Updated August 1, 2022
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela, under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro,
After the March 2022 meeting with U.S. officials, Maduro
remains in a deep economic and humanitarian crisis
released two unjustly imprisoned Americans and pledged to
worsened by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
restart negotiations but has not done so. Even if
pandemic. Maduro has consolidated power over all of
negotiations restart, it is unclear whether Maduro will make
Venezuela’s institutions since his 2013 election after the
significant concessions without U.S. sanctions relief.
death of President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). Maduro’s
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) took control of
Economic and Humanitarian Crisis
the National Assembly in January 2021. The PSUV and
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
allies won 19 of 23 gubernatorial races in flawed November
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
2021 elections.
exacerbating the effects of a decline in oil production.
Between 2014 and 2021, Venezuela’s economy contracted
Maduro has quashed dissent and resisted U.S. and
by 80%, according to estimates by the International
international pressure to step down since his reelection in a
Monetary Fund (IMF). According to a February 2021
2018 presidential vote widely condemned as fraudulent.
Government Accountability Office report, sanctions
Support for opposition leader Juan Guaidó, the former
imposed by the United States in response to Maduro’s
National Assembly president once regarded as interim
authoritarian actions, particularly sanctions targeting
president by nearly 60 other countries, has dissipated,
Venezuela’s oil industry, contributed to the economic crisis.
although the Biden Administration continues to recognize
Since 2021, hyperinflation has abated and higher oil prices
Guaidó’s government, partially to prevent Venezuelan
driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appear to be driving
assets abroad from coming under Maduro’s control.
a nascent economic recovery.
Administration officials nevertheless met with Maduro in
March and June 2022, reportedly to discuss U.S. citizens
Nevertheless, shortages in food and medicine, declines in
illegally detained in Venezuela, restarting stalled
purchasing power, and a collapse of social services have
negotiations with the opposition, and energy issues.
created a humanitarian crisis. According to the National
Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI), a May 2021
Political Situation
survey by a group of Venezuelan universities, 94% of
Maduro has used security forces, buoyed by corrupt courts,
Venezuelans live in poverty, with 77% in extreme poverty,
to quash dissent. His government has rewarded allies,
and 60% experience moderate to severe food insecurity. In
particularly in the security forces, by allowing them to earn
April 2021, the Maduro government allowed the World
income from illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other
Food Program to launch a school lunch program. Health
illicit activities. Those forces have detained and abused
indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality rates,
Maduro’s opponents, including military officers, opposition
have worsened. Violent clashes between illegally armed
politicians, and civic leaders. As of July 25, 2022, the
groups along the Venezuela-Colombia border have
government had imprisoned 244 political prisoners,
complicated humanitarian relief efforts in that region.
according to Foro Penal, a Venezuelan human rights group.
The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
According to data from Johns Hopkins University (JHU),
Rights has documented, and the International Criminal
Venezuela reported 5,741 deaths from COVID-19 (as of
Court is investigating, extrajudicial killings and other grave
late July 2022), but experts maintain the actual number is
crimes committed by Venezuela’s security forces.
much higher. The pandemic has strained Venezuela’s
hollowed-out health system. According to JHU, 50.2% of
The Venezuelan opposition has been weak and divided,
Venezuelans were fully vaccinated as of July 2022.
with many of its leaders in exile. Guaidó challenged
Venezuela has used Russian and Cuban vaccines and has
Maduro’s authority in 2019, but Guaidó’s support has since
received Chinese vaccines both bilaterally and through the
faded. After Norway-led negotiations stalled in mid-2019,
COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility.
the Maduro government persecuted Guaidó’s supporters. In
April 2021, Guaidó called on opposition parties, labor and
As of July 2022, U.N. agencies estimated 6.2 million
civic groups, and business leaders to form a Unity Platform
Venezuelans had left the country (with 26.9 million
to negotiate with Maduro officials. The Unity Platform
remaining). Some 5.1 million of these migrants fled to other
seeks better human rights, humanitarian, and electoral
Latin American and Caribbean countries. Migrants have
conditions for the 2024 presidential elections; Maduro’s
faced obstacles keeping jobs and accessing health care
team seeks relief from U.S. sanctions and international
during the pandemic; they are vulnerable to human
recognition. Mediated by Norway, the negotiations began in
trafficking and other abuses. In 2021, Colombia and Peru
Mexico in September 2021, but Maduro suspended them
began granting temporary protected status to Venezuelans.
after the United States extradited a top ally, Alex Saab,
from Cape Verde to stand trial for money laundering.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
International Response
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
The international community is divided on policies toward
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
Venezuela, hindering the effectiveness of efforts to restore
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
democratic processes. The United States has encouraged
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884).
other countries to sanction Maduro officials, hold the
In March 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Maduro
Maduro government responsible for human rights abuses,
and 14 top officials for narco-terrorism, drug trafficking,
and provide humanitarian aid to Venezuelans. The United
and other crimes. U.S. agencies have worked with partner
States, European Union (EU), Canada, and 11 Western
countries to combat drug trafficking, money laundering,
Hemisphere countries have imposed targeted sanctions and
and illicit mining in Venezuela. In December 2021, the
travel bans on Maduro officials. The United Kingdom and a
Treasury Department designated two Revolutionary Armed
few Western Hemisphere countries still recognize Guaidó
Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident groups that operate
as interim president. The EU, Canada, and the United States
in Venezuela as foreign terrorist organizations.
have issued joint statements, including in February 2022,
pledging to review sanctions if negotiations yield improved
U.S. Assistance. The United States is providing assistance
conditions for the Venezuelan people. Colombia, long a
and helping coordinate the regional response to the
staunch Guaidó supporter, is poised to restore diplomatic
Venezuelan migration crisis. From FY2017 to FY2022, the
relations with the Maduro government after President-Elect
United States provided $1.94 billion in humanitarian aid to
Gustavo Petro takes office on August 7; Petro backs a
Venezuela and countries sheltering Venezuelans. U.S.
negotiated solution to the Venezuela crisis.
democracy, development, and health support for the
Venezuela crisis totaled $323 million through FY2021 (the
Other countries, including China, Russia, Cuba, Turkey,
last year complete figures are available).
and Iran, support Maduro. Russia has supported the oil
industry in Venezuela, helped Venezuela skirt U.S.
Congressional Action. In March 2022, Congress enacted
sanctions, and sent military personnel and equipment to the
the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-
country. China continues to purchase Venezuelan oil and
103), which includes $40 million for democracy programs
has provided surveillance equipment and other technology.
in Venezuela ($7 million more than the FY2021 allocation).
Turkey has purchased Venezuela’s illegally mined gold.
The act directs U.S. agencies to continue providing support
Since May 2020, Iran has shipped gasoline to Venezuela in
to other countries hosting Venezuelans. The explanatory
exchange for gold, and the countries signed a 20-year
statement directs USAID to address violence against
economic cooperation agreement in July 2022.
Venezuelan women and child migrants and requires a report
on how the U.S. government can repatriate illegally stolen
U.S. Policy
assets to the people of Venezuela.
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as
Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019. The
Congress is considering the Administration’s FY2023
Trump Administration discussed using military force in
request of $55 million for Venezuela. The FY2023 State
Venezuela but ultimately sought to compel Maduro to leave
and Foreign Operations appropriations bill reported by the
office through diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure.
House Appropriations Committee (H.R. 8282) would
The Biden Administration initially maintained a similar
provide $50 million in assistance for Venezuela, including
policy toward Venezuela, although the March 2022 talks
democracy funding.
noted above signaled a policy shift. Biden officials are
considering how potential U.S. sanctions relief could
Oversight has focused on the Biden Administration’s
incentivize Maduro to negotiate a path toward free and fair
approach to sanctions and negotiations. While some in
elections. In July 2022, the Administration announced an
Congress support continued pressure on the Maduro
18-month extension of the temporary protected status first
government, others assert that broad sanctions have hurt the
announced for Venezuelans in March 2021.
Venezuelan people. Whereas some Members of Congress
expressed support for U.S. talks with Maduro, others
Sanctions and Indictments. Sanctions are key parts of
opposed those talks and introduced legislation that would
U.S. policy toward Venezuela. They include the following:
prohibit U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil (H.R. 6942, H.R.
Individual sanctions for terrorism, drug trafficking,
7012, H.R. 7023, H.R. 7207, S. 3798). Among other bills,
antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, or
H.R. 6539 and S. 688 (reported by the Senate Homeland
corruption (see Executive Order [E.O.] 13692; P.L. 113-
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in March
278; P.L. 114-194)
2021) would prohibit contracting with persons who do
business with the Maduro regime. H.R. 6539 and S. 1417
Financial sanctions restricting access to U.S. financial
would establish a fund to help repatriate frozen Venezuelan
markets by the Maduro government and state oil
assets in the United States to the Venezuelan people.
company PdVSA (E.O. 13808); prohibiting transactions
using cryptocurrency issued by the Maduro government
See also CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional
(E.O. 13827); and prohibiting the purchase of
Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19; CRS In Focus
Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835)
IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
Affairs
other entities (E.O. 13850)
IF10230
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 53 · UPDATED