Updated April 1, 2022
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela, under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro,
top ally, Alex Saab, from Cape Verde to stand trial for
remains in a deep economic and humanitarian crisis
money laundering. After the meeting with U.S. officials,
worsened by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
Maduro released two unjustly imprisoned Americans and
pandemic. Maduro has consolidated power over all of
pledged to restart negotiations with the opposition. Even if
Venezuela’s institutions since his 2013 election after the
negotiations restart, it is unclear whether Maduro will make
death of President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013). Maduro’s
significant concessions without U.S. sanctions relief.
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) took control of
the National Assembly, the last independent branch of
Economic and Humanitarian Crisis
government, in January 2021. The PSUV and allies won 19
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
of 23 gubernatorial elections in flawed November elections.
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
exacerbating the effects of a decline in oil prices and
Maduro has quashed dissent and resisted international
production. The International Monetary Fund estimates the
pressure to step down since his reelection in a 2018
economy contracted by 74% from 2014 to 2020 and by 5%
presidential vote that was widely condemned as fraudulent.
in 2021. Hyperinflation has abated, and higher oil prices
Support for opposition leader Juan Guaidó, the former
appear to be driving a nascent economic recovery.
National Assembly president once regarded as interim
president by nearly 60 other countries, has dissipated,
Despite that progress, shortages in food and medicine,
although the Biden Administration continues to recognize
declines in purchasing power, and a collapse of social
Guaidó’s government, partially to prevent Venezuelan
services have created a humanitarian crisis. According to
assets abroad from coming under Maduro’s control.
the National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI), a
Administration officials nevertheless met with Maduro in
May 2021 survey by a group of Venezuelan universities,
early March 2022, reportedly to discuss U.S. citizens
94% of Venezuelans live in poverty, with 77% in extreme
illegally detained in Venezuela, restarting stalled
poverty, and 60% experience moderate to severe food
negotiations with the opposition, and energy issues.
insecurity. In April 2021, the Maduro government allowed
the World Food Program to launch a school lunch program.
Political Situation
Health indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality
Maduro has used security forces, buoyed by corrupt courts,
rates, have worsened. Violent clashes between illegally
to quash dissent. His government has rewarded allies,
armed groups along the Venezuela-Colombia border have
particularly in the security forces, by allowing them to earn
complicated humanitarian relief efforts in that region.
income from illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other
illicit activities. Those forces have detained and abused
According to data from Johns Hopkins University (JHU),
Maduro’s opponents, including military officers, opposition
Venezuela reported 5,679 deaths from COVID-19 (as of
politicians, and civic leaders. As of March 2022, the
March 28, 2022), but experts maintain the actual number is
government had imprisoned 241 political prisoners,
much higher. The pandemic has strained Venezuela’s
according to Foro Penal, a Venezuelan human rights group.
hollowed-out health system. According to JHU, 50.1% of
The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Venezuelans were fully vaccinated as of March 28.
Rights has documented, and the International Criminal
Venezuela has used Russian and Cuban vaccines and has
Court is investigating, extrajudicial killings and other
received Chinese vaccines both bilaterally and through the
crimes against humanity committed by Venezuela’s
COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility.
security forces.
As of February 2022, U.N. agencies estimated 6.1 million
The Venezuelan opposition has been weak and divided,
Venezuelans had left the country (with 26.9 million
with many of its leaders in exile. Guaidó challenged
remaining). Some 5 million of these migrants fled to other
Maduro’s authority in 2019, but Guaidó’s support has since
Latin American and Caribbean countries. Migrants have
faded. After Norway-led negotiations stalled in mid-2019,
faced obstacles keeping jobs and accessing health care
the Maduro government persecuted Guaidó’s supporters.
during the pandemic; they are vulnerable to human
trafficking and other abuses. In 2021, Colombia and Peru
In April 2021, Guaidó called on opposition parties, labor
began granting temporary protected status to Venezuelans.
and civic groups, and business leaders to form a Unity
Platform to negotiate with Maduro officials. The Unity
International Response
Platform seeks better human rights, humanitarian, and
The international community is divided on policies toward
electoral conditions; Maduro’s team seeks sanctions relief
Venezuela, hindering the effectiveness of efforts to restore
and international recognition. Mediated by Norway, the
democratic processes. The United States has encouraged
negotiations began in Mexico in September 2021, but
other countries to sanction Maduro officials, hold the
Maduro suspended them after the United States extradited a
Maduro government responsible for human rights abuses,
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
and provide humanitarian aid to Venezuelans. The United
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
States, European Union (EU), Canada, and 11 Western
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
Hemisphere countries have imposed targeted sanctions and
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
travel bans on Maduro officials. The United Kingdom and
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884).
some Western Hemisphere countries still recognize Guaidó
In March 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Maduro
as interim president, although EU countries have not since
and 14 top officials for narco-terrorism, drug trafficking,
January 2021. The EU, Canada, and the United States have
and other crimes. U.S. agencies have worked with partner
issued joint statements, including in February 2022,
countries to combat drug trafficking, money laundering,
pledging to review sanctions if negotiations yield improved
and illicit mining in Venezuela. In December 2021, the
conditions for the Venezuelan people.
Treasury Department designated two Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissident groups that operate
Other countries, including China, Russia, Cuba, Turkey,
in Venezuela as foreign terrorist organizations.
and Iran, support Maduro. Russia has supported the oil
industry in Venezuela, helped Venezuela skirt U.S.
U.S. Assistance. The United States is providing assistance
sanctions, and sent military personnel and equipment to the
and helping coordinate the regional response to the
country. Sanctions on Russia following its invasion of
Venezuelan migration crisis. From FY2017 to FY2021, the
Ukraine have inhibited Maduro’s ability to access assets in
United States provided $1.65 billion in humanitarian aid to
Russian banks. China continues to purchase Venezuelan oil
Venezuela and countries sheltering Venezuelans. Over that
and has provided surveillance equipment and other
period, U.S. democracy, development, and health support
technology. Turkey has purchased Venezuela’s illegally
related to the Venezuela crisis totaled some $323 million.
mined gold. Since May 2020, Iran has shipped gasoline to
Venezuela in exchange for gold.
Congressional Action. In March 2022, Congress enacted
the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-
U.S. Policy
103), which includes $40 million for democracy programs
The U.S. government ceased recognizing Maduro as
in Venezuela ($10 million less than the Administration
Venezuela’s legitimate president in January 2019. The
requested; $7 million more than the FY2021 estimated
Trump Administration discussed using military force in
allocation). In addition, the act directs U.S. agencies to
Venezuela but ultimately sought to compel Maduro to leave
continue providing support to other countries hosting
office through diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure.
Venezuelan migrants and refugees. The report to the House
The Biden Administration has maintained a similar policy
appropriations bill approved in July 2021, H.Rept. 117-84,
toward Venezuela, although the March 2022 talks noted
requires a report on how the U.S. government can repatriate
above could signal a policy shift.
illegally stolen assets to the people of Venezuela. Looking
ahead, Congress faces consideration of the Biden
Biden officials have sought to support the Venezuelan
Administration’s FY2023 request of $55 million for
people while engaging in multilateral diplomacy to press
Venezuela. That figure includes $50 million for democracy
for a return to democracy and hold corrupt and abusive
programs and $5 million for health programs (the same
Maduro officials accountable. On March 8, 2021, the Biden
level allocated by the Administration in FY2021).
Administration designated Venezuela as a beneficiary
country for temporary protected status (TPS). In 2021,
Oversight has focused on the Biden Administration’s
Biden Administration officials reviewed and maintained
approach to sanctions, negotiations, and humanitarian
U.S. sanctions on Venezuela. Should negotiations advance,
relief. Many Members of Congress praised the March 2021
the Administration could provide some sanctions relief (e.g.
designation of TPS for Venezuela. Although some in
allowing Chevron to resume joint ventures with Petróleos
Congress support continued pressure on the Maduro
de Venezuela [PdVSA] to export oil to U.S. refineries).
government, others favor a more targeted approach, arguing
that broad sanctions have hurt the Venezuelan people.
Sanctions and Indictments. Sanctions are key parts of
Similarly, whereas some Members of Congress expressed
U.S. policy toward Venezuela. They include the following:
support for U.S. talks with Maduro, others opposed
Individual sanctions for terrorism, drug trafficking,
engagement with the Maduro regime. Opponents of U.S.-
antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, or
Venezuela energy talks introduced legislation that would
corruption (see Executive Order [E.O.] 13692; P.L. 113-
prohibit U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil (H.R. 6942, H.R.
278; P.L. 114-194)
7012, H.R. 7023, H.R. 7207, S. 3798).
Financial sanctions restricting access to U.S. financial
Among other bills, H.R. 6539 and S. 688 (reported by the
markets by the Maduro government and state oil
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
company PdVSA (E.O. 13808); prohibiting transactions
Committee in March 2021) would prohibit contracting with
using cryptocurrency issued by the Maduro government
persons who do business with the Maduro regime.
(E.O. 13827); and prohibiting the purchase of
Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835)
See also CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
U.S. Relations; CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19; CRS In
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.
other entities (E.O. 13850)
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10230
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 52 · UPDATED