Updated April 2, 2019
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Political and Economic Crisis
for a transition government, drafting a proposal to offer
Venezuela has been in a deep crisis under the authoritarian
amnesty for officials (including the military) who support
rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of
the transition, and creating a strategy for receiving
Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro was narrowly elected in 2013
humanitarian assistance.
after the death of populist President Hugo Chávez, who had
served since 1999. Maduro’s regime has exhibited high
Guaidó’s supporters had hoped that these actions, which
levels of corruption and economic mismanagement, which
culminated in a large-scale effort to have Venezuelan
have exacerbated the impact of a decline in global oil prices
civilians bring assistance from the United States and others
on the country’s economy. According to the International
into the country on February 23, 2019, would encourage
Monetary Fund, Venezuela’s economy contracted by 18%
military officers to abandon the Maduro regime. According
and inflation exceeded 1.37 million percent in 2018.
to Foro Penal, National Guard troops acting on Maduro’s
Nevertheless, Maduro has used the courts, security forces,
behest and armed civilian militias (colectivos) killed at least
and electoral council to repress political opposition and
five individuals (four indigenous people) and injured
quash dissent. According to the Venezuelan human rights
hundreds as they blocked aid from entering the country.
organization Foro Penal, the regime held 892 political
While that aid remains blocked, both Guaidó and Maduro
prisoners as of early March 2019. Most Venezuelans and
have agreed to allow the Red Cross to begin providing
much of the international community considered Maduro’s
large-scale assistance by mid-April 2019.
May 2018 reelection illegitimate.
For now, the military high command remains loyal to
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
Maduro. Many military leaders have enriched themselves
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
through corruption, drug trafficking, and other illicit
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela that is affecting the entire
industries. Others fear that they will face prosecution for
region. According to household surveys, the percentage of
human rights abuses should a new government take office.
Venezuelans living in poverty increased from 48.4% in
Human Rights Concerns
2014 to 87% in 2017. Health indicators, particularly infant
and maternal mortality rates, have worsened. Previously
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
eradicated diseases, such as diphtheria and measles, have
colectivos have quashed protests, detained and abused those
returned and spread. As of January 2019, United Nations
suspected of dissent, and used violence against civilians. In
(U.N.) agencies estimated that at least 3.4 million
August 2017, a U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for
Venezuelans (1 in 10) had left the country, 2.7 million of
Human Rights report documented human rights violations
whom were in Latin America and the Caribbean. Migrant
perpetrated by Venezuelan security forces against protesters
flows could increase, as successive blackouts since March
during clashes that left more than 130 killed and thousands
2019 have worsened conditions considerably.
injured. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is
examining the regime’s serious human rights violations.
Interim Government Challenges Maduro Regime
Since January 2019, the democratically elected, opposition-
Since 2018, the Maduro regime has arrested and tortured
controlled National Assembly and its president, Juan
many of those it perceives as threats, including military
Guaidó, have sought to establish an interim government.
officers and opposition politicians. A February 2019
Three months later, the United States and 53 other countries
Amnesty International report documents serious human
(including most of the European Union [EU] and 15
rights abuses committed against some of the 900
Western Hemisphere countries) recognize Guaidó as
individuals detained in January 2019. The regime recently
arrested Guaidó’s chief of staff and barred Guaidó from
interim president of Venezuela and view the National
Assembly as Venezuela’s only democratic institution.
seeking office for 15 years. The Supreme Court may also
Despite their backing, Maduro remains in power.
remove Guaidó’s legislative immunity from prosecution.
International Response
The National Assembly elected Guaidó as its president on
January 5, 2019; he is a 35-year-old industrial engineer
The international community remains divided over how to
from the Popular Will (VP) party of Leopoldo López (under
respond to the multifaceted crisis in Venezuela. Russia,
house arrest). In mid-January, Guaidó announced he was
Cuba (which has provided military support), Turkey, and
willing to serve as interim president until new presidential
other countries support Maduro. Russia and China have
elections are held. He called for protests on January 23,
blocked efforts at the U.N. Security Council to recognize
2019, the 61st anniversary of the ouster of another dictator.
the Guaidó government and provided medical aid to
Buoyed by massive turnout, Guaidó took the oath of office
Maduro. Russia has also supported Venezuela’s struggling
on that day. Under Guaidó’s leadership, the National
oil industry and sent military personnel and equipment,
Assembly has enacted resolutions declaring that President
prompting U.S. condemnation.
Maduro’s mandate is illegitimate, establishing a framework
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
The Lima Group of Western Hemisphere countries and the
purchases of Venezuela’s new digital currency (E.O.
EU support the Guaidó government but oppose any military
13827), and barring U.S. purchases of Venezuelan debt
intervention to oust Maduro. An International Contact
(E.O. 13835). On November 1, 2018, President Trump
Group on Venezuela, backed by the EU and several Latin
signed E.O. 13850, creating a framework to sanction those
American countries, is pushing for internationally observed
who operate in Venezuela’s gold sector or are deemed
elections to be held through a negotiated, political process.
complicit in corrupt transactions involving the government.
On January 28, pursuant to E.O. 13850, the Administration
U.S. Policy
imposed sanctions on PdVSA to prevent Maduro and his
The United States traditionally had close relations with
government from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue.
Venezuela, a major U.S. oil supplier, but friction increased
The Administration has also sanctioned 7 individuals and
under the Chávez government and has intensified under the
23 companies engaged in a currency smuggling scheme, a
Maduro regime. U.S. policymakers have had concerns
Russian bank, a Venezuelan bank and its subsidiaries, and a
about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in
Venezuelan gold company and its president.
Venezuela and the lack of bilateral cooperation on antidrug
and counterterrorism efforts. In the wake of the May 2018
Humanitarian Assistance. The United States is providing
elections, the Trump Administration has increased
assistance (funded mostly through global humanitarian
sanctions on the Maduro regime and assistance for
accounts) and helping to coordinate and support the
neighboring countries sheltering Venezuelan migrants.
regional response to the Venezuelan migration crisis.
Including additional support announced on February 25,
The United States has coordinated its efforts with Interim
2019, the United States has committed to providing more
President Guaidó and encouraged other countries to
than $195 million since FY2017 for Venezuelans who have
recognize his government. President Trump recognized
fled to other countries and for the communities hosting
Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela on January 23
Venezuelan refugees and migrants.
and has encouraged other governments to do the same. The
Administration has since blocked the Maduro regime’s
Congressional Action. The 116th Congress is following
access to revenue from Venezuela’s state oil company and
developments in Venezuela and overseeing U.S. policy
imposed targeted sanctions (visa bans and financial
responses. Many Members of Congress have pledged to
sanctions) on Maduro officials and their families. President
support the Guaidó government, but not authorized the use
Trump and Vice President Mike Pence have repeatedly
of U.S. military force. Congress provided $17.5 million for
asserted that “all options are on the table” to address the
democracy and rule of law programs in Venezuela in the
Venezuela situation, including using U.S. military force.
FY2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-6); the
joint explanatory statement (H.Rept. 116-9) requires a
On January 24, 2019, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
strategy on how U.S. agencies are supporting countries
announced that the United States would provide $20 million
sheltering Venezuelans. The Administration’s FY2020
in humanitarian assistance to the people of Venezuela at
budget request asks for $9 million in democracy aid and the
Guaidó’s request. The United States pre-positioned 400
authority to transfer up to $500 million to support a
tons of emergency supplies (food, hygiene and medical
democratic transition or to respond to a crisis in Venezuela.
kits) on Venezuela’s borders with Colombia and Brazil.
On March 25, 2019, the House passed H.R. 854 (Mucarsel-
As the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated, the State
Powell) to require a U.S. strategy to provide humanitarian
Department announced that it had withdrawn its remaining
assistance to Venezuelans and authorize $150 million in
diplomatic personnel on March 11 and urged all Americans
U.S. humanitarian assistance for Venezuelans in FY2020
to leave the country the following day.
and FY2021; H.R. 920 (Shalala), to restrict arms transfers
to the Maduro regime; and H.R. 1102 (Wasserman-Schultz)
Targeted Sanctions. In 2015, President Obama issued
to require the State Department to assess the threat posed by
Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, authorizing targeted
Russian-Venezuelan security cooperation.
sanctions against individuals who inhibit democratic
processes or institutions, commit violence or human rights
Other legislative initiatives on Venezuela include H.R. 549
abuses, or engage in corruption. The Trump Administration
(Soto), to make certain Venezuelans in the United States
has imposed sanctions on 73 Venezuelan officials pursuant
eligible for Temporary Protected Status. A similar bill, S.
to E.O. 13692 (in addition to 7 officials sanctioned by
636 (Menendez), has been introduced in the Senate. Other
President Obama). These officials include Maduro and his
initiatives include H.R. 1004 (Cicilline), to prohibit the use
wife; Vice President Delcy Rodriguez; PSUV First Vice
of U.S. military forces in combat operations in Venezuela.
President Diosdado Cabello; Supreme Court members; the
In the Senate, a joint resolution, S.J.Res. 11 (Merkley), to
leaders of Venezuela’s army, national guard, and national
prohibit the unauthorized use of U.S. Armed Forces in
police; four state governors; and other security officials.
Venezuela has been introduced. See CRS In Focus
Financial sanctions also have been imposed on some 22
IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; CRS In
individuals and 27 entities for drug trafficking.
Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis;
CRS Insight IN11037, Venezuela Oil Sector Sanctions:
Broader Sanctions (Including Oil Sanctions). The
Market and Trade Impacts.
Administration has issued executive orders restricting the
ability of the government and of Venezuela’s state oil
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to access
Affairs
the U.S. financial system (E.O. 13808), barring U.S.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
IF10230
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 34 · UPDATED