Updated May 3, 2019
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
The political situation in Venezuela is at a stalemate. High-
announced he was willing to serve as interim president until
level military leaders did not back interim President Juan
new presidential elections are held. Buoyed by a massive
Guaidó’s April 30, 2019, call for an uprising against the
turnout for protests he called for, Guaidó took the oath of
regime of Nicolás Maduro. Clashes between pro-Guaidó
office on January 23, 2019. Under Guaidó’s leadership, the
protesters and security forces have resulted in at least four
National Assembly has since enacted resolutions declaring
deaths and hundreds of injuries. Guaidó hopes sustained
Maduro’s mandate illegitimate, establishing a framework
protests and strikes, combined with international pressure,
for a transition government, drafting a proposal to offer
will compel Maduro to leave office.
amnesty for officials who support the transition, and
creating a strategy for receiving humanitarian assistance.
Background on the Political and Economic Crisis
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under Maduro’s
Guaidó’s supporters have organized two high-profile efforts
authoritarian rule. Maduro, leader of the United Socialist
to encourage security forces to abandon the regime, neither
Party of Venezuela (PSUV), was narrowly elected in 2013
of which has succeeded. On February 23, they sought to
after the death of populist President Hugo Chávez, who had
bring emergency supplies donated from the United States
served since 1999. Most Venezuelans and much of the
and others positioned on the Colombia- and Brazil-
international community considered Maduro’s May 2018
Venezuela borders into the country. Security forces loyal to
reelection illegitimate. Maduro has used the courts, security
Maduro killed seven individuals (four indigenous people)
forces, and electoral council to quash dissent. According to
and injured hundreds as they prevented the aid convoys
the human rights organization Foro Penal, the regime held
from crossing the border. While that aid remains blocked,
790 political prisoners as of mid-April 2019.
both Guaidó and Maduro agreed to allow the International
Committee of the Red Cross to begin providing aid.
Maduro’s regime has mismanaged the economy and
engaged in massive corruption, exacerbating the impact of a
On April 30, 2019, Guaidó and Leopoldo López, a former
decline in global oil prices and collapsing oil production on
political prisoner and head of the VP party who had been
the country’s economy. According to the International
released from house arrest by pro-Guaidó military officials,
Monetary Fund, Venezuela’s economy contracted by 18%
called for a civil-military rebellion against the Maduro
in 2018. Inflation may exceed 10 million percent in 2019.
regime. Forces loyal to Maduro violently put down pro-
Guaidó demonstrations and attacked several journalists.
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
The regime took several media outlets off the air and
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
blocked social media. As the day ended, López sought
humanitarian crisis. According to household surveys, the
refuge in the Spanish Embassy.
percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty reached 87%
in 2017. U.N. officials estimate that some 7 million people
Many observers regard the military’s participation as
are in need of humanitarian assistance. Health indicators,
essential for the opposition’s transition plan to work. For
particularly infant and maternal mortality rates, have
now, however, aside from the former head of the national
worsened. Previously eradicated diseases like diphtheria
intelligence agency, the military high command appears to
and measles have returned and spread. In March 2019, U.N.
remain loyal to Maduro. Many military leaders have
agencies estimated that at least 3.7 million Venezuelans had
enriched themselves through corruption, drug trafficking,
left the country, 3 million of whom were in Latin America
and other illicit industries. Some military leaders may fear
and the Caribbean. Migrant flows could increase, as recent
that they could face prosecution for human rights abuses
electrical blackouts have worsened conditions considerably.
under a new government, even though the opposition has
proposed amnesty for those who join their side.
Interim Government Challenges Maduro Regime
Since January 2019, the democratically elected, opposition-
Human Rights Concerns
controlled National Assembly and its president, Juan
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
Guaidó, have sought to establish an interim government.
civilian militias have violently quashed protests and
The United States and 53 other countries (including most of
detained and abused those suspected of dissent. In 2017,
the European Union [EU] and 15 Western Hemisphere
security forces committed serious human rights violations
countries) now recognize Guaidó as interim president of
during clashes with protesters that left more than 130 killed
Venezuela and view the National Assembly as Venezuela’s
and thousands injured. The regime has arrested and tortured
only democratic institution. Despite their backing, Maduro
many of those it perceives as threats, including military
remains in power.
officers and opposition politicians. It has arrested Guaidó’s
chief of staff and barred Guaidó from seeking office for 15
The National Assembly elected Guaidó as its president on
years. Analysts predict increasing repression as Maduro has
January 5, 2019; he is a 35-year-old industrial engineer
called for López and other opposition leaders’ arrest. Some
from the Popular Will (VP) party. In mid-January, Guaidó
fear Guaidó could also face arrest or exile.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
International Response
company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to access
The international community remains divided over how to
the U.S. financial system (E.O. 13808), barring U.S.
respond to the crisis in Venezuela. Russia, Cuba (which has
purchases of Venezuela’s new digital currency (E.O.
provided some military and intelligence support), Turkey,
13827), and barring U.S. purchases of Venezuelan debt
and other countries support Maduro. Russia and China have
(E.O. 13835). On November 1, 2018, President Trump
provided aid to Maduro and blocked efforts at the U.N.
signed E.O. 13850, creating a framework to sanction those
Security Council to recognize the Guaidó government.
who operate in Venezuela’s gold sector or are complicit in
Russia has supported Venezuela’s struggling oil industry
corrupt transactions involving the government. On January
and sent military personnel and equipment, prompting U.S.
28, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Administration imposed
condemnation. Russia condemned Guaidó’s “failed coup”
sanctions on PdVSA to prevent Maduro and his regime
and opposes what it views as U.S.-backed regime change.
from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue. Secondary
sanctions are being applied to entities and individuals doing
The Lima Group of Western Hemisphere countries and the
business with the Maduro regime. Some observers are
EU support the Guaidó government but oppose any military
concerned that the stronger economic sanctions are
intervention to oust Maduro. An International Contact
worsening the humanitarian situation.
Group on Venezuela, backed by the EU and several Latin
American countries, is pushing for internationally observed
Humanitarian Assistance. The United States is providing
elections to be held through a negotiated, political process.
assistance and helping to coordinate and support the
regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis. The
Recent U.S. Policy
United States has committed to providing more than $213.3
Since recognizing the Guaidó government on January 23,
million since FY2017 for Venezuelans who have fled to
2019, the United States has coordinated its efforts with
other countries and for the communities hosting them.
Interim President Guaidó and encouraged other countries to
recognize his government. The Trump Administration has
Congressional Action. The 116th Congress is following
blocked the Maduro regime’s access to revenue from
developments in Venezuela and overseeing U.S. policy
Venezuela’s state oil company and imposed targeted
responses. Congress provided $17.5 million for democracy
sanctions (visa bans and financial sanctions) on Maduro
and rule of law programs in Venezuela in the FY2019
officials and their families. In addition to increasing
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6); the joint
humanitarian aid to countries sheltering Venezuelans, the
explanatory statement (H.Rept. 116-9) requires a strategy
Administration has pre-positioned assistance for the
on how U.S. agencies are supporting countries sheltering
Venezuelan people in Brazil, Colombia, and Curaçao. As
Venezuelans. The Administration’s FY2020 budget request
the situation in Venezuela deteriorated, the State
asks for $9 million in democracy aid and the authority to
Department withdrew its remaining diplomatic personnel
transfer up to $500 million to support a transition or
on March 11.
respond to a crisis in Venezuela.
President Trump has repeatedly asserted that “all options
On March 25, 2019, the House passed H.R. 854 (Mucarsel-
are on the table” to address the Venezuela situation,
Powell) to require a U.S. strategy to provide humanitarian
including using U.S. military force. On April 30, National
assistance to Venezuelans and authorize humanitarian aid;
Security Adviser John Bolton publicly identified three
H.R. 920 (Shalala), to restrict arms transfers to the Maduro
Maduro officials, including the defense minister, who he
regime; and H.R. 1102 (Wasserman Schultz) to require the
says had pledged to back Guaidó’s uprising. On May 1,
State Department to assess the threat posed by Russian-
Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said that U.S. “military
Venezuelan security cooperation. On April 9, 2019, the
action was possible” if Maduro does not step down.
House Committee on Foreign Affairs ordered reported H.R.
Statements threatening U.S. military action have
1004 (Cicilline) to prohibit the use of U.S. military forces in
accompanied denunciations of Cuba and Russia’s support
combat operations in Venezuela.
of the Maduro regime. President Trump has threatened
additional sanctions on Cuba over Venezuela.
Other initiatives introduced include H.R. 549 (Soto)/S. 636
(Menendez), to make certain Venezuelans in the United
Targeted Sanctions. In 2015, President Obama issued
States eligible for Temporary Protected Status; H.R. 2204
Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, authorizing targeted
(Waltz), to prohibit federal contracting with persons who
sanctions against individuals who inhibit democratic
have business ties to the Maduro regime; S.J.Res. 11
processes, commit violence or human rights abuses, or
(Merkley), to prohibit the unauthorized use of the U.S.
engage in corruption. The Trump Administration has
military in Venezuela; and S. 1025 (Menendez), to, among
imposed sanctions on 74 Venezuelan officials pursuant to
other measures, provide humanitarian assistance to
E.O. 13692. They include Maduro and his wife; Vice
Venezuela and support its democratic transition and
President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First Vice President
reconstruction.
Diosdado Cabello; Supreme Court members; the leaders of
Venezuela’s army, national guard, and national police; and
Also see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of
governors. The United States also has imposed sanctions on
U.S. Sanctions, and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela
22 individuals and 27 entities for drug trafficking.
Regional Migration Crisis.
Broader Sanctions (Including Oil Sanctions). The
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Administration has issued executive orders restricting the
Affairs
ability of the government and of Venezuela’s state oil
IF10230
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 36 · UPDATED