Updated June 10, 2020
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian
diphtheria and measles have returned and spread. The
rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of
COVID-19 pandemic has presented a new health challenge.
Venezuela (PSUV). On January 10, 2019, Maduro began a
The government reported only 24 deaths from COVID-19
second term that most Venezuelans and much of the
(as of June 10), but experts predict that the actual number is
international community consider illegitimate. Congress has
much higher and that the pandemic could decimate
enacted legislation affecting U.S. policy on Venezuela,
Venezuela’s hollowed-out health system. Some 70% of
appropriated foreign assistance to support the people of
Venezuelan hospitals surveyed in 2019 lacked access to
Venezuela and to address the regional migration crisis, and
clean water. A Maduro-Guaidó agreement negotiated in
held oversight hearings on U.S. policy toward Venezuela.
early June 2020 should allow the Pan American Health
Organization to lead relief efforts.
Since January 2019, Juan Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s
democratically elected, opposition-controlled National
In May 2020, U.N. agencies estimated that 5.1 million
Assembly, has sought to form a transition government to
Venezuelans had left the country, most of whom were in
serve until internationally observed elections can be held.
Latin America and the Caribbean. Migrants face obstacles
The United States and 57 other countries recognize Guaidó
maintaining informal sector jobs and accessing health care,
as interim president. In early 2020, Guaidó completed an
as neighboring countries have implemented quarantines and
international tour during which he met with President
border closures to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Trump. Thus far, he has proved unable to harness that
international support to dislodge Maduro from power.
Political Situation
On January 5, 2019, the National Assembly elected Guaidó,
Background
an industrial engineer from the Popular Will party, as its
Maduro was narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of
president. Guaidó then announced he was willing to serve
populist President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and reelected
as interim president until new presidential elections were
in May 2018 in a fraudulent election. Maduro has used the
held. Buoyed by massive protests, Guaidó took the oath of
Venezuelan courts, security forces, and electoral council to
office on January 23, 2019.
quash dissent. Security forces have detained and abused
Maduro’s opponents, including military officers and
Eighteen months later, Guaidó retains diplomatic support
opposition politicians. More recently, police have violently
but lacks political power at home. In 2019, Guaidó’s
enforced a Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
supporters organized two unsuccessful efforts to get
quarantine and arrested those who have criticized the
security forces to abandon Maduro—in February, they
government’s response to the pandemic. As of June 1,
sought to bring emergency aid into the country across
2020, the government held 451 political prisoners,
borders that Maduro had closed, and on April 30, Guaidó
according to Foro Penal, a human rights organization.
called for a civil-military uprising. After those efforts
failed, observers hoped negotiations between Guaidó and
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
Maduro could lead to an electoral solution to the crisis.
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
exacerbating the effects of a decline in global oil prices and
When talks stalled, Maduro increased persecution of
oil production on the country’s economy. Maduro has
Guaidó’s supporters while negotiating with a group of
rewarded allies, including the military, with income
legislators from smaller parties. Maduro installed one of
siphoned from state industries, as well as from illegal gold
these legislators (Luis Parra) as head of the National
mining, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities. The
Assembly in January 2020—a move that triggered U.S.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the
sanctions. Guaidó lost domestic support after being linked
Venezuelan economy contracted by 35% in 2019 and
to a botched raid against Maduro in early May 2020
inflation reached 9,585%. According to IMF forecasts,
(reportedly involving U.S. mercenaries and former
hyperinflation will continue in 2020 and an economic
Venezuelan soldiers), and the Supreme Court recognized
contraction of some 15% could occur.
Parra as head of the assembly. It then ruled that since
efforts to select a new electoral council to oversee the
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
legislative elections due in 2020 had stalled in the National
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
Assembly, the court would select the council members .
humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, U.N. officials estimated
Legislative elections could occur in December 2020, but
that some 90% of Venezuelans were living in poverty. A
many observers maintain that the elections would not be
February 2020 World Food Program assessment estimated
free and fair.
that 9 million Venezuelans were food insecure. Health
indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality rates,
have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases such as
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
International Response
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
The international community remains divided over how to
other entities (E.O. 13850); and
respond to the crisis in Venezuela. The United States,
Canada, most of the European Union (EU), and 16 Western
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
Hemisphere countries recognize Guaidó as interim
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
president. The United States, EU, Canada, and 11 Western
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
Hemisphere countries that are states parties to the Inter-
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884).
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty)
have imposed targeted sanctions and travel bans on Maduro
The Administration has imposed sanctions on Cuba for its
officials. The EU and Western Hemisphere countries
support of Maduro and sanctions on two subsidiaries of
oppose military intervention to oust Maduro. An
Russia’s Rosneft and on shipping companies from other
International Contact Group, backed by the EU and some
countries for shipping oil for PdVSA. (CRS In Focus
Latin American countries, endorsed negotiations led by
IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.)
Norway, but those efforts have not yet succeeded.
Other U.S. Pressure. In late March, the Department of
Russia, Cuba (which has provided military and intelligence
Justice indicted Maduro and 14 top officials and the State
support), Turkey, Iran, and a few other countries support
Department’s $15 million reward offer for information
Maduro. Russia and China have provided aid to Maduro
leading to Maduro’s arrest. On April 1, President Trump
and blocked efforts at the U.N. Security Council to
announced the deployment of additional U.S. naval
recognize the Guaidó government. Russia has supported
counterdrug assets to the Caribbean to curb drug trafficking
Venezuela’s struggling oil industry, helped Venezuela skirt
emanating from Venezuela. Both actions target drug
U.S. oil sanctions, and sent military personnel and
trafficking, reportedly a key source of Maduro’s revenue.
equipment, a move that prompted U.S. condemnation. In
May 2020, Iran shipped gasoline to Venezuela.
U.S. Assistance. The United States is providing assistance
and helping to coordinate and support the regional response
Recent U.S. Policy
to the Venezuelan migration crisis. Since FY2017, the
The U.S. government ceased to recognize Maduro as
Administration has provided $610.6 million in
Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019. The
humanitarian assistance to support countries sheltering
Trump Administration has since implemented a “maximum
Venezuelans, including $76 million for humanitarian relief
pressure” campaign to compel Maduro to leave office. On
activities in Venezuela, $12.3 million of which is aimed at
March 31, 2020, the Administration issued a “democratic
helping address COVID-19. In October 2019, the U.S.
transition framework” backed by Guaidó. The framework
government signed an agreement with Guaidó
would lift certain sanctions in exchange for Maduro
representatives to provide more than $125 million in new
releasing political prisoners, having foreign security forces
democracy, development, and health programs.
leave the country, and allowing the creation of a Council of
State to carry out presidential duties until elections can be
Congressional Action. Congress has supported most of the
held. The Council of State would consist of four members
Trump Administration’s efforts to restore democracy in
from the National Assembly and a Secretary General they
Venezuela and provide humanitarian assistance to
choose; it would not include Maduro or Guaidó. With
Venezuelans. Some Members have expressed concerns
Guaidó weakened politically, it is unclear how Maduro can
about the humanitarian effects of sanctions and called for
be compelled to accept such a framework.
their temporary suspension due to COVID-19. Others are
concerned about a potential unauthorized use of the U.S.
Diplomacy. The United States has worked to encourage
military in Venezuela.
countries to recognize the Guaidó government, sanction
Maduro officials, and provide shelter or humanitarian aid to
In December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which
Venezuelans who have fled. U.S. officials continue to
provided $30 million in FY2020 assistance for democracy
denounce Cuban, Russian, and Iranian support of Maduro.
and human rights programs in Venezuela. The measure also
incorporated provisions from S. 1025, the VERDAD Act,
Sanctions. Individual, financial, and sectoral s anctions are
authorizing $400 million in FY2020 humanitarian aid,
key parts of U.S policy toward Venezuela. They include
codifying some sanctions, and authorizing $17.5 million to
support elections in Venezuela. P.L. 116-94 included
Individual sanctions for terrorism; drug trafficking;
language from House-approved bills including H.R. 920,
and those who have committed antidemocratic actions,
restricting the export of defense articles to Venezuela, and
human rights violations, or corruption (see Executive
H.R. 1477, requiring a strategy to counter Russian influence
Order (E.O.) 13692; P.L. 113-278; P.L. 114-194);
in Venezuela. Congress is considering the Administration’s
$205 million FY2021 budget request for Venezuela.
Financial sanctions restricting Maduro government and
state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA),
In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 549, designating
access to U.S. financial markets (E.O. 13808);
Venezuela as a beneficiary country for temporary protected
prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency (E.O.
status. On July 30, 2019, a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549
13827); or purchasing Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835);
by unanimous consent failed. (See also CRS Report
R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations.)
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10230
Disclaimer
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