has a pending request with DOS for an
explanation of its position on the conflicting statutes.
49 P.L. 110-242.
50 For further information about the conversion of petitions, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual,
“Certain Special Immigrant T ranslators,” 9 FAM 502.5-11(B); and U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual,
“Certain Iraqi and Afghan Nationals Employed by or on Behalf of the U.S. Government in Iraq or Afghanistan, and
Certain Afghan Nationals Employed by the International Security Assistance Force or a Successor Mission,”
Categories of Foreign Service Personnel,” 9 FAM 502.5-12(B) (hereinafter cited as “ 9 FAM 502.5-12(B)”).
Congressional Research Service

8

link to page 12 link to page 9 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Afghans Who Worked
for or on Behalf of the
Iraqis and Afghans
U.S. Government or
Who Worked as
Iraqis Who Worked
for the International
Translators or
for or on Behalf of the
Security Assistance

Interpreters
U.S. Government
Force
Application deadline
None
9/30/2014
12/31/2022
Current numerical cap
50 per year
2,500 after 1/1/2014
26,500 after 12/19/2014a
Eligibility for refugee
Yes
Yes
Yes
benefits
Source: P.L. 109-163, §1059, as amended, 8 U.S.C. §1101 note; P.L. 110-181, §1244, as amended, 8 U.S.C. §1157
note: P.L. 111-8, §602, as amended, 8 U.S.C. §1101 note; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
a. In accordance with the FY2021 CAA (see related discussion at end of the “Afghan Program” section of this
report).
Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa
Application Process
The process of applying for an Iraqi or Afghan SIV has multiple steps. The application process
described in this section is for Iraqis and Afghans who are abroad, who represent the vast
majority of applicants.51 (An applicant in the United States whose petition for classification as a
special immigrant is approved under the process described below could then submit an
application to adjust status52 along with supporting documentation; applicants in the United States
do not go through the visa process.)
The first step under the programs for Iraqis and Afghans who worked for or on behalf of the
United States is to apply for COM approval. To apply, the principal applicant must submit
documentation to DOS’s National Visa Center (NVC), including, among other required
information, a letter from the applicant’s employer confirming employment; a letter of
recommendation from the applicant’s direct U.S. citizen supervisor; and a statement from the
applicant describing the threats he or she received as a result of his or her U.S. government
employment. If approval is granted, the applicant receives a COM approval letter.
The next step for applicants under the special immigrant programs for Iraqis and Afghans who
worked for, or on behalf of, the United States—and the first step for applicants under the program
for translators and interpreters—is to file a petition53 with the Department of Homeland Security’s
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) along with accompanying documents.
In the case of the classification for those who worked for, or on behalf of, the United States, the
required documents include copies of the COM approval letter and of the letter of
recommendation from the direct supervisor. In the case of the program for translators or
interpreters, the required documents include evidence of qualifying employment, a letter of

51 For additional information on the application process, see links for “Iraqi and Afghan T ranslators/Interpreters,”
“Iraqis – Worked for/on behalf of the U.S. Government,” and “Afghans – Worked for/on behalf of the U.S.
Government” at U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Employment-Based Immigrant Visas (under
“Employment Fourth Preference (E4): Certain Special Immigrants” heading), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/
us-visas/immigrate/employment -based-immigrant -visas.html#fourth.
52 Adjustment of status is the process of obtaining LPR status from within the United States.
53 Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant.
Congressional Research Service

9

link to page 15 link to page 15 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

recommendation from the COM or a general or flag officer in the relevant U.S. Armed Forces
unit, and evidence of a background check and screening by the COM or the U.S. Armed Forces.
A petition for classification as an Iraqi or Afghan special immigrant that is approved by USCIS is
forwarded to the NVC, which contacts the applicant to advise him or her to begin collecting
required documents. The applicant must submit forms and documents for al family members
applying for visas to the NVC. In addition to the immigrant visa application, these materials
include copies of passport biodata pages, birth certificates, and civil documents; police
certificates, if applicable;54 and a refugee benefits election form, indicating whether the applicant,
if approved to receive a special immigrant visa, would like to participate in DOS’s Reception and
Placement program and receive associated benefits (see the “Resettlement Assistance and Federal
Public Benefits” section of this report).
After reviewing the application package for completeness, the NVC schedules an in-person visa
interview for the principal applicant and any family members at a U.S. embassy or consulate
abroad. The interview is required to determine eligibility for a visa. Applicants’ fingerprints are
taken at the time of the interview. After the interview, the case undergoes “administrative
processing, which may include requesting additional documentation, conducting additional
interviews, and interagency security checks.”55 Applicants are also required to have a medical
examination at their own cost.
In general, applicants who are issued visas and who have elected to participate in DOS’s
resettlement program must have their travel to the United States arranged by the International
Organization for Migration.56 Visa recipients who have elected not to participate in DOS’s
resettlement program are responsible for making their own travel arrangements. Upon admission
to the United States, SIV recipients obtain LPR status.
Comparison of Special Immigrants to Other
Selected Admissions Categories
Special immigrant classifications have been established to provide for the permanent admission to
the United States of specific populations. As noted, special immigrants comprise a subcategory of
permanent employment-based immigrants in the INA, although they are not, in fact, admitted for
employment purposes.57 While the special immigrant category is unique, it does bear similarities
to other admission categories that are authorized by other sections of the INA.

54 A police certificate is required for residents of Iraq. Applicants from Iraq or Afghanistan who have lived in another
country for more than 12 months after age 16 must submit a police certificate from that locality. A police certificate is
not otherwise required for residents of Afghanistan.
55 2020 DOS OIG report, p. 5.
56 SIV holders who have not elected to participate in DOS’s resettlement program before travelling to the United States
may be able to do so upon arrival. See “What if I have to travel immediately and cannot arrange travel through the
International Organization for Migration (IOM)?” in U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Special
Immigrant Visas for Afghans - Who Were Employed by/on Behalf of the U.S. Government, https://travel.state.gov/
content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/special-immg-visa-afghans-employed-us-gov.html.
57 For a general discussion of the permanent immigration system, including employment -based immigration, see CRS
Report R42866, Perm anent Legal Im migration to the United States: Policy Overview.
Congressional Research Service

10

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Refugees
Unlike special immigrants, refugees comprise a category of humanitarian admissions under the
INA.58 As defined in the INA, a refugee is a person who is unwil ing or unable to return to his or
her home country “because of persecution or a wel -founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”59
Refugees accepted for admission to the United States can be accompanied by their spouses and
children. The admissions process for refugees is separate from, and different than, the process for
immigrants. After one year in refugee status, they are required to apply to adjust to LPR status.
By contrast, special immigrants, like immigrants general y, are granted LPR status upon
admission to the United States.
Despite the definitional and procedural differences, there is overlap between the refugee category
and the special immigrant category, particularly the special immigrant classifications for Iraqis
and Afghans, and the same individuals may be eligible to apply for both refugee status and for
classification under one of the Iraqi or Afghan SIV programs. Unlike the refugee category, the
special immigrant classifications for Iraqis and Afghans do not require a showing of persecution.
At the same time, the statutory definitions of an eligible alien for the special immigrant programs
for Iraqis and Afghans who worked for, or on behalf of, the United States include the following:
“has experienced or is experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of the alien’s
employment by the United States Government.”60
Another similarity between the special immigrant and refugee categories concerns the element of
having a connection to the United States. As noted in the preceding legislative history discussion,
U.S. government service is a common feature in special immigrant classifications, including
those for Iraqis and Afghans. A U.S. connection also may facilitate access to the U.S. refugee
admissions program. Overseas refugee processing is conducted through a system of three
priorities for admission. The priorities provide access to U.S. resettlement consideration. Priority
1, which covers refugees for whom resettlement seems to be the appropriate durable solution,
applies to al nationalities and requires no connection to the United States. A U.S. connection,
however, is a factor under Priorities 2 and 3, which provide more direct access to the U.S. refugee
admissions program. Priority 2 covers specified groups of special humanitarian concern to the
United States, which may be defined by their nationalities, clans, ethnicities, or other
characteristics. A U.S. connection is a required element for some Priority 2 groups, such as Iraqis
associated with the United States. Priority 3, which is limited to designated nationalities, covers
family reunification cases and requires the prospective refugee to have an eligible relative in the
United States.

58 T he refugee admissions process is set forth in INA Section 207. For additional information about the U.S. refugee
program, see CRS Report RL31269, Refugee Adm issions and Resettlem ent Policy.
59 INA §101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. §101(a)(42).
60 P.L. 110-181, §1244(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. 1157 note (Iraqis); P.L. 111-8, §602(b)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. 1101 note
(Afghans). No such requirement exists for applicants under the special immigrant program for translators and
interpreters. For further discussion of the relationship between the refugee and Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs, see
T estimony of USCIS Refugee Affairs Division Chief Barbara L. Strack, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Terrorist Exploitation of Refugee Program s,
hearing, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., December 4, 2012, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), pp. 21 -22 (hereinafter cited as
“Strack testimony, December 2012”).
Congressional Research Service

11

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Resettlement Assistance and Federal Public Benefits
Iraqi and Afghan special immigrants are treated like refugees for purposes of federal public
benefits. Refugees are eligible for resettlement assistance through programs administered by DOS
and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR).
Under DOS’s Reception and Placement program, public and private, nonprofit entities provide
new arrivals with initial resettlement services and referrals to other services, as needed. ORR’s
refugee resettlement programs provide transitional assistance to refugees and other designated
groups. Refugees are also subject to special rules with respect to federal public benefits, such as
Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for the Aged, Blind and Disabled.61
While Iraqi and Afghan special immigrants are now eligible for the same federal public assistance
as refugees, this was not always the case. The original law establishing the special immigrant
program for Iraqi and Afghan translators included no language on eligibility for resettlement
support. Subsequent laws on the Iraqi and Afghan special immigrant programs made Iraqis and
Afghans eligible for refugee assistance and benefits on a time-limited basis.62 With the enactment
of the NDAA for FY2010, special immigrants from Iraq and Afghanistan became eligible for the
same resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other benefits as refugees and for the
same periods of time.63
Amerasians
Amerasians fathered by U.S. citizens, like Iraqis and Afghans who have assisted the U.S.
government, are the subject of special permanent admissions provisions in the INA.64 The
Amerasian provisions have a humanitarian component, but, like the special immigrant provisions,
are not a category of humanitarian admissions. Instead, Amerasian sons and daughters of U.S.
citizen fathers are admitted to the United States under the permanent family-based immigration
provisions of the INA (as opposed to the employment-based provisions under which special
immigrants are admitted).65 A law enacted in 198266 amended the INA to provide for the
admission as family-based immigrants of individuals born in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea
(Cambodia), or Thailand between 1950 and 1982 with U.S. citizen fathers. An immigrant petition
could be filed by the eligible individual or by another person on behalf of an eligible individual.
Beneficiaries could not be accompanied to the United States by their mothers or other relatives. In
the case of minors, the 1982 law required the mother or guardian to sign a written release and
provided for placement of the child with a U.S. citizen or LPR sponsor.

61 See CRS Report RL31269, Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy.
62 P.L. 110-161, Div. G, §525 (Iraqi and Afghan eligibility for up to six mont hs); P.L. 110-181, §1244(g), January 28,
2008 (Iraqi eligibility for up to eight months); P.L. 111-8, Div. F, §602(b)(8) (Afghan eligibility for up to eight
months).
63 P.L. 111-118, Div. A, T itle VIII, §8120. For additional information, see U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Afghan and Iraqi Special Im m igrants: More Inform ation on Their Resettlem ent Outcom es Would Be Beneficial , GAO-
18-107, February 2018.
64 For additional information, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. P, chap. 9 (Amerasian Immigrants), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-7-part -p-
chapter-9.
65 For additional information, see CRS Report R43145, U.S. Family-Based Immigration Policy.
66 P.L. 97-359, 8 U.S.C. §1154(f).
Congressional Research Service

12

link to page 16 link to page 17 link to page 17 link to page 30 link to page 17 link to page 16 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

A subsequent law enacted in 1987, as amended, eliminated some of these immigration
restrictions.67 The 1987 law, which provided for the admission to the United States as immigrants
of Vietnamese nationals born in Vietnam between 1962 and 1976 and fathered by a U.S. citizen,
permitted the beneficiary to be accompanied by a mother, a spouse, and children. This law, as
amended, also made the public charge ground of inadmissibility inapplicable to these aliens and
made them eligible for benefits under the refugee provisions of the INA. With these changes, the
treatment of this group became more similar to that of refugees and today’s Iraqi and Afghan
special immigrants.
Special Immigrant Visa Statistics
Through March 31, 2021, according to DOS data, almost 100,000 individuals had been issued
SIVs abroad, or been adjusted to LPR status in the United States, under the two special immigrant
classifications for Iraqi and Afghan nationals.68 Principal applicants accounted for about 31,000
of the total; dependent spouses and children accounted for about 69,000. Table 2 provides data on
the special immigrant classification for Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters. Table 3
provides data on the special immigrant classification for Iraqis and Afghans who were employed
by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government in Iraq or Afghanistan, respectively. As shown in Table 3
and as discussed in the next section, there was a significant drop in visa issuances from FY2017
to FY2018. The tables are mutual y exclusive; an individual appears in only one table.69 (The
Appendix contains separate tables for Iraqis and Afghans for each special immigrant
classification.)
Table 2. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqi and Afghan Translators and Interpreters
Fiscal Year
Principals
Dependents
Total
2007
537
466
1,003
2008
559
557
1,116
2009
51
69
120
2010
43
84
127
2011
42
85
127
2012
64
91
155
2013
32
80
112
2014
45
131
176
2015
44
146
190
2016
58
165
223
2017
51
171
222

67 P.L. 100-202, §101(e), T itle V, §584, 8 U.S.C. §1101 note.
68 Special immigrant visa statistics are available from the DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs, http://travel.state.gov/
content/visas/english/law-and-policy/statistics/immigrant-visas.html.
69 As indicated in the table notes, Table 3 includes individuals with approved petitions under the translator/interpreter
program whose cases were converted as provided for in P.L. 110-242; however, any such individuals would not be
included in Table 2.
Congressional Research Service

13

link to page 17 link to page 17 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Fiscal Year
Principals
Dependents
Total
2018
50
147
197
2019
21
57
78
2020
19
58
77
2021a
9
16
25
Totals
1,625
2,323
3,948
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
Notes: The data include individuals classified as special immigrants who adjusted to LPR status in the United
States.
a. Through March 31, 2021.
Table 3. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis and Afghans Who Worked for the
U.S. Government
Fiscal Year
Principals
Dependents
Total
2008
371
334
705
2009
1,680
1,736
3,416
2010
947
1,103
2,050
2011
320
392
712
2012
1,724
2,320
4,044
2013
1,992
3,116
5,108
2014
3,876
6,805
10,681
2015
2,636
5,299
7,935
2016
4,283
10,100
14,383
2017
4,677
13,713
18,390
2018
1,801
6,025
7,826
2019
2,416
7,640
10,056
2020
1,829
6,134
7,963
2021a
364
1,698
2,062
Totals
28,916
66,415
95,331
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
Notes: The data include individuals with approved petitions under the translator/interpreter program whose
cases were converted in accordance with P.L. 110-242; the data also include individuals classified as special
immigrants who adjusted to LPR status in the United States.
a. Through March 31, 2021.
Selected Challenges
There is a fundamental tension in the administration of the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs
between a sense of urgency to issue visas in a timely fashion to eligible individuals and a need to
conduct appropriate security screening. This tension is quite sharp because on the one hand these
programs are aimed at individuals who assisted the United States and face danger because of it,
Congressional Research Service

14

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

and on the other hand there are serious concerns that this population may pose security threats.70
Overlaying this dynamic is the structure of the SIV programs themselves, with statutory
timeframes and numerical limitations.
Application Processing
The Iraqi and Afghan SIV application process has been subject to much criticism over the past
decade. In a 2010 assessment of the SIV program for Iraqis who worked for, or on behalf of, the
U.S. government, an observer characterized the application process as a series of procedural
barriers and argued that it was impossible to navigate the process without English-speaking legal
assistance.71
DOS has acknowledged past processing problems but has also cited steps it has taken to improve
the efficiency of the system. In written testimony for a July 2011 Senate hearing, then-Assistant
Secretary of State for Consular Affairs Janice Jacobs enumerated changes DOS had made to the
Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs to decrease processing times:
We no longer require documentation that we found to be redundant; we have decreased the
amount of paperwork that must be submitted by mail in favor of electronic submissions;
and we have reorganized internal procedures so that the process moves faster.72
For its part, the Department of Homeland Security reported at a December 2012 House Homeland
Security Committee hearing that it took between 3 and 10 days, on average, to process an Iraqi or
Afghan SIV petition.73 The department indicated in response to a question following the October
2011 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing that it did not need additional resources to expedite SIV
petition processing.74
A February 2014 PBS NewsHour piece on the SIV program for Afghans who worked for, or on
behalf of, the U.S. government described ongoing chal enges with this program:

70 For example, a 2008 DOS Inspector General report on the SIV program for interpreters and translators stated, “T he
due diligence of officials involved in the security and background screening of applicants resulted in several SIV
candidates being ruled ineligible due to their personal activities or conditions. ” T he report also highlighted some “ cases
of concern,” which included “[f]ormer Saddam-era military personnel, including Republican Guard officers, a chemical
warfare specialist, a former fighter pilot who flew against U.S. military forces, and a commander of the national air
defense center.” U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General,
Middle East Regional Office, Status of Iraqi Special Im m igrant Visa Program s, Report Number MERO-IQO-08-01,
July 2008, pp. 7, 10.
71 Brendan Rigby, “Mission Impossible: An Assessment of the Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa,” Northeastern University
Honors Junior/Senior Projects, May 1, 2010.
72 Written T estimony of Assistant Secretary of State Janice L. Jacobs, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Ten Years After 9/11:Preventing Terrorist Travel, hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess.,
July 13, 2011 in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ten Years After
9/11—2011
, hearings, 112th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), p. 522 (hereinafter cited as “ Jacobs
testimony, July 2011”).
73 Strack testimony, December 2012, p. 13.
74 DHS further responded, “We respectfully refer you to the Department of State to comment on whether they have
unmet resource needs.” U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary , Oversight of the U.S. Department of
Hom eland Security
, hearing, 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 19, 2011 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), p. 44 (hereinafter
cited as “DHS oversight hearing, October 2011”).
Congressional Research Service

15

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Critics describe the process of applying for a visa as opaque, prohibitively complicated and
painfully slow, putting the applicant’s [sic] lives at risk with each passing month that their
visas aren’t approved.75
At around the same time, newspapers published anecdotal reports of years-long waits for
approval, layers of bureaucracy, and unexpected denials under this program.76
In the PBS NewsHour piece, Jarrett Blanc, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, asserted that processing improvements had been made to the Afghan SIV program. He
identified the need to obtain approval by the COM committee in the U.S. embassy in Kabul,
Afghanistan, as a “key bottleneck at the start of the process” that has been addressed. Blanc said
that by increasing the number of committees handling cases, applications could be reviewed
within two weeks of filing.77 (More recent delays in COM processing are discussed below.)
Incomplete applications also present chal enges. In response to questions on the SIV program for
Iraqis who worked for, or on behalf of, the U.S. government following an October 2011 Senate
Judiciary Committee oversight hearing, DHS referred to obstacles faced by SIV applicants in
preparing their applications. The cited obstacles included difficulties obtaining a recommendation
from a supervisor and a copy of the work contract.78 In his comments on the paral el Afghan SIV
program for the PBS NewsHour piece, Blanc argued that the Afghan applicants share
responsibility for the processing delays by failing to submit al the necessary paperwork.79
Legislative Provisions and Reporting Requirements
The 113th Congress enacted legislation to amend the SIV programs for Iraqis and Afghans who
worked for, or on behalf of, the U.S. government to address application processing-related
concerns. The FY2014 NDAA established several coordinator positions. It instructed the
Secretary of State to designate an Iraqi SIV coordinator and an Afghan SIV coordinator in the
U.S. embassies in Baghdad, Iraq, and Kabul, Afghanistan, respectively, to “[oversee] the
efficiency and integrity of the processing of special immigrant visas.”80 It directed the Secretaries
of State, Homeland Security, and Defense each to designate a senior coordinating official whose
responsibilities would include “develop[ing] proposals to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the process for issuing special immigrant visas” and “coordinat[ing] and
monitor[ing] the implementation of such proposals” under the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs.81
It also established a review process for denial of COM approval under each program.
This law further directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to make changes to the processing of applications
under each program such that “al steps under the control of the respective departments incidental
to the issuance of such visas, including required screenings and background checks, should be
completed not later than 9 months after the date on which an eligible alien submits al required

75 P.J. T obia, “T ongue T ied in Afghanistan,” PBS NewsHour, February 19, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
updates/tongue-tied-afghanistan/ (hereinafter cited as “ P.J. T obia, February 2014”).
76 See, for example, Kevin Sieff, “U.S. Rejects More Visas for Afghan Interpreters,” Washington Post, November 11,
2013, p. A1.
77 P.J. T obia, “T ongue T ied in Afghanistan.”
78 DHS oversight hearing, October 2011, p. 45.
79 P.J. T obia, “T ongue T ied in Afghanistan.”
80 P.L. 113-66, Div. A, §§1218-1219.
81 Ibid.,, §1218.
Congressional Research Service

16

link to page 9 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

materials to complete an application for such visa.” At the same time, the act included an
exception to the nine-month limit in “high-risk cases for which satisfaction of national security
concerns requires additional time.”82
The FY2014 NDAA included reporting requirements related to application processing under the
Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs. It required the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to report to Congress on the
implementation of improvements to SIV application processing under each program. The FY2019
NDAA subsequently required a new report on the implementation of SIV application processing
improvements to the Afghan program. The July 2018 conference report on this legislation noted
concern that “the SIV application process continues to suffer from inadequate interagency
coordination which has resulted in undue delay, needless stress on applicants, and a sizable drop
in SIV admissions this year.”83
In addition to requiring congressional reports, the FY2014 NDAA provided for public reports on
Iraqi and Afghan SIV application processing. It required the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to publish quarterly reports
describing improvements in the efficiency of SIV application processing.84 The first quarterly
reports on the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs, dated April 2014, stated that the “U.S. government
has devoted resources to reducing the amount of time required to complete the SIV process.”85
Prioritization of Afghan SIV Applications
The FY2019 CAA required the Secretary of State to develop a system for prioritizing the
processing of Afghan SIV applications as a condition for receiving funding for the additional
visas authorized by the legislation (see the “Afghan Program” section of this report). DOS
determined that applicants would be prioritized in the following order:
1. Interpreters and Translators: Afghans working with U.S. military and U.S. government
personnel as interpreters or translators, with extra consideration for those who assisted in
combat operations.
2. U.S. Government Direct Hire Employees: Afghan locally employed staff under personal
services agreement or personal services contract for the Department, DOD, or other U.S.
government agencies. This also includes direct hire employees of International Security

82 Ibid., §§1218-1219.
83 U.S. Congress, Conference Committee, John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2 019,
conference report to accompany H.R. 5515, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 115-874, July 25, 2018, p. 980.
84 Links to all the quarterly reports are available at https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/iraqis-work-for-
us.html (Iraqi program); and https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/immigrate/afghans-work-for-us.html (Afghan
program). T he most recent quarterly reports are: Joint Departm ent of State/Departm ent of Hom eland Security Report:
Status of the Iraqi Special Im m igrant Visa Program
, January 2021, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/SIVs/
Iraqi-Public-Quarterly-Report -Q1-Jan-2021.pdf (hereinafter cited as “ Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program,
January 2021”); Joint Department of State/Department of Homeland Security Report: Status of the Afghan Special
Im m igrant Visa Program
, January 2021, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/SIVs/Afghan-Public-Quarterly-
Report -Q1-Jan-2021.pdf (hereinafter cited as “ Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, January 2021”).
85 Joint Department of State/Department of Homeland Security Report: Extension and Improvement of the Iraqi Special
Im m igrant Visa (SIV) Program
, April 2014, p. 1, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/
Iraqi_SIVs_public_report_(05%2001%2014).pdf (hereinafter cited as “ Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program,
April 2014”); Joint Department of State/Department of Homeland Security Report: The Implementation of Processin g
Im provem ents for Afghan Special Im m igrant Visa (SIV) Program
, April 2014, p. 1, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/
visas/Afghan_SIVs_public%20report_(05%2001%2014).pdf (hereinafter cited as “ Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV
Program, April 2014”).
Congressional Research Service

17

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Assistance Force (ISAF) or Resolute Support (RS), NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization], and governments participating in ISAF or RS in Afghanistan.
3. Contractors with U.S. Government Installation Badges: Afghan third party contractors
or subcontractors employed on behalf of the U.S. government working at a U.S.
government installation in Afghanistan. This includes employees of companies that
provide on-compound support for the U.S. Embassy, DOD, or other U.S. government
installation.
4. Implementing Partners (IP): Afghan third party contractors or subcontractors employed
on behalf of U.S. government entities, such as USAID and INL [Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs], implementing instructions in the field in
Afghanistan.
5. All Other Applicants: Afghan U.S. government contractors, logistics or transportation
service providers, and companies contracted by the U.S. government to provide services to
Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police installations.86
2020 DOS Review of Afghan SIV Program
The FY2020 NDAA, as noted, directed the DOS Inspector General to report on the SIV programs
for persons who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government. The report, which was intended
to evaluate obstacles and make recommendations, was to address, among other items: (1) “means
of expediting processing at al stages of the process for applicants;” (2) “appropriate staffing
levels for expedited processing;” and (3) “documenting the identity and employment of local y
employed staff and contractors of the United States Government, including the possibility of
establishing a central database of employees of the United States Government and its
contractors.”87
Completed in June 2020, the report evaluated the Afghan SIV program. Among its conclusions
were:
OIG found that the Department’s staffing levels across its various offices that process
Afghan SIVs have generally remained constant since 2016 and are insufficient to reduce
the SIV applicant backlog…. Additionally, the Department lacks a centralized database to
effectively document the identity of locally employed staff and contractors.88
With respect to the information technology systems involved in Afghan SIV application
processing, the report noted that they are maintained by different DOS bureaus, lack
interoperability, and impede efficient processing. It further explained, “An SIV processor at any
single stage of the Afghan SIV program must manual y export data from one system and import it
into the next to continue processing and gain a full picture of one application.”89
The OIG report highlighted the chal enges of verifying the employment of contractors and
subcontractors, who represent “the majority of Afghan SIV applicants.”90 As explained in the
report, DOS has to determine “an applicant’s eligibility for the program by verifying, among
other items, history and length of employment and a letter of recommendation from the

86 9 FAM 502.5-12(B).
87 P.L. 116-92, Div. A, §1215(b).
88 2020 DOS OIG report, “Highlights” page.
89 Ibid., p. 25.
90 Ibid., p. 21.
Congressional Research Service

18

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

applicant’s immediate supervisor.”91 The report noted, based on information provided by DOS
officials, that “qualifying applicants who worked for the Department of Defense pose additional
chal enges because of recordkeeping weaknesses.”92 The DOD verification issue was discussed at
a May 2021 hearing of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. One of the witnesses, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs David Helvey, said, “We are
working very closely with State Department to identify and provide data that can help to provide
the identification and the identities of those employees of the Department of Defense that would
qualify.”93
The OIG report made a number of recommendations, some of which referenced the DOS senior
coordinating official position for the Afghan SIV program that was established by the FY2014
NDAA. One recommendation was for this official to conduct an assessment of staffing levels at
al stages of Afghan SIV application processing and report to the OIG on DOS plans to reduce the
backlog of applicants and maintain adequate staffing to meet the nine-month processing
timeframe set by Congress. In a response provided in an appendix to the OIG report, the
Undersecretary of State for Management, who serves as the DOS senior coordinating official,
concurred in this recommendation and indicated that such a review would be conducted. He also
stated, “if staffing levels are inadequate … the Department’s ability to obtain additional resources
wil be subject to the availability of funds and competing priorities.”94
Two other recommendations concerned data systems. The OIG report suggested that the Secretary
of State, in consultation with other specified officials, “re-examine options for establishing a
unified database of information related to personnel conducting work on executive agency
contracts, grants, or cooperative agreements that can be used to adjudicate special immigrant
visas or, alternatively, use an existing database.”95 The undersecretary concurred in this
recommendation while noting that “creating or modifying a database would be subject to the
availability of resources, and that utilizing an existing database … would be subject to final
determinations of the system owner.”96
Another recommendation involved DOS determining whether “legacy systems should be updated
or made interoperable or if a new system should instead be developed to minimize redundancy in
data entry.”97 The undersecretary concurred in this recommendation. His response included the
following: “[The DOS Bureau of Consular Affairs] determined that its ongoing system
development effort, Consular One, when fully implemented, wil greatly minimize data entry
redundancy. As it relates to visa systems, modernization wil begin in 2021 and end in 2025.”98
Afghan SIV Pending Applications and Processing Times
The DOS/DHS quarterly reports on the Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs include data on pending
applications at selected steps in the application process. For the Iraqi program, there were more

91 Ibid., p. 4.
92 Ibid., p. 21.
93 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, To receive testimony on the transition of all United States and
Coalition forces from Afghanistan and its im plications, hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., May 20, 2021, stenographic
transcript, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/21-41_05-20-2021.pdf.
94 2020 DOS OIG report, p. 35.
95 Ibid., p. 31.
96 Ibid., pp. 36.
97 Ibid., p. 31.
98 Ibid., p. 36.
Congressional Research Service

19

link to page 12 link to page 12 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

than 1,000 pending applications from principal applicants reported in the initial April 2014
submission, more than 400 pending applications in the January 2017 report (the application
deadline for this program was September 30, 2014), and less than 100 pending applications in the
most recent January 2021 report.99 For the Afghan program, the comparable numbers of pending
applications from principal applicants were more than 4,000 (April 2014), more than 6,000
(January 2017), and almost 15,000 (January 2021).100 These totals include incomplete
applications. For example, the January 2021 report stated: “8,795 principal applicants had COM
applications pending at NVC. These applicants had submitted some, but not al , of the documents
required to apply for COM approval.”101
The fact that pending application data are provided for only some of the processing steps means
that the actual numbers of pending applications are likely higher than the reported numbers.
According to the congressional y mandated 2020 DOS OIG report, there were more than 18,000
pending applications for the Afghan program in December 2019.102 In testimony before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee in May 2021, Zalmay Khalilzad, Special Representative on
Afghanistan Reconciliation, said, “We have 17,000 to 18,000 who have applied,” referring to
Afghan principal applicants.103
A related question for which U.S. officials do not seem to have an answer is how many Afghans
may be eligible for the program (whether or not they have submitted applications). Asked at the
House hearing whether he had an estimate of how many Afghans may be eligible for the Afghan
SIV program who had not yet applied, Special Representative Khalilzad replied, “I do not.”104
The DOS/DHS quarterly reports also provide data on average total U.S. government processing
time for SIV applications.105 This statistic excludes any steps in the application process that are
the responsibility of the applicant, such as filing a petition with USCIS (see the “Iraqi and Afghan
Special Immigrant Visa Application Process
” section of this report). As such, these data are an
incomplete measure of average total processing time.106 For the Iraqi program, average total U.S.
government processing time was 239 business days in the initial April 2014 quarterly report, 393
calendar days in the January 2017 report, and 543 calendar days in the most recent January 2021

99 Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program, April 2014, pp. 3 -4; Joint Department of State/Department of Homeland
Security Report: Status of the Iraqi Special Im m igrant Visa (SIV) Program
, January 2017, p. 4, https://travel.state.gov/
content/dam/visas/SIVs/Iraqi%20SIV%20public%20report_Jan%20201 7.pdf (hereinafter cited as “ Quarterly Report on
the Iraqi SIV Program, January 2017”); Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program, January 2021, p. 4.
100 Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, April 2014, pp. 3 -4; Joint Department of State/Department of
Hom eland Security Report: Status of the Afghan Special Im m igrant Visa Program
, January 2017, p. 4,
https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/SIVs/Afghan%20SIV%20public%20report_Jan%202017.pdf (hereinafter
cited as “Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, January 2017”); Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program,
January 2021, p. 5.
101 Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, January 2021, p. 5.
102 2020 DOS OIG report, p. 22.
103 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The U.S.-Afghanistan Relationship Following the Military
Withdrawal,
hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., May 18, 2021, CQ T ranscriptions.
104 Ibid.
105 In the April 2014-April 2016 quarterly reports, processing times are provided in business days; beginning with the
July 2016 quarterly report, processing times are provided in calendar days.
106 As stated in the January 2021 reports on both programs, “Overall processing times are greater than U.S. government
processing times.” Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program, January 2021, p. 4 (table note 8); Quarterly Report on
the Afghan SIV Program, January 2021, p. 4 (table note 8).
Congressional Research Service

20

link to page 12 link to page 12 link to page 25 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

report.107 The comparable averages for the Afghan program were 287 business days (April 2014),
410 calendar days (January 2017), and 996 calendar days (January 2021).108
The January 2021 quarterly report on the Afghan program singled out two processing steps where
applications were pending for more than nine months—Chief of Mission review and
administrative processing (see the “Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Application
Process
” section of this report).109 According to the report, this was “due to low program staffing
and high caseload volume.” Regarding the COM review step, the report indicated that average
processing time for applicants who completed this step during the October-December 2020 period
was 833 calendar days. It offered the following explanation:
During the COM review, the Congressionally mandated prioritization plan implemented
by the Department focuses attention on the higher tiers. Lower tiers, therefore, wait longer
for review and analysis relative to higher tiers…. Wait times at the COM stage also increase
when there is an increase in the volume of cases processed by COM. The increase in wait
time is due to a greater number of older cases being processed, thereby making the average
wait time longer. The processing numbers achieved during this quarter were due to the 35
temporary staff COM received.110
A lawsuit chal enging the delays in processing Iraqi and Afghan SIV applications was filed in
federal court in the District of Columbia in June 2018.111 In February 2020, the judge granted
class certification, describing the class as al individuals who submitted applications under the
SIV programs for Iraqis or Afghans who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government and
have been waiting more than nine months for the government to act on their applications.112 A
June 2020 order in the case requires the government to follow an adjudication plan, which assigns
timeframes to various application processing steps. The government is also required to submit
progress reports every 90 days.113
In his February 2021 executive order that directed the Secretary of State to lead a review of the
Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs, President Biden referenced statutory time frames for SIV

107 Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program, April 2014, pp. 2-3; Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program,
January 2017, pp. 2-3; Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program, January 2021, pp. 1 -4. T he January 2021 report
indicates that its average processing time data for two processing steps are fo r the corresponding quarter of FY2021
(October-December 2020); it does not provide time periods for the other processing steps. T he April 2014 and January
2017 reports specify the covered time periods for the reported data for several processing steps; all these periods end
before the start of the corresponding quarters.
108 Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, April 2014, pp. 2 -3; Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program,
January 2017, pp. 2-3; Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, January 2021 , pp. 2-4. T he January 2021 report
indicates that the data on average processing time are for the corresponding quarter of FY2021 (October -December
2020). T he April 2014 and January 2017 reports specify the covered time periods for their reported data for several
processing steps; all these periods end before the start of the corresponding quarters.
109 T he report’s comments on administrative processing are discussed below in the “ Security Concerns” section of the
report.
110 Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, January 2021, p. 4.
111 Kat Greene, “Afghan, Iraqi Allies Sue Over Visa Holdup,” Law360, June 14, 2018, https://www.law360.com/
articles/1053545/afghan-iraqi-allies-sue-over-visa-holdup; the article includes a link to the complaint (Class Action
Complaint, Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Pompeo, No. 18-cv-01388 (T SC) (D.D.C. June 12, 2018)).
112 Sarah Martinson, “ Afghan, Iraqi Nationals Nab Cert. In Visa Delay Suit,” Law360, February 6, 2020,
https://www.law360.com/articles/1241383/afghan-iraqi-nationals-nab-cert-in-visa-delay-suit; the article includes a link
to the judge’s opinion. For further developments in the case, see Sarah Martinson, “Afghan, Iraqi Allies Say Gov't
Can't Further Delay Visa Plan,” March 3, 2020, https://www.law360.com/articles/1249588/afghan-iraqi-allies-say-gov-
t-can-t-further-delay-visa-plan.
113 Order, Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Pompeo, No. 18-cv-01388 (TSC) (D.D.C. June 14, 2020).
Congressional Research Service

21

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

application processing. The President specified that the resulting report should include “an
assessment of whether there are undue delays in meeting statutory benchmarks for timely
adjudication of applications, including due to insufficient staffing levels.”114
At a May 2021 press briefing, a DOS spokesperson described recent actions to expedite the
processing of SIV applications for Afghans who had worked for or on behalf of the U.S.
government:
[A]dditional resources, including augmenting domestic staff in Washington to process
applications, [have] already been put in place. In addition, we approved a temporary
increase in consular staffing at our embassy in Kabul in order to conduct interviews and
process visa applications. And we’ll continue to do that contingent on the security situation
in the country. We will continue to look for ways to speed up this process.115
Secretary of State Antony Blinken made remarks along the same lines during a June 2021
television interview with CNN. In response to a question about whether the Administration
planned to evacuate Afghans116 who had helped the United States during the war, he said:
Evacuation is the wrong word. We’re determined to make good on our obligation to those
who helped us, who put their lives on the line …. We have put in significant resources into
making sure that that [Afghan SIV] program can work fast and work effectively so that we
can process any requests that we get for these so-called Special Immigrant Visas. We’ve
added about 50 people here in Washington in the State Department to help do that.117
Security Concerns
Protecting U.S. national security remains a major concern about the Iraqi and Afghan SIV
programs. Applicants are subject to security checks conducted by DHS and DOS, a process that
involves coordination with other agencies.
Details of the security review process are not publicly available. In her written testimony for the
July 2011 Senate hearing, then-Assistant Secretary of State Jacobs said, “While we cannot discuss
specifics for security reasons, SIV applicants from Iraq as wel as Afghanistan undergo multiple
layers of review.”118
Scrutiny of the security review process for Iraqi and Afghan SIV applicants increased in 2011
following the arrest on terrorism charges of two Iraqi nationals who had entered the United States
through the U.S. refugee program. The potential security risks posed by prospective refugees and
special immigrants from Iraq and elsewhere were discussed at the December 2012 House hearing
cited above, which was entitled Terrorist Exploitation of Refugee Programs. At the hearing, then-
DHS Deputy Under Secretary for Intel igence and Analysis Dawn Scalici described U.S.
government efforts to identify potential threats:

114 E.O. 14013.
115 U.S. Department of State, Department Press Briefing, May 10, 2021, https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-
press-briefing-may-10-2021/.
116 For a discussion of the evacuation question, see CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Afghanistan:
Im m igration and Evacuation of U.S. Partners
, June 3, 2021 (available upon request).
117 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Secretary Antony J. Blinken On CNN’s State of the Union
with Dana Bash
, press release, June 13, 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-on-cnns-state-of-the-
union-with-dana-bash/.
118 Jacobs testimony, July 2011, p. 522.
Congressional Research Service

22

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

When we look at … the potential in the future for terrorist groups to exploit the refugee
program, we do have concerns. Hence, we have the enhanced security and vetting
procedures.... I will tell you that we have intelligence-driven processes regardless of the
immigration program that a terrorist actor may seek to use or just travel to the United States.
We are reviewing intelligence on a regular basis, sharing that with interagency partners
and developing the procedures by which we can help to identify and further [screen]
individuals of concern.119
The time required to complete security screening for applicants under the SIV program for
Afghans who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Afghanistan has been a focus of
attention. In written responses to questions following an April 2013 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing, then-Secretary of State John Kerry identified the interagency security
screening process as one of the “major obstacles” to the quick processing of Afghan SIV
applications. Indicating that security screening “takes the most time,” he offered that “the
Department of State is working constantly with our interagency counterparts to streamline this
comprehensive and essential process while eliminating bottlenecks.”120
Prior to 2017, as discussed in the 2020 DOS OIG report, “nearly al Afghan SIV applicants were
referred for interagency processing.” DOS guidance issued in 2017 made changes to this process,
enabling “lower risk applicants to experience expedited processing” by not requiring them to
undergo interagency processing. Security checks for these applicants are performed by the Bureau
of Consular Affairs Office of Screening, Analysis, and Coordination. The OIG report noted,
however, that most Afghan SIV applicants stil are referred for interagency processing.121
One of the issues that Congress directed the DOS Inspector General to address in its 2020 report
was “means to reduce delays in interagency processing and security checks.”122 The report
concluded that “staffing levels during the interagency and security check process contribute to
delays in processing the Afghan SIVs.”123 “As of March 2020,” according the report, “the Office
of Screening, Analysis, and Coordination had one analyst to coordinate interagency processing
and conduct internal security checks.”124 The report recommended an evaluation to determine the
staffing level needed at this office; the DOS senior coordinating official concurred.
The January 2021 DOS/DHS quarterly report on the Afghan SIV program addressed
administrative processing, which, as noted, is a step in the application process that “may include
requesting additional documentation, conducting additional interviews, and interagency security
checks.” According to the report: “Administrative processing often involves rigorous background
checks, which are essential to the integrity of the SIV program. This processing may take
anywhere from less than 30 days to over a year.”125

119 T estimony of DHS Deputy Under Secretary Dawn Scalici, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Terrorist Exploitation of Refugee Program s, hearing,
112th Cong., 2nd sess., December 4, 2012, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2013), p. 18.
120 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, National Security and Foreign Policy Priorities in the
Fiscal Year 2014 International Affairs Budget,
hearing, 113th Cong., 1st sess., April 18, 2013 (Washington, DC: GPO,
2014), p. 107.
121 2020 DOS OIG report, pp. 18-19.
122 P.L. 116-92, §1215(b)(8).
123 2020 DOS OIG report, “Highlights” page.
124 Ibid., p. 19.
125 Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, January 2021, p. 4. T he report includes additional data on
administrative processing on p. 5.
Congressional Research Service

23

link to page 6 link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 30 link to page 6 link to page 6 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Visa Availability
The SIV program for Iraqi and Afghan translators and interpreters is permanent, while the
programs for Iraqis and Afghans who worked for, or on behalf of, the U.S. government are
temporary. As of the date of this report, the temporary Afghan program and the temporary Iraqi
program are scheduled to end when al the available visas are issued.
As detailed above, each of the three SIV programs has been subject to statutory numerical
limitations from the start.126 The numerical limitations language in the statutes creating the
programs for Iraqis and Afghans who worked for, or on behalf of, the U.S. government also
provided for the carryover of unused visas from a given fiscal year to the next during a specified
period (see the “Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis and Afghans” section of this report). The
program for translators and interpreters did not original y include carryover provisions, but such
language was later added by amendment. Visas that are carried forward but not used in the next
fiscal year are lost.
The SIV program for translators and interpreters is capped at 50 visas for principal applicants per
year. It has been capped at this level for each year except for FY2007 and FY2008, when the limit
was set at 500.
The separate SIV programs for Iraqis and Afghans who worked for, or on behalf of, the U.S.
government were initial y subject to annual caps. The Iraqi program was capped at 5,000 visas for
principal applicants per year for FY2008 through FY2012. Any of the 5,000 visas not used in a
given fiscal year were carried forward to the next fiscal year, with unused visas for FY2012
carried forward to FY2013. At the end of FY2013, the Iraqi program ended and any remaining
visas were lost. The program was subsequently revived and new visas were authorized.
Congress made 1,500 visas available for principal aliens under the Afghan program annual y for
FY2009 through FY2013. Any visas not used in a given fiscal year were carried forward to the
next fiscal year. P.L. 113-76 provided for the issuance of 3,000 visas to principal aliens for
FY2014 and the carrying forward of any unused balance for issuance in FY2015. Subsequent
Afghan SIV provisions enacted by the 113th Congress made additional visas available subject to
specified employment periods, application deadlines, and visa issuance authority expiration dates.
Consideration of these numerical limitation and carryover provisions, in conjunction with the visa
issuance data for the SIV programs for Iraqis and Afghans who worked for, or on behalf of, the
U.S. government (in Table A-3 and Table A-4 in the Appendix), indicates that thousands of visas
provided for these two programs are no longer available. As shown in the tables, through
FY2013, visa issuances under both programs consistently fel wel below the statutory limits.
More recent legislation that made additional visas available for the Iraqi and Afghan SIV
programs provided that these visas would remain available until used. P.L. 113-66 provided for
the issuance of 2,500 visas to principal applicants under the Iraqi program after January 1, 2014.
This law required that applications be filed by September 30, 2014. According to the April 2020
quarterly report on the Iraqi program: “This program wil continue until al qualified applicants
have received visas. There are sufficient visa numbers remaining to meet demand from applicants

126 Subsequent amendments, however, made changes to the numerical limitations provisions (see the “ Special
Immigrant Visas for Iraqis and Afghans”
section of this report).
Congressional Research Service

24

link to page 9 link to page 9 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

in the pipeline.”127 According to the January 2021 quarterly report, 2,116 of the al otted 2,500
visas had been issued as of December 31, 2020.128
Legislation enacted from the 113th Congress to 116th Congress made a total of 26,500 Afghan
SIVs available for issuance after December 19, 2014, according to DOS.129 Some of these laws
also extended employment termination dates and application deadlines for this program (see the
“Afghan Program” section of this report for details). In 2014 and 2017, DOS temporarily stopped
scheduling interviews for Afghan SIV applicants due to a dwindling stock of available visas.130
According to the January 2021 quarterly report on the Afghan program, as of December 31, 2020,
15,507 of the al otted 26,500 visas had been issued, leaving 10,993 visas available for issuance.131
At the direction of Congress, the 2020 DOS OIG report addressed “the effect of uncertainty of
visa availability on visa processing,” 132 The report distinguished between the initial years of the
Afghan SIV program, for which Congress provided annual visa al ocations in advance, and the
later years. It stated, “Uncertainty regarding visa availability started in FY 2014, when Congress
began authorizing SIVs in various annual legislations and the Department increased visa
issuance.”133 The report concluded that the uncertainty of visa availability negatively affected
application processing. It further found that the temporary character of the Afghan SIV program
was another source of uncertainty hampering its operation:
In addition to uncertainty regarding the number of available visas, the temporary nature of
the Afghan SIV program affects the Department’s ability to conduct long-term planning to
support the program…. [O]verall uncertainty with the program’s future has likely
contributed to the Department’s inability to meet the 9-month processing timeframe.134
Regarding congressional action going forward, the report noted that “likely future applicant
volume should be considered when authorizing visas to effectively reduce visa uncertainty,
thereby improving the efficiency of Afghan SIV processing.”135
Conclusion
There seems to be broad agreement that the United States should admit for permanent residence
Iraqis and Afghans who assisted the U.S. government overseas, provided that they do not pose
security risks. Yet implementing the SIV programs intended to accomplish this policy goal has
proven difficult. Given the seeming consensus that the U.S. government should assist its Iraqi and
Afghan employees in need, an ongoing question for Congress is whether the existing SIV
provisions are sufficient to accomplish this, or whether further extensions of or changes to the

127 Joint Department of State/Department of Homeland Security Report: Status of the Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa
Program
, April 2020, p, 1, https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/SIVs/Iraqi-Public-Quarterly-Report -Q2-April-
2020.pdf.
128 Quarterly Report on the Iraqi SIV Program, January 2021, p. 1.
129 T wo FY2021 measures enacted at the end of the 116th Congress included language to authorize different numbers of
additional Afghan SIVs. T he 26,500 total includes the FY2021 CAA provision of 4,000 additional visas, in accordance
with DOS’s view that this is the operative allocation. For further discussion of this issue, see the last paragraph of the
“Afghan Program” section of this report.
130 For a discussion of the impact of these temporary stoppages, see 2020 DOS OIG report, pp. 11 -13.
131 Quarterly Report on the Afghan SIV Program, January 2021, p. 1.
132 P.L. 116-92, §1215(b)(6).
133 2020 DOS OIG report, p. 11
134 Ibid., p. 13.
135 Ibid., p. 14
Congressional Research Service

25

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

temporary Iraqi and Afghan SIV programs are warranted. The pending withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Afghanistan has added new urgency to these questions.
Congressional Research Service

26

link to page 16 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 16 link to page 16 link to page 30 link to page 31 link to page 31 link to page 7 link to page 7 link to page 30 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Appendix. Additional Special Immigrant Data
Iraqi and Afghan Translators and Interpreters
Table 2
in the main body of the report provides data on visa issuances to Iraqis and Afghans
(combined) under the special immigrant classification for translators and interpreters. The tables
here present visa issuance data under this classification for Iraqis and Afghans separately. Table
A-1 provides data on Iraqi nationals who were issued SIVs or adjusted to LPR status in the
United States. Table A-2 provides comparable data for Afghan nationals. Both Table A-1 and
Table A-2 exclude certain dependents that are included in Table 2. These are dependents (32 in
total) who received an SIV or adjusted status under the translator/interpreter classification and are
Iraqi or Afghan nationals but were born in a third country. These 32 dependents account for the
discrepancy between these tables and Table 2. The significant decreases in Table A-1 and Table
A-2
after FY2008 reflect changes in the numerical limitations on this classification (see the “Iraqi
and Afghan Translators or Interpreters” section of this report).
Table A-1. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqi Translators and Interpreters
Fiscal Year
Principals
Dependents
Total
2007
437
387
824
2008
353
327
680
2009
30
38
68
2010
13
40
53
2011
8
32
40
2012
7
29
36
2013
5
11
16
2014
2
4
6
2015
1
0
1
2016
3
9
12
2017
2
2
4
2018
0
0
0
2019
4
1
5
2020
6
14
20
2021a
6
6
12
Totals
877
900
1,777
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
Notes: The data include individuals classified as special immigrants who adjusted to LPR status in the United
States; the data do not include dependents born in a country other than Iraq.
a. Through March 31, 2021.
Congressional Research Service

27

link to page 31 link to page 17 link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 32 link to page 17 link to page 17 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Table A-2. Special Immigrant Visas for Afghan Translators and Interpreters
Fiscal Year
Principals
Dependents
Total
2007
100
69
169
2008
206
220
426
2009
21
30
51
2010
30
43
73
2011
34
53
87
2012
57
61
118
2013
27
68
95
2014
43
127
170
2015
43
146
189
2016
55
156
211
2017
49
169
218
2018
50
144
194
2019
17
55
72
2020
13
42
55
2021a
3
8
11
Totals
748
1,391
2,139
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
Notes: The data include individuals classified as special immigrants who adjusted to LPR status in the United
States; the data do not include dependents born in a country other than Afghanistan.
a. Through March 31, 2021.
Iraqis and Afghans Who Worked for the U.S. Government
Table 3
in the main body of the report provides data on visa issuances to Iraqis and Afghans
(combined) under the special immigrant classification for Iraqis and Afghans who were employed
by, or on behalf of, the U.S. government (or, in the case of Afghans, by the International Security
Assistance Force). The tables here present visa issuance data under this classification for Iraqis
and Afghans separately. Table A-3 provides data on Iraqi nationals who were issued SIVs or
adjusted to LPR status in the United States. Table A-4 provides comparable data for Afghan
nationals. Both Table A-3 and Table A-4 exclude certain dependents that are included in Table 3.
These are dependents (598 in total) who received an SIV or adjusted status under this
classification and are Iraqi or Afghan nationals but were born in a third country. These 598
dependents account for the discrepancy between these tables and Table 3.
Congressional Research Service

28

link to page 32 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

Table A-3. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis Who Worked for the U.S. Government
Fiscal Year
Principals
Dependents
Total
2008
172
125
297
2009
1,418
1,347
2,765
2010
940
1,051
1,991
2011
317
352
669
2012
1,661
2,209
3,870
2013
1,340
2,215
3,555
2014
435
1,075
1,510
2015
335
845
1,180
2016
657
1,593
2,250
2017
557
1,577
2,134
2018
152
372
524
2019
69
179
248
2020
30
68
98
2021a
4
10
14
Totals
8,087
13,018
21,105
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
Notes: The data include individuals with approved petitions under the translator/interpreter program whose
cases were converted in accordance with P.L. 110-242; the data also include individuals classified as special
immigrants who adjusted to LPR status in the United States; the data do not include dependents born in a
country other than Iraq.
a. Through March 31, 2021.
Table A-4. Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans Who Worked for
the U.S. Government
Fiscal Year
Principals
Dependents
Total
2008
199
195
394
2009
262
366
628
2010
7
36
43
2011
3
28
31
2012
63
62
125
2013
652
846
1,498
2014
3,441
5,666
9,107
2015
2,301
4,411
6,712
2016
3,626
8,460
12,086
2017
4,120
12,050
16,170
2018
1,649
5,585
7,234
2019
2,347
7,394
9,741
Congressional Research Service

29

link to page 33 Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

2020
1,799
6,024
7,823
2021a
360
1,676
2,036
Totals
20,829
52,799
73,628
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.
Notes: The data include individuals with approved petitions under the translator/interpreter program whose
cases were converted in accordance with P.L. 110-242; the data also include individuals classified as special
immigrants who adjusted to LPR status in the United States; the data do not include dependents born in a
country other than Afghanistan.
a. Through March 31, 2021.







Author Information

Andorra Bruno

Specialist in Immigration Policy



Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service
R43725 · VERSION 15 · UPDATED
30