Updated July 8, 2019
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
The political situation in Venezuela has been at a stalemate
Under Guaidó’s leadership, the National Assembly has
since Juan Guaidó, head of the National Assembly, became
since enacted resolutions declaring Maduro’s mandate
interim president of Venezuela in January 2019. Although
illegitimate, establishing a framework for a transition
the United States and 53 other countries recognize Guaidó’s
government, drafting a proposal to offer amnesty for
government, he has been unable to wrest Nicolás Maduro
officials who support the transition, and creating a strategy
from power and convene free and fair elections. Guaidó and
for receiving humanitarian assistance.
Maduro have engaged in talks to end the standoff since
May, but actions taken by security forces loyal to Maduro,
Guaidó’s supporters organized two high-profile efforts to
including the torture and killing of a naval officer in
encourage security forces to abandon the regime, neither of
custody, have hindered prospects for a negotiated solution.
which succeeded. On February 23, they sought to bring
emergency supplies donated by the United States and others
Background on the Political and Economic Crisis
positioned on the Colombia- and Brazil-Venezuela borders
Maduro, leader of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
into the country. Security forces loyal to Maduro killed
(PSUV), was narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of
seven individuals and injured hundreds, as forces prevented
populist President Hugo Chávez, who had served since
the aid convoys from crossing the border. Some of that aid
1999. Most Venezuelans and much of the international
is being distributed to Venezuelans and host communities in
community considered Maduro’s May 2018 reelection
Colombia. Separately, both Guaidó and Maduro agreed to
illegitimate. Maduro has used the courts, security forces,
allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to
and electoral council to quash dissent. The human rights
provide aid within Venezuela.
organization Foro Penal estimated that the regime held 601
political prisoners as of July 1, 2019. Maduro has since
On April 30, 2019, Guaidó and Leopoldo López, a former
pledged to release 22 of those prisoners.
political prisoner and head of the VP party who had been
released from house arrest by pro-Guaidó military officials,
Maduro’s government has mismanaged the economy and
called for a civil-military rebellion against Maduro. Forces
engaged in massive corruption, exacerbating the impact of a
loyal to Maduro violently put down pro-Guaidó supporters
decline in global oil prices and collapsing oil production on
and attacked journalists. Resulting clashes resulted in four
the country’s economy. According to the International
deaths and hundreds of injuries and arrests. As the day
Monetary Fund, Venezuela’s economy contracted by 18%
ended, López sought refuge in the Spanish Embassy.
in 2018. Inflation may exceed 10 million percent in 2019.
Many observers regard the military’s participation as
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
essential for the opposition’s transition plan to work. For
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
now, however, aside from the former head of the national
humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, U.N officials estimated
intelligence agency, the military high command appears to
that some 90% of Venezuelans are living in poverty and 7
remain loyal to Maduro, who reappointed his defense
million are in need of humanitarian assistance. Health
minister on July 5, 2019. Many military leaders have
indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality rates,
enriched themselves through corruption, drug trafficking,
have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases like
and other illicit industries. Some military leaders may fear
diphtheria and measles have returned and spread. In June
that they could face prosecution for human rights abuses
2019, U.N. agencies estimated that at least 4 million
under a new government, even though the opposition has
Venezuelans had left the country, 3.2 million of whom were
proposed amnesty for those who join their side.
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Migrant flows could
increase, as electrical blackouts have worsened conditions,
Human Rights Concerns
including access to potable water, considerably.
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
civilian militias have violently quashed protests and
Interim Government Challenges Maduro Regime
detained and abused those suspected of dissent. In 2017,
The National Assembly elected Juan Guaidó as its president
security forces committed serious human rights violations
on January 5, 2019; he is a 35-year-old industrial engineer
during clashes with protesters that left more than 130 killed
from the Popular Will (VP) party. In mid-January, Guaidó
and thousands injured. A July 2019 report by the Office of
announced he was willing to serve as interim president until
the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
new presidential elections are held. Buoyed by a massive
estimates that security forces committed some 6,800
turnout for protests he called for, Guaidó took the oath of
extrajudicial killings from January 2018 through May 2019.
office on January 23, 2019. The United States and 53 other
OHCHR also details how intelligence agencies have
countries (including most of the European Union [EU] and
arrested and tortured those perceived as threats to Maduro,
15 Western Hemisphere countries) recognize Guaidó as
including military officers and opposition politicians.
interim president of Venezuela and view the National
Maduro loyalists arrested Guaidó’s chief of staff in March
Assembly as Venezuela’s only democratic institution.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
and the vice president of the National Assembly in May.
the U.S. financial system (E.O. 13808), barring U.S.
Some fear Guaidó could face arrest.
purchases of Venezuela’s new digital currency (E.O.
13827), and barring U.S. purchases of Venezuelan debt
International Response
(E.O. 13835). On November 1, 2018, President Trump
The international community remains divided over how to
signed E.O. 13850, creating a framework to sanction those
respond to the current stalemate in Venezuela. The Lima
who operate in Venezuela’s gold sector or are complicit in
Group of Western Hemisphere countries and the EU
corrupt transactions with the government. On January 28,
support the Guaidó government but oppose any military
2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Administration imposed
intervention to oust Maduro. An International Contact
sanctions on PdVSA to prevent Maduro and his regime
Group, backed by the EU and some Latin American
from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue. Secondary
countries, has endorsed negotiations led by Norway leading
sanctions are being applied to individuals and entities doing
to the convening of internationally observed elections.
business with Maduro. Some observers are concerned that
Russia, Cuba (which has provided military and intelligence
the stronger economic sanctions are worsening the
support), Turkey, and a few other countries support
humanitarian situation.
Maduro. Russia and China have provided aid to Maduro
and blocked efforts at the U.N. Security Council to
Humanitarian Assistance. The United States is providing
recognize the Guaidó government. Russia has supported
assistance and helping to coordinate and support the
Venezuela’s struggling oil industry and sent military
regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis. The
personnel and equipment, prompting U.S. condemnation.
United States has committed to providing more than $213.3
(See CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela: International
million since FY2017 for Venezuelans who have fled to
Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis.)
other countries and for the communities hosting them.
Recent U.S. Policy
Congressional Action. Congress provided $17.5 million
Since recognizing the Guaidó government on January 23,
for democracy and rule of law programs in Venezuela in
2019, the United States has coordinated its efforts with
FY2019 (P.L. 116-6). The Administration’s proposed
Interim President Guaidó and encouraged other countries to
FY2020 budget asks for $9 million in democracy aid and
recognize his government. The Trump Administration has
authority to transfer up to $500 million to support a
imposed more targeted sanctions (visa bans and financial
transition or respond to a crisis in Venezuela. The House-
sanctions) on Maduro officials and their families and
passed FY2020 minibus, H.R. 2740 (Division D covers
blocked the Maduro regime’s access to revenue from
foreign operations appropriations and references H.Rept.
Venezuela’s state oil company. In addition to increasing
116-78 to H.R. 2839) would provide $20.5 million for
humanitarian aid to countries sheltering Venezuelans, the
democracy programs in Venezuela.
Administration has pre-positioned emergency aid for the
Venezuelan people in Brazil, Colombia, and Curaçao. As
House-reported legislation includes H.R. 549, to make
the situation deteriorated, the State Department withdrew its
certain Venezuelans in the United States eligible for
remaining diplomatic personnel from Caracas in March.
Temporary Protected Status (a companion bill, S. 636, has
been introduced in the Senate); H.R. 1004, to prohibit the
President Trump and top Administration officials have
use of U.S. military forces in combat operations in
repeatedly asserted, “all options are on the table” to address
Venezuela; and H.R. 2500, the FY2020 National Defense
the Venezuela situation, including using U.S. military force.
Authorization Act (NDAA), which includes language
The Administration has denounced Cuba and Russia’s
similar to H.R. 2204 that would prohibit federal contracting
support of the Maduro regime and imposed additional
with persons who have business ties to the Maduro regime.
sanctions on Cuba over its support for Venezuela.
The Senate-passed version of the FY2020 NDAA, S. 1790,
has a similar provision.
Targeted Sanctions. In 2015, President Obama issued
Executive Order (E.O.) 13692 authorizing targeted
Senate-reported legislation includes S. 1025, reported with
sanctions against individuals who inhibit democratic
an amendment in May 2019 to include language similar but
processes, commit violence or human rights abuses, or
not identical to three House-passed measures. The measures
engage in corruption. The Trump Administration has
are H.R. 854, which would authorize expanded
imposed sanctions on 78 Venezuelan officials pursuant to
humanitarian aid to Venezuela; H.R. 920, which would
E.O. 13692. They include Maduro, his wife, and his son;
restrict arms transfers to the Maduro government; and H.R.
Vice President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First Vice
1477, which would require an assessment of the threat
President Diosdado Cabello; Supreme Court members; and
posed by Russian-Venezuelan security cooperation. Other
the heads of Venezuela’s army, national guard, and police.
initiatives introduced include S.J.Res. 11, to prohibit the
In May 2019, the Administration removed sanctions on a
unauthorized use of the U.S. military in Venezuela.
general who broke ranks with Maduro and said that it
would do so for others. The United States also has imposed
Also see CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of
sanctions on at least 22 individuals and 27 entities for drug
U.S. Sanctions; CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela
trafficking.
Regional Migration Crisis; and CRS Report R44841,
Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations.
Broader Sanctions (Including Oil Sanctions). The
Administration has issued executive orders restricting the
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
ability of the government and of Venezuela’s state oil
Affairs
company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to access
https://crsreports.congress.gov

Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy

IF10230


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 40 · UPDATED