Updated March 1, 2019
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Political and Economic Crisis
for a transition government, offering amnesty for officials
Venezuela has been in a deep crisis under the authoritarian
(including the military) who support the transition, and
rule of President Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist
creating a strategy for receiving humanitarian assistance.
Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro was narrowly elected
in 2013 after the death of populist President Hugo Chávez,
Many of Guaidó’s supporters had hoped that these actions,
who had served since 1999. Maduro’s regime has exhibited
which culminated in a large-scale effort to have Venezuelan
high levels of corruption and economic mismanagement,
civilians bring assistance from the United States and other
which have exacerbated the impact of a decline in global oil
donors into the country on February 23, 2019, would
prices on the country’s economy. According to the
encourage military officers to abandon the Maduro regime.
International Monetary Fund, Venezuela’s economy
In anticipation, the Maduro regime erected barricades at the
contracted by 18% and inflation exceeded 1.37 million
border with Colombia, closed the border with Brazil, and
percent in 2018. Nevertheless, Maduro has used the courts,
halted air and sea traffic from three neighboring Dutch
security forces, and electoral council to repress political
Caribbean islands, one of which (Curacao), like Brazil and
opposition and quash dissent. According to the Venezuelan
Colombia, had agreed to pre-position U.S. assistance.
human rights organization Foro Penal, the regime held 918
According to Foro Penal, National Guard troops and armed
political prisoners as of mid-February 2019. Most
civilian militias (colectivos) killed at least five individuals
Venezuelans and much of the international community
(four indigenous people), injured hundreds, and burned
considered Maduro’s May 2018 reelection illegitimate.
trucks containing food and medical supplies. With the
Maduro regime willing to use force to restrict the arrival of
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
food and medicine, Guaidó has limited room to maneuver.
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela that is affecting the entire
For now, the military high command remains loyal to
region. According to household surveys, the percentage of
Maduro. Many military leaders have enriched themselves
Venezuelans living in poverty increased from 48.4% in
under Maduro through corruption, drug trafficking, and
2014 to 87% in 2017. Health indicators, particularly infant
other illicit industries. Others may fear that they will face
and maternal mortality rates, have worsened. Previously
prosecution for human rights abuses and others crimes
eradicated diseases, such as diphtheria and measles, have
should a new government take office.
returned and spread. As of January 2019, United Nations
(U.N.) agencies estimated that at least 3.4 million
Human Rights Concerns
Venezuelans (1 in 10) had left the country, 2.7 million of
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
whom were in Latin America and the Caribbean.
colectivos have quashed protests, detained and abused those
suspected of dissent, and used violence against civilians
Interim Government Challenges Maduro Regime
seeking to bring food and medicine into the country. In
Since January 2019, the democratically elected, opposition-
August 2017, a U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
controlled National Assembly and its president, Juan
Human Rights report documented human rights violations
Guaidó, have garnered domestic and international support
perpetrated by Venezuelan security forces against protesters
for their efforts to declare Maduro’s second term
during clashes that left more than 130 killed and thousands
illegitimate and establish an interim government. The
injured. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is
United States and 53 other countries (most of the European
investigating the regime’s serious human rights violations;
Union, 15 Western Hemisphere countries, Australia, and
the Lima Group, a group of Western Hemisphere countries
Japan) have recognized Guaidó as interim president of
that formed in 2016 to coordinate regional efforts to hasten
Venezuela. They view the National Assembly as
a return to democracy in Venezuela, has urged the ICC to
Venezuela’s only democratic institution.
investigate the regime’s recent denial of access to
international assistance, which constitutes a crime against
The National Assembly elected Guaidó as its president on
humanity. Since 2018, the Maduro regime has arrested and
January 5, 2019; he is a 35-year-old industrial engineer
tortured many of those it perceives as threats, including
from the Popular Will (VP) party of Leopoldo López (under
military officers and opposition politicians accused of
house arrest). In mid-January, Guaidó announced he was
involvement in alleged coup attempts. A February 2019
willing to serve as interim president until new presidential
Amnesty International report documents serious human
elections are held. He called for protests on January 23,
rights abuses among the more than 900 individuals
2019, the 61st anniversary of the ouster of another dictator.
arbitrarily detained in January 2019.
Buoyed by massive turnout, Guaidó took the oath of office
on that day. Under Guaidó’s leadership, the National
International Response
Assembly has enacted resolutions declaring that President
The international community remains divided over how to
Maduro’s mandate is illegitimate, establishing a framework
respond to the multifaceted crisis in Venezuela. Russia,
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Cuba, Turkey, and a few other countries support Maduro.
Broader Sanctions (Including Oil Sanctions). The
Russia and China have blocked U.S.-led efforts at the U.N.
Administration has issued executive orders restricting the
Security Council to recognize the Guaidó government. The
government and the ability of Venezuela’s state oil
Lima Group supports the Guaidó government but opposes
company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to access
any military intervention to oust Maduro. An EU-backed
the U.S. financial system (E.O. 13808), barring U.S.
International Contact Group on Venezuela, which also
purchases of Venezuela’s new digital currency (E.O.
includes several Latin American countries, is pushing for
13827), and barring U.S. purchases of Venezuelan debt
internationally observed elections to be held and
(E.O. 13835). On November 1, 2018, President Trump
humanitarian assistance to be allowed into Venezuela
signed E.O. 13850, creating a framework to sanction those
through a negotiated, political process.
who operate in Venezuela’s gold sector or are deemed
complicit in corrupt transactions involving the government.
U.S. Policy
On January 28, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Administration
The United States traditionally had close relations with
imposed sanctions on PdVSA to prevent Maduro and his
Venezuela, a major U.S. oil supplier, but friction increased
government from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue.
under the Chávez government and has intensified under the
Maduro regime. U.S. policymakers have had concerns
Humanitarian Assistance. The United States is providing
about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in
assistance (funded mostly through global humanitarian
Venezuela and the lack of bilateral cooperation on antidrug
accounts) and helping to coordinate and support the
and counterterrorism efforts. In the wake of the May 2018
regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis.
elections, the Trump Administration has increased
Including additional support announced on February 25,
sanctions on the Maduro regime and assistance for
2019, the United States has committed to providing more
neighboring countries sheltering Venezuelan migrants.
than $195 million since FY2017 for Venezuelans who have
fled to other countries and for the communities hosting
The United States has coordinated its efforts with Interim
Venezuelan refugees and migrants.
President Guaidó and encouraged other countries to
recognize his government. On January 10, 2019, the U.S.
Congressional Action. The 116th Congress is closely
State Department condemned Maduro’s “illegitimate
following developments in Venezuela and U.S. policy
usurpation of power.” President Trump recognized Guaidó
responses. Congress provided $17.5 million for democracy
as interim president of Venezuela on January 23 and has
and rule of law programs in Venezuela in the FY2019
encouraged other governments to do the same. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6); the joint
Administration has since blocked the Maduro regime’s
explanatory statement (H.Rept. 116-9) also requires a
access to revenue from Venezuela’s state oil company and
strategy on how U.S. agencies are supporting countries
imposed targeted sanctions (visa bans and financial
sheltering Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Members of
sanctions) on some Maduro officials. President Trump and
Congress have pledged to support the Guaidó government
Vice President Mike Pence have repeatedly asserted that
but have not authorized the use of military force in
“all options are on the table” to address the Venezuela
Venezuela.
situation, including using U.S. military force, although most
observers believe that is a remote possibility.
Other legislative initiatives on Venezuela include H.R. 549
(Soto), to make certain Venezuelans residing in the United
On January 24, 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
States eligible for Temporary Protected Status; H.R. 854
announced that the United States would provide $20 million
(Mucarsel-Powell), to require a U.S. strategy to provide
in additional humanitarian assistance to the people of
humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans in the country and
Venezuela at Guaidó’s request. The United States has since
sheltering abroad and authorize $150 million in U.S.
pre-positioned roughly 400 tons of emergency supplies
humanitarian assistance for Venezuelans in FY2020 and
(food, hygiene and medical kits) on Venezuela’s borders
FY2021; H.R. 920 (Shalala), to restrict arms transfers to the
with Colombia and Brazil.
Maduro regime; H.R. 1004 (Cicilline), to prohibit the use of
U.S. military forces in combat operations in Venezuela; and
Targeted Sanctions. In 2015, President Obama issued
H.R. 1102 (Wasserman-Schultz) requiring the State
Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, authorizing targeted
Department to assess the threat posed by Russian-
sanctions against individuals who inhibit democratic
Venezuelan security cooperation.
processes or institutions, commit violence or human rights
abuses, or engage in corruption. The Trump Administration
For background, see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela:
has imposed sanctions on 67 Venezuelan officials pursuant
Overview of U.S. Sanctions; CRS In Focus IF11029, The
to E.O. 13692 (in addition to 7 officials sanctioned by
Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis; CRS Insight
President Obama). These officials include President Nicolás
IN11037, Venezuela Oil Sector Sanctions: Market and
Maduro and his wife, Vice President Delcy Rodriguez;
Trade Impacts; and CRS Report R44841, Venezuela:
PSUV First Vice President Diosdado Cabello; eight
Background and U.S. Relations.
Supreme Court members; the leaders of Venezuela’s army,
national guard, and national police; and four state
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
governors. Financial sanctions also have been imposed on
Affairs
some 22 individuals and 27 entities for drug trafficking.
IF10230
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 29 · UPDATED