Updated March 16, 2020
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian
Venezuelans had left the country, most of whom were in
rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of
Latin America and the Caribbean. Migrant flows continue,
Venezuela (PSUV). On January 10, 2019, Maduro began a
but migrants may face additional obstacles as neighboring
second term that most Venezuelans and much of the
countries close their borders in an attempt to prevent the
international community consider illegitimate. The 116th
spread of coronavirus.
Congress has enacted legislation affecting U.S. policy on
Venezuela, appropriated foreign assistance to support the
Interim Government vs. Maduro Regime
people of Venezuela and to address the regional migration
On January 5, 2019, the National Assembly elected Guaidó,
crisis, and conducted numerous oversight hearings on U.S.
a 35-year-old industrial engineer from the Popular Will
policy toward Venezuela.
party, as its president. In mid-January, Guaidó announced
he was willing to serve as interim president until new
Since January 2019, Juan Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s
presidential elections were held. Buoyed by a massive
democratically elected, opposition-controlled National
turnout for anti-Maduro protests, Guaidó took the oath of
Assembly, has sought to form a transition government to
office on January 23, 2019.
serve until internationally observed elections can be held.
The United States and 57 other countries recognize Guaidó
A year later, Guaidó retains broad diplomatic support, but
as interim president. Guaidó has been unable to wrest
he lacks political power. In 2019, Guaidó’s supporters
Maduro from power and has faced increased danger since
organized two high-profile but ultimately unsuccessful
returning home from an early 2020 diplomatic tour, which
efforts to get security forces to abandon Maduro—in
included a meeting with President Trump. Some observers
February, Guaidó supporters sought to bring emergency aid
believe that National Assembly elections due this year
into the country across borders that Maduro had closed, and
might start an electoral path out of the current stalemate.
on April 30, Guaidó called for a civil-military uprising.
Background on the Political and Economic Crisis
After those efforts failed, observers hoped that mediated
Maduro was narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of
negotiations between Guaidó and Maduro could lead to an
populist President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and reelected
electoral solution to the crisis. When those talks stalled,
in May 2018 in an election characterized by widespread
Maduro increased persecution of Guaidó’s supporters while
fraud. Maduro has used the Venezuelan courts, security
negotiating with a group of legislators from smaller parties,
forces, and electoral council to quash dissent. As of March
one of whom he tried to install as head of the National
9, 2020, the Maduro government held some 316 political
Assembly. Maduro may try to move up legislative elections
prisoners, according to Foro Penal, a human rights
due by December 2020 to wrest control of that body, but
organization. At the same time, Maduro has rewarded
such a move could lead to strong international pushback.
allies, including the military, with income from illegal gold
mining, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.
Human rights abuses have increased as security forces and
civilian militias have violently quashed protests and
By most accounts, Maduro’s government has mismanaged
detained and abused those suspected of dissent. A July 2019
the economy and engaged in massive corruption,
report by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
exacerbating the effects of a decline in global oil prices and
Human Rights (OHCHR) estimated that security forces
collapsing oil production on the country’s economy.
committed some 6,800 extrajudicial killings from January
According to International Monetary Fund estimates,
2018 through May 2019. OHCHR detailed how intelligence
Venezuela’s economy contracted by 35% in 2019 and
agencies have arrested and tortured those perceived as
inflation reached some 200,000%. Hyperinflation is
threats to Maduro, including military officers and
forecast to continue in 2020, but the rate of economic
opposition politicians. Some fear Guaidó could face arrest.
decline may ease as oil production stabilizes (albeit at a low
level) and remittances increase.
International Response
The international community remains divided over how to
Shortages in food and medicine, declines in purchasing
respond to the crisis in Venezuela. The United States,
power, and a collapse of social services have created a
Canada, most of the European Union (EU), and 16 Western
humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, U.N. officials estimated
Hemisphere countries are among the 57 countries that
that some 90% of Venezuelans were living in poverty and a
recognize Guaidó as interim president. The United States,
quarter of the population needed humanitarian assistance.
EU, Canada, and 11 Western Hemisphere countries that are
Health indicators, particularly infant and maternal mortality
states parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
rates, have worsened. Previously eradicated diseases such
Assistance (Rio Treaty) have imposed targeted sanctions
as diphtheria and measles have returned and spread. In
and travel bans on Maduro officials. The EU and Western
February 2020, U.N. agencies estimated that 4.8 million
Hemisphere countries oppose military intervention to oust
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
Maduro. An International Contact Group, backed by the EU
access to U.S. financial markets (E.O. 13808);
and some Latin American countries, endorsed negotiations
prohibiting transactions using cryptocurrency (E.O.
led by Norway, but those efforts have not yet succeeded.
13827); or purchasing Venezuelan debt (E.O. 13835);
Most of these actors back the convening of legislative and
presidential elections in Venezuela this year.
Sectoral sanctions blocking assets and prohibiting
unlicensed transactions with PdVSA, Venezuela’s
Russia, Cuba (which has provided military and intelligence
central bank, and the state gold mining company, among
support), Turkey, Iran, and a few other countries support
other entities (E.O. 13850); and
Maduro. Russia and China have provided aid to Maduro
and blocked efforts at the U.N. Security Council to
Sanctions on the Maduro government blocking assets
recognize the Guaidó government. Russia has supported
in the United States and prohibiting transactions with
Venezuela’s struggling oil industry, helped Venezuela skirt
that government unless authorized as part of efforts to
U.S. oil sanctions, and sent military personnel and
aid the Venezuelan people (E.O. 13884).
equipment, a move that prompted U.S. condemnation.
The Administration has imposed sanctions on Cuba for its
Recent U.S. Policy
support of Maduro. Since February 2020, the Treasury
Since recognizing the Guaidó government in January 2019,
Department has imposed sanctions on two subsidiaries of
the United States has coordinated its efforts with Interim
Russia’s Rosneft for shipping oil for PdVSA. (CRS In
President Guaidó. U.S. strategy has emphasized diplomatic
Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.)
efforts to bolster support for Guaidó; sanctions and visa
revocations to increase pressure on Maduro, along with
U.S. Assistance. The United States is providing assistance
economic sanctions on the Maduro government; and
and helping to coordinate and support the regional response
humanitarian and other assistance. In early 2019, President
to the Venezuelan migration crisis. Since FY2017, the
Trump discussed the possibility of using U.S. military force
Administration has provided $472 million in humanitarian
to address the crisis in Venezuela, a policy option no longer
and development assistance to support countries sheltering
publicly discussed. U.S. officials remain concerned about
Venezuelans, including $56 million for humanitarian relief
the destabilizing impact on regional security of illegally
activities in Venezuela. U.S. democracy assistance to civil
armed groups that are active in Venezuela.
society totaled $17.5 million in FY2019. In October 2019,
the U.S. government signed an agreement with Guaidó
representatives to provide more than $125 million in new
“We call on all nations to join us in supporting
democracy, development, and health programs, including
Interim President Guaidó and the National Assembly
support for the interim government.
as they work peacefully to restore democracy.”
- Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, January 2020
Congressional Action. Congress has supported the
Administration’s efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela
As Maduro remains in power despite strong U.S. pressure,
and provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans,
the Administration recently has called for a political
although some Members have expressed concerns about the
solution that would lead to the convening of free and fair
humanitarian effects of sanctions and about potential
legislative and presidential elections in 2020. The U.S.
unauthorized use of the U.S. military in Venezuela.
position is that elections be overseen by a “negotiated
transitional government”; the Maduro government is
In December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which
unlikely to accept that requirement.
provided $30 million for democracy and human rights
programs in Venezuela. The measure also incorporated
Diplomacy. The United States has worked to encourage
provisions from S. 1025, the VERDAD Act, authorizing
countries to recognize the Guaidó government, sanction
$400 million in FY2020 humanitarian aid to Venezuela,
Maduro officials, and provide shelter (or humanitarian aid)
codifying several types of sanctions on the Maduro
to Venezuelans who have fled the country. This work has
government, and authorizing $17.5 million to support
occurred at the Organization of American States, with the
elections in Venezuela. P.L. 116-94 included language from
Lima Group of nations that recognize Guaidó, and through
House-approved bills including H.R. 920, restricting the
the Rio Treaty process. (CRS Insight IN11116, The Inter-
export of defense articles to Venezuela, and H.R. 1477,
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Crisis in
requiring a strategy to counter Russian influence in
Venezuela.) At the same time, U.S. officials continue to
Venezuela. Congress has begun consideration of the
denounce Cuban and Russian support of Maduro.
Administration’s $205 million FY2021 foreign assistance
budget request for Venezuela.
Sanctions. Individual, financial, and sectoral sanctions are
key parts of U.S policy toward Venezuela. They include
In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 549, designating
Venezuela as a beneficiary country for temporary protected
Individual sanctions for terrorism; drug trafficking;
status. On July 30, 2019, a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549
and those who have committed antidemocratic actions,
by unanimous consent failed. (See also CRS Report
human rights violations, or corruption (see Executive
R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations.)
Order (E.O.) 13692; P.L. 113-278; P.L. 114-194);
Financial sanctions restricting Maduro government and Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA),
Affairs
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Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy
IF10230
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10230 · VERSION 43 · UPDATED