Updated March 14, 2019
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Political and Economic Crisis
Maduro’s mandate is illegitimate, establishing a framework
Venezuela has been in a deep crisis under the authoritarian
for a transition government, drafting a proposal to offer
rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of
amnesty for officials (including the military) who support
Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro was narrowly elected in 2013
the transition, and creating a strategy for receiving
after the death of populist President Hugo Chávez, who had
humanitarian assistance.
served since 1999. Maduro’s regime has exhibited high
levels of corruption and economic mismanagement, which
Many of Guaidó’s supporters had hoped that these actions,
have exacerbated the impact of a decline in global oil prices
which culminated in a large-scale effort to have Venezuelan
on the country’s economy. According to the International
civilians bring assistance from the United States and other
Monetary Fund, Venezuela’s economy contracted by 18%
donors into the country on February 23, 2019, would
and inflation exceeded 1.37 million percent in 2018.
encourage military officers to abandon the Maduro regime.
Nevertheless, Maduro has used the courts, security forces,
In anticipation, the Maduro regime erected barricades at the
and electoral council to repress political opposition and
border with Colombia, closed the border with Brazil, and
quash dissent. According to the Venezuelan human rights
halted air and sea traffic from three neighboring Dutch
organization Foro Penal, the regime held 892 political
Caribbean islands. According to Foro Penal, National
prisoners as of early March 2019. Most Venezuelans and
Guard troops and armed civilian militias (colectivos), killed
much of the international community considered Maduro’s
at least five individuals (four indigenous people), and
May 2018 reelection illegitimate.
injured hundreds as they blocked most aid from entering the
country from February 22-23. The aid remains blocked.
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
With the Maduro regime willing to use force to restrict the
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
arrival of assistance, Guaidó has limited room to maneuver.
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela that is affecting the entire
region. According to household surveys, the percentage of
For now, the military high command remains loyal to
Venezuelans living in poverty increased from 48.4% in
Maduro. Many military leaders have enriched themselves
2014 to 87% in 2017. Health indicators, particularly infant
under Maduro through corruption, drug trafficking, and
and maternal mortality rates, have worsened. Previously
other illicit industries. Others may fear that they will face
eradicated diseases, such as diphtheria and measles, have
prosecution for human rights abuses and others crimes
returned and spread. As of January 2019, United Nations
should a new government take office.
(U.N.) agencies estimated that at least 3.4 million
Human Rights Concerns
Venezuelans (1 in 10) had left the country, 2.7 million of
whom were in Latin America and the Caribbean. Migrant
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
flows could increase, as a massive, nationwide blackout that
colectivos have quashed protests, detained and abused those
began on March 7 worsened conditions considerably.
suspected of dissent, and used violence against civilians. In
August 2017, a U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
Interim Government Challenges Maduro Regime
Human Rights report documented human rights violations
Since January 2019, the democratically elected, opposition-
perpetrated by Venezuelan security forces against protesters
controlled National Assembly and its president, Juan
during clashes that left more than 130 killed and thousands
Guaidó, have garnered domestic and international support
injured. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is
for their efforts to declare Maduro’s second term
examining the regime’s serious human rights violations; the
illegitimate and establish an interim government. The
Lima Group, a group of Western Hemisphere countries that
United States and 53 other countries (most of the European
formed in 2016 to coordinate regional efforts to hasten a
Union [EU]), 15 Western Hemisphere countries, Australia,
return to democracy in Venezuela, has urged the ICC to
and Japan) have recognized Guaidó as interim president of
investigate the regime’s recent denial of access to
Venezuela. They view the National Assembly as
international assistance as a crime against humanity. Since
Venezuela’s only democratic institution.
2018, the Maduro regime has arrested and tortured many of
those it perceives as threats, including military officers and
The National Assembly elected Guaidó as its president on
opposition politicians accused of involvement in alleged
January 5, 2019; he is a 35-year-old industrial engineer
coup attempts. A February 2019 Amnesty International
from the Popular Will (VP) party of Leopoldo López (under
report documents serious human rights abuses among more
house arrest). In mid-January, Guaidó announced he was
than 900 individuals arbitrarily detained in January 2019.
willing to serve as interim president until new presidential
elections are held. He called for protests on January 23,
International Response
2019, the 61st anniversary of the ouster of another dictator.
The international community remains divided over how to
Buoyed by massive turnout, Guaidó took the oath of office
respond to the multifaceted crisis in Venezuela. Russia,
on that day. Under Guaidó’s leadership, the National
Cuba, Turkey, and other countries support Maduro, and
Assembly has enacted resolutions declaring that President
Russia and China have blocked efforts at the U.N. Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Council (UNSC) to recognize the Guaidó government.
Financial sanctions also have been imposed on some 22
Russia also blocked a U.S.-backed UNSC resolution that
individuals and 27 entities for drug trafficking.
Venezuela should allow the entrance of humanitarian
assistance. The Lima Group and the EU support the Guaidó
Broader Sanctions (Including Oil Sanctions). The
government but oppose any military intervention to oust
Administration has issued executive orders restricting the
Maduro. An International Contact Group on Venezuela,
government and the ability of Venezuela’s state oil
backed by the EU and several Latin American countries, is
company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to access
pushing for internationally observed elections to be held
the U.S. financial system (E.O. 13808), barring U.S.
and humanitarian assistance to be allowed into Venezuela
purchases of Venezuela’s new digital currency (E.O.
through a negotiated, political process.
13827), and barring U.S. purchases of Venezuelan debt
(E.O. 13835). On November 1, 2018, President Trump
U.S. Policy
signed E.O. 13850, creating a framework to sanction those
The United States traditionally had close relations with
who operate in Venezuela’s gold sector or are deemed
Venezuela, a major U.S. oil supplier, but friction increased
complicit in corrupt transactions involving the government.
under the Chávez government and has intensified under the
On January 28, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Administration
Maduro regime. U.S. policymakers have had concerns
imposed sanctions on PdVSA to prevent Maduro and his
about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in
government from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue.
Venezuela and the lack of bilateral cooperation on antidrug
and counterterrorism efforts. In the wake of the May 2018
Humanitarian Assistance. The United States is providing
elections, the Trump Administration has increased
assistance (funded mostly through global humanitarian
sanctions on the Maduro regime and assistance for
accounts) and helping to coordinate and support the
neighboring countries sheltering Venezuelan migrants.
regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis.
Including additional support announced on February 25,
The United States has coordinated its efforts with Interim
2019, the United States has committed to providing more
President Guaidó and encouraged other countries to
than $195 million since FY2017 for Venezuelans who have
recognize his government. On January 10, 2019, the U.S.
fled to other countries and for the communities hosting
State Department condemned Maduro’s “illegitimate
Venezuelan refugees and migrants.
usurpation of power.” President Trump recognized Guaidó
as interim president of Venezuela on January 23 and has
Congressional Action. The 116th Congress is closely
encouraged other governments to do the same. The
following developments in Venezuela and overseeing U.S.
Administration has since blocked the Maduro regime’s
policy responses through hearings and other actions.
access to revenue from Venezuela’s state oil company and
Congress provided $17.5 million for democracy and rule of
imposed targeted sanctions (visa bans and financial
law programs in Venezuela in the FY2019 Consolidated
sanctions) on Maduro officials and their families. President
Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6); the joint explanatory
Trump and Vice President Mike Pence have repeatedly
statement (H.Rept. 116-9) also requires a strategy on how
asserted that “all options are on the table” to address the
U.S. agencies are supporting countries sheltering
Venezuela situation, including using U.S. military force.
Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Members of Congress
have pledged to support the Guaidó government but have
On January 24, 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
not authorized the use of U.S. military force.
announced that the United States would provide $20 million
in additional humanitarian assistance to the people of
Other legislative initiatives on Venezuela include H.R. 549
Venezuela at Guaidó’s request. The United States pre-
(Soto), to make certain Venezuelans residing in the United
positioned roughly 400 tons of emergency supplies (food,
States eligible for Temporary Protected Status. A similar
hygiene and medical kits) on Venezuela’s borders with
bill, S. 636 (Menendez), has been introduced in the Senate.
Colombia and Brazil as of mid-February 2019.
Other initiatives include H.R. 854 (Mucarsel-Powell), to
require a U.S. strategy to provide humanitarian assistance to
As the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated, the State
Venezuelans and authorize $150 million in U.S.
Department announced that it had withdrawn its remaining
humanitarian assistance for Venezuelans in FY2020 and
diplomatic personnel on March 11 and urged all Americans
FY2021; H.R. 920 (Shalala), to restrict arms transfers to the
to leave the country the following day.
Maduro regime; H.R. 1004 (Cicilline), to prohibit the use of
U.S. military forces in combat operations in Venezuela; and
Targeted Sanctions. In 2015, President Obama issued
H.R. 1102 (Wasserman-Schultz) requiring the State
Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, authorizing targeted
Department to assess the threat posed by Russian-
sanctions against individuals who inhibit democratic
Venezuelan security cooperation. In the Senate, a joint
processes or institutions, commit violence or human rights
resolution, S.J.Res. 11 (Merkley), to prohibit the
abuses, or engage in corruption. The Trump Administration
unauthorized use of U.S. armed forces in Venezuela also
has imposed sanctions on 73 Venezuelan officials pursuant
has been introduced. For background, see CRS In Focus
to E.O. 13692 (in addition to 7 officials sanctioned by
IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; CRS In
President Obama). These officials include Maduro and his
Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis;
wife, Vice President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First Vice
CRS Insight IN11037, Venezuela Oil Sector Sanctions:
President Diosdado Cabello; Supreme Court members; the
Market and Trade Impacts; and CRS Report R44841,
leaders of Venezuela’s army, national guard, and national
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations.
police; four state governors; and other security officials.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
IF10230
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 32 · UPDATED