Updated January 27, 2021
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian
production on the country’s economy. Maduro has
rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of
rewarded allies, including the military, with income
Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after
siphoned from state industries and illegal gold mining, drug
the death of President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013), began a
trafficking, and other illicit activities. The International
second term in January 2019 that is widely considered
Monetary Fund estimates the country’s economy contracted
illegitimate. Despite U.S. and international pressure to leave
by 35% in 2019 and inflation reached 9,585%. Economic
office, Maduro remains firmly in power. His party now
conditions deteriorated further in 2020 because of gasoline
controls a de facto National Assembly seated on January 5,
shortages, COVID-19, and broadened U.S. sanctions.
2021.
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
Since January 2019, the United States has recognized Juan
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
Guaidó, president of the democratically elected, opposition-
humanitarian crisis. According to a 2019-2020 household
controlled National Assembly elected in December 2015, as
survey, the percentage of Venezuelans living in poverty
interim president. Guaido, once recognized as Venezuela’s
increased to 96% in 2019 (80% in extreme poverty). A
leader by more than 55 countries, has been losing
February 2020 World Food Program (WFP) assessment
international and Venezuelan domestic support. Although
estimated that 9 million Venezuelans were food insecure.
the Biden Administration and many in Congress support
Maduro continues to block the establishment of a WFP
Guaidó, some are calling for a new strategy for Venezuela.
program in the country, preferring to provide food aid
through a program tied to support for his government.
Political Situation
Health indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality
Maduro, reelected in May 2018 in an election widely
rates, have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases such
deemed to be fraudulent, has used the Venezuelan courts,
as diphtheria and measles have returned and spread.
security forces, and electoral council to quash dissent.
Security forces have detained and abused Maduro’s
The government reported 1,148 deaths from COVID-19 (as
opponents, including military officers and opposition
of January 25), but experts maintain the actual number is
politicians. As of mid-January 2021, the government held
much higher. The pandemic could decimate Venezuela’s
some 350 political prisoners. The U.N. Office of the High
hollowed-out health system. A June 2020 Maduro-Guaidó
Commissioner for Human Rights documented thousands of
agreement to address COVID-19 may be in jeopardy, with
extrajudicial killings and other abuses committed by
the opposition alleging Maduro has not distributed
security forces that it described as crimes against humanity.
medicines apolitically and both sides disputing how to pay
Electoral authorities convened December 2020 legislative
for vaccines.
elections boycotted by the opposition; plagued by
irregularities; and rejected by the United States, the
In December 2020, U.N. agencies estimated 5.4 million
European Union (EU), and most Latin American countries.
Venezuelans had left the country. Some 4.6 million of those
migrants fled to other Latin American and Caribbean
The Venezuelan opposition is weak and divided, with many
countries, especially Colombia. Migrants face obstacles
of its leaders in exile. Although Guaidó challenged
maintaining jobs and accessing health care, as neighboring
Maduro’s authority in 2019, his support has since faded
countries have implemented quarantines and border
substantially. In 2019, two Guaidó-led efforts to encourage
closures to counter COVID-19.
security forces to abandon Maduro failed. After Norway-led
negotiations stalled in mid-2019, the Maduro government
International Response
increased persecution of Guaidó’s supporters. Since March
The international community remains divided over how to
2020, restrictions put in place to combat the spread of the
respond to the crisis in Venezuela. The United Kingdom
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) have limited
and some Western Hemisphere countries still recognize
Guaidó’s ability to convene protests. Guaidó also lost
Guaidó as interim president, although EU countries no
support after reports emerged that he condoned a plan that
longer label him as such since January 5, 2021. The United
ended in a botched raid against Maduro in May 2020.
States, EU, Canada, and 11 Western Hemisphere countries
Guaidó and other opposition legislators now face
that are parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
prosecution by judicial authorities, who assert the
Assistance (Rio Treaty) have imposed targeted sanctions
legislators no longer have immunity since their legislative
and travel bans on Maduro officials. The EU and most
terms ended in January 2021.
Western Hemisphere countries oppose military intervention
to oust Maduro. The EU and some Latin American
Economic and Humanitarian Crisis
countries endorsed 2019 negotiations led by Norway, but
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
those efforts did not prove successful.
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
exacerbating the effects of a decline in global oil prices and
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Russia, Cuba (which has provided military and intelligence
U.S. Assistance. The United States is providing assistance
support), Turkey, Iran, and a few other countries support
and helping to coordinate and support the regional response
Maduro. Russia and China have provided aid to Maduro
to the Venezuelan migration crisis. From FY2017 to
and blocked efforts against him at the U.N. Security
FY2020, the United States provided $1 billion in total to
Council. Russia has supported Venezuela’s struggling oil
Venezuela and countries sheltering Venezuelans. U.S.
industry, helped Venezuela skirt U.S. sanctions, and sent
agencies separately have provided $43.7 million in COVID-
military personnel and equipment. China continues to
related aid efforts in Venezuela. Since FY2018, USAID has
purchase Venezuelan oil and provides surveillance
provided some $125 million for democracy, development,
equipment and other technology. Since May 2020, Iran has
and other health programs.
shipped gasoline to Venezuela in exchange for gold.
Congressional Action. The 116th Congress supported the
Recent U.S. Policy
Trump Administration’s efforts to promote a restoration of
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as
democracy in Venezuela without U.S. military intervention
Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019. Although
and to provide humanitarian support to Venezuelans. Some
the Trump Administration initially discussed the possibility
Members expressed concerns about the humanitarian
of using military force in Venezuela, it ultimately sought to
impact of sanctions.
compel Maduro to leave office through economic pressure.
In March 2020, the Administration issued a “democratic
In December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which
transition framework” that would lift certain sanctions in
appropriated $30 million in FY2020 for democracy
exchange for Maduro releasing political prisoners,
programs in Venezuela and incorporated the Senate-
expelling foreign security forces, and creating a Council of
reported version of the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), a
State (not to include Maduro or Guaidó) to carry out
comprehensive bill to address the crisis in Venezuela. The
presidential duties until elections can be held.
VERDAD Act incorporated House-passed measures
authorizing humanitarian aid to Venezuela (H.R. 854),
In early statements, Biden Administration officials have
restricting the export of defense articles to Venezuela (H.R.
called for addressing the humanitarian situation, supporting
920), and requiring a U.S. strategy to counter Russian
the Venezuelan people, and engaging in multilateral
influence in Venezuela (H.R. 1477). In the FY2020
diplomacy to hold corrupt and abusive officials accountable
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-92),
and to press for a return to democracy. Officials also may
Congress prohibited federal contracting with persons who
review the humanitarian impacts of U.S. sanctions.
do business with the Maduro government.
Diplomacy. In recent years, the United States has
For FY2021, the Administration requested $200 million in
encouraged countries to recognize the Guaidó government,
democracy aid to support a democratic transition in
sanction Maduro officials, hold the Maduro government
Venezuela and $5 million in global health assistance. The
responsible for human rights violations, and provide
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260),
humanitarian aid. U.S. officials have denounced Cuban,
provided not less than $33 million in Economic Support
Russian, and Iranian support of Maduro.
Funds for democracy programs in Venezuela and an
unspecified amount of humanitarian support for countries
Sanctions and Indictments. Sanctions are key parts of U.S
sheltering Venezuelan refugees. H.Rept. 116-617
policy toward Venezuela. They include the following:
accompanying the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) required
a briefing for certain committees on the contents of the
Individual sanctions for terrorism; drug trafficking;
report required by P.L. 116-94, as well as an update on the
and those who have committed antidemocratic actions,
crisis in Venezuela and its regional implications.
human rights violations, or corruption (see Executive
Order [E.O.] 13692; P.L. 113-278; P.L. 114-194)
Congress is likely to provide input to the Administration in
sanctioning human rights abuses, corruption, and
Financial sanctions restricting access to U.S. financial
antidemocratic actions by the Maduro government and its
markets of the Maduro government and state oil
backers. The 117th Congress may continue to examine U.S.
company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), (E.O.
efforts to support a return to democracy in Venezuela and
13808); prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency
respond to humanitarian and security challenges. Although
(E.O. 13827); or purchasing Venezuelan debt (E.O.
the Trump Administration ended removals of Venezuelans
13835);
eligible for Deferred Enforced Departure, Congress may
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
seek to designate Venezuela as a beneficiary country for
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
temporary protected status.
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
other entities (E.O. 13850)
See also CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and
U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19; CRS In
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884)
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
In March 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Maduro
Affairs
and 14 top officials for narco-terrorism, drug trafficking,
IF10230
and other crimes.
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 46 · UPDATED