Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Updated March 27, 2023
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela remains under the rule of authoritarian President
Between 2014 and 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted
Nicolás Maduro (2013-present), despite an array of
by 80%, according to estimates by the International
sanctions and international support for an interim
Monetary Fund. According to a February 2021 Government
government from 2019 to 2022. Within Venezuela, the
Accountability Office report, sanctions imposed by the
Unity Platform of opposition parties has adjusted its
United States in response to Maduro’s authoritarian actions,
strategy, deciding to compete in presidential elections due
particularly sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil industry,
in 2024, dissolve the interim government led by Juan
contributed to the economic crisis. Since 2021,
Guaidó, and negotiate with the Maduro government.
hyperinflation has abated and poverty has declined.
Meanwhile, some foreign governments have normalized
According to the National Survey of Living Conditions,
relations with the Maduro government. In November 2022,
conducted by a Venezuelan university, roughly 50% of the
the Biden Administration offered limited sanctions relief to
population lived in poverty in 2022 (down from 65% in
the Maduro government if those negotiations produce
2021). Income inequality has increased significantly,
“meaningful progress” toward elections. With negotiations
however, particularly after the government eased
stalled, Congress may consider legislation and oversight to
restrictions on access to dollars. Since that time, the income
shape U.S. policy responses to developments in Venezuela.
gap between those with and without access to dollars has
widened sharply.
Political Situation
Venezuela, which Freedom House ranked “partly free”
In 2023, an estimated 7.7 million Venezuelans required
under President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), has deteriorated
humanitarian assistance, according to the United Nations.
to “not free” under Nicolás Maduro (2013-present). Maduro
Food insecurity remains a challenge, mainly due to the
has used security forces, buoyed by corrupt courts, to quash
excessive dollar-denominated price of food. Many
dissent. His government has rewarded allies, particularly in
households lack reliable access to potable water, and
the security forces, by allowing them to earn income from
interruptions in electrical service and gas supplies are
illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other illicit
common. With a collapsed health system, overall health
activities. Those forces have detained and abused Maduro’s
indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality rates,
opponents, including military officers, politicians, and civic
remain poor. Previously eradicated diseases such as
leaders. As of March 2023, the government had imprisoned
diphtheria and measles also have become a major concern.
282 political prisoners, according to Foro Penal, a
Venezuelan human rights group. The U.N. Office of the
As of March 2023, U.N. agencies estimated that more than
High Commissioner for Human Rights has documented,
7.2 million Venezuelans had left the country (with 26.9
and the International Criminal Court is investigating,
million remaining). Some 6 million of these migrants fled
extrajudicial killings and other grave crimes committed by
to other Latin American and Caribbean countries, and a
Venezuela’s security forces.
record 187,700 arrived at the U.S. border in FY2022.
Migrants have faced obstacles keeping jobs and accessing
The Venezuelan opposition has been weak and divided,
health care; they are vulnerable to human trafficking and
with many of its leaders in exile. Guaidó challenged
other abuses. In 2021, Colombia and Peru began granting
Maduro’s authority in 2019, but support for Guaidó has
temporary protected status to Venezuelans.
since faded. In April 2021, Guaidó called on opposition
parties and civil society to form a Unity Platform. In late
International Response
November 2022, the Unity Platform announced the
The international community, once divided on policies
resumption of Norway-mediated talks with Maduro
toward Venezuela, has coalesced behind support for
officials; the talks had been suspended since October 2021.
Maduro-opposition negotiations.
The two sides announced an agreement to establish a U.N.-
administered fund for humanitarian programs supported by
In 2019, the United States, European Union (EU), Canada,
Venezuelan assets frozen abroad. Technical and legal
and most Western Hemisphere countries recognized Guaidó
challenges have delayed the fund’s creation. Since
as interim president and exerted economic and diplomatic
November, Maduro has been unwilling to allow
pressure on Maduro to leave office. Other countries,
negotiations to advance. Nevertheless, the Unity Platform
including China, Russia, Cuba, Turkey, and Iran, have
scheduled a primary election for October 2023 to select one
supported the Maduro government. Russia has supported
candidate to stand against Maduro in 2024.
the oil industry in Venezuela, helped Venezuela skirt U.S.
sanctions, and sent military personnel and equipment to the
Economic and Humanitarian Crisis
country. China has continued to purchase Venezuelan oil
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
and has provided surveillance equipment and technology to
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
Maduro. Turkey has purchased Venezuela’s illegally mined
exacerbating the effects of a decline in oil production.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
gold. Since May 2020, Iran has shipped gasoline to
and other crimes. U.S. agencies have worked with partner
Venezuela in exchange for gold.
countries to combat drug trafficking, money laundering,
and illicit mining in Venezuela. In December 2021, the
By 2022, as sanctions had failed to dislodge Maduro and
Treasury Department designated two Revolutionary Armed
domestic support for Guaidó waned, most countries save
Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident groups that operate
the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) no longer
in Venezuela as foreign terrorist organizations.
recognized the Guaidó government. The EU, Canada, the
UK, and the United States have issued joint statements,
U.S. Assistance. The United States has been providing
including most recently in November 2022, pledging to
assistance toward a coordinated regional response to the
review sanctions if restarted negotiations yield improved
Venezuelan migration crisis. From FY2017 to FY2023, the
conditions for the Venezuelan people. Colombia, long a
United States has provided some $2.5 billion in
staunch Guaidó supporter, has restored diplomatic relations
humanitarian aid to Venezuela and countries sheltering
with the Maduro government, as have most neighboring
Venezuelans. U.S. democracy, development, and health
countries. Most of Venezuela’s neighbors now back a
support for the Venezuela crisis has totaled $387 million.
negotiated solution to the crisis.
Migration. In July 2022, the Administration announced an
U.S. Policy
18-month extension of the temporary protected status for
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as
Venezuelans announced in March 2021. U.S. officials
Venezuela's legitimate president in January 2019. From
introduced new policies in October 2022 aimed at
then until 2022, U.S. officials sought to compel Maduro to
addressing a significant rise in apprehensions of
leave office through diplomatic, economic, and legal
Venezuelans at the Southwest border. (See CRS Insight
pressure. While maintaining most sanctions, the Biden
IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan
Administration has recently sought to support negotiations.
Migrants).Those policies could change, however, due to
U.S. officials met with Maduro twice in 2022 and
ongoing legal challenges.
negotiated an October 2022 prisoner swap. Since November
2022, the Department of the Treasury has issued licenses to
Congressional Action. According to the VERDAD Act
allow certain companies to conduct business with Petróleos
(P.L. 116-94, Division J), U.S. policy supports “diplomatic
de Venezuela , S.A. (PdVSA), Venezuela’s state oil
engagement in order to advance a negotiated and peaceful
company, as incentives for Maduro to resume negotiations.
solution” to the crisis in Venezuela. The 118th Congress
could consider using various policy tools to shape the U.S.
The U.S. government recognizes the 2015 National
approach toward Venezuela.
Assembly as “the last remaining democratic institution in
Venezuela.” In January 2023, the Administration accepted
The VERDAD Act authorizes targeted sanctions for
the National Assembly’s decision to dissolve the interim
corruption, human rights abuses, and antidemocratic actions
government. Opposition supporters are concerned that the
in Venezuela through 2023. Congress may seek to extend
dissolution of the interim government could threaten the
those sanctions or modify them, for example, by expanding
future of Venezuelan assets frozen abroad. Creditors are
the types of behavior subject to sanctions or removing
seeking to seize those assets for debt repayment.
sanctions on those who facilitate democratic elections.
Sanctions and Indictments. Sanctions are key parts of
While some in Congress support continued pressure on the
U.S. policy toward Venezuela. They include the following:
Maduro government, others argue that broad sanctions have
not achieved their stated goals and have hurt the
Individual sanctions for terrorism, drug trafficking,
Venezuelan people. Congress could repeal sanctions
antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, or
authorities, codify existing executive orders, and/or set the
corruption (see Executive Order [E.O.] 13692; P.L. 113-
terms under which the Administration could lift sanctions.
278; P.L. 114-194)
Financial sanctions restricting access to U.S. financial
In December 2022, Congress enacted the FY2023
markets by the Maduro government and PdVSA (E.O.
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103), which
13808); prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency
included $50 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for
issued by the Maduro government (E.O. 13827); and
democracy programs in Venezuela. The Administration
prohibiting the purchase of Venezuelan debt (E.O.
requested $54 million for Venezuela in its FY2024 budget
13835)
($50 million in ESF and $4 million in global health funds);
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
slightly more than the $40 million in ESF and $8.6 million
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
in global health allocated in FY2022. Congress may modify
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
the amount and type of assistance appropriated for
other entities (E.O. 13850)
Venezuela and may examine how to coordinate future
assistance with the Venezuelan opposition, particularly if
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
the Unity Platform seeks election-related assistance.
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
See also CRS Insight IN12112, Venezuela: Issues for the
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884)
118th Congress; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela:
In March 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Maduro
Overview of U.S. Sanctions; and CRS Report R44841,
and 14 top officials for narco-terrorism, drug trafficking,
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10230
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 56 · UPDATED